FIR under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 & provisions of IPC quashed: Justice Sandeep Kumar

Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar quashed F.I.R. registered for the offence under Sections 323, 341, 376, 376-D, 420, 313, 120-B, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under section 67 of the Information Technology Act and all the consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid F.I.R. including the order dated January 6, 2023 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1st, Danapur. The Magistrate had passed the order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for registration of the F.I.R.. 

In his 34-page long judgement in Sanjeev Hans vs. The State of Bihar & Ors (2024). Justice Kumar examined as to whether the offence of rape is made out against the petitioner or not besides non-compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C.

The other respondents were: Director General of Police, Patna, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Rupaspur Police Station, Patna and Gayatri Kumari of Kataiya, Jamhur, Aurangabad.

Gayatri Kumari, the complainant is a practicing advocate in Allahabad High Court. She was practicing in Patna High Court from 2009 to 2015. In the month of February, 2016 while the complainant was staying at the residence of Senior Advocate Gajendra Prasad Yadav situated at Golden Plaza Apartment, Chitkohra for getting her case mentioned, a junior advocate namely, Shiv Nandan Bharti introduced her to Gulab Yadav, who was an M.L.A. It has also been alleged that said Gulab Yadav lured her by saying that he will get make her member of Women Commission and asked her to come to meet him along with her bio-data at his residence situated at Flat No.401, Bindeshwari Apartment. It is alleged that when the Complainant reached the house of said Gulab Yadav, he raped her at gun point and when the complainant was going to register F.I.R. then Gulab Yadav asked his servant Lalit to bring vermilion and put the same on the forehead of the complainant and said that they were married and they will get their marriage registered and asked for some time to get divorce from his first wife. 

She alleged that Gulab Yadav called the complainant to Pune to show the papers of the Court, by which divorce has been granted. On July 8, 2017 when thec complainant reached Hotel Bestil then Gulab Yadav introduced her to Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner and both raped her after mixing some intoxicating substance in her food. When the complainant regained her consciousness, Gulab Yadav showed her the video of her rape and sent the same on her mobile and threatened her to make the video viral. The complainant got scared and started to live in Allahabad and when she missed her periods, she informed Gulab Yadav about the same but Gulab Yadav asked her to take medicine for abortion which she consumed, however, she had to get admitted in hospital due to medical condition. Thereafter, Gulab Yadav got the complainant admitted in Rahul Judicial Classes, Delhi and arranged for her stay in a hostel in Mukherji Nagar, Delhi. 

She also alleged that Gulab Yadav used to call the complainant at different hotels and raped her where Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner also used to accompany Gulab Yadav. It has also been alleged that on February 13, 2018 at Ashoka Hotel, on February 14, 2018 at Park Avenue hotel and on March 27, 2018 at Le’ Meriden hotel, she was gang raped and resultantly she conceived and when she informed the accused about this, the accused persons threatened her. Out of fear, the complainant vacated her hostel and started living in Shalimar Bagh, Delhi where she gave birth to a male child on October 25, 2018 and when she informed this fact to Gulab Yadav, he told that it can not be his child as he has undergone vasectomy and said that the child is of Sanjeev Hans. When the complainant tried to contact Sanjeev Hans, he did not speak with her and since then the complainant is hiding from the accused persons as they are quite influential. It has further been alleged that the complainant went to Rupaspur Police Station for registering the F.I.R., but the Police did not register the F.I.R. by saying that the accused persons are quite influential and then the complainant sent the complaint to Superintendent of Police, Patna on October 28, 2021, however no action was taken in this regard. 

The complaint case was filed by the complainant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Danapur, Patna for lodging the F.I.R. The Magistrate in his order dated November  18, 2021 recorded that the complainant has not produced any document in support of her claim of compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, called a report from the concerned Police Station. Despite granting sufficient opportunity, the complainant did not appear for recording her S.A. and resultantly, the Magistrate vide order dated September 20, 2022 dismissed the complaint case under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. Being aggrieved by the same, the complainant approached the High Court by way of filing Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 has disposed of the said petition with certain directions. 

The relevant part of the order dated December 12, 2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 reads as under:-

“Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State, this Court finds that there is no dispute with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this case, police was conducting a preliminary enquiry into the matter and a report was required to be sent to the learned ACJM Court at Danapur. The said report has been submitted or not is not within the knowledge of learned counsel for the State.

Be that as it may, this Court is of the considered opinion that once the matter was pending at the stage of preliminary enquiry and the report had been called for from the police, the learned ACJM should not have acted in haste in taking up the enquiry at his level by treating it as a complaint case.

The Magistrate vide order dated 06.01.2023  allowed the prayer of the petitioner to send the complaint petition under sectionn156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the Police for registration of the F.I.R and accordingly, the present F.I.R. has been lodged. The Investigating Officer of the case has filed an application in the Court of learned A.C.J.M.-1, Danapur for deputing a Magistrate so that blood sample of Gulab Yadav, the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 and the petitioner be collected for DNA test but the Magistrate vide order dated 06.03.2023 has rejected the prayer of the Investigating Officer by holding that he has no jurisdiction to pass an order for DNA test. 

The counsel for Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 that respondent no.5 is a practicing advocate and Gulab Yadav and present petitioner used to commit rape with her. Since Gulab Yadav has undergone vasectomy, the presumption goes to establish that the petitioner is the biological father of the son of the respondent no.5. Thus, the DNA test of the petitioner and the son of the respondent no.5 is required in order to determine the biological father of the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5.

The judgement reads: "This Court can consider the quashing of the F.I.R. for preventing the abuse of the process of the Court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice and in my opinion, it is a fit case for interference in view of glaring facts of the case. This Court finds that it is a malafide prosecution because of some dispute... "

The Court observed:"From reading of the complaint petition, I find that the complainant has not filed any affidavit as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme in the aforesaid case and she has also not filed any document with the complaint petition showing compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, on account of non-compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C., the direction for registration of the F.I.R. vide order dated 06.01.2023 is against the law laid down by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt. The learned Magistrate though recorded non-compliance of the provisions of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. on 18.11.2021 but, has proceeded to pass the order dated 06.01.2023 for registration of the F.I.R. Before the learned Magistrate passed an order for registration of the F.I.R., he had passed an order for preliminary enquiry. On 18.11.2021, the learned Magistrate directed for calling for a report from the concerned Police Station through Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna in light of the complaint petition. On 11.05.2022, the Police submitted an application saying that the Police was directed to submit the report after conducting the enquiry outside the State. Thereafter, the case was started as a complaint case and because of the nonappearance of the complainant on a number of days, the complaint was dismissed on 20.09.2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 has set aside the orders dated 12.05.2022 and 20.09.2022 passed by the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, on 06.01.2023, the preliminary enquiry report of the police was opened in the Court, which was submitted in a sealed cover, and after considering the same, the learned Magistrate directed for registration of the F.I.R. 

The moment the enquiry report was opened by the learned Magistrate on 06.01.2023, before directing for registration of the F.I.R., the fact that the complainant/informant claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and she gave birth to a child claiming to be the son of Gulab Yadav was well within the knowledge of the Court as well as the complainant /informant. The complainant / informant while filing the complaint / FIR has not disclosed the true facts i.e. she was treating herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav, whenever she was hospitalized she claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and when a boy was born the name of Gulab Yadav was disclosed by the complainant/informant saying that the father of her son is Gulab Yadav. These materials have been collected by the Police during the enquiry and they have been suppressed by the complainant / informant in her complaint/F.I.R.

From reading of the F.I.R., it appears that the complainant / informant has made allegation against two persons i.e. Gulab Yadav and the present petitioner. The date of occurrence mentioned in the complaint/F.I.R. is from February, 2016 to the date of filing of the complaint petition i.e. 16.11.2021. Initially, the allegations are levelled against Gulab Yadav who is said to have committed rape with the complainant/informant. The name of the petitioner is mentioned for an occurrence which is said to have taken place on 08.07.2017 at a Hotel in Pune alleging that the complainant was sexually assaulted by both the accused persons and Gulab Yadav made a video of the same and thereafter threatened her of making the video viral. Further allegations levelled in the complaint/F.I.R. primarily against Gulab Yadav and the complainant/informant has mentioned the name of the petitioner as an accomplice of Gulab Yadav and has alleged that he also used to commit rape with her. The complainant/informant is admittedly a lawyer practicing since 2009 and the complaint has been filed after about five years of the alleged incident of rape.

The complainant has waited for five years to file the complaint and there is no satisfactory explanation for the delayed filing of the complaint petition.

The petitioner herself is a grown-up woman, who is practicing Law and as per her own statement she was in a relationship with Gulab Yadav. 

