Justice Jitendra Kumar sets aside order by Sailendra Kumar Panda, the Ist Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Children’s Court, Bhojpur in a robbery case from Koilwar, Bhojpur, grants bail

“An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection by catering to their basic needs through proper care, protection, development, treatment, social reintegration, by adopting a child-friendly  approach in the adjudication and disposal of matters in the best interest of children and for their rehabilitation through processes provided, and institutions and bodies established, hereinunder and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” 

-Preamble to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015 

In CICL-X vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 21-page long judgement dated October 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"I find that learned Children Court has misconceived motion of ends of justice under the J.J. Act, because under the J.J. Act, meaning and import of ends of justice is different from one under the general criminal justice. If the detention of the appellant at the observation home ensures better reformation and development of the juvenile in conflict with law, it may be called that release of the appellant on bail would defeat the ends of justice. But there is no such facts and circumstances in the case on hand. 33. As such, I find that none of the grounds for rejecting the application of the appellant under Section 12 of J.J. Act is sustainable in the eye of law. 34. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, directing the appellant to be released on bail, subject to furnishing the bail bond of Rs.10,000/- and undertaking by his Father by way of affidavit that he would keep vigil on the appellant regarding his habits and he would not allow the appellant to come in contact with any criminal persons and take care of the developmental needs of the appellant and the appellant would attend the Court as and when required or directed. He will also ensure that he does not get involved in the commission of any offense. 35. The Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith along with a copy of this judgment." J.J. Act refers to Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015. Advocate Gopal Krishna is the counsel of the appellant.

Sailendra Kumar Panda is posted as District and Additional Sessions Judge, Ara since March 20, 2025. Prior to this posting he was District and Additional Sessions Judge, Sasaram, P.O., Exclusive Special Excise Court, Sasaram and Additional District and Sessions Judge, Barh.

The appellant was accused of offence punishable under Section 309(4) of BNS. Justice Kumar noted that the appellant was not named in the F.I.R. and his name transpired in the confessional statement of co-accused. Besides the confessional statement, there was no other material against the appellant on record. As per Social Investigation Report (S.I.R.), the appellant belongs to a very poor family and his father is a mason and he himself works as a labour in cotton mills. However, he passed matriculation in first class and also passed intermediate examination in second class and thereafter, he was not continuing his education. He had two criminal antecedents of similar nature. However, both the cases were pending and in neither of them, he has been convicted so far. The Children Court had rejected the regular bail application of the appellant under Section 12 of the J.J. Act on account of the view that there was strong possibility that on release of the appellant on bail, he will come into association with known criminal friends. However, as per the S.I.R., there was no finding in any report suggesting that he was in association with any criminal friends or any criminal gang. As per Children Court, the release of the appellant on bail may expose him to moral and psychological danger, but there was no such report in the S.I.R. The Children court was also of the view that the release of the appellant on bail would defeat the ends of justice. 

The appeal was preferred by the appellant against the impugned order dated February 26, 2026, passed by Ist Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Children’s Court, Bhojpur at Ara in Special Children Case No. 01 of 2026, arising out of Koilwar P.S. Case No. 204 of 2025, registered for the offence punishable under Section 309(4) of BNS, whereby Children Court rejected the regular bail application of the appellant under Section 12 of the J.J. Act holding that on release of the appellant on bail, there is strong possibility of his coming into association with his known criminal friends. It was also held by Children Court that release of the appellant shall expose him to moral and psychological danger and it would also defeat the ends of justice.

The case pertains to an offence of robbery on September 1, 2025 at Sakaiddi-Brahm Sthan-Pachaina Road (100 meters prior to Brahm Sthan) registered against four unknown persons, who snatched jewellery and mobile of Karun Kumar Karin and ran away towards Pachaina, Koilwar. 

As per prosecution case, Karun Kumar Karun alias Munnaji (54), s/o Satyanand Sah, the informant from Mahui Balha, Koilwar is a jewellery shopkeeper in Ramesh Ji's Market, Jamalpur Bazar and he was coming from Ara after purchasing some jewellery. When he was on way, he was intercepted by four persons riding two motorcycles and showing the threat of pistol, he was abused and jewellery made of gold and mobile were snatched by them and thereafter they fled away. The appellant has two other criminal antecedents bearing Ara Nagar P.S. Case No. 489 of 2025 and Gidha P.S. Case No. 140 of 2025, both registered for the offence punishable under Section 309(4) of BNS, 2023, in which the appellant was on bail 9. Before I consider the rival submission of the parties, it would be pertinent to refer to Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which deals with bail to the Juvenile. Narrottam Chandra, the SHO, Koilwar P.S. who registered the case is also the I.O. of the case.  

Section 12 of the Act reads: “12. Bail to a person who is apparently a child alleged to be in conflict with law.-(1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person: Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the person's release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision. (2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under subsection (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation home ¹[or a place of safety, as the case may be,] in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can be brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order. (4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail.”

From perusal of Section 12 of the J.J. Act, 2015, it clearly emerges that Section 12 of the Act overrides the bail provisions as contained in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1973 or any other law for time being in force. It further emerges that as per Section 12 of the Act, bail to the Juvenile is a rule and refusal of the same is an exception and Juvenile can be denied bail only on the following three grounds: (i) if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal, or, (ii) expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger, or, (iii) the person's release would defeat the ends of justice.

Justice Kumar drew on the decision of the Supreme Court in Juvenile in Conflict with Law vs. State of Rajasthan, as reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5297, wherein, it has been held that juvenile in conflict with law has to be necessarily released on bail unless the proviso is applicable and there must be clear finding regarding the applicability of the proviso. The relevant part of judgment reads:"6. From the phraseology used in sub-section 1 of Section 12, a juvenile in conflict with law has to be necessarily released on bail with or without surety or placed under supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person unless proviso is applicable. 7.We have perused all the orders passed earlier by the JJ Board, Special Court and High Court and specially the order dated 11th December, 2023 passed by the JJ Board. There is no finding recorded that the proviso to sub-Section 1 of Section 12 is applicable to the facts of the case. Without recording the said finding, bail could not have been denied to juvenile in conflict with law.........................................................................................9.Though none of the courts at no stage have recorded a finding that in the facts of the case, the proviso to sub- Section 1 of Section 12 was applicable, the juvenile in conflict with law has been denied bail for last one year. 10.Hence, the impugned orders are set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed. 11.We direct that the juvenile in conflict with law shall be released on bail without surety. However, the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board shall issue appropriate directions to the jurisdictional Probation Officer to keep the juvenile under supervision and to submit periodical reports to the Board about the conduct of the Juvenile."

Justice Kumar's judgement referred to Supreme Court's decision in Re-Exploitation of Children in Orphanages in the State of T.N. vs. Union of Indian and Ors. as reported in (2020) 14 SCC 327, wherein, it has held that bail to a juvenile can be denied only on three grounds as provided in the Proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act, 2015. The relevant part of the judgment reads: "7. Sub-section (1) makes it absolutely clear that a child alleged to be in conflict with law should be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person. The only embargo created is that in case the release of the child is likely to bring him into association with known criminals or expose the child to moral, physical or psychological danger or where the release of the child would defeat the ends of justice, then bail can be denied for reasons to be recorded in writing. Even if bail is not granted, the child cannot be kept in jail or police lock-up and has to be kept in an observation home or place of safety."

