Saturday, September 30, 2023

Sushmita Minz, Assistant Collector, ADM Office Rourkela, Odisha found dead in a pond

The dead body of Sushmita Minz (35), Rourkela Assistant Collector was found floating in a pond near a newly constructed sensory park within Plant Site Police Limits in Rourkela, Odisha at around at 3.15 PM on September 19, 2023 by a security guard. He alerted the Plantsite police. Her sandals and personal items, contained in a plastic bag were discovered on the water body’s steps. It is reported that she was looking after issues related to land acquisition. When she did not return home on September 16, Sandeep, her brother had lodged a missing complaint with Uditnagar police in Rourkela on September 17 after he failed to trace her at the ADM office. She was appointed as the Assistant Collector of Rourkela around 18 months ago. She was a native of Rambahal area of Rajgangpur in Sundargarh district. She was staying at her home in Rajgangpur. She used to travel to her workplace at the ADM office in Rourkela. Celestina Minz, Sushmita’s mother is of the view that she has been murdered. It has been reported that some physical injuries were observed on her body. It is inexplicable as to why Sushmita was staying in Radhika Hotel prior to her death. 

Based on the complaint, the police traced her out alive in Radhika Hotel, located near Rourkela Railway Station. Thereupon, on intimation of police, her family went to meet her at the hotel. They found her depressed, and wanted to take her home. Alhough the police had given them assurance to hand her over to them but the police neither handed over Sushmita Minz to her mother and brother nor took her to hospital for medical examination. Reportedly, instead of doing so, she was taken to the police station. Her brother and mother were helpless. They had returned home with full of pain and disappointment.

In this backdrop, the following questions:
1. When the District administration knew about d mental depression condition & communicated d same to the family members through block development officer (BDO) and child development project officer (CDPO), Gurundia, why Sushmita Minz was neither brought to the family nor taken for medical treatment?
2. When Sushmita Minz was under the police surveillance after being traced out from missing,knowing her mental depression,why she was not handed over to the family?
3. When Sushmita Minz was under the police surveillance in Radhika Hotel, near Rourkela railway station how she was found dead in a pond?
4. After the body of Sushmita Minz was identified by the family members, without registering the FIR, how was the dead body sent for post-mortem to Rourkela General Hospital?
5. When Sushmita Minz was under the police surveillance and the District Administration had knowledge that she was undergoing depression, why her family members were not informed anything about her on 18/09/2023 and 19/09/2023?

It has been reported that police received the postmortem report on September 23. The postmortem report states that she had died due to drowning. 

Sundargarh Adivasi Manch gheraoed the office of the Additional District Magistrate (ADM) demanding CBI inquiry under the supervision of SC/HC Judge into the death. It also demanded the arrest of Sundargarh Collector and Rourkela ADM in this case. 
 
Her brother has sought an investigation into the role of Sundargarh Collector, Rourkela ADM, Gurundia BDO, Gurundia CDPO and a woman sub-inspector in her death. The circumstances surrounding the death remains unclear. On September 28, Rourkela SP Mitrabhanu Mahapatra ordered a probe into the matter by DCP-rank officer Banita Majhi. The police investigation is likely to examine all possible angles including her pending divorce petition. If she was married, why her husband's name is not being reported.

Wednesday, September 20, 2023

After the death of respondent, a safaikarmachari, Union Govt does not dispute Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Patna Bench order

The case was disposed of on September 18, 2023. The case case was listed on 26 occasions. Bharat, the sole respondent died on November 16, 2021. He was the sole respondent in Union of India v. Bharat case which was filed in Patna High Court on July14, 2021 against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Patna Bench, Patna. The order of CAT, Patna dated May 2, 2019 was authored by Jayesh V. Bhairavia, Member (J) and Dinesh Sharma, Member (A) in favour of Bharat, son of Late Rangila Manjhi, Substitute Safaiwala, under Chief Health Inspector, East Central Railway, Muzaffarpur. From the final judgement of the High, it is crystal clear that CAT's order has survived.

Patna High Court registered the case on on July 19, 2021. There were 10 additional petitioners namely-General Manager (Personnel), East Central Railway, Hajipur, Bihar, The Chief Medical Director,East Central Railway, Hajipur, Divisional Railway Manager,East Central Railway, Sonepur, Bihar, Senior Divisional Personnel Officer,East Central Railway, Sonepur, Chief Medical Superintendent,East Central Railway, Sonepur,Senior Divisional Financial Manager,East Central Railway, Sonepur, Divisional Medical Officer, (Dental), East Central Railway, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, Dr. Shaligram Choudhary,Divisional Medical Officer,East Central Railway, Muzaffarpur and Shailesh Kumar Sinha,Health Inspector-Cum-Inquiry Officer, East Central Railway, Muzaffarpur.Dr. Anand Kumar was petitioner's advocate. Abhay Shankar Jha was respondent's advocate.Subsequently, Dharamshila Devi, wife of Late Bharat, resident of Village-Goshi Amnor,Saran,Bihar and Rubi Kumari, daughter of Late Bharat joined as a co-respondents.The additional advocates for the respondent were Anshay Bahadur Mathur, M.P. Dixit, Sanjay Kumar Chaubey and Swastika. Notably. M.P. Dixit was the advocate for Bharat before the CAT, Patna and The respondents were represented by B.K. Choudhary with Sri Kumar Sachin.

Prior to the disposal, the first order dated August 24, 2021 reads: "None appears on behalf of the petitioners when the matter is called. 2. In the interest of justice, let the matter be listed on 21.09.2021." The second order dated September 23,2021 reads; "The matter has been heard via video conferencing. As prayed for by Dr. Anand Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, on personal ground, the matter be listed on 1st October, 2021." The third order dated November 2, 2021 reads: "Issue notice to the sole respondent for which requisites etc. under registered cover with A/D as well as ordinary process must be filed within three weeks. List the matter on 14.12.2021."

There were no orders during November 2021-May 2023. The order dated June 23,2023 reads: "As prayed for, re-list this matter on 07.07.2023."

The order of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Jitendra Kumar bench dated July 11, 2023 reads: "None appears for the petitioner. In order to provide one more opportunity, list this matter on 25.07.2023. If there is no representation on behalf of the petitioners, petition would be dismissed for non prosecution. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondent on instruction submitted that the sole respondent is stated to have died during the pendency on 16.11.2021.Therefore, the petitioners are permitted to file Interlocutory Application bringing legal heirs of the respondent, if so advised." The respondent died in November 2021 but the Court was informed about it in July 2023.

The order dated July 26, 2023 reads:"Registry is hereby directed to tag the interlocutory application stated to have been filed on behalf of the petitioner in bringing legal heirs of the sole respondent on record. Re-list this matter on 02.08.2023." The petitioner took some 20 months to bring legal heirs of the sole respondent on record through its interlocutory application (I.A.). The Court's website shows the status of I.A. to be pending as of September 20, 2023.

The order dated August 2, 2023 reads: "Mr. M.P. Dixit, learned counsel for the respondent intends to file Vakalatnama for legal heirs of the respondent. He is permitted to file it in the Registry. Re-list this matter on 23.08.2023." The order dated August 23,2023 reads: Respondent–Bharat is stated to have died, therefore, petitioner – Union of India filed I.A. No. 1 of 2023 to bring legal heir of deceased-Bharat on record. Re: I.A. No. 1 of 2023. 2. Heard I.A. No. 1 of 2023 for the reasons stated in the application and affidavit. I.A. No. 1 of 2023 stands allowed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners are hereby directed to carry out necessary amendment in the cause title during the course of the day. 4. Relist this matter on 18.09.2023. 

The oral judgement dated September 18, 2023 reads: "In the instant petition, petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: 'For issuance of an appropriate writ or writs, preferably in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 02.05.2019 passed by the Hon’ble Mr. Jayesh V. Bhairavia, Member (J) and Hon’ble Dinesh Sharma, Member (A), in O.A. No.903/2018, whereby and where under the Learned Tribunal has interfered with the punishment order of removal dated 30.08.2018 as well as the inquiry report dated 11.10.2018 as well as the inquiry report dated 28.05.2018 and directed the petitioners/respondents to consider the case of Respondent/Applicant for his re-instatement in service within 60 days.' 2. During pendency of the present petition, the sole respondent-Bharat died on 16.11.2021. Therefore, the proceedings stand abated. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not disputed the above issue. 4. Accordingly, the present petition stands disposed of as abated."

