Friday, November 14, 2025

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh dismmisses "sponsored litigation"

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements in Md. Shadab vs. The State of Bihar, Ashutosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Babu Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Ajit Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Ajay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Jyoti Khandelwal vs. The State of Bihar and Birendra Kumar Nidhi vs. The State of Bihar

In Md. Shadab vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 2-page long judgement dated October 31, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"3. From the perusal of the record, it appears that the transfer policy of the State, by virtue of which transfer and posting of the teachers are being made, has been challenged. None of the transferred teachers/Head Masters has approached this Court. Apparently, it appears that it is a sponsored litigation. 4. We find no merit in the present writ petition. Accordingly, the same the dismissed." This fourth judgement was authored by Justice Singh as Acting Chief Justice.

The petitioner had prayed for a direction/directions, order/orders commanding upon the respondent authorities to appoint Urdu Knowing teachers and Head teachers/Head Masters in Urdu Schools and maktabs. He had also prayed for quashing/modifying memo dated July 14, 2025 as Urdu Knowing teachers/Head teachers/Head Masters not posted in Urdu Schools. He further prayed for a direction/directions, order/orders commanding the respondent authorities to protect the sanctity of Urdu Schools and Maktabs established/run by the Government of Bihar.


 



Patna High Court delivered nine judgements in on November 13, no judgements uploaded on November 14

Patna High Court delivered nine judgements in on November 13, 2025 in Rakesh Kumar Trivedi vs. The Bihar Staff Selection Commission & Ors., Sribhagvan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Shiv Shankar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar, Pramod Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Rahul Kumar Singh vs. The State Bank Of India & Ors., Yogendra Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Munilal Sharma vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Binod Sah @ Binod Kumar Sah @ Binod Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, and Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary (Home), Police Department Bihar.

But the Court did not upload any judgement on November 14.   

 

Thursday, November 13, 2025

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad led Division Bench directs I.G. Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, to issue appropriate guidelines to all Jail Superintendents to abide by Constitutional Mandate against unauthorized detention

High Court awards a consolidated amount of Rs. 2 lakh to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee 

In Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh Vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary (Home), Police Department, Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey delivered a 12-page long judgement dated November 13, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"Having considered the entire materials and the submissions as recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that a consolidated amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be a reasonable amount which may be awarded to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee. 12. Since we have come to know that this practice is going on in other jurisdictions of the Jail Superintendents in the State, the I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services is directed to issue appropriate guidelines to all the Jail Superintendents in the State of Bihar requiring them to strictly abide by the Constitutional Mandate and order of the Court without any exception. Such guideline shall be issued within a period of two weeks from today. The Respondent State of Bihar shall pay the compensation amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) to the petitioner within one month from today. Following the settled principle as discussed in the case of K.K. Pathak (supra), we direct that the amount so paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring official in accordance with law." Pranav Kumar, I.G. Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, the respondent no.3 was present through virtual mode during the hearing. 

The other nine respondents were:Director General of Police, Bihar, Inspector General of Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Jail Superintendent , Central Jail District-Gaya, Deputy Jailor, Central Jail, District-Gaya, Senior Superintendent of Police, District-Gaya, SHO Sarbahda Police Station, District-Saran, District Magistrate, Gaya, Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya and Officer-in-Charge, Sarbahda P.S., District- Gaya.

This writ application was taken up for consideration on November 12, 2025. The writ application raised an issue of serious concern for a Constitutional Court. It is well said that a Constitutional Court acts as a guardian to protect the fundamental rights of a citizen when it comes to protect his Right to Life and Liberty. In the case, the petitioner was confined in the Central Jail at Gaya Jee in connection with Sarbahda P.S. Case of 2025 registered on July 31, 2025 for the offences punishable under Section 30(a) and 37 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. In the said case, he was granted bail vide order dated September 23, 2025 by the competent Court and the Exclusive Special Excise Judge, Court No. 2, Gaya Jee issued a warrant to release him unless he is liable to be detained for some other matter. The warrant of release dated September 29, 2025 was communicated to the Superintendent, Central Jail at Gaya Jee.What happened thereafter are some disturbing features of this case. It appears that prior to receipt of the warrant to release, the Superintendent of Jail, Gaya Jee had received a production warrant from the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar requiring production of the petitioner in connection with Buxar P.S. Case No. 87 of 2025. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 has been filed enclosing certain documents. Annexure ‘R-1/B’ is the order requiring production of the petitioner in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar (Bihar) on 04.09.2025 by 10:00 AM as he was involved in a case of theft punishable under Section 303(2) of the Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita. Despite receipt of the production warrant, the Superintendent of Jail, Gaya Jee did not produce the petitioner in the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Court at Buxar on 04.09.2025. 

The counter affidavit to show that the Superintendent of Jail, Gaya Jee informed the learned court of Exclusive Special Judge, Excise, 2nd Gaya Jee, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar with regard to the requirement to produce the petitioner in the light of the production warrant. The Superintendent of Jail was looking for adequate force and vehicle with fuel from the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee in order to produce the petitioner in Buxar Court. The respondents have not brought on record any other communication by way of response from the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee. It is also not clear whether the court at Gaya Jee was moved for seeking an order to take the petitioner to Buxar Court. The fact remains that even after his release order, the petitioner continued in detention.

The attention of the High Court was drawn towards the communication as contained in letter dated 06.10.2025 written by the Superintendent of Central Jail, Gaya Jee to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya Jee wherein he has clearly recorded that after receipt of the release order from the local court, the petitioner has been released but had been kept confined on the strength of a production warrant. It is to be kept in mind that the date fixed in the production warrant was 04.09.2025 which had already expired. This is why it has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in terms of Section 304 read with Section 305 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, once the date fixed in the production warrant expired and the order of release had already reached in the hand of the Superintendent of Central Jail, Gaya Jee, he had no option but to release the petitioner. It is pointed out that prior to receipt of the release order, the present authority could have requested the Buxar Court to issue a fresh warrant of production and the petitioner could have been produced on the strength of a fresh warrant of production before receipt of the release order. It was submitted that, in fact, in his communication dated 06.10.2025, the Superintendent, Central Jail made a wrong statement that after receipt of the release order, the petitioner was already released. His own statement in the said letter that the petitioner was still kept confined in the jail on the strength of the production warrant demonstrates that the continued detention of the petitioner was not authorized by any competent court of law, thus, his confinement in jail is in breach of the fundamental right of the petitioner. He was kept in jail for days even after release without there being any order of a competent court.

The Court noted the submission of P.N. Sharma, AC to AG that perhaps, this practice was an ongoing practice, though, it was not placed on affidavit and he has no specific instruction in his regard but what was gathered from his experience at the Bar as an Officer of the Court perhaps, this was the practice which is being followed.

AC to AG further submitted that prima-facie, it cannot be denied that the petitioner was not actually released from jail even after the receipt of the release order. He was produced in Buxar Court only on 17.10.2025. During the intervening period, there was no authorized detention of the petitioner.

Justice Prasad observed:"....this Court has no iota of doubt that in this case, the life and liberty of the petitioner has been curtailed to a great extent by keeping him in confinement for 18 days without any authorized detention order from a competent court of law. This Court is further disturbed from the fact that perhaps the same thing is happening as a matter of practice in the State of Bihar. This is a wider issue. While holding that the action of the State respondents in not releasing the petitioner actually from jail and keeping him confined in jail for 18 days without any authorized detention order is wholly illegal and is to be held as a breach of the fundamental right of the petitioner, we propose to award adequate compensation to the petitioner for his illegal detention and such compensation would be required to be realized from the erring official. It is wellsettled in law that if because of misuse of power by an executive/officer acting on behalf of the State, any compensation is required to be allowed to a citizen, such compensation should not go from the public exchequer, rather such money should be realized from the erring official.

