Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra sets aside orders by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur, underlines criminal breach of trust and cheating have different ingredients

In Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 17-page long judgement dated July 31, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated March 5, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in G.R. No. 739 of 2016 which arose out of V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 and the subsequent order dated September 10, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in Trial No. 1019 of 2018/G.R. No. 739 of 2016. The judgement reads:"Consequently, the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom, stands quashed. 21. Both the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are, accordingly, allowed." Justice Mishra observed:"19. In the considered opinion of this Court, even if the allegations contained in the F.I.R are accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the petitioner. The dispute, at its core, is essentially contractual and civil in nature, which has been sought to be given the colour of a criminal prosecution."  

Justice Mishra relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Race Club (1940) & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690 wherein, it has distinguished between criminal breach of trust and cheating.  “36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients...."

The trial court had taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the petitioner, and the discharge application preferred by the petitioner was rejected. 

Justice Mishra recorded that in this case, neither entrustment of property nor dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction was discernible from the allegations made in the F.I.R. The dispute, arose out of an alleged breach of contractual obligations relating to sale of a motor vehicle and does not disclose the commission of either offence. A plain reading of the First Information Report did not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 503 and 504 Indian Penal Code. Except for a bald allegation of abuse and threat, there is no material to indicate intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace as required under Section 504 Indian Penal Code, nor are the allegations sufficient to constitute criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 503 Indian Penal Code punishable under Section 506 Indian Penal Code. The case fell squarely within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute any offence and where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or exerting pressure." 

Justice Mishra also concluded: "Continuation of the criminal proceeding, in the facts of the present case, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and would warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court."

The prosecution case was that Anil Kumar Chaudhary, the opposite party No.2 (informant), being the registered owner of a Bolero Pick-up Van bearing Registration No. BR-09M-4666, alleged that on August 1, 2016 the petitioner had approached him with a proposal to purchase the said vehicle. The sale consideration was settled at Rs.4,21,000/-, whereupon the petitioner allegedly issued a cheque of Rs.2,50,000/- towards part payment and agreed to pay the remaining Rs.1,71,000/- within two weeks, whereafter possession of the vehicle was delivered to him. It is further alleged that when the cheque was presented for encashment on September 30, 2016, the same was dishonoured. Thereafter, on October 5, 2016, when O.P. No.2 approached the petitioner demanding either payment of the amount or return of the vehicle, the petitioner allegedly abused and threatened him with dire consequences and refused either to return the vehicle or to make payment, further stating that he would dispose of the vehicle as scrap. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, a written report was submitted by O.P. No.2 before the SHO, Vidyapatinagar Police Station, Samastipur, pursuant to which F.I.R bearing V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 was registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In Lalan Kumar v. The State of Bihar (Cr.Misc No. 37503 of 2023), the High Court has held that prosecution under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act can only be initiated by filing complaint. It was also submitted that no statutory demand notice, as mandated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was ever issued and, therefore, the very institution of criminal proceedings under the said provision is legally unsustainable. He further submitted that the Magistrate  mechanically took cognizance without due application of judicial mind and that the subsequent rejection of the discharge application also suffers from the same infirmity. It is, thus, submitted that both the impugned orders dated 05.03.2018 and 10.09.2018 be quashed along with the entire criminal proceeding.
 

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Supreme Court reverses judgement of remand passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya in a case from Munger

In Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K Vinod Chandran delivered a 30-page long judgement dated May 12, 2026, wherein, it reversed 9-page long judgement of remand dated July 4, 2025 passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. 

Justice Chandran observed: "35. The prosecution has failed to establish the constant demands of dowry, a bitter matrimony or any other circumstance which could lead to a conclusion that the family of the husband or the husband alone had instigated or perpetrated the crime of dowry death or subjected her to cruelty leading to the death. Sadly, the prosecution has completely failed to bring forth the nature of the burn injuries suffered by the victim, which could have, on analysis by a forensic expert, garnered an expert opinion as to whether it was a homicide, a case of fatal self-harm or as argued by the defence, purely accidental. We have to emphasise in this context the absence of the postmortem and unsatisfactory explanation offered on that count. 36. The case set up by the defence of the husband having declined the entreaties of the family of the wife to marry her sister assumes relevance, especially in the context of the delayed FIR registered at the home town of the deceased while her marital home, where the incident occurred was at Mirzapur and she succumbed at a hospital in Allahabad. The defence evidence led, also indicate a happy marriage and a caring husband; which has not been controverted effectively by the prosecution in cross examination. In the circumstances of the valid defence evidence, we could also rely on the dying declaration, exculpating the accused, as a corroborative piece of evidence, making believable the version of accidental burn injuries. 37. The defence evidence was given a complete go by without any valid reasons, despite the substantive testimonies and credible documents produced, remaining uncontroverted. The prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the attendant circumstances coupled with the defence evidence brings forth a probable hypothesis of innocence. The trial courts would do well to bestow equal attention to the defence evidence as that bestowed on the prosecution evidence. There is no cause to approach the defence evidence with distrust, suspicion or even scepticism."

He pointed out that "The accused is not obliged to prove his/her innocence and if a reasonable doubt is raised either from the unsatisfactory evidence led by the prosecution or from the evidence led by the defence its benefit should inure to the accused; which is the reasonable hypothesis of innocence as laid down" in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116. 

Justice Chandran observed: "A valid defence plea, substantiated through testimonies of independent witnesses and documents, as in this case, tested alongside the sketchy evidence led on behalf of the prosecution ought to have raised the judicial antenna of caution especially when the standard of proof is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt." It has been held in Swaran Singh vs. State of Punjab (1957) 1 SCR 953 in travelling from ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’ the whole of the distance should be paved with ‘legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence’.

In the penultimate paragraph, the judgement reads: "38. Before leaving the matter, we are constrained to notice the clear travesty of justice which has occurred in the above case, putting on the dock seventeen persons for reason only of having marital ties with the victim who, in all probability, sustained burn injuries in an accidental fire at her matrimonial home. The High Court also should have bestowed better care in disposing of a criminal appeal from a conviction for an offence alleged to have been committed a quarter century back. The casual approach is evident from the remand order made for reason only of lack of opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses, which testimonies were inconsequential and the impugned order of the Sessions Court having considered only those witnesses led in the trial of the accused, appellant herein." It concluded: "39. We allow the appeal and acquit the appellant/accused reversing the order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court and the order of remand passed by the High Court. We had released the accused on bail, which if carried out, the bail bonds shall stand cancelled. It goes without saying that if the accused is still in custody, he shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case." 

Granting leave, the Justice Chandran observed:" Leave granted. 2. A serious procedural deviation, resulting in a graver travesty of justice is alleged; of two trials, from two final reports on the same First Information Report, having been proceeded with against seventeen persons leading to conviction of only one of them in the second trial, despite the further investigation having unearthed no evidence against the fifteen accused. The appellant, the hapless husband of a woman who succumbed to burn injuries in her matrimonial home, has been in the dock for a quarter of a century on the accusation of marital cruelty and dowry death. The prosecution is also blamed of having failed to bring in material evidence; adduced by the defense, which the investigators ought to have detected before the charge sheet was filed. 3. The two cases were clubbed together after considerable evidence was led in both separately. Later, after further evidence was adduced jointly, they were de-tagged and adjudicated individually. In the first case the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, the two accused arrayed, were acquitted. Fourteen family members of the husband were acquitted in the second case wherein the husband alone stood convicted. The impugned order remanded the matter to the trial court on the premise of the convicted accused not being present when the witnesses were examined in the other case, before clubbing. The appeal is filed by the sole accused who stood convicted." 

Justice Malviya's order indicated that before clubbing, in the instant case PW1 to PW6 were examined and after clubbing, PW13 to PW15 and DW1 to DW5 were examined. The trial court had also recorded that the oral testimonies of only those witnesses examined in the presence of the accused in this case would be evaluated to come to a just decision; scrupulously done avoiding any prejudice to the accused. PW1 to PW6 examined herein are respectively PWs 1, 11, 3, 2, 12 & 4 in the first case; the first two, associates of the family, then a cousin, two brothers and the father of the deceased. PW13 proved the sanction order and PW14 &15 testifying in the joint trial were another brother of the deceased and the Investigating Officer (I.O) respectively. PW5 to PW10 examined in the first case were not even cross-examined by the two accused and their testimonies were completely eschewed even in the first case, the order of acquittal in which was produced. 

In his order, Justice Malviya had concluded:"10. It is settled principle of law that all evidence taken in a trial or other proceedings is recorded in the presence of the accused. This principle is fundamental to fair trial as it allows that accused to hear the evidence, observe the demeanor of witnesses, and instruct their legal counsel accordingly. Essentially it guarantee accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and to ensure transparency and to allow the accused to understand the case against him and present their defence effectively. Legally, both the cases cannot be disposed off together, so, separate trial is required to be concluded after examining the remaining witnesses within six months in accordance with law. 11. The learned trial court, before clubbing both the sessions trial vide order dated 05.03.2009, should have considered the aforesaid exigency and that being so, the amalgamation happens to be contrary to the spirit of law. Consequent thereupon, the judgment impugned has been passed on the basis of illegal procedure so followed by the learned Trial court and ultimately, leading to illegality which is being found incurable and consequently, it leads to a failure of justice. Hence, the same happens to be against the spirit of law, whereupon, is set aside judgment accordingly conviction and sentence is set aside. 12. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court to proceed with the trial independently right from the stage after examination of PW-6. Learned trial court is directed to complete the trial within six months but, with a caution that there should be proper presence of the witnesses. The appellant is on bail, hence he is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within ten days of the receipt of copy of this judgment by the Trial Court and their bail bonds stand cancelled. Further, Superintendent of Police, Munger is directed to procure attendance of all the witnesses so that, the trial be concluded at an earliest. Learned Trial Court is directed to grant bail to the current appellant after surrendering before the Trial Court within stipulated time. If the appellant did not surrender within stipulated time then the Trial Court is directed to take coercive steps against him." Now the Supreme Court has reversed the judgement of remand by Justice Malviya.  