Victim not given right to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence under Section 372 of Cr.PC: Justice Vipul M. Pancholi

In Shankar Thakur vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's division bench of Justices Vipul M. Pancholi and Alok Kumar Pandey concluded that the victim has not been given the right to file an appeal for the enhancement of the sentence under Proviso of Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC). 

The Gopalganj Trial court convicted Rajiv Ranjan Pathak, the Respondent No. 2/accused for committing the offences punishable under Sections- 304B, 306 of I.P.C. and Sections- 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for 7 years for the offence punishable under Section-304B of I.P.C. He was sentenced to undergo R.I. for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offence punishable under Section-306 of I.P.C. and, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional imprisonment of six months. The Trial court also sentenced him to undergo R.I. for 5 yrs. and to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000/- for committing offence punishable under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional imprisonment of six months. The Trial court has also sentenced the Respondent No. 2/accused to suffer R.I. for 1 year and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for committing the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional imprisonment of 3 months and, if the fine is realized, the same has been directed to be given to the child of the deceased.

The appellant/victim has preferred the present appeal under Proviso of Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in which the appellant has challenged the order dated April 8, 2024 rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Gopalganj in Session Trial No. 84 of 2022 to the extent of imposing lesser punishment/sentence to Respondent No. 2/accused.

The counsel for the appellant/victim submitted that the present appeal was filed by the appellant with a grievance that the Trial court ought to have imposed maximum punishment/ sentence provided under Section 304B and Section 306 of I.P.C. looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case. He, therefore, urged that the present appeal be admitted and, after hearing the parties, the sentence imposed by the Trial Court be enhanced.

The Court has recorded that from perusal of the judgment dated April 8, 2024 passed by the concerned Trial court, it transpires that the Trial court has convicted the Respondent No. 2/accused for committing offence punishable under Section 304 of I.P.C. and he has been sentenced to suffer R.I. for 7 years. Similarly, he has been convicted for committing the offence under Section 306 of I.P.C. and has been sentenced to suffer R.I. for 7 years. Now, it is the grievance of the appellant/victim that the Trial court has imposed lesser punishment/ sentence and, therefore, punishment imposed by the Trial court be enhanced.

The provisions contained in Section 372 reads:“No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.—No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. [Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing in inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.]

From the Proviso contained in the Section, it emerges that the right has been given to the victim to prefer an appeal against the order passed by the Court under three circumstances: (i) when the accused has been acquitted or (ii) when the accused has been convicted for lesser offence or (iii) when the Trial court has awarded inadequate compensation.

It is apparent that when the Trial court imposed lesser sentence, victim cannot prefer an appeal under Proviso of Section 372 of the Cr.PC. If the facts of the present case and the grievance of the appellant/victim is carefully examined, it is revealed that the appellant has not preferred the present appeal against the order of acquittal nor he has preferred the present appeal with a grievance that Respondent No. 2/ accused was convicted for lesser offence nor there is no grievance of the appellant that the Trial court has granted inadequate compensation. The only grievance of the appellant is that the Trial court has imposed lesser sentence.

The Court concluded: "We are of the view that for enhancement of the sentence, victim cannot prefer an appeal under Proviso of Section 372 of the Code. In fact, under Section 377 of the Code, the State can prefer an appeal against an order of sentence imposed by the Trial court. However, such right has not been given to the victim to file an appeal for the enhancement of the sentence under Proviso of Section 372 of the Code. Accordingly, we are of the view that the present appeal is not maintainable and, therefore, the same stands dismissed."

The Court clarified that we have not examined the merits of the case of the appellant and, therefore, it is always open of the appellant to file appropriate proceeding before appropriate forum including filing of Criminal Revision application before this Court for the grievances raised in the present appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Pancholi. 

Patna High Court endorses order by Justice Madhuresh Prasad

In Rina Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), the division bench of Patna High Court comprising of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy heard the appellant who hac preferred two on-line applications for consideration of her appointment as Anganbari Sevika and dismissed the appeal. In the applications, there were different entries. The appellant had approached the Divisional Commissioner for permitting her to press the second application with the correct entries, which was allowed. Besides the State of Bihar, the six respondents were:Director, ICDS, Divisional Commissioner, Gaya, District Magistrate, Aurangabad, District Progamme Officer, Aurangabad, Child Development Project Officer, Obra, Aurangabad, and Sonamati Kumari. 

The division bench of the High Court noted that the exercise of discretion by the Divisional Commissioner was not found to be tenable by Justice Madhuresh Prasad, the Single Judge of the High Court in Sonamati Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Social Welfare Department (2023) by judgment dated September 26, 2023. The issue was tested in the context of the format of the on-line application, which specified that any entry made in the first instance by an applicant on-line shall be the facts undertaken by the maker thereof and all liabilities and responsibilities would be fastened on the maker of such application. With such clarity in the format of the on-line application, the first application-form only was to be scrutinized. The judgment of the Single Judge indicates that there were changes not only in the name of the husband of the appellant but also in her date of birth as also in the class/category in which she had applied. 

In its judgment dated February, 27, 2028, the division bench observed: "We are in complete agreement with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, which requires no interference."

In Sonamati Kumari case before Justice Madhuresh Prasad, the other six respondents were: Director, ICDS, Bihar, Divisional Commissioner, Gaya, District Magistrate, Aurangabad, District Progamme Officer, Aurangabad, Child Development Project Officer, Obra, Aurangabad and Rina Kumai. 

Justice Prasad's order reads:"The tone and tenor of the note, at the bottom of the form, is clear. The applicant is bound by the information furnished in the on-line application form and it is clearly stipulated that for any discrepancy, it shall be the applicant furnishing the on-line application form who shall be liable. Contrary to such stipulation, the liability even if it is accepted to be a human error committed by Respondent No. 7, is sought to be fastened on the petitioner by interfering with her selection. The order of the Divisional Commissioner to this effect, in the opinion of this Court, is unsustainable. The order dated 29.11.2022 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Magadh Division is hereby set aside. The consequences shall follow." The Respondent No. 7 is Rina Kumari. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench modifies judgement of Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Land Acquisition Fair Compensation case

We must ask: "why statements are acceptable in 'development' discourse that would be considered absurd in academic settings, but also why many acceptable statements from the realm of academic discourse - or even from that of common observation - fail to find their way into the discursive regime of 'development'"

-James Ferguson (1990). The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press. p. 67.

It seems all is fair in war, government, for "public purpose", and development. Warmongering, governmentality, veil of public purpose,  governmentality and  developmentality manifest themselves in myriad deceptive ways.

The judgement of Patna High Court's division bench by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy reminds one of insights from The Anti-Politics Machine, the book by James Ferguson. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. He observed: "the direction of the learned Single Judge that it should be done first and then compensation be paid, would not be practical in the sense that updating the Circle Rates require time and in the present circumstance, time would be the essence especially if seen in the context of the land owners who have been divested of their land who would require money urgently for their resettlement" in Ranjeet Kumar and others vs. The State of Bihar & others (2025). Besides the State of Bihar, there were 16 respondents. In a batch of petitions, the 71-page long judgement of the division bench concluded:"We, therefore, modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge and direct that the MVR/Circle rates of 2014 must be updated, which would be an independent exercise which shall be carried out by the State after observing the due process in that regard but the payment of compensation to the land owners would not be contingent on such updation as it would take long time. Thus the appeals on behalf of the land owners are dismissed whereas the appeals preferred by the State and the PMRC are allowed to the extent indicated above." PMRC refers to Patna Metro Rail Corporation. 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge had passed his 125-page long judgement and order on December 21, 2023 after hearing the petitioners who were land as well as the house owners, whose properties were acquired for the construction of Patna Metro Rail Depot, having a total area of 75.96 acres of land, in two mauza, i.e. Pahari and Ranipur. They had approached the High Court for quashing of the land acquisition notice, issued under Section 11 (1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with regard to 15.95 acres of land, situated in mauza Pahari and 23.35 acres of land, situated in mauza Ranipur, having a total area of 75.96 acre. the petitioners had prayed for setting aside the Social Impact Assessment Report prepared by the Development Management Institute, Patna. They had also prayed for quashing of the formation of Technical Expert Committee, constituted under Section 7 of the 2013 Act as well as quashing of the report of the Technical Expert Committee, dated June 30, 2021. They sought quashing of the order dated February 2, 2022 passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna, by which objections filed by the petitioners were rejected, for quashing the paper publication, under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. They also sought quashing of the award, dated August 4, 2023, prepared in L. A. Case No. 29/2021-2022, under Sections 23 and 30 of the 2013 Act. 