The High Court noted that AC to AG informed that the petitioner was made to appear virtually before the In-charge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar on 04.10.2025 and he had been remanded to custody until 17.10.2025. Thus, his submission is that, in fact, it is not 18 days confinement without any authorized detention order, the actual unauthorized detention would come down to five days if counted from 29.09.2025 which was the date of the receipt of the release order of the petitioner in Sarbahda P.S. Case No. 91 of 2025.

Pranav Kumar, I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services submitted that on perusal of the entire records, he noticed that the petitioner was confined in jail even after September 29, 2025 without there being any order of a competent court of law, according to him, this was occasioned due to the intervening Durga Puja Holidays. The High Court, pointed out to him that even during Durga Puja Holidays, an In-charge Court was always available for this purpose and, in fact, the virtual appearance of the petitioner was done on October 4, 2025 which was during the Puja Holidays only, therefore, it cannot be allowed to be contend that the illegal detention of the petitioner from September 29, 2025 until his virtual production on October 4, 2025 was due to any reason beyond the control of the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee. The I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services was immediately realised this and was admitted that “Yes, there is an illegal detention for atleast five days”. 

Justice Prasad observed: "7. There being an admitted position that it is a case of unauthorized detention of the petitioner from 29.09.2025 until 04.10.2025 and this practice is going on without drawing much attention of the Department, this Court being a Constitutional Court cannot remain a silent spectator. The I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services has informed this Court that he has taken action against the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee in administrative side and will take it to a logical end, however, keeping in view the admitted facts of the case as we have already held that it is a case of illegal detention, we proceed to award compensation to the petitioner."

The judgement reads: "8. On the quantum of compensation, we have invited even I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services to say as to what would be a reasonable amount of compensation to the petitioner. He has submitted that a sum of Rs.10,000/- may perhaps be appropriate. Learned AC to AG has submitted that the Court should take a lenient view of the matter and a sum of Rs.10,000/-for each day of detention would be an appropriate amount of compensation."

The judgement recorded that the counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the quantum of compensation to be fixed by the High Court should not be an indicative and symbolic one. "It is a matter in which admittedly, the liberty of the petitioner has been curtailed without following the established procedure of law, therefore, a clear case of violation of the Constitutional mandate under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been made out. It is submitted that in such cases, in fact, the Government should have a policy to award ex-gratia compensation to an illegal detenue and such amount which are required to be paid to a person for his illegal detention be realised from the erring official so that the Public Exchequer which is the Custodian of public money should not be burdened with cost and compensation. He has relied upon a judgment of a learned Writ Court in case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 in which this principle has been discussed. It has also been pointed out that an appeal preferred against this judgment of the learned Writ Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not succeed and the same was dismissed vide order dated 26.04.2019."

The counsel for the petitioner had prayed for an adequate compensation which according to him should not be less than Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) per day. He had relied upon a 9-page long judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215 in which a Writ Court of Delhi High Court's Justice Subramonium Prasad was pleased to award a compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner for his illegal detention for about half an hour. 

The Delhi High Court relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in D. K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, 1997 (1) SCC 416, wherein it had directed the following requirements to be fulfilled in case of arrest. Paragraph 35 of the said judgment (D.K. Basu) reads as under:-

“35. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to issue the following requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures:

(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.

(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 4 of 9 arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.

(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.

(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.

(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.

(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.

(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 5 of 9 examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The “Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.

(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well.

(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record.

(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.

(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board. “

The Delhi High Court emphasised the Supreme Court’s observations in Para 44 in D K Basu (supra) also observed as under (Para 11):-

44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.

The Delhi High Court judgement also relied on the Nilabati Behera case [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] in which heirs of a victim of custodial torture were granted compensation.

  1. In Nilabati Behera case [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] , it was held: (SCC pp. 767-68, para 32) “

Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a victim W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 7 of 9 of custodial death for the infraction or invasion of his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not always enough to relegate him to the ordinary remedy of a civil suit to claim damages for the tortious act of the State as that remedy in private law indeed is available to the aggrieved party.

The citizen complaining of the infringement of the indefeasible right under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be told that for the established violation of the fundamental right to life, he cannot get any relief under the public law by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction. The primary source of the public law proceedings stems from the prerogative writs and the courts have, therefore, to evolve „new tools‟ to give relief in public law by moulding it according to the situation with a view to preserve and protect the Rule of Law.

While concluding his first Hamlyn Lecture in 1949 under the title „Freedom under the Law‟ Lord Denning in his own style warned: „No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilty of the sins that are common to all of us. You may be sure that they will sometimes do things which they ought not to do: and will not do things that they ought to do.

But if and when wrongs are thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy? Our procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, our procedure for preventing the abuse of power is not. Just as the pick and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so also the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the case are not suitable for the winning of freedom in the new age.

They must be replaced by new and up-to-date machinery, by declarations, injunctions and actions for negligence…. This is not the task of Parliament … the courts must do this. Of all the great tasks that lie ahead this is the greatest.

Properly exercised the new powers of the executive W.P.(C) 3851/2023 Page 8 of 9 lead to the welfare state; but abused they lead to a totalitarian state. None such must ever be allowed in this country.‟ 

The Delhi High Court judgement, also relied on Nilabati Behera v. State of Orisa & Ors., 1993 (2) SCC 746, while dealing with the power of a constitutional court to award compensation rather than relegating such person to file a suit for recovery of damages, the Supreme Court observed as under:- (Para 12)

“22. The above discussion indicates the principle on which the court’s power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144] distinguished therefrom.

We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son.”

It was submitted that the High Court has recently in the case of Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 52 dealt with this aspect of the matter, though, in case of illegal arrest resulting in unauthorized detention and has been pleased to award Rs.1,00,000/- to each of the Respondents Nos. 9 and 11 for their unauthorized detention in police custody. 

The attention of the High Court was drawn towards the judgment in Arvind Kumar Gupta (supra) which we quote hereunder for a ready reference:-“27. In the case of Rudal Sah vs. State of Bihar and Another reported in AIR 1983 SC 1086 while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.”

The High Court held that in Pankaj Kumar Sharma vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials. Having regard to the well settled law on the subject, in the admitted facts of this case where these police officials have contravened the procedures and thereby caused injustice to Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 by keeping them in police custody without any sanction of law, we are of the considered opinion that Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 both are entitled for a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) each. The State shall be liable to pay Rs.1,00,000/- to each of Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 within a period of 30 days from today and recover the same from Respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 12 who have admitted the violation of the fundamental rights of Respondent Nos. 9 and 11 by not complying with the established procedure of law. It is well-settled that for any misuse of power by an officer of the State, if the State is being saddled with cost or compensation, the same be recovered from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which attained finality as the same has not been interfered with by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019.

Justice Prasad observed:"11. Having considered the entire materials and the submissions as recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that a consolidated amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be a reasonable amount which may be awarded to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee."

Also readFate of a Habeas Corpus petition, after disposal of the case by High Court, CBI finds Rajnath Sharma, the "absconding person" was killed, burnt in police custody

 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha directs authorities to place petitioner's case for premature release before State Sentence Remission Board

Patna High Court delivered six judgments on November 13, 2025 in Rakesh Kumar Trivedi vs. The Bihar Staff Selection Commission & Ors., Sribhagvan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rahul Kumar Singh vs. The State Bank of India & Ors., Yogendra Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, Binod Sah @ Binod Kumar Sah @ Binod Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna and Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary (Home), Police Department Bihar, Patna.

In Yogendra Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha delivered a 4-page long judgement dated November 13, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"this writ application is disposed of with direction to the respondent authorities to place the case of the petitioner for his premature release before the State Sentence Remission Board within six weeks and the State Sentence Remission Board would take a decision within six weeks thereafter considering the state policy and judicial pronouncement as the case of the petitioner appears to be covered under the 1984 policy." This case arose out of PS. case of 2024 from Patna. 