Justice Kumar's verdict drew on the decision of the Bombay High Court in XYZ vs. State of Maharashtra, as reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2790, wherein, it has held that grounds for denial of bail must be based on material. The relevant part of judgment reads: "6.The mandate of the aforesaid provisions requires that the CCL alleged to have committed a bailable or non bailable offence and apprehended, shall be release on bail with or without surety. The proviso to Section 12(1) puts an exception, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the release of CCL is likely to bring him into the association with any known criminal or exposed him to moral, physical or sociological danger or his release would defeat the ends of justice. It is therefore, evident that the denial of bail to the CCL shall be for specific reasons akin to above proviso. ………………………………………………………...9. There is nothing on record to indicate that the CCL is likely to come in association with the known criminals or get exposed to moral, physical or sociological danger or his release would defeat the ends of justice. In the wake of aforesaid circumstances the case is made out to allow this Revision Application and to release the CCL on bail by setting aside the impugned order passed by the Sessions Judge, Beed. Hence following order:"

Justice Kumar observed: "14. It also emerges that seriousness of the alleged offence or the age of the juvenile are also no relevant considerations for denial of bail under Section 12 of the J. J. Act. Even the child who is 16 years or above 16 years of age and is alleged to have committed a heinous offence is also entitled to get bail under Section 12 of the Act, 2015. There is no classification, whatsoever, provided in Section 12 of the Act, 2015 in regard to grant of bail. Section 12 is applicable to all juveniles in conflict with law without any discrimination of any nature. (Also refer to Lalu Kumar @ Lal Babu Vs. State of Bihar, 2019 (6) BLJ 2016)." 

In the penultimate paragraph of the judgement, Justice Kumar observed:"Summary of the legal Provisions 27. Hence, it is clearly found that notwithstanding anything contained in the code of criminal procedure or any other law for time being in force, bail to a juvenile in conflict with law is governed by Section 12 of the J.J. Act, 2015. 27(1). Section 12 of the J.J. Act is equally applicable to all juveniles in conflict with law without any discrimination of any nature. Even a juvenile, aged between 16 to 18 years and being accused of heinous offence and being tried by Children Court, is entitled to get bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act. 27(2). The nature and seriousness of the alleged offence is not relevant for consideration of bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act. 27(3). “The ends of justice” as used in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act is drastically different to one as used in general criminal jurisprudence. If the detention of the juvenile at Observation Home or other institutions as contemplated under the J.J. Act is helpful in protection, development and rehabilitation of the juvenile, only then it can be said that release of the child would defeat the ends of justice. 27(4). The family of the child in conflict with law is the best and first desirable institution to achieve the object of the J.J.Act. Institutionalization of a juvenile in conflict with law is the last resort and every child in conflict with law has right to be reunited with his family at the earliest. 27(5). Under Section 12 of the J.J. Act, 2015, bail to a juvenile is a rule and the refusal of the same is an exception and it can be denied only on the grounds as provided in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act, 2015. 27(6). The denial of bail must be reasoned and the grounds of denial must be based on relevant facts and circumstances, as emerging from the material on record. Social Investigation Report is one of the most important such material. Perusal of such report is mandatory as per Section 15 (2) of the J.J. Act, 2015. The Board/Court is required to know not only about the offence committed by the juvenile but even about the socio-economic conditions/circumstances under which the offence was committed, so that, appropriate order in regard to the juvenile in conflict with law could be passed with intent to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile and reintegrate him with the mainstream of the society. 27(7). All resources have to be mobilized including those of the family and the community for reforming and rehabilitating the juvenile in conflict with law to make him productive member of the society. (Refer to Section 3 (vii) of the J.J. Act, 2015.)"

The Juvenile Justice Act requires that all decisions regarding the child under the Act are based on primary consideration of the best interest of the child. Any juvenile in conflict with law is entitled to get released on bail irrespective of nature of the offence. Bail could be denied to him only on the grounds as provided in the proviso to Section 12 (1) of the J.J. Act., 2015. The intention of the legislature to grant bail to the juvenile, irrespective of nature or gravity of the offence, alleged to have been committed by him.  

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, Amicus Curiae of the High Court in the special courts/special laws case observed: "The Ist Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Children’s Court, Bhojpur at Ara could not appreciate the intention of the legislature and the language of Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which is unambiguous. The bail can be denied only in the case where there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal, or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat ends of justice. Section 12 of the Act overrides the bail provisions as contained in the  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 or any other law for time being in force. Justice Kumar has detected fatal errors in the trial court's order- the appellant was not named in the F.I.R., his name emerged in the confessional statement of co-accused, there was no other material against the appellant on record, and the Social Investigation Report (S.I.R.) did not contain any no finding in any report suggesting that he was in association with any criminal friends or any criminal gang. Although the accused had two criminal antecedents of similar nature, both the cases were pending and in neither of them, he has been convicted as yet." 

 

 

Supreme Court stays all further proceedings in the FIR against Kamal Nayan Pandey, SHO, Murar, Buxar in a case of police atrocity

In Kamal Nayan Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Parale passed a 2-page long order dated September 7, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"In the meantime, there shall be a stay on the operation of the impugned order dated 16.06.2026 and on all further proceedings pursuant to the FIR No.5793027260052 of 2026 dated 03.07.2026, registered at Police Station Murar, District-Buxar, Bihar." The impugned order was passed by Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court. It was in compliance with the High Court's order that the FIR was registered on dated July 3, 2026 under Sections 115(2), 126 (2), 117(2),352,351 (2), 303 (2),3(5) of BNS, 2023 in a case of police brutality at 2 PM on July 4, 2024. Ram Ishwar Kumar is the Investigator of the case. Supreme Court did not inquire about the findings of the investigation undertaken during July 3, 2026-September 6, 2026. 

The complaint dated July 3, 2026 was filed by Manish Kumar, the victim of police atrocity. (Photo:The content of the complaint application filed by the victim)

Supreme granted permission to Kamal Nayan Pandey to file the SLP. The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that apart from the fact that the petitioner was not heard before the Patna High Court, the mandate of compliance with Section 175(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 was waived off. It was also submitted that the contesting respondent had suppressed the factum of a complaint before the State Human Rights Commission which was dismissed.  It issued notice, returnable on October 12, 2026. The counsel appearing for the respondent accepted the notice. 

Earlier, in Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Director General of Police, Bihar (2026), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court had passed a 5-page long order dated June 16, 2026 in a case of police brutality Kamal Nayan Pandey. The other six respondents were: Home Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The District Magistrate, Ara, 4. The Superintendent of Police, Buxar, 5. The Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Ara, 6. The Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar and 7. The Station House Officer, Muffassil Police Station, Ara. 

Also read: FIR lodged against Kamal Nayan Pandey, SHO, Murar, Buxar registered in compliance with order by Patna High Court in a case of police brutality

 

 

FIR lodged against Kamal Nayan Pandey, SHO, Murar, Buxar registered in compliance with order by Patna High Court in a case of police brutality

In Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Director General of Police, Bihar (2026), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court had passed a 5-page long order dated June 16, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" "5. Be as it is, as per the allegation, prima facie case of cognizable offence is clearly made out against Kamal Nayan Pandey, who was the then Officer in-Charge of Murar Police Station, Buxar, Ara. The Court, at this Stage, is required not to look into the veracity of the allegation but to see to it that as per the allegation, prima facie cognizable offence is made out, warranting registration of FIR against the accused, and it is needless to say that as per the allegation, there is clearly commission of serious cognizable offence by the accused. 6. Moreover, for prosecution of the accused, who happened to be a police officer, does not require even sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC/ 218 B.N.S.S. because such brutal act on the part of the police officer against a poor man is not a part of his official duty. 7. It is shocking and disturbing that the cry of the victim for lodging of FIR before the concerned police officers, including the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, went unheard by the officers despite their duty to do the needful to prosecute the accused, even if the accused happened to be an officer. It is trite to say that ours is a constitutional democracy based on rule of law. Howsoever high one may be, the law is above all. There is also equality before law and equal protection of law of everybody, howsoever poor he may be." 