Earlier two depots were to be constructed in mauza Aitwarpur and mauza Ramchak Bairiya, but subsequently it was decided to construct only one depot, at mauza Pahari and Ranipur. The Cabinet of the State of Bihar approved the Patna Metro Rail Project on October 9, 2018. Rail India Technical and Economic Service (RITES) had given the proposal for two depots. On September 3, 2019, the work of construction of Metro Rail and Depot in Patna was given by Patna Metro Rail Corporation Limited (PMRCL) to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and the same was approved by State of Bihar. The agreement between PMRCL and DMRC was entered on September 25, 2019. The DMRC made changes in the line alignment of the Patna Metro on February 8, 2020 and also changed the location of metro depot from two locations to one locations, i.e. mauza Pahari and Ranipur, which are under acquisition. The lands have been acquired under the general provisions of the 2013 Act. The Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, issued an Office Order on March  17, 2020, in which reasons for relocation of the Metro depot from two depots to one depot, has been mentioned that there shall be large number of demolition of houses at previous location, drainage system, seamless integration of I.S.B.T. and the Metro depot, and further 11.6 Hectares for the purpose of Property Development Area. The revised detailed project report has been approved by the State Government and the Union Government.

Justice Sinha had framed the following questions for considerations by the Court:

(a) Whether the provisions of the 2013 Act have been followed for acquiring the land, in question?

(b) Scope of rehabilitation and resettlement, if any

(c)Whether the property development area and the depot area are integral part of the PMRP?

(d) Whether the PMRP, including the property development area, is a project of larger public interest?

Justice Sinha had also  considered the question as to how to ascertain the just and fair compensation, which the petitioners and others are entitled. He observed: "The price of the land in Patna has skyrocketed and increased manifold, but the M.V.R./circle rate of the area has not been revised for many years. The Court has been informed that the compensation has been fixed on the M.V.R./circle rate prevalent in the year 2014. The M.V.R./circle rate is provided for the purpose of payment of stamp duty, but that cannot be made a basis to determine the actual price of the market value of the property. The purchasers, while purchasing the land, in the sale deed, quote the consideration amount on the basis of the M.V.R./circle rate and not the actual price paid for the purchase of the land.

The judgement of Justice Sinha reads:"let the M.V.R./circle rate, which has not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised by taking into consideration the relevant factors, including the opinion of the Expert. The concerned respondents are further directed to re-fix the compensation amount, payable to the petitioners, based upon the revised M.V.R./circle rate. Justice Sinha recorded that recommendations of the Expert Committee, have not been considered by the State Government, including the recommendation of the Expert Committee on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement, accordingly, I direct the State Government and the Collector, Patna, to consider the recommendation of the Expert Committee, and to take decision on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement of the land/house losers, as per Section 31 of the 2013 Act." He concluded that these "exercises must be completed by the respondents within the maximum period of six months from today. "

The Single Judge on the issue of breach of Rule -11 (3) of Rules of 2014 mandating that public hearing must be announced three weeks in advance through daily newspaper and clear 21 days time is required to be given to the landholders, had held that from the materials put forth by the parties, it transpired that in the public hearing during the course of preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report by the Development Management Institute, Patna, 111 persons had participated but according to the State, 250 people as well as representatives of Ward No. 56 had participated and that there was substantial compliance of the provisions except some procedural lapses here and there.

In the opinion of the Single Judge, the Social Assessment Impact Report clearly stated that the positive impact had a higher quotient than negative impact.

With respect to the opposition regarding non-consideration of alternative sites suggested by the land owners, the Single Judge was of the view that the same was considered but not found to be suitable as the site suggested for construction of depot would have incurred extra cost ranging between 500-700 crores and that no interference was required since the construction work has started at the selected site and the progress was to the extent of 44%.

Majority of the land owners, it was found, had already received compensation to the tune of Rs. 130 crores. The suitability of land, the learned Single Judge agreed, fell in the domain of the acquiring agency as also the agency executing the project and they are the best judge to decide the suitability and feasibility of the project including the site selected. Relying on Ramji Veerji Patel case, it was held that it was not open to the Court to examine the aspect of suitability and the Court substituting its opinion with that of the acquiring and executing agency.

With respect to the objection regarding the formation of the Expert Committee for appraisal of Social Assessment Impact Report as mandated under Section 7(2) (b) of 2013 Act, the revelation by the Advocate General that the proposal of the Expert Committee was not considered by the State Government as it was not found to be viable, was taken into account.

The argument with respect to the property development area component of the project not being relatable to public purpose, it was held that in view of the reason that Metro Rail Policy, 2017 contemplated provisions for enhancement of revenue of the Metro rail projects and included commercial/property development at stations and on other urban land which could be used as key instruments for maximizing revenue in Metro rail/railway systems in the cities, no fault could be found. The exemplars were drawn from Hongkong and Tokyo. It was found from the records that while conceiving of the project, the State had taken into all the above factors which would increase the non-fair box revenue which was in sync with the Metro Rail Policy, 2017 and hence the construction and development of property development area was held to be part of the public purpose and it was complementary to each other and therefore integral to the scheme of PMRP. 

It was thus concluded, in view of the judgment in Godrej & Boyce vs The State Of Maharashtra case, that even if there are some irregularities in the procedure followed by the acquiring authority for infrastructural project, the Courts, in exercise of their extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to interfere, especially when the project is of public importance. In matters of land acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice and public interest intermingle.

The Single Judge, therefore, refused to interfere with the process of acquisition.

However, while considering the issue of just and fair compensation to which the land owners would be entitled, a direction was issued that the MVR/Circle Rates which had not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised after taking into consideration the relevant factors including the opinion of the experts and then re-fix the compensation amount payable to the land owners based upon the revised MVR/Circle Rate.

While assailing the judgment of the Single Judge, Amit Sibbal, the Senior Advocate appearing virtually argued that even though right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right after the 44th amendment of the Constitution, it continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300A and therefore any expropriatory law which deprives a person of his property nust be in line with the overarching principles of law and must be just fair and reasonable. The exercise of power of eminent domain ought to be construed narrowly in favour of a person’s right to his property. It was argued that the land owners would not do good by challenging the public purpose behind the acquisition proceedings. The challenge thus is primarily to the manner in which the proceedings were concluded with complete disregard to the statutory safeguards. Whether the land is to be acquired under the Act, under the new law cannot be a unilateral decision. The process has to be humane, informed and transparent with least disturbance to the owners of the land and the affected families and the deprived persons would be entitled to just and fair compensation.

In this context, it was argued that Social Impact Assessment study is not a mere formality and the Single Judge has erred in law in being satisfied about substantial compliance of the provision, looking aside procedural lapses here and there.

Relying on Urban Development Trust, Bikaner vs. Gordhan Das (dead) Through LR (2024) 3 SCC 250; Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs.Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. (2024) 10 SCC 533; D.B.Basnett vs. Collector, East District Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 569; Dinesh & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2024) SCC Online SC 937; Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal (2012) 2 SCC 25; Rajesh K vs. Managing Director, Kerala Rail Development Corporation (WP(C) 41009/22 (Kerala High Court) and Manekbben Rama Tandel vs. The Collector, Daman, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli & Daman and Diu & Ors.(MANU/MH/1796/2023), it was argued that the importance of property rights and requirements of strict adherence to procedure cannot be ignored or by-passed or else the entire acquisition proceeding gets vitiated.

Taking the argument of “acquisition by ambush” further, which is impermissible, it was pointed out that there was complete disregard to the procedural safeguards under Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 19 in as much as there was no finding or analysis with regard to land being the bare minimum land required for public purpose.

Even with respect to rejection of the alternative places where the depots could be constructed, it was argued that it was not prudent to discard such suggestions as the land suggested viz.

The Sahara land, Gair Mazarua lands and a dumping yard in close vicinity to the selected site would have caused minimum displacement and minimum requirement to resettle and rehabilitate human heads. It would have reduced the cost of acquisition for the Government. The rejection was not based on any sound reason.

A special grievance was made with respect to only three days having been given for voicing the objection in place of clear 21 days and that also at a time when the State was swept by COVID -19 pandemic. A special reference was made to the letter of one Councilor viz. Kismat Devi of Ward No. 56, where she had highlighted the difficulties faced by the affected people of the area and inefficacy and the infirmities in the S.I.A. study being conducted by the State.

Even if the argument on behalf of the State that 250 people had participated in the public hearing, the persons affected were numbering around 1300.

Section 15 of the 2013 Act provides the right of the people affected by the land being acquired under Section 11 notification to raise objections with respect to the suitability of the land being acquired and the findings of the S.I.A. study report. The objections raised by the displaced persons are stated to have been mechanically rejected without due consideration. The Single Judge having lightly dealt with the lapses suggested that it was not understood that the preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report and its vetting by the Special Expert Committee are the heart and soul of the Act and represent the very purpose of the humane, participative, informed and transparent process of land acquisition envisaged under the scheme of the Act. The argument of the State as also PMRCL regarding nonsuitability of the alternative site was not based on any pleadings on affidavit or any minutes of the meeting of a technical body or any data or reasoning. The dumping yard displacing none, in fact, could have been shifted elsewhere and that land which in itself would have sufficed the purpose could have been selected as the site in fact in one of the writ proceedings sometimes in the year 2012, the High Court had directed the State to consider relocating the dumping yard as it was within the municipal limits and was causing hazards and other health hazards. 