The other seven respondents were: The State Sentence Remission Board through the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar, Joint Secretary-cum-Director (Administration), Home Deptt. (Prison), Bihar, Secretary, Law Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, Additional Director General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Bihar, Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar Patna, Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar and Jail Superintendent, Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur. 

This writ application prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of CERTIORARI for quashing the decision of the State Remission Board dated November 1, 2021 and the same was communicated to all concerned vide letter no. 4679 dated April 21, 2022 issued under the signature of Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, the Respondent No. 7, so far it related to the petitioner, whereby and where under the proposal for grant of pre-mature release was rejected on the ground that there was no favourable report of Superintendent of Police and Presiding Judge as also as per clause (iv) (ka) of Notification No. 3106 dated December 10, 2002, the petitioner was not eligible for consideration of his pre-mature release notwithstanding the fact that in the writ application filed by the petitioner being Cr.W.J.C. No. 209 of 2020, the High Court vide judgment and order dated August 16, 2021 held that the petitioner was convicted prior to July 2, 2007 and thus his case was required to be considered in the light of 1984 policy contained in letter dated January 21, 1984. It also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of MANDAMUS, commanding and directing the Respondent Authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for grant pre-mature release pursuant to the 1984 provision dated January 21, 1984 on the ground that the petitioner had already completed 14 years of his physical incarceration and 20 years with remission on September 6, 2013 and now he had completed about 25 years of his physical incarceration.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was convicted vide judgment dated February 21, 2006 under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in Sessions Trial of 2000/44 of 2003 and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life vide order dated February 22, 2006 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, F.T.C. No. IV, Gopalganj. The counsel also submitted that the case of the petitioner was not considered for remission though he has completed more than 14 years of his actual incarceration and more than 20 years with remission. The counsel also submitted that earlier prayer for premature release of the petitioner was rejected vide order dated November 1, 2021. The counsel also submitted that the case of
the petitioner is covered under the 1984 policy which was prevailing during relevant time, i.e., on the date of conviction of the petitioner and was also covered by the decision of the High Court in the case of Md. Allauddin Ansari & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (vide order dated 22.12.2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No. 861 of 2021 & analogous case). 

The counsel appearing on behalf of the State- respondents submitted that appropriate orders may be passed and the authorities will consider the case of the petitioner for his premature release in the light of the Rule VI (d) of Notification No. 3106 dated December 10, 2002, which stipulates rejection of the case of a prisoner for premature release on one or more occasion by the Remission Board will not be a bar for reconsideration of his case. However, the reconsideration of the case of a convict already rejected could be done only after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of last consideration of his case.

Similar judgement was passed by Justice Jha in Binod Sah @ Binod Kumar Sah @ Binod Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna (2025).  

 

Wednesday, November 12, 2025

Patna High Court judgments during November 1-12

Patna High Court delivered seven judgments on November 12, 2025 in Anjesh Sada vs. The State of Bihar, Bhushan Sada vs. The State of Bihar, Dinesh Das vs. The State of Bihar, Yogendra Das vs. The State of Bihar, Ramdhani Ram vs. The State Of Bihar, Ajay Kumar vs. The Chairman, Bank of India, Dipu Kumar Yadav @ Deepu Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar and Md. Umar Farooque vs. The State of Bihar, through the Commissioner-Cum-Secretary.
 
The High Court delivered eight judgements on November 11 in Ajay Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Nokhlal Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, Shrawan Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Pushpraj Bajaj vs. The Union of India through the Assistant Director, ED, Patna Zonal Office, Ranjeet Kumar Rajak vs. The State of Bihar, Akash Kumar vs. The Punjab National Bank, Ankit Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ajay Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar.
 
The High Court delivered thirteen judgements on November 10 in Parmod Chaudhary @ Pramod Prasad vs. State Of Bihar & Anr., Binay Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar, Dinesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Amrendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Munshi Mahto vs. The State of Bihar, Amrit vs. The State of Bihar, Dhananjay Nishad @ Dhananjay Kumar Nishad vs. The State of Bihar, Indal Prasad Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Kumari Indrasan vs. The State of Bihar, Rajeev Ranjan vs. The State of Bihar, Bibhuti Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Karnal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Excise, Government of Bihar, Patna, Sanjeet Singh @ Sanjeet Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Pankaj Kumar Sinha @ Pankaj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar. 

The High Court delivered thirteen judgements on November 7 in National Insurance Company Through Its The Divisional Manager vs. Chandramani Devi & Ors., Shila Devi vs. Raja Ram Dokania, Ganesh Das & Anr. vs. Vinay Kumar Chaubay & Ors., Nagina vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary Bihar, Patna namely Brajesh Mehrotra and Satyendra Kumar Pathak vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.
 
The High Court delivered 31 judgements on November 4 in Rahul Yadav @ Cheta Yadav @ Chaitu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rajesh Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance, Raj Kumar Mahaseth vs. The State of Bihar, Shanti Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Surya Prakash vs. The State of Bihar, Shakeel Ahmad @ Shakeel Azam vs. The State of Bihar, Bunty Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Premlata Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Rajeev Kumar Jha vs. The State of Bihar, Kumari Ranju @ Ranju Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Sunny Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Samiul Arefin vs. The State of Bihar, Vishwamitra Giri vs. The State of Bihar, Bebi Tabasum Naj @ Baby Naaz Tabassum & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Bindeshwari Prasad Yadav @ Bindeshwar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, Harsh Raj vs. The State of Bihar, Saddam Kureshi @ Md. Saddam Kureshi vs. The State of Bihar, XXX vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Moqutadir Firdausi @ Talib vs. The State of Bihar, Bishwanath Prasad vs. Sri Kumar Ravi,  Ranjan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Shyam Bihari Singh Paramedical and Nursing Institute vs. The State of Bihar, Satyam Para medical College and Research vs. The State of Bihar, Shri Arvind Foundation vs. The State of Bihar, Raju Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Om Prakash Gupta vs. The Union of India  Brahmadeo Ravidas vs. The State of Bihar, Naval Kishore Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Dharmendra Yadav @ Dharbindar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rita Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Abhimanyu Kumar Singh @ Manu Singh @ Aabhimanyu Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Sanjay Rai @ Sanjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar. 
 
The High Court delivered 26 judgements on November 3 in M/s Best Furniture Industry vs. The Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA), Vijay Thakur vs. The State of Bihar, Rafat Praveen @ Rafat Mobin @ Raffat Mobin @ Juhi vs. The State of Bihar, Karuna Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Sima Devi @ Sima Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Usha Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Anand Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Chanchal Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Kaushalya Devi & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Mukesh Kumar Roy vs. The State of Bihar, Chandra Mouleshwar & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Ram Sundar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar, Vivek Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Mukesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Md. Naushad Alam vs. The State of Bihar, Ajay Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Anil Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Rakesh Kumar @ Rakesh Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar, Sunil Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Bindu Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Saiyad Sarvar Husain vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Briksha Sahu vs. The State of Bihar, Dhirendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rakesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The Honble High Court Of Judicature At Patna Through Registrar General High Court & Ors., Vivek Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Pappu Kumar Chauhan @ Shiv Shankar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, Annapurna Jajodiya vs. The State of Bihar and M/s Bihar State Road Development Corporation Ltd vs. M/s BSC-C and C (JV).
 
The High Court delivered 17 judgements on November 2 in The State of Bihar vs. Smt. Ranjana Kumari, Mohan Mishra @ Baba @ Pyara Mohan Mishra vs. The State of Bihar, Ratan Kumar Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Saidur @ Saidur vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Shadab vs. The State of Bihar, Ashutosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Babu Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Ajit Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Ajay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Jyoti Khandelwal vs. The State of Bihar, Birendra Kumar Nidhi vs. The State of Bihar, Sunil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Jahangir Alam, vs. The State of Bihar, Sangita Devi vs. The State of Bihar, The Hafiz Mubarak Hussain Memorial Trust Islamia Urdu Academy at Mirganj, vs. The State of Bihar, Pramila kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Dular Chand Mochi vs. The State of Bihar and Shahid Ekram @ Shahid Ekran vs. Hashim Mian.

