Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in a POCSO case

In Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Patna High Court's Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra dated March 11, 2026. The order concluded:"6. It is pertinent to note at this juncture itself and for the limited purpose of considering the prayer for bail, that the statements of the recused girls which have been recorded under Section 183 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and particularly two victims associated with the orchestra group where petitioner was working would disclose that there were no recent evidence of sexual
assault and three co-accused Gena Sah, Rajat Sardar @Rajjat Kumar @ Rajat Kumar and Subhash Kumar have since then granted regular bail by the jurisdictional High Court. Hence, on the ground of parity, petitioner is also entitled for grant of bail. 7. The impugned order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the High Court is set aside and petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional court deems fit to impose, including the condition of directing the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court on all dates of hearing."

The petitioner was arraigned as an accused No. 11 in the FIR No. 8 of 2025, registered at Police Station Women Police Station, District Betiah, for the offence punishable under Section 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 95, 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 6, 8 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 75 and 79 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956 and Section 16, 17, and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, was seeking regular bail. The record disclosed that investigation had been concluded and charge-sheet was filed and two witnesses were already examined. It was the case of the prosecution that minor girls were found in various orchestra groups who had been trafficked and they were sexually exploitated. Even according to the FIR, the petitioner was neither the owner or Manager of the orchestra group and he was only a employee (Announcer) in Chhoti New Musical Orchestra Dhamaka Group.

Earlier, in Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated March 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"...the prayer for bail of the petitioner is again rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from today. If the trial is not concluded within the period of six months, as stated above, the petitioner will be at liberty to renew his prayer before the court below." The name of respondent no. 2 has been kept anonymous. 

The petitioner sought bail in connection with Bettiah Mahila P.S. case of 2025 instituted for the offences under Sections 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 98 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 6, 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act and Sections 75 and 79 of the J.J. Act and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. This was the second attempt of the petitioner for bail. The petitioner had renewed his prayer for grant of regular bail which was earlier rejected on merit by Justice Mishra of the High Court vide 3-page long order dated August 13, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 31511 of 2025, taking into account the nature of accusation and the gravity of the offence and involvement of the petitioner in the offence.  

The order dated August 13, 2025 recorded that the informant filed a complaint before the ADJ, Champaran, based on an tip-off from National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) constituted under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which led to raids at seven locations by the police team. Sixteen girls were rescued. The victims gave statements under Section 180 BNSS alleging repeated sexual assaults, exploitation for dance, and being forced into sexual activities by various accused associated with different orchestra groups.

APP for the State and counsel for the informant had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioners. They submitted that on perusal of record it appeared that the several victims were minor girl. It was specifically submitted that petitioner, namely, Dhamu Sah used to inappropriately touch the body of victim, during dance on the stage, whereas petitioner, namely, Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey, had established illicit relation with one of the victims.

In compliance of the order dated January 17, 2026, a report dated February 12, 2026 with regard to the present stage of trial has been received. From perusal of the report, it appeared that two (2) out of nineteen (19) charge sheet witnesses had been examined in the case. It was also reported that trial was likely to be concluded within a period of nine months. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that the petitioner was languishing in judicial custody since February 23, 2025 without any rhymes or reason, having no criminal antecedent. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, hence, petitioner may be enlarged on bail. The APP for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail. The APP had further relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3539 (X. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.), wherein, in paragraph No.14, Supreme Court had observed as under: “14. Ordinarily inserious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court be it the Trial Court or the High Court should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the accused.”  

Justice Mishra observed: "7. There is no new ground to consider the bail petition of the petitioner. From the aforesaid report, it appears that the trial is going on." Supreme Court has reversed the order by the High Court. 

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for two convicts

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Patna High Court's Division Bench modifies judgement of Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Land Acquisition Fair Compensation case

We must ask: "why statements are acceptable in 'development' discourse that would be considered absurd in academic settings, but also why many acceptable statements from the realm of academic discourse - or even from that of common observation - fail to find their way into the discursive regime of 'development'"

-James Ferguson (1990). The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press. p. 67.