The Supreme Court and High Courts have recognised that the expression " public purpose " is not capable of precise definition. The concept of "public purpose finds mention in article 31(2) of the constitution of india. 

In University of Bombay v. municipal commr. of the city of Bombay, I.L.R.16 Bom. 217, it has been held that acquisition of land comes with the purview of public purpose if it is meant for providing suitable accommodation to the public servant.

In Radha Binode v. Surendra Nath, 105 I.C. 377, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing road facilities in municipal areas is public purpose.

In State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji, A.I.R 1956, S.C. 294, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation for homeless is public purpose. 

In Iftikher Ahmed v. state of M.P, A.I.R. 1961 M.P 140, it has been held that acquisition of land for establishment of slaughter house for maintaining supplies of food in locality is public purpose.

In Ganga Prasad Verma v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 22, it has been held that acquisition of land for resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons is public purpose. 

In Walliammal v. state of Madras and Others, 1967 Mad 334: (1965) 2 Mad. 388: (1966) 79 Mad. LW 702, it has been held that acquisition of land for opening of a burial ground is public purpose.

In Guru Shiddawwavitra Sangayya v. state of Mysore, 1968 Mys 127, it has been held that removal of timber shops from the scattered places in the city area to a place outside the city area for the establishment of timber market comes under public purpose. An acquisition is for public purpose when it involves an element of public utility, provides public good and aims for social welfare. Acquisition need not be an acquisition which benefits each and every member of the public.

The 2013 Act which came into force on January 1, 2014 defines public purpose. The Act is applicable when the land is acquire by the government for its own use, including land acquired for public sector undertaking. The land is acquired by the land with the intention of transferring it for the use of private company for the specific stated public purpose. The acquisition of land by the government for immediate and declared use by private companies for public purpose.

The definition of public purpose is provided in the 2013 Act. Under Section 2 (1) (a) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for strategic purposes relating to naval, military, air force, and armed forces of the Union, including central paramilitary forces or any work vital to national security or defence of India or State police, safety of the people. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (i) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for infrastructure projects: excluding private hospitals, private educational institutions and private hotels.

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (ii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for projects related to agriculture and allied activities set up or owned by the appropriate Government or by a farmers' cooperative or by an institution set up under a statute. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (iii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones. 

Under Section 2 (1) b (iv-vii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for water conservation structures sanitation, Government aided educational and research schemes or institutions, sports, healthcare, tourism, transportation or space programme or any infrastructure facility as may be notified in this regard by the Central Government and after tabling of such notification in Parliament. 

Under Section 2 (1) (f) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken project for project affected families, for housing for such income groups, as may be specified from time to time by the appropriate Government, for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by the Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State. 

Under Section 2 (2) (a) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for public private  partnership projects, where the ownership of  the land continues to vest with the Government, for public purpose. 

Under Section 2 (2) (b) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for private companies for public purpose. 

In this backdrop, the division bench of the Patna High Court opined that "there is no gainsaying that establishment of Metro line in the city of Patna is in public interest. No further ink is required to be wasted in deciding whether it is in public interest or not. Relieving the city dwellers of traffic congestion, providing fast moving traffic and the income generated from the property development area are by no means opposed to public interest."

It is apparent that the division bench of the High Court did not pay heed to the decision of Supreme Court in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar and Others reported in 2011(12) SCC 375 held that “Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power—sometimes called colorable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions, and satisfaction—is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for the promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colorable exercise and is undeceived by illusion”, a veil of public purpose was employed to acquire land from the people who were misled in the name of planned industrial development

In absence of demand before competent authority, writ of mandamus not maintainable or is pre-mature:Patna High Court

In Ali Ashraf Siddiqui vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's division bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Sunil Dutta Mishra heard the petitioner who had sought direction for the respondent authorities to release the vehicle, Scorpio because he is an actual/ bonafide owner of the vehicle. He prayed the Court to direct the respondents authorities to hand over the vehicle of the petitioner after furnishing suitable, sureties as per direction of the Court.

The Court noted that "there is no demand before the competent authority in particularly under Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023. In the absence of demand before the competent authority, the present Writ petition for writ of mandamus is not maintainable or it is pre-mature. Accordingly, the present Writ petition stands disposed of as pre-mature." 

The Court observed: "Disposal of the present petition would not be a hurdle for the petitioner to invoke remedy under Rule 12A of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 including amended provisions in the year 2022 and 2023. If such application is submitted in the prescribed form before the competent authority, the competent authority shall pass speaking order within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of such application. If the confiscation of the vehicle has attained finality, in that event, petitioner is at liberty to prefer an appeal before the appropriate authority."

Besides the State of Bihar, the six other respondents were: District Magistrate, Siwan, Superintendent of Police, Siwan, S.H.O. of Excise, Siwan, District Magistrate, Patna, Superintendent of Police, Patna, S.H.O. of Phulwari Sharif Police Station, Patna.  Justice Bajanthri authored the judgement. 

All appointments in all Madarsas and Sanskrit Schools get same salary: Patna High Court

While adjudicating the petitions of residents from Muzaffarpur district, in Ashok Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, the division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy observed: "the present petition with respect to the validity of Clause 5(h) of the resolution of the Education Department, published in the Gazette, has already been decided by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 27.03.2019 passed in CWJC No. 985 of 2015. The issue does not require any further deliberation." 

Notably, the 10-page long judgement of March 2019 was delivered by Chief Justice Amreshwar Pratap Sahi and Justice Anjana Mishra. In the previous judgement the Court had recorded the submission of Advocate General saying, "as per Clause 7 and Clause 8 of the resolution dated 15th February, 2011, the same was also meant to be applied in respect of all appointments in all Madarsas and Sanskrit Schools irrespective of their status of recognition and receiving grant-in-aid list prior to 15th February, 2011." His argument was that since the petitioners were appointed after February 15, 2011, "therefore, they are also covered by the aforesaid two clauses." After the resolution dated February 15, 2011, they were entitled to a fixed pay which has been now indicated in the impugned memo dated August 31, 2013 where Clause 6 categorically provides that such of these teachers who have been appointed after February 15, 2011 shall be entitled to fixed pay only. 

The challenge had been raised to the resolution dated August 31, 2013 to the aforesaid extent contending that the same is arbitrary and discriminatory and there is no rationale so as to reduce the pay-scale of the petitioners that they were already enjoying pursuant to their appointment by retrospectively applying the resolution dated August 31, 2013. The background in which this challenge has been raised centres around two resolutions, one dated February 15, 2011 and the impugned resolution dated August 31, 2013. 

The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Sahi. It reads:"the impugned action and Resolution to the aforesaid effect converting the pay-scale of the petitioners cannot be sustained and is, hereby, quashed insofar as it relates to the petitioners. We....declare that the petitioners will continue to get the same salary that they were getting prior to the impugned resolution together with all arrears on that account that shall be released forthwith within a period of three months from today." The petitioners had claimed to be the validly appointed teachers of Madarsa Islamia Arbia, Naeemia, Sonebarsa, Maharajganj, Siwan. They had claimed that the petitioner No.1 was appointed under a resolution dated July 16, 2012, whereas the petitioner No. 2 was appointed under a resolution dated August 16, 2012. These proposals were preceded by an advertisement in the year 2011 and after the selection process, the papers with regard to the selection of these two teachers were sent for approval to the competent authority with regard to which approval was granted. This factum of appointment of the petitioners and their approval remained undisputed. The residents of Siwan had approached the Court in CWJC No.985 of 2015 (Imran Alam and others vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Bihar) . The other ten respondents were: the Principal Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, the Special Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, Joint Secretary, Education Department, District Education Officer, District Program Officer (Establishment), Siwan, District Program Officer (Secondary Education), Siwan, Bihar State Madarsa Education Board, Patna through the Secretary, Secretary, the Bihar State Madarsa Education Board, Patna, Secretary, Madarsa Islamia Arbia, Naeemia, Sonebarsa, Maharajganj, Siwan and Head Maulbi, Madarsa Islamia Arbia, Naeemia, Sonebarsa, Siwan. 

The Court observed in it's February 2025 judgement that if the petitioners are in any way aggrieved by the action of the respondents, it would be open for them to approach the appropriate forum for redressal of their grievances. However, this petition would not survive for discussing the validity of the clause in the resolution of the Government. The petition is disposed of with the liberty to the petitioners to approach the appropriate authority for redressal of their grievance. In case any representation is filed by the petitioners before the concerned authority, needless to say that it shall be disposed of within a reasonable period of time, giving reasons. 

