Supreme Court stays order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a family dispute case

In Chandramohan Kumar & Anr. vs. 1. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 2-page long order dated June 16, 2026. The order reads: "4. The condition imposed by the impugned order is stayed until further orders, subject to the petitioner depositing or paying Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) to the respondent No. 2 within two weeks from today towards legal expenses for the present case." The respondent no. 2 is Aarti Kumari. Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had passed the 3-page long impugned order dated February 17, 2026.  

Earlier, Justice Kumar had concluded; "6. Considering the submission of the parties and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, this application of grant of anticipatory bail is allowed." He added: "7. Let the petitioners, above named, in the event of their arrest or surrender before the concerned Court below within four weeks from today, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- ( ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st class, East Muzaffarpur/ concerned court below in connection with Minapur Case No. 117 of 2025, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 482 of the BNSS. 8. As a condition of this order, the petitioner is directed to pay a maintenance amount of Rs. 6,000/- from the month of February, 2026 to the informant and the maintenance for the month of February, 2026 shall be paid to the informant within one week from the date of pronouncement of this order and thereafter, the maintenance amount shall be paid to the informant every month before the 10th day of the month." 

Justice Kumar made it clear that the order of maintenance passed by the High Court shall be subject to the outcome of maintenance case of the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court concerned, if any.

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with Minapur P.S Case No.117 of 2025 registered for the offence under sections 126(2),115 (2), 109, 85, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of BNS. 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioners were husband and devar of the informant. It was alleged that the petitioners and other family members started demanding Rs, 3 lakh and one motorycle. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the petitioners were innocent and they were falsely implicated in this case. There was no specific allegation against the petitioners. The petitioners have got clean antecedent. 

  

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Satyavrat Verma in a ca se from Govindganj, Motihari

In Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih passed a 5-page long order dated June 3, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "6. It is not in dispute that the conditions stand fully complied with; the appellant has cooperated during the investigation; he has not threatened or intimidated any of the witnesses; or has tried to influence the investigation in any manner. 7. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed. 8. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 21.04.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to seek any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the
Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 9. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail. 10. Further, if the appellant possesses a passport, the same shall be surrendered before the Competent Authority/Court until the conclusion of the trial or directed otherwise. 11. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.03.2026 is set aside."

The appellant had challenged the judgment and order dated March 24, 2026 in Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar”, passed by Justice Stayavrat Verma of the Patna High Court. 

On April 21, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads: "6. In the event of arrest in connection with FIR No. 280 of 2025, registered at Govindganj Police Station, District Motihari, Bihar dated 20.11.2025, the petitioner shall be released on bail by the Investigating/Arresting Officer on such terms and conditions as imposed and found to be just, fair and reasonable."

Earlier, in Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated March 24, 2026, wherei, he had concluded:"the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the instant anticipatory bail application stands rejected." The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 318(4), 303(2), 336(4), 340(1), 340(2), 308(5), 61(2) and 111(1) of the BNS, 2023.  

Ajay Kumar Thakur, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner had antecedent of one case and the informant alleged that petitioner called him on his mobile and introduced himself as having business of jewellery and called him to Muzaffarpur for buying jewellery, the informant went to Muzaffarpur and saw jewellery worth crore of rupees and said that he will come back with money, accordingly, the informant along with his friend went to buy jewellery, but before reaching Muzaffarpur, made a call when petitioner asked him to come near Areraj accordingly, the informant along with his friend went to the place where he was called by the petitioner, further the petitioner took him to the hose of Amresh and disclosed that the house is also for sale and showed jewellery, further petitioner in the meantime made a call when 7-8 accused on 3-4 motorcycles came and took Rs. 19 Lakhs along with other articles and started fleeing, when his friend caught an accused who disclosed his name as Surendra and also disclosed that petitioner, Amresh and others are part of organized gang who fled with the articles and cash. 

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner had been falsely implicated in the instant case by the informant, it was also submitted that the mobile from which the informant got a call does not belong to the petitioner. It was submitted that even the informant dealt in business of purchasing looted jewellery. It was further submitted that petitioner was engaged in business with one Neha Kumari, wife of the brother of the petitioner and the informant had given money to Neha but when the deal failed, the instant false case came to be instituted.

A.P.P. for the State had opposed the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner and submitted that Neha is also an accused in the instant case. It was also submitted that if informant was dealing in purchasing looted jewellery in that event the same would surface during the course of investigation and appropriate action would be taken, but then as far as the petitioner was concerned, the mobile may not belong to him, but when informant before reaching Muzaffarpur called him on the mobile from which he had received a call from the petitioner earlier, the same was picked by petitioner again. It was submitted that the informant specifically alleged that petitioner along with others were operating an organized crime. It also submitted that investigation of the case is continuing and if privilege of anticipatory bail is granted to the petitioner, the petitioner may abscond.

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Rajiv Roy who had declined extension of bail for non-disclosure of criminal antecedant at the outset

In Ritesh Kumar @ Ritesh Kumar Mahto @ Ritesh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed an order dated May 21, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay. The order noted:"....it is seen that first modification application was filed to indicate that he has criminal antecedents. 2 . Thereafter another application was filed for extension of period to furnish the bail bonds in the Criminal Miscellaneous No. 36600 of 2025. The High Court in first application only took the fact on record but not granted extension, however, the subsequent application was rejected." Supreme Court concluded: "In our view, after grant of the bail, the High Court may have granted extension after taking the fact of antecedents on record. 3. In this view of the matter, we dispose of this special leave petition with a direction that in furtherance to the order dated 16.09.2025 passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail, the bail bonds be furnished now within two weeks from today." 

Prior to this, in Ritesh Kumar @ Ritesh Kumar Mahto @ Ritesh vs. The State of Bihar (2026) Criminal  Miscellaneous  No. 24937 of 2026, Justice Rajiv Roy of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order dated April 10, 2026. The order reads:"2 . The petitioner was granted relief on 16.09.2025. However, he could not surrender as in the petition it was recorded that he has no criminal antecedent whereas the petitioner was having criminal antecedent. In that background, the earlier modification petition (Cr. Misc. No. 954 of 2026) was rejected on 30.01.2026. 3. Once again, a fresh modification petition has been filed with following prayer:“for extension of time in the order dated 16.09.2025 vide Cr. Misc. No. 36600 of 2025.” 4. It is again rejected in view of the earlier rejection dated 30.01.2026 with a cost of Rs. 500/- to be deposited with the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee."

Justice Roy's earlier order dated January 30, 2026 reads: "2. The present application has been preferred for
modification in Cr. Misc. No. 36600 of 2025 vide an order dated 16.09.2025, the order contains the statement of having no criminal antecedent in paragraph nos. 5 and 7 which is a factual error committed due to our hearing negligence. 3. On 16.09.2025, the Cr. Misc. No. 36600 of 2025 (Ritesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar) was allowed and grounds amongst other was that main allegation is against Saurabh, the petitioner has been shown to be friend and he do not have criminal antecedent. 4. By filing the modification petition, the petitioner now wants correction in paragraph 5 and 7 of the said order and learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has criminal antecedent. 5. Learned APP, Mr. Jitendra Kumar Singh submits that paragraph 3 of the main petition shows that the petitioner do not have criminal antecedent. 6. Considering the aforesaid fact, as recorded, no relief can be granted. 7. The Cr. Misc. No. 954 of 2026 is dismissed." 

Earlier, in Ritesh Kumar @ Ritesh Kumar Mahto @ Ritesh vs. The State of Bihar (2025) Criminal  Miscellaneous  No.36600 of 2025, Patna High Court's Justice Rajiv Roy passed a 3-page long order dated September 16, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"7. The allegation is there, it is mainly against Saurabh, the petitioner has been shown to be the friend, the girl has not stated anything about the sexual assault on her, he is only twenty years of age having no criminal antecedent, FIR is there and he shall be facing the music, in that background, this Court is inclined to extend him the privilege of anticipatory bail with conditions. 8. Let the petitioner be released on bail in the event of arrest or surrender within a period of four weeks from the receipt of this order, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) with two sureties of like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge VII-cum-Spl. Court (POCSO), Purnia in connection with Raghuvansh Nagar P.S. Case No. 19 of 2025 subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. (i) one of the bailor should be the family member/relative of the petitioner who shall provide official document to show his/her bona fide; (ii) the petitioner shall appear on each and every date before the Trial Court and failure to do so for two consecutive dates without plausible reason will entail cancellation of his bail bond by the Trial Court itself; (iii) the petitioner shall in no way try to induce or promise or threat the witnesses or tamper with the evidences, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds; (iv) the petitioner shall desist from committing any criminal offence again, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of his bail bonds." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a Raghuvansh Nagar P.S. Case No. 19 of 2025 for the offence under sections 137(2), 96 and 3(5) of the BNS lodged on March 13, 2025 by the informant, Raj Kishore Kumar Dinkar. Earlier, by his order dated June 5, 2025, Justice Partha Sarthy had called for legible photocopy of the case diary and statement of the victim recorded under section 183 BNSS in connection with Raghuvansh Nagar P.S Case no.19 of 2025 from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-VII-cum-Special Court  (POCSO), Purnea.

