Saturday, August 31, 2024

All India Judges Association (AIJA) case pending since 1989

"All persons possessing a portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust, and that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author and Founder of Society" wrote Edmund Burke. This observation was quoted by the 21st Chief Justice of India Rangnath Mishra led bench in the judgment in first All India Judges Association (AIJA) case. 

The bench of 50th Chief Justice of India Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud and Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra heard the issue of non-compliance with the directions of payment of arrears to judicial officers in terms of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission recommendations on August 27, 2024. It directed the States and Union Territories to disburse the funds within 4 weeks from the date of claims raised by Judicial Officers for clearance of arrears and allowances in terms of Court's previous directions. They had to comply till August 20, 2024. So far only  Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Madhya Pradesh have complied with the directions.  It is likely to be listed again on October 1, 2024.

On August 22, 2024, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India has recorded in its order that K Parameshar, amicus curiae has submitted that as per the responses received from the States/Union Territories, "the following States/UTs have still not complied with the orders of this Court dated 27 July 2022, 19 May 2023 and 4 January 2024:
(i) Tamil Nadu
(ii) Madhya Pradesh
(iii) Andhra Pradesh
(iv) West Bengal
(v) Chhattisgarh
4(vi) Delhi
(vii) Assam
(viii) Nagaland
(ix) Meghalaya
(x) Himachal Pradesh
(xi) J&K
(xii) Ladakh
(xiii) Jharkhand
(xiv) Kerala
(xv) Bihar
(xvi) Haryana
(xvii) Odisha"

The order reads: "We direct that, in terms of the previous directions, the Chief Secretaries and the Finance Secretaries of the aforesaid States shall remain personally present in Court on 27 August 2024 at 10.30 am." 

All India Judges Association (AIJA) filed a fresh case in the Supreme Court on July 20, 2015. It was registered on September 7, 2015. It was "admitted" on September 6, 2022. It prayed for the formation of All India Judicial Commission "to review the service conditions of the judicial officers of subordinate judiciary in India including but not limited to Pay Scale, Retirement Age, Pension and other emoluments”. The I.As. in W.P.(C) No. 1022 of 1989, arising out of similar issue, is pending before the Court. It was filed on September 15, 1989. The first judgement in case was delivered November 13, 1991 by a 3-judge bench of 21st Chief Justice of India and Justices A M Ahmadi and P.B. Sawant. The judgement of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Mishra.  Its directions are as under:
(i) An All India Judicial Service should be set up and the Union of India should take appropriate steps in this regard.
(ii) Steps should be taken to bring about uniformity in designation officers both in civil and the criminal side by 31.3.1993.
(iii) Retirement age of judicial officers be raised to 60 years and appropriate steps are to be taken by 31.12. 1992.
(iv) As and when the Pay Commissions/Committees are set up in the States and Union Territories; the question of appropriate pay scales of judicial officers be specifically referred and considered.
(v) A working library at the residence of every judicial officer has to be provided by 30.6.1992. Provision for sumptuary allowance as stated has to be made.
(vi) Residential accommodation to every judicial officer has to be provided and until State accommodation is available, Government should provide requisitioned accommodation for them in the manner indicated by 31.12.1992. In providing residential accommodation, availability of an office room should be kept in view.
(vii) Every District Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate should have a State Vehicle, Judicial officers in sets of 5 should have a pool vehicle and others would be entitled to suitable loans to acquire two wheeler automobiles within different time limits as specified.
(viii)Inservice Institute should be set up within one year at the Central and State or Union Territory level.

Subsequently, a case by it was admitted on March 16, 2015. The show cause notice was issued to all 67 respondents by speed post on September 18, 2015. The Court's order dated March 8, 2017 underlined the need for collection of certain data from the States, Union of India and the High Courts by a Commission with a terms of reference which is competent to collect a data as was done earlier by the orders of the Court by appointing the Shetty Commission. 

The order dated May 9, 2017 passed by Supreme Court's bench of Justices J. Chelameswar and Abdul Nazeer recorded that Government of India has since filed the draft Terms of Reference. The agreed Terms of Reference reads:-
a. To evolve the principles which should govern the structure of pay and other emoluments of Judicial Officers belonging to the sub-ordinate judiciary all over the country.
b. To examine the present structure of emoluments and conditions of service of Judicial Officers in the states and UT's taking into account the total packet of benefits available to them and make suitable recommendations including post retirement benefits such as pension etc. having regard among other relevant factors, to the existing relativities in the pay structure between the officers belonging to sub-ordinate judicial services vis-a-vis other civil servant and mechanism for redressal of grievances in this regard.
c. ... x x x x ...
d. To examine the work methods and work environment as also the variety of allowance and benefits in kind that are available in Judicial Officers in addition to pay and to suggest rationalization and simplification thereof with a view to promoting efficiency in Judicial Administration, optimizing the size of judiciary etc. and to remove anomalies created in implementation of earlier recommendations.
e. To consider and recommend such interim relief as it considers just and proper to all categories of Judicial Officers of all the States/Union Territories. The interim relief, if recommended, shall have to be fully adjusted against and included in the package which may become admissible to the Judicial Officers on the final recommendations of the Commission.
f. To recommend the mechanism for setting up of a permanent mechanism to review the pay and service conditions of members of sub-ordinate judiciary periodically by an independent commission exclusively constituted for the purpose and the composition of such commission should reflect adequate representation on behalf of the judiciary.
The Commission will make its recommendations as soon as feasible. It may consider, if necessary, sending reports on any of the matters as and when the recommendations are finalized. It shall make its recommendations to the State Governments. The Commission will devise its own procedure and may appoint such advisers, institutional consultants and experts as it may consider necessary for any particular purpose. It may call for such information and take such evidence as it may consider necessary. All State Governments, UT Administrations and the Ministries/Departments of the Central Government will furnish such information, documents and other assistance as required by the Commission.” 

Taking not of the submission of the government, the Court appointed a Commission  headed by Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi, a former Judge of the Supreme Court, who would act as a Chairman of the Commission, and Justice R. Basant, a former Judge of the Kerala High Court and a Senior Advocate of Supreme Court, to be the Member of the Commission.  It requesedt the Commission to complete the collection of data and make appropriate recommendations and submit a copy of the same to the Court preferably within a period of 18 months. The Court's order reads: "As and when a copy of the report is submitted, the matter be listed for further orders."

On March 20, 2018, Supreme Court's bench of Justices J. Chelameswar and S. K. Kaul passed an order in Justice M. Vijayaraghavan vs. Union of India saying, "Our attention has been drawn to judicial pronouncements including of 3-Judges Bench qua issue of principles of equality for pension amongst Judges of the High Court. We are of the view that considering the importance of the matter as also some of the observations made in the judgments, it would be appropriate that this matter be examined by a larger Bench. Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength."