In the case in question, the other four petitioners were: Manoj Kumar Mishra, Naveen Kumar, Sweta Kumari, Prem Sheela Devi, the residents of Muzaffarpur district. Besides the State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, the other seven respondents were: Principal Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Joint Secretary, Education Department,  Special Secretary, Education Department, District Education Officer, Muzaffarpur, District Programme Officer (Establishment), Muzaffarpur, Bhar Sanskrit Shiksha Board,  Patna through the Secretary and Chairman, The Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board, Patna. The judgement was delivered on February 25, 2025. 

Patna High Court adjudicates in writ of mandamus from Bhojpur residents

Adjudicating in a writ of mandamus, in Bindu Thakur and Birendra Thakur vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Land Reforms and Revenue & Others (2025), Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court directed the Circle Officer, Charpokhari to comply with the order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Collector as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, within a period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of Court's order. 

The petitioners were aggrieved by the fact that the Circle Officer, Charpokhari was not complying with the orders of the Collector and the DCLR. The petitioner's counsel submitted that it is an act of insubordination that the Circle Officer, despite specific direction passed by the Collector, was not giving heed to the order. The petitioners were compelled to move before the Patna High Court seeking a writ of mandamus.

A writ of Mandamus is a command issued by the High Court to the State or its Authorities requiring the performance of a particular duty specified, which duty results from the official duty or by operation of law. A writ of mandamus is imposed for securing judicial enforcement of public duties, performance of which has been wrongfully refused.

The writ of mandamus is regarded as one of the highest remedies in the Indian Judicial System.

Two pre-conditions must exists before granting remedy by way of mandamus, first; it must be shown that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of a particular act or duty at the hands of respondents and second; it must appear that the law affords no other adequate or specific remedy to secure the enforcement of the right and the performance of the duty which it is sought to enforce.

The condition precedent for the issue of mandamus is the presence of statutory right.

The purpose of mandamus is to remedy defects of justice. It lies in the cases where there is a specific right but no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right. In general, it is not available in anticipation of any injury except when the petitioner is likely to be affected by an official act in contravention of a statutory duty or where an illegal or unconstitutional order is made. The grant of mandamus is, therefore, an equitable remedy; a matter for the discretion of the court, the exercise of which is governed by well-settled principles.

The High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion

In Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra,  2020 SCC OnLine SC 631, the Supreme Court's division bench of Justices Indira Banjerjee and Indu Malhotra decided it on August 7, 2020 that "The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus, but are duty bound to exercise such power, where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide, or on irrelevant consideration.” In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. There is no limitation for the High Courts to issue the writ “in the nature of mandamus”. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Court. 

On May 16, 2024, Supreme Court's division bench of Justices B. R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta pronounced the judgement in MR. R. S  Madireddy vs. Union of India observed: "A plain reading of Article 226 of the Constitution of India would make it clear that the High Court has the power to issue the directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within its territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India and for any other purpose."

Supreme Court has interpreted the term ‘authority’ used in Article 226 in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 691 wherein it was held as follows:

“17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The ‘public authority’ for them means everybody which is created by statute—and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no such  limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ ‘in the nature of mandamus’. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to ‘any person of authority’. It can be issued ‘for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose’.... 20. The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning like the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words ‘any person or authority’ used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.”

In the case of Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733, the Supreme Court culled out the categories of body/persons who would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.”

In Bindu Thakur case, the counsel for the petitioners, Dr. S.S.P. Yadav submitted that from perusal of Annexure-1, i.e., order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Collector-cum-2nd Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, it is manifest that the Collector-cum-2nd Appellate Authority has clearly directed the Circle Officer, Charpokhari to carry out the measurement of land for which petitioners have deposited the requisite fee. The petitioners produced the order of Collector dated June 27, 2024 before the Circle Officer, but then he was sitting tight over the matter. It was submitted that the moment the land of the petitioners will get measured by the Circle Officer through the Amin the real fact would come to the light that how private respondents are trying to encroach on the settled land of the petitioners. 

The State counsel submitted that he did not have any objection in the event if the writ application is disposed of with a direction to the Circle Officer, Charpokhari to comply with the order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Collector within a time frame. 

Besides the State of Bihar, the other four respondents  were: The Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Bhojpur, The Circle Officer at Charpokhari Anchal,  Bhojpur, Birendera Kumar Himanshu @ B.D. Singh, Dhedha, Charpokhari, Bhojpur and Vikas Kumar, Son of Birendra Kumar Himanshu @ B.C. Singh, Charpokhari, Bhojpur.

Supreme Court outlines guiding proportionality principles for actions taken by legislatures against its members, reinstates Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh as MLC

On February 25, 2025, Justice Surya Kant pronounced the judgment of the Division Bench comprising  Justice N. Kotiswar Singh in Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh vs. Bihar Legislative Council (2025) wherein it provided an outline of guiding principles for courts to consider while scrutinising the proportionality of actions taken by the House against its member(s). An indicative list of such parameters includes:

(a) Degree of obstruction caused by the member in the proceedings of the House;
(b) Whether the behaviour of the member has brought disrepute to the dignity of the entire House;
(c) The previous conduct of the erring member;
(d) The subsequent conduct of the erring member, such as expressing remorse, cooperation with the institutional scrutiny mechanism;
(e) Availability of lesser restrictive measures to discipline the delinquent member;
(f) Whether crude expressions uttered are deliberate and motivated or a mere outcome of language largely influenced by the local dialect;
(g) Whether the measure adopted is suitable for furthering the desired purpose; and
(h) Balancing the interest of society, particularly the electorates, with those of the erring members.

A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court  on August 8, 2024 by Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh, the former Member, Bihar Legislative Council (MLC) to challenge the 112-page long Report No. 1/2024 dated June 14, 2024 submitted by Dr. Ramvachan Rai, the current Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council and senior leader of JDU and the head Ethics Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) recommending his expulsion as a MLC. He had also assailed the consequential notification dated July 26, 2024 relieving Dr. Singh, the petitioner from the membership of the BLC issued by the BLC’s Secretariat. The other members of the Ethics Committee were: Neeraj Kumar, Dt, Madan Mohan Jha, Prof. Sanjay Kumar Singh, Ashok Kumar Pandey, Prof. (Dr.) Rajyavardhan Azad and Dr. Pramod Kumar. The petitioner was directed to be reinstated as member of the BLC with immediate effect by the Court.

The judgement reads:"we set aside the Impugned Report of the Ethics Committee as well as the Notification of the BLC, only to the extent of nature of punishment it recommends to be imposed on the Petitioner." It reads: "The Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as a member of the BLC with immediate effect. However, he shall not be entitled to claim any remuneration or other monetary benefits for the period of his disbandment. The Petitioner shall be entitled to such other perks and privileges which any other similarly placed MLC is entitled to upon completion of their full tenure. For the limited purpose of post-tenure benefits, if any, the Petitioner shall be deemed to have served as MLC for the entire tenure. Should the Petitioner indulge further in such misconduct upon his reinstatement, we leave it to the Ethics Committee or Chairperson of the BLC to take appropriate action, in accordance with law."

Supreme Court judgement noted that the petitioner has already undergone almost 7 months of expulsion. He has also missed the 208th Session of the BLC held between 25.11.2024 and 29.11.2024, and since his term is expiring in the year 2026, the Petitioner is left with a short duration....It is settled law that the extraordinary powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, cases where remitting the matter would result in undue delay and where the interests of justice demand a swift resolution. In view thereof, we are of the considered opinion that the exceptional situation before us warrants invocation of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between the parties." 

It observed: "Balancing the competing considerations, we hold that the period of expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner is deemed to be considered as a period of his suspension; and in our view, constitutes sufficient punishment for the misconduct displayed by him. Accordingly, the Impugned Report of the Ethics Committee and the subsequent Notification notifying the expulsion of the Petitioner deserves to be modified to that extent."

The Court clarified that the indulgence extended by the Court "in reducing the punishment imposed on the Petitioner should not be misconstrued as condonation of his conduct. This Court has exercised its discretion squarely in the interests of proportionality and fairness. Consequently, the Petitioner is expected to uphold the dignity of the House and adhere to the standards of discipline befitting its members. Henceforth, it is incumbent upon the Petitioner to conduct himself with decorum and responsibility in legislative proceedings. Any deviation from this expectation or recurrence of misconduct will not be viewed lightly, and the concerned authority shall be at liberty to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

The Court rejected  the objection raised by the respondents against the maintainability of the petition. The issues raised in the Writ Petition do not fall within the restrictions outlined under Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India. There is no absolute bar on the Constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of the punishment imposed on a Member while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the House. The punishment meted out to the Petitioner was highly excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the misconduct committed by him. 

Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh was elected as a MLC June on 29, 2020 for a period of six years. He was nominated as the Chief Whip by the RJD in the BLC.The case was registered on August 23, 2024.  On August 30, 2024, it came up before the division bench of Justices Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Senior Advocate, Priyansha Sharna, Advocate and other counsels represented the petitioner.  On January 15, 2025, the division bench of Justices Surya Kant and P. Kotiswar Singh passed an order saying,"the result of bye election in the State Legislative Council in respect of the vacancy caused by removal of the petitioner, shall not be declared."  During the pendency of the petition, the Election Commission of India, respondent no. 6 issued a Press Note dated December 30, 2024 declaring the bye-election for the seat held by the petitioner before his expulsion. The election process was resolved to be completed before January 25, 2025. Considering the impact of the notified election on the outcome of the petition, the declaration of the result of the bye-election was stayed by the Court. The petitioner's counsel submitted that the actions against the petitioner were actuated by mala fide and suffered from gross illegalities, both in procedure and substance. The expulsion of the petitioner from the membership of BLC was violative of the principles of natural justice, fair and just play, as the relevant material, including the video clip containing his transgressions were not furnished to him. The petitioner was denied access to the material evidence on the pretext that the proceedings of the House are confidential and could only be perused by him during the meetings of the Ethics Committee. The petitioner was thus caused inexorable prejudice in the matter of preparing his defence. The Ethics Committee explicitly assured the petitioner on June 12, 2024 that charges would be framed only after receiving all the relevant material, for which the next date of proceeding was fixed on June 19, 2024. But the Ethics Committee, unilaterally and deliberately advanced the date of hearing to June 14, 2024 without his knowledge. The petitioner has thus been condemned unheard, and in a manner which reeks of malice and amounts to gross illegality. The Ethics Committee’s report dated June 14, 2024 was circulated selectively with the members belonging to the ruling party, and was kept confidential from the members belonging to the opposition parties. Such members being in the minority could not effectively participate in the proceedings. The petitioner has been hammered with severe punishment, disproportionate to the attributed misconduct and also in comparison to despite facing somewhat similar allegations, was awarded suspension of two days from the upcoming Session. It is settled law that a ‘graded’ approach is required where the House is disciplining its members. Deviation from such an approach in the case of the Petitioner is not based on any sufficient material, and the disproportionate punishment imposed on him falls foul of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The arguments were heard and order was reserved on January 29, 2025. In its judgement dated February 25, 2025, the Court quashed the Press Note dated December 30, 2024 issued by Election Commission of India, the respondent No. 6 declaring the bye-election for the seat earlier held by the petitioner. It annulled any action taken pursuant to such Press Note. 

The Court relied on its decision in Ashish Shelar and Ors. vs. The Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and Anr; (2022) 12 SCC 273 wherein it was held that the substantive disciplinary or rationality of the self-security measure inflicted upon the erring member is open to judicial review on the touch stone of being unconstitutional, grossly illegal, irrational or arbitrary. In Ashish Shelar case, the Court held that: “The sweep of Article 21 is expansive enough to govern the action of dismembering a member from the House of the legislative assembly in the form of expulsion or be it a case of suspension by directing withdrawal from the meeting of the Assembly for the remainder of the Session”. 

In Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha; (2007) 3 SCC 184, the Court recognised the power of the Legislature to expel a member. However, it laced the existence of such power with a word of caution. It was held that the “expulsion of a member is a grave measure and normally, it should not be taken”. Needless to say, the expulsion of a member from the House constitutes a higher degree of deprivation and must only be sustained in exceptional circumstances.

The Court has consistently acknowledged that "the degree of punishment should be commensurate to the gravity of the offence, such that it is consistent with the principle of proportionality." It observed:"the principle of proportionality also finds purchase in something as fundamental as the interpretation of statutes, which, in turn, colours all the spheres of law we have previously laid out. Statutory interpretation is that unique tool a jurist possesses to give meaningful voice to the law enacted by the Legislature, and it has been our jurisprudence to always read proportionality into the laws we seek to interpret."

It underlined that "Indian experience with ‘due process’ began with the reading of proportionality into our grund norm, i.e. the Indian Constitution" in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India; (1978) 1 SCC 248. The Court referred to its decision in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr.; (2014) 8 SCC 273.

The incident which led to expulsion of Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh took place on February 13, 2024, at the budget session of the BLC after the completion of the Governor’s address during the motion of thanks. He approached the well of the House and raised slogans against the Chief Minister, mocking him as “Paltu Ram”. A complaint was lodged against him before the chairman, BLC by Bhishma Sahni, the ruling JDU MLC on February 19, 2024. The judgement records:"The Ethics Committee, in somewhat of an unusual manner, preponed the proceedings from 19.06.2024 to 14.06.2024 without any notice to the Petitioner."

The Court observed: "it is evident that the demeanour of the Petitioner in the House was abhorrent and unbecoming of a member of the Legislature. We are constrained to add that the Petitioner’s subsequent evasive and high-handed demeanour before the Ethics Committee was even more egregious. We have no hesitation in observing that the Petitioner actively attempted to delay and obfuscate the proceedings by refusing to cooperate with the Ethics Committee. We have already elaborated on how the Petitioner sought exemption from appearing before the Ethics Committee on some pretext or another. Such behaviour was nothing but a brazen attempt to circumvent the authority of the Ethics Committee. Even when the Petitioner finally appeared before the Ethics deemed it appropriate to question the authenticity and legitimacy of the Ethics Committee itself. The Petitioner, who has served as his party’s Chief Whip in the BLC, cannot possibly claim that he was unaware of the provisions under which the Ethics Committee was constituted and conducted its proceedings. The haughtiness demonstrated by the Petitioner before the Ethics Committee is, no doubt, highly undignified of a Public Representative. 

It also observed: "we are at the same time of the considered view that the House, as custodian of constitutional values and democratic principles, ought to exercise magnanimity and rise above petty criticism and unwarranted remarks against its members. In doing so, they would exemplify tolerance, restraint, and institutional maturity, thereby reinforcing the dignity, impartiality, and respectability of their office. While we do not discount the fundamental principle that an individual must bear the consequences of their actions, we are equally mindful that the ramifications of such a decision extend beyond the Petitioner alone. The actions prescribed against the Petitioner will inevitably have a direct and significant impact on a vast number of stakeholders, particularly the constituents who have reposed their faith in the Petitioner as their representative. Their voices, aspirations, and democratic rights cannot be disregarded, and it is in furtherance of these principles that the needs and interests of the electorate must take precedence in any decision that affects their representation in a democratic forum. While dealing with individuals, such as the Petitioner, it is imperative that disciplinary measures are undertaken with due regard to the principles of proportionality and fairness. The House, in the exercise of its authority to regulate its own proceedings and maintain order, must not lose sight of the necessity for a calibrated and judicious approach. In fact, this aspect is already prescribed in the Rules governing the procedure of the BLC. In this regard, our attention was drawn to Rule 10, Procedure and Conduct of Business, which provides for the penalties that the Ethics Committee may recommend. A perusal of the provision depicts that if the Committee finds a member violating the code/rules, it may recommend: (a) Censure, (b) Reprimand, (c) Suspension from the House for a specified period; and (d) any other punishment as deemed fit. This Court, in a series of decisions, has consistently held that punishment disproportionate to the offence or action is in direct violation of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution of India, particularly Articles 14 and 21.32 The expulsion of the Petitioner from the House not only raises concerns about the violation of Fundamental Rights but also impacts the legal rights of his constituents. We find that the disproportionate nature of the punishment imposed by the House in expelling the Petitioner pricks the conscience of this Court compelling it to intervene on the sheet anchor of justice and fairness."

The Court felt that a "more measured and balanced approach would have sufficed to address the misconduct while upholding the dignity and decorum of the House." It reiterated that "the principle of proportionality is a cornerstone of our judicial system, and it mandates that the severity of the punishment must correspond to the gravity of the offence." The judgement reads: we hold that the punishment meted out to the Petitioner was excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the offence he committed."