The case in question arose from an incident of the year 2000. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a remand at this stage would only prolong the matter. The counsel for the accused agreed to a  consideration on merits by the Court at the expense of losing one appellate forum, i.e., the High Court, to which the State Counsel also did not object. Therefore, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the matter on its merits. 

The allegation arose from an incident where the wife of the appellant was first taken to the District Hospital, Mirzapur from her marital home on April 13, 2000 allegedly with 40% burns sustained and then re-admitted to a private nursing home, at Allahabad, where the poor lady succumbed a few days later. The Court wondered as to whether the it was accidental, as contended by the husband and the in-laws or whether it was self-inflicted or induced, the causation being the cruelty which arose from incessant dowry demands, is the moot question arising. The victim died on May 2, 2000 and an FIR was registered at the Kotwali Police Station, Munger, which is situated the parental home of the deceased, on June 1, 2000. It arrayed the husband and his brother; the other family members was the father-in-law and the mother-in-law. 

The Court perused the FIR and also the charge sheets in both the cases received from the trial court. The FIR was registered on a complaint dated May 15, 2000 by the father, filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Munger, one under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. FIR No.272 of 2000 dated June 1, 2000 resulted first, in Final Report No.625 of 2000 dated October 31, 2000 leading to Sessions Case No.592 of 2001 and then, Final Report No.215 of 2005 dated May 31, 2005 which led to the instant case numbered as Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006.

The complaint spoke of the marriage and the continued demand of dowry of Rs.50,000/- despite sufficient gifts having been given by the bride’s family and the frequent complaints made by the deceased when she came to her parental home. Even during the pregnancy of the victim, she is said to have been harassed which resulted in the childbirth occurring in the parental home of the mother. The misdeeds continued even after the son was born and there was also an allegation of forced abortion, eventually leading to the death at the marital home. It was also alleged that since the marital family was very influential the entire incident was hushed up. In addition to the husband, his relatives, including immediate in-laws, were arrayed only for reason of the marital home having housed a joint family.

In the Final Report of October 31, 2000 after a brief narration of the complaint of constant demands of dowry pursuant to the marriage of the daughter of the complainant with Brijesh Kumar, it was categorically stated that on investigation, the allegation of offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 appeared to be true. It was noticed that the father-in-law and mother-in-law were in judicial custody and that the Superintendent of Police (S.P) had directed charge-sheet to be filed against the said accused considering the investigation against them as completed and directed investigation against the other 15 persons in the FIR to be continued. The charge-sheet first filed against the two accused gave rise to Sessions Case No.592/2001, which ended in acquittal of both the accused by judgment dated 17.12.2012. On the very same day, judgment dated December 17, 2012 was passed in Sessions Case No.504/2006 wherein the first accused alone was convicted, and the other 14 accused acquitted. Sessions Case No.504 of 2006 arose from a final report filed by a different I.O after further investigation finding no further evidence against the 15 accused remaining.

Issue arose of the trial court having taken cognizance based on a closure report filed by the I.O finding no evidence against the 15 persons who were not charged at the first instance; urged, placing reliance on Mariam Fasihuddin vs. State by Adugodi Police Station 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 and two trials having been proceeded with on the very same allegation of dowry death of the wife of the appellant. The first charge sheet filed; despite finding the offences made out against all the 17, charged only the two who were in judicial custody on the directions of the S.P who also directed further investigation against the others; such directions being clearly impermissible. The second final report stated that no evidence was found available on the record against all the others and there was no cause to raise a supplementary charge against the 15 accused, by another officer who was not examined before the trial court.

Justice Chandran observed: " 10. We are quite conscious of Section 158 of the CrPC which provides that a report be sent to the Magistrate through a superior officer of police, if the State Government by general or special order so directs. Apposite would be reference to Section 173 (3) which provides in such circumstances that the report should be submitted through that superior officer to the Magistrate and pending orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of the police station to make further investigation. Pertinently, the facts of the present case reveal that the report itself was filed by the officer-in-charge of the police station which makes it clear that there was no special or general order passed by the State Government under Section 158. Further, pertinent is the fact that the FIR was registered on the complaint forwarded under Section 156(3) on the directions of the CJM. The order of the S.P hence was clearly without any authority." 

He noted that the decision in Mariam Fasihuddin case frowned upon a supplementary charge sheet filed without any new material unearthed by the investigating agency; wherein the further investigation directed
was with respect to the dropping of two offences under the IPC. However, here the first charge sheet finds material against the other accused also which makes it imperative that we dwell upon the primacy of the Court which takes cognizance.

In H.N. Rishbud vs. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934, the Court was concerned with an investigation carried out under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, which could have been carried out only with the order of a Magistrate. It was held that investigation is the first step, followed by cognizance and then the trial itself. But an invalid investigation does not nullify the cognizance or the trial based thereon, since a defect or illegality in investigation has no bearing on the cognizance taken or the trial. Though a police report under Section 190 of the CrPC is the material on which cognizance is taken, a valid or legal police report is not the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken on a police report vitiated by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the trial cannot be set aside merely on that ground, unless the illegality in the investigation is shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice as provided under Section 537 of the CrPC of 1898 (Section 465 of CrPC of 1973). Finding also that the invalidity of an investigation is not to be completely ignored by the court during trial, it was held that if the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the court at a sufficiently early stage, the court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.

In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107, the Court emphasized the prerogative of the I.O while carrying out an investigation into an offence reported, as juxtaposed with the powers of the jurisdictional court in taking cognizance. The Judges dealt with Sections 154 to 176 of the CrPC of 1898 under the heading ‘Information to the Police and their powers to investigate’ together with Section 190, relating to the jurisdiction of the criminal court in inquiries and trials; which are almost in pari materia with CrPC of 1973. Finding very elaborate provisions made for securing an investigation into a reported offence, without causing any harassment to the accused and at the same time completion without unnecessary or undue delay, it was held that the manner and method of conducting the investigation are left entirely to the police and the Magistrate has no power to interfere with the same. After investigation, if the officer finds no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying forwarding the accused to the Magistrate, Section 169 provides that the accused shall be released on his executing a bond to appear before the Magistrate. 

On the other hand, if sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds are found to make out an offence, then the accused has to be forwarded to the Magistrate under Section 170 if the offence is bailable or otherwise released on bond requiring his appearance before the Magistrate. However, be it invocation of Section 169 or Section 170 the police officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under Section 173, either a closure report; finding no offence made out or a charge sheet; with material allegations based on valid evidence leading to the offence. It was categorically held relying on King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 71 IA 203, 212 that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping, leaving each to exercise its own functions, subject only to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case. When the jurisdictional court has no right to interfere less said the better about the interference made by a superior officer, herein the S.P, especially when the I.O forms an opinion that a case for trial is made out.

It was categorically held that the formation of opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is exclusively with the officer in charge of the investigation. If a closure report is filed; finding no case made out, it is not open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge sheet. It was also clarified that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless since the Magistrate is competent to proceed to take cognizance of the offence, on the materials revealed in the investigation, under Section 190 which imports a judicial discretion on the Magistrate to receive such report under Section 173. The Magistrate, hence, is not bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is no case to place the accused on trial as it is always open to take a contrary view on the facts disclosed in the report.

In Ram Naresh Prasad vs. State of Jharkhand (2009) 11 SCC 299 held that when the police file a report, colloquially termed a ‘closure report’; finding no sustainable case made out, the Court cannot direct a charge sheet to be filed, but could always take cognizance on the basis of the material in the report or direct further investigation. H.S. Bains v. State (U.T. of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631 & Ramswaroop Soni vs.State of M.P. (2020) 18 SCC 327 reiterated that when a closure report is filed finding no offence made out, the Court has three options; (i) to accept the same and close the proceedings or (ii) take cognizance of the matter on the materials in the report or (iii) direct further investigation. It is thus open to the Magistrate on submission of a closure report to look into the material facts disclosed in the report and form an opinion as to whether it constitutes an offence and take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b). To buttress this position, Abhinandan Jha3 made reference to Section 169 of the Code which provides that even if the police officer finds on investigation that there is no reasonable ground or sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial, the officer while releasing the accused has to take a bond for appearance before the Magistrate, if required. The primacy of the Court to take cognizance or deny it is the law discernible from the very provisions of the CrPC. 

 In the instant case the first charge sheet was filed only against the two accused and investigation was continued against the other 15 accused arrayed in the FIR, on instructions of the S.P, which should have been left to the Court taking cognizance, especially when the charge sheet found a trial enabled against all the accused. On submission of the first charge sheet and if there is felt a need for further investigation, ideally it should have been done with the orders of the Court and the commencement of trial ought to have awaited the completion of such investigation. But the cognizance taken by the Court against the fifteen accused, on the basis of the subsequent final report cannot be faulted since though the report on further investigation found no fresh material, the first report found the offence made out against all the accused, which was also before Court when the closure report was considered.