Justice Kumar observed: "8. At this stage, referring the Petitioner to the Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.PC/175(3) B.N.S.S. would be further injustice to the Petitioner. Moreover, as per the allegation, there is clear violation of fundamental right of the Petitioner as granted and guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution requiring immediate lodging of FIR, failing which, the people of the Country would lose faith not only in police but even in the Writ Court."

The High Court's order reads: "9. Hence, the Station House Officer, Murar Buxar is directed to lodge FIR against Kamal Nayan Pandey, the then Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar. 10. The Director General of Police, Bihar is directed to take compliance report from the Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar, Ara regarding lodging of the FIR and entrust the investigation to the Crime Investigation Department because this case is lodged against a police officer. 11. In case, the Petitioner is not satisfied by the investigation of the C.I.D. also, then he would be at liberty to file a further writ petition before this Court seeking appointment of C.B.I. to investigate into the matter, because this matter relates to protection of the fundamental right of the people and brutality committed by the police officer. If such conduct is not controlled and checked, the whole rule of law and constitutional protection of life and liberty of the citizen of the country would go to wind and the national police may become like one of Nazi Germany. 12. The present writ petition is allowed, accordingly. 13. The D.G.P., Bihar is also directed to send a compliance report to the Registrar General of this Court to be put up on record within thirty days." The 30-day period expired on July 16, 2026. In compliance with the High Court's order FIR No. 5793027260052 dated July 3, 2026 under Sections 115(2), 126 (2), 117(2),352,351 (2), 303 (2),3(5) of BNS, 2023 in a case of police brutality at 2 PM on July 4, 2024. Ram Ishwar Kumar has been appointed as the Investigator of the case. The complaint dated July 3, 2026 filed by Manish Kumar, the petitioner is as under:    

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महाशय, सविनय निवेदन इस प्रकार है कि मनीष कुमार पिता शिव शंकर यादव ग्राम एवं पोस्ट - गंगहर थाना- आरा मुफस्सिल जिला भोजपुर का निवासी हूँ। मैं दिनांक 04.07.24 को जो जमीन के कागजात लेकर ऑनलाइन करने अपने दोस्त के दुकान पर ग्राम चौगाई गया था तभी मैं दिन में 2:00 बजे के करीव दुकान से  शौच करने के लिए जा रहा था तब मुरार थाना जो जिला बक्सर में आता है वहां की पुलिस गाड़ी लेकर आई  जिसमें मुरार थाना जो जिला बक्सर में आता है वहां के पुलिस गाड़ी लेकर आई जिसमें मुरार थाना के तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष कमलनयन पांडेय एवं अन्य सिपाही मौजूद थे उन्होंने मुझे बुलाया तो मैं उन लोगों को बुलाने पर गया जाने के बाद उनलोगों के द्वारा मुझसे पूछताछ किए जाने लगा हम जिस काम के लिए गए थे वही भी मैंने बताया फिर मुझे मेरा नाम पूछा गया जैसे कि मैं अपना नाम मनीष कुमार यादव बताया तो तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष कमलनयन पांडेय कहने लगी है कि ये अहिर जाति का है और गालियां देने लगे मुझे बेरहमी से लाठी डंडे से उनके द्वारा बहुत मारा गया जिसमें मैं घायल हो गया | वह डंडे से मुझे मार कर मेरा पैर तोड़ दिया जिसमें मैं अधमरा सा हो गया तब मैंने अपने दोस्त के पास फोन करके बुलाया लेकिन उन लोगों ने मुझे मिलने नहीं दिया-तथा मुझे पुलिस के गाड़ी में बैठ कर वसंतपुर गांव में लेकर गए और ग्रामीण लोगों से पूछने लगे कि यह लड़का यही का है जब गांव वाले ने बताया कि यहां का नहीं है तब मुझे प्राथमिक स्वास्थ्य केंद्र चौड़ाई में ले जाकर इलाज काराये वहां मैंने देखा कि तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष कमलनयन पांडेय अपने हाथों को छिलकर दवा लगवाने लगे और अस्पताल में लिखवाने लगे कि यह भाग रहा था तब मैं डॉक्टर को बोला कि हम भाग नहीं रहे थे उनके बाद डॉक्टर ने बक्सर सदर अस्पताल में रेफर कर दिया गया रास्ते में एंबुलेंस को रोककर बातचीत आपस में करने लगे पुलिस द्वारा मुझे एंबुलेंस में बैठ कर सदर अस्पताल वक्सर ले जाया गया तथा वहां पर मेरा इलाज एवं पैर का एक्स-रे हुआ जिसकी प्रति इस आवेदन के साथ संलग्न है जहां डॉक्टर ने मुझसे पूछा कि यह कैसे हुआ तो मैंने बताया कि मुरार थाना के तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष ने मार कर मेरा पैर तोड़ दिया है तब तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष वहां मौजूद थे इस डॉक्टर एवं तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष के बीच मुझे लेकर बहस होने लगा तब सदर अस्पताल बक्सर के डॉक्टर द्वारा पटना रेफर किया गया तब मुझे तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष कमलनयन पांडेय के द्वारा धमकाया किया अगर तुमने मुझ पर FIR किया तो तुम्हारे साथ-साथ तुम्हारे पिता का नौकरी खत्म कर दूंगा मेरे पिता जो आरा मुफ्फसिल थथाना में चौकीदार के पद पर कार्यरत है तथा पुलिस मुझे अस्पताल में ही छोड़ कर वहां से भाग गए किंतु मैं पुलिस कि डर से पटना नहीं जा पाया क्योंकि पुलिस सुलह कराने के लिए मेरा पीछा कर रहा था किसी तरह मैंने अपने निजी शहर आरा में ही डॉक्टर से अपना इलाज करवाए साथ में ही मेरा मोबाइल पर एवं पर्स में रखे कुछ कागजात एवं छ: हजार रुपया अभी तत्कालीन थानाध्यक्ष कमलनयन पांडेय के पास हैं. अतः श्रीमान से प्रार्थना की उक्त तथ्यों को ध्यान में रखते हुए दोपियों पर एफआईआर दर्ज करने की कृपा करें. ताकि मुझे न्याय प्राप्त हो सके. आपका विश्वासी मनीष कुमार, पिता शिव शंकर यादव, ग्राम एवं पोस्ट - गंगहर, थाना-आरा मुफ्फसिल, जिला - भोजपुर (विहार), पिन कोड 802312

The other six respondents were: Home Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The District Magistrate, Ara, 4. The Superintendent of Police, Buxar, 5. The Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Ara, 6. The Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar and 7. The Station House Officer, Muffassil Police Station, Ara. 

The writ petition was preferred by Manish Kumar, the Petitioner seeking lodging of FIR against the Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar, pleading that despite the written report given by the Petitioner to the concerned Officer In-Charge, of the Police Station, and the Superintendent of Police, as well as the District Magistrate, FIR was not lodged by the concerned police station. As per the allegation, the Petitioner was brutally assaulted by the Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar breaking his both legs without any rhyme and reason, only on account of the Petitioner belonging to a particular caste. As per the written report submitted by the Petitioner to the concerned police officer, the Petitioner had gone to the stall of his friend situated in the village Chaugaya on 04.07.2024 for online uploading of title documents in regard to his land. At 2:00 PM. When the Petitioner was going to answer the call of nature, the vehicle of Murar police station came, wherein, the Station House Officer, Murar Police Station and other constables were present. The Station House Officer called him and enquired about him and when he came to know that he belongs to a particular caste, he started abusing him in filthy language and assaulting him with his danda breaking his both legs. 