The order dated March 27, 2018 by bench of Justices Chelameswar and Kaul stated that the Committee appointed by this Court by the Orders of this Court dated 9.5.2017, submitted a report dated 9.3.2018 on Interim Relief(Pay) to the Judicial Officers. The summary of its recommendations reads:-
1. Interim relief to the extent of 30% of increase in basic pay with accrued increments shall be paid to all categories/ranks of Judicial Officers.
2. The said increased in Pay shall be treated as a separate component and no D.A. is payable thereon.
3. Arrears shall be worked out with effect from 01.01.2016 on the above basis. The details of calculations are set out in Annexure-I.
4. On the same basis, the interim relief shall be provided to the pensioners and family pensioners with effect from 01.01.2016 and the arrears to be paid accordingly.
5. Wherever the benefit of interim relief has already been granted, the Judicial Officers in those States/UTs can exercise their option to continue to be governed by such Orders.
6. The amounts payable by way of interim relief now proposed are liable to the adjusted against the future determination pursuant to the final report submitted by the Commission.
It recorded that none of the respondents raised any objection with respect to the recommendations made by the Committee regarding the interim relief(pay). "In the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to direct all the respondents to implement the recommendations of the Commission, the summary of which is already extracted above."

In M. Vijayaraghavan vs. Union of India and other cases, the Supreme Court's bench of 46th Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justices L. Nageswara Rao and S. K. Kaul passed an order on January 9, 2019 saying, "these petitions highlight the perceived inequalities in the matter of payment of pension to Service Judges as compared to Bar Judges following the decision of this Court in P.Ramakrishnam Raju vs. Union of India and Others (2014) 12 SCC 1. Before we examine the contentions advanced, we would like the Department of Justice, Government of India, to examine the matter and place its views before us. The other connected aspect that may be considered by the Department of Justice is the difference in pension paid to Service Judges appointed to the High Court who come from two different streams i.e. direct recruit District Judges and promotee District Judges. All the above will be done within a period of six weeks when the matter will be listed for hearing again."

On October 18, 2019, in The State of Rajasthan vs. Rajasthan Judicial Employees Association, Justices N.V. Ramana and Saniv Khanna passed an order saying, "To give a last chance to the State Governments to report about the compliance of the Shetty Commission’s Report, list on 19.11.2019."  On November 19, 2019, the order of 3- judge bench of Justices Ramana, R. Subhash Reddy and B.R. Gavai recorded that "the petitioner-State submits that the State has considered the judgments of the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court. Learned counsel further submits that the State has also considered the Shetty Commission’s Report and it is going to implement all the recommendations except classification and a Notification, in this regard, is also going to be issued." 

On December 13, 2019, the bench  of Justices Ramana and V. Ramasubramanian recorded:"At the commencement of hearing, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the assurance given to this Court on 19.11.2019 shall be fulfilled and the necessary Notification/Order in this regard shall be issued by 12.00 Noon today. Taking note of the assurance given today by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners to the Court, we adjourn the matter to 16.12.2019, on which date, the Notification/Order issued by the petitioner-State shall be placed before us."

On December 16, 2019, the bench  of Justices Ramana, Ajay Rastogi and V. Ramasubramanian recorded: "During the course of hearing, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners produced two copies of Orders dated 13-12-2018 issued by the Government of Rajasthan which are extracted below:-
I. 'As per the recommendation of the Committee, the employees of Subordinate Courts are entitled to fixed
medical allowance under Order dated 04.03.11 of Rs.100/- per month, is to be allowed in addition to the medical attendance including hospitalization and outdoor treatment they are presently getting. This order will be effective from the date of issuance which is 13.12.2019.”
II. “As per the recommendation of the Committee, the employees of Subordinate Courts are entitled to Robe allowance of Rs.4000/- to IV class employee, Driver, Process Server, Bailiffs annually instead of existing Robe Allowance of Rs.3600/- biennially and Rs.6000/- to Stenographers and Readers annually instead of existing Robe Allowance of Rs.4500 biennially. This order will be effective from the date of issuance which is 13.12.2019.'

The Court observed that "the above orders show that these orders are prospective in nature". Sanjay Parikh, Senior Advocate appearing for Rajasthan Judicial Employees Association objected to it. The Court the parties to place the material before the Court "to show whether any State has extended the said benefits to its employees from the date of recommendations of the Shetty Commission i.e. 1.04.2003."

On February 28, 2020, in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, the bench of 47th Chief Justice o India S.A. Bobde and Justices B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant observed" The Constitution envisages a unified judicial system in this country against the backdrop of a federal system of governance in relation to the legislature and executive. Given that the Constitution in Chapter VI, Part VI largely vests the appointment and service conditions of the subordinate judiciary with the Governor, in consultation with the High Court of the respective states, conditions of service were often found to be asymmetrical within the country. This prompted the All India Judges Association to approach this Court by filing a writ petition." It recalled the Court's decision in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 119, wherein it considered questions as to pay scales and service conditions of the members of the subordinate judiciary. It directed the states and the union territories to separately examine and review the pay structure of judicial officers as and when the states constitute pay commissions for its employees. Various states and the Union of India filed review petitions against the directions given in the aforesaid judgment and these objections were disposed of by judgment reported as All India Judges Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 288. The Court held that "judicial service is not a service in the sense of ‘employment’ and judges are not employees. It held that parity in terms of conditions of service is to be maintained between the political executive, the legislators and the judges and between the judges and the administrative staff." It also held that "although service conditions were to be regulated by Rules made under Art. 309 to 312 of the Constitution, it does not mean that the judiciary will not have any say with respect to its service conditions."

The Court, speaking through Justice Sawant, held, “8. This distinction between the Judges and the members of the other services has to be constantly kept in mind for yet another important reason. Judicial independence cannot be secured by making mere solemn proclamations about it. It has to be secured both in substance and in practice. It is trite to say that those who are in want cannot be free. Self-reliance is the foundation of independence. The society has a stake in ensuring the independence of the judiciary, and no price is too heavy to secure it. To keep the Judges in want of essential accoutrements and thus to impede them in the proper discharge of their duties, is to impair and whittle away justice itself.”

Therefore, the Court had recommended that the service conditions of the judicial officers should be laid down and reviewed from time to time by an independent Commission exclusively constituted for the purpose, and the composition of such Commission should reflect adequate representation on behalf of the judiciary. Pursuant to the directions of the Court, the Union of India appointed the first National Judicial Pay Commission on March 21, 1996, under the chairmanship of Justice K. J. Shetty. The Justice Shetty Commission submitted a preliminary report on January 31, 1998 and a final report on January 11, 1999. 

