Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for two convicts

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Dr. Anshuman sets aside trial court judgement, reverses previous order by Justice Rakesh Kumar which relied on "inadmissible evidence"

Ajay Kumar Thakur's cogent arguments makes the High Court reverse orders by Justice Rakesh Kumar in 2018, Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh in 2021 and Justice Arvind Srivastava in 2024, and to set aside untenable and indefensible judgement of conviction of 2018 by the judge from the Araria Trial Court. 

In Vijay Kumar Yadav @ Vivek Kumar @ Golu vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 15-page long judgement dated December 17, 2025, wherein,  it concluded:" 31. In the instant case, the I.O. did not collect any certificate from IDBI Bank to prove the SMS sent to the mobile phone of the deceased from service provider. Certification of CCTV footage electronically generated money receipt from ATM swipe machine was also not obtained from the concerned authority by the I.O. Prosecution did not take any attempt to examine the shop owner of Maa Lakhi Jewelers. The appellant was not identified by any independent witness except the I.O. 32. For the reasons stated above, we have no other alternative but to hold that the trial court illegally without considering the basic requirement of the Evidence Act and the manner in which the charge can be proved held the accused guilty for committing offence and convicted and sentenced him accordingly. For such gross mistake, the accused unnecessarily remained in custody for more than 7 years. As a result, the instant appeal is allowed. 33. The judgment of conviction dated 11.04.2018 and order of sentence dated 17.04.2018 is hereby set aside. Let the appellant be released forthwith in connection with Sessions Trial No. 203 of 2017 arising out of Araria P.S. Case No. 856 of 2017, if not required in other case." 

The appellant was in custody approximately for more than 7 years while suffering sentence. The criminal appeal was filed on May 29, 2018 and registered on June 4, 2018. 

Justice Chaudhari who authored he judgement observed: "3. We are not constrained to note that this case is a classic example of conviction upon inadmissible evidence by the learned trial Judge. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, the appellant preferred a series of applications for suspension of sentence and bail, but his prayer was constantly rejected by the High Court, which also relied on inadmissible evidence." 

Notably, although Y.C. Verma, senior advocate had submitted before the Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Arvind Srivastava on August 9, 2018 that the case was completely based on circumstantial evidence without any proof of completion of chain and, as such, it was not a case for conviction, however trial Judge had incorrectly passed Judgement of conviction and sentence. Accordingly, he had submitted that it was a fit case for passing order for suspension of sentence and granting bail to the appellant during pendency of the appeal. In his 3-page long order dated August 9, 2018, Justice Kumar had concluded:"Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have also cursorily examined the evidence on record and after going through the same, it is evident that during investigation, the appellant was apprehended and his confessional statement was recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The confession led to recovery of certain facts, which were only within the knowledge of the appellant. His confession also led to recovery of ATM Card of the deceased and, thereafter, it was noticed that ATM Card was subsequently used and amount was transferred. The learned trial Judge considered that it was completion of chain of circumstantial evidence and, thereafter, he passed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The appellant was solely tried and held guilty. In view of the facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to pass favourable order. Accordingly, the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail stands dismissed." 

Notably, the Division Bench of Justices Ashwani Kumar Singh and Arvind Srivastava passed a 2-page long order dated February 2, 2021 reiterating the order by Justice Kumar. Justice Singh who authored the order, had concluded:"By way of the instant interlocutory application preferred under section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant, who has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with section 34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, has renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during pendency of the appeal. A similar prayer made on his behalf was earlier rejected by this Court vide order dated 09.08.2018. For the reasons assigned in the order dated 09.08.2018, since there is no changed circumstance, we are not inclined to take a different view of the matter. Accordingly, his prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail is rejected.Interlocutory application stands rejected." 

The Division Bench of Justices Arvind Srivastava and Sunil Dutta Mishra passed a 2-page long order dated January 3, 2024 reiterated Justice Kumar's order when the appellant prayed for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of appeal. The counsel for the appellant had submitted that the prayer for bail of the appellant was earlier twice rejected by this Court. Now the fresh ground for bail of the appellant was that he was languishing in custody since December 28, 2016, as such he remained in custody for more than seven years and there was no likelihood of the appeal to be taken up for hearing in near future. The Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State opposed the prayer of the appellant by contending that the prayer for bail of the appellant was earlier twice rejected by this Court on merit. He also submitted that although the appellant remained in custody for more than seven years but it  came in evidence that the confession of the appellant led to recovery of certain facts which were only within the knowledge of him. His confession also led to recovery of ATM Card of the deceased and thereafter, it was noticed that ATM Card was subsequently used and amount was also transferred. Justice Srivastava who authored the order, had concluded:"As such, the prayer for bail of the appellant is not fit to be reconsidered. 5. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the materials available on record, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the appellant. His prayer for bail is again rejected."

Justice Chaudhary had reserved the judgement on December 9, 2025. The compelling submission by Ajay Kumar Thakur, counsel for the petitioner on December 9 when he concluded the argument and made the Court change it's mind and reverse orders by Justice Rakesh Kumar in 2018, Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh in 2021 and Justice Arvind Srivastava in 2024.