The High Court has recorded that the X-Ray report of the broken legs of the Petitioner was annexed with this writ petition, which clearly showed that the Petitioner suffered at the brutal hands of the accused, who happened to be a police officer, who is supposed to be a protector of the life and liberty of a citizen. 

The High Court has recorded: "4. Counter affidavit on behalf of the Superintendent of Police, Buxar has been filed, as per which, the breaking of legs of the Petitioenr is admitted. The defense put forward by the police is that the police has not beaten the Petitioner. The Petitioner had in fact, slipped on account of rainy weather resulting into breaking of his legs. However, the breaking of the legs of the Petitioner, as is visible in the X-Ray Report, does not persuade this Court to accept the explanation given by the police, nor can one believe that a poor man who does not gather courage to lodge FIR even against his co-citizen can dare to lodge false report against a police officer."

Supreme Court stays order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a family dispute case

In Chandramohan Kumar & Anr. vs. 1. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 2-page long order dated June 16, 2026. The order reads: "4. The condition imposed by the impugned order is stayed until further orders, subject to the petitioner depositing or paying Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) to the respondent No. 2 within two weeks from today towards legal expenses for the present case." The respondent no. 2 is Aarti Kumari. Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had passed the 3-page long impugned order dated February 17, 2026.  

Earlier, Justice Kumar had concluded; "6. Considering the submission of the parties and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, this application of grant of anticipatory bail is allowed." He added: "7. Let the petitioners, above named, in the event of their arrest or surrender before the concerned Court below within four weeks from today, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- ( ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st class, East Muzaffarpur/ concerned court below in connection with Minapur Case No. 117 of 2025, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 482 of the BNSS. 8. As a condition of this order, the petitioner is directed to pay a maintenance amount of Rs. 6,000/- from the month of February, 2026 to the informant and the maintenance for the month of February, 2026 shall be paid to the informant within one week from the date of pronouncement of this order and thereafter, the maintenance amount shall be paid to the informant every month before the 10th day of the month." 

Justice Kumar made it clear that the order of maintenance passed by the High Court shall be subject to the outcome of maintenance case of the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court concerned, if any.

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with Minapur P.S Case No.117 of 2025 registered for the offence under sections 126(2),115 (2), 109, 85, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of BNS. 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioners were husband and devar of the informant. It was alleged that the petitioners and other family members started demanding Rs, 3 lakh and one motorycle. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the petitioners were innocent and they were falsely implicated in this case. There was no specific allegation against the petitioners. The petitioners have got clean antecedent. 

  

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Satyavrat Verma in a ca se from Govindganj, Motihari

In Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih passed a 5-page long order dated June 3, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "6. It is not in dispute that the conditions stand fully complied with; the appellant has cooperated during the investigation; he has not threatened or intimidated any of the witnesses; or has tried to influence the investigation in any manner. 7. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed. 8. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 21.04.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to seek any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the
Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 9. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail. 10. Further, if the appellant possesses a passport, the same shall be surrendered before the Competent Authority/Court until the conclusion of the trial or directed otherwise. 11. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.03.2026 is set aside."

The appellant had challenged the judgment and order dated March 24, 2026 in Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar”, passed by Justice Stayavrat Verma of the Patna High Court. 

On April 21, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads: "6. In the event of arrest in connection with FIR No. 280 of 2025, registered at Govindganj Police Station, District Motihari, Bihar dated 20.11.2025, the petitioner shall be released on bail by the Investigating/Arresting Officer on such terms and conditions as imposed and found to be just, fair and reasonable."

Earlier, in Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated March 24, 2026, wherei, he had concluded:"the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the instant anticipatory bail application stands rejected." The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 318(4), 303(2), 336(4), 340(1), 340(2), 308(5), 61(2) and 111(1) of the BNS, 2023.  

Ajay Kumar Thakur, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner had antecedent of one case and the informant alleged that petitioner called him on his mobile and introduced himself as having business of jewellery and called him to Muzaffarpur for buying jewellery, the informant went to Muzaffarpur and saw jewellery worth crore of rupees and said that he will come back with money, accordingly, the informant along with his friend went to buy jewellery, but before reaching Muzaffarpur, made a call when petitioner asked him to come near Areraj accordingly, the informant along with his friend went to the place where he was called by the petitioner, further the petitioner took him to the hose of Amresh and disclosed that the house is also for sale and showed jewellery, further petitioner in the meantime made a call when 7-8 accused on 3-4 motorcycles came and took Rs. 19 Lakhs along with other articles and started fleeing, when his friend caught an accused who disclosed his name as Surendra and also disclosed that petitioner, Amresh and others are part of organized gang who fled with the articles and cash. 

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner had been falsely implicated in the instant case by the informant, it was also submitted that the mobile from which the informant got a call does not belong to the petitioner. It was submitted that even the informant dealt in business of purchasing looted jewellery. It was further submitted that petitioner was engaged in business with one Neha Kumari, wife of the brother of the petitioner and the informant had given money to Neha but when the deal failed, the instant false case came to be instituted.

A.P.P. for the State had opposed the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner and submitted that Neha is also an accused in the instant case. It was also submitted that if informant was dealing in purchasing looted jewellery in that event the same would surface during the course of investigation and appropriate action would be taken, but then as far as the petitioner was concerned, the mobile may not belong to him, but when informant before reaching Muzaffarpur called him on the mobile from which he had received a call from the petitioner earlier, the same was picked by petitioner again. It was submitted that the informant specifically alleged that petitioner along with others were operating an organized crime. It also submitted that investigation of the case is continuing and if privilege of anticipatory bail is granted to the petitioner, the petitioner may abscond.

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Rajiv Roy who had declined extension of bail for non-disclosure of criminal antecedant at the outset

In Ritesh Kumar @ Ritesh Kumar Mahto @ Ritesh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed an order dated May 21, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay. The order noted:"....it is seen that first modification application was filed to indicate that he has criminal antecedents. 2 . Thereafter another application was filed for extension of period to furnish the bail bonds in the Criminal Miscellaneous No. 36600 of 2025. The High Court in first application only took the fact on record but not granted extension, however, the subsequent application was rejected." Supreme Court concluded: "In our view, after grant of the bail, the High Court may have granted extension after taking the fact of antecedents on record. 3. In this view of the matter, we dispose of this special leave petition with a direction that in furtherance to the order dated 16.09.2025 passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail, the bail bonds be furnished now within two weeks from today." 

Prior to this, in Ritesh Kumar @ Ritesh Kumar Mahto @ Ritesh vs. The State of Bihar (2026) Criminal  Miscellaneous  No. 24937 of 2026, Justice Rajiv Roy of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order dated April 10, 2026. The order reads:"2 . The petitioner was granted relief on 16.09.2025. However, he could not surrender as in the petition it was recorded that he has no criminal antecedent whereas the petitioner was having criminal antecedent. In that background, the earlier modification petition (Cr. Misc. No. 954 of 2026) was rejected on 30.01.2026. 3. Once again, a fresh modification petition has been filed with following prayer:“for extension of time in the order dated 16.09.2025 vide Cr. Misc. No. 36600 of 2025.” 4. It is again rejected in view of the earlier rejection dated 30.01.2026 with a cost of Rs. 500/- to be deposited with the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee."