As per the prosecution story, the informant had alleged that while his minor daughter was going to coaching center, the named accused persons including the petitioner took her away for marriage purposes. This led to the FIR. As the story unfolds, the victim girl returned and supported the allegation made in the FIR. The petitioner's senior counsel submitted that allegation was that one Saurabh Kumar wanted to marry the girl and only to implicate, his friends were named. The petition was a student having no criminal antecedent and is only twenty years of age. Asha Kumari, the APP had opposed the prayer submitting that the petitioner was also named by the informant as also the girl upon return.

Supreme Court reverses denial of reguar bail order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a POCSO case

In Madhav @ Madho Kumar vs. 1. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed 3-page long order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, and considering the delay in lodging the FIR and as alleged, the story of political rivalry has been contemplated, in addition, taking note of the fact that the medical evidence do not corroborate with the allegation, at present, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail. 3. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court. 4. Petitioner to abide all the conditions as imposed and shall regularly attend the trial until exempted by the Court. Violation, if any, may give a cause to take recourse as permissible and the trial Court is at liberty to do the needful."

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court to seek bail against an order rejecting the regular bail by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The petitioner is in custody w.e.f. March 30, 2025 in connection with a FIR dated March 29, 2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 64, 352, 351(3) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) registered with Police Station Paharpur, District Motihari, Bihar. Prior to this Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey had called for case diary along with the statement of the victim recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS from the Court of 6th District & Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive Special Judge, POCSO Act, East Champaran, Motihari by his order dated September 3, 2025.

Earlier, Justice Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated October 15, 2025. The application for grant of regular bail, wherein, the petitioner was accused of committing rape with a minor girl. The counsel for the informant had submitted that the trial had started and in the trial the informant and the victim had already been examined and they had supported the prosecution case. Justice Kumar had concluded: "5. Considering the aforesaid facts and also the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of X
vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3539, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner Accordingly, this bail application is rejected." Supreme Court has reversed this order. 

Supreme Court reverses conditional pre-arrest bail order by Justice Purnendu Singh in a rape case, vindicates bail order by Justice Satyavrat Verma

In Ghutuk Miyan @ Ismail Miyan vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it reversed the conditional order dated April 28, 2026 by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It issued notice and concluded: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in connection with P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered SLP (Crl.) No(s). 8811/2026  at Police Station Gopalpur, District West Champaran, Bihar...." The respondent no. 2 from village, Mahesda, Gopalpur, West Champaranis is not named because it is a rape case. The Court's order vindicates the order dated March 12, 2026 by Justice Satyavrat Verma. 

Earlier, Justice Singh had passed an order wherein, he had observed:"7. Having heard the rival  submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, having perused the allegation made in the FIR, from the manner in which the entire story has been narrated, it appears to be shaky to the extent that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has rightly submitted that no one can carry a female in his lap without her desire. No force was applied by the informant, however, the informant has supported the allegation made in the FIR, in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS and the same is also supported by the 11 years old child in his statement recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer." 

The order reads: "8. In such circumstances, I direct the learned District Court to first get the statement of the 11 years old child of the informant recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS by a child friendly Court and if the learned District Court finds that the 11 years old child of the informant has not supported the allegation as alleged in the FIR, then in that case, the petitioner, above named, is directed to be released on pre-arrest bail, in the event of his/her arrest or surrender before the learned District Court within a period of four weeks from today, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District Court where the case is pending, in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. 9. If the child supports the allegations made in the FIR, in his statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, then in that case, the petitioner is directed to be taken into custody forthwith. 10. The learned District Court is directed to verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner as stated in paragraph no. 3 of the bail application. If any other case is pending against the petitioner as what has been stated in paragraph no. 3, this order will lose its force automatically." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 64, 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the BNS. According to the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner had allegedly committed rape upon the informant while her husband was not present in the house. The rape was allegedly committed in presence of her 11 years old son. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the manner in which the allegation was narrated, itself makes the allegation of commission of rape doubtful as it is the case of the informant that she was taken into lap and, thereafter, without having resisted to the same act of the petitioner, she was taken to another room where the rape was committed in presence of her 11 years old son, who supported the prosecution case along with the victim, who was the informant of the case. She also submitted that the victim was examined by the doctor and the doctor opined that there was no trace of any recent sexual assault having been committed. She submitted that Rs 70, 000 of the petitioner was due with the informant and in order to avoid payment of the same, the informant lodged the FIR. She had also submitted that on these grounds, co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had granted interim relief to the petitioner and, as such, in absence of any evidence, the petitioner deserve to be released on pre-arrest bail.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the informant, referred to the impugned order of the District Court, submitted that enough evidences have been collected in course of investigation and the petitioner having taken advantage of the absence of the husband of the informant, had committed rape, which was in presence of her 11 years old son and the statement of her son was also recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer, in which, he supported the prosecution story. He also  submitted that it was not a case of tutoring of the 11 years old child, who is innocent and his version is required to be given emphasis, particularly, in case where rape is committed. He submitted that the petitioner had not taken any plea that the child was tutored and narrated a false story under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer. He also submitted that evidence was there, which suggested that the petitioner had committed rape upon the victim, who is the informant. He had vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail.

Prior to this Justice Satyavrat Verma had passed an order dated March 12, 2026. The case arose from a Gopalpur P.S. Case of 2025 from the Court of Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned Exclusive Special Judge Rape and POCSO Act, Bettiah, West Champaran. The order reads: "4. There shall be no coercive action against the petitioner until the anticipatory bail application is finally adjudicated by this Court, as it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is a person with clean antecedent and from perusal of the allegation as alleged in the FIR, it would manifest that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship and when the child of the informant woke up, the petitioner fled and thereafter the instant FIR came to be instituted after a delay of six days. It is also submitted that the informant in the FIR alleges that after making her children sleep, she also went to sleep without locking the door and petitioner taking advantage of the same entered the house and came to her room, lifted her in his arms and brought her in another room and on the point of knife threatened and raped her. It is submitted that it does not appear probable that petitioner would have been knowing that the door was unlocked on the date of occurrence, this fact also creates a suspicion that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship."

Supreme Court reverses Justice Anil Kumar Sinha's order denying anticipatory bail

In Bablu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol  and Augustine George Masih passed a 3-page long order dated May 8, 2026, wherein, it reversed the 2-page long order dated March 19, 2026 passed by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court. The petitioner challenged the order by the High Court. The Supreme Court's order concluded: "8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.5804036250020 of 2025 of Korma Police Station, Sheikhpura District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. However, in the attending facts, one of the conditions shall necessarily be that if the petitioner possesses a passport, the same shall be deposited before the Competent Authority/Court, till the conclusion of the Trial or directed otherwise. The order recorded: "10. Needless to add, till the investigation is not complete in all respects, the petitioner(s) would fully cooperate, and if the challan/charge sheet is filed...."

The application, for grant of anticipatory bail, had arisen out of a Korma Police Station Case of 2025, disclosing offences under Sections 137(2), 96, 3(5) of the BNS, 2023. As per the prosecution case, on February 15, 2025 at about 7:00 PM, the informant’s 17-year-old daughter, Savita Kumari, went to the fields and was allegedly abducted by several accused persons who lured her with the intention of marriage. Despite efforts, she could not be traced and her mobile phone was found switched off. The informant fears that the accused may cause harm to his daughter. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and he had falsely been implicated in the case due to ulterior motives. He submitted that petitioner had no connection with the alleged occurrence and he was merely the brother of co-accused Deepak Kumar. The petitioner asserted that the informant’s daughter had voluntarily left her home owing to a consensual relationship with the co-accused Deepak Kumar. It was also submitted that the FIR disclosed only general and omnibus allegations against the petitioner without any specific role attributed to him. The petitioner had denied having any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the co-accused and the informant’s daughter. He submitted that the case was lodged maliciously with the intent to harass and exert pressure upon the petitioner. 