Tuesday, November 11, 2025

Constitutionality of Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 remains sub judice

Anurag Krishna Sinha filed the appeal in the Supreme Court on March 7, 2024 against the judgement dated February 29, 2024 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Rajiv Roy in Anurag Krishna Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna & Anr. (2024). Justice Chandran had delivered the verdict after hearing the writ petition which challenged the constitutional validity Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library  (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 on January 8, 2024. The petition was filed in the High Court on May 15, 2015. The High Court reversed the interim order dated May 22, 2015 by the Division Bench of the then Chief Justice L. Narasimha Reddy and Justice Sudhir Singh which had suspended the operation of the Act as an interim measure. The case was registered in the Supreme Court on March 11, 2024. It was verified On March 14, 2024.

Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated November 11, 2025 reads:"Pursuant to order dated 29th April, 2025, we have been informed by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Bihar that he has the Original Records of the 2015 enactment, i.e. Smt Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidananda Sinha Library (Requisition and Management) Act, 2015, with him. The said Original Records are to retained by him. List the appeal on 19th November, 2025 on the TOP OF THE BOARD. Till 19th November, 2025, status quo, as it exists today, be maintained."

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Hrishikesh Roy and Prashant Kumar Roy passed an order dated April 22, 2024. The order reads:"2. While various contentions are raised by the petitioner to assail the impugned judgment dated 29.02.2024 and the vires of Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition and Management) Act, 2015, it is noticed that the concerned Institute having, inter-alia a Public Library and an Auditorium, are located on Government land. 3. It is also pointed out that the State Government had enacted 2015 Act for the purpose of better management and development of the Institute and its Library." 

It referred to para 46 of the impugned judgment itself regarding the obligation of the State after they took over the Institute and Library. It reads: "46. The vesting occurs of ‘the Institute & Library’ on the State Government for the purpose of better management and development of ‘the Institute & Library’. The objects of the Trust cannot be digressed from by the State Government nor is it intended to be, as is disclosed from the impugned enactment. Whatever rights, powers and duties that remained with the Trustees, in the management of ‘the Institute & Library’ as was available after Annexure-2 agreement was entered into, would also vest completely in the State Government by the impugned enactment.” Later, the Court passed an order dated April 29, 2025. It reads: "We have heard learned senior counsel appearing for the parties at some length and, in our considered 1opinion, it would be appropriate and just to examine the original records related to 2015 enactment, i.e. Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidananda Sinha Library (Requisition and Management) Act, 2015. We order accordingly. Mr. Nadkarni, learned senior counsel, to arrange for the production of original records on the next date." 

The Supreme Court recorded senior counsel's submission that the State Government intends to honour its commitment for proper maintenance of the Institute and Library and the steps that are being taken are in larger public interest. The order concluded: "5. Having considered the above, we feel that interim order as sought by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner may not be justified. The Interlocutory Application (IA NO.66319/2024) is accordingly dismissed. The IA No.73646/2024 – for impleadment is rejected." 

Also read: Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 is constitutionally valid: Patna High Court


 

Patna High Court delivered two judgements on November 11, Justice Jha remands sets aside order by Special Judge, PMLA, Patna, remands for fresh hearing

Patna High Court delivered two judgements on November 11, 2025 in Ajay Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma (as part of Division Bench led by Acting Chief Justice) and Pushpraj Bajaj vs. The Union of India through the Assistant Director, ED, Patna Zonal Office, Patna by Justice Arun Kumar Jha. 

In his 33-page long judgement in the case of Pushpraj Bajaj, a Kolkata based resident, Justice Jha relied on Supreme Court's decision in Kushal Kumar Agrawal vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221, wherein the Court observed that the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 223 of BNSS puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance in the absence of opportunity of hearing being afforded to the accused and, thus, set aside the order taking cognizance by the learned Special Court on a complaint filed under Section 44 (1) (b) of PMLA. 

Justice Jha observed: "52. Now, having regard to the position of law as discussed herein above and specifically taking note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kushal Kumar Agrawal (supra), I have no hesitation in holding that as the complaint has been filed after 01.07.2024 and cognizance has been taken on 08.01.2025, Section 223 of BNSS will apply to the present complaint. Thereafter, proviso to Section 223 of BNSS mandatorily provides for an opportunity of hearing to an accused before cognizance could be taken against him, which means no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused of an opportunity of being heard and admittedly, no opportunity has been given by the learned Special Court to the petitioner before taking cognizance of an offence."

He concluded:"....I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 08.01.2025 passed by the learned Special Court in Special Trial No. (PMLA) 10/2024 suffers from infirmity and, hence, the same is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Patna for taking decision afresh in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner in terms of Section 223(1) of BNSS within a reasonable time. 54. Accordingly, the present revision petition stands allowed. 55. However, it is made clear that this Court has interfered with the impugned order merely on infirmity and illegality committed by the learned Special Court. This order shall not be treated to be an order expressing any opinion on the merits of the case."

The criminal revision was filed under Sections 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 seeking setting aside of the order dated January 8, 2025 passed by the Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (PMLA), Patna in Special Trial No. (PMLA) 10/2024 along with proceedings emanating therefrom, whereby and whereunder the Special Court took cognizance for the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 against the petitioner and others. 

Patna High Court delivered eight judgements on November 10, 4 by Justice Arun Kumar Jha

Patna High Court delivered eight judgements on November 10, 2025 in Amrendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and Munshi Mahto vs. The State of BiharKarnal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Excise, Government. of Bihar, PatnaPankaj Kumar Sinha @ Pankaj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar by Justice Arun Kumar Jha, Amrit vs. The State of Bihar by Justice Harish Kumar, Dhananjay Nishad @ Dhananjay Kumar Nishad vs. The State of Bihar, by Justice Sourendra Pandey Rajeev Ranjan vs. The State of Bihar, by Justice Ajit Kumar and Bibhuti Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, by Justice Partha Sarthy. 

Out of these four were by Justice Jha. In Amrendra Kumar's case, Justice Jha concluded:" in the light of the provision of Negotiable Instruments Act and the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Gian Chand Garg (supra), the present revision petition is allowed and the judgment dated 25.02.2020 and judgment and order of sentence dated 23.08.2019 are set aside." 

In Gian Chand Garg vs. Harpal Singh & Anr. passed in Special Leave To Appeal (CRL.) No. 8050 of 2025, the Supreme Court in its order dated August 11, 2025 held that although dishonour of cheque entails criminal consequence, the legislature by virtue of section 147 of the Negotiable Instrument Act has made it compoundable notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the same can be compounded at any stage of the proceedings especially when the parties have themselves arrived at a voluntary compromise. Thereafter, considering the compromise between the complainant and the convict, the concurrent conviction rendered by the Courts below have been set aside. 

 

 

Saturday, November 8, 2025

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh upholds the order by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy in a case from Darbhanga

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Bihar & Ors. vs. Lal Jha (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 5-page long judgement dated October 31, 2025, wherein, it upheld the 5-page long order dated September 23, 2024 by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy in Lal Jha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Bihar (2024). The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. In his third judgement as Acting Chief Justice , he concluded:"....we find no reason to interfere in the order of the learned Single Judge. affirmed, and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed." The other 4 respondents were: The Chief Engineer, Rural Works Department, Patna, Additional Chief Executive Officer, Rural Works Department, Patna, Superintending Engineer, Rural Works Department, Works Circle, Darbhanga and Executive Engineer, Rural Woks Department, Works Division, Madhubani.