Justice Roy's earlier order dated January 30, 2026 reads: "2. The present application has been preferred for
modification in Cr. Misc. No. 36600 of 2025 vide an order dated 16.09.2025, the order contains the statement of having no criminal antecedent in paragraph nos. 5 and 7 which is a factual error committed due to our hearing negligence. 3. On 16.09.2025, the Cr. Misc. No. 36600 of 2025 (Ritesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar) was allowed and grounds amongst other was that main allegation is against Saurabh, the petitioner has been shown to be friend and he do not have criminal antecedent. 4. By filing the modification petition, the petitioner now wants correction in paragraph 5 and 7 of the said order and learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has criminal antecedent. 5. Learned APP, Mr. Jitendra Kumar Singh submits that paragraph 3 of the main petition shows that the petitioner do not have criminal antecedent. 6. Considering the aforesaid fact, as recorded, no relief can be granted. 7. The Cr. Misc. No. 954 of 2026 is dismissed." 

Earlier, in Ritesh Kumar @ Ritesh Kumar Mahto @ Ritesh vs. The State of Bihar (2025) Criminal  Miscellaneous  No.36600 of 2025, Patna High Court's Justice Rajiv Roy passed a 3-page long order dated September 16, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"7. The allegation is there, it is mainly against Saurabh, the petitioner has been shown to be the friend, the girl has not stated anything about the sexual assault on her, he is only twenty years of age having no criminal antecedent, FIR is there and he shall be facing the music, in that background, this Court is inclined to extend him the privilege of anticipatory bail with conditions. 8. Let the petitioner be released on bail in the event of arrest or surrender within a period of four weeks from the receipt of this order, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) with two sureties of like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge VII-cum-Spl. Court (POCSO), Purnia in connection with Raghuvansh Nagar P.S. Case No. 19 of 2025 subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. (i) one of the bailor should be the family member/relative of the petitioner who shall provide official document to show his/her bona fide; (ii) the petitioner shall appear on each and every date before the Trial Court and failure to do so for two consecutive dates without plausible reason will entail cancellation of his bail bond by the Trial Court itself; (iii) the petitioner shall in no way try to induce or promise or threat the witnesses or tamper with the evidences, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds; (iv) the petitioner shall desist from committing any criminal offence again, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of his bail bonds." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a Raghuvansh Nagar P.S. Case No. 19 of 2025 for the offence under sections 137(2), 96 and 3(5) of the BNS lodged on March 13, 2025 by the informant, Raj Kishore Kumar Dinkar. Earlier, by his order dated June 5, 2025, Justice Partha Sarthy had called for legible photocopy of the case diary and statement of the victim recorded under section 183 BNSS in connection with Raghuvansh Nagar P.S Case no.19 of 2025 from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-VII-cum-Special Court  (POCSO), Purnea.

As per the prosecution story, the informant had alleged that while his minor daughter was going to coaching center, the named accused persons including the petitioner took her away for marriage purposes. This led to the FIR. As the story unfolds, the victim girl returned and supported the allegation made in the FIR. The petitioner's senior counsel submitted that allegation was that one Saurabh Kumar wanted to marry the girl and only to implicate, his friends were named. The petition was a student having no criminal antecedent and is only twenty years of age. Asha Kumari, the APP had opposed the prayer submitting that the petitioner was also named by the informant as also the girl upon return.

Supreme Court reverses denial of reguar bail order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a POCSO case

In Madhav @ Madho Kumar vs. 1. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed 3-page long order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, and considering the delay in lodging the FIR and as alleged, the story of political rivalry has been contemplated, in addition, taking note of the fact that the medical evidence do not corroborate with the allegation, at present, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail. 3. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court. 4. Petitioner to abide all the conditions as imposed and shall regularly attend the trial until exempted by the Court. Violation, if any, may give a cause to take recourse as permissible and the trial Court is at liberty to do the needful."

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court to seek bail against an order rejecting the regular bail by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The petitioner is in custody w.e.f. March 30, 2025 in connection with a FIR dated March 29, 2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 64, 352, 351(3) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) registered with Police Station Paharpur, District Motihari, Bihar. Prior to this Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey had called for case diary along with the statement of the victim recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS from the Court of 6th District & Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive Special Judge, POCSO Act, East Champaran, Motihari by his order dated September 3, 2025.

Earlier, Justice Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated October 15, 2025. The application for grant of regular bail, wherein, the petitioner was accused of committing rape with a minor girl. The counsel for the informant had submitted that the trial had started and in the trial the informant and the victim had already been examined and they had supported the prosecution case. Justice Kumar had concluded: "5. Considering the aforesaid facts and also the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of X
vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3539, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner Accordingly, this bail application is rejected." Supreme Court has reversed this order. 

Supreme Court reverses conditional pre-arrest bail order by Justice Purnendu Singh in a rape case, vindicates bail order by Justice Satyavrat Verma

In Ghutuk Miyan @ Ismail Miyan vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it reversed the conditional order dated April 28, 2026 by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It issued notice and concluded: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in connection with P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered SLP (Crl.) No(s). 8811/2026  at Police Station Gopalpur, District West Champaran, Bihar...." The respondent no. 2 from village, Mahesda, Gopalpur, West Champaranis is not named because it is a rape case. The Court's order vindicates the order dated March 12, 2026 by Justice Satyavrat Verma. 

Earlier, Justice Singh had passed an order wherein, he had observed:"7. Having heard the rival  submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, having perused the allegation made in the FIR, from the manner in which the entire story has been narrated, it appears to be shaky to the extent that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has rightly submitted that no one can carry a female in his lap without her desire. No force was applied by the informant, however, the informant has supported the allegation made in the FIR, in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS and the same is also supported by the 11 years old child in his statement recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer." 

The order reads: "8. In such circumstances, I direct the learned District Court to first get the statement of the 11 years old child of the informant recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS by a child friendly Court and if the learned District Court finds that the 11 years old child of the informant has not supported the allegation as alleged in the FIR, then in that case, the petitioner, above named, is directed to be released on pre-arrest bail, in the event of his/her arrest or surrender before the learned District Court within a period of four weeks from today, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District Court where the case is pending, in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. 9. If the child supports the allegations made in the FIR, in his statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, then in that case, the petitioner is directed to be taken into custody forthwith. 10. The learned District Court is directed to verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner as stated in paragraph no. 3 of the bail application. If any other case is pending against the petitioner as what has been stated in paragraph no. 3, this order will lose its force automatically." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 64, 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the BNS. According to the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner had allegedly committed rape upon the informant while her husband was not present in the house. The rape was allegedly committed in presence of her 11 years old son. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the manner in which the allegation was narrated, itself makes the allegation of commission of rape doubtful as it is the case of the informant that she was taken into lap and, thereafter, without having resisted to the same act of the petitioner, she was taken to another room where the rape was committed in presence of her 11 years old son, who supported the prosecution case along with the victim, who was the informant of the case. She also submitted that the victim was examined by the doctor and the doctor opined that there was no trace of any recent sexual assault having been committed. She submitted that Rs 70, 000 of the petitioner was due with the informant and in order to avoid payment of the same, the informant lodged the FIR. She had also submitted that on these grounds, co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had granted interim relief to the petitioner and, as such, in absence of any evidence, the petitioner deserve to be released on pre-arrest bail.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the informant, referred to the impugned order of the District Court, submitted that enough evidences have been collected in course of investigation and the petitioner having taken advantage of the absence of the husband of the informant, had committed rape, which was in presence of her 11 years old son and the statement of her son was also recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer, in which, he supported the prosecution story. He also  submitted that it was not a case of tutoring of the 11 years old child, who is innocent and his version is required to be given emphasis, particularly, in case where rape is committed. He submitted that the petitioner had not taken any plea that the child was tutored and narrated a false story under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer. He also submitted that evidence was there, which suggested that the petitioner had committed rape upon the victim, who is the informant. He had vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail.