It seems all is fair in war, government, for "public purpose", and development. Warmongering, governmentality, veil of public purpose,  governmentality and  developmentality manifest themselves in myriad deceptive ways.

The judgement of Patna High Court's division bench by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy reminds one of insights from The Anti-Politics Machine, the book by James Ferguson. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. He observed: "the direction of the learned Single Judge that it should be done first and then compensation be paid, would not be practical in the sense that updating the Circle Rates require time and in the present circumstance, time would be the essence especially if seen in the context of the land owners who have been divested of their land who would require money urgently for their resettlement" in Ranjeet Kumar and others vs. The State of Bihar & others (2025). Besides the State of Bihar, there were 16 respondents. In a batch of petitions, the 71-page long judgement of the division bench concluded:"We, therefore, modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge and direct that the MVR/Circle rates of 2014 must be updated, which would be an independent exercise which shall be carried out by the State after observing the due process in that regard but the payment of compensation to the land owners would not be contingent on such updation as it would take long time. Thus the appeals on behalf of the land owners are dismissed whereas the appeals preferred by the State and the PMRC are allowed to the extent indicated above." PMRC refers to Patna Metro Rail Corporation. 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge had passed his 125-page long judgement and order on December 21, 2023 after hearing the petitioners who were land as well as the house owners, whose properties were acquired for the construction of Patna Metro Rail Depot, having a total area of 75.96 acres of land, in two mauza, i.e. Pahari and Ranipur. They had approached the High Court for quashing of the land acquisition notice, issued under Section 11 (1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with regard to 15.95 acres of land, situated in mauza Pahari and 23.35 acres of land, situated in mauza Ranipur, having a total area of 75.96 acre. the petitioners had prayed for setting aside the Social Impact Assessment Report prepared by the Development Management Institute, Patna. They had also prayed for quashing of the formation of Technical Expert Committee, constituted under Section 7 of the 2013 Act as well as quashing of the report of the Technical Expert Committee, dated June 30, 2021. They sought quashing of the order dated February 2, 2022 passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna, by which objections filed by the petitioners were rejected, for quashing the paper publication, under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. They also sought quashing of the award, dated August 4, 2023, prepared in L. A. Case No. 29/2021-2022, under Sections 23 and 30 of the 2013 Act. 

Earlier two depots were to be constructed in mauza Aitwarpur and mauza Ramchak Bairiya, but subsequently it was decided to construct only one depot, at mauza Pahari and Ranipur. The Cabinet of the State of Bihar approved the Patna Metro Rail Project on October 9, 2018. Rail India Technical and Economic Service (RITES) had given the proposal for two depots. On September 3, 2019, the work of construction of Metro Rail and Depot in Patna was given by Patna Metro Rail Corporation Limited (PMRCL) to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and the same was approved by State of Bihar. The agreement between PMRCL and DMRC was entered on September 25, 2019. The DMRC made changes in the line alignment of the Patna Metro on February 8, 2020 and also changed the location of metro depot from two locations to one locations, i.e. mauza Pahari and Ranipur, which are under acquisition. The lands have been acquired under the general provisions of the 2013 Act. The Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, issued an Office Order on March  17, 2020, in which reasons for relocation of the Metro depot from two depots to one depot, has been mentioned that there shall be large number of demolition of houses at previous location, drainage system, seamless integration of I.S.B.T. and the Metro depot, and further 11.6 Hectares for the purpose of Property Development Area. The revised detailed project report has been approved by the State Government and the Union Government.

Justice Sinha had framed the following questions for considerations by the Court:

(a) Whether the provisions of the 2013 Act have been followed for acquiring the land, in question?

(b) Scope of rehabilitation and resettlement, if any

(c)Whether the property development area and the depot area are integral part of the PMRP?