Notably, Devesh Chandra Thakur, chairman, BLC had ordered the disqualification of RJD’s Rambali Singh as MLC on a petition filed by Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh, RJD’s deputy chief whip Rambali Singh was elected as a member of the legislative council (MLC) in June 2020 as an RJD nominee from the assembly quota and his term was to expire in 2026. RJD had disapproved of his campaign against the state government’s decision to include Teli, Tamoli, Chaurasia and Dangi castes among the extremely backward classes (EBCs) in 2015. RJD deemed his stance to be anti-party activities. Rambali Singh has been fighting for the rights of 110 extremely backward castes (EBCs). In November 2023, as RJD’s deputy chief whip Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh had petitioned the BLC chairman to disqualify Rambali Singh and the council secretariat had issued the latter two show-cause notices but Rambali Singh did not reply. Rambali Singh approached the Patna High Court once he came to know about the disqualification proceedings, but he did not get any relief from the court. The Court had directed him to approach the chairman, BLC. Rambali Singh had filed a case in the High Court and the Supreme Court against the government’s 2015 order to include Teli, Tamoli, Chaurasia and Dangi castes among the extremely backward classes (EBCs) without any success. He had undertaken taken padyatra in support of his cause on October 2, 2023 from Karpoori Gram village of Samastipur, the native place of former Bihar chief minister Bharat Ratna Karpoori Thakur. 

It is noteworthy that Karpoori Thakur who was removed from the position of Leader of Opposition on two occasions on October 4, 1982 by Radhanandan Jha, the Speaker, Bihar State Assembly and on August 11, 1987 by Shiv Chandra Jha, the Speaker, Bihar State Assembly, did not get relief from the Court like Dr, Sunil Kumar Singh. But Rambali Singh is yet to get relief from the Court. 

Patna High Court upholds constitutional validity of Bihar Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal (Constitution And Service Condition) Rules, 2023 and amendment of 2024

Several writ petitions were filed initially for declaration of Bihar Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal (Constitution And Service Condition) Rules, 2023 to be bad in law, arbitrary, beyond jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions contained in section 166 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act, 1988) on various grounds but primarily on the issue of lessening the number of Tribunals for the purpose and for not providing for the correct procedure filing of claim petitions, in sync with the provisions contained in Secion166 (2) of MV Act, 1988 of filing the claim petition before the Tribunal. 

The 38-page long judgement of Patna High Court records the petitioners' objections but dismissed them. The High Court's division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy held that "the rules of 2023 along with the amendment of 2024 are completely in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 165, 166 and 176 of the M.V. Act, 1988" as also the dictum of the Supreme Court in Gohar Mohammad case and Anita Kushwaha case. The challenge in these writ petitions failed.  All the writ petitions were dismissed. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. It was delivered on February 21, 2025. Notably, the High Court has directed that "there shall be no prohibition for the Advocates appearing for the parties before the Tribunals."

The petitioners' counsel had commented upon adversely with respect to the constitution and composition of the Search Committee for appointing the Chairman and the Members of the Tribunal as in the amendment/notification, the Search Committee comprised mainly administrative Officers, thus falling foul of the judgment in Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India; (2021) 7 SCC 369.

In the year 2021, a State Level Tribunal was constituted in terms of the powers granted to the State Government under Section 165 and 176 of the MV Act, 1988. Against the notification constituting State Level Tribunal vide notification number 683 and 684 dated 11/08/2021, several writ petitions were filed by affected persons including Insurance Companies, which was stayed by a Bench of the High Court by order dated December 21, 2022 passed in the batch of writ petitions, the lead case being CWJC No. 2183 of 2022. The stay was granted in view of the amendment brought about in Section 166 (3) of the MV Act, 1988 with effect from Apil 1, 2022 providing for limitation period for 6 months for filing applications for compensation from the date of occurrence of the accident and the notification by the State Government in not making such corresponding provisions. 

Thereafter, the Department of Transport came out with a fresh draft notification on April 19, 2023, on which objections were invited. By the said notification, District Level Tribunals were formed. The notification no. 683 and 684 were withdrawn. 

The objections raised by the concerned parties were rejected by the Secretary, Transport Department. Thereafter vide notification dated May 29, 2023, the rules of 2023 were notified which was gazetted on May 30, 2023. 

By the Rules, the Tribunals were constituted at the district level and the composition of the Search Committee for the Members and the Chairman of the Tribunal remained the same, namely, Secretary/Principal Secretary/ Additional Chief Secretary, Transport Department; Secretary, Law Department; an Officer nominated by the General Administrative Department and; a Deputy Secretary or Officer on Special Duty in Transport Department. Though the Rules of 2023 were gazetted but it was not found available on the official website of the Transport Department, Government of Bihar. 

After about four months, a fresh draft notification dated September 20, 2023 was uploaded on the website of the Transport Department, inviting objections. In this draft notification, the Tribunals were constituted at the divisional level with practically no change in the composition of the Search/Screening Committee. 

The objections were with respect to clause 7 that no representation of the Judiciary was provided in this selection and appointment of the Chairperson and clause 8 whereby the Transport Department had been given the authority to remove the Chairperson of the Tribunal on the grounds of misbehaviour, incompetence, laxity in discharge of duties or of passing order in contravention of rules enforced by the Government etc.

The objection was that such power of removal of Chairperson should not have been left with the bureaucracy. There were objections also with respect to clauses – 10 to 14 as also for lessening the number of Tribunals by making such Tribunals operate at divisional level. 

The rule was ultimately notified and gazetted on October 26, 2023. This led to filing of the present writ petitions challenging the vires of the rules on ground of incompetence of the State Legislature/State Government to make rules in contravention of the provisions contained in the Central/Parent Act of 1988 and for it to be arbitrary and not in keeping with the principles decided in Gohar Ahmad vs. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Others; (2023) 4 SCC 381 and Madras Bar Association case.

During the hearing of these writ petitions, the Advocate General had intimated the court that the Government would give a re-look at the challenged rules, specifically with respect to the constitution of Selection Committee and the removal of the incumbents appointed to the Tribunal. All the writ petitions, therefore, were adjourned awaiting the revisit of those rules by the Government and perhaps proposing amendment in the rules to bring it in consonance with the judgment in Madras Bar Association case.

The Advocate General denied the charge that the newly constituted Tribunals were not permitting Advocates to appear.  

Several other issues also were raised, one of which was that the Government had introduced the rules with effect from April 1, 2019 against the advice of the Advocate General, which issue was also required to be considered.

In the meantime, the Government on a re-look at the challenged rules, came out with notification contained in letter no. 9965 dated August 27, 2024, making changes in rule 7 of the earlier 2023 rules with regard to appointment of Members and Chairman of the Tribunal and the constitution of the Selection Committee for the said appointments. The Chief Justice of the Patna High Court or any Judge nominated by him was to be made Chairman of that Selection Committee and the other Members of the selection committee would be the Registrar General of the Patna High Court, Secretary/ Principal Secretary/Additional Chief Secretary or any Representative Officer of the Transport Department; Secretary-cum-Legal Adviser, Law Department and Representative Officer of the General Administration Department.

Rule 8 also was amended which dealt with resignation and removal of Chairman of the claims Tribunal.

It was brought to the notice of the Court that initially only seven Tribunals were conceived of but the number was increased to ten divisional level Tribunals covering the State of Bihar. Thus necessary amendments were made in the prayer of the writ petitioners and even with such amendment, the challenge mounted earlier continued. 

The challenge inter alia was that the State Government had the power to issue notification only with respect to territorial jurisdiction under Sections 165 (1) (4) of the M.V. Act, 1988 and to appoint Members of the Tribunal under Section 165(2) thereof. It was urged that under Section 176 of the M.V. Act, 1988, the scope of issuance of such notification is limited and the State Government was incompetent to make rules on the condition of service of the Members of the Tribunals and selection of Presiding Officers. The use of the words in Section 176 of the MV Act, 1988 makes it very clear that rules could be made for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174 of the M.V. Act of 1988 with respect to, (a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars, it may contain and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of search applications; (b) the procedure to be followed by the claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this chapter; (c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a claims Tribunal; (d) the form and the manner in which and the fee ( if any) on payment of which, an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal and; (e) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.

Thus the rule making power of the State could not have been extended to what has been done in the present set of rules.

It was argued that in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Thomas Joseph; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1737, it has been held that if a rule goes beyond the rule making powers conferred by the statue, the same would be required to be declared invalid. A rule could not supplant any provision for which power has not been conferred and the basic test to determine and consider is the source power which is relatable to the rule. Similarly, a rule must be in accord with the parent statute and cannot travel beyond it. The doctrine of ultra vires envisages that a rule making body must function within the purview of rules making authority conferred on it by the parent act. There is no inherent power of its own,which could be invoked to make rules. It was also argued that the Supreme Court in Global Energy Limited vs.Central Electricity Commission; (2009)15 SCC 570, has clarified that the rule making power for carrying out the purpose of the act is a general delegation which may not be used for laying down any other guidelines. By reason of such a provision alone, the regulation making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence or affect substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the act.

The Second challenge was regarding the fact that notwithstanding the notification of 2024, bringing about changes in rule 7 and 8 of the 2023 rules, the Screening Committee was still not free from executive control. The Secretary of the Tribunal ought not to be an administrative Officer of the Transport Department as the Transport Department is more often than not, a litigant before such Tribunal. The independence of the Tribunal will only be secured when even the administrative function would be in the hands of judicial body, otherwise there would be complete absence of any link with the parent department.