The intra court appeal was filed against Justice Reddy's order whereby the he had issued direction to the authorities to calculate the amount payable to the petitioner towards the maintenance for the year 2021-22 to 2022-23 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of the order and pay the same. It was further clarified that, in case, the amounts are not paid by the authority within the stipulated time, the petitioner would be entitled to simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the submission of the bills till the date of actual payment to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the notice inviting tender (NIT) floated under the authority of the respondent department, the petitioner was allotted the construction and five years maintenance work of the road, namely, Champa Laxmipur and Jadaha under the Scheme New Maintenance Policy MR 3054 vide Agreement No. 90MBD/2020-21 dated 19.09.2020. The respondent-petitioners were paid the maintenance cost for the year 2023-24. However, they were not paid the maintenance cost for the year 2021-22 and 2022-23. The respondent-petitioners had contented before the Writ Court that they had completed the construction work in the year 2021 itself and ought to be paid the maintenance cost for the year 2021-22 and 2022-23. 

Justice Reddy had observed: “5. Admittedly, as seen from the record, the petitioner was entrusted with the work of laying of the roads for the areas i.e. Jadaha Tole Road measuring length 1.130 Kilometres and Champa-laxmipur measuring length 19.750 Kilometres. The petitioner after completion of the work was entitled for maintenance of the roads for a period of five years under the said agreement. The respondents are disputing the date of completion of the work which according to the petitioner was completed on 15.06.2021, whereas the respondents are stating that the work was completed only in the year 2023. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the works were completed only in the year 2023, however, it is to be noted that in the said counter affidavit the factum of entering into the contract in the year 2020 is not disputed and also the fact that the completion of the work was within a period of nine months from the date of the commencement of the work i.e. from 19.09.2020 has also not been disputed by the authorities. When they themselves are stating that the agreement was entered on 19.09.2020 and the works were commenced from 19.09.2020 to be completed within a period of nine months from the date of commencement of the work, the question of completing the works in the year 2023 does not arise." 

The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in case, the petitioner had completed the work only in the month of July 2023 as alleged by the respondents, the petitioner could have been subjected to penalty for not completing the work within the stipulated time and also black-listing. However, the same is not the case, moreover, there is no averments in the counter affidavit to the effect that the petitioner at any point of time was given any extension of time. Further, it is to be noted that merely because the Management Information System (MIS) shows the completion of work as 15.07.2023, the same cannot be a ground for denying the payment and penalize the petitioner for the same. It was pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that the measurement book filed by the respondents themselves shows that the works were completed in the year, 2021.

The High Court recorded:"5. From perusal of records of the case, it is apparent that the concerned Department themselves have stated in their counter-affidavit that the agreement was entered into on 19.09.2020, and the work commenced from 19.09.2020. Further, it has been stated in the counter-affidavit before the Writ Court that the date of completion of work was 9 months from the date of commencement of the work. As such, the appellants have themselves stated that the work was completed within the stipulated period of time.  

In Lal Jha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Patna & Ors. (2024), Justice Reddy had concluded:"....the stand taken by the authorities that the petitioner has completed the work only in the month of July, 2023 and, therefore, he is not entitled for the year 2021-22 to 2022-23 is without any legal basis and contrary to the record. The authorities have directed to calculate the amount payable to the petitioner towards the maintenance for the year 2021-22 to 2022-23 as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order and pay the same. It is further clarified that, in case, the amounts are not paid by the authority within the stipulated time, the petitioner would be entitled to simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the submission of the bills till the date of actual payment to the petitioner." With these directions, the writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated.

Supreme Court reverses Justice Satyavrat Verma's anticipatory bail rejection order

In Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated November 7, 2025 upon hearing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) which arose out of impugned 3-page long order dated July 16, 2025 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench reversed the order of Justice Verma saying, "3....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 4 In view of the above, we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties...." The Court had granted interim relief by its order dated September 24, 2025 by issuing direction for not taking coercive steps.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court apprehending her arrest in connection with a FIR dated December 1, 2024 registered at Police Station Banjariya, District East Champaran, Bihar for the offences
punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 109, 118(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 

Earlier, in Sima Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Verma had concluded:"5. Considering the submissions made by the learned APP, the court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 6. The anticipatory bail application of the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, if the petitioner surrenders on or before 30.07.2025, in that event, the learned trial Court shall dispose of the case, on the same day, keeping in mind that husband of the petitioner has been granted the privilege of regular bail by this Court." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending her arrest in connection with Banjariya P.S. Case No.394/2024, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(2), 109, 352, 3(5) of the B.N.S. Act.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that woman petitioner was a person with clean antecedent. The husband of the petitioner had approached the High Court seeking regular bail by filing Cr. Misc.No.32639/2025 and the same was allowed by an order dated 22.05.2025. It was submitted that informant alleged that husband of the petitioner was indulged in trade of liquor, further on 26.11.2024, the Banjariya police caught the liquor of her husband, on account of which, the husband of the petitioner abused the informant alleging that it was at his instance that the liquor was caught, thereafter husband of the petitioner assaulted the informant by knife causing injury. It was next alleged that the petitioner along with co-accused Vivek Kumar also assaulted the brother of the informant Vinod Sah by knife causing injury. It was submitted that the injury suffered by Vinod Sah was simple in nature. A.P.P. for the State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner along with Vivek were alleged to have assaulted Vinod by knife causing injury. It was also submitted that Vinod suffered two injuries and the husband of the petitioner was granted the privilege of regular bail, as such, the APP submitted that it was not a fit case, where the privilege of anticipatory bail be granted to the petitioner, in the nature of allegation as alleged in the FIR.

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh led Bench upholds Justice Bibek Chaudhuri's order on petitioners' right for regularization, dismisses appeal by Principal Secretary, Health Department

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Anil Kumr Sharma & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 3-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. Upon perusal of records of the case, we find that there is no sufficient material available on record to substantiate the grounds of the present appeal. Therefore, in our view, the appellant has been unable to dislodge the findings of the learned Single Judge. 5. Thus, considering the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the observations and findings of the learned Single Judge, we find no infirmity in the order. 6. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed."  

The other seven appellants were: Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Deputy Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Director-in-Chief, Disease Control Public Health Paramedical, Health Service, Government of Bihar, Chief Malaria Officer, Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Patna, Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Patna and District Malariaa Officer, Sultanganj, Patna. 

The other eight respondents were: Surendra Prasad, Ramekwal Prasad, Vidya Sagar Prasad, Ram Bhawan Paswan, Rajnandan Saw @ Rajnandan Sao, Madan Prasad, Prem Paswan and Chuni Lal Thakur @Chunilal. 

The appeal was directed against the order and judgment dated September 25, 2024 passed in Anil Kumar Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024) by Justice Chaudhuri, the Single Judge whereby and whereunder he had held that the petitioners/respondents were entitled to be absorbed/regularised as Superior Field Workers/Field Workers in the establishment of the Department of Health and Family Welfare, subject to the condition of their seniority in the existing vacancy of the department, within 90 days from the date of communication of this order.

Justice Chaudhuri had observed: “13. Since, the petitioners worked for 240 days during the period of 5 years starting from 1985-1986, their right of absorption/regularization has been crystallized by virtue of the resolution of the State Government dated 16.03.2006. When the right of the petitioners for regularization has been settled by a 2006 Resolution, the same cannot be denied by a subsequent decision of the General Administrative Department taken in the year 2022. Moreover, I have already come to the conclusion that the reasoned order passed on 30.08.2022 on the basis of the decision in C.W.J.C. No.5538 of 2020 completely misinterpreted and misconstrued the resolution dated 16.03.2006. Thus, the said resolution cannot stand. 14. In view of what has been stated above, this Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to be absorbed/regularized as Superior Field Workers/Field Workers in the establishment of the Department of Health and Family Welfare, subject to the condition of their seniority in the existing vacancy of the department, within 90 days from the date of communication of this order”. 