(d) Whether the PMRP, including the property development area, is a project of larger public interest?

Justice Sinha had also  considered the question as to how to ascertain the just and fair compensation, which the petitioners and others are entitled. He observed: "The price of the land in Patna has skyrocketed and increased manifold, but the M.V.R./circle rate of the area has not been revised for many years. The Court has been informed that the compensation has been fixed on the M.V.R./circle rate prevalent in the year 2014. The M.V.R./circle rate is provided for the purpose of payment of stamp duty, but that cannot be made a basis to determine the actual price of the market value of the property. The purchasers, while purchasing the land, in the sale deed, quote the consideration amount on the basis of the M.V.R./circle rate and not the actual price paid for the purchase of the land.

The judgement of Justice Sinha reads:"let the M.V.R./circle rate, which has not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised by taking into consideration the relevant factors, including the opinion of the Expert. The concerned respondents are further directed to re-fix the compensation amount, payable to the petitioners, based upon the revised M.V.R./circle rate. Justice Sinha recorded that recommendations of the Expert Committee, have not been considered by the State Government, including the recommendation of the Expert Committee on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement, accordingly, I direct the State Government and the Collector, Patna, to consider the recommendation of the Expert Committee, and to take decision on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement of the land/house losers, as per Section 31 of the 2013 Act." He concluded that these "exercises must be completed by the respondents within the maximum period of six months from today. "

The Single Judge on the issue of breach of Rule -11 (3) of Rules of 2014 mandating that public hearing must be announced three weeks in advance through daily newspaper and clear 21 days time is required to be given to the landholders, had held that from the materials put forth by the parties, it transpired that in the public hearing during the course of preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report by the Development Management Institute, Patna, 111 persons had participated but according to the State, 250 people as well as representatives of Ward No. 56 had participated and that there was substantial compliance of the provisions except some procedural lapses here and there.

In the opinion of the Single Judge, the Social Assessment Impact Report clearly stated that the positive impact had a higher quotient than negative impact.

With respect to the opposition regarding non-consideration of alternative sites suggested by the land owners, the Single Judge was of the view that the same was considered but not found to be suitable as the site suggested for construction of depot would have incurred extra cost ranging between 500-700 crores and that no interference was required since the construction work has started at the selected site and the progress was to the extent of 44%.

Majority of the land owners, it was found, had already received compensation to the tune of Rs. 130 crores. The suitability of land, the learned Single Judge agreed, fell in the domain of the acquiring agency as also the agency executing the project and they are the best judge to decide the suitability and feasibility of the project including the site selected. Relying on Ramji Veerji Patel case, it was held that it was not open to the Court to examine the aspect of suitability and the Court substituting its opinion with that of the acquiring and executing agency.

With respect to the objection regarding the formation of the Expert Committee for appraisal of Social Assessment Impact Report as mandated under Section 7(2) (b) of 2013 Act, the revelation by the Advocate General that the proposal of the Expert Committee was not considered by the State Government as it was not found to be viable, was taken into account.

The argument with respect to the property development area component of the project not being relatable to public purpose, it was held that in view of the reason that Metro Rail Policy, 2017 contemplated provisions for enhancement of revenue of the Metro rail projects and included commercial/property development at stations and on other urban land which could be used as key instruments for maximizing revenue in Metro rail/railway systems in the cities, no fault could be found. The exemplars were drawn from Hongkong and Tokyo. It was found from the records that while conceiving of the project, the State had taken into all the above factors which would increase the non-fair box revenue which was in sync with the Metro Rail Policy, 2017 and hence the construction and development of property development area was held to be part of the public purpose and it was complementary to each other and therefore integral to the scheme of PMRP. 

It was thus concluded, in view of the judgment in Godrej & Boyce vs The State Of Maharashtra case, that even if there are some irregularities in the procedure followed by the acquiring authority for infrastructural project, the Courts, in exercise of their extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to interfere, especially when the project is of public importance. In matters of land acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice and public interest intermingle.