Justice Sinha had concluded; "Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and taking into consideration the fact that minor girl has been kidnapped, there is allegation against the petitioner that he along with Deepak Kumar and others kidnapped the minor daughter of the informant and the girl has not yet been recovered, I am not inclined to grant the petitioner privilege of anticipatory bail. 6. This application is, accordingly, rejected."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in a POCSO case

In Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Patna High Court's Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra dated March 11, 2026. The order concluded:"6. It is pertinent to note at this juncture itself and for the limited purpose of considering the prayer for bail, that the statements of the recused girls which have been recorded under Section 183 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and particularly two victims associated with the orchestra group where petitioner was working would disclose that there were no recent evidence of sexual
assault and three co-accused Gena Sah, Rajat Sardar @Rajjat Kumar @ Rajat Kumar and Subhash Kumar have since then granted regular bail by the jurisdictional High Court. Hence, on the ground of parity, petitioner is also entitled for grant of bail. 7. The impugned order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the High Court is set aside and petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional court deems fit to impose, including the condition of directing the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court on all dates of hearing."

The petitioner was arraigned as an accused No. 11 in the FIR No. 8 of 2025, registered at Police Station Women Police Station, District Betiah, for the offence punishable under Section 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 95, 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 6, 8 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 75 and 79 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956 and Section 16, 17, and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, was seeking regular bail. The record disclosed that investigation had been concluded and charge-sheet was filed and two witnesses were already examined. It was the case of the prosecution that minor girls were found in various orchestra groups who had been trafficked and they were sexually exploitated. Even according to the FIR, the petitioner was neither the owner or Manager of the orchestra group and he was only a employee (Announcer) in Chhoti New Musical Orchestra Dhamaka Group.

Earlier, in Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated March 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"...the prayer for bail of the petitioner is again rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from today. If the trial is not concluded within the period of six months, as stated above, the petitioner will be at liberty to renew his prayer before the court below." The name of respondent no. 2 has been kept anonymous. 

The petitioner sought bail in connection with Bettiah Mahila P.S. case of 2025 instituted for the offences under Sections 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 98 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 6, 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act and Sections 75 and 79 of the J.J. Act and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. This was the second attempt of the petitioner for bail. The petitioner had renewed his prayer for grant of regular bail which was earlier rejected on merit by Justice Mishra of the High Court vide 3-page long order dated August 13, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 31511 of 2025, taking into account the nature of accusation and the gravity of the offence and involvement of the petitioner in the offence.  

The order dated August 13, 2025 recorded that the informant filed a complaint before the ADJ, Champaran, based on an tip-off from National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) constituted under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which led to raids at seven locations by the police team. Sixteen girls were rescued. The victims gave statements under Section 180 BNSS alleging repeated sexual assaults, exploitation for dance, and being forced into sexual activities by various accused associated with different orchestra groups.

APP for the State and counsel for the informant had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioners. They submitted that on perusal of record it appeared that the several victims were minor girl. It was specifically submitted that petitioner, namely, Dhamu Sah used to inappropriately touch the body of victim, during dance on the stage, whereas petitioner, namely, Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey, had established illicit relation with one of the victims.

In compliance of the order dated January 17, 2026, a report dated February 12, 2026 with regard to the present stage of trial has been received. From perusal of the report, it appeared that two (2) out of nineteen (19) charge sheet witnesses had been examined in the case. It was also reported that trial was likely to be concluded within a period of nine months. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that the petitioner was languishing in judicial custody since February 23, 2025 without any rhymes or reason, having no criminal antecedent. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, hence, petitioner may be enlarged on bail. The APP for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail. The APP had further relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3539 (X. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.), wherein, in paragraph No.14, Supreme Court had observed as under: “14. Ordinarily inserious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court be it the Trial Court or the High Court should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the accused.”  

Justice Mishra observed: "7. There is no new ground to consider the bail petition of the petitioner. From the aforesaid report, it appears that the trial is going on." Supreme Court has reversed the order by the High Court. 

Supreme Court takes note of allegations "against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner" in a matrimonial case from Naugachhiya, Bhagalpur

In Amit Kumar Hari @ Amit Kumar Abhimanyu vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed a 3-page long order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, it observed:".....we notice that certain allegations have been made against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner even after the order dated 25.11.2025 passed by this Court extending the interim protection granted by the High Court to the petitioner, due to which, the petitioner has filed a complaint bearing M.P. No.264 of 2026 against those police officers before the learned CJM, Purnia. We further note that the said Court has also issued notice in the said petition. The said Court has also asked for a report from the concerned police, which is awaited. 4. Be that as it may, let the concerned Superintendent of Police applied with the aforesaid order of the learned CJM, Purnia without any delay. Thereafter, the learned CJM, Purnia shall take a call in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1-State of Bihar shall communicate the present order to the Trial Court. 6. A copy of this order be also sent to the learned CJM, Purnia." The Respondent no. 2 is Palak Kumari @ Pallawi Kumari. 

Prior to this order, the Supreme Court had passed an order dated November 25, 2025, when the parties were sent to mediation initially, there was lack of cooperation on the side of the petitioner. However, later on, he did participate, but the mediation ultimately failed. The Court went into the merits of the matter. The Court found that no case for anticipatory bail was made out. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. The order of the Court dated November 25, 2025 for continuation of the interim protection granted to the petitioner by the High Court vide the impugned order dated September 24, 2025 stands vacated. 

The case arose out of impugned final 4-page long order dated September 24, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of the Patna High Court. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Naugachhiya P.S. Case No. 33 of 2025 registered under Sections 85,115(2),126(2),352,3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3,4 of the DP Act. As per the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner along with other family members had assaulted the informant due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 

Justice Singh had recorded and observed that "the parties have failed to settle the matrimonial dispute, the Court till last minute must strive to give opportunity to the parties to settle the dispute between the husband and wife amicably. The matrimonial dispute is not an offense against the society rather a matrimonial dispute is a private conflict between spouses and does not inherently constitute an offence against society. However, a false case can have a disastrous consequence in absence of any criminal content. The personal dispute cannot call for a criminal offence. Continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law leading to vexatious proceeding against the petitioner."

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana, reported in, (2003) 4 SCC 675, in paragraph nos. 12 and 13 wherein it held as under:-
“ 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.

Justice Soni Shrivastava quashes order by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in a rape case of 2021

In Md. Said Ali Ansari vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Soni Shrivastava of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated January 12, 2026 wherein, she quashed the order by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in a Sessions Trial of 2021. The second respondent was Ravina Tabassum. Despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of her. Justice Shrivastava concluded:"....this Court is of the considered view that the present prosecution against the petitioner is not only frivolous and vexatious, but the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 375 of the IPC in order to prosecute the petitioner particularly for an offence under Section 376 of IPC is clearly and visibly not made out. In such view of the matter continuance of prosecution would amount to abuse of process of the Court, hence, the impugned order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in S.Tr. No. 161 of 2021 (arising out of Jagdispur P.S. Case No.121 of 2019) is hereby quashed. 19. Accordingly, the present application filed by the petitioner is allowed." 

The application was filed for quashing of of the order by the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur whereby and whereunder the petition dated October 26, 2021 filed by the petitioner under Section 227 Cr.P.C. to discharge the petitioner under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was rejected. The brief facts leading to the impugned order emanated from an F.I.R bearing Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 121 of 2019 dated April 26, 2019, registered under Section 341, 376, 379/34 of the IPC on the written statement of the informant Rabina Tabassum aged about 25 years, alleged inter alia that on the allurement and pretext of marriage, the informant was subjected to sexual exploitation by the petitioner for the last one year. The F.I.R further discloses that on April 22, 2019, on being asked by the petitioner to come along with him for getting married, she left her home along with cash and jewellery and went along with the petitioner to his maternal uncle’s house where they stayed in a room where the father of the petitioner had arrived and upon his assurance for marriage, she, along with the petitioner, came back to her village whereafter the mother of the petitioner also assured the informant’s parents about marriage which never happened. Hence, the present case was instituted stating in the F.I.R that other members of the family were also preventing the marriage to happen. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner and others and cognizance was taken thereupon under Section 376, 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC and after commitment of the case to the Court of Sessions, the petitioner filed the discharge application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. which stood rejected vide the impugned order dated November 17, 2021.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that no offence is made out against the petitioner, much less an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. He substantiated his submission on account of the fact that a bare perusal of the allegations made in the F.I.R itself would disclose that the petitioner and the informant/victim were having a relationship which was continued for the past one year and the informant being a 25 years old adult, as she herself claimed in the F.I.R, had entered into physical relationship with the petitioner with open eyes and there was no allegation of any threat perception or any force or coercion exercised upon her. He submitted that a relationship between two consenting adults would not bring the case within the ambit of Section 376 of IPC. He also submitted that even in the statement of the informant/victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she did not whisper a single word with regard to any sexual assault by the petitioner and had rather narrated the story in a different manner making reference to assurance given by the petitioner’s parents, specifically her mother about getting her married to the petitioner which was a definite pointer to the fact that there was a bona fide intention of marriage with Ravina Tabassum, the opposite party no.2 and there was no misconception of fact. The medical examination of the informant/victim was also referred to by the senior counsel to submit that the informant was an adult and upon vaginal swab examination, no spermatozoa was found, which was further indicative of the fact that medical evidence also did not corroborate the allegations made in the F.I.R by the informant. To buttress his submissions with respect to the offence under Section 376 of IPC not being made out, the senior counsel relied upon some recent judgments of the Supreme Court in (a) Jaspal Singh Kaural vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 756. (b) Surendra Khawse vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2025 INSC 1143), (c) Prashant vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2025) 5 SCC 764 