In All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247, the Court accepted the recommendations made by the Shetty Commission with modifications made in the judgment. It also directed the Union of India and the states to implement the judgment and report compliance.

The Court was impelled to intervene and set up a Pay Commission under Justice E Padmanabhan, a retired High Court Judge in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2011) 12 SCC 677. This was followed by a similar set of orders and judgments attempting to implement the recommendations of the report submitted by the Commission.

The petitioner approached the Court again by filing the writ petition seeking the appointment of another Pay Commission. By order dated May 9, 2017, a Pay Commission was constituted under the chairmanship of Justice P Venkatarama Reddi. The Commission submitted its interim report on March 9, 2018. By order dated March 27, 2018, the Court had directed the official Respondents to implement the recommendations of the Commission with regard to interim relief. The Commission submitted its report with respect to the pay, pension and allowances of the Judicial Officers to the Court on January 29, 2020. The Court directed state governments and Union Territories to file their responses with respect to each recommendation of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission. The respective , if any, within a period of four weeks. It hoped that "the recommendations of the Commission will be implemented proactively" in its order dated February 28, 2020. The bench comprised of 47th Chief Justice of India S.A. Bobde and Justices B.R. Gavai and Suryakant. 

On August 11, 2020, the bench of Justices R F Nariman, Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee observed: "we find that in Writ Petition (C)No. 643 of 2015, which is the All India Judges Association case, a series of questions have been posed by the Court and the question relating to pay pension and allowances of judicial officers has come up before this Court and is awaiting decision."

On November 4, 2020, the 3-judge bench headed by 47th Chief Justice observed: "We are surprised that 18 States/UTs have not filed their responses. The said States/UTs are as follows: (1) Kerala, (2) Andhra Pradesh, (3) Telangana, (4)Maharashtra, (5) Jharkhand, (6) Odisha, (7) West Bengal, (8) Assam, (9) Rajasthan, (10) Punjab, (11)Jammu & Kashmir, (12) Ladakh, (13) Delhi, (14) Haryana, (15) Nagaland, (16) Manipur, (17) Sikkim, and (18) Goa. The matter is of seminal importance particularly for the sub-ordinate judiciary in the country."  It extended the term of the Commission upto January 31, 2021. 

On January 6, 2022, the 3-judge bench headed by 48th Chief Justice N. V. Ramana observed: "We find that it would be appropriate for us to decide the first two issues on priority basis, i.e., one relating to Pay Scales to the subordinate Judiciary and the other relating to pensionary/retiral benefits, keeping in mind the long pendency of these two issues."

On July 27, 2022, the 3-judge bench headed by 49th Chief Justice Uday Umesh Lalit made the following order: "1. In All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India1, (All India Judges’ Association Case I) , this Court had issued a slew of directions, which included (i) the setting up of an All India Judicial Service; (ii) bringing about uniformity in the designation of officers; (iii) raising of the age of retirement to 60 years; (iv) provision of residential accommodation to judicial officers etc. One of the directions so issued, which is relevant for our present purpose, reads as follows:
“63(iv) As and when the Pay Commissions/Committees are set up in the States and Union Territories, the question of appropriate pay scales of judicial officers be specifically referred and considered.”
2. Petitions for reviewing the aforesaid Judgment were filed by the Union of India as well as by various States, objecting to certain specific directions contained therein. These review petitions were disposed of by this Court by an Order dated 24.08.1993 in All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India2, which came to be referred to as All India Judges’ Association Case.
II. Though certain directions issued in All India Judges’ AssociationI were modified in the judgment in All India Judges’ Association CaseII, the above direction contained in paragraph 63(iv) of the original judgment was not modified.
3. In All India Judges’ Association CaseII, the necessity to maintain parity in status between the Judges and the Political Executive, and not between the Judges and the Administrative Executive, was highlighted. It will be appropriate to quote the first part of paragraph 36 of the decision in All India Judges Association CaseII:“we have already discussed the need to make a distinction between the political and the administrative executive and to appreciate that parity in status can only be between Judges and the political executive and not between Judges and the Administrative executive. Hence the earlier approach of comparison between the service conditions of the Judges and those of the administrative executive has to be abandoned and the service conditions of the Judges which are wrongly linked to those of the administrative executive have to be revised to meet the special needs of the judicial service.”
4. Moreover, this Court highlighted in All India Judges’ Association CaseII, the need to keep Judges above their essential wants, considering the distinct nature of Judges’ duties, the society’s expectations, the lifestyle of the Judge and the occupational hazards to which he is exposed.
5. Subsequently the Government of India constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission (FNJPC) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice K.J. Shetty. As a consequence, the reference to the 5th Central Pay Commission, of the question of revision of pay scales of judicial officers was dropped.
6. The FNJPC submitted its Report on 11.11.1999 recommending adoption of what is known as `Master Pay Scales’ comprising of 44 stages. The Commission recommended fixed quantum increments with six incremental rates from Rs.250 to Rs.500, spanning over 44 specified stages.
7. By a judgment dated 21.03.2002 passed in All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India3, (All India Judges’ Association caseIII), this Court recommended the implementation of the revised scales of pay with effect from 1.07.1996. However, it was directed that the judicial officers shall be paid salary in revised pay scales with effect from 1.07.2002 and the arrears of salary for the period from 1.07.1996 to 30.06.2002 was directed to be paid either in cash or by crediting the same into the provident fund accounts of the officers.
8. After the constitution of the 6th Central Pay Commission, the question of revision of the scales of pay of judicial officers came up once again before this Court in All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India4, (All India Judges’ Association CaseIV). By an order dated 28.04.2009 this Court appointed Mr. Justice E. Padmanabhan, a retired Judge of the High Court of Madras as a One man Committee, to make suitable recommendations. This Committee submitted a report on 17.07.2009.
9. Thereafter, this Court passed an Order on 4.05.2010 recording that most of the States have accepted the recommendations, though there was a dispute about the date of implementation. Moreover, this Court directed the States to implement Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee’s recommendations with effect from 01.01.2006.
10. Nearly 5 years after the order passed in All India Judges’ Association CaseIV, the present writ petition came to be filed by the All India Judges’ Association in the year 2015, seeking various reliefs including constitution of All India Judicial Commission to review the service conditions of judicial officers. In this writ petition, an order was passed on 09.05.2017, appointing the Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC), with Mr. Justice P. Venkatarama Reddy, a former Judge of this Court as its Chairman and Mr. R. Basant, a former Judge of the Kerala High Court as its member. The terms of reference of the Commission, as agreed to by all parties, were extracted in the Order dated 09.05.2017.
11. Accordingly a notification was issued on 16.11.2017 constituting the Second National Judicial Pay Commission. Some of the terms of reference of the Commission were as follows:  (i) to evolve the principles which should govern the structure of pay and other emoluments of Judicial Officers.
(ii) to examine the existing structure of emoluments and conditions of service and to make recommendations including post retirement benefits.
(iii) to examine the work methods and work environment as also the variety of allowances and benefits and to suggest rationalization.
12. In January 2020, the Commission submitted its Report in five volumes, namely Volume I, IA, II, III and IV....