It is evident that it took the High Court over seven years to appreciate the argument of the  counsel of the petitioner. 

The judgement was delivered upon hearing an appeal under Section 374 (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the convict assailing the judgment of conviction dated April 11, 2018 and the order of sentence dated April 17, 2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge IIIrd Court, Araria in a Sessions Trial of 2017. The case arose out of Araria P.S. case of 2017 whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 1,00,000/. He was also convicted for committing offence under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced for rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- only. Substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment was directed to run concurrently.

One Shambhu Dharkar, a village Chowkidar of Azam Nagar, Kushimar village under the police station and district Araria received an information on December 23, 2016 at about 08:30 AM that dead body of one unknown person was kept on the southern side of village Diwari Fatak Bridge in a bamboo groove of one Vishundev Yadav. In order to work out the said information, the chowkidar went to the said spot. He found that police party also reached the spot. He found one unknown dead body with blackish ligature mark around the neck and bleeding from the left ear. Seeing the dead body, the chowkidar approximately ascertained his age around 35 years. He was wearing a black jacket, pink colored Shirt, a blue colored warm vest, red colored T-shirt, white colored vest and blue colored jeans full pant. There was a black thread on his neck with a locket inscribed thereon 786 and 92. He also found a blank cartridge of 315 bore in one of his pocket. Local people assembled there. Nobody could identify him. It seemed to the Chowkidar that the deceased was murdered at some other place and his dead body was tied with a Simul tree by a rope. A belt was tied around his neck.

One Ashok Kumar Singh, Sub-inspector of police recorded the statement of the said Shambhu Dharkar and treated the same as FIR. On the basis of the said statement, duly signed by Shambhu Dharkar, the SHO of Araria police station registered FIR dated December 23, 2016 under Section 302/301 IPC against unknown miscreants and entrusted Sub-Inspector King Kundan to investigate into the case. The I.O., on completion of the investigation, submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 302/34, 201/34, and 120(B) of the IPC against Vijay Kumar Yadav. After filing of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The Principal Sessions Judge transferred the case record to the Court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Araria for trial and disposal. The trial judge framed charge against the appellant under Section 302/34 and 201/34 as well as 120 (B) of the IPC on 13 June 2017. As the appellant pleaded not guilty, trial of the case commenced. In order to bring home the charge against the accused/appellant, prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses. None of the witnesses could identify the accused. They also did not know how the deceased was murdered. The identity of the deceased was first ascertained on December 24, 2016 when a photograph of the deceased was published by the investigating authority in Urdu Daily. Seeing the photograph, PW-8 Md. Inteqab Alam identified the photograph of the deceased as his brother'S. In his affidavit, he stated that his brother Niyaz Ahmed was missing since December 22, 2016.  After he saw the photograph in Urdu Daily on December 24, 2016, he identified the deceased to be his brother Niyaz Ahmed and went to P.S. Araria. From the P.S., he came to know that the dead body was kept in the post-mortem room. He went there and identified the dead body as of his brother's. Thereafter, he filed an application and received the dead body of his brother. 

The appellant was made an accused in Araria P.S. Case of 2016 by the I.O. on the basis of the evidence which he collected during the investigation of the case. 

Notably, Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act states that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. It is a rule of thumb that a confession made to a police officer, of whatever rank and at whatever time, is inadmissible in evidence under the purview of Section 25. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act states: "No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved against such person."

The confession is required to be recorded by a Magistrate. In the instant appeal the confession of an accused while in custody can only be recorded by a Magistrate in terms of Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 164 of the CrPC. Any statement recorded by an I.O. during investigation of the case of any witness or an accused is a statement under Section 161 of the CrPC and Section 162(1) clearly states that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XII of the CrPC shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, except to contradict such witness in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the evidence of the appellant admitting the guilt before the I.O. is not admissible in evidence and the said document could not be marked as exhibit by the trial court. The trial court committed illegality in relying on such statement allegedly made by the appellant. 

Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. Section 27 of the said Act states that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from an accused of any offence while he is in custody, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. In other words, the language of Section 27 of the Evidence Act indicates that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person who is in the custody of the police in connection with an offence, it must relate distinctly to the facts so discovered. The phrase 'facts thereby discovered is preceded with words "that so much of such information, whether it amounts to confession or not as relates distinctly". The word 'distinctly' as used in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is made to exclude certain language and to limit and confine the information which may be proved within definite limits and not necessarily to include everything which may relate to that information. The word “distinctly” indicates directly, indubitably, strictly and unmistakably, apparently, used in Section 27 to limit and define the scope of probable information. Therefore, only that much information as is clearly connected with the fact discovered can be treated as relevant under the phrase 'facts discovered'. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "28. In the instant case, the trial court in violation of Section 25 and Section 26 wrongly brought entire statement of the accused in evidence marking the same as Exhibit-9. 29. Had it been the fact that the accused made such a statement before the I.O. while he was in custody, so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, i.e., the discovery of the black purse, ATM card, bill of Maa Lakhi Jewelers, and original receipt generated from the ATM machine, etc., would have been admissible in evidence. It is needless to say that the discovery of a fact must be distinctly connected with the statement of the accused; when the discovery of a fact is distinctly connected in consequence of information, that part of the statement made by the accused is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act." He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Govind vs. State of Haryana, reported 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2456 