Justice Shrivastava observed: "9. After having heard the rival contentions of the parties and having considered the impugned order as also the material on record, the moot question which falls for consideration before this Court is as to whether there is sufficient material on record and grounds for proceeding against the petitioner, prosecuting him under Section 376 of the IPC. 10. Upon examining the contents of the F.I.R and the other materials on record, it is clear that the prosecutrix is a 25 years old adult and had entered into a relationship with the petitioner, which was continuing for the past one year leading to the inference that there was a consensual relationship between two adults. However, there is an allegation that sexual exploitation of the informant was done on the pretext of marriage. At this stage, it needs to be considered that there can be several reasons for developing physical intimacy between two consenting partners and the question of entering into a relationship under a misconception of fact needs to be established by way of specific assertion and material to show that the informant was made to enter into such relationship upon a false promise to marry and that she would not have done so in absence of such promise and assurance, coupled with the fact that the petitioner, in fact, never had any intention to marry the informant right from the inception. 11. The facts and materials disclosed in the present case, in no way, point towards any such intention of the petitioner to have sexually exploited her without intending to marry her. The prosecutrix has rather herself stated that it was due to the interference by the family members, including the parents of the petitioner, that impediments were caused in the marriage which could not fructify as a consequence of the same. It has to be kept in mind that there is a clear cut distinction between a ‘false promise’ to marry, which would come under the purview of misconception of fact as envisaged under Section 90 of the IPC and a ‘breach of promise’ which is a result of some supervening circumstances on account of which a promise earlier made has not been honored." 

She referred to a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Naim Ahmed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 15 SCC 385 wherein the distinction between a false promise to marry and a breach of promise was clarified. It reads: “21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.”

Justice Shrivastava observed: "12. The aforesaid issue of a woman engaging in sexual relations on the basis of misconception of fact amounting to rape and a breach of promise being distinct from a false promise has also been dealt with in several other judicial pronouncements rendered by this Court as also the Hon’ble Apex Court and such grounds have led to quashing of the entire prosecution. She recollected teh Supreme Court's decision in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein the legal position with regard to “consent” of a woman vis-a-vis “mis-conception of fact” arising out of a false promise to marry, was summarized . Paragraph 18 of the said judgment reads:“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

She added: "14. Upon analysis of the facts of the present case, it can be safely concluded that there is nothing on record to indicate that it is only on account of a false promise to marry that the prosecutrix had engaged herself in a physical relationship with the petitioner and thus, existence of any such assurance or promise to marry cannot be said to bear a direct nexus with the decision of the informant to engage in any sexual act. 15. This Court cannot also loose sight of the fact that the informant, who by virtue of her age and maturity, was capable enough to take her independent decisions and engaging in a sexual relationship with the petitioner was a conscious and informed choice made by the informant, being in a position to assess the morality or immorality attached to the act in which she indulged with the petitioner without there being any force or coercion upon her. Such a willful conduct would lead to only an inevitable conclusion of her willingness in carrying a relationship, including physical intimacy with the petitioner, as
such, her consent was totally voluntary. A criminal prosecution under Section 376 of IPC cannot be permitted to be initiated and to continue merely on account of the reason that a cordial and consensual relationship between a consenting couple does not materialize and fructify into a marital relationship...."

Notably, 84th report of the Law Commission of India (1980) dealt with rape and allied offences. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) deals with rape. Section 64 of BNS deals with punishment for rape. The BNS replaced the IPC from July 2, 2024.

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ritesh Kumar bench directs release of minor, directs payment of Rs 5 lakh by erring officials as compensation for illegal arrest

In Md. Jahid (Minor) under the guardianship of cousin brother Mohammad Navi Hussain/Parokar vs. The State of Bihar, through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench-II of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:".....we direct that the petitioner shall be released forthwith by the Juvenile Justice Board from the observation home/children’s home and in this regard appropriate release order shall be issued by the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura forthwith. 24. For his unlawful arrest and detention, we direct the State to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as compensation. This amount, we are assessing, keeping in view that a young boy who is a juvenile at this stage has undergone physical and mental agony for two and half months by now. The State Government shall pay this amount to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Justice Prsad who authored the judgement drew on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 1960 while dealing with the case of contravention of fundamental rights of a citizen. He referred to the decision in Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 5 by the Patna High Court which observed in paragraphs ‘27’, ‘28’ and ‘29’: “27. In the case of Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar and Another while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.” 28. In the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the learned Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials."

The judgement reads: "25. We find that the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ application of Habeas Corpus. He/his family has incurred expenses in contesting the litigation which were imposed upon them due to misuse of power by the police official. 26. We, therefore, award a cost of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) to the petitioner which shall also be paid by the State within the same period. 27. It is well settled in law that when the State is saddled with cost and compensation because of misuse of power by an executive, such cost and compensation must be realized from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which was subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019, however, the same has not been interfered with and the view is based on the earlier views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been duly discussed."

Justice Prasad who authored the judgement wrote: "28. We direct the competent authority/the Director General of Police, Bihar to institute an inquiry into the matter in administrative side, take a suitable view based on the materials which would come in course of the inquiry proceeding and realize the cost and the compensation amount from the erring officials. The cost and compensation amount which will be paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring officials after completion of inquiry, within a period of six months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 29. This writ application stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Principal District Judge, Madhepura, the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura and the Director General of Police, Bihar for compliance."

The writ application was filed in the nature of a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking release of the petitioner from the illegal detention of the respondents. It was the case of the petitioner that the I.O. in this case arrested the petitioner in complete disregard to the powers of arrest and without following the established procedure of law. The petitioner alleged gross violation of his fundamental right as embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

One Khushboo Praveen wife of Md. Amzad, resident of village Sapardah Ward No. 8, P.S.- Puraini, District- Madhepura lodged a first information report giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 11, 2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 308(2), 109, 303(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. She alleged that in connection with a land dispute, a Panchayati was held with the intervention of the co-villagers, the accused persons called the prosecution side to participate in the said Panchayati but while the Panchayati was going on, the 14 named accused including this petitioner who are all the co-villagers of the informant assaulted the prosecution side. It was also alleged that the accused persons had taken away the silver chain and other ornaments. In connection with the said occurrence, the petitioner’s mother also lodged a counter case giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 16, 2025. The  case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 76, 126(2), 109, 303(2), 352, 351(2), 351(3) of the BNS, 2023. 

During investigation of the Puraini P.S. Case, the I.O. found that there was no sufficient material to proceed against ten named accused persons including thE petitioner. One accused, namely, Md. Naushad was arrested. The investigation was supervised by the Inspector and upon instructions, the I.O. filed a chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 235 of 2025 dated September 1, 2025 in which ten accused including this petitioner were shown in Column No. 12 as not chargesheeted accused. In another words, they were not sent up for trial. A reading of the chargesheet which is on the record  would show that the same was filed on the direction of the Senior Police officer, while the arrested accused Md. Naushad was chargesheeted, the investigation was kept open against three absconding accused, namely, (1) Md. Muktar, (2) Md. Zakir and (3) Md. Akhtar. It was apparent that after about 25 days, the I.O. received a review note/supervision note from the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short ‘DIG’), Koshi Range, Saharsa. It was evident that the supervision note was recorded by the DIG on his own on the request of the informant who had visited the office of the DIG with an application complaining that the Inspector of Police had wrongly exonerated ten named accused persons. The DIG simply recorded in his note the allegations. Taking note of the statements of the witnesses, he issued a direction to the I.O. to proceed with the investigation of the case assuming that the allegations are true against the accused persons. He directed the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura to ensure further action and arrest all the remaining accused persons expeditiously. A perusal of the case diary would showed that the supervision note of the DIG was incorporated in the case diary on September 25, 2025 whereafter the I.O. straightway proceeded to conduct raid on the house of the accused persons. The case diary did not show that after the supervision note of the DIG, any instruction was obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura. It did not show that the I.O., being fully aware of the fact that the ten accused persons had already been shown not sent up for trial, made any application in the court of Magistrate for permitting a further investigation. The I.O. could not lay his hand to any other material against the petitioner but on October 23, 2025, he arrested the petitioner, described his age as 19 years and produced him before the court from where he was sent to jail. It appeared that even at the time of his production before the Magistrate, the attention of the Magistrate was not drawn towards the fact that the petitioner was shown in the column of not chargesheeted accused in the chargesheet, therefore, once the chargesheet had been filed in the court, it was incumbent upon the I.O. to file an application seeking further investigation of the case if at all any material had come against the petitioner. Even the Magistrate did not look into these aspects of the matter and straightway in a mechanical manner sent the petitioner behind the bars. 