There could be claimed an irregularity but there is no illegality, miscarriage of justice or prejudice caused to the accused since split trials, in the same offence is not unheard of, which we will now deal with. Useful reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Banwari v. State of U.P.1962 SCC OnLine SC 98, wherein the two accused were convicted under charges of Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Magistrate committed three cases to the Sessions Court two with respect to the two murders and the other for attempt to murder, all by gunshot injuries. The Sessions Court modified the charges and consolidated the three cases, permitting evidence to be adduced in the first case and relied on that evidence in the other two cases. The incidents occurred in quick succession and this Court held that though Section 235 is not applicable, joint trial was justified under Sections 234 & 239 of the Code. When separate commitments are made of distinct offences not coming within the exception to Section 233, they cannot be tried at one trial. But, if there are separate commitment orders; (i) of persons who could be tried together or (ii) of the same person for offences which could be tried together, the accused could still be tried at one trial. Persons accused of committing a particular offence or offences jointly or in the course of the same transaction are not put up for trial at the same time, oftener than ever for reason of some being not available. When they are later made available and subsequently committed, the Sessions Judge is not bound to have two separate trials, one with respect to each commitment, if the trial in the first instance has not commenced.

A committal order just gives the Sessions Court cognizance over the trial of the persons committed and is not the basis of the cognizance taken for trial. If there is no prejudice to the accused, multiple committal orders can be consolidated to try the accused at one trial, provided it is justified under Sections 233 to 239 of the CrPC of 1898 (Sections 218 to 223 of the CrPC of 1973). It was held that ‘…the validity of a joint trial before the Sessions Judge is dependent on the fact whether the provisions of the Code justify one joint trial or not’ (para 25). The above discussion makes it crystal clear that the opinion in the final report filed is not decisive of the cognizance and the committal order/s is/are not determinative of whether the trial is single/separate/joint; which is at the exclusive discretion of the Court.

Herein, though triable together, before the report of further investigation was filed, the first trial commenced. Despite the futile exercise of a joint trial in between, the cases were separated before final adjudication. The relevant witnesses led on behalf of the prosecution and the defence were identical and no prejudice is caused to the accused, which persuades us to consider the matter on its merits.

Supreme Court observed: "21. It is distressing that no postmortem was conducted of the deceased who died in the hospital at Allahabad nor is any wound certificate produced. A person who sustained serious burn injuries having been admitted to the hospital, intimation would have gone to the jurisdictional police station; both at Mirzapur and Allahabad but not produced or even enquired into. It is also pertinent that the witnesses examined to prove the allegations are the friend of the father of the deceased (PW1), the father-in-law of one of the brothers of the deceased (PW2), her brothers (PWs 3 to 5 & 14) and her father (PW6). The testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses indicate that though the incident occurred on 13.04.2000 they were informed only on 21.04.2000; effectively controverted in the defense evidence.

PW1 says that the information was passed on to PW6 on April 22, 2000 and he along with PW6 went to see the victim at the hospital on April 22, 2000. PW2 deposed that his son-in-law i.e. PW14, the brother of the deceased went to the hospital at Allahabad on 26.04.2000 and met the victim. PW14 however deposed that on April 22, 2000 he saw his sister, completely burned, at Allahabad and on April 30, 2000 his father returned to Munger for arranging money for the treatment of his sister. It is also the testimony of the brothers and the father of the deceased that on May 2, 2000 when the victim died, a hasty cremation was conducted, to avoid a postmortem. It is very unlikely that having reached the hospital long before the death, the family members of the victim would have abandoned the victim in the company of her in-laws against whom allegations are raised of dowry demands. What is more disturbing is that the I.O has not attempted to bring out what transpired after the victim sustained the burns especially since the incident occurred at Mirzapur, where she was first admitted to the District Hospital and then later taken to a hospital at Allahabad where she succumbed after a few days’ hospitalization. The explanation of the relatives of the deceased is only that the accused are very influential in Allahabad which however does not
prevent an I.O from inquiring in the neighboring State while carrying out an investigation, bringing to light the facts as they existed.

All the witnesses confined themselves with a bland refrain about the demand of a dowry of Rs.50,000/- commenced from the date of marriage till her death. Admittedly, a son was born to the couple in the meanwhile, and the son was kept with the father after the death of the mother. 

PW15 was the I.O who does not speak anything worthwhile as to the investigation carried out. His deposition, as found from the impugned order marks the FIR and describes the marital home of the deceased and records that there is no incident reported at the  police station at Mirzapur where the marital home is situated. The statement of the doctor at the hospital at Allahabad in which the victim was treated is said to have been recorded but the said person was not summoned as a witness for the prosecution. It was also stated that on enquiries made at the police station having jurisdiction over the location in which the hospital is located, he was informed that a statement of the victim was recorded before the Magistrate. It is further deposed that it was not produced since it was not provided; clearly a lackadaisical approach. What assumes significance is that the I.O. categorically deposes that but for the family members of the complainant, none in the neighborhood came forward to speak of an acrimonious marriage, quite relevant in the context of the defense set up by the accused.

Supreme Court's judgement reads:" 28. We would, for the moment, not reckon the dying declaration which absolves the accused in toto. It is trite that a dying declaration though delicate, is a crucial piece of evidence if found to be trustworthy from the overall circumstances, enabling a conviction on that basis alone. However, when the dying declaration is exculpatory in nature, then necessarily the entire evidence would have to be analysed and if the other circumstances form a complete chain, the exculpatory statement of the deceased will have to be treated with some circumspection or at times eschewed completely.' 

In the present case, from the evidence at least it is clear that when the dying declaration was recorded, the deceased was admitted to the hospital and looked after by her husband and in-laws. The statements made in the above circumstances, presumably when the injured victim was looked after entirely by the accused will have to be treated with some circumspection and hence, we do not place any reliance on the same, at this point. 

The Court noted that it cannot but opine that the testimonies were in the nature of a soulless reiteration of a demand of Rs.50,000/-, having been made right from the inception of the marital life till the death occurred. The defense produced certificates of investments made in the joint names of the husband and the wife; far exceeding the demand alleged. DW1, the accused himself mounted the box to speak of an idyllic marriage and narrated the incident, the medical certificate indicating that his left hand was also scorched in the episode, while trying to save his wife. The accused also testified of informing his father-in-law on April 14, .2000 at 9:18 am through telephone, the call receipt evidencing the same. He had also sent telegrams on the same day at 08:35 am. The Kisan Vikas Patra and National Saving Certificates taken out in the joint name of himself and his wife, as also the LIC policy in his name, with his wife as the nominee were produced. The documents relating to the treatment of the deceased and the receipts with respect to the expenses incurred. The prescriptions during the treatment were also exhibited, belying the very contention of PW6 having returned to his village to arrange finance for his daughter’s treatment. 

The Court recorded that the trial court found that the entire documents from the hospital were not produced and it is not clear as to what medicines were administered to the patient, which in fact ought to have been procured and produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was rejected on the ground that the same was not forwarded through the jurisdictional CJM, the same having been received at the trial court, as directly forwarded from the office of the ADM. The efficacy of the dying declaration was further doubted since DW5 had not recorded it in the question-and-answer form. As to the demand of dowry, the trial court relied on the testimony of the witnesses regarding the demand made of Rs.50,000/- from 1995 till 1999. It was found that the time when the victim was taken to the hospital is 1:00 am on 14.04.2000 and there is discrepancy between the time of incident and the time claimed by the defense.

It also noted that the enquiries carried out at the police station having jurisdiction over the hospital, where the death occurred, clearly indicates a dying declaration having been made which was not produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and the doctor of the hospital, in which the victim was admitted, certified her fitness to make such a declaration. There is no hard and fast rule that a dying declaration should be in the question-and-answer form. The dying declaration, even if not reckoned to absolve the husband and the family members, at least raises a reasonable doubt regarding their culpability coupled with the other circumstances. The family of the victim reached the hospital long before her death and it is very unlikely that they left their child alone when they were arranging money for her treatment. 

The Court noted:" 34. Neither was a postmortem conducted nor was there an immediate FIR registered, at least in the hometown of the victim. The exact time when the fire occurred is discernible only from the statement in the dying declaration that it was around 10:45 pm. The time stated could only be an approximation and there would have been some time taken in arranging a transport and taking her to the hospital, first to the District Hospital at Mirzapur where the Doctor deposes, the victim was brought at 1 am. There was no attempt by the prosecution to bring forth the distance between the marital house of the deceased and the hospital. The victim was transferred to a higher medical center at Allahabad on the very same day for better treatment; all of which was carried out by the husband, as is indicated from the documents produced. The oral evidence led by the prosecution fails to prove the case set up of a demand of dowry or the animosity the husband is alleged to have been harboring against the wife. The hollow statement made of demand of dowry echoed listlessly by the witnesses; all relatives of the victim, raise not a grain of doubt but a sea of suspicion regarding the entire story set up.

“NO”, Police has no powers to arrest even during the course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.PC", Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Ram Pukar Yadav & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and AArun Palli passed a 7-page long order dated June 16, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 2-page long order dated May 5, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. The Court passed the order upon hearing a anticipatory bail application which arose out of a Complaint Case No. 410 of 2023 pending on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Division, Madhubani, State of Bihar. 