The prayer of the Union of India, the petitioner and its ten additional petitioners against Bharat, the petitioner from Saran for the relief remained unaddressed. They had prayed for "quashing the order dated 02.05.2019 passed by the Hon’ble Mr. Jayesh V. Bhairavia, Member (J) and Hon’ble Dinesh Sharma, Member (A), in O.A. No.903/2018, whereby and where under the Learned Tribunal has interfered with the punishment order of removal dated 30.08.2018 as well as the inquiry report dated 11.10.2018 as well as the inquiry report dated 28.05.2018 and directed the petitioners/respondents to consider the case of Respondent/Applicant for his re-instatement in service within 60 days." 

It is evident that after the death of respondent, a safaikarmachari, Union Government did not dispute the order of Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Patna Bench in Patna High Court. Tribunal's order was based on High Court's earlier order dated April 25. 2017 in B. S. Chaturvedi v. Union of India.

The order of Jayesh V. Bhairavia, and Dinesh Sharma led Tribunal stands vindicated, now that the petition of 11 petitioners has been disposed of as abated. In its order dated August 3, 2022, it has  been observed by Supreme Court's bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian in Sukhram since deceased v. Kisahnrao that "Abatement occurs only when the cause of action does not survive upon or against the surviving party". The proceedings abate on the death of the accused, as their continuance thereafter will be infructuous and meaningless.   

The order of the Tribunal reads: The applicant has filed the present OA seeking the following reliefs : -
“8[1] That your Lordships may graciously be pleased to quash and set aside the orders dated 30.08.2018, 11.10.2018 passed by the Respondent No.9 and 6 as contained in Annexure-A/9 and A/11 respectively together with Inquiry Report dated 28.05.2018 communicated through Letter dated 25.07.2018 as contained in Annexure-A/7 which has been submitted at the behest and dictated of Vigilance Officials as evident from the impugned order dated 30.08.2018 as contained in Annexure-A/9 itself. 8[2] That Your Lordships may further be pleased to direct/command the Respondents to post the applicant on regular basis treating his initial appointment on 16.04.1999 for all purposes.” The Respondent No, 9 and 6 are the Chief Medical Superintendent, East Central Railway, Sonenpur and Dr. Shaligram Choudhary, Divisional Medical Officer, East Central Railway, Muzaffarpur respectively. 

The Tribunal observed: " It is noticed that in an identical case, i.e. in OA/050/00611/2018, Narendra Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors. wherein this Tribunal has dealt with the issue with regard to charges leveled against the applicant-delinquent of the same department that on the basis of applicant’s false declaration that he had past experience as Safaiwala since 1976 and on that basis had obtained employment as Casual Labour which is found irregular because at the relevant time, the period of so called work experience, the applicant was minor and practically not possible to gain such work experience
due to tender age. Therefore, the initial engagement of the applicant on the basis of his past experience has been found irregular. Accordingly, the charge memorandum was issued after continuous service of more than 12 years that too after the applicant-delinquent was granted temporary status in the year 2001-02 and declared successful in the screening test conducted in the year 2005 after duly scrutinized by the respondents themselves and thereby considered the applicant’s service as temporary against Group-D post. The applicant has declared that he had never submitted any certificate of past experience and his engagement was as fresher and not based on any past experience. The said fact was corroborated by the order dated 2005 whereby he was declared successful in the screening test considering the service record. It is also noticed that during the enquiry the report of preliminary enquiry dated 12.04.1996 on which disciplinary proceeding was initiated was never supplied to him and without any sufficient prove the enquiry officer opined that the charges were partially proved against the applicant. Since the applicant had admitted that his engagement was not on the basis of any past experience. The said opinion of the enquiry officer is vague in nature and the disciplinary authority without considering the material on record in its true spirit in mechanical manner held that the charges leveled against the applicant is proved, and therefore, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service by issuing the aforesaid impugned orders." The CAT's order dated May 2, 2019 in Narendra Kumar vs. Union of India had directed: " The respondents are directed to consider the case of the applicant for his reinstatement in service forthwith, preferably within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." This order had relied on High Court's earlier verdict.

The order of Jayesh V. Bhairavia, and Dinesh Sharma led Tribunal concluded: "The aforesaid disciplinary proceedings and charge memorandum are identical with the aforesaid OA No. 611/2018 wherein the said punishment order of dismissal from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority has been found suffering from infirmities as also contrary to the law laid down by Hon’ble High Court of Patna in CWJC No.12812 of 2016 decided on 25.04.2017. The said impugned orders of punishment has been quashed and set aside with directions upon the respondents to consider the case of the applicant to reinstate him in service forthwith, preferably within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the present case also, in our view, same principle will apply as it is a squarely covered case. Thus, in the light of aforesaid discussions, the impugned orders in the present OA is quashed and set aside with directions to the respondents to respondents to consider the case of the applicant to reinstate him in service forthwith, preferably within a period of sixty days from the
date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs."

       
           
           

           
           
           
           
           
           

Sunday, September 17, 2023

Patna High Court's verdict, legitimacy of a child and Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes

In Sunny Devi versus Ram Babu Kumar, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Jitendra Kumar heard the matter and reserved the judgment on August 2, 2023. The appellant was represented by Shiva Shankar Sharma and the respondent was represented by Abhishek Kumar. Prior to this the court examined the records of Matrimonial Case No. 250 of 2012 from the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, East Champaran, Motihari. In this case relating to appeal against matrimonial case decided by the Family Court, Justice Bajanthri's oral order noted the difficulty in ascertaining the list of documents and list of witnesses which were relied upon by the Family Court. It faced difficulty in searching the exhibits/documents relied upon by the witnesses. In his oral order of June 20, 2023, Justice Bajanthri wrote: "In the appeal, we are finding it Therefore, in order to facilitate the Appellete Court, the Family Courts of State of Bihar are requested to prepare a chart of list of documents and list of witnesses alongwith the orders passed in matrimonial cases. This copy should be communicated to each and every Family Court of the State of Bihar through the Registry of this Court."

The judgement was pronounced on September 15, 2023. The judgement is as under:

The present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 impugning the judgment dated 18.04.2019, passed by Ld. Principal Judge, Family Court, East Champaran, Motihari in Matrimonial (Divorce) Case No. 250 of 2012, whereby the petition, filed by the Plaintiff-Respondent under Section 12(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 praying for decree of nullity for annulment of marriage between the parties, has been allowed on contest.

2. The case of the Plaintiff-Respondent, as per the petition filed before the Family Court, is that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.04.2012 at the Village Malahi Bazar situated in the District East Champaran as per Hindu rites and customs. The parties had last resided together at Sunarpur located in the local jurisdiction of the Family Court, East Champaran, Motihari. It is also averred that there is no petition filed by the Plaintiff-Respondent prior to the present petition and there was no collusion between the parties to present the matrimonial petition. It is further averred that following the marriage, the Defendant-Appellant joined his matrimonial house. It is further averred that soon the Defendant-Appellant began to misbehave with the Plaintiff- Respondent and disliked his company and also refused cohabitation with him. It is further averred that on 30.04.2012, the Plaintiff-Respondent had seen various symptoms of Defendant-Appellant being pregnant. The Defendant- Appellant tried to live lonely with an intent to suppress the sign of pregnancy. It is further averred that the Plaintiff- Respondent, having seen abnormality of physique and behaviour of the Defendant-Appellant, got pregnancy test of the Defendant-Appellant conducted, which was found positive. It is further averred that the Defendant-Appellant herself confessed her guilt and admitted illicit relationship with other person prior to the marriage. It is further averred that on complaint on 07.06.2012, the father and brother of the Defendant-Appellant came Singhiya Hiwan and asked the Plaintiff-Respondent that his suspicion is wrong and they advised him to get the ultrasound test of the Defendant- Appellant conducted. As per advice, ultrasound test of Defendant-Appellant was conducted on 08.06.2012 at HI Tec Scan Centre Janpul Chowk, Motihari and the report of the ultrasound revealed that the age of fetus is eight weeks, meaning thereby that the child was conceived prior to the date of marriage, in spite of the fact that the petitioner never met the respondent before the marriage. It is further averred that after ultrasound report, the brother and father of the Defendant-Appellant took her with them to their home and this time, the Defendant-Appellant took away all her ornaments and other belongings along with herself. Hence, he claims that marriage is voidable and fit to be annulled on the ground of pregnancy since prior to the marriage with a person other than the Plaintiff-Respondent-husband. Hence, the Plaintiff- Respondent prayed for decree of nullity for annulling the marriage between the parties.