He added: "There is no evidence as to whether the appellant accompanied the police party and the independent witness during discovery of ATM Card of the deceased and other materials. The witnesses to whom prosecution claimed to be the seizure witnesses did not support the prosecution case. From their evidence, it is clear that they were not present at the time of seizure of ATM Card of the deceased and other materials. They put their signature on the seizure list at Maranga P.S. on being instructed by a police officer. Therefore, seizure of the materials was also not proved. 30. Last but not the least, Call Details Report, CAIF, receipt generated from ATM Swipe Machine are electronic records which could have been proved only under Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act." 

The verdict by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chaudhuri, and Dr. Anshuman has rectified the glaring blunder committed by previous orders of the High Court.  

Death Reference case under POCSO Act decided in 2022 by Patna High Court's Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ashwani Kumar Singh reaches Supreme Court

F.I.R was registered in 2018 with Phulwarisharif Mahila Station under sections 376, 376(b), 120(B), 504, 506, 354(D) IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of POCSO Act 

In ZZZ vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. etc. (2025), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard a Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) which arose out of the impugned final judgment and order dated October 19, 2022 in Death Reference No. 3/2021, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 218/2021 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 285/2021 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ashwani Kumar Singh. The two other respondents in the Supreme Court are: Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania and Abhishek Kumar. The Court had condoned the delay and issued notice by its order dated July 14, 2025. It came up before Supreme Court's Registrar Ms. Sujata Singh on September 15, 2025. 

The High Court's 48-page long judgement dated October 19, 2022 in The State of Bihar vs. Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania (2022) was authored by Justice Prasad. It was heard and decided along with Abhishek Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2022).

Justice Prasad had concluded: "73. To this Court, it appears that this case cannot be equated with the cases where there is kidnapping, rape and murder of victim. It has been submitted that in the case of Pappu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2022(2) BLJ 231(SC) which was case of rape and murder of a child sentence of death was commuted to life imprisonment. 74. Considering the aforesaid submissions and materials on the record, this Court while sustaining the conviction of the appellant-Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania converts it from 376 (DB) IPC to Section 376 IPC. Accordingly his sentence is modified and he is awarded rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) for the offence under Section 376 IPC. His conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is also upheld, however, in view of Section 42 of the POCSO Act no separate sentence is awarded for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He is further sentenced under Section 506 IPC for two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only). All the sentences shall run concurrently. 75. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 are, thus, allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.76. In consequence thereof Death Reference No. 3 of 2021 made by the learned trial court under Section 366 Cr.P.C. is rejected."

The appellants in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Patna in Special POCSO Case No. 186 of 2018 (arising out of Mahila P.S. Case No. 136 of 2018 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376 (b), 504, 506, 354(D), 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 6, 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The trial court had convicted them for the offences under Sections 376(DB) IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 120(B) IPC. As far as appellant Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 was concerned, he was also convicted under Sections 506 IPC. The appellant Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania was awarded capital punishment / death penalty for the offence under Section 376(DB) under Section 6 of POCSO Act and a fine of Rs. 01 lakh. He was sentenced rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 05 thousand under Section 506 IPC. After awarding the death penalty the trial court made a reference under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the High Court for confirmation of the death penalty. The reference has been registered as Death Reference Case No. 03 of 2021 and the same is under consideration together with the two appeals. The appellant Abhishek Kumar in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 was awarded a term of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50 thousand for the offence under Section 376(DB) read with Section 120(B) of the IPC. 

A first information report was registered on September 19, .2018 with Phulwarisharif Mahila Station giving rise to P.S. Case No. 136 of 2018 under sections 376, 376(b), 120(B), 504, 506, 354(D) IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of POCSO Act. The informant was mother of the victim girl. It was alleged in the written complaint that the victim ‘X’ aged about 11 years was a student of New Central Public School, Phulwarisharif. She was studying in Class V for about one year. The School Principal Arvind Kumar (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021) sexually exploited the victim girl and by making her video, under threat that the same will be made viral, he was blackmailing her. It was alleged that in this act one teacher of the school namely, Abhishek Kumar aged about 26 years (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021) was also helped the principal. The informant alleged that there was a bed room of the principal adjacent to the class room and in the name of checking of writing, the victim girl was being taken to the said room where she was exploited. The victim girl, disclosed that her principal called her on the pretext of checking of writing through Abhishek and then he indulged in wrong act. This led to stoppage of menstruation of the victim. She had a bout of vomiting which led to a suspicion in the mind of of her mother. She got her pregnancy tested wherein the pregnancy was confirmed. The alleged act were done under threat of a knife.