The petitioner approached the High Court by filing the writ application and informed this Court on November 24, 2025 in course of hearing that the petitioner was a juvenile as per his date of birth certificate i.e. the registration card of the Bihar School Examination Board showing his date of birth as January 1, 2010. The petitioner complained that despite the fact that he was a juvenile, the Magistrate did not assess his age at the time of sending him behind the bars and in complete breach of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the petitioner was languishing in jail. On 24.11.2025, the High Court noticed the submissions and asked the State to file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the I.O. who had effected the arrest of the petitioner. In the meantime, the High Court observed that “it will be open to the Jurisdictional Magistrate to take corrective measures after considering the date of birth certificate of the petitioner. If it is found that the petitioner is aged below 18 years, it will be incumbent upon the Jurisdictional Magistrate to send him to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for assessment of age and considering his date of birth certificate as per the Bihar School Examination Board, he would be kept in an observation home and not in jail with adults.”

The High Court was been informed at this stage that, in fact, after coming to know the claim of the petitioner that he was a juvenile, the Jurisdictional Magistrate had vide his order dated November 21, 2025 referred him for assessment of age to the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura. A Letter No. 13 dated January 7, 2026 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura showed that the petitioner was declared juvenile aged about 15 years 06 months and 08 days on the date of occurrence.

A question arose for consideration in the present case as to how the petitioner could have been arrested on October 23, 2025 when he was not chargesheeted in the case and, in fact, in the Chargesheet No. 235, he was shown one amongst the ten accused persons who were not chargesheeted/sent up for trial.

Justice Prasad observed:"We have already taken note of the fact that during investigation, sufficient materials were not found against the petitioner to send him to trial and after the supervision note of the DIG, the I.O. had not collected any other and further material against the petitioner. All that he did after receipt of the supervision note of the DIG was that he conducted a raid and ultimately arrested the petitioner from his house on 23.10.2025." 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Satyavrat Verma's anticipatory bail rejection order

In Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated November 7, 2025 upon hearing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) which arose out of impugned 3-page long order dated July 16, 2025 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench reversed the order of Justice Verma saying, "3....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 4 In view of the above, we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties...." The Court had granted interim relief by its order dated September 24, 2025 by issuing direction for not taking coercive steps.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court apprehending her arrest in connection with a FIR dated December 1, 2024 registered at Police Station Banjariya, District East Champaran, Bihar for the offences
punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 109, 118(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 

Earlier, in Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Verma had concluded:"5. Considering the submissions made by the learned APP, the court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 6. The anticipatory bail application of the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, if the petitioner surrenders on or before 30.07.2025, in that event, the learned trial Court shall dispose of the case, on the same day, keeping in mind that husband of the petitioner has been granted the privilege of regular bail by this Court." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending her arrest in connection with Banjariya P.S. Case No.394/2024, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(2), 109, 352, 3(5) of the B.N.S. Act.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that woman petitioner was a person with clean antecedent. The husband of the petitioner had approached the High Court seeking regular bail by filing Cr. Misc.No.32639/2025 and the same was allowed by an order dated 22.05.2025. It was submitted that informant alleged that husband of the petitioner was indulged in trade of liquor, further on 26.11.2024, the Banjariya police caught the liquor of her husband, on account of which, the husband of the petitioner abused the informant alleging that it was at his instance that the liquor was caught, thereafter husband of the petitioner assaulted the informant by knife causing injury. It was next alleged that the petitioner along with co-accused Vivek Kumar also assaulted the brother of the informant Vinod Sah by knife causing injury. It was submitted that the injury suffered by Vinod Sah was simple in nature. A.P.P. for the State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner along with Vivek were alleged to have assaulted Vinod by knife causing injury. It was also submitted that Vinod suffered two injuries and the husband of the petitioner was granted the privilege of regular bail, as such, the APP submitted that it was not a fit case, where the privilege of anticipatory bail be granted to the petitioner, in the nature of allegation as alleged in the FIR.

Supreme Court reverses pre-arrest bail rejection order by Justice Purnendu Singh

In Praween Barnawal @ Praween Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 4-page long order dated November 6, 2025, wherein, he concluded:''....the interim protection granted by this Court on 18.09.2025 is made absolute and it is directed that no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner and in the event of his arrest, he shall be released on bail, provided he continues to cooperate in the investigation.'' It disposed of the Special Leave Petition. The petitioner had approached the Court seeking anticipatory bail in connection with a FIR of 2024 dated December 30, 2024, which was rejected by the High Court and the courts below.During the pendency of the Special Leave Petition, the petitioner was granted interim protection by this Court vide order dated September 18, 2025 and it was provided that if the petitioner joins the investigation and cooperates with the Investigating Officer (IO), no coercive steps shall be taken against him. The petitioner joined the investigation and was found cooperating with the IO.

Earlier, in Praween Barnawal @ Praween Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court passed a 3-page long order dated August 20, 2025, wherein, he concluded:''7. Having considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, the fact that though it is not specific in the FIR, as to whether, the demand of dowry was made just before the alleged murder took place, however, considering the fact that certain amount was transferred through RTGS into the account of the petitioner just before the marriage on 03.02.2022 and the marriage had taken place on 10.02.2022 and it is evident that after commission of murder, the dead body was hanged and the door was locked from outside, I don’t find that in any manner the complicity of the petitioner can be denied. I am not inclined to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, the present bail application stands dismissed.'' 

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with Kankarbagh P.S. case of 2024 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 80, 85 and 3(5) of the BNS. According to the allegation made in the FIR, for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry, the petitioner along with other co-accused committed murder of the daughter of the informant. The deceased was found hanging in a close room which was locked from outside. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that petitioner was younger brother of the husband of the deceased and he was a student and had no connection with the matrimonial affairs between the husband and the wife and due to some difference, the petitioner who was not present at the time of alleged offence was implicated in the  case on the ground that certain amount was transferred through RTGS into the account of the petitioner just before the marriage took place which was deposited willingly by the father of the deceased. The counsel also submitted that for similar allegation, other co-accused was granted bail by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court vide order dated April 30, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No.22663 of 2025. The petitioner had clean antecedent and sought pre-arrest bail.

Abhlasha Jha, the counsel on behalf of the informant had vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail. She submitted that the entire family including the petitioner had committed murder of the daughter of the informant and after commission of murder, the dead body was hanged and the door was locked from outside and, as such, the complicity of the petitioner cannot be denied in the alleged murder. APP for the State also vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail.

Supreme Court oders mediation in a matrimonial dispute/criminal case

In Niwash Kumar Son of Nand Kishor Mehta @ Kishori Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N;K Singh passed a 2-page long order dated November 3, 2025, wherein, it concluded:''....the parties are directed to appear before the Coordinator, Supreme Court Mediation Center on 12th November, 2025 at 11.00 a.m. The Coordinator shall appoint a Mediator to enable the parties to make an effort to settle the matter amicably. 3. Initially, the parties are permitted to appear virtually and thereafter, the parties shall appear as per the directions of the Mediator. 4. All expenses towards travel and lodging of the wife shall be borne by the petitioner-husband. 5. List the matter along with Mediation Report on 16.01.2026.'' 

The case arose out of the order in Niwash Kumar Son of Nand Kishor Mehta @ Kishori Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated September 4, 2025, wherein, he concluded:''Considering the heinous nature of allegation and gravity of offence , prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is rejected.'' The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 126 ( 2 ), 115 ( 2 ), 109, 351 ( 2 ), 352 and 3 (5) of BNS.