The nine petitioners before the High Court's Single Judge Bench used to work on Daily Wage basis as a Seasonal Field Workers as DDT sprayers in Malaria Eradication Department under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar. The case of the petitioners was that they were engaged as Seasonal Workers in the year 1985 and 1986, till 1990, they worked more than 240 days, therefore, they were entitled to be regularized/absorbed in Group-D posts in the Department of Health and Family Welfare as per State Government Resolution dated March 16, 2006, which came into force retrospectively w.e.f. December 11, 1990. The petitioners had prayed for issuance of appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari for setting aside the memo dated August 30, 2022 issued under signature of the Director-in-Chief, (Disease Control, Public Health, Paramedical), Health Service, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby and whereunder, grievance of the petitioners for regularization/absorption in the regular cadre Class- IV was rejected. They had also prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent authorities to issue orders for regularization/absorption of the petitioners in the regular cadre Class-IV as Superior Field Worker/Field Worker respectively in accordance with law keeping in view of the Seniority List in the District-Patna. They prayed for directing the respondent authorities to follow the Seniority List strictly for regularization/ absorption of the petitioners in the regular cadre against the vacancy available.  

In the second judgement as Acting Chief Justice, Justice Singh upheld the 12-page long order dated September 25, 2024 passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri. 

Friday, November 7, 2025

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh upholds Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's verdict, dismisses "unsustainable order", LPA by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Bihar

"I express my anguish and displeasure over the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding has been held in the present case and the appellate order has been passed. 67. In numerous cases, this Court has experienced that more often than not, the authorities/functionaries, under the Rules, fail to adhere to the statutory provisions. Breach of statutory prescriptions in disciplinary proceedings, involving matters of serious misconduct by Government Servants, renders the disciplinary action unsustainable, which is not in public interest. I have dealt with various provisions under the Rules, in the present judgment, with an expectation, that top officials, under the State Government, shall take all possible corrective measures including by way of imparting training to the officials who play their respective roles under the Rules. For the said purpose, let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Bihar, for him to chalk out ways and means to ensure strict compliance of various provisions under the Rules, in the light of the observations made in the present judgment."

-Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020)February 24, 2020 

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Abhay Kumar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 4-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. From the perusal of records of the case it is apparent that the order of the learned Single Judge does not take away any right of the concerned parties, and the matter has already been remanded to the competent authority for taking a fresh decision in accordance with the law. 5. In addition to this, the department has already made compliance of the order awaiting the outcome of this appeal. We also could not find any impropriety in the said direction of learned Single Judge. Further, we find that there is no sufficient material available on record to substantiate the grounds of the present appeal. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merit and not fit for interference. 6. The present Letters Patent Appeal is accordingly dismissed." 

The other four respondents were: Commissioner, Munger Division, Munger, Collector, Lakhisarai, Senior Deputy Collector, Lakhisarai and Circle Officer, Suryagarha Block, Lakhisarai.  

The Letters Patent Appeal was directed against 53-page long judgment dated February 24, 2020 passed in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020)by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh whereby and where under the Single Judge had been pleased to allow the writ application and set aside the impugned order dated April 20, 2015 passed by the disciplinary authority and order dated November 16, 2016 passed by the appellate authority being unsustainable in the law. The Court directed the disciplinary authority to consider afresh, the report of inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry and take a fresh decision in accordance with law, observing that it will open for him to exercise his power under Sub Rule 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to Inquiring Authority for further enquiry consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order and further the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been concluded and the punishment has been imposed. The Court also directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment.

Justice Singh, the Single Judge had observed: “64. I direct the disciplinary authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to consider afresh, the report of the inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry, and take afresh decision in accordance with law. It will be open for him to exercise his power under sub Rule (1) of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to the Inquiring Authority for further enquiry. Consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order, the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith. Because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been conducted and the punishment has been imposed, I direct that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment. 65. This writ application is allowed accordingly in terms of the directions and observations as made hereinabove.” 

Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had relied on the decision in Union of India vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon (AIR 2009 SC 1375), wherein, the Supreme Court, dealing with the role of the Inquiry Officer held as under:-
“15. The principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning a witness by the delinquent officer should be enquiry officer. It was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. It is not for the Railway Administration to contend that it is for them to consider as to whether any witness should be examined by it or not. It was for the enquiry officer to take a decision thereupon. A disciplinary proceeding must be fairly conducted. An enquiry officer is a quasi-judicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonably which is even otherwise the requirement of the principles of natural justice.”

He underlined the significance of recording of reasons which has been noted in a series of decisions; illustratively in G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 497, Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 and Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496

In his first order as Acting Chief Justice Justice Sudhir Singh upheld the judgement by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar.   

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside judgment by Patna High Court's Justice Vinod Chandran led Division Bench, quashes 2019 Amendment Notification

In Samiullah vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Registration Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Baghci delivered a 34-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein it set aside the 21-page long judgement dated February 9, 2024 in Amod Bihari Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Registration Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024) by Patna High Court's Division of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and Rajiv Roy and quashed the Notification of 2019. The Court's judgement was authored by Justice Vinod Chandran. 

The High Court had heard the case of Amod Bihari Sinha along with the cases of Samiullah, Umesh Kumar, Rakesh Kumar, Deepak Kumar Singh and Avinash. The petitioners in the High Court filed the writ petitions to challenge the addition of sub-rule (xvii) and (xviii) to Rule 19 of the Bihar Registration Rules, 2008. It was argued that the same was ultra vires the Registration Act, 1908, and beyond the scope of clauses (a) and (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 69. Justice Vinod Chandran had concluded: "25. We find absolutely no reason to interfere with the amendment incorporated. We reject the writ petitions."

Reversing High Court's judgement, the Supreme Court has concluded:"....we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 or any other provisions of the Act", the Registration Act, 1908. It observed: "...Section 69(1)(a) and (aa), as referred to and relied on by the Government to frame the impugned sub-rules. These provisions only relate to the power of Inspector General of Registration to frame rules for “safe custody of books, papers and documents” and also for “providing the manner in which and safeguards subject to which books may be kept in …. electronic form.” Equally, Section 69(1)(j) also does not legitimize making of the impugned sub-rules, as it only enables making of rules for “generally regulating the proceedings of registrars and sub-registrars”. 

The judgement reads:"23. A detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the Act, coupled with Sections 21 and 22 and also Section 69(1)(h) read with Sections 55(3), do not indicate anything as assumed by the High Court. At the same time a detailed examination of Sections 21, 22 and 55(3) only evidences the requirement of sufficient description to property. All these requirements are intended only to identify the property and for this purpose the provisions enable reference to maps, plans or surveys, if practicable. The reality is that, none of these provisions require reference to or production of proof of mutation in the name of the owner. That is to say, the provision does not relate to the right of disposition of the executant in respect of a property which is otherwise physically identifiable. The power to make the impugned sub-rules 19 (xvii) and (xviii) cannot be traced to these provisions."

Supreme Court observed:"17. Interestingly, while the notification introducing impugned sub-rules 19 (xvii) and (xviii) sources the power of making it to Section 69(1)(a) and (aa), the High Court came to the conclusion that the power to introduce sub-rules (xvii) and (xviii) of Rule 19 is not relatable to 69(1)(a) and (aa). High Court, however, traced the power to make the impugned sub-rules to Section 69(1)(h) and Section 55 (3), read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, or in the alternative to the Inspector General’s general rule-making power under Section 69(1)(j). We will now refer to these provisions and at the same time consider other provisions of the Act to examine the legality and authority of sub-rules 19(xvii) and (xviii)."  

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes punishment order by District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, appellate order by Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya

In Satyendra Kumar Pathak vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anil Kumar Sinha delivered a 11-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"The order of punishment dated 01.10.2016 passed by the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, as well as the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh  Division, Gaya, is hereby quashed. 23. The petitioner is entitled to be paid his full salary for the suspension period and the consequential benefits. The entire payments shall be made to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." 