As per prosecution case, these petitioners took Rs.6.5 lacs from the informant on the pretext of providing admission in B. Ed course with hostel fee in the college but later on they came to know that admission slip was forged. It is alleged that all the accused persons including these petitioners run a racket in the name of RK Consultancy in which petitioners are agent. The second petitioner before the High Court was Ram Babu Yadav. The second respondent was Deepak Kumar Basta.

Supreme Court has held in SLP (Crl.) No.16221/2015 that in a complaint case the police has hardly any role to play. Relevant portion of the order passed in SLP(Crl.) No.16221/2025 reads: “7. We have noticed that there is a serious problem in two States, viz. the State of Bihar and State of Jharkhand, respectively. We fail to understand that in a private complaint how does the Police involve itself or is concerned, in any manner. What was the basis for the accused to express apprehension that the police would arrest them.  8. In a private complaint when cognizance is taken and process is issued all that the Court would do is to issue summons. We have explained many times in the past the purport of Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.PC.”) The Section 87 of the Cr.PC. reads thus:-“87. Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.—A Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to issue a summons for the appearance of any person, issue, after  recording its reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest— (a) if, either before the issue of such summons, or after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court sees reason to believe that he has absconded or will not obey the summons; or (b) if at such time he fails to appear and the summons is proved to have been duly served in time to admit of his appearing in accordance therewith and no reasonable excuse is offered for such failure.” 9. Section 87 empowers the Court to issue warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons. However, this power has to be exercised only in two contingencies as explained by the provision itself, i.e, (a) and (b), referred to above, respectively. 10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the  accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons. 11. We may give one another simple illustration. Take a case wherein on a private complaint, the magistrate deems fit to take cognizance under Section 200 of the Cr.PC. but postpones the issue of process till the conclusion of the magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. If a magistrate orders a Police inquiry under Section 202 and asks the police to give a report, then whether in the course of such inquiry, the police can arrest the accused. The answer is an emphatic “NO”, Police has no powers to arrest even during the course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.PC.” 

Supreme Court concluded: "4. That being the position, there is no question of the petitioners being taken into custody by the police. 5. Consequently, the impugned order dated 05.05.2026 is set aside. 6. The special leave petition is, accordingly, allowed.

Supreme Court reverses regular bail rejection order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Niraj Kumar @ Niraj Kumar Mandal vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K  Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 4-page long order dated May 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "...considering all the attending circumstances, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail. (iv) Accordingly, we direct to release the petitioner on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court."

The court passed the order upon hearing the special leave petition filed against the order of rejection of regular bail by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court and to seek bail. 

Supreme Court observed:"After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances in which the victim was of 47 years of age at the date of incident and the allegation is not supported by the medical evidence. Learned counsel for the respondent-State oppose the prayer only on the ground that after rejection of the anticipatory bail in 2014, the accused surrendered in 2025."  

Earlier, in Niraj Kumar @ Niraj Kumar Mandal vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order date December 18, 2025, wherein, he denied regular bail in the rape case. He concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and the gravity of the offence, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected. If the trial is delayed by the prosecution, the petitioner may renew his prayer for bail."   

The petitioner sought regular bail in connection with Mahila (Sachivalaya) P.S. Case  of 2013 registered for the offence under Sections 376, 379/34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per the prosecution case, the allegation against the petitioner was that he along with others forcibly kidnapped the victim lady and committed rape with her. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner was innocent and had not committed any offence. The petitioner was in custody since June 16, 2025. He also submitted that the petitioner was named in the case on the basis of the confessional statement of one Ravi Kumar. 

Supreme Court reverses order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Praveen Kumar in a murder case from Bihta, Patna

In Pankaj @Phakkad @Phakkad @ Pankaj Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated May 7, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly, the period of incarceration already undergone by the petitioner, which is more than four years and nine  months, and the fact that the pending appeal is likely to take substantial time for disposal, with the admitted case of the prosecution that the petitioner was not present at the time of occurrence, we are inclined to suspend the sentence of the petitioner and grant bail to the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court.  Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail, on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court, in connection with FIR No.704 of 2017 date 15.09.2017 registered with Bihta Police Station, Sub Division Danapur, District Patna, Bihar." 

The Court observed:"In the event the Trial Court or the State finds that the petitioner is delaying the conclusion of trial, it will be open for them to approach this Court for recall of this order. The Special Leave Petition and pending applications are disposed of accordingly."

Earlier, in Pankaj @Phakkad @Phakkad @ Pankaj Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Praveen Kumar had passed a 9-page long order dated February 17, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"17. In presence of the entire evidences showing the
conspiracy in the commission of the murder of Nirbhay Singh, who was the President of the Local Traders Association and the deposition of the witnesses showing that it was because he was opposing demand of rangdari by the criminals, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case for grant of suspension of sentence and release on bail. Prayer is rejected." The order was authored by Justice Prasad.

The appellant had approached the High Court for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal. Justice Prasad had relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr. reported in (2023) 6 SCC 123 reiterated in the case of Janardan Ray vs. The State of Bihar and Anr.passed in Cr. Appeal Nos. 1892-1893 of 2025 on 9th April, 2025. The High Court was of the considered opinion that "at this stage there are prima facie materials on record showing close connection of the appellant with the main assailant of the deceased. The electronic evidences on the record and the evidence of the IO (PW 6) are such that this Court cannot go into a threadbare discussion into the same in order to grant benefit of suspension of sentence to the appellant. 16. The case of the appellant is clearly distinguishable with that of Chandan Kumar @ Chandan Singh as pointed out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State."

The appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 120B read with 302/34 and 326/34 of the Indian Penal Code vide judgment dated August 1, 2022 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge-XXIV, Patna, in Sessions Trial No. 81B of 2018 (CIS No. 1260081 of 2018), which arose out of Bihta P.S. Case of 2017, and sentenced, vide order dated August 8, 2022, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the offences under Sections 120B read with 302/34 and 326/34 and a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he had to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

The prosecution story is based on the fardbeyan of Ajay Kumar (PW 4), who is the brother of the deceased. In his fard-beyan, the informant had stated that his family was engaged in business, he was five brothers and they have a cinema hall in Bihta known as ‘Uday Chitra Mandir’. On September 15, 2017, in the evening, he and his brother were getting the cleanliness of the hall and the nearby areas. At about 05:45 PM, when both of them were in front of the main gate of the cinema hall and his brother, Nirbhay Singh, was at a distance of ten steps ahead to him, all of a sudden firing started. The informant found that his brother Nirbhay Singh was surrounded by three persons, who were armed with pistols. The brother of the informant fell down on the road. The informant ran towards his brother, who had fallen down and was in pool of blood, the criminal involved in the occurrence fled away raising the weapons in their hands towards the kerosene oil depot of Raj Kumar Singh. The informant gave some description of the miscreants who were fleeing away. He disclosed that his brother had no enmity with anyone and that he can identify the criminals on seeing them. It appeared from the materials on record that in course of investigation, it was revealed that the main assailant Amit Singh, this appellant and some others were involved in the occurrence. So far as this appellant is concerned, it has come in the evidence that the main assailant Amit Singh was using the whatsapp number of the mobile phone of this appellant. The appellant has been convicted with the aid of Section 120B IPC.

Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment by Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a rape case

In Dheeraj Sahni vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 20-page long judgement dated May 7, 2026, wherein, set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 11, 2014 and order of sentence dated February 14, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a Sessions Case of 2012, which arose out of Khagaria (Muffasil) P.S. Case of 2012, whereby, the appellant was convicted under Section 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Singh observed that applying the settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, and bearing in mind that material contradictions between the version of the informant as set out in the F.I.R. and her deposition before the Court render her testimony unreliable, "this Court finds that the prosecution case does not inspire confidence. In the present matter, not only has the victim failed to support the allegations during trial and even failed to identify the appellant, but the sole testimony of the informant (P.W. 7) also suffers from material inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities. Further, the medical evidence, as deposed by the doctor (P.W. 6), clearly indicates absence of any injury or sign suggestive of sexual assault and does not corroborate the prosecution version. In such circumstances, where the ocular testimony is inconsistent and stands uncorroborated by medical evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and the conviction cannot be sustained." 

The appellant had preferred the appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated February 11, 2014 and order of sentence dated February 14, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a Sessions Case 2012, which arose out of Khagaria (Muffasil) P.S. Case of 2012, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and Rs. 5000 and the amount of fine shall be paid to the mother of the victim. 

The prosecution version was that the informant Pinki Devi, wife of Hare Ram Sahni, submitted a written report before the Superintendent of Police, Khagaria, on June 30, 2012, wherein she categorically alleged that on June 29, 2012 at about 1:00 p.m., while her daughters, namely Deepika Kumari, aged about 5 years, and Daizy Kumari, aged about 4 years, were playing in front of the house of Dinesh Sahni. The appellant who was son of Dinesh Sahni, allegedly lured the victim Deepika Kumari on the pretext of giving money and then took the victim along with her younger sister Daizy Kumari inside the room and committed rape upon her. On hearing the cry of her daughter, the informant rushed to the house and allegedly witnessed the accused through a window committing rape upon the victim. However, upon raising an alarm, the accused fled away through the roof. It was also alleged that the informant found her daughter lying naked, with dust on her body. Thereafter, the informant took her daughter (the victim). Subsequently, she went to the Police Station, where she was advised to approach the Sarpanch for redressal of her grievance. She approached the Sarpanch of the Gram Katchahari who did not meet her. On the basis of the written report filed by the informant before the Superintendent of Police, Khagaria, Khagaria (Mufassil) P.S. Case No. 329 of 2012 was lodged on June 30, 2012 under Section 376 of the I.P.C. against the sole accused, appellant hereof. After institution of the F.I.R., the Investigating Officer conducted investigation and found the case to be true under Section 376 of the I.P.C., and accordingly submitted charge-sheet before the court below. Thereafter, the Magistrate, upon perusal of the materials on record, took cognizance of the alleged offence on September 10, 2012, and the case was subsequently committed to the Court of Sessions on November 1, 2012. Pursuant to the conclusion of the trial, impugned judgment was passed. 