According to the prosecution case, informant namely, Rani Kumari alleged that she got married with this petitioner , Nivas Kumar on December 19, 25 and gift of Rs. 75 lakh and other items were given to this petitioner. After sometime of marriage, this petitioner along with other co-accused persons started torturing and harassing her for demand of dowry. It was also  alleged that her husband was involved in immoral activities and also made objectionable videos of her and started threatening to circulate the same on social media . On May 24, 2025 , her husband and her in -laws assaulted her and pressurized her to bring more dowry (including a car) and she was also threatened with dire consequences.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was husband of informant allegation was absolutely false and concocted. At no point of time, this petitioner tortured or harassed the informant for dowry. He neither demand dowry nor involved in unnatural sex with informant or made any video of the incident. Petitioner claims clean antecedent. 

The counsel for the State opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that there is direct and specific allegation against this petitioner that he was involved in unnatural sex with the informant and also made vide of the incident and thereafter continued to blackmail her. He also committed torture and harassment for dowry and also tried to kill her for non-fulfillment of the same.

Patna High Court delivered seven judgments on October 31, denies interim bail to Rit Lal Yadav

Patna High Court delivered seven judgments on October 31, 2025 in Uma Pandey vs. Munna Pandey, Swarnima Gupta @ Anita Gupta, vs. Barun Kumar Choudhary, Kishor Kunal vs. The State of Bihar, Bhawa Nand Jha vs. The State of Bihar, Chunchun Kumar vs. The Union of India & Ors., Prakash Chandra Roy vs. Union Bank Of India & Anr. and Rit Lal Yadav @ Rit Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar.

In Rit Lal Yadav @ Rit Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court  delivered a 33-page long judgement, wherein, he concluded: "....it is clear that when alternative remedy is available, the power under Article 226 could be exercised under certain conditions/contingencies and none of these conditions are present in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court under some misconceived notion. If the petitioner was already before this Court by filing of bail petition and also before the learned trial court seeking regular bail, an equally efficacious remedy was available to the petitioner but he did not pursue the said remedy. 26. Moreover, considering the antecedent and background of the petitioner and pressing demand of the time that the Indian polity should be purged of criminal elements, the prayer of the petitioner could not be acceded to." 

He added: "A balance should be struck between the rights of citizens who deserve a clean India and rights of undertrial prisoners in custody who want to participate in the election process. Obviously the balance will tilt in the favour of common citizens. The people of India should be given a choice to elect people with clean image and antecedents and hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that allowing a person with criminal antecedents of serious nature, would not be in larger interest of the society and would not further the cause of democratic institutions. 27. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances in totality, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition and finding no merit, the present writ petition stands dismissed." 

Rit Lal Yadav was represented by Y. C. Verma, senior advocate and Advocates namely, Dr. Gopal Krishna, Ghanshyam Tiwary, Vikas Kumar Jha, Adarsh Singh, Saloj Kumar Rai, Khalil Faizan, Harsh Kumar, Rahul Deo Varman, Abhinav Kumar and Prinyanka Singh. 

Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in paragraph-5 in Vishwanath Pratap Singh vs. Election Commission of India and Anr. (decided on 09.09.2022, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 13013 of 2022), Justice Jha observed:"Thus, there is no doubt that the right to canvass and campaign for getting elected in an election is not a fundamental right. It is only a statutory right on which restriction can be imposed by statutes." 

 

Supreme Court grants relief to Niraj Kumar, which was denied by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Niraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra passed an order dated August 11, 2025 in a case which arose out of a P.S. case 2024 from Ganga bridge Thana, Vaishali. It condoned the delay. The order reads:"In the event of arrest, the petitioner(s) shall be released on bail by the Investigating/arresting officer on such terms and conditions as imposed and found to be just, fair and reasonable." The petitioner has challenged to the judgment and order dated January 29, 2025 passed by the High Court. 

In Niraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court had passed a 2-page long order dated January 29, 2025 rejecting the prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner due to the nature of accusation and gravity of offence. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 103(1), 61 (2) and 3(5) of BNS, 2023. 

As per the prosecution case on 05.08.2024 at 11.00 AM the petitioner along with other F.I.R., named accused persons called brother of the informant who went in the company of accused persons and on the same day at about 2.30 Pm, informant came to know that his brother was lying on ground in dead condition . With the help of villagers, his brother was rushed to nearby clinic of Sadhusharan Choudhary where he was declared dead. Then , informant raised suspicion that the petitioner along with other co-accused persons in collusion with each other killed brother of informant.

The counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely been implicated in the case . Only suspicion has been raised against this petitioner. Informant was no eye witness to the alleged occurrence. There was delay of 4 days in lodging the F.I.R., for which there was no plausible explanation for the same . At best, it was a case of last seen with the deceased. The State opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that there was specific allegation against the petitioner that he along with other co-accused persons killed the deceased. It was also submitted that it was the petitioner and other co-accused persons who took away the deceased along with them and thereafter deceased was left in dead condition. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench grants bail, Justice Sandeep Kumar had declined bail to the accused with "no criminal antecedent"

In Md. Saheb vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 3-page long order on May 1, 2025 saying, "taking into account the nature of the offence and the period of incarceration, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail pending trial" after hearing the appeal against the order of Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant. The appellant's counsel submitted that  Md. Saheb, a resident of Basgaon, Abadpur, Katihar. has suffered incarceration of over seven months. The prosecution case against the appellant was based on recovery of Rs. 5,300/- cash and a mobile. 

But as far as the cash is concerned, it has not been identified as a looted article and the mobile which has been recovered is not connected with the crime. It was submitted that First Information Report was lodged against unknown persons and co-accused has already been granted bail. The order recorded that the State's counsel "could not point out any previous criminal antecedents of the appellant rather, in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit, it is admitted that appellant has no criminal antecedent."  

In Md. Saheb vs. The State of Bihar (2025), in his 2-page order dated February 21, 2025 Justice Sandeep Kumar  concluded: "this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner." The petitioner had sought bail in connection with police case registered for the offence under Section 309(4) of the BNS which provides punishment for robbery which is rigorous imprisonment for a term that may extend to ten years, and a fine. The prosecution case was that four unknown criminals are alleged to have looted Rs. 55,805/-, one Tab etc. from the informant. Rs. 5300/- and one mobile phone was recovered from the petitioner and the petitioner had given a self-inculpatory statement. The petitioner is in jail since August 5, 2024. The petitioner's application was dismissed.

19 Chapters and 358 Sections of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) replaces 23 chapters and 511 Sections of Indian Penal Code

In his note of dissent to the parliamentary report on Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the new criminal law, N. R. Elango, Member of the Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs wrote:"I find no new clause that imbibe Indian thought process and the Indian soul. This bill is also not having any citizen centric approach. I am of the view that there is no provision introduced, no new definition of the offences is given except adding or deleting some words in the existing provisions, adding new offences, which are already punishable under special enactments, enhancing the punishment of few offences without any rationale."

It is noteworthy that 20 new offences have been added and 19 provisions in the repealed IPC have been dropped. The punishment of imprisonment has been increased for 33 offences, and fines have been increased for 83 offences. A mandatory minimum punishment has been introduced for 23 offences. 

In general, like IPC, BNS deals with offences against the body. It has retained the provisions of the IPC on murder, abetment of suicide, assault and causing grievous hurt. It has added new offences such as organised crime, terrorism, and murder or grievous hurt by a group on certain grounds.

Like IPC, it deals with sexual offences against women. It has retained the provisions of the IPC on rape, voyeurism, stalking and insulting the modesty of a woman. It has increased the threshold for the victim to be classified as a major, in the case of gang rape, from 16 to 18 years of age.

Like IPC, it deals with offences against property. It has retained the provisions of the IPC on theft, robbery, burglary and cheating. It has added new offences such as cybercrime and financial fraud. The fact is that it was already incorporated in the IPC through amendment. 

Like IPC, it deals with the offences against the state. The BNS creates an impression about removal of sedition as an offence. The fact is that it was been brought in as a new offence for acts endangering India's sovereignty, unity and integrity. 

Like IPC, it deals with offences against the public.

The BNS has 19 Chapters and 358 Sections. 174 Sections of IPC have been changed, 8 new Sections added and 22 Sections repealed.

Chapter 1 has Sections 1 to 3 which deal with the Preliminary including definitions (2) and General explanations (3).
Chapter 2  has Sections 4 to 13 which deal with Punishments.
Chapter 3  has Sections 14 to 44 which deal with General Exceptions (14-33) and the Right to Private Defence (34 to 44).
Chapter 4 has Sections 45 to 62 which deal with Abetment, Criminal Conspiracy and Attempt.