13. Though the recommendations of SNJPC covers various aspects, for the present, we propose to deal only with the revision of the pay structure. This is for the reason that after the implementation of the recommendations of Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee, with effect from 01.01.2006, a period of 16 years have passed without any revision of the same. In contrast, the 7th Central Pay Commission has already been implemented with effect from 01.01.2016. Therefore, there is a need to atleast implement the revised pay structure immediately so as to alleviate the sufferings of the judicial officers.
14. As a matter of fact, the scales of pay of Government servants are raised in some States once in five years/six years and by the Central Government once in 10 years. Judicial Officers are not covered by the Pay Commissions constituted by the Central or State Governments. Therefore, there is an imperative need to revise the pay structure immediately.
15. One of the main objections to the revision of pay structure as proposed by SNJPC, is the application of the multiplier of 2.81 and above. But this objection has already been taken by some of the States and is liable to be rejected for the two reasons, namely,
(i) that the 7th Central Pay Commission has applied a multiplier of 2.81 in respect of certain categories of All India Service Officers; and (ii) that Justice Padmanabhan Committee actually applied a multiplier of 3.07.
16. As a matter of fact, SNJPC, before making its recommendations, considered three modules, i.e., (1) Master Pay Scale Method; (2) Pay Matrix Method; and (3) Fixed Pay Method. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of all the three modules, the SNJPC has adopted Pay Matrix Method, as it had already been adopted by the 7th Central Pay Commission. A fourth module, namely, Fixed Pay Pattern was also examined but was not accepted, as it was a new concept and had not been tested anywhere else.
17. Having considered the Report of the SNJPC, the objections of the Union and the State Governments and the submissions of the learned amicus, we are of the view that the revision of pay structure as recommended by SNJPC, indicated in table1 appended, hereto shall be accepted.
18. This will lead us to two ancillary issues, namely (i) effective date; and (ii) arrears.
19. Since implementation of the recommendations of Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee was with effect from 01.01.2006, the revision of pay structure as recommended by SNJPC shall be implemented with effect from 01.01.2016.
20. Insofar as arrears are concerned, it is noticed that the judicial officers were provided interim relief @ 30% of the basic pay, vide order dated 27.03.2018. Therefore, the arrears shall be computed with effect from 01.01.2016 and after adjusting the interim relief already paid, the balance amount shall be paid in stages in the following manner: I 25% in cash within a period of 3 months; II Another 25% to be paid in cash within 3 months thereafter;  and III the balance 50% has to be paid on or before the end of June, 2023.
21. We are informed that a few States have given revised pay structures to the Judicial Officers on the basis of the recommendations of the State Pay Commissions. Wherever the judicial officers have been given benefits under the respective Pay Commissions with effect from 01.01.2016, those judicial officers shall also be brought within the ambit of the pay structure, as recommended by SNJPC and the arrears shall be calculated after adjusting the amounts they have already received with effect from 01.01.2016. In case the arrears calculated on the basis of this order is less than the amount already disbursed, no recovery need be effected.
22. During the course of hearing, it was brought to our notice by the learned Amicus Curiae that on earlier occasions, though directions were issued by this Court, several States have not implemented the pay scales, as approved by this Court and there was undue delay.
23. Taking into consideration the said fact, we direct the State Governments/Union Territories to file affidavits of compliance of this Order after each stage as indicated above, with the first compliance affidavit being filed within a period of three months from today."

On July 2, 2022, the 3-judge bench headed by 49th Chief Justice Uday Umesh Lalit made the following order:"Taking into consideration the long pendency of the matters and particularly, the issue relating to appropriate pension payable to the retired Judges, which requires urgent disposal, a special Bench be constituted for the said purpose. The said Bench is requested to hear and decide the matters as early as possible. 4. Writ petitions relating to salaries of the subordinate staff of the District Courts and the High Courts shall also be listed before the same Bench. 5. The Registry is directed to place the matters before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a Bench."

On January 18, 2023, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud made the following order:"1. Shri K. Parameshwar, learned amicus curiae submitted a note on the developments so far and the areas yet to be covered. As per the said note, the order passed by this Court on 27.07.2022 covers one aspect of the revision of pay and allowances and that there are other aspects concerning pay and allowances, in respect of which recommendations have been made by SNJPC.
Therefore, the aspects to be taken note of heretofore are:
(i) Other aspects related to pay and allowances not covered by the Order dated 27.07.2022;
(ii) Recommendations relating to pension and family pension;
(iii) Revival of old pension scheme;
(iv) Premature retirement, commutation of pension, etc.;
(v) Ombudsman;
(vi) Permanent mechanism for the periodical revision of pay and allowances
and conditions of service; and
(vii) Work environment.
2 The note submitted by the learned amicus also contains a tabular chart giving details of the States and Union Territories which have complied with the order dated 27.07.2022 and the States and Union Territories which have either sought extension of time or a review of the order passed on 27.07.2022.
3 The chart indicates that out of the 29 States, 17 have filed affidavits of compliance, one State has filed an application for extension of time, two States have filed applications for review; and nine States have not chosen to file any response.
4 Out of the seven Union Territories, three have not filed any responses, one has filed an affidavit of compliance and one has filed an application seeking extension of time.
5 Out of the States which have complied with the order dated 27.07.2022, a few appear to have taken an undertaking from the Judicial Officers that they have no objection to the recovery of any excess pay that they have already received, on account of the respective State Governments having already given higher pay scales than what is recommended by SNJPC.
6 Taking into account all the above, we pass the following order :
(i) The affidavits of compliance filed by the States and Union Territories which have complied with the Order dated 27.07.2022 are taken on record.
(ii) States such as Assam, Gujarat and Karnataka which have taken undertakings from the Judicial Officers for recovery of the excess pay, shall not enforce the recovery, in view of the categorical direction issued by this Court in the Order dated 27.07.2022.
(iii) All the States/Union Territories which have made payment of only the first installment or the first two installments and the States and Union Territories which have come up with applications for extension of time, are permitted to make payment of arrears, at least within the time indicated in this order. The States and Union Territories which have not yet made payment of the first installment, shall make payment of the first installment by 31.03.2023. These States and Union Territories, as well as those who have already made payment of the first installment, shall make payment of the second installment by 30.04.2023. The third and final installment shall be made by 30.06.2023.
6. All the review applications are directed to be listed before the appropriate bench. The contempt petitions shall stand adjourned, to enable the States and Union Territories to comply with this Order.
7. For consideration of the remaining recommendations of the SNJPC, the matter shall stand adjourned to 25.01.2023."