Prior to this Justice Satyavrat Verma had passed an order dated March 12, 2026. The case arose from a Gopalpur P.S. Case of 2025 from the Court of Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned Exclusive Special Judge Rape and POCSO Act, Bettiah, West Champaran. The order reads: "4. There shall be no coercive action against the petitioner until the anticipatory bail application is finally adjudicated by this Court, as it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is a person with clean antecedent and from perusal of the allegation as alleged in the FIR, it would manifest that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship and when the child of the informant woke up, the petitioner fled and thereafter the instant FIR came to be instituted after a delay of six days. It is also submitted that the informant in the FIR alleges that after making her children sleep, she also went to sleep without locking the door and petitioner taking advantage of the same entered the house and came to her room, lifted her in his arms and brought her in another room and on the point of knife threatened and raped her. It is submitted that it does not appear probable that petitioner would have been knowing that the door was unlocked on the date of occurrence, this fact also creates a suspicion that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship."

Supreme Court reverses Justice Anil Kumar Sinha's order denying anticipatory bail

In Bablu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol  and Augustine George Masih passed a 3-page long order dated May 8, 2026, wherein, it reversed the 2-page long order dated March 19, 2026 passed by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court. The petitioner challenged the order by the High Court. The Supreme Court's order concluded: "8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.5804036250020 of 2025 of Korma Police Station, Sheikhpura District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. However, in the attending facts, one of the conditions shall necessarily be that if the petitioner possesses a passport, the same shall be deposited before the Competent Authority/Court, till the conclusion of the Trial or directed otherwise. The order recorded: "10. Needless to add, till the investigation is not complete in all respects, the petitioner(s) would fully cooperate, and if the challan/charge sheet is filed...."

The application, for grant of anticipatory bail, had arisen out of a Korma Police Station Case of 2025, disclosing offences under Sections 137(2), 96, 3(5) of the BNS, 2023. As per the prosecution case, on February 15, 2025 at about 7:00 PM, the informant’s 17-year-old daughter, Savita Kumari, went to the fields and was allegedly abducted by several accused persons who lured her with the intention of marriage. Despite efforts, she could not be traced and her mobile phone was found switched off. The informant fears that the accused may cause harm to his daughter. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and he had falsely been implicated in the case due to ulterior motives. He submitted that petitioner had no connection with the alleged occurrence and he was merely the brother of co-accused Deepak Kumar. The petitioner asserted that the informant’s daughter had voluntarily left her home owing to a consensual relationship with the co-accused Deepak Kumar. It was also submitted that the FIR disclosed only general and omnibus allegations against the petitioner without any specific role attributed to him. The petitioner had denied having any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the co-accused and the informant’s daughter. He submitted that the case was lodged maliciously with the intent to harass and exert pressure upon the petitioner. 

Justice Sinha had concluded; "Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and taking into consideration the fact that minor girl has been kidnapped, there is allegation against the petitioner that he along with Deepak Kumar and others kidnapped the minor daughter of the informant and the girl has not yet been recovered, I am not inclined to grant the petitioner privilege of anticipatory bail. 6. This application is, accordingly, rejected."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in a POCSO case

In Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Patna High Court's Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra dated March 11, 2026. The order concluded:"6. It is pertinent to note at this juncture itself and for the limited purpose of considering the prayer for bail, that the statements of the recused girls which have been recorded under Section 183 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and particularly two victims associated with the orchestra group where petitioner was working would disclose that there were no recent evidence of sexual
assault and three co-accused Gena Sah, Rajat Sardar @Rajjat Kumar @ Rajat Kumar and Subhash Kumar have since then granted regular bail by the jurisdictional High Court. Hence, on the ground of parity, petitioner is also entitled for grant of bail. 7. The impugned order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the High Court is set aside and petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional court deems fit to impose, including the condition of directing the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court on all dates of hearing."

The petitioner was arraigned as an accused No. 11 in the FIR No. 8 of 2025, registered at Police Station Women Police Station, District Betiah, for the offence punishable under Section 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 95, 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 6, 8 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 75 and 79 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956 and Section 16, 17, and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, was seeking regular bail. The record disclosed that investigation had been concluded and charge-sheet was filed and two witnesses were already examined. It was the case of the prosecution that minor girls were found in various orchestra groups who had been trafficked and they were sexually exploitated. Even according to the FIR, the petitioner was neither the owner or Manager of the orchestra group and he was only a employee (Announcer) in Chhoti New Musical Orchestra Dhamaka Group.

Earlier, in Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated March 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"...the prayer for bail of the petitioner is again rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from today. If the trial is not concluded within the period of six months, as stated above, the petitioner will be at liberty to renew his prayer before the court below." The name of respondent no. 2 has been kept anonymous. 

The petitioner sought bail in connection with Bettiah Mahila P.S. case of 2025 instituted for the offences under Sections 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 98 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 6, 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act and Sections 75 and 79 of the J.J. Act and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. This was the second attempt of the petitioner for bail. The petitioner had renewed his prayer for grant of regular bail which was earlier rejected on merit by Justice Mishra of the High Court vide 3-page long order dated August 13, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 31511 of 2025, taking into account the nature of accusation and the gravity of the offence and involvement of the petitioner in the offence.  

The order dated August 13, 2025 recorded that the informant filed a complaint before the ADJ, Champaran, based on an tip-off from National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) constituted under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which led to raids at seven locations by the police team. Sixteen girls were rescued. The victims gave statements under Section 180 BNSS alleging repeated sexual assaults, exploitation for dance, and being forced into sexual activities by various accused associated with different orchestra groups.

APP for the State and counsel for the informant had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioners. They submitted that on perusal of record it appeared that the several victims were minor girl. It was specifically submitted that petitioner, namely, Dhamu Sah used to inappropriately touch the body of victim, during dance on the stage, whereas petitioner, namely, Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey, had established illicit relation with one of the victims.

In compliance of the order dated January 17, 2026, a report dated February 12, 2026 with regard to the present stage of trial has been received. From perusal of the report, it appeared that two (2) out of nineteen (19) charge sheet witnesses had been examined in the case. It was also reported that trial was likely to be concluded within a period of nine months. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that the petitioner was languishing in judicial custody since February 23, 2025 without any rhymes or reason, having no criminal antecedent. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, hence, petitioner may be enlarged on bail. The APP for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail. The APP had further relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3539 (X. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.), wherein, in paragraph No.14, Supreme Court had observed as under: “14. Ordinarily inserious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court be it the Trial Court or the High Court should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the accused.”  

Justice Mishra observed: "7. There is no new ground to consider the bail petition of the petitioner. From the aforesaid report, it appears that the trial is going on." Supreme Court has reversed the order by the High Court. 

Supreme Court takes note of allegations "against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner" in a matrimonial case from Naugachhiya, Bhagalpur

In Amit Kumar Hari @ Amit Kumar Abhimanyu vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed a 3-page long order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, it observed:".....we notice that certain allegations have been made against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner even after the order dated 25.11.2025 passed by this Court extending the interim protection granted by the High Court to the petitioner, due to which, the petitioner has filed a complaint bearing M.P. No.264 of 2026 against those police officers before the learned CJM, Purnia. We further note that the said Court has also issued notice in the said petition. The said Court has also asked for a report from the concerned police, which is awaited. 4. Be that as it may, let the concerned Superintendent of Police applied with the aforesaid order of the learned CJM, Purnia without any delay. Thereafter, the learned CJM, Purnia shall take a call in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1-State of Bihar shall communicate the present order to the Trial Court. 6. A copy of this order be also sent to the learned CJM, Purnia." The Respondent no. 2 is Palak Kumari @ Pallawi Kumari. 