Justice Sinha observed: "This Court finds that the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, is cryptic and non-speaking. The appellate authority has merely reiterated the conclusion of the disciplinary authority without assigning any independent reason, and without examining the correctness of the procedure adopted in the inquiry. The appellate order is, thus, nothing but a mere mechanical affirmation and suffers from clear non-application of mind. 21. Considering the facts as discussed above, this Court is  satisfied that the punishment order, dated 01.10.2016 as well as the appellate order, dated 16.01.2018, stand vitiated which violates the principles of natural justice causing serious prejudice to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed." 

The other seven respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Director, Primary Education Bihar, Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Bihar, District Education Officer, Arwal, District Programme Officer, Establishment, Arwal, Block Education Officer, Block-Karpi, Arwal and Head Master-Cum Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Middle School, Karpi, Arwal.

The writ petition was filed for quashing the order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016 passed by the District Programme Officer, Arwal. It also prayed for a direction to the respondent/authorities for payment of salary and subsistence allowance for the entire period of suspension along with all consequential and monetary benefits. The petitioner sought amendment in the prayer portion of the writ petition, stating that during the pendency of the present petition, the respondent no. 4, namely the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, Bihar, who is the appellate authority, had passed an order dated January 16, 2018, whereby the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority was upheld. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the appellate order.

The petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Matric Trained Scale on November 1, 1977, at Primary School, Kendua, Imamganj, District Gaya. In the year 1987, he was granted the first time-bound promotion and subsequently received ‘Pravar Koti’ promotion in the year 1989. Thereafter, he was posted as the In-charge Headmaster of the Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, District -Arwal, and was due to retire on June 30, 2017. While the petitioner was serving as In-charge Headmaster, the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, issued a letter dated February 17, 2010, placing the petitioner under suspension on the basis of a report submitted by the Area Education Officer cum Incharge, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Arwal on the allegation that he was absent without notice and irregularities were committed in the mid-day meal scheme. Pursuant to the order of suspension, petitioner submitted his joining at headquarters on February 19, 2010. The District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, by order dated May 6, 2010, framed memo of charge in Prapatra “Ka” and appointed Block Education Officer, Arwal, as Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi, as Presenting Officer to conduct the departmental inquiry.

By order dated March 10, 2011, District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, revoked the suspension of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to be posted at Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi, Arwal. In the said order, it was clarified that the Departmental Proceeding would continue. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his joining at Middle School, Kochahasa on March 15, 2011. Thereafter, a memo of charge was again served upon the petitioner vide order dated June 4, 2011 in Prapatra “Ka” by District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, and Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi was appointed as Presenting officer. At this stage, the Enquiry officer, submitted the inquiry report on April 4, 2016. 

In view of the inquiry report dated April 4, 2016, the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, passed the order of punishment dated October 1, 2016 imposing punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect alongwith warning regarding not to remain absent in the school in future without prior intimation and departmental permission. In the punishment order, it was also directed that apart from subsistence allowance during suspension period, nothing will be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner had filed an appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, against the impugned order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016. The appellate authority disposed the appeal vide order, dated January 16, 2018, whereby the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority has been upheld. 

The counsel for the petitioner argued that the Enquiry Officer without issuing a show-cause notice or affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, proceeded to submit an inquiry report on April 4, 2016 before the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad. The enquiry report was submitted behind his back and in complete disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards, a copy of which was not furnished to the petitioner.

It was the specific case of the petitioner that, before passing the order of punishment, a second show-cause notice was not served upon him, nor was any opportunity of personal hearing afforded. The entire proceeding, according to him, was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. Non-supply of inquiry report and second show cause has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. During the entire period of suspension, the petitioner was neither paid his salary nor even the subsistence allowance to which he was entitled under the law.

Assailing the appellate order, the counsel for the petitioner submits that the appellate order also vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind and has been passed in a cryptic manner. The said order is nothing but a mere reiteration of the original punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority, without any independent reasoning, analysis of the grounds urged in appeal, or consideration of the procedural lapses pointed out by the petitioner.

To sum up, his argument was that the entire departmental proceeding is vitiated on multiple counts. Firstly, the petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy as charges were framed twice for the same misconduct. Secondly, the inquiry was conducted ex-parte without issuance of any show-cause notice or providing him any opportunity to defend himself. Thirdly, the order of punishment was passed after an unexplained delay of six years, thereby, causing grave prejudice to him. Fourthly, the denial of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension is not only violative of statutory provisions but also violates the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The counsel for the State submitted that during posting of the petitioner as In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, serious complaints were received regarding petitioner’s conduct,
including the allegation that he remained absent from the school at Kinjar without any intimation to the competent authorities and that irregularities were found in the implementation of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme under his supervision. The entire departmental proceeding starting from suspension order, submission of the inquiry report, passing of the punishment order till the passing of appellate order are strictly in accordance with law after following the due process and that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Justice Sinha noted that the record disclosed that the petitioner was served with two separate charge-memos on two different occasions. The first was issued by the then District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, on May 6, 2010, and the second by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, on June 4, 2011.  Though issued on separate dates, both charge-memos substantially contain the same set of allegations. However, it appeared that the inquiry was conducted only with reference to the second charge memo issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal. The Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi as Presenting officer. The allegations put forth against the petitioner as evident from memo of charge dated June 4, 2011 were as follows:-
(I) While functioning as the In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kinjhar, the petitioner remained absent from the school on 09.02.2010 without giving any prior information or obtaining permission from the competent authority.
(ii) During the period of his suspension vide Memo No. 494 dated 17.02.2010 issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, the petitioner did not report at the Headquarters as required under the suspension order.
(iii)That the petitioner disobeyed the directions issued by the Superior officers, appointing officers as well as controlling officers.
(iv) That the petitioner did not comply with Memo No. 493 dated 14.05.2010 thereby violating the order of the superior authority.
(v) During his functioning as the Headmaster, irregularities were committed by the petitioner in the 

He observed: "From perusal of the memo of charge, it would be evident that neither the charge-memos contains the statutory particulars required under Rule 17(3) of the Bihar CCA Rules. The charge-memos does not have any list of documents or list of witnesses as required by Rule 17(3) by whom the charges were proposed to be proved. The absence of these essential ingredients goes to the very root of the proceeding, for without being apprised of the documentary and oral evidence proposed to be relied upon. In order to sustain the charges, the delinquent cannot be expected to defend himself effectively. This Court
therefore finds that the very initiation of the departmental proceeding suffers from a foundational illegality." 

Justice Sinha observed: "19. It further appears that neither the petitioner nor the respondents have placed the inquiry report on record. In the absence of the report, this Court is unable to satisfy itself as to whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with law, whether evidence was led in support of the charges, or whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. The stand of the petitioner is that no notice of hearing was ever served upon him by the Enquiry Officer and that he was never given an opportunity to offer his defence. It is also his specific case that the disciplinary authority did not issue any second show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report prior to imposition of the punishment, which is mandatory requirement under CCA Rules. These assertions have not been specifically denied on behalf of the State, and in the absence of such, the submissions of the petitioner is to be accepted."


Justice Jitendra Kumar directs National Insurance Company to pay enhanced compensation

In Shila Devi & Anr.vs. Raja Ram Dokania & Ors. (2025), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 25-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....the respondent No.3/Insurance Company is directed to pay the said amount of Rs.6,92,648/- to the appellants within two months, failing which the respondent No.3/Insurance Company would be liable to pay penal interest @ 12% per annum. This amount must be paid by way of account payee cheque or Bank Draft in the name of the appellant No.1, Shila Devi." The Respondent No. 3 is Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company, Bhagalpur.