3. On notice, the Defendant-Appellant appeared before the Family Court and filed her written statement wherein she has denied all the allegations made against her and she has claimed that just next day of the marriage there was physical relationship between the parties, leading to her pregnancy. She has further averred that marriage was solemnized on 19.04.2012 and a female child was born on 22.01.2013, which clearly shows that allegation against the Defendant-Appellant is false. She has further deposed that the child was born in Referal Hospital, Areraj. She has further averred that after ousting by Plaintiff-Respondent, she was living at her Mayake. She has further claimed that on account of his illicit relationship with Sunit Devi, who is the wife of his brother Sugrim Prasad, this baseless allegation has been levelled against her. She has also claimed that after the ultrasound report, the Plaintiff-Respondent came to know that child is female, he pressurized her for abortion, but she was not ready for abortion and hence, false allegation has been levelled against her. It is also alleged that there was illegal demand of dowry and on account of non-fulfillment of the same, she was ousted from the matrimonial house on 12.09.2012 and hence, a complaint was lodged on 20.12.2012. She has further claimed that she had never sexual relationship with anybody prior to the marriage with the Plaintiff- Respondent and she has prayed that the petition is liable to be dismissed with cost.

4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by Ld. Family Court:

(i) Whether the petition, as framed, is maintainable.
(ii) Whether the Defendant was pregnant by other person prior to the marriage and it was not in the knowledge of the Plaintiff.
(iii) Whether the Plaintiff established physical relationship with Defendant after knowledge of her pregnancy.
(iv) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief.
5. During trial, the Plaintiff-Respondent examined himself as a sole witness, whereas, the Defendant-Appellant had also examined herself as a sole witness in defence of her case.

6. The sole Plaintiff witness Ram Babu Kumar, who is Plaintiff himself has been examined as P.W.-1. In his examination-in-chief, he has reiterated his statement as made in his petition. In his cross examination, he has deposed that Defendant-Appellant is not at his home nor will he keep her at his home. Defendant-Appellant has one daughter, who was born after the marriage. He had denied the allegation that he has ousted his wife after beating and snatching her belongings. He admits that Defendant-Appellant has lodged a case against him. However, he claims that he has lodged his case prior to her. He has also deposed that he is ready for DNA test of the child. He denied the allegation that he has illicit relationship with his Bhabhi. He has also admitted that he has no knowledge that with whom, his wife has illicit relationship. He has also admitted that he has not seen the illicit relationship of his wife with anybody with his own eyes. He has also deposed that he cannot tell the names of those persons who have told him about bad character of his wife. He has further deposed that he is a Government Teacher and his wife is living at her Mayake. He has also deposed that his father-in-law is no more and the Defendant-Appellant-wife is living with her mother. He has also deposed that he is able to maintain his wife, however, his wife is leading a miserable life at her Mayake. He has further deposed that he gets salary of ₹19,000/- per month. He has further deposed that he is not aware whether his wife has entered into second marriage. He wants to get rid of her so that he can re-marry. He also denied the allegation that he has filed this petition for the purpose of re-marriage.

7. Defendant Sunny Devi has examined herself as a sole Defendant witness to support her case. Her examination-in-chief has been filed by way of affidavit. In the said affidavit, she has reiterated her statement as made in her written statement. She has also deposed that her daughter is presently five years old. She has also deposed that she has filed maintenance case bearing No. 312 of 2014, as well as harassment case bearing no. 14 of 2017, which is presently pending in the court of Ld. ACJM, Motihari. She has also deposed that she has got an order of court for payment of maintenance of ₹5,000/- per month for herself and her daughter and the same is being paid by her husband. She has further deposed that for her and her daughter, nobody is there to look after except her husband because her father has already died.

7(i) In her cross-examination, she has deposed that she is separate from her husband for last five years and she has lodged criminal case for harassment and her husband has gone to jail also in that regard. She has also deposed that her father-in-law has been murdered and she has lodged a murder case against her husband and his family members. She has further deposed that she does not get payment of maintenance regularly. Sometimes, she gets payment, but sometimes not.

8. After considering the evidence on record and submission advanced on behalf of both the parties, the petition of the petitioner has been allowed declaring the marriage between the parties void finding that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.04.2012 and after the marriage the Appellant-wife joined the Respondent-husband at his matrimonial home and on doubt expressed by Respondent- husband, ultrasound was conducted on the Appellant-wife on 08.06.2012 to test her pregnancy and as per the ultrasound report, she was found to be pregnant of eight weeks. It has further been found that after the ultrasound, the Appellant-wife was taken by her brother and father to their house. It has been further found by the Ld. Family Court that on 08.06.2012, two months of living of the Appellant-wife at matrimonial home was not complete and hence the Appellant-wife being pregnant of two months clearly shows that she was pregnant since prior to the marriage. The Respondent-husband was not aware of this pregnancy at the time of marriage. It has also been found that prior to the marriage there was no cohabitation between the parties. Hence, on the basis of ultrasound report, Ld. Family Court came to the conclusion that she was pregnant since prior to the marriage with a person other than the Respondent-husband. Hence, marriage was declared null and void by decree of nullity.

9. Ld. counsel for the Appellant submits that the Ld. Family Court has failed to properly appreciate the facts and law and hence court has reached the erroneous conclusion. He further submits that in this case though the legitimacy of the child is not expressly involved but the finding of the court on the issue involved is bound to have serious repercussions for the wife as well as the child. He further submits that the Ld. Family Court has failed to appreciate that pregnancy test by ultrasound cannot precisely find the exact date of conception of the child. He further submits that the child is born within 278 days of the Appellant-wife joining the Respondent-husband at the matrimonial home after marriage i.e. on 20.04.2012 and there was cohabitation between them since then till 12.09.2012, when she was ousted by him. He further submits that female child was born on 22.01.2013, i.e., within 278 days of first cohabitation between the parties and as such as per Section 112 of the Evidence Act, there is conclusive proof that the child is born to the parties. This conclusive proof has not been rebutted by the Respondent- husband by proving non-access to the Appellant-wife. Only statement of the husband that he has never cohabited with the Appellant-wife, is not sufficient to discharge the onus to prove non-access.

10. However, Ld, counsel for the Respondent- husband defends the judgement passed by the Ld. Family Court saying that in view of the ultrasound report, the child was not conceived during the marriage and the Appellant-wife was carrying pregnancy since prior to the marriage and hence there is no illegality committed by the Ld. Family Court while allowing the petition filed by the Respondent-husband and declaring the marriage void by decree of nullity.

11. In view of the submissions of the parties, the following points arise for determination by this Court:

(i) Whether the Appellant-wife was at the time of marriage pregnant by some person other than Respondent- husband.

(ii) Whether the Respondent-husband is entitled to get his marriage with the Appellant declared as null and void by decree of nullity under Section 12(1)(d) of Hindu Marriage Act.

12. Before we proceed to discuss the points arising for determination, it is imperative to see case laws or authoritative Judicial Pronouncements regarding Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof in matrimonial cases.

13. Hon'ble Supreme Court has elaborately discussed the nature of burden of proof in matrimonial cases in Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane Vs. Sucheta Narayan Dastane as reported in 1975 (2) SCC 326 and law laid down herein is still holding the field. In para 23 of the case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that, doubtless, the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case for, ordinarily, the burden lies on the party which affirms a fact, not on the party which denies it. This principle accords with commonsense as it is so much easier to prove a positive than a negative. The petitioner must therefore prove that the respondent has treated him with cruelty.

14. Coming to the Standard of Proof, we find that some misconception had arisen on account of the use of the words "Matrimonial Offences" to describe the misconducts of Defendants under the Hindu Marriage Act. That is why before authoritative decision of Hon'ble Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane Vs. Sucheta Narayan Dastane as reported in 1975 (2) SCC 326, there were conflicting views. As per one view, matrimonial cases are of civil nature and hence standard of proof in such cases would be preponderance of probabilities whereas, as per the another view, proof beyond reasonable doubt should be standard of proof in matrimonial cases in view of the use of word "matrimonial offences" in Hindu Marriage Act. However, in Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane case (supra), Hon'ble Full Bench of the Supreme Court clearly held that matrimonial cases are civil in nature and preponderance of probabilities will be standard of proof in trial of Matrimonial cases under the Hindu Marriage Act, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which is applicable in criminal trials. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 24 of Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane case (supra) observed that the normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged.

15. Ruling out application of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" in matrimonial cases, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 25 of Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane case (supra) has observed that the proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vascillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature. In para 26 of Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that under the Hindu Marriage Act, nowhere it is required that the petitioner must prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is "satisfied" on matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of its sub-section of (1). Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word "satisfied" must mean "satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities" and not "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt". Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases.

16. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 27 of Dr. Narayan Ganesh Dastane case (supra) has further observed that the misconception regarding the standard of proof in matrimonial cases arises perhaps from a loose description of the respondent's conduct in such cases as constituting a "matrimonial offence". Acts of a spouse which are calculated to impair the integrity of a marital union have a social significance. To marry or not to marry and if so whom, may well be a private affair but the freedom to break a matrimonial tie is not. The society has a stake in the institution of marriage and therefore the erring spouse is treated not as a mere defaulter but as an offender. But this social philosophy, though it may have a bearing on the need to have the clearest proof of an allegation before it is accepted as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage, has no bearing on the standard of proof in matrimonial cases.

17. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 10 of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi as reported in AIR 1988 SC 121 has also observed that considering that proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act is essentially of a civil nature, the word 'satisfied' must mean 'satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities' and not 'satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt'. Section 23 of the Act does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases.

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 of A.

Jayachandra Vs. Aneel Kaur as reported in 2005(2) SCC 22 has observed that in a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.

19. Hon'ble Kerala High Court, after referring to A. Jayachandra case (supra), in para 19 of Mohandas Panicker Vs. Dakshayani as reported in 2013 SCC Online Ker 24493 has observed that the principles laid down in the above decisions reiterate that in civil cases, preponderance of probabilities is the standard to be adopted to prove the case. No doubt, matrimonial cases are civil proceedings and the Court can act upon preponderance of probabilities, especially in adultery cases, since it is difficult to get direct evidence.

20. Now let us consider the points which have been formulated for determination.

Point No.1

21. Before we consider this point, it would be pertinent to refer to the relevant statutory provisions.

22. Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act :

"12. Voidable marriages.--

(1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds,namely:--

(a) ....
(b) ....
(c) ....
(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), no petition for annulling a marriage--

(a) ....

(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied--

(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;
(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnised after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and
(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground."

23. As such, under Section 12(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the marriage may be annulled by a decree of nullity if the Respondent was pregnant at the time of the marriage by some person other than the petitioner. Three conditions are however to be satisfied which are mentioned in Sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (b) of Sub-sec. (2) of Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Those conditions are: (i) that the Petitioner was at the time of marriage ignorant of the facts alleged, (ii) that the proceedings have been instituted in the case of marriage solemnized before the commencement of the Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriage solemnized after the commencement of the Act within one year from the date of the marriage. Thus, a period of limitation is fixed for filing an Application under this Clause, (iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground

24. Compliance of the aforesaid conditions is a condition precedent for annulment of marriage under this clause. However, in the present case at hand, there is no dispute regarding ignorance of alleged pregnancy of the Appellant-wife and the limitation to file this petition. As such, we are only required to see whether Respondent - husband has proved that Appellant - wife was pregnant at the time of marriage and whether there was marital intercourse with the consent of the husband-Petitioner, who is Respondent herein, after discovery of alleged pregnancy.

25. Before we proceed to consider the evidence on record in this regard, it would be also imperative to refer to Section 112 of the Evidence Act, which comes into play as the finding on the issue has direct bearing on the legitimacy of the child.

26. Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 1872 :-

"112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.--The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten."

27. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 34 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, as reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 161 has observed that Section 112 embodies the rule of law that the birth of a child during the continuance of a valid marriage or within 280 days (i.e., within the period of gestation) after its dissolution shall be "conclusive proof" that the child is legitimate unless it is established by evidence that the husband and wife did not or could not have any access to each other at any time when the child could have been conceived. The object of this provision is to attach unimpeachable legitimacy to children born out of a valid marriage. When a child is born during the subsistence of lawful wedlock, it would mean that the parents had access to each other. Therefore, the Section speaks of "conclusive proof" of the legitimate birth of a child during the period of lawful wedlock.

28. In para 35 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that the latter part of the Section is with reference to proof of the non- access of the parents of the child to each other. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy of the birth of the child is rebuttable by way of strong evidence to the contrary.

29. In para 36 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that the principle underlying Section 112 is to prevent an unwarranted enquiry as to the paternity of the child whose parents, at the relevant time had "access" to each other. In other words, once a marriage is held to be valid, there is a strong presumption as to the children born from that wedlock as being legitimate. This presumption can be rebutted only by strong, clear and conclusive evidence to the contrary. Section 112 of the Evidence Act is based on the presumption of public morality and public policy.

30. In para 37 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that "access" or "non-access" does not mean actual cohabitation but means the "existence" or "non-existence" of opportunities for sexual relationship. Section 112 refers to point of time of birth as the crucial aspect and not to the time of conception. The time of conception is relevant only to see whether the husband had or did not have access to the wife. Thus, birth during the continuance of marriage is "conclusive proof" of legitimacy unless "non-access" of the party who questions the paternity of the child at the time the child could have been begotten is proved by the said party.

31. In para 38 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that a conjoint reading of Section 112 of the Evidence Act, with the definition of "conclusive proof" under Section 4 thereof, makes it amply clear that a child proved to be born during a valid marriage should be deemed to be a legitimate child except where it is shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten or within 280 days after the dissolution of the marriage and the mother remains unmarried, that fact is the conclusive proof that the child is the legitimate son of the man. Operation of the conclusive presumption can be avoided by proving non-access at the relevant time.

32. In para 39 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that the latter part of Section 112 of the Evidence Act indicates that if a person is able to establish that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been begotten, the legitimacy of such child can be denied. That is, it must be proved by strong and cogent evidence that access between them was impossible on account of serious illness or impotency or that there was no chance of sexual relationship between the parties during the period when the child must have been begotten. Thus, unless the absence of access is established, the presumption of legitimacy cannot be displaced.

33. In para 40 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that thus, where the husband and wife have co-habited together, and no impotency is proved, the child born from their wedlock is conclusively presumed to be legitimate, even if the wife is shown to have been, at the same time, guilty of infidelity. The fact that a woman is living in adultery would not by itself be sufficient to repel the conclusive presumption in favour of the legitimacy of a child. Therefore, shreds of evidence to the effect that the husband did not have intercourse with the wife at the period of conception, can only point to the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock, but it would not uproot the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112.

34. In para 41 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that the presumption under Section 112 can be drawn only if the child is born during the continuance of a valid marriage and not otherwise. "Access" or "non-access" must be in the context of sexual intercourse that is, in the sexual sense and therefore, in that narrow sense. Access may for instance, be impossible not only when the husband is away during the period when the child could have been begotten or owing to impotency or incompetency due to various reasons or the passage of time since the death of the husband. Thus, even though the husband may be cohabiting, there may be non-access between the husband and the wife. One of the instances of non-access despite co-habitation is the impotency of the husband. If the husband has had access, adultery on the wife's part will not justify a finding of illegitimacy.

35. In para 43 of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that even the result of a genuine DNA test cannot escape from the conclusiveness of the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. If a husband and wife were living together during the time of conception but the DNA test reveals that the child was not born to the husband, the conclusiveness in law would remain irrebuttable. What would be proved, is adultery on the part of the wife, however, the legitimacy of the child would still be conclusive in law. In other words, the conclusive presumption of paternity of a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage is that the child is that of the husband and it cannot be rebutted by a mere DNA test report. What is necessary to rebut is the proof of non-access at the time when the child could have been begotten, that is, at the time of its conception.

36. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 18 of Thatchinamoorthy Vs. Sivagamy as reported in 2010 (2) MWN (Civil) 337 has observed that law presumes strongly in favour of legitimacy of off-spring. Section 112 of Evidence Act embodies a rule of law that a child born during the continuance of a valid marriage or during 280 days (within the period of gestation), it shall be conclusive proof that it is legitimate unless it is proved by clear and strong evidence that the husband and wife did not and could not have any access at any time when the child could have been begotten.

37. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 9 of Sham Lal Alias Kuldip Vs. Sanjeev Kumar & Ors. as reported in (2009) 12 SCC 454 has observed that Section 112 of the Evidence Act is based on English Law. Section 112 reproduces the rule of English Law that it is undesirable to inquire into the paternity of a child when the mother is a married woman and the husband had access to her. Adultery on her part will not justify finding of illegitimacy if husband has had access.

38. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 10 of Kamti Devi (Smt) & Anr. Vs. Poshi RAm as reported in (2001) 12 SCC 311 has observed that we may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific advancements with deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as well as ribonucleic acid (RNA) tests were not even in contemplation of the legislature. The result of a genuine DNA test is said to be scientifically accurate. But even that is not enough to escape from the conclusiveness of Section 112 of the Act e.g. if a husband and wife were living together during the time of conception but the DNA test revealed that the child was not born to the husband, the conclusiveness in law would remain irrebuttable. This may look hard from the point of view of the husband who would be compelled to bear the fatherhood of a child of which he may be innocent. But even in such a case the law leans in favour of the innocent child from being bastardised if his mother and her spouse were living together during the time of conception. Hence the question regarding the degree of proof of non-access for rebutting the conclusiveness must be answered in the light of what is meant by access or non-access as delineated above.

39. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 21 of Goutam Kundu Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. as reported in (1993) 3 SCC 418 has observed that this section is based on the well-known maxim pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant (he is the father whom the marriage indicates). The presumption of legitimacy is this, that a child born of a married women is deemed to be legitimate, it throws on the person who is interested in making out the illegitimacy, the whole burden of proving it. The law presumes both that a marriage ceremony is valid, and that every person is legitimate. Marriage or filiation (parentage) may be presumed, the law in general presuming against vice and immorality.

40. In para 22 of Goutam Kundu case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that it is a rebuttable presumption of law that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. This presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderance of evidence, and not by a mere balance of probabilities.

41. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 12 of Smt. Dukhtar Jahan Vs. Mohammed Farooq as reported in (1987) 1 SCC 624 has observed that another serious infirmity noticed in the judgment is that the learned Judge has completely lost sight of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 112 lays down that if a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution and the mother remains unmarried, it shall be taken as conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. This rule of law based on the dictates of justice has always made the courts incline towards upholding the legitimacy of a child unless the facts are so compulsive and clinching as to necessarily warrant a finding that the child could not at all have been begotten to the father and as such a legitimation of the child would result in rank injustice to the father. Courts have always desisted from lightly or hastily rendering a verdict and that too, on the basis of slender materials, which will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and its mother an unchaste woman.

42. Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nandkishore Vs. Smt. Munnibai as reported in 1981 Madhya Pradesh Series 585 has observed that imputing unchastity to a woman is charge of a very serious nature. The charge, if established, may result in serious consequences. Not only that such a woman be condemned in the society and be lowered in the eyes of her relatives and associates, but may also suffer a child, if any, being called a bastard. It shall, therefore, be just to seek for a more cogent and convincing evidence in such cases than the one which may only be sufficient to create a doubt.

43. Hon'ble Apex Court in para 160 of Mahendra Manilal Nanavati Vs. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati as reported in AIR 1965 SC 364 has observed that the notional period of pregnancy is calculated from the first day of the menstruation preceding the conception and it is on this account that 14 days are added to the period of pregnancy from the actual date of conception. On the basis of notional calculation, the fully mature child is born after 280 days. On the basis of the date of conception, the child is born between 265 and 270 days. The development of the foetus undoubtedly depends on its age as counted from the date of conception and it is for this reason that the books on obstetrics mostly deal with the development of the foetus on the basis of days or weeks after conception, for a period of about two months and thereafter they began to note its development with respect to the end of the third and consecutive months. This must be due to the fact that by that time a difference of about a fortnight in the period of gestation does not bring about a substantial difference in the description of the development of the foetus. After all, the entire knowledge with respect to the development of the foetus with respect to the period of gestation is based on a consideration of a large number of cases and then arriving at some generalised conclusion about the development of the foetus corresponding to its age from the date of conception.

44. Now coming to the case at hand, we find that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.04.2012 and the wife joined the Respondent - husband at his matrimonial home the next day i.e., 20.04.2012 and female child is born on 22.01.2013. As such, after calculation we find that the child was born within 278 days of the wife joining the husband at his matrimonial home. Here, it would be pertinent to mention that general gestation period of a child is 280 days. This general gestation period of 280 days has been enshrined in Section 112 of the Evidence Act also. This is also relevant to mention that this 280 days is upper limit of the gestation period and not the lower limit. The child may be born few days prior to 280 days. As such, it goes without saying that the child born within 278 days has been conceived on or after 20.04.2012 when the Appellant-wife joined the Respondent-husband at his matrimonial home after the marriage.

45. Hence, it is conclusively proved that the Respondent has fathered the child. The Appellant was not carrying pregnancy since prior to the marriage.

46. The aforesaid conclusive proof can be rebutted only by way of proving by the husband that he had no access to the appellant wife.

47. In this context, we find that as per evidence of Respondent-husband, the Appellant-wife joined the Respondent-husband on 20.04.2012 following the marriage on 19.04.2012 and she was taken by her father and brother to their house on 08.06.2012 after the ultrasound pregnancy test. However, as per the Appellant - wife after joining her husband at his matrimonial home on 20.04.2012 she continued to be at her matrimonial home till 12.09.2012 when she was ousted by the Respondent-husband. Even going by the admitted period from 20.04.2012 to 08.06.2012 during which the Appellant - wife stayed with Respondent - husband at his matrimonial home, it is apparent that the Respondent - husband had access to his Appellant - wife when the born child could have been begotten. In such situation, onus is on the husband to show that he had no access. We have already seen that access does not necessarily mean actual cohabitation. It only amounts opportunity of cohabitation. Hence, statement of the Respondent - husband that he has no cohabitation with the Appellant - wife has no meaning in view of the fact that the Appellant - wife stayed with him for 49 days since 20.04.2012 when he had access to his wife. In such situation, he could prove non-access only by way of pleading impotency, serious illness or impossibility of cohabitation with the Appellant - wife. But there is no such pleading or evidence on the part of the husband. In such situation, the Respondent-husband is not permitted to rebut the conclusive proof. No evidence scientific or otherwise can be admissible to dispute the paternity of the child. Even otherwise, pregnancy test by ultrasound is not fully accurate. On the basis of such test one cannot claim on which date the child was precisely conceived. There is always possibility of error of few days.

48. As such we find that the Appellant-wife was not pregnant on the date of marriage. She conceived the child during 20.04.2012 to 08.06.2012 when she was staying with her husband at the matrimonial home and when both had access to each other.

49. Even without application of Section 112 of the Evidence Act, we find that the Respondent-husband has no merit in the case, because the pregnancy test by ultrasound is not fully perfect technique to determine the exact date of conception of the child. That is why the findings in the test is given in the term of week and not in days and even in the term of week, there is scope of error. If we calculate the period from 20.04.2012 to 08.06.2012 during which both parties were staying together, it would be 49 days i.e. seven weeks, just one week short of eight weeks. There is always scope of such error in the pregnancy test.

50. Moreover, there is no DNA test report of the child and the Respondent-father on record. We find that though during evidence, the Respondent-husband was ready for DNA test but he has never applied to Ld. Family Court for direction of such test, whereas onus was on him to prove that he has not fathered the child, though we are afraid that he could have got such direction without proving non-access to his wife during the period the child could have been conceived. Roving inquiry into the paternity of a child is prohibited in view of Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Our legal framework leans in favour of the legitimacy of a child and frowns upon his/her bastardy. Husband is strongly presumed to be father of the child born to his wife. The presumption could be rebutted only when the husband proves that husband and wife had no access to each other during the period when the child could have been conceived.

51. Hence, even without application of Section 112 of the Evidence Act, we find that the Appellant-wife was not carrying pregnancy prior to the date of marriage.

52. Now coming to the compliance of the condition as provided in Section 12(2)(b)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the husband is also required to prove that after knowledge of the claimed ground for nullity of the marriage, he had no marital intercourse with the Appellant-wife. Such condition for maintainability of the petition has been complied with by the Respondent-husband, who was petitioner before the Family Court, by pleading and deposition that after the ultrasound test on 08.06.2012, the wife was taken by her father and brother to their house from the matrimonial home.

Point No.2

53. In view of the finding of Point No. 1, the Respondent - husband is not entitled to get his marriage with the Appellant-wife declared void by decree of nullity.

54. In view of the aforesaid findings, we are of considered opinion that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law. The impugned judgement dated 18.04.2019, passed by Ld. Principal Judge, Family Court, East Champaran, Motihari in Matrimonial (Divorce) Case No. 250 of 2012 is set aside. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 287 of 2019 is allowed. However, both the parties shall bear their own costs. Let the decree be drawn accordingly.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is no denying the fact that High Court's verdict is sensitive towards the legitimacy of a child. But in para 50 of the verdict, the use of the word "bastardy" appears "incorrect" in the light of Supreme Court's recommendations against "Stereotype promoting language". The apex court has frowned upon the use of "bastard", it prefers "non-marital child or, a child whose parents were not married" in its place.