The Single Judge, therefore, refused to interfere with the process of acquisition.

However, while considering the issue of just and fair compensation to which the land owners would be entitled, a direction was issued that the MVR/Circle Rates which had not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised after taking into consideration the relevant factors including the opinion of the experts and then re-fix the compensation amount payable to the land owners based upon the revised MVR/Circle Rate.

While assailing the judgment of the Single Judge, Amit Sibbal, the Senior Advocate appearing virtually argued that even though right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right after the 44th amendment of the Constitution, it continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300A and therefore any expropriatory law which deprives a person of his property nust be in line with the overarching principles of law and must be just fair and reasonable. The exercise of power of eminent domain ought to be construed narrowly in favour of a person’s right to his property. It was argued that the land owners would not do good by challenging the public purpose behind the acquisition proceedings. The challenge thus is primarily to the manner in which the proceedings were concluded with complete disregard to the statutory safeguards. Whether the land is to be acquired under the Act, under the new law cannot be a unilateral decision. The process has to be humane, informed and transparent with least disturbance to the owners of the land and the affected families and the deprived persons would be entitled to just and fair compensation.

In this context, it was argued that Social Impact Assessment study is not a mere formality and the Single Judge has erred in law in being satisfied about substantial compliance of the provision, looking aside procedural lapses here and there.

Relying on Urban Development Trust, Bikaner vs. Gordhan Das (dead) Through LR (2024) 3 SCC 250; Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs.Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. (2024) 10 SCC 533; D.B.Basnett vs. Collector, East District Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 569; Dinesh & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2024) SCC Online SC 937; Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal (2012) 2 SCC 25; Rajesh K vs. Managing Director, Kerala Rail Development Corporation (WP(C) 41009/22 (Kerala High Court) and Manekbben Rama Tandel vs. The Collector, Daman, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli & Daman and Diu & Ors.(MANU/MH/1796/2023), it was argued that the importance of property rights and requirements of strict adherence to procedure cannot be ignored or by-passed or else the entire acquisition proceeding gets vitiated.

Taking the argument of “acquisition by ambush” further, which is impermissible, it was pointed out that there was complete disregard to the procedural safeguards under Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 19 in as much as there was no finding or analysis with regard to land being the bare minimum land required for public purpose.

Even with respect to rejection of the alternative places where the depots could be constructed, it was argued that it was not prudent to discard such suggestions as the land suggested viz.

The Sahara land, Gair Mazarua lands and a dumping yard in close vicinity to the selected site would have caused minimum displacement and minimum requirement to resettle and rehabilitate human heads. It would have reduced the cost of acquisition for the Government. The rejection was not based on any sound reason.

A special grievance was made with respect to only three days having been given for voicing the objection in place of clear 21 days and that also at a time when the State was swept by COVID -19 pandemic. A special reference was made to the letter of one Councilor viz. Kismat Devi of Ward No. 56, where she had highlighted the difficulties faced by the affected people of the area and inefficacy and the infirmities in the S.I.A. study being conducted by the State.

Even if the argument on behalf of the State that 250 people had participated in the public hearing, the persons affected were numbering around 1300.

Section 15 of the 2013 Act provides the right of the people affected by the land being acquired under Section 11 notification to raise objections with respect to the suitability of the land being acquired and the findings of the S.I.A. study report. The objections raised by the displaced persons are stated to have been mechanically rejected without due consideration. The Single Judge having lightly dealt with the lapses suggested that it was not understood that the preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report and its vetting by the Special Expert Committee are the heart and soul of the Act and represent the very purpose of the humane, participative, informed and transparent process of land acquisition envisaged under the scheme of the Act. The argument of the State as also PMRCL regarding nonsuitability of the alternative site was not based on any pleadings on affidavit or any minutes of the meeting of a technical body or any data or reasoning. The dumping yard displacing none, in fact, could have been shifted elsewhere and that land which in itself would have sufficed the purpose could have been selected as the site in fact in one of the writ proceedings sometimes in the year 2012, the High Court had directed the State to consider relocating the dumping yard as it was within the municipal limits and was causing hazards and other health hazards. 