Prior to this order, the Supreme Court had passed an order dated November 25, 2025, when the parties were sent to mediation initially, there was lack of cooperation on the side of the petitioner. However, later on, he did participate, but the mediation ultimately failed. The Court went into the merits of the matter. The Court found that no case for anticipatory bail was made out. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. The order of the Court dated November 25, 2025 for continuation of the interim protection granted to the petitioner by the High Court vide the impugned order dated September 24, 2025 stands vacated. 

The case arose out of impugned final 4-page long order dated September 24, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of the Patna High Court. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Naugachhiya P.S. Case No. 33 of 2025 registered under Sections 85,115(2),126(2),352,3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3,4 of the DP Act. As per the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner along with other family members had assaulted the informant due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 

Justice Singh had recorded and observed that "the parties have failed to settle the matrimonial dispute, the Court till last minute must strive to give opportunity to the parties to settle the dispute between the husband and wife amicably. The matrimonial dispute is not an offense against the society rather a matrimonial dispute is a private conflict between spouses and does not inherently constitute an offence against society. However, a false case can have a disastrous consequence in absence of any criminal content. The personal dispute cannot call for a criminal offence. Continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law leading to vexatious proceeding against the petitioner."

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana, reported in, (2003) 4 SCC 675, in paragraph nos. 12 and 13 wherein it held as under:-
“ 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.

Justice Soni Shrivastava quashes order by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in a rape case of 2021

In Md. Said Ali Ansari vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Soni Shrivastava of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated January 12, 2026 wherein, she quashed the order by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in a Sessions Trial of 2021. The second respondent was Ravina Tabassum. Despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of her. Justice Shrivastava concluded:"....this Court is of the considered view that the present prosecution against the petitioner is not only frivolous and vexatious, but the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 375 of the IPC in order to prosecute the petitioner particularly for an offence under Section 376 of IPC is clearly and visibly not made out. In such view of the matter continuance of prosecution would amount to abuse of process of the Court, hence, the impugned order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in S.Tr. No. 161 of 2021 (arising out of Jagdispur P.S. Case No.121 of 2019) is hereby quashed. 19. Accordingly, the present application filed by the petitioner is allowed." 

The application was filed for quashing of of the order by the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur whereby and whereunder the petition dated October 26, 2021 filed by the petitioner under Section 227 Cr.P.C. to discharge the petitioner under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was rejected. The brief facts leading to the impugned order emanated from an F.I.R bearing Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 121 of 2019 dated April 26, 2019, registered under Section 341, 376, 379/34 of the IPC on the written statement of the informant Rabina Tabassum aged about 25 years, alleged inter alia that on the allurement and pretext of marriage, the informant was subjected to sexual exploitation by the petitioner for the last one year. The F.I.R further discloses that on April 22, 2019, on being asked by the petitioner to come along with him for getting married, she left her home along with cash and jewellery and went along with the petitioner to his maternal uncle’s house where they stayed in a room where the father of the petitioner had arrived and upon his assurance for marriage, she, along with the petitioner, came back to her village whereafter the mother of the petitioner also assured the informant’s parents about marriage which never happened. Hence, the present case was instituted stating in the F.I.R that other members of the family were also preventing the marriage to happen. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner and others and cognizance was taken thereupon under Section 376, 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC and after commitment of the case to the Court of Sessions, the petitioner filed the discharge application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. which stood rejected vide the impugned order dated November 17, 2021.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that no offence is made out against the petitioner, much less an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. He substantiated his submission on account of the fact that a bare perusal of the allegations made in the F.I.R itself would disclose that the petitioner and the informant/victim were having a relationship which was continued for the past one year and the informant being a 25 years old adult, as she herself claimed in the F.I.R, had entered into physical relationship with the petitioner with open eyes and there was no allegation of any threat perception or any force or coercion exercised upon her. He submitted that a relationship between two consenting adults would not bring the case within the ambit of Section 376 of IPC. He also submitted that even in the statement of the informant/victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she did not whisper a single word with regard to any sexual assault by the petitioner and had rather narrated the story in a different manner making reference to assurance given by the petitioner’s parents, specifically her mother about getting her married to the petitioner which was a definite pointer to the fact that there was a bona fide intention of marriage with Ravina Tabassum, the opposite party no.2 and there was no misconception of fact. The medical examination of the informant/victim was also referred to by the senior counsel to submit that the informant was an adult and upon vaginal swab examination, no spermatozoa was found, which was further indicative of the fact that medical evidence also did not corroborate the allegations made in the F.I.R by the informant. To buttress his submissions with respect to the offence under Section 376 of IPC not being made out, the senior counsel relied upon some recent judgments of the Supreme Court in (a) Jaspal Singh Kaural vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 756. (b) Surendra Khawse vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2025 INSC 1143), (c) Prashant vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2025) 5 SCC 764 

Justice Shrivastava observed: "9. After having heard the rival contentions of the parties and having considered the impugned order as also the material on record, the moot question which falls for consideration before this Court is as to whether there is sufficient material on record and grounds for proceeding against the petitioner, prosecuting him under Section 376 of the IPC. 10. Upon examining the contents of the F.I.R and the other materials on record, it is clear that the prosecutrix is a 25 years old adult and had entered into a relationship with the petitioner, which was continuing for the past one year leading to the inference that there was a consensual relationship between two adults. However, there is an allegation that sexual exploitation of the informant was done on the pretext of marriage. At this stage, it needs to be considered that there can be several reasons for developing physical intimacy between two consenting partners and the question of entering into a relationship under a misconception of fact needs to be established by way of specific assertion and material to show that the informant was made to enter into such relationship upon a false promise to marry and that she would not have done so in absence of such promise and assurance, coupled with the fact that the petitioner, in fact, never had any intention to marry the informant right from the inception. 11. The facts and materials disclosed in the present case, in no way, point towards any such intention of the petitioner to have sexually exploited her without intending to marry her. The prosecutrix has rather herself stated that it was due to the interference by the family members, including the parents of the petitioner, that impediments were caused in the marriage which could not fructify as a consequence of the same. It has to be kept in mind that there is a clear cut distinction between a ‘false promise’ to marry, which would come under the purview of misconception of fact as envisaged under Section 90 of the IPC and a ‘breach of promise’ which is a result of some supervening circumstances on account of which a promise earlier made has not been honored." 

She referred to a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Naim Ahmed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 15 SCC 385 wherein the distinction between a false promise to marry and a breach of promise was clarified. It reads: “21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.”

Justice Shrivastava observed: "12. The aforesaid issue of a woman engaging in sexual relations on the basis of misconception of fact amounting to rape and a breach of promise being distinct from a false promise has also been dealt with in several other judicial pronouncements rendered by this Court as also the Hon’ble Apex Court and such grounds have led to quashing of the entire prosecution. She recollected teh Supreme Court's decision in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein the legal position with regard to “consent” of a woman vis-a-vis “mis-conception of fact” arising out of a false promise to marry, was summarized . Paragraph 18 of the said judgment reads:“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

She added: "14. Upon analysis of the facts of the present case, it can be safely concluded that there is nothing on record to indicate that it is only on account of a false promise to marry that the prosecutrix had engaged herself in a physical relationship with the petitioner and thus, existence of any such assurance or promise to marry cannot be said to bear a direct nexus with the decision of the informant to engage in any sexual act. 15. This Court cannot also loose sight of the fact that the informant, who by virtue of her age and maturity, was capable enough to take her independent decisions and engaging in a sexual relationship with the petitioner was a conscious and informed choice made by the informant, being in a position to assess the morality or immorality attached to the act in which she indulged with the petitioner without there being any force or coercion upon her. Such a willful conduct would lead to only an inevitable conclusion of her willingness in carrying a relationship, including physical intimacy with the petitioner, as
such, her consent was totally voluntary. A criminal prosecution under Section 376 of IPC cannot be permitted to be initiated and to continue merely on account of the reason that a cordial and consensual relationship between a consenting couple does not materialize and fructify into a marital relationship...."