On January 25, 2023, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India made the order with regard to 4 Review Petitions which are pending in respect of the order of this Court dated 27 July 2022 in Writ Petition (C) No 643 of 2015. Its order reads:"Since Mr Justice N V Ramana, former Chief Justice of India was a member of the three Judge Bench which delivered the order dated 27 July 2022, the Registry shall take appropriate administrative directions for constitution of the Bench to hear the Review Petitions."

On February 24, 2023, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India made the order in Justice Shailendra Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. It reads: "Having due regard to the fact that the petition impinges upon the conditions of service of Judges of the High Court, who have been recruited from the district judiciary, Mr K M Nataraj, Additional Solicitor General fairly states that he would have the matter duly looked into at the appropriate level of the Government of India so that this Court can be informed on the next date of hearing of the decision which has been taken to remedy the grievance".

On May 19, 2023, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India made the order. It reads: "Hon’ble Mr Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, Hon’ble Mr Justice V Ramasubramanian and His Lordship. 
2 In terms of the reportable judgment, the following consequential directions have been issued: “112. Ultimately, the effect of the acceptance of the recommendations of this Court is that necessary amendments must be carried out in Service Rules of the Judicial Officers across all jurisdictions. It is thus directed that the High Courts and the competent authorities, wherever applicable, bring the rules in conformity with the recommendations accepted by this Court above within a period of 3 months. Compliance affidavits be placed on record by the High Courts, the States and the Union within four months. 113. In the case of payment of arrears of pay, this Court had by Orders dated 27.07.2022 and 18.01.2023 already directed that all arrears of pay be cleared by 30.06.2023. In this regard, it is directed that compliance affidavits must be filed by all States and Union Territories by 30.07.2023 that the arrears of pay have been positively credited into the accounts of the concerned officers. 114. The revised rates of pension, which have been approved by this Court, shall be payable from 01.07.2023. For the payment of arrears of pension, additional pension, gratuity and other retiral benefits as well, following the Orders dated 27.07.2022 and 18.01.2023, it is directed that 25% will be paid by 31.08.2023, another 25% by 31.10.2023, and the remaining 50% by 31.12.2023.”
3 List the matters on 17 July 2023 at 3 pm for further compliance on pay and pension on which date this Court will take up the recommendations on allowances."

On November 23, 2023, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India made the order with regard to compliance on behalf of States/Union Territories recalling its directions dated May 19, 2023. K Parameshwar, amicus curiae placed on the record a tabulated statement indicating the status of compliance by 29 States and 7 Union Territories on the directions of the Court. The order reads:"Despite the peremptory directions of this Court, it is apparent that the above States and Union Territories have not complied with the directions of this Court. Where arrears of pay have been paid, there has been no compliance in respect of pension. We, prima facie, are of the view that there has been a default and breach in compliance with the order of this Court warranting the initiation of contempt action against the State governments and Union Territories in default. However, in order to grant one last opportunity for compliance, we direct that compliance with the directions contained in the judgment dated 19 May 2023 shall be positively effected before 6 December 2023, failing which the Chief Secretaries of all the defaulting States or, as the case may be, the Union Territories shall remain personally present before this Court on the next date of listing, that is, 8 December 2023. In the event that compliance has been effected, compliance affidavits shall be filed on or before 6 December 2023 through the Standing Counsel. A copy each of the compliance affidavits shall also be forwarded to the amicus curiae who shall collate them in the form of a compilation. 5 We clarify that the direction for compliance before 6 December 2023 shall mean the actual crediting of the amounts payable to each judicial officer and, in the case of family pension to the surviving spouses, into their accounts. 6 A copy of the above order shall be served by the Registry forthwith on the Chief Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories as well as on the Standing Counsel for compliance."

On January 12, 2024, Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of 50th Chief Justice of India and Justices J.B. Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra issued notice to the Union of India, the State of Bihar and the Registrar General of the Patna High Court in Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra vs. Union of India & Ors. The petition of Justice Mishra, a sitting judge of the Patna High Court throws light on his efforts to obtain the opening of a General Provident Fund (GPF) account and the release of his salary. His counsel pressed for interim relief during the hearing. Justice Mishra was elevated to the High Court in November 2023 from the higher judicial services. He has submitted that despite completing all required documentation, he has not been allotted a GPF account. The case is related to Section 20 of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of service) Act, 1954. It states that every judge is entitled to subscribe to the General Provident Fund (Central Services). The Act further specifies that judges who held pensionable civil posts before their appointment shall continue to subscribe to the Provident Fund they were enrolled in before assuming the judicial position. The denial of GPF benefits resulted in Justice Mishra not getting his salary since his elevation. It is listed for hearing on September 2, 2024 along with other tagged petitions.
 
On February 26, 2024, the chief justice 3-judge bench made oral observations in the course of the hearing the All India Judges Association case. The Court asked R Venkataramani, the Attorney General: “The retired District judges are clocking a pension of Rs 19,000-20,000….after a long service, how do they survive? This is the kind of office where you are completely disabled; you cannot suddenly jump into practice and go to the High Court at the age of 61-62 years and start practicing.” The Court sought his assistance to address the issue.