The amicus curiae, submitted that the testimony of Pinki Devi (informant), the Prosecution Witness No. 7, the informant, was not reliable and does not inspire confidence, so as, to sustain the conviction in the absence of independent corroboration. It was contended that the entire prosecution case rests upon her sole testimony and single identification. The informant was an interested witness, being the chachi of the appellant and they reside in the same house with a common courtyard giving rise to the possibility of prior animosity or ulterior motive, which the prosecution failed to dispel. The counsel drew the attention of the High Court to paragraph 22 of the case diary and submitted that, as per the description therein, the alleged place of occurrence had no door or window; however, PW-7 in her examination-in-chief deposed that the door was closed from inside and that she witnessed the occurrence by peeping through a window and thereafter instructed her younger daughter aged about 4 years to open the door. This material contradiction, it was urged, struk at the root of the prosecution case and rendered her version inherently unreliable. It was also submitted that the testimony of PW-7 suffered from serious improbabilities, inasmuch as her claim of having witnessed the occurrence through a window appeared doubtful. It was contended that, instead of raising an alarm and calling other family members, the informant allegedly instructed her minor daughter to open the door, who was unable to reach the bolt to unlock it. Moreover, the fact that the Investigating Officer did not find any such door at the place of occurrence renders the entire version unnatural and improbable. The counsel further submitted that the condition of the victim, as described by PW-7, finds no
corroboration from the medical evidence, which assumes significant importance in a case of this nature. It was also urged that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not recorded, and, more importantly, the victim child, in her deposition before the trial court, did not support the prosecution case and categorically stated that no wrongful act had been committed against her. The victim also failed to identify the appellant, who was admittedly her own cousin brother, thereby creating a serious dent in the prosecution case. The counsel submitted that the testimony of PW-7 cannot be said to be of sterling quality so as to form the sole basis of conviction. It was thus urged that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The relevant provisions of Sections 375, 376 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, which are as under:-
375. Rape.— A man is said to commit "rape" if he—(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:
(First.)— Against her will. 
(Secondly.) — Without her consent.
(Thirdly.) — With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom
she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt, 
(Fourthly.) — With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
(Fifthly.) — With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
(Sixthly.) — With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
(Seventhly.) — When she is unable to communicate consent.
Explanation 1.— For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2.— Consent means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception 1.— A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

376. Punishment for rape.— (1)Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine]

511. Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.—Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both. 
Illustrations
(a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a box, and finds after so opening the box, that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards the commission of theft, and therefore is guilty under this section.
(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z’s pocket. A fails in the attempt in consequence of Z’s having nothing in his pocket. A is guilty under this section.

Justice Singh relied on Supreme Court's decision in Vijaya Singh & Anr. v State of Uttarakhand reported in 2024 INSC 905 to underline the settled law in regard to statement recorded under Section 164 and retraction during the course of trial. The statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can not be discarded, which finds reference in Paragraph No.31. It reads: “31. Having said so, we deem it fit to observe that a statement under Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a hat and on a mere statement of the
witness that it was not recorded correctly. For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate, to the effect that the statement being recorded is the correct version of the facts stated by the witness, forms part of every such statement and a higher burden must be placed upon the witness to retract from the same. To permit retraction by a witness from a signed statement recorded before the Magistrate on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would effectively negate the difference between a statement recorded by the police officer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In the present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and reliance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below.” 

Justice Sing also relied on the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Om Prakash reported in (2002) 7 SCC 745, wherein, the Supreme Court sounded a warning against offences of sexual nature against children, in Paragraph no.19. It reads: “19. Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases are not even brought to light because of the social stigma attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has been a steep rise in child rape cases. Children need special care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country's future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted…” 

Justice Singh's judgement referred to the decision in Pradeep vs. State of Haryana reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 777, it was held that the role of the trial Judge, when a case involves a child witness, becomes heightened. The Supreme Court held:“10. Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him with a view to ascertain whether the minor can understand the questions put to him and is in a position to give rational answers. The Judge must be satisfied that the minor is able to understand the questions and respond to them and understands the importance of speaking the truth. Therefore, the role of the Judge who records the evidence is very crucial. He has to make a proper preliminary examination of the minor by putting appropriate questions to ascertain whether the minor is capable of understanding the questions put to him and is able to give rational answers. It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.”

The judgement by Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi vs. State
of Gujarat, reported in, (2019) 17 SCC 523, wherein the Court held that a nine year old prosecutrix turning hostile would not be fatal blow to the prosecution case when other evidence can establish the guilt of the accused. 

In Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, held that the sole testimony of the victim, if found reliable and trustworthy, requires no corroboration and may be sufficient to invite conviction of the accused also the reliance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below, the Court observed.
17. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether nine witnesses, namely:
1) PW-1 Leela Devi ( Co - Villager)
2) PW-2 Mahesh Tanti, ( Co - Villager)
3) PW-3 Dilip Kumar Tanti ( Co - Villager)
4) PW-4 Hare Ram Sahni, father of the victim
5) PW-5 Deepika Kumari (victim)
6) PW-6 Dr. Manju Kumari (Doctor)
7) PW-7 Pinki Devi (informant)
8) PW-8 Rajpati Devi ( Co – Villager)
9) PW-9 Dasrath Yadav ( Co – Villager)
18. The prosecution has also relied upon following
documents exhibited during the course of trial:
(i) Exhibit- 2- Medical Report
(ii) Exhibit-2/1- Pathology Report
19. On the basis of materials surfaced during the
trial, the appellant/accused Upon a meticulous examination of
the record, it appears that the PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 turned
hostile and the evidence of other prosecution witnesses (PWs)
are summarized as follows:
(I) P.W. 4 - Hare Ram Sahni, the father of the
victim, establishes that upon hearing an alarm (halla), he
proceeded to the appellant's door where he observed his
daughter in a nude state. He admitted in his cross-examination
that the appellant is his cousin-nephew and that they share the
same courtyard. Crucially, he conceded that no physical injuries
were found on the victim's body and clarified that his
understanding of the alleged assault was based entirely on the
account provided by his wife.
(II) P.W. 5, Deepika Kumari, the victim, stated that
she is aged about five years, but notably turned hostile to the
prosecution's case. In her testimony before the court, she
categorically denied the allegations set forth by her mother and
stated that no rape had been committed upon her. Furthermore,
she failed to identify the appellant.
(III) P.W. 6, Dr. Manju Kumari, - She deposed that
she conducted the physical examination of the victim. She did
not find any external injury on the victim’s body. She confirmed
that there was no medical sign or traumatic indicator of rape
found in the private parts of the victim.
(IV) P.W. 7, Pinki Devi, the informant and mother of
the victim, remained consistent with her initial version of the
incident as alleged in the F.I.R. She maintained in her testimony
that she was the sole eyewitness to the occurrence. However, it
was noted that she did not disclose the existence of any land
dispute between her family and the accused during her
deposition.
(V) P.W. 8, Rajpati Devi, - She serves as hearsay
evidence regarding the immediate aftermath of the incident. She
stated that she rushed to the spot upon hearing the cries of P.W.
7 and was informed by the informant at the scene that a rape had
been committed upon the child.
(VI) P.W. 9, Dashrath Yadav, testified as a formal
witness. While he successfully proved his signature on the
F.I.R., he did not provide any substantive evidence regarding the
commission of the alleged offense or the involvement of the
appellant.
 

On the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellant/accused was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against him, which he denied and showed his complete innocence. The record revealed that PW-1 Leela Devi, PW-2 Mahesh Tanti, and PW-3 Dilip Kumar Tanti were declared hostile during the trial as they did not support the prosecution case on material particulars, and nothing substantive transpired from their testimonies which could be said to corroborate or lend assurance to the version of the other prosecution witnesses. Their evidence does not advance the prosecution case with regard to the allegations of dowry demand, cruelty, or the alleged disappearance of the deceased. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses are not relevant qua establishing the guilt of the accused/appellants.