Chapter 5 has Sections 63 to 99 which deal with Offences against Women and Children including Sexual Offences (63 to 79), Criminal Force and Assault against Women (74 to 79), Offences relating to Marriage (80 to 92) and Causing of Miscarriage and including offences against child (93-99) like Exposure and abandonment of child under twelve years, of age, by parent or person having care of it Concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body, Hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence, Procuration of child, Kidnapping or abducting child under ten years of age with intent to steal from its person, Selling child for purposes of prostitution, Buying child for purposes of prostitution.

Chapter 6 has Sections 100 to 146 which deal with Offences Affecting the Human Body including Offences Affecting Life (100 to 113), Hurt (114 to 127), Criminal Force and Assault (128 to 136), Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour (137 to 146).

Chapter 7 has Sections 147 to 158 which deal with Offences Against the State.
Chapter 8 has Sections 159 to 168 which deal with Offences Relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force
Chapter 9 has Sections 169 to 177 which deal with Offences Relating to Elections
Chapter 10 has Sections 178 to 188 which deal with Offences Relating to Coins, Bank Notes, Currency Notes and Government Stamps
Chapter 11 has Sections 189 to 197 which deal with Offences Against the Public Tranquility
Chapter 12 has Sections 198 to 205 which deal with Offences by Or Relating to Public Servants
Chapter 13 has Sections 206 to 226 which deal with Contempt of Lawful Authority of Public Servants
Chapter 14 has Sections 227 to 269 which deal with False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice.
Chapter 15  has Sections 270 to 297 which deal with Offences affecting the Public Health, Safety, Convince, Decency and Morals
Chapter 16  has Sections 298 to 302 which deal with Offences Relating to Religion
Chapter 17 has Sections 303 to 334  which deal with Offences against Property including Theft (303), Extortion (304), Theft in a dwelling house, or means of transportation or place of worship (305), Theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master(306), Theft after preparation made for causing death, hurt or restraint in order to committing of theft (307), Extortion (308), Robbery and Dacoity (309 to 313), Criminal Misappropriation of Property (314 and 315), Criminal Breach of Trust (316), Receiving of Stolen Property (317), Cheating (318 and 319), Fraudulent Deeds and Dispositions of Property (320 to 323), Mischief (324 to 328) and Criminal Trespass (329 to 334).
Chapter 18 has Sections 335 to 350 which deal with Offences Relating to Documents and to Property Marks.
Chapter 19 has Sections 351 to 358 which deal with Criminal Intimidation, Insult, Annoyance, Defamation, etc including Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance (349 to 353), Breach of peace (352) Public Mischief (353) Defamation (356), breach of contract to attend on and supply wants of the helpless person (357) and Repeal and Savings (358).

Section 358 states that IPC is repealed but savings pending proceedings shall continue under the repealed law. IPC has 23 chapters and 511 sections. The 119 page long IPC came into operation on January 1, 1862.

Chapter I of IPC has Sections 1 to 5 which provide Introduction including definitions
Chapter II has Sections 6 to 52 which deal with  General Explanations
Chapter III has Sections 53 to 75 which deal with Punishments
Chapter IV has Sections 76 to 106 which deal with General Exceptions and of the Right of Private Defence (Sections 96 to 106)
Chapter V has Sections 107 to 120  which deal with Abetment
Chapter VA has Sections 120A to 120B which deal with Criminal Conspiracy
Chapter VI  has Sections 121 to 130 which deal with Offences against the State
Chapter VII has Sections 131 to 140  which deal with Offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force
Chapter VIII  has Sections 141 to 160 which deal with Offences against the Public Tranquillity
Chapter IX has Sections 161 to 171 which deal with Offences by or relating to Public Servants
Chapter IXA has Sections 171A to 171 which deal with Offences Relating to Elections
Chapter X has Sections 172 to 190 which deal with Contempts of Lawful Authority of Public Servants
Chapter XI has Sections 191 to 229 which deal with False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice
Chapter XII has Sections 230 to 263 which deal with Offences relating to coin and Government Stamps
Chapter XIII has Sections 264 to 267 which deal with Offences relating to Weight and Measures
Chapter XIV has Sections 268 to 294 which deal with Offences affecting the Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decency and Morals.
Chapter XV has Sections 295 to 298 which deal with Offences relating to Religion
Chapter XVI has Sections 299 to 377 which deal with Offences affecting the Human Body including Offences Affecting Life including murder, culpable homicide (Sections 299 to 311), Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to Unborn Children, of the Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births (Sections 312 to 318), Hurt (Sections 319 to 338), Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement (Sections 339 to 348), Criminal Force and Assault (Sections 349 to 358), Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour (Sections 359 to 374) and Sexual Offences including rape and Sodomy (Sections 375 to 377)
Chapter XVII has Sections 378 to 462 which deal with Offences Against Property including Theft (Sections 378 to 382), Extortion (Sections 383 to 389), Robbery and Dacoity (Sections 390 to 402),  Criminal Misappropriation of Property (Sections 403 to 404), Criminal Breach of Trust (Sections 405 to 409), Receiving of Stolen Property (Sections 410 to 414), Cheating (Section 415 to 420), Fraudulent Deeds and Disposition of Property (Sections 421 to 424), Mischief (Sections 425 to 440) and Criminal Trespass (Sections 441 to 462)
Chapter XVIII has Section 463 to 489 -E which deal with Offences relating to Documents and Property Marks including Offences relating to Documents (Section 463 to 477-A), Offences relating to Property and Other Marks (Sections 478 to 489) and Offences relating to Currency Notes and Bank Notes (Sections 489A to 489E)
Chapter XIX has Sections 490 to 492 which deal with Criminal Breach of Contracts of Service
Chapter XX has Sections 493 to 498 which deal with Offences related to marriage
Chapter XXA has Sections 498A which deal with Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband
Chapter XXI has Sections 499 to 502 which deal with Defamation
Chapter XXII has Sections 503 to 510 which deal with Criminal intimidation, Insult and Annoyance

Chapter XXIII  has Section 511 which deals with Attempts to Commit Offences 

A joint reading of the provisions of BNS and IPC reveals that both the laws are still in operation. The former is operational with regard to offences committed prior to July 1, 2024 and the latter with regard to offences committed after July 1, 2024. 

It is also evident that four Sections 499, 500, 501 and 502 for "defamation" under IPC have been clubbed under Section 356 of BNS. 

The the nine Sections 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 150, 151, 157 and 158 of IPC for "Unlawful Assembly" under IPC have been clubbed under Section 189 of BNS. 

The six Sections 233, 234, 235, 256, 257 and 489 D of IPC that dealt with "making or selling instruments or materials for forging or counterfeiting coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes" have been clubbed under one Section 181 of BNS.  

The six Sections 242, 243, 252, 253, 259 and 489C of IPC that dealt with "possession forged  counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes" have been clubbed under one Section 180 of BNS. 

The nine Sections 239, 240, 241, 250, 251, 254, 258, 260 and 489B of IPC that dealt with "using as genuine, forged  counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes" have been clubbed under one Section 179 of BNS. 

The nine Sections 230, 231, 232, 246, 247, 248, 249, 255 and 489A of IPC that dealt with "counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes" have been clubbed under one Section 178 of BNS. 

Notably, 124-A of IPC which dealt with "sedition" has been deleted but Section 152 of the BNS deals with and "act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India". There are decisions of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath Singh vs. State of Bihar (1962) to S.G Vombatkare vs. Union of India (2022) on the constitutionality of the Section 124-A of the IPC. In 2022, the Court directed the governments to restrain from filing any FIR under Section 124-A of the IPC. On September 12, 2023, it has referred the matter to a Constitution Bench of the Court.

With reference to the provision in the BNS on "Sedition law", it is noteworthy that the parliamentary committee's report acknowledges the fact that the Sedition law has just been paraphrased and retained. The 22nd Law Commission had suggested that sedition should be well defined. The Union government has decided to do the opposite of that. The provision in the new bill gives it such a broad definition that it can encompass any act in the name of endangering the unity and integrity of India. It leaves a lot of room for discretion which is the opposite of what was advised by the law commission. It talks about Acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. Sedition gets a sinister backfoot entry in the proposed legal regime. This broad definition could potentially infringe on individuals' rights to free expression and peaceful dissent. The broad and vaguely worded sedition provisions can create a chilling effect on free speech and peaceful protest. Individuals may self-censor their opinions and criticisms, fearing legal consequences, which can undermine democratic values and civil liberties. The potential for misuse and abuse under the redefined sedition law has increased. Such broad and discretionary provisions can be employed to stifle legitimate dissent and criticism, limiting freedom of expression and potentially infringing on individuals' rights.

The three Sections 364, 364A and 365 of IPC which dealt with "Kidnapping for murder, ransom, etc." have been clubbed under one Section 140 under BNS. 