On March 15, 2024, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India  delivered a judgement in Union of India, Ministry of Law & Justice vs. Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg (Raj Rani Jain) and Others. It reads: "2 This appeal arises from a judgment dated 14 August 2018 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
3 The first respondent was appointed as a Judicial Magistrate in the State of Haryana on 11 May 1981. She was appointed as an Additional District Judge on 26 August 1997 and later, as a District Judge on 19 July 2010. In December 2013, she was recommended for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. Sometime
before her appointment as a Judge of the High Court, she retired as a District Judge on 31 July 2014. On 25 September 2014, the first respondent assumed office as a Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. She attained the age of superannuation and retired from service on 4 July 2016.
4 As a former Judge of the High Court, the first respondent instituted proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, aggrieved by the determination of her pensionary benefits. She sought that notwithstanding the gap between her superannuation as a District judge and appointment as a Judge of the High Court, the entire period of service as from 11 May 1981 to 31 July 2014 as well as service rendered from 25 September 2014 to 04 July 2016, be reckoned for pensionary and other retirement benefits. The Union of India contested the petition on the ground that the gap ought to be considered as a break in service.
5 By its judgment dated 14 August 2018, the Division Bench of the High Court held that the entire period of service rendered by the first respondent from 25 September 2014 to 4 July 2016 as a Judge of the High Court shall be blended with the years of her service from 11 May 1981 till 31 July 2014 as a Judge of the
district judiciary for the purpose of computing her pension as a Judge of the High Court. The Union of India is in appeal against the judgment of the High Court. 
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
6 Article 217 of the Constitution provides for the appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court. Clause (2) of Article 217 stipulates that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless such a person has:
(a) held a judicial office for a period of ten years in the territory of India; and
(b) been an Advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession for at least ten years.
7 Sub-clause (a) of clause (2) of Article 217 deals with persons who have held judicial office before appointment as a Judge of the High Court, while clause (b) essentially sets out conditions of eligibility for the appointment of Advocates to the Bench of the High Court.
8 Article 221 of the Constitution provides for salaries, allowances and pensions to be paid to the Judges of the High Courts. Clause 2 of Article 221 states that “(2) Every Judge shall be entitled to such allowances and to such rights in respect of leave of absence and pension as may be from time to time be determined by or under law made by Parliament and, until so determined, to such allowances and rights as are specified in the Second Schedule.”
9 The High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act 1954 has been enacted by Parliament “to regulate salaries and certain conditions of service of the Judges of the High Court”. Section 2(1)(g) of the Act defines the expression ‘Judge’ to mean a Judge of a High Court and to include the Chief Justice, an acting Chief Justice, an Additional Judge and an acting Judge of the High Court. Chapter III of the statute deals with salaries and pensions. Section 14 stipulates that subject to the provisions of the Act, every Judge would, on retirement be paid a pension in accordance with the scale and provisions in Part I of the Schedule. The proviso, however, qualifies the entitlement to pension by stipulating that “no such pension shall be payable to a Judge unless”:
(a) he has completed not less than twelve years of service for pension; or
(b) he has attained the age of superannuation; or
(c) his retirement is medically certified to be necessitated by ill health.
10 The proviso to Section 14 stipulates that if a Judge is in receipt of a pension at the time of their appointment in respect of any previous service in the Union or a State, other than a disability or wound pension, the pension payable under the Act shall be in lieu of and not in addition to that pension. The Explanation to Section 14, however, is in the following terms: “Explanation.— In this section “Judge” means a Judge who has not held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State and includes a Judge who having held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State has elected to receive the pension payable under Part I of the First Schedule.”
11 In terms of the Explanation, an artificial meaning is ascribed to the expression ‘Judge’ for the purpose of Section 14. The meaning ascribed to the expression, for the purposes of Section 14, is a Judge who has not held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State and includes a Judge who, having held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State, elects to receive the pension payable under Part I of the First Schedule. At this stage, it would be, therefore, material to emphasize that while Section 2(1)(g) contains a broad and all-encompassing definition of the expression ‘Judge’, the same expression for the purposes of Section 14 has a more restricted meaning as described in the Explanation.
12 Section 15 contains a special provision for the payment of pension to Judges who are members of the service. Section 15 is in the following terms: “15. Special provision for pension in respect of Judges who are members of service.—[(1)] Every Judge—(a) * * * *(b) who * * *has held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State, shall, on his retirement, be paid a pension in accordance with the scale and provisions in Part III of the First Schedule: Provided that every such Judge shall elect to receive the pension payable to him either under Part I of the First Schedule or, * * * Part III of the First Schedule, and the pension payable to him shall be calculated accordingly. [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), any Judge to whom that sub-section applies and who is in service on or after the 1st day of October, 1974, may, if he has elected under the proviso to that sub-section to receive the pension payable to him under * * * Part III of the First Schedule before the date on which the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Amendment Act, 1976, receives the assent of the President, cancel such election and elect afresh to receive the pension payable to him under Part I of the First Schedule and any such Judge who dies before the date of such assent shall be deemed to have elected afresh to be governed by the provisions of the said Part I if the provisions of that Part are more favourable in his case.]”
13 Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 indicates that every Judge who has held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State would be paid a pension in terms of Part III of the First Schedule, subject to the condition (set out in the proviso) that the Judge elects to receive the pension payable either under Part I or, as the case may be, Part III of the First Schedule. Under Section 15(1)(b), upon electing for the payment of a pension under Part III of the First Schedule, the Judge would be entitled to pensionary benefits in the terms set out in Part III. Part III of the First Schedule is in the following terms:  “PART III 1. The provisions of this Part apply to a Judge who has held any pensionable post under the Union or a State (but is not a member of the Indian Civil Service) and who has not elected to receive the pension payable under Part I. 2. The pension payable to such a Judge shall be—(a) the pension to which he is entitled under the ordinary rules of his service if he had not been appointed a Judge, his service as a Judge being treated as service therein for the purpose of calculating that pension; and (b) a special additional pension of [Rs.45,016] per annum in respect of each completed year of service for pension, * * *[Provided that the pension under clause (a) and the additional pension under (b) together shall in no case exceed [Rs. 15,00,000] per annum in the case of a Chief Justice and [Rs. 13,50,000] per annum in the case of any other Judge.]” 
Decision of the High Court
14 In the present case a communication dated 04 May 2016 addressed by the Under Secretary to the Government of India to the Deputy Accountant General (Pension) stated that since there was a break in the service of the first respondent, and the same could not be condoned and the period of her service as a Judge of the High Court could not be considered for calculating her pension.
15 The High Court noted that paragraph 2 of Part III was applicable to the first respondent. The High Court held that reading paragraph 2 harmoniously would entail a ‘blending of the period of both the services’; and that if the services were not so blended, the service of the first respondent as a Judge of the High Court would slip into oblivion. Hence, it was held that in accordance with the definition of ‘service’ in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1954 Act, the first respondent’s service as a Judge of the High Court was ‘actual service’:. The High Court observed: “To conclude, it is manifestly clear that what is to be blended is the ‘actual service’ rendered as a Judge of the High Court to the service rendered by the petitioner from 1981 till 31 July 2014 as service, for pension and accordingly, the pension will have to be calculated as judge of High Court”
16 The High Court directed that the service of the first respondent as a Judge of the High Court had to be blended with her services as a Judge of the District Judiciary and pension was to be calculated as for a Judge of the High Court.