On a careful perusal of the evidence, facts, and law, it emerged that the prosecution case suffered from serious infirmities and lacks the degree of proof required to sustain conviction. P.Ws. 1, 2, and 3 have admittedly turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution case in any manner. PW-4 Hare Ram Sahni, father of the victim, was not an eyewitness and has clearly deposed that his knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence was based solely on what was narrated to him by P.W. 7, Pinki Devi, the informant and mother of the victim; he was also admitted that no injury was found on the body of the victim and that the parties are closely related, residing in the same premises with a common courtyard. P.W. 5, the victim
herself, who is the most material witness, had turned hostile and categorically denied the allegation of rape and even failed to identify the appellant in Court, thereby striking at the very root of the prosecution case. The medical evidence, as deposed by P.W. 6, Dr. Manju Kumari, did not support the prosecution version, as no external or internal injury or any sign suggestive of sexual assault was found on the victim. P.W. 8, Rajpati Devi was merely a hearsay witness, having reached the place of occurrence after the alleged incident and having derived knowledge only from the informant, while P.W. 9, Dashrath Yadav was a formal witness who has only proved the formal aspects of the case. Thus, the entire prosecution case essentially rests upon the sole testimony of P.W. 7, the informant, whose version, suffers from material contradictions, inherent improbabilities, and lack of corroboration from both ocular and medical evidence. In such circumstances, where the star witness (victim) has not supported the case, the medical evidence did not corroborate the allegations, and the independent witnesses turned hostile, it would be unsafe to base the conviction solely on the testimony of P.W. 7.

In the case, the most crucial aspect, namely, the statement of the victim, did not advance the prosecution case, rather, it creates a serious dent in it. It was an admitted position on record that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not recorded at all, thereby depriving the prosecution of a vital piece of substantive corroborative evidence ordinarily relied upon in cases of this nature. Further, when the victim herself entered the witness box as P.W. 5 before the learned trial court, she did not support the prosecution version and categorically denied that any such occurrence had taken place. She also failed to identify the appellant, who is admittedly her close relative, thereby rendering the prosecution story highly doubtful. In the absence of a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., coupled with the victim turning hostile in court, the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution case stands considerably weakened, and no reliance
can safely be placed on the uncorroborated testimony of the informant (P.W. 7) to sustain the conviction.

The primary challenge in the present appeal lied in the fact that the material prosecution witnesses, including the victim (P.W. 5) and other independent witnesses, had not supported the prosecution case and were  declared hostile during trial. 

Justice Singh observed: "While it is a settled principle of law that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in total and that the Court may rely upon such portions of the evidence which find corroboration from other reliable material on record, the said principle does not aid the prosecution in the facts of the present case. Significantly, the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which could have lent some degree of assurance to the prosecution version, was admittedly not recorded. In such a situation, there remains no prior consistent statement of the victim before a judicial authority which could be used even for the limited purpose of corroboration. On the contrary, the victim, in her deposition before the learned trial court, has categorically denied the occurrence and has not supported the allegations levelled against the appellant. In the absence of any substantive or corroborative material, and particularly when the star witness has resiled from the prosecution case, the evidentiary foundation becomes too fragile to sustain conviction."

The judgement reads:"....it is evident from the medical evidence on record that the same does not provide any unimpeachable scientific support to the prosecution case so as to bridge the gaps created by the hostility of the witnesses. On the contrary, P.W. 6, the doctor who examined the victim, has categorically deposed that “no external injury was found on the body of the victim and there were no signs or indicators
suggestive of rape on her private parts.” The medical findings, thus, do not disclose any evidence of recent sexual assault or penetration. In such circumstances, where the medical evidence fails to corroborate the ocular version and does not indicate any genital injury or trauma, the evidentiary chain stands seriously weakened. In absence of any supportive medical findings, coupled with the victim turning hostile and denying the occurrence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to establish its case through reliable scientific or medical evidence.

Justice Singh referred to the decision in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 92, wherein, the Supreme Court held that when the version of the prosecutrix is not of sterling quality and is inconsistent with the medical evidence, and when the surrounding circumstances render the prosecution story doubtful, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The Court also held that conviction cannot be sustained where the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

 

Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Supreme Court modifies anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Putul Rai @ Putul Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court has deprecated the practice of the High Court to direct the applicant to surrender and apply for regular bail while rejecting the anticipatory bail prayer. 5. In such circumstances, we do not find a good reason to entertain the prayer for anticipatory bail. However, we deem it appropriate to expunge the direction in the impugned order which requires the petitioner to surrender and apply for regular bail though, it goes without saying that if the petitioner has been required by the Complaint Court to appear before it, the petitioner must comply with such a direction. 6. With the aforesaid observations, this special leave petition stands disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order dated February 9, 2026 was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar.  

Justice Kumar's order had rejected the anticipatory bail application and the petitioners were directed to surrender before the Court concerned within a period of two weeks from the date of the order.

Supreme Court observed:"2. It is not stated that the Court where the complaint proceedings are pending has issued coercive processes, such as non-bailable warrant, to secure the presence of the petitioner. In such circumstances there exists no material for the petitioner to apprehend her arrest." 

It recalled it decision in Om Prakash Chhawnika alias Om Prakash Chabnika alias Om Prakash Chawnika vs. State of Jharkhand and Another 2026 SCC OnLine SC 676, wherein, the Court observed:“10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in connection with a Complaint Caseof 2023 instituted under Sections 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code  As per prosecution case, the allegation against the petitioner and her husband was that they had entered into agreement for sale and have cheated the complainant of Rs. 14,60,000/.  The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner was innocent and she was the wife of co-accused, Bhushan Rai, who was granted anticipatory bail by the Court below. He submitted that the petitioner also deserves anticipatory bail. Since the petitioner had not taken any amount, she was entitled for grant of bail. It was also submitted that she being the wife of the co-accused was not involved in the crime. 

Supreme Court expresses angusish due to non-compliance of its order by State Legal Services Authorities for Legal aid

"Legal aid, simply put, refers to the provision of free or affordable legal services to individuals who lack the economic or social capacity to access justice through conventional means. It rests on the idea that equality before the law must be real and not symbolic. Legal aid helps ensure that rights are not confined to those who can afford legal representation, but are available to all, including the poor and marginalized. In this sense, it plays a crucial role in making legal protections meaningful. In India, the concept of legal aid is closely tied to the vision expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution, which promises justice be it social, economic, and/or political, along with equality of status and opportunity, and affirms the secular character of the State. Social justice, in this context, requires the State to reduce structural inequalities and protect vulnerable groups from exclusion and exploitation. Legal aid contributes directly to this goal by enabling disadvantaged individuals to assert their rights and seek remedies against injustice. Political justice, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring meaningful participation in democratic processes and equal access to institutions of governance. Without access to legal advice and representation, many citizens would find it difficult to exercise these rights effectively, whether in matters of voting, representation, or challenging arbitrary state action. The commitment to secularism further strengthens the case for legal aid, as it demands that the legal system remain neutral and accessible to all individuals irrespective of religion, ensuring that justice is administered without discrimination or bias. This commitment was given a clear constitutional expression through the insertion of  Article 39A by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. Article 39A directs the State to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity and to provide free legal aid so that no individual is denied access to justice due to economic or other disadvantages. While the legacy of the 42nd Amendment remains contested because of its enactment during the Emergency period from 1975 to 1977, Article 39A is arguably one of its most constructive and enduring contributions. It firmly situates access to justice within the Directive Principles of State Policy. Over time, the Judiciary has further strengthened this framework by linking legal aid to Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Courts have interpreted this right to include fair legal procedures and access to legal representation, thereby reinforcing the centrality of legal aid in a just legal system. On the whole these developments show that legal aid in India is not merely a matter of policy, but a constitutional responsibility that advances the broader ideals of justice, equality, secularism, and fairness envisioned in the Preamble."

-Supreme Court's order dated April 16, 2026 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2026)

"we consider it appropriate to have views of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) for laying down a step by step procedure for ensuring intimation of an adverse order/judgment to the accused; seeking whether he intends to file an appeal; informing the accused of his right to legal aid, and taking steps to ensure that an appeal is filed. It is also necessary to ensure a monitoring mechanism for following whether due intimation and certification is being done."

-Supreme Court's order dated October 24, 2017 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2017)

"We find that there is an usual inordinate delay in this matter in which legal aid is involved. Such delay has been noticed in several cases where the legal aid authorities are involved. It is important to find out where such inordinate delays occur and to issue directions for preventing such delay." 

-Supreme Court's order dated May 5, 2017 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2017)

In Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar Through Home Department (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Sanjay Karol and N. K. Singh passed an order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it wrote:"For ensuring compliance with the directions issued vide judgment dated 16th April, 2026, Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned senior counsel (Amicus Curiae) would prepare and circulate an implementation format for necessary compliance.
2. Let the needful be done within a period of one week from today. 3. List on 25.05.2026."

Earlier, the same bench had passed a 29-page long order dated April 16, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay. The order wass authored by Justice Sanjay Karol. While dealing with an appeal by the appellant, who had challenged the judgment of conviction and sentence to death awarded to him and confirmed in terms of Criminal Appeal No. 425 of 2002 passed by Patna High Court, as per judgment dated February 20, 2014, the Supreme Court in terms of its order dated May 5, 2017 noticed that inordinate delay was affecting matters in which legal aid was involved. It made an effort to find out the cause for the same and issued necessary directions.