In his foreword to the Supreme Court of India's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, Dr. Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India wrote, "Our oath as judges mandates that we ‘perform the duties of our office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.’ The oath demands that we discharge our functions with impartiality and objectivity, applying the law to every case before us. A judge’s oath
demands rejecting improper attempts to influence their decision-making. The oath also requires a judge to put aside any preconceived notions about the parties before the court. Relying on predetermined stereotypes in judicial decision-making contravenes the duty of judges to decide each case on its merits, independently and impartially. In particular, reliance on stereotypes about women is liable to distort the law’s application to women in harmful ways. Even when the use of stereotypes does not alter the outcome of a case, stereotypical language may reinforce ideas contrary to our constitutional ethos. Language is critical to the life of the law. Words are the vehicle through which the values of the law are communicated. Words transmit the ultimate intention of the lawmaker or the judge to the nation. However, the language a judge uses reflects not only their interpretation of the law, but their perception of society as well. Where the language of judicial discourse reflects antiquated or incorrect ideas about women, it inhibits the transformative project of the law and the Constitution of India, which seek to secure equal rights to all persons, irrespective of gender." He admitted that there are "many words or phrases that are used in legal discourse (both by lawyers and by judges)" which reflects "archaic ideas with patriarchal undertones." 

According to him "the Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes aims to assist judges and the legal community in identifying, understanding and combating stereotypes about women. It contains a glossary of gender-unjust terms and suggests alternative words or phrases which may be used while drafting pleadings as well as orders and judgments. The Handbook identifies common stereotypes about women, many of which have been utilised by courts in the past and demonstrates why they are inaccurate and how they may distort the application of the law. The intention is not to criticise or cast doubt on past judgements but merely to show how stereotypes may unwittingly be employed. Finally, it encapsulates the current doctrine on key legal issues which may be relevant while adjudicating certain cases, particularly those concerning sexual violence." He wrote, "The Handbook will give a fresh impetus to our quest towards a gender-just legal order and will be a crucial document to ensure that courts can deliver equal and impartial justice to individuals of all genders." He hoped that all members of the legal profession will ensure that legal reasoning and writing is free of harmful notions about women. This 31- page long Handbook was uploaded on Supreme Court's website on September 4, 2023. 

 

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

Tentative Agenda of 5-day special session of Parliament includes Bills on Election Commissioners, Advocates, Press and Post Office

In the aftermath of Sonia Gandhi's letter to the Prime Minister, the agenda for the special 5-day session of Parliament beginning September 18 has been announced. In her letter dated September 6, she drew Prime Minister's attention towards nine specific issues in the face of government's failure to disclose the session's agenda. 

She wrote, “I must point out that this special session has been convened without any consultation with other political parties. None of us have any idea of its agenda. All we have been communicated is that all five days have been allocated for government business".

The issues she mentioned included unemployment, price rise, inequality, distress of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises, farmers' demand for Minimum Support Price, caste census, formation Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to investigate the Adani issue, deterioration in inter-state relations, natural disasters, flood, drought, occupation of Indian territory by China, and communal tension in Haryana, and Manipur. 

Prior to the introduction of the Bills on Election Commissioners, Advocates, Press and Post Office , there will be discussion on ‘Parliamentary Journey of 75 years starting from Samvidhan Sabha – Achievements, Experiences, Memories and Learnings’ will be held in Lok Sabha on 18th September, the first day of Parliament special session, as per Parliamentary Bulletin. The two bills to be taken up in the Lok Sabha and two others to be taken up in the Rajya Sabha. Lok Sabha will engage with The Advocates (Amendment) Bill, 2023, The Press and Registeration of Periodicals Bill, 2023. Rajta Sabha will take up The Post Office Bill, 2023 and The Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023. 


In the last session the controversial Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill 
was tabled in the Rajya Sabha. It seeks to replace the Chief Justice of India with a cabinet minister in the panel for selection of the chief election commissioner and election commissioners. This paves the way for the government to have more control over the appointments of members of the election commission. 

The Bill introduction of the Bill by the Law Minister faced bitter opposition from the opposition parties. They have accused the government of "diluting and overturning" the decision of Supreme Court's Constitution Bench. 

In March 2023, the Court had ruled that a three-member panel, headed by the prime minister and comprising the leader of the opposition in Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India, will select the CEC and ECs till a law is framed by Parliament on the appointment of these commissioners.

Now the Prime Minister-led panel for the selection of the chief election commissioner and election commissioners will have the power to consider even those not short-listed by the cabinet secretary-led Search Committee according to the bill.

According to Section 6 of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, a Search Committee headed by the cabinet secretary and comprising two other members not below the rank of secretary, having knowledge and experience in matters relating to elections, shall prepare a panel of five persons for consideration of the Selection Committee for appointment as the CEC and ECs.

According to Section 8 (2) of the proposed law, the Selection Committee may also consider any other person than those included in the panel by the Search Committee.

Section 7 (1) of the bill states that the CEC and ECs will be appointed by the president on the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, who will be the chairperson, the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha and a Union Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Prime Minister as members.

The 'tentative list' of the agenda for Parliament's special session from September 18 to 22 is likely to come up for discussion at the all-party meeting on September 17 amidst the possibility of the proposal for introduction of the 'One Nation, One Election' bill. 

Monday, September 11, 2023

356 cyber offences with political motive reported in 2020, reveals 2023 report on Status of Policing in India

All over India 356 cyber offences with political motive were reported in 2020. In 2016, there were 40 such reported offences, 139 in 2017, 218 in 2018 and 316 in 2019 all over India. Bihar reported 7 cyber crime offences with a reportedly political motive in 2020. It had reported 3 such offences in 2016.

In 2020, Tamil Nadu reported 108 cases, the highest number of such offences followed by 73 offences in Uttar Pradesh (UP). UP had reported 90 cases in 2019. Andhra Pradesh reported 67 cases in 2020 and 88 cases in 2019.   

Bihar, Maharashtra, and Karnataka have the highest number of social media monitoring cells. 

The high number of social media monitoring cells in these states is highly unusual in a context where the limitations imposed on State for surveillance are not properly legally defined. Such cells are presumed to be functioning without any kind of constitutional or judicial oversight in the absence of data protection laws. This provides them wide discretion to conduct digital surveillance of citizens. The conduct of Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Haryana and Punjab is noteworthy in this regard. 

Bihar has 127 CCTVs available with the police as on January 1, 2022. The information obtained under RTI Act reveals that Bihar 1056 police stations are under CCTV coverage as of 2021. 952 police stations are installed with functioning CCTV cameras. This amounts to CCTV compliance in over 90 percent of State's police stations. The State has installed 5 facial recognition technology (FRT) system but only 1 is active. 

The State has 1 cyber crime police station, 48 cyber crime cells and 48 social media monitoring cells as of 2021. Bihar reported 11 cyber crime cases registered under the Information Technology Act, 1402 cyber crime cases under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in 2021.

These details have come to light from the recent "Status of Policing in India Report 2023:Surveillance and the Question of Privacy" by Lokniti-CSDS and Common Cause.

The report recalls how even in incidents where there is clear violation of the law, such as the Bhagalpur blinding case, the larger public opinion was in favour of the accused police officers. 

Drawing on the 1986 report of the Justice N.N. Singh Inquiry Commission in the “Bhagalpur Blindings” case which indicted several police officials for their involvement in the blinding of over 30 under-trial prisoners by pouring acid into their eyes during interrogation, allegedly to extract confessions, this 2023 report underlines that the uninformed perception of majority regarding the utility of CCTVs, social media monitoring cells, facial recognition technology is not an indicator of their appropriateness. 

The report points out that the majoritarian public opinion need not always be taken at face value or seen as a justification for acts that go against human rights and constitutional values.

Saturday, September 9, 2023

Supreme Court questions decisions of Justice Rakesh Kumar, Patna High Court and Janardan Tripathi, Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in a rape-murder case

On September 4, 2023, Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench pronounced a 68 page long judgement authored by Justice J.B. Pardiwala setting aside the judgement authored by Justice Rakesh Kumar of Patna High Court and asked the High Court to re-consider the case of death sentence given to Munna Pandey, a resident of Thatheri Tola, Sabour, Bhagalpur who was on visiting term with the family of the victim, the daughter of Kiran Devi and Arvind Sah was found guilty of luring the victim, who was aged about 11 years and carrying her to his house, committing rape and brutally murdering her. The appellant was accused of luring the victim to come to his house to watch TV. The victim went to the house of the appellant in the morning on 31.05.2015 to watch TV and thereafter she went missing. The Court examiend whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment. It found that Justice Rakesh Kumar of the "High Court completely forgot that there was a co-accused also namely Pritam Tiwari in the picture. Pritam Tiwari being a juvenile was tried in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and was held guilty and sentenced to three years imprisonment." It is noteworthy that there was involvement of a co-accused Pritam Tiwari in the crime of rape who raised the plea of being a juvenile. His case was separated vide order dated February 3, 2016 passed by the Trial Court and was referred to the Juvenile Justice Board, Bhagalpur. The Trial Court had proceeded only against Munna Pandey. It treated the case as one falling under the category of “rarest of the rare cases” and sentenced him to death.
 