Submissions
17 The Union of India has adopted the position that: (i) The computation of the retiral benefits has been done correctly, taking into account the thirty-three years of her service as a member of the District Judi-
ciary and the special additional pension. The High Court has erred in including her service as a Judge of the High Court, condoning the break in service of 54 days;
(ii) The first respondent had not completed twelve years of pensionable service as a Judge of the High Court within the meaning of Section 14;
(iii) There was a break in service between the date on which the first respondent retired as a District Judge (31 July 2014) and assumed the office of a Judge of the High Court (25 September 2014). This break could not be condoned under the 1954 Act by the High Court or by this Court;
(iv) The first respondent having opted to receive her pensionary payments under Part III of the First Schedule, the years of service which were rendered by her as a Judge of the High Court would be accumulated with her service as a member of the district judiciary;
(v) The pension payable to the first respondent would then be computed on the basis of last drawn salary as a District Judge; and
(vi) Since paragraph 2(b) of Part III of the First Schedule provides for a special additional pension in respect of each completed year of service, the first respondent would be entitled to that as well.
18 The essence of the contest in these proceedings relates to the correctness of the interpretation which has been placed by the Union of India.
19 Mr Shailesh Madiyal, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India has adopted the above submissions. It has been urged that though the first respondent had not completed twelve years as a Judge of the High Court for the eligibility for pension in terms of Section 14, in view of the provisions of Section 15, she would be entitled to the computation of pension in terms of Part III of the First Schedule. Mr Madiyal urged that in terms of paragraph 2(a) of Part III, the total length of service rendered as a Judge of the High Court would have to be added to the length of service as a Judge of the district judiciary, to which a special additional pension would be added. Hence, it is urged that the Union was correct in computing the pensionary payment on the basis of the salary last drawn by the first respondent as a Judge of the High Court.
20 Mr P S Patwalia, senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has, on the other hand, urged that the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in holding that the years of service as a member of the district judiciary would have to be blended with the years of service as a Judge of the High Court. Adverting to the provisions of Section 14A of the Act, which were introduced to provide an addition of ten years of service to a member of the Bar who is appointed as a Judge of the High Court, it was urged that it would be entirely discriminatory if a similar principle were not applied to the members of district judiciary appointed as a Judge of the High Court.
 
Analysis
21 Section 14(1) of the Act provides that the pension payable to a Judge shall be computed in accordance with Part I of the First Schedule. Among the three conditions prescribed for eligibility to receive pension, is the requirement of completing twelve years of service for pension. At the same time, the Explanation
to Section 14 which was inserted by Act 13 of 2016, provides meaning to the expression ‘Judge’ for the purposes of Section 14. In its first part, the Explanation indicates that the expression means a Judge who has not held any other pensionable post either under the Union or a State. In the second part, the expression includes a Judge who has held a pensionable post under the Union or a State and has elected to receive pension under Part I of the First Schedule. The first part of the Explanation would encompass members of the Bar who would not have held any other pensionable post under the Union or a State. The latter part encompasses Judges falling within the description contained in Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution, who have held a pensionable post under the Union or the State and who have opted to receive pension under Part I of the Schedule. The latter part thus covers only a person who has opted for pension under Part I of the First Schedule.
22 Section 15, on the other hand, is a special provision as its marginal note indicates, for Judges who are members of the service meaning the judicial service. Clause (b) of Section 15(1) indicates that a person who has held a pensionable post under the Union or a State may elect to receive the pension payable either under Part I or Part III. In the case of a Judge, such as the first respondent, who elects to receive pension under Part III of the First Schedule, the pension payable has to be computed in terms of the provisions contained in paragraph 2 of Part III. . For the purpose of clause (a), the pension which is payable to the Judge is the pension to which they are entitled under the ordinary rules of service if they had not been appointed as a Judge and their service as a Judge is treated “as service therein for the purpose of calculating that pension”. In other words, the service which is rendered as a Judge of the High Court has to be cumulated with the service rendered as a member of the district judiciary by treating it as service therein for computing the pension. To this, would be added a special additional pension in terms of clause (b) of paragraph 2.
23 As a result of Section 14A, a period of ten years is added and is deemed to have been added from 1 April 2004 for the purpose of pension to the service of a Judge who is appointed under clause (2)(b) of Article 217. Section 14A, is in other words, a special provision which was introduced for Judges of the High Court who have been appointed from the Bar. The introduction of Section 14A in 2016 was preceded by three judgments of this Court. The first of them in Kuldip Singh vs Union of India, dealt with the appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court from the Bar. This Court held that a member of the Bar who was appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court would be entitled to the addition of ten years of service for the purpose of computing pension. This principle was similarly applied in Government of NCT of Delhi vs All India Young Lawyers Association (Registered) in the case of the district judges. Eventually, the same principle was extended by this Court in P Ramakrishnam Raju vs Union of India in dealing with the pension payable to High Court Judges who are appointed from the Bar under Article 217(2)(b) of the Constitution. A three-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Sathasivam, CJ noted that Judges who are appointed under Article 217(2)(a) being members of the judicial service obtain full pensionary benefits even if they serve as a Judge of the High Court for a bare period of a year or two because of their earlier entry into judicial service, but such a benefit is not extended to members of the Bar who become Judges of the High Court. This Court while laying down the principle of non-discrimination between High Court judges elevated from the bar on the one hand and from the district judiciary on the other, observed:
“19. When persons who occupied the constitutional office of Judge, High Court retire, there should not be any discrimination with regard to the fixation of their pension. Irrespective of the source from where the Judges are drawn, they must be paid the same pension just as they have been paid same salaries and allowances and perks as serving Judges. Only practising advocates who have attained eminence are invited to accept Judgeship of the High Court. Because of the status of the office of High Court Judge, the responsibilities and duties attached to the office, hardly any advocate of distinction declines the offer. Though it may be a great financial sacrifice to a successful lawyer to accept Judgeship, it is the desire to serve the society and the high prestige attached to the office and the respect the office commands that propel a successful lawyer to accept Judgeship. The experience and knowledge gained by a successful lawyer at the Bar can never be considered to be less important from any point of view vis-à-vis the experience gained by a judicial officer. If the service of a judicial officer is counted for fixation of pension, there is no valid reason as to why the experience at Bar cannot be treated as equivalent for the same purpose.
20. The fixation of higher pension to the Judges drawn from the subordinate judiciary who have served for shorter period in contradistinction to Judges drawn from the Bar who have served for longer period with less pension is highly discriminatory and breach of Article 14 of the Constitution. The classification itself is unreasonable without any legally acceptable nexus with the object sought to be achieved.”
(emphasis supplied)
24 The principles which have been laid down by the three-Judge Bench decision in P Ramakrishnam Raju (supra) provide guidance to this Court in resolving the controversy in the present case.
25 Pensionary payments to Judges constitute a vital element in the independence of the judiciary. As a consequence of long years of judicial office, Judges on demitting office do not necessarily have the options which are open to members from other services. The reason why the State assumes the obligation to pay pension to Judges is to ensure that the protection of the benefits which are available after retirement would ensure their ability to discharge their duties without “fear or favour” during the years of judgeship. The purpose of creating dignified conditions of existence for Judges both during their tenure as Judges and thereafter has, therefore, a vital element of public interest. Courts and the Judges are vital components of the rule of law. Independence of the judiciary is hence a vital doctrine which is recognized in the constitutional scheme. The payment of salaries and dignified pensions serves precisely that purpose. Hence, any interpretation which is placed on the provisions of the Act must comport with the object and purpose underlying the enactment of the provision.
26 The contention of the Union of India is that the first respondent did not fulfill the requirement of twelve years of service and was, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of Section 14. This submission clearly misses the plain consequence of the Explanation to Section 14. The Explanation is exhaustive in terms of the categories of Judges to which it applies since it uses both the expression ‘means’ and ‘includes’. In other words, Section 14 applies to a Judge who has not held any pensionable post either in the Union or the State or a person who having held a pensionable post has opted to receive pension under Part I of the Schedule. A Judge such as the first respondent who has not opted to receive the benefits of pension under Part I of the First Schedule would fall outside the purview of the Explanation and, hence Section 14 would have no application. 
27 The post-retiral pension to such a Judge would, therefore, be governed by Section 15 read with paragraph 2 of Part III of the Act. Upon electing to receive pension under Part III of the First Schedule, the first respondent was entitled to have the years of service which were rendered by her as a Judge of the High Court cumulated with the years of service rendered as a member of the district judiciary. This is in accordance with clause (a) which stipulates that the pension payable to a Judge shall be first, the pension they would be entitled to under the ordinary rules of ‘service’ if they had not been appointed as a Judge of the High Court, that is if they continued their service as a District Judge; second, their service as a Judge of the High Court would be treated as service therein for the purpose of calculating their pension. Paragraph 2 (a) or any other provision of the Act does not indicate that a break in service such as the one in the service of the first respondent would make paragraph 2 inapplicable and disentitle such a Judge from adding their service as a High Court Judge to their service as a District Judge for the purpose of calculating their pension. The Union of India has failed to establish such a disentitlement. Further, the break in service was attributable to the time taken in processing the recommendation made in her favor. In any case, it was not attributable to anything that the first respondent had done, and it could not be used to prejudice her by rendering her service as a Judge of the High Court inconsequential to the calculation of pension.
28 The Union has sought to urge that the pension was correctly calculated on the basis of the last drawn salary as a District Judge. To accept this position would be contrary to established precedent and would result in a clear discrimination between a member of the Bar who becomes a Judge of the High Court and a member of the district judiciary who is appointed as a Judge of the High Court.
29 In M L Jain vs Union of India, this Court was deciding upon the validity of a letter issued by Ministry of Law and Justice which stated that the pension under para 2(a) of Schedule I of the 1954 Act would be in accordance with the pay that they drew in the parent department, preceding their elevation to the High Court. Quashing the said letter as contrary to the para 2(a) of Schedule I of the Act, a three-judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice O Chinnappa Reddy, observed as follows:
“We are of the opinion that para 2(ii) of the letter dated September 19, 1984 is a clear departure from para 2 clause (a) of Schedule I to the High Courts Judges (Conditions of Service) Act. Under clause (a) of para 2 of the Schedule I to the High Courts Judges' (Conditions of Service) Act the retiring Judge’s entire service as a Judge has to be reckoned for the purpose of calculating his pension and for that purpose the last pay drawn by him has to be the pay drawn by him as a Judge of the High Court and not the pay that would have been drawn by him as a District Judge , had he not been appointed a High Court Judge.”
30 Acceptance of the submission of the Union of India would discriminate against Judges of the High Court based on the source from which they are drawn. A member of the Bar is entitled to the addition of ten years of service by virtue of the provisions of Section 14A. On the addition of the years of service, their pensionary benefits would be computed on the basis of the last drawn salary as a Judge of the High Court. However, if the argument of the Union of India is accepted, the pension of a Judge who was a former District Judge would be computed on the basis of their salary as a District Judge. A similar principle, as applicable to Judges appointed from the Bar, must be applied for computing the pension of a member of the district judiciary who is appointed to the High Court. Any other interpretation would result in a plain discrimination between the Judges of the High Court based on the source from which they have been drawn. Such an interpretation would do disservice to the importance of the district judiciary in contributing to the judiciary of the nation, and would be contrary to the overall scheme and intendment of Chapter III of the statute. It would go against the anti-discriminatory principles stipulated by this Court in so far as Judges drawn from various sources are concerned.
 