The eight Sections 340, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347 and 348 of IPC which dealt with "wrongful confinement" have been clubbed under one Section 127 under BNS. 

Certain offences defined under BNS are already defined and punishable under Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. UAPA, 1967 is a Special Enactment, it is having a special procedure with regard to investigation, bail etc. The incorporation of same provisions in the BNS will cause lot of confusion in the matter of registration of a case, investigation, inquiry and trial of a particular offence. The offenders who fall under both the enactments will attempt to escape the rigor of UAPA, 1967. There is an overlapping between UAPA and BNS and such overlapping will cause confusions. How a Police officer, though he is a senior officer can decide under which enactment a person is to be prosecuted. This is to be decided by the Court.

The provision in the BNS on the "Commutation of a sentence" is problematic. It gives the executive the powers to commute an offender’s sentence punishment for any other punishment. Allowing the executive to commute sentences can blur the separation of powers in a government. It gives the executive branch, which is responsible for enforcing the law, a role in altering or mitigating the legal punishments determined by the judiciary. This could potentially lead to an imbalance of power and an infringement on the judiciary's independence. Executive decisions might be swayed by electoral or popularity concerns rather than solely focusing on justice and the merits of individual cases. Commutations can be seen as undermining the authority and decisions of the judiciary. It may give the impression that the executive branch can override or second-guess the judiciary's determinations, eroding trust in the legal system.

With regard to the provision in the BNS on the "Solitary Confinement", it is noteworthy that solitary confinement is inhumane. There is research which shows that solitary confinement is not an effective tool for deterrence or rehabilitation. It does not reduce recidivism or promote positive behaviour change; instead, it can increase aggression and antisocial behaviour. It has been shown to have serious detrimental effects on individuals' mental and physical well-being, and it raises ethical and human rights concerns. The characterization of solitary confinement as a brutal type of incarceration by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev v. State of Rajasthan highlights the court's recognition of the severe and adverse effects of solitary confinement on individuals.

With regard to the provision in the BNS on the "Promise to Marry", it must be noted that relationships and decisions about marriage are deeply personal matters that should be left to the individuals involved, subject to only some basic safeguards that may be consensually instituted by the society Criminalizing a Promise to Marry can be seen as an undue intrusion into individuals' Right to Privacy and autonomy. Determining whether a promise to marry has been made can be subjective and challenging to prove. Intentions can change over time, and proving that a promise was genuinely made with the intention to marry can be difficult. Defining what constitutes a legally binding Promise to Marry can be vague and open to interpretation. This lack of clarity can lead to inconsistencies in enforcement and judgments. Criminalizing a Promise to Marry can be viewed as an unwarranted intrusion into the fundamental Right to Privacy and personal autonomy, which are cherished principles in a democratic society. In this context, a more nuanced and rights-based approach to addressing matters related to promises to marry would be both pragmatic and respectful of individual freedoms and choices.

With regard to the provision in the BNS on "Kidnapping and begging", fails to exclude the exception of lawful guardian of such child. Even guardians who wrongfully push children into begging should be rigorously punished. Excluding the exception of lawful guardians in a clause punishing those who wrongfully push children into begging is essential to safeguard the rights and well-being of vulnerable children. It sends a strong message that all individuals, regardless of their legal relationship with the child, will be held accountable for such harmful actions, acting as a powerful deterrent against child exploitation. This approach prioritizes the child's best interests, prevents potential legal loopholes, and aligns with international human rights standards, fostering a child-centered and protective legal framework that leaves no room for evading responsibility in cases of child exploitation.

The current definition of "imprisonment for life" within the BNS is not explicitly clear. It appears to be using the term "imprisonment for the remainder of a person's natural life." However, in the IPC, Section 53, the term "imprisonment for life" is used without specifying whether it means "imprisonment for the remainder of a person's natural life" or if it is equivalent to a "whole life sentence." There needs to be clarity about whether the convicts are expected to remain in prison for the entirety of their natural life or are eligible for release. The proposed definition of "imprisonment for life" in the BNS is not explicitly clear, and it differs from how "imprisonment for life" is generally understood in the context of the IPC. To avoid confusion and ensure legal clarity, the definition in the BNS be aligned with the understanding that "imprisonment for life" means a "whole life sentence" unless otherwise specified. This would help in harmonizing the definitions and interpretations across different legal contexts in India. 

With regard to "Offences Relating to Elections", it has been noted in the report that "One of the general patterns in contemporary India’s criminal law is that offences that are particularly difficult to regulate and especially elaborate in their organisation internally while having a large-scale impact on society are addressed by ‘special statutes’. These special statutes while being harsh in punishment are rigorous in the procedural safeguards, they offer the accused. The emphasis being that there are checks and balances present in the quest of the state to prosecute and the efforts of the accused to defend herself. Any detraction from the procedural protections that general criminal law offers, will have checks in place in these special statutes. Offences related to elections should be on Representation of People Act. Similarly with UAPA, the special legislation should remain and amended if need be. But it should not be subsumed in the IPC."

With regard to clause on "Defamation", there is no limitation on filing cases for defamation. Imposing a time limitation on defamation claims helps protect the fundamental principle of free speech. Without such limitations, individuals or organizations could potentially bring defamation claims many years after an alleged defamatory statement was made. This could have a chilling effect on free expression and public discourse, as people may become reluctant to express their opinions or engage in critical discussions for fear of facing legal action at any time in the future.

A new Section 69 in the BNS deals with "sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means". It penalizes sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means (false promise of employment or promotion, inducement or marrying after suppressing identity) or by making promise to marry without intention of fulfilling the same.

A sentence of community service has been introduced for six offences. This is reserved for minor offences, non-violent crimes, and first-time offenders. These are:

1. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under Section 84 BNSS (Section 209 BNS).
2. Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade (Section 202 BNS).
3. Attempt to commit suicide to compel or restrain exercise of lawful power (Section 226 BNS).
4. Petty theft (involving property worth less than INR 5,000) by first-time offenders upon returning the stolen property (Proviso to Section 303 BNS).
5. Misconduct in public by a drunken person (Section 355 BNS).
6. Defamation (Section 356 BNS).

Notably, under section 18(c) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 a juvenile may be directed to undertake Community Service as a penalty.

Community service has been defined as ‘Court ordered work that benefits the community, and which is not entitled to any remuneration’ (Explanation to section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). In State through PS Lodha Colony, New Delhi v. Sanjeev Nanda (BMW Hit and Run case), Supreme Court directed community service under Article 142 of the Constitution of India as a reformative measure along with payment of compensation instead of enhancing the sentence. 

BNS misses the opportunity to the menace of ‘hate speeches’. It has not been defined in any law including the new law. Section 196 of the BNS deals with the offence of  promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony. It includes electronic communication in its ambit but does not define it. It ignores Law Commission’s 267th Report on Hate Speech and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan vs. Union of India (2014).

BNS fails to include Section 153AA of IPC, which deals with punishment for knowingly carrying arms in any procession or organizing, or holding or taking part in any mass drill or mass training with arms. It was enacted in 2005 by Parliament but it was not notified. 

Section 104(2) of the BNS violates Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution which says “no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”.

The new criminal laws enhances the time for which a person can be kept in police custody, there exists no protective measures to provide safety to the accused persons under police custody which is bound to adversely affect the safety of detainees.

There are several provisions in these laws which consolidate powers introduced by the colonial powers. For instance, Section 113 (terrorist acts) of the BNS unmindful of the fact that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 already deals with it. It is intriguing as to why create a general law provision when UAPA, a special law already exists in this regard.

The BNS retains the marital rape exception. It retains the value laden phrase ‘outraging the modesty of women’ instead of replacing it with the gender-neutral term ‘sexual assault’. It provides inadequate protection to victims of non-consensual intimate imagery. It does not include any provision for offences involving rape of males or of transgender individuals. The provision for offence for acts endangering ‘sovereignty or unity and integrity of India’, is ambiguous, with the potential to curtail freedom of speech or to stifle dissent.

The judgement of the Supreme Court in Mithu Vs. State of Punjab underlined that there is no intelligible differentia in sentencing a person only with death sentence under section 303 of IPC. The BNS attempts an alternate sentence to the death, namely imprisonment for life which means imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s life. This falls foul of the Court's judgement. 

The National Judicial Data Grid reveals that 34,180,141 criminal cases at the district and taluka courts are pending in India. 1,755,946 criminal cases are pending in the high courts. At the Supreme Court 18,049 (less than one year old) cases are pending. The new criminal laws will result 30 percent increase in criminal litigation. It is all set to create two parallel sets of laws since the criminal justice system is a combination of both substantive and procedural laws.