The Supreme Court and High Courts have recognised that the expression " public purpose " is not capable of precise definition. The concept of "public purpose finds mention in article 31(2) of the constitution of india. 

In University of Bombay v. municipal commr. of the city of Bombay, I.L.R.16 Bom. 217, it has been held that acquisition of land comes with the purview of public purpose if it is meant for providing suitable accommodation to the public servant.

In Radha Binode v. Surendra Nath, 105 I.C. 377, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing road facilities in municipal areas is public purpose.

In State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji, A.I.R 1956, S.C. 294, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation for homeless is public purpose. 

In Iftikher Ahmed v. state of M.P, A.I.R. 1961 M.P 140, it has been held that acquisition of land for establishment of slaughter house for maintaining supplies of food in locality is public purpose.

In Ganga Prasad Verma v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 22, it has been held that acquisition of land for resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons is public purpose. 

In Walliammal v. state of Madras and Others, 1967 Mad 334: (1965) 2 Mad. 388: (1966) 79 Mad. LW 702, it has been held that acquisition of land for opening of a burial ground is public purpose.

In Guru Shiddawwavitra Sangayya v. state of Mysore, 1968 Mys 127, it has been held that removal of timber shops from the scattered places in the city area to a place outside the city area for the establishment of timber market comes under public purpose. An acquisition is for public purpose when it involves an element of public utility, provides public good and aims for social welfare. Acquisition need not be an acquisition which benefits each and every member of the public.

The 2013 Act which came into force on January 1, 2014 defines public purpose. The Act is applicable when the land is acquire by the government for its own use, including land acquired for public sector undertaking. The land is acquired by the land with the intention of transferring it for the use of private company for the specific stated public purpose. The acquisition of land by the government for immediate and declared use by private companies for public purpose.

The definition of public purpose is provided in the 2013 Act. Under Section 2 (1) (a) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for strategic purposes relating to naval, military, air force, and armed forces of the Union, including central paramilitary forces or any work vital to national security or defence of India or State police, safety of the people. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (i) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for infrastructure projects: excluding private hospitals, private educational institutions and private hotels.

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (ii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for projects related to agriculture and allied activities set up or owned by the appropriate Government or by a farmers' cooperative or by an institution set up under a statute. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (iii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones. 

Under Section 2 (1) b (iv-vii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for water conservation structures sanitation, Government aided educational and research schemes or institutions, sports, healthcare, tourism, transportation or space programme or any infrastructure facility as may be notified in this regard by the Central Government and after tabling of such notification in Parliament. 

Under Section 2 (1) (f) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken project for project affected families, for housing for such income groups, as may be specified from time to time by the appropriate Government, for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by the Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State. 

Under Section 2 (2) (a) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for public private  partnership projects, where the ownership of  the land continues to vest with the Government, for public purpose. 

Under Section 2 (2) (b) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for private companies for public purpose. 

In this backdrop, the division bench of the Patna High Court opined that "there is no gainsaying that establishment of Metro line in the city of Patna is in public interest. No further ink is required to be wasted in deciding whether it is in public interest or not. Relieving the city dwellers of traffic congestion, providing fast moving traffic and the income generated from the property development area are by no means opposed to public interest."

It is apparent that the division bench of the High Court did not pay heed to the decision of Supreme Court in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar and Others reported in 2011(12) SCC 375 held that “Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power—sometimes called colorable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions, and satisfaction—is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for the promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colorable exercise and is undeceived by illusion”, a veil of public purpose was employed to acquire land from the people who were misled in the name of planned industrial development