Justice Pardiwala wrote:"This Court has condemned the passive role played by the Judges and emphasized the importance and legal duty of a Judge to take an active role in the proceedings in order to find the truth to administer justice and to prevent the truth from becoming a casualty. A Judge is also duty bound to act with impartiality and before he gives an opinion or sits to decide the issues between the parties, he should be sure that there is no bias against or for either of the parties to the lis. For a judge to properly discharge this duty the concept of independence of judiciary is in existence and it includes ability and duty of a Judge to decide each case according to an objective evaluation and application of the law, without the influence of outside factors. If the Courts are to impart justice in a free, fair and effective manner, then the presiding judge cannot afford to remain a mute spectator totally oblivious to the various happenings taking place around him, more particularly, concerning a particular case being tried by him. The fair trial is possible only when the court takes active interest and elicit all relevant information and material necessary so as to find out the truth for achieving the ultimate goal of dispensing justice with all fairness and impartiality to both the parties."He recalled Justice Chinnappa Reddy's order in Ram Chander v. State of Haryana, (1981) wherein he observed that if a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He must become a participant in the trial by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.

Supreme Court has noticed serious lapses in the entire investigation. It was disturbed by the oral evidence of the investigating officer Rita Kumari, the Prosecution Witness (PW) 5. The investigating officer in her cross examination deposed that in accordance with the order dated June 29, 2015 a letter on behalf of the officer-in-charge of the Police Station, Sabour, was filed before the Trial Court seeking permission to send the muddamal articles to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Patna for examination. However, Rita Kumari in her cross examination before the Trial Court admitted that following the instructions of her senior officers, she did not take any steps to procure FSL report. The Court asked, "Who are these senior officers of PW 5 and why they instructed the PW 5 not to procure the FSL report". It should have been a subject matter of inquiry by both, the State as well as the trial court. Even High Court failed to inquire in to it. It has detected the failure of the investigating officer to subject the appellant to medical examination by a medical practitioner under Section 53(1) of the CrPC enables a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to request a registered medical practitioner, to make such an examination of the person arrested, as is reasonably necessary to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, whenever a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence of such a nature that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence.

The Court's perusal of the statements of prosecution witnesses made under Section 161 of CrPC before the police revealed that it was Pritam Tiwari who had come to the house of the victim on the fateful day and date and had taken the victim along with him to his house to watch TV. All the statements further reveal that it was Pritam Tiwari who was found locking the door when the witnesses enquired with Pritam Tiwari about the whereabouts of the victim. But "Neither the defence counsel nor the public prosecutor nor the presiding officer of the Trial Court and unfortunately even the High Court thought fit to look into the aforesaid aspect of the matter and try to reach to the truth." It records that "he learned defence counsel had no idea how to contradict a witness with his or her police statements in accordance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872."

The Court records that "The lapse on the part of public prosecutor is also something very unfortunate. The public prosecutor knew that the witnesses were deposing something contrary to what they had stated before the police in their statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. It was his duty to bring to the notice of the witnesses and confront them with the same even without declaring them as hostile. The presiding officer of the Trial Court also remained a mute spectator. It was the duty of the presiding officer to put relevant questions to these witnesses in exercise of his powers under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Section 162 of the CrPC does not prevent a Judge from looking into the record of the police investigation. Being a case of rape and murder and as the evidence was not free from doubt, the Trial Judge ought to have acquainted himself, in the interest of justice, with the important material and also with what the only important witnesses of the prosecution had said during the police investigation. Had he done so, he could without any impropriety have caught the discrepancies between the statements made by these witnesses to the investigating officer and their evidence at the trial, to be brought on the record by himself putting questions to the witnesses under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. There is, in our opinion, nothing in Section 162 CrPC to prevent a Trial Judge, as distinct from the prosecution or the defence, from putting to prosecution witnesses the questions otherwise permissible, if the justice obviously demands such a course. In the present case, we are strongly of the opinion that is what, in the interests of justice, the Trial Judge should have done but he did not look at the record of the police investigation until after the investigating officer had been examined and discharged as a witness. Even at this stage, the Trial Judge could have recalled the officer and other witnesses and questioned them in the manner provided by Section 165 of the Evidence Act. It is regrettable that he did not do so."

It observed: "In our opinion, in a case of the present description where the evidence given in a Court implicates persons who are not mentioned in the first information report or police statements, it is always advisable and far more important for the Trial Judge to look into the police papers in order to ascertain whether the persons implicated by witnesses, at the trial had been implicated by them during the investigation. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely on a three-Judge Bench decision in the case of V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588, wherein this Court, after due  consideration of Section 161 of the CrPC and Section 145 of the Evidence Act...."

In this case the Court underlined that "Section 162 CrPC bars use of statement of witnesses recorded by the police except for the limited purpose of contradiction of such witnesses as indicated there. The statement made by a witness before the police under Section 161(1) CrPC can be used only for the purpose of contradicting such witness on what he has stated at the trial as laid down in the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC. The statements under Section 161 CrPC recorded during the investigation are not substantive pieces of evidence but can be used primarily for the limited purpose: (i) of contradicting such witness by an accused under Section 145 of the Evidence Act; (ii) the contradiction of such witness also by the prosecution but with the leave of the Court; and (iii) the re-examination of the witness if necessary." It further states that the court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved and ask questions with reference to them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the court. The words in Section 162 CrPC “if duly proved” clearly show that the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway nor can be looked into but they must be duly proved for the purpose of contradiction by eliciting admission from the witness during cross-examination and also during the cross-examination of the investigating officer. The statement before the investigating officer can be used for contradiction but only after strict compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act that is by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.

Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads: Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The attention of witness is drawn to that part and this must reflect in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands proved and there is no need to further proof of contradiction and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter when investigating officer is examined in the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked for the purpose of contradiction, it will then be proved in the deposition of the investigating officer who again by referring to the police statement will depose about the witness having made that statement. The process again involves referring to the police statement and culling out that part with which the maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.”

Drawing these insights from the previous judgement, the Court observed: "What is important to note in the aforesaid decision of this Court is the principle of law that if the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the Court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to prove all major contradictions in the form of material omissions in accordance with the procedure as established under Section 145 of the Evidence Act and bring them on record. It is the duty of the defence counsel to do so." It pointed out that the Judge should not be a passive spectator but should take a proactive role.

The Court gave a lesson on the "role and duty of the High Court in confirmation cases" saying, "We regret to state that the High Court completely overlooked the aforesaid aspects as discussed above. What was expected of the High Court to do in such circumstances? If the High Court would have taken little pains to look into the record, then immediately it could have taken recourse to Section 367 of the CrPC. We invite the attention of the High Court to the provisions of Chapter XXVIII (Section 366 to Section 371) and Chapter XXIX (Section 372 to Section 394)." According to Section 366 when a Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the High Court and the sentence of death is not to be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. Section 367 then proceeds to lay down the power of the High Court to direct further enquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken. Section 368, thereafter, lays down the power of the High Court to confirm the sentence so imposed or annul the conviction. One of the powers which the High Court can exercise is one under Section 368(c) of the CrPC and that is to “acquit the accused person”. Pertinently, the power to acquit the person can be exercised by the High Court even without there being any substantive appeal on the part of the accused challenging his conviction. To that extent, the proceedings under Chapter XXVIII which deal with “submission of death sentences for confirmation” is a proceeding in continuation of the trial. These provisions thus entitle the High Court to direct further enquiry or to take additional evidence and the High Court may, in a given case, even acquit the accused person. The scope of the chapter is wider. Chapter XXIX of the CrPC deals with “Appeals”. Section 391 also entitles the appellate court to take further evidence or direct such further evidence to be taken. Section 386 then enumerates powers of the appellate court which inter alia includes the power to “reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate court or committed for trial”. The powers of the appellate court are equally wide. The High Court in the present case was exercising powers both under Chapters XXVIII and XXIX of the CrPC.