Its order dated January 19, 2021 reads: “We have noticed that in the special leave petitions filed by Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC) on behalf of the convicts, there is an inordinate delay which becomes difficult to condone. Needless to say, the situation brings about a lack of even handedness
in dealing with matters of condonation of delay. We see no reason why these delays should continue to occur particularly with the availability of tools provided by information and communication technology which are easily available. In this matter, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted a report dated 15.01.2021 in consultation with the SCLSC on measures to curb the delay. Valuable as that report is, we consider it appropriate to constitute a Committee comprising of certain experts who would examine all the suggestions and responses which may be received by it from the High Courts as well as the other stakeholders. In view of the other suggestions (Annexure B) by NALSA and the response submitted by various High Courts, we find it appropriate to constitute a Committee comprising of Secretary (Ministry of Home Affairs), Government of India, Director General, National Informatics Centre, Member (Process), E-Committee, Supreme Court of India and Member Secretary, NALSA. The Committee shall examine the aforementioned suggestions/responses and submit a report with regard to digitization, translation and electronic transmission of records to facilitate access to justice and timely filing of appeals/SLPs by the convicts, by utilizing the Information and Communication Technology tools, within four weeks. We have also gone through the Module and the Note dated 16.10.2019 as per the report for timely filing of appeals/SLPs of convicts though the Legal Services Institutions. We therefore direct the High Courts to submit their responses to the Committee through their Registrars General within two weeks. The Committee shall submit its report within two weeks’ thereafter. The Secretary General of this Court shall coordinate meetings of the Committee....”

By order dated May 23, 2025, certain questions were put to the Secretary of the SCLSC, and he was required to file an affidavit in that regard. The questions are as follows :-“i. What is the current pendency upto 30.05.2025, i.e. out of the total requests received by the SCLSC so far. How many cases have been filed, and how many are under consideration? ii. What has been the year wise average days of delay in filing petitions of applicants under each category of applicants as provided under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, after Operation Cleanup in the year 2018? iii. Is there adequate infrastructure and staff to deal with the load of SCLSC? iv. What are the reasons for delay, and how have those delays been addressed? v. What is the status of online connectivity between the SCLSC with other stakeholders like High Courts, Prisons, Panel Counsels etc?”

In response to these queries, the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, submitted in affidavit dated July 14, 2025. In response to direction (i) i.e., “what is the current pendency, upto May 30, 2025, for the total requests received by the SCLSC, how many cases have been filed and how many cases are under consideration”, the data taken from the SCLSC website portal revealed that a total of 4062 legal aid applications/requests were received in 2024, out of which 1972 cases were assigned to Panel Advocates and in 906 cases legal aid was refused/closed. There was no legal aid application pending with SCLSC. During January 1, 2025-May 30, 2025, a total of 3305 legal aid applications/requests were received. Out of which 1819 cases were assigned to Panel Advocates and in 476 cases legal aid was refused/closed There were 688 cases in which legal aid application were pending with SCLSC. The data of total cases assigned to the Panel Advocates for the period between Jnauary 1, 2025 to May 30, 2025 is as per the information available on the SCLSC website portal and manual record as the data of newly increased panel advocates was yet to be updated. As per information available on the SCLSC website portal is 745 and manual record is 1074. The updated data of the actual cases filed/pending before the Supreme Court was not available on the SCLSC website portal as there was no official intimation or updating on the login IDs by the panel advocates post assignment. 

 In response to directions/query (ii), i.e. the average year wise delay in filing petitions of applicants under the categories enumerated under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, after the Operation Cleanup in the year 2018, it was submitted that the feature providing for the information regarding the delay caused in the filing of petition is not available on the SCLSC website portal. 

The procedure for grant of legal aid was brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Court which is as under:
(a) The SCLSC has made provisions for receiving the applications from the persons seeking legal aid services, both in physical form and through the SCLSC online portal (sclsc.gov.in).
(b) The legal aid application can also be submitted through:
(i) the High Court Legal Aid Services Committee (HCLSC) or;
(ii) the district legal aid authorities or;
(iii) jail authorities or;
(iv) NALSA Portal or;
(v) Directly from the litigant.

There is a mandatory check list of documents which are necessary for the purpose of consideration of grant of legal aid before approaching the Supreme Court. The persons seeking legal aid can seek assistance of the HCLSC for completion of documents. On completion of documents, the cases are then referred to the screening committees, consisting of Senior Advocates, to render an opinion on the merits of
the applications. The cases of applicants under judicial custody are directly assigned to the panel advocates.

On November 29, 2014, under the Chairmanship of Justice T. S. Thakur, Judge, Supreme Court of India & Executive Chairman, NALSA a resolution was passed which reads: “3. All matters that are required to be filed before the Supreme Court be processed and prepared by the High Court Legal Services Committee, including translations of documents and that SLSAs transfer adequate funds to High Court Legal Services Committees for preparation and translation of documents before dispatch to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee for filing.”

In terms of the circular dated April 13, 2015 issued by the SCLSC adopting the circular issued by NALSA dated February 19, 2015), all legal aid cases which are to be filed before the Supreme Court, are to be prepared and processed by the HCLSC, before they are dispatched to SCLSC for filing.

On completion of documents the matters which are civil in nature or criminal in nature confined to the cases pertaining to the complainant, quashing, transfer, etc. are referred to the Screening Committee consisting of Senior Advocates to render opinion on the merits of legal aid applications. The cases recommended by the Screening Committee are processed further. The cases of persons under judicial custody/prison are directly assigned to the panel advocate for filing the matter before the Supreme Court. The assignment letter assigning the case to the panel advocates specifically stipulates to file the case within 15 days. There is a Login ID of each Panel Advocate and the legal aid applications along with documents which are scanned and indexed are also available in the respective Login IDs immediately on assignment. The panel advocates and the legal aid applicant can communicate directly on the address and
contact number of both given in the assignment letter. However, there is no timely official communication by the panel advocate regarding the filing of the case before the Supreme Court or the orders passed by the Supreme Court till the submission of bill and return of documents by Panel Advocate to SCLSC after disposal of the matter. 

In response to directions (iii), i.e., availability of adequate infrastructure and staff to deal with the load of SCLSC, it was submitted that SCLSC is well equipped with infrastructure and staff.

In response to directions (iv), i.e., the reasons for delay, and how have those been addressed, it is submitted that the reasons for delay are broadly identified as under:
(a) Submission of legal aid application after delay by the legal aid applicant;
(b) submission of incomplete documents by the legal aid applicant;
(c) delay caused by the panel lawyers in filing the petitioner after assignments of the matter.
(d) Translations of vernacular documents, custody certificate to be obtained from jailors, retrieving records from the high court in case of appeals, collating information from the litigant/ or next friend in case of death of parties are some of the causes for delay.

There are various methods adopted by SCLSC to curb the delays which are as under:-
There was a massive campaign initiated in January  2025 (Mission Mode). vide letter dated January 10, 2025, the Director General of Prisons and Member Secretaries of High Court Legal Services Committees and the State Legal Services Authorities were communicated with the decisions of the Chairman, SCLSC requesting to collect the data with respect to: 
▪ Matters in which High Court has upheld the conviction but inmate has not yet filed appeal.
▪ Matters is which the prisoners have remain in jail for half/more than half of sentence period and bail prayer rejected by the High Court but inmate has not yet moved to Supreme Court.
▪ Prisoners whose remission/pre-mature release has been rejected by the state sentence review board and writ against that order has also been rejected by the High Court but inmate has not yet moved Supreme Court. 

It was requested to send the details of prison inmates covered under aforesaid three categories and willing to avail legal services of Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Thereafter, reminders were sent on February 6, 2025 and February 19, 2025 to the authorities for furnishing the requisite data in pursuance of the MISSION MODE. Further, a letter dated March 5, 2025 was sent to the Authorities to provide complete documents with respect to the inmates whose names were mentioned in the data collected and who were willing to avail legal aid services.

A video conference chaired by Justice Suryakant, the then Chairman of SCLSC was held on April 1, 2025 with the Chairpersons of all the State Legal Services Authorities and High Court Legal Services Committees regarding MISSION MODE. The letter dated April 5, 2025 was sent to all the Concerned Authorities requesting to expedite furnishing of the documents. Then another letter dated April 5, 2025 was sent to all the Concerned Authorities in pursuance of the Video Conferencing dated April 1, 2025 to constitute a team of 5 Panel Advocates for visiting the jails to create awareness among the inmates and submit a stage wise report to SCLSC. The letter dated May 3, 2025 was sent to the Registrar Generals of all the High Court communicating the virtual interaction scheduled on May 5, 2025 at 5.30 P.M. of the then Chairman, SCLSC with the Chief Justices of High Courts, Executive Chairperson of SLSAs and HCLSCs. 

It was submitted that, after the successful implementation of Mission Mode, SCLSC is now receiving legal aid applications along with documents from the various Legal Services Authorities to provide legal aid to the jail inmates. The panel of Advocates in the category of AOR, Non-AOR and Arguing Counsel was reconstituted by expanding the panel and additional advocates have been taken on the panel and the number is increased. An additional category of Assisting Counsels was introduced who will provide assistance to the AORs, Non AORs and Arguing Counsels to ensure timely filing and assistance in preparation of the cases. The number of the Screening Committee increased for expeditious grant of legal aid. In response to directions (v), i.e. the status of online connectivity between SCLSC is as under:
• The facility of online connectivity through video conferencing and intercommunication with the High Court Legal Services Committee, Prisons, Panel Counsel, etc. is available on the SCLSC web portal i.e.,
sclsc.gov.in.
• Separate Login IDs are allotted to the HCLSCs, SLSAs, DLSAs, TLSAs, Prisons, Panel Counsels and any communication is immediately is shown in the respective Login IDs.
• The stakeholders including the legal aid applicants can apply for counseling/meeting through video conferencing and on receipt of such application a date and time is given on which the said counseling/meeting can be facilitated.
The status of the legal aid applications submitted by the legal aid applicant can be checked on the SCLSC web portal.”