The Miscellaneous Appeal was preferred against the impugned judgment/award dated August 5,  2019 passed by learned District Judge-cum-Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (M.A.C.T.), Bhagalpur in Claim Case of 2017, whereby M.A.C.T., Bhagalpur had directed the insurance company, who was the Respondent No.3 , to pay an amount of Rs. 6,33,000/- to the claimants, who were Appellants, as compensation on account of death of one Ashu Raj Kumar @ Ashu Raj @ Shrawan Kumar in a motor accident along with interest @ 8 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition. The payment of Rs. 50,000/-already made towards interim compensation was directed to be adjusted against the total compensation amount and the compensation was directed to be paid within sixty days from the date of the order.

The counsel for the Appellants submitted that the total compensation amount as directed by Tribunal was already received by the Appellants from the insurance company. However, being dissatisfied by the quantum of the compensation, the Appellants preferred the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act for getting enhanced compensation. 

In the course of pendency of this appeal, the Appellant No.2, Pappu Thakur died. Hence, he was substituted by his legal heir, Champa Devi, who is his married daughter. The other legal heir Shila Devi (wife of Pappu Thakur) was already Appellant No.1. 

The factual background of this case is that on March 29, 2017, an accident took place involving a tanker resulting into death of one Ashu Raj Kumar @ Ashu Raj @ Shrawan Kumar, son of the claimants Shila Devi and Pappu Thakur. Subsequently, Rajoun P.S. Case No. 104 of 2017 was registered on 29.03.2017 for the offences punishable under Section 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC against the driver and the owner of the aforesaid tanker. As per further averment in the claim petition, the deceased Ashu Raj Kumar @ Ashu Raj @ Shrawan Kumar was traveling in an auto-rickshaw which was dashed by the said tanker on account of rash and negligent driving. The deceased is alleged to be 19 years of age at the time of death and he was unmarried and working as a private tutor earning Rs. 10,000/- per month. It was further claimed that the offending tanker was insured with National Insurance Company Limited at the relevant time of accident vide the policy no.171000/31/16/6300002116 effective from 10.07.2016 to 09.07.2017 covering the date of accident on 29.03.2017. 

The Appellants, Shila Devi and Pappu Thakur filed the claim case no. 98 of 2017 on 11.05.2017 for compensation of Rs. 16,16,000/- impleading the driver, owner of the offending vehicle and the insurance company. On notice, all the three Opposite Parties appeared, but the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2, who were owner and driver of the offending vehicle respectively, did not file any written statement. However, the insurance company, who was the Opposite Party No.3 before the Tribunal, filed its written statement. However, no application under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was filed by the insurance company seeking permission to contest the claim petition.

On the basis of the pleadings of the Claimants and the Insurance Company, the following six issues were
framed:
“(i) Whether the claim case is maintainable? 
(ii) Whether the claimants have valid cause of action for the present claim case?
(iii) Whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle?
(iv)Whether the claimants are entitled to get compensation as prayed for?
(v). Whether the offending vehicle was insured at the time of alleged incident?
(vi) Whether the driver has valid license at the time of accident?”

The Judgement recorded that nobody was present on behalf of the Respondent No.3, insurance company, despite valid service of notice.

The counsel for the Appellants submitted that he had no dispute with the finding by the Tribunal regarding the income of the deceased @ Rs. 200/- per day. However, no addition to income has been made towards future prospect. He also submitted that Tribunal has applied multiplier of only 16, whereas it should have been 18 and hence, the loss of dependency has been determined on the lower side. Even the quantum of compensation under the conventional heads has been granted on the lower side. Hence, the Appellants could not get just compensation.

The counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 contested the submission of counsel for the appellants submitting that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment/award and the appellants are not entitled to get any higher quantum of compensation. He also submitted that the Respondent Nos. 1 and
2, being owner and driver of the vehicle and the vehicle being insured with Respondent No. 3/Insurance Company, were not liable to pay any compensation to the appellants. 

Justice Kumar opined that the Tribunal had rightly directed the Respondent No. 3/Insurance Company to pay the awarded amount of compensation to the appellants and which was already paid to the appellants. 
But nobody was present on behalf of the Respondent No. 3/Insurance Company, despite valid service of
notice.

The High Court inferred that the following points arose for determination:-
(i) Whether there should be any addition to the income of the deceased towards future prospect while calculating the loss of dependency?
(ii) What should be the appropriate multiplier in the case on hand ?
(iii) Whether the appellants are entitled to get higher quantum of compensation under conventional heads?
(iv) What should be the quantum of just compensation ?

The Court dealt with the law regarding just compensation. It recollected Supreme Court's landmark judgment in Sarla Verma vs. DTC, (2009) 2 SCC 770 with regard to assessment of compensation in cases of death. In this judgment, the Court has laid down principles to provide uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation. The principles as laid down in Sarla Verma Case (supra) were subsequently modified and improved by the Court in subsequent judgments which are as follows:
(i) Reshma Kumari vs. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65
(ii) Royal Sundram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mandala Yadagari Goud, (2019) 5 SCC 554
(iii) National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680
(iv) Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130 

These landmark judgments have been referred the Court's decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satinder Kaur, (2021) 11 SCC 780 providing complete prevailing law regarding assessment of compensation in cases of death arising out of Motor Vehicle Accident. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as follows:
“Relevant principles for assessment of compensation in cases of death as evolved by judicial dicta.
11. The criteria which are to be taken into consideration for assessing compensation in the case of death are : (i) the age of the deceased at the time of his death; (ii) the number of dependants left behind by the
deceased; and (iii) the income of the deceased at the time of his death.

In Sarla Verma vs. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 this Court held that to arrive at the loss of dependency, the Tribunal ought to take into consideration three factors: (SCC p. 132, para 18)
(i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and
(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased.

13. In order to provide uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation, the following steps are required to be followed : Sarla Verma case (2009) 6 SCC 121
“Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) 
The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier)
Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be
selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a Table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said Table with reference to the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual calculation)
The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the “loss of
dependency” to the family. Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to Rs 10,000 may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the range of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased. The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the
deceased before death (if incurred) should also added.”
(a) Deduction for personal and living expenses
14. The personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from the income, to arrive at the
contribution to the family. In Sarla Verma (2009) 6 SCC 121, this Court took the view that it was necessary to standardise the deductions to be made under the head personal and living expenses of the deceased. Accordingly, it was held that:
14.1. Where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses should be 1/3rd if the number of dependant family members is two to three.
14.2. 1/4th if the number of dependant family members is four to six.
14.3. 1/5th if the number of dependant family members exceeds six.
14.4. If the deceased was a bachelor, and the claim was filed by the parents, the deduction would normally be 50% as personal and living expenses of the bachelor. Subject to evidence to the contrary, the father was likely to have his own income, and would not be considered to be a dependant. Hence, the mother alone will be considered to be a dependant. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters of the deceased bachelor would not be considered to be dependants, because they would usually either be independent and earning, or married, or dependant on the father. Thus, even if the deceased was survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant. The deduction towards personal expenses of a bachelor would be 50%, and 50% would be the contribution to the family.
14.5. However, in a case where the family of the bachelor was large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he had a widowed mother, and a large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses could be restricted to 1/3rd, and contribution to the family be taken as 2/3rd.

Justice Kumar concluded: "29. Hence, total compensation payable to the Claimants/Appellants would work out to be Rs.13,25,648/-(12,15,648+15,000+80,000+15,000). As per the pleading of the parties, the claimants/appellants have already received Rs.6,33,000/-. Hence, the appellants are entitled to get balance
amount of Rs.6,92,648/- (13,25,648-6,33,000). 30. Hence, the respondent No.3/Insurance Company is directed to pay the said amount of Rs.6,92,648/- to the appellants within two months, failing which the respondent No.3/Insurance Company would be liable to pay penal interest @ 12% per annum. This amount must be paid by way of account payee cheque or Bank Draft in the name of the appellant No.1, Shila Devi."