It explained how ordinarily, in a criminal appeal against conviction, the appellate court, under Section 384 of the CrPC, can dismiss the appeal, if the Court is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for interference, after examining all the grounds urged before it for challenging the correctness of the decision given by the Trial Court. It is not necessary for the appellate court to examine the entire record for the purpose of arriving at an independent decision of its own whether the conviction of the appellant is fully justified. The position is, however, different where the appeal is by an accused who is sentenced to death, so that the High Court dealing with the appeal has before it, simultaneously with the appeal, a reference for confirmation of the capital sentence under Section 366 of the CrPC. On a reference for confirmation of sentence of death, the High Court is required to proceed in accordance with Sections 367 and 368 respectively of the CrPC and the provisions of these Sections make it clear that the duty of the High Court, in dealing with the reference, is not only to see whether the order passed by the Sessions Judge is correct, but to examine the case for itself and even direct a further enquiry or the taking of additional evidence if the Court considers it desirable in order to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the convicted person. It is true that, under the proviso to Section 368, no order of confirmation is to be made until the period allowed for preferring the appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is presented within such period, until such appeal is disposed of, so that, if an appeal is filed by a condemned prisoner, that appeal has to be disposed of before any order is made in the reference confirming the sentence of death. In disposing of such an appeal, however, it is necessary that the High Court should keep in view its duty under Section 367 CrPC and, consequently, the Court must examine the appeal record for itself, arrive at a view whether a further enquiry or taking of additional evidence is desirable or not, and then come to its own conclusion on the entire material on record whether conviction of the condemned prisoner is justified and the sentence of death should be confirmed.

The Court also gave a lesson on concept of fair trial. It observed: All fair trials are necessarily legally valid, but is the reverse necessarily true? What then is the genesis of the concept of a fair trial? The concept of a fair trial has a very impressive ancestry, is rooted in history, enshrined in the Constitution, sanctified by religious philosophy and juristic doctrines and embodied in the statute intended to regulate the course of a criminal trial. Its broad features and ingredients have, in course of time, been concretised into well recognised principles, even though there are grey areas, which call for further legal thought and research. Truth is the cherished principle and is the guiding star of the Indian criminal justice system. For justice to be done truth must prevail. Truth is the soul of justice. The sole idea of criminal justice system is to see that justice is done. Justice will be said to be done when no innocent person is punished and the guilty person is not allowed to go scot free....The role of a judge in dispensation of justice after ascertaining the true facts no doubt is very difficult one. In the pious process of unravelling the truth so as to achieve the ultimate goal of dispensing justice between the parties the judge cannot keep himself unconcerned and oblivious to the various happenings taking place during the progress of trial of any case. No doubt he has to remain very vigilant, cautious, fair and impartial, and not to give even a slightest of impression that he is biased or prejudiced either due to his own personal convictions or views in favour of one or the other party. This, however, would not mean that the Judge will simply shut his own eyes and be a mute spectator, acting like a robot or a recording machine to just deliver what stands feeded by the parties.

The judgement reads: "In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for reconsideration of the Death Reference No. 4 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 358 of 2017. The Death Reference No. 4 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 358 of 2017 stand restored for reconsideration of the High Court in accordance with law. The appellant is in jail past more than nine years. In such circumstances, the Death Reference referred to above on being restored to the file of the High Court shall be taken up for hearing expeditiously. The learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to notify the Death Reference along with the Criminal Appeal for hearing before a Bench which he may deem fit to constitute. We also request the learned Judges who would be hearing the matter to give priority and dispose of the same at the earliest in accordance with law." The judgement begins after quoting Harry Browne, an American jurist and judge saying “A fair trial is one in which the rules of evidence are honored, the accused has competent counsel, and the judge enforces the proper court room procedures - a trial in which every assumption can be challenged.” The appellant had prayed that judgment and order of conviction and capital sentence be set aside and he be acquitted of all the charges."

Earlier, on April 10, 2018 as part of Division Bench of Patna High Court Justice Rakesh Kumar had pronounced an oral judgement in The State of Bihar Vs. Munna Pandey confirming the death sentence, which has been imposed by the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant against his conviction. By doing so "the judgment of conviction of the appellant dated 2.2.2017 for offence under Sections 302 and 376 of the I.P.C. passed by Sri Janardan Tripathi, learned Additional Sessions Judge I, Bhagalpur in Sessions Trial No. 581 of 2015 and death sentence of the appellant dated 23.2.2017" was approved and confirmed by the High Court judge in question. The death sentence was uploaded and transmitted on April 19, 2018. The Division Bench included Justice Arvind Srivastava.

The Criminal Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on July 12, 2018. It was registered and admitted on October 8, 2018 by Advocate Kabir Dixit. Between 2018 and September 2023, the case was listed for hearing on 13 occasions. It was initially listed before Justice Ranjan Gogoi, the 46th Chief Justice of India headed 3-Judge Bench including Justices S.K. Kaul and K.M.Joseph. This bench had condoned the delay and granted  leave. Its order dated October 8, 2018 directed, "There shall be stay of the execution of the death sentence till disposal of the appeals."

The order of Anil Laxman Pansare, Registrar, Supreme Court dated February 6, 2019 reads: "Await original record from the High Court as well as Trial Court. Reminder be issued."

The order of Avani Pal Singh, Registrar, Supreme Court dated April 1, 2019 reads: "Await original records from the High Court and Trial Court. Issue letter of request to the learned Registrar General of the concerned Court with a request that original record may be ensured to be dispatched within two weeks from the date of receipt of request(upon due translation)." The order of Anil Laxman Pansare, Registrar, Supreme Court dated July 8, 2019 reads: "Await original record from the Trial Court." His order dated October 14, 2019 reads: "Original record has been received from the High Court. Await original record from the Trial Court. Reminder be issued." His order dated January 22, 2020 reads: "Original records have been received from the High Court and Trial Court. Parties may file additional documents. Registry to process the matter for listing before the Hon'ble Court, as per rules."

Subsequently, it got listed before Justice S. Abdul Nazeer headed 3-Judge Bench on 6 September, 2022. On May 5, 2023, it got listed before Justice B.R. Gavai headed 3-Judge Bench. On July 20, 2023, the case was heard by a 3-Judge Bench comprising of Justices Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala and P. K. Mishra and the judgement was reserved. Munna Pandey, the Appellant was represented by advocates Dr. Aditya Sondhi and Aishwarya Saranga, Meghana Tm, Harini Raghupathi, Shivani Mishra and Kabir Dixit. The State of Bihar, the respondent was represented by advocates Samir Ali Khan and Pranjal Sharma. The Court'S order dated July 20 reads: "1. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 2. Hearing concluded. 3. Judgment reserved. 4. Written submission, if any, be filed by 24.07.2023."

Dr. Aditya Sondhi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant convict argued that the "Case purely of circumstantial evidence" and the chain of evidence is incomplete and inconclusive. He pointed out the failure to conduct medical examination required in cases of rape under Section 53 A of Criminal Procedure Code. The prosecution did not place on record the exculpatory evidence against the Appellant. The alleged confession of Pritam Tiwari, a juvenile co-accused implicating Munna Pandey cannot be relied upon. He underlined the flaws in the judgment of the Trial Court and the Patna High Court. Munna Pandey’s wife Sangeeta was elected as the ward councilor in 2010. The Courts below have incorrectly sentenced the Appellant to undergo the sentence of death. He argued that the judgment and order of conviction and capital sentence be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of all the charges.

Samir Ali Khan, the counsel appearing on behalf of the State argued that no error has been committed by the Courts below in holding the appellant guilty of the offence charged with and treating the case to be one falling under the category of “rarest of the rare cases”. He pointed out that when the house of Munaa Pandey was opened, the dead body of the victim was recovered beneath a cot and the room from where the dead body was recovered was of the ownership of the appellant. It was for the appellant to explain, how the dead body of the victim was recovered from the room of his house over which he had full control. It was also argued that Priya Kumari, the elder sister of the victim and the Prosecution Witness 3 in her deposition stated that she had seen the appellant locking the door of his room. This is suggestive of the fact that the keys of the room were with the appellant. The learned counsel submitted that the facts established are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant convict and are of a conclusive nature. He submitted that the chain of evidence is so complete that it does not leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.

Finally, the judgement was delivered on September 4, 2023. The Court's Record of Proceedings states that Justice J.B. Pardiwala pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Justices Gavai and Prashant Kumar Mishra. The judgement underlines that Justice Rakesh Kumar bench of Patna "High Court had before it not only the appeal filed by the accused but also a reference made by the Sessions Court for confirmation of the capital sentence under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Time and again this Court has pointed out that on a reference for confirmation of the sentence of death, the High Court is under an obligation to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 367 and 368 resply of the CrPC. Under these Sections the High Court must not only see whether the order passed by the Sessions Court is correct but it is under an obligation to examine the entire evidence for itself, apart from and independently of the Sessions Court's appraisal and assessment of that evidence. The judgement has directed the Registry to "forward one copy each of this judgment  to all the High Courts with a further request to each of the High Courts to circulate the same in its respective district judiciary" as a lesson.