The order reads: The Supreme Court Legal Service Committee, sought directions from this Court in the following terms as recorded in order dated September 1, 2025. There appears to be some laxity on part of the authorities to furnish affidavits in terms of our order which anguish us (order dt 16.09.2025 to be picked) and as such we had requested the Learned Amicus Curiae to interact with the Chairpersons of the Legal Service Authorities and furnish the requisite information in tabular form."

The order dated September 1, 2025 reads: 
“I. For High Court Legal Services Committee (HCLSC) a. In cases where the applicant has directly approached the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC), the HCLSC must transmit the complete Paperbook filed before the High Court and the Courts below within seven days of the requisition from SCLSC. 
b. In cases where application for legal aid is forwarded from the HCLSC to SCLSC when the applicant has approached the HCLSC, the HCLSC should ensure that the complete Paperbook of the High Court and Courts below is accompanied along with the forwarding letter.
c. In cases where the matter referred to is not a criminal matter and/or the applicant is not in judicial custody, the HCLSC must forward the duly signed/identified vakalatnama and attested affidavit within seven days of receipt of the same from the SCLSC.
d. The HCLSC shall also send the soft scanned copies of all the documents to SCLSC.

In cases where the legal aid applicant is in judicial custody and approaches SCLSC through HCLSC, the Vakalatnama and custody certificate (with complete particulars) duly attested and signed by the Jail Authority/Jail Superintendent must be sent (digital and hard copy) to HCLSC within three days from the receipt of request received from the Prison in mate. The HCLSC shall send the Paperbook, true copy of order passed by the High Court and the lower courts records, alongwith documents received from the Jail (Vakalatnama, Custody Certificate and duly attested affidavit hard as well as scanned copy) to SCLSC within seven days from the date of receipt of request from SCLSC.

As and when the Advocate or the SCLSC sends a request for any additional document, the same must be sent to the SCLSC within seven days from the request received in this regard.

Order dated September 16, 2025 reads: “We express our anguish in the manner in which the statutory authorities have not chosen to respond to the orders passed by this Court. 2. Under these circumstances, we request Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned amicus curiae, to personally get in touch with the Chairman
of all the State Legal Services Authorities with a further request to them, ensuring necessary compliance of the order before the next date of hearing.”

Supreme Court's order underlined that the development of the concept of legal aid through judicial pronouncements is important to note for the purposes of the directions issued in this Judgment. At the outset, it be noted that in Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration 2 (1978) 4 SCC 494 held that prisoners do not surrender their fundamental rights at the prison gate. In that context, let us proceed further. The most recognizable name in the line of cases of this Court, furthering the Directive Principles of State Policy as mentioned in Article 39A of the Constitution of India, is Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81, in which the Court held that the speedy trial to be a facet of Article 21 and free legal aid is an essential component of fair, just and reasonable procedure in law. It was emphasized that the State had an obligation to ensure access to justice and that the Court was required to take steps to provide legal representation and expedite criminal trials. Even before this, in the year 1978, this Court in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot vs. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 held that the right to counsel was a fundamental right traceable to Article 21. We take note of another case from the same year i.e., Khatri (II) vs. State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627 in which it was held that free legal aid is a fundamental right and that it attaches from the moment the accused is first produced before a Magistrate and not only at the commencement of the trial. Further, it was held that the right to legal aid does not depend on a request to that effect from the accused, thereby placing a positive obligation on the State to provide the same. Most recently, this Court in Suhas Chakma vs. Union of India 2024 INSC 813 speaking through K.V. Viswanathan, J. extensively dealt with this issue of systemic deficiency in access to free legal aid for prisoners, particularly the under trials. 

Supreme Court concluded: "10. We have given careful consideration to the SOP and the proposed directions. We are of the considered view that this SOP is a result of in depth deliberations conducted by the “stakeholders” or “major players in the game”, that being the case the same deserves consideration by all the High Courts on the administrative side, so that, necessary changes to the procedure in place, can be
adopted in furtherance of the aims of the SOP. As such, it is directed that a copy of this order be placed before the learned Chief Justice of the High Court, for necessary consideration and appropriate action at their end.
11. While implementation of the entire breadth of the SOP is left to the wisdom of the High Courts, we do hereby direct that the timelines mentioned under Heading 5 of the SOP shall be treated as binding. This is for the purposes of streamlining the filing of appeals in cases where the respective Legal Services Committees are required to take lead. This, it is our hope, will go a long way in addressing the structural gaps that had prompted this Court to take forward the present proceedings apart from dealing with the death reference from which they emanated.
12. Regarding the issue of translators, while we do not issue any directions, we may only observe that the poor quality of translation has engaged the attention of this Court, recently, on quite of few occasions, indicating that some sort of structural change is necessitated in this regard. The respective High Court may
seriously examine and take decision on paragraph 6 of the SOP within a time bound period, i.e., not more than four weeks.
13. The aspect of monitoring and accountability as delineated in paragraph 8 of the SOP ensures that there is effective monitoring and ‘keeping tabs’ on the functioning and processes to be undertaken by the Legal Services Committees of the respective High Courts. Let the necessary constitution of the committee be carried out at the earliest. The Standing Committee/Administrative Committee, may appoint the members either by itself or after consulting the Full Court, as may be warranted. The Member Secretary of HCLSC shall be an ex-officio member. In so far as the constitution of the committee for this Court is concerned, the Member Secretary, SCLSC is directed to bring this order to the notice of the learned Executive Chairman, SCLSC and solicit orders thereon as may be deemed suitable by such authority.
14. On the aspect of coordination with jail authorities and inter-agency communication, the suggestions made in the SOP (para 9) shall be implemented forthwith as far as practicable. The last aspect delineated upon therein i.e., delay explanation (para 13-SOP), in our view, is a necessary change that will enable the tabling of the actual time taken in the process of filing the appeal. It is as such directed that the said format shall be incorporated forthwith into the necessary documentation. We hereby grant two weeks from the date of this order for it to be incorporated after which any appeal filed by HCLSC shall necessarily contain the same.
15. Suggestions ‘b’ and ‘d’ of the learned amicus curiae reproduced in paragraph 9 of this order shall be read as directions issued by this Court.
16. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to circulate a copy of this order to the Registrars General of all the High Courts, who shall ensure a copy of the same is placed before the Learned Chief Justices and the Executive Chairpersons of the State Legal Service Committees, for necessary follow up action and requisite changes as may be required.

In its order Court had directed that the status report/compliance report be filed by all concerned institutions including the National Informatics Centre, by April 30, 2026. The matter was fixed for further consideration on May 4, 2026.

Earlier, in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2014), Justice Akhilesh Chandra of Patna High Court had delivered a 4-page long judgement dated February 20, 2014, wherein, he concluded:"6. In such type of incident with a female, the statement of the victim itself is sufficient to establish the guilt even  without any corroboration unless and until anything strongly otherwise is shown, but as stated, in the case in hand, there appears nothing to disbelieve her. Consequently, finding no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as recorded by the trial court, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 7. The solitary appellant is required to serve the remaining period of sentence and the appellant is on bail, hence, his bail bond is cancelled. 8. The learned trial court will take due steps for taking the appellant into custody." 

The solitary appellant had preferred the appeal against his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/, as awarded by Sessions Judge, Begusarai vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence respectively dated 20th & 23rd Day of July, 2002 in Sessions Case No. 169 of 1991 arising out of Sahebpur Kamal P.S.

The prosecution case was based on the Fardbeyan of P.W.1 recorded on 22nd September, 1990 at 10.30 hours is that in the previous evening at about 6.00 p.m. while she was visiting her field found the appellant getting crops grazing by his animals, which was object, but bluntly refused by the appellant to get the animals out from there. However, while the prosecutrix was returning she was got hold from behind by him (appellant), who not only slapped her but also subjected to rape. She could be released only when on alarm raised other co-villager were found coming. She on return intimated the incident to her husband (P.W.6) and, thereafter, on the following day got the case was instituted. 

The judgement recorded that the appellant had tried his best to obstruct smooth proceeding of the trial on 3 - 4 occasions and he misused the privilege of bail for substantial period. However, the prosecution could be able to examine altogether eight witnesses and produced documentary evidence like Injury Report, F.I.R. and Case diary of S. Kamal 103/90. Out of the total eight prosecution witnesses examined, three prosecution witness, P.W.2, Umesh Sao, P.W.3, Sone Lal Sah and P.W.4, Prabhu Sah, were declared hostile, out of whom, P.W.3 and P.W.4 could be examined three years after examination of P.W.1 & P.W.2. P.W.5, Sita Ram Yadav, at whose field the offence was committed, had come to state about the condition of crops subsequent to incident. He had heard about the incident and is not an eye-witness, but whatever he said about the physical features that remain intact. 

P.W.6, namely, Rajendra Sao, was the husband of the prosecutrix, not an eye-witness, got such information through his wife (P.W.1) and denied the suggestion of false implication at the instance of one Sitaram Yadav with whom the appellant was at inimical terms. P.W.7, Dr. Baidehi Kumari, examined the prosecutrix but found no injury, proved her report, Exhibit.1. P.W.8, Bhuneshwar Yadav, was a formal witness, proved Exhibits 2 and 3.  

The solitary witness, the Prosecutrix, P.W.1, namely, Soni Devi, who stated the prosecution version and from her entire statement nothing appeared to disbelieve her. Her statement, stating the miseries faced by her at the hands of appellant remained intact.