Notably, 84th report of the Law Commission of India (1980) dealt with rape and allied offences. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) deals with rape. Section 64 of BNS deals with punishment for rape. The BNS replaced the IPC from July 2, 2024.

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ritesh Kumar bench directs release of minor, directs payment of Rs 5 lakh by erring officials as compensation for illegal arrest

In Md. Jahid (Minor) under the guardianship of cousin brother Mohammad Navi Hussain/Parokar vs. The State of Bihar, through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench-II of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:".....we direct that the petitioner shall be released forthwith by the Juvenile Justice Board from the observation home/children’s home and in this regard appropriate release order shall be issued by the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura forthwith. 24. For his unlawful arrest and detention, we direct the State to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as compensation. This amount, we are assessing, keeping in view that a young boy who is a juvenile at this stage has undergone physical and mental agony for two and half months by now. The State Government shall pay this amount to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Justice Prsad who authored the judgement drew on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 1960 while dealing with the case of contravention of fundamental rights of a citizen. He referred to the decision in Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 5 by the Patna High Court which observed in paragraphs ‘27’, ‘28’ and ‘29’: “27. In the case of Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar and Another while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.” 28. In the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the learned Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials."

The judgement reads: "25. We find that the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ application of Habeas Corpus. He/his family has incurred expenses in contesting the litigation which were imposed upon them due to misuse of power by the police official. 26. We, therefore, award a cost of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) to the petitioner which shall also be paid by the State within the same period. 27. It is well settled in law that when the State is saddled with cost and compensation because of misuse of power by an executive, such cost and compensation must be realized from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which was subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019, however, the same has not been interfered with and the view is based on the earlier views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been duly discussed."

Justice Prasad who authored the judgement wrote: "28. We direct the competent authority/the Director General of Police, Bihar to institute an inquiry into the matter in administrative side, take a suitable view based on the materials which would come in course of the inquiry proceeding and realize the cost and the compensation amount from the erring officials. The cost and compensation amount which will be paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring officials after completion of inquiry, within a period of six months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 29. This writ application stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Principal District Judge, Madhepura, the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura and the Director General of Police, Bihar for compliance."

The writ application was filed in the nature of a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking release of the petitioner from the illegal detention of the respondents. It was the case of the petitioner that the I.O. in this case arrested the petitioner in complete disregard to the powers of arrest and without following the established procedure of law. The petitioner alleged gross violation of his fundamental right as embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

One Khushboo Praveen wife of Md. Amzad, resident of village Sapardah Ward No. 8, P.S.- Puraini, District- Madhepura lodged a first information report giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 11, 2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 308(2), 109, 303(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. She alleged that in connection with a land dispute, a Panchayati was held with the intervention of the co-villagers, the accused persons called the prosecution side to participate in the said Panchayati but while the Panchayati was going on, the 14 named accused including this petitioner who are all the co-villagers of the informant assaulted the prosecution side. It was also alleged that the accused persons had taken away the silver chain and other ornaments. In connection with the said occurrence, the petitioner’s mother also lodged a counter case giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 16, 2025. The  case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 76, 126(2), 109, 303(2), 352, 351(2), 351(3) of the BNS, 2023. 

During investigation of the Puraini P.S. Case, the I.O. found that there was no sufficient material to proceed against ten named accused persons including thE petitioner. One accused, namely, Md. Naushad was arrested. The investigation was supervised by the Inspector and upon instructions, the I.O. filed a chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 235 of 2025 dated September 1, 2025 in which ten accused including this petitioner were shown in Column No. 12 as not chargesheeted accused. In another words, they were not sent up for trial. A reading of the chargesheet which is on the record  would show that the same was filed on the direction of the Senior Police officer, while the arrested accused Md. Naushad was chargesheeted, the investigation was kept open against three absconding accused, namely, (1) Md. Muktar, (2) Md. Zakir and (3) Md. Akhtar. It was apparent that after about 25 days, the I.O. received a review note/supervision note from the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short ‘DIG’), Koshi Range, Saharsa. It was evident that the supervision note was recorded by the DIG on his own on the request of the informant who had visited the office of the DIG with an application complaining that the Inspector of Police had wrongly exonerated ten named accused persons. The DIG simply recorded in his note the allegations. Taking note of the statements of the witnesses, he issued a direction to the I.O. to proceed with the investigation of the case assuming that the allegations are true against the accused persons. He directed the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura to ensure further action and arrest all the remaining accused persons expeditiously. A perusal of the case diary would showed that the supervision note of the DIG was incorporated in the case diary on September 25, 2025 whereafter the I.O. straightway proceeded to conduct raid on the house of the accused persons. The case diary did not show that after the supervision note of the DIG, any instruction was obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura. It did not show that the I.O., being fully aware of the fact that the ten accused persons had already been shown not sent up for trial, made any application in the court of Magistrate for permitting a further investigation. The I.O. could not lay his hand to any other material against the petitioner but on October 23, 2025, he arrested the petitioner, described his age as 19 years and produced him before the court from where he was sent to jail. It appeared that even at the time of his production before the Magistrate, the attention of the Magistrate was not drawn towards the fact that the petitioner was shown in the column of not chargesheeted accused in the chargesheet, therefore, once the chargesheet had been filed in the court, it was incumbent upon the I.O. to file an application seeking further investigation of the case if at all any material had come against the petitioner. Even the Magistrate did not look into these aspects of the matter and straightway in a mechanical manner sent the petitioner behind the bars. 

The petitioner approached the High Court by filing the writ application and informed this Court on November 24, 2025 in course of hearing that the petitioner was a juvenile as per his date of birth certificate i.e. the registration card of the Bihar School Examination Board showing his date of birth as January 1, 2010. The petitioner complained that despite the fact that he was a juvenile, the Magistrate did not assess his age at the time of sending him behind the bars and in complete breach of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the petitioner was languishing in jail. On 24.11.2025, the High Court noticed the submissions and asked the State to file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the I.O. who had effected the arrest of the petitioner. In the meantime, the High Court observed that “it will be open to the Jurisdictional Magistrate to take corrective measures after considering the date of birth certificate of the petitioner. If it is found that the petitioner is aged below 18 years, it will be incumbent upon the Jurisdictional Magistrate to send him to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for assessment of age and considering his date of birth certificate as per the Bihar School Examination Board, he would be kept in an observation home and not in jail with adults.”

The High Court was been informed at this stage that, in fact, after coming to know the claim of the petitioner that he was a juvenile, the Jurisdictional Magistrate had vide his order dated November 21, 2025 referred him for assessment of age to the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura. A Letter No. 13 dated January 7, 2026 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura showed that the petitioner was declared juvenile aged about 15 years 06 months and 08 days on the date of occurrence.

A question arose for consideration in the present case as to how the petitioner could have been arrested on October 23, 2025 when he was not chargesheeted in the case and, in fact, in the Chargesheet No. 235, he was shown one amongst the ten accused persons who were not chargesheeted/sent up for trial.

Justice Prasad observed:"We have already taken note of the fact that during investigation, sufficient materials were not found against the petitioner to send him to trial and after the supervision note of the DIG, the I.O. had not collected any other and further material against the petitioner. All that he did after receipt of the supervision note of the DIG was that he conducted a raid and ultimately arrested the petitioner from his house on 23.10.2025."