In support of the contention, it was argued that in Madras Bar Association case. it was clearly sounded that independent judicial Tribunals for determination of the rights of citizens and for the adjudication of the disputes and complaints of the citizens, is a necessary concomitant of the rule of law.

The argument on this point thus was concluded that with the Secretary of the Tribunal hailing from the sponsoring department, it cannot be said that there would be no control of the bureaucracy over the Tribunal.

A non-Judicial Member in any capacity ought not to be appointed in Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal. 

The third argument advanced was that divisional level Tribunals provided under rules of 2023, makes access to justice illusory. Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, the fruits of which ought not to have been kept up and hanging for poor and indigent. No reasonable explanation appears to be available with the Government for shifting the jurisdiction from district level to divisional level. Reference in this context was made to the judgment in Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan; (2016) 8 SCC 509, which declared that access to justice is indeed a facet of right to life, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution as also a facet of right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws.

The other argument raised was whether the rules made, could be enforced retrospectively. The 2023 rules were amended on August 27, 2024 declaring that it shall apply on all pending cases filed on or after April 1, 2019.

In support of the argument, it was suggested that chapter- 11 of the MV Act, 1988 was amended In the year 2019, but it came into force only from April 1, 2022. Section 212 (2) of the MV Act, 1988 further provides that any modification or annulment in the rule so made, shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the rule, scheme or notification.

Lastly, it was argued that the form for filing the complaint provided by the Transport Department on the portal falls foul of Section 166 (1) and (2) of the MV Act, 1988. It was also pointed out that no provision has been made in the form issued by the Transport Department on the web portal about accidents occurring outside the State of Bihar but the claimants being residents of Bihar. There is no option for them to file their claims in the State of Bihar. Thus, larger public interest has been adversely affected with the promulgation of the rules 2023 and the amendment brought out in the year 2024. It was thus argued that the rules are practically uninformed by reason and therefore are arbitrary.

Responding to the contentions, the Advocate General argued that a statutory rule cannot be declared ultra-vires on the grounds of inconvenience and that too without any basis for concluding the same but only on presumptions. A statutory rule could be declared ultra vires only if it is shown that it is beyond the Legislative competence or is in breach of any enactment or violates any provision of the Constitution. With the establishment of ten Tribunals at divisional level, with utmost clarity that the numbers shall not remain perpetually the same, the Government of the day has only shown its consciousness and alacrity to the situation. On periodical review, as and when necessity for creation of more Tribunals would be felt in the interest of the accident victims, the Government would consider the same and increase the number of Tribunals. In fact, initially, only seven Tribunals were conceived of at divisional level but the number was immediately increased to ten, repelling any doubt that when need would arise, more number of Tribunals will not be created. The ten newly dedicated claims Tribunals, according to the Government, have been constituted for the purpose of providing speedy justice to the people. The jurisdictional area of the Tribunal has also been clearly defined along with the divisional headquarter where the Tribunal would be located. Such a decision was not made without any assessment of pending cases. Even the future accretion in the number of cases have been taken into account for making dedicated divisional level Tribunals. The assessment was based on the inputs that number of pending cases did not justify more than ten Tribunals, especially when such Tribunals were exclusively dedicated for deciding claim cases. Hitherto, one court of the District Judge/Additional District Judge was operating as a Tribunal in that district. The finance involved is not the consideration of the Government. The number has been fixed at ten presently, which could be changed if situation so demands. The highest number of pending cases is in Patna division is only 73; in Saran division, there are only 10 pending cases. Similarly the numbers of such cases is less in Bhagalpur, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga etc. The earlier Tribunals were dealing with such claim cases along with the other areas of litigation.

The State contended that the rules have been framed after considering the due process of law.

The Court examined the provisions contained in sections 165, 166 and 176 of the MV, Act 1988.

The Court observed:"the provisions of the Parent Act, the State Government’s power to make rules constituting one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals is clearly established. Section 166 provides for the contents of the application for compensation arising out of an accident. Section 166 (2) which was introduced w.e.f. 14.11.1994 gives the option to the claimant to either file his claim before the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimants reside or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. From the perusal of the rules of 2023, the presumption of the rules not being in sync with the provisions contained in Section 166(2) of the MV Act, 1988 appears to be unfounded and uncalled for."

It records: "no victim or their legal representatives would have to move physically for filing their claim applications. For filing claim applications, an online portal has been developed by the State Government for convenience of accident victims, considering their physical as well as mental conditions. Any claimant could file their claim application by using their own personal credentials. It could be filed from any place using any cyber cafe. The rules of 2023 do not infringe, in any way, the freedom of selection of claims Tribunal of its choice in accordance with the section 166 (2) of the Parent Act. They could also appear before such Tribunal virtually."

It relied on Supreme Court's decision in Gohar Mohammad, wherein it  had directed that the State authorities would take appropriate steps to develop a joint web portal/platform to co-ordinate and facilitate the stakeholders for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Motor Vehicles Amendment Act and the Rules in coordination with any technical agency and be notified to the public at large. In the light of what was directed in Gohar Mohammad by the Supreme Court, an online portal has been developed by the State Government. A facility of digital mode of hearing of cases has also been provided. 

In the light of the judgment in Gohar Mohammad case, a new investigative process has been notified by the Central Government, which has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, which mandates that the victims have to file their details in prescribed format to police and all reports by police after verification and investigation is to be submitted through a portal developed by MORTH. It only facilitates the filing of claim petition which has not to be filed like any suit before the Civil Court. 

There is no bar on the lawyers appearing in these Tribunals either physically or virtually. 

A conjoint reading of Section 165, 166 and 176 of the MV Act, 1988 would reflect that the rules of 2023 (amended in 2024) would clearly pass the muster. 

The Court observed that with the change in the composition of the Screening Committee, making it in line with the judgment in Madras Bar Association case, removes that defect also in the rules viz. the committee would be under the influence of the parent Department of Transport. 

The contentions raised on behalf of the writ petitioners with respect to the power of the Government to make such rules and the extent of it stands answered. The Government has the power to make rules and also decide about number of Tribunals in the State of Bihar. 

In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company vs Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd; ( 1983) 1 SCC 147, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had held that “scales of justice are just not designed to weigh competing social and economic factors. In such matters, legislative wisdom must prevail and judicial review must abstain”. 

The judicial review of Government Policies/rules encapsulates determining whether they infringe upon the fundamental rights of citizens, contravene constitutional provisions, violate statutory regulations and display manifest arbitrariness, capriciousness or malafides. The High Court referred to Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth: 1984 (4) SCC 27.

The focus of judicial scrutiny is limited to the legality of the policy, excluding any evaluation of its wisdom and soundness. The Court cannot compel the Government to formulate a policy, evaluate alternatives or assess the effectiveness of existing policies. This constraints stems from the principle of separation of powers, where the Courts lack the democratic mandate and institutional expertise to delve into such matters. While the Court cannot look into these aspects, the Court can definitely check the Constitutional validity of a policy or a rule or a statute. The Court referred to the decision IN RE: Section 6A of Citizenship Act, 1955, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2880)

Fixing a cut-off date retrospectively is not to be read in isolation but with the provision contained in the rules of 2023 and the amendment of 2024 regarding repeals and savings. The power to make law by an authority also entails in it a power to repeal law or to make it prospective or retrospective. The watershed date is with a reason, namely, that all cases after a particular date would stand transferred to the newly constituted Tribunals with the territorial jurisdiction defined so that the newer cases are decided speedily. 

The Court opined that with respect to creating ten Tribunals, which reduces the number from many to limited resulting in the distortion of the principle of access to justice, it needs be noticed that in Anita Kushwaha case, the Supreme Court clearly held that it forms a necessary component of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court formulated four facets constituting the essence of access of justice, namely, (1) the State must provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism; (2) the mechanism so provided must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance; (3) the process of adjudication must be speedy; and (4) the litigants access to adjudicatory process must be affordable. 

In his judgement, Justice Ashutosh Kumar concluded: "Testing the validity of the rules of 2023 and the amendment of 2024 on this score, we have no difficulty in holding that the Tribunals so constituted provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism, which is in consonance

with the provisions of Section 166 (2) of the Parent Act. Out of 38 districts, 10 Tribunals, which number could increase in future as well, clearly covers the State of Bihar with contiguous districts falling within the territorial jurisdiction of each of the Divisional Tribunal. This does not make it any less accessible than what a litigant would expect. With the new portal having been developed and the investigative process endorsed by the Supreme Court having been introduced, the accessibility to justice has become speedier, cheaper and transparent. The process also makes it affordable."