Conclusion
31 We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the first respondent was entitled to the addition of the period during which she served as a Judge of the High Court to be added to the length of her service as a member of the district judiciary from 11 May 1981 to 31 July 2014. The break in her service must necessarily have no adverse implications in computing her pension for the simple reason that her service upon appointment as a High Court Judge was in pursuance of a recommendation which was made during her tenure as a Judge of the district judiciary.
32 The pensionary payments shall be computed on the basis of her last drawn salary as a Judge of the High Court. The arrears of pension shall be payable to the first respondent on or before 31 March 2024 together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum." The judgement was authored by Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud.
 
On March 18, 2024,  Supreme Court made an order in Justice M. Vijayaraghavan vs. Union of India & Ors. It reads: "On the request of the counsel, reference to the Cabinet Secretary, Government of India in Writ Petition (Civil) No 911 of 2018 as representing the Union of India shall stand substituted by the 'Ministry of Law and Justice'."

On July 11, 2024, the 3-judge bench headed by 50th Chief Justice of India made an order. It reads: "A note has been submitted by Mr K Parameshwar, Amicus Curiae indicating the States’ compliance with the orders passed by this Court on 23 July 2022, 19 May 2023 and 4 January 2024. 2 Though seven opportunities have been granted by this Court to the States to comply, it appears that full compliance has not been effected and several States are in default." The note highlights the States which are in default. It directed: "The Chief Secretaries and Finance Secretaries of the States of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, National Capital Territory of Delhi, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mozoram, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Odisha, Bihar, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Sikkim and Tripura and Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh shall remain personally present before this Court on 23 August 2024."

On July 15, 2024, the Court's order dealt with the issue of "whether the provisions for TDS will apply to allowances payable to the judicial officers under the Second National Judicial Pay Commission. Mr N.Venkataraman, Additional Solicitor General, has indicated that he would have the issue examined in the Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance." It also referred to "the issue of the applicability of the National Pension Scheme to judges in the district judiciary." 

The order of August 8, 2024 recorded that along with All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, 16 cases are tagged. These are: Joseph Joy vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, The State of Karnataka vs. Vijayakumar Rai, Justice M. Vijayaraghavan vs. Union of India, Justice Malai Subramanian vs. Union of India, Elavarasi Veeraraghavan vs. Union of India Secretary to Govt. of India Ministry of Law Justice and Company Affairs, Justice Alok Kumar Mukherjee (Retired) vs. Union of India, Justice Surendra Kumar (Retd.) vs. Union of India Justice Het Singh Yadav (Retd.) vs, Union of India, Jagdish Chandra Gupta vs. Union of India, Justice Shailendra Singh vs. Union of India, Justice Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan vs. Union of India, Justice Vikas Kunvar Srivastav vs. Union of India, Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra Prem Prakash vs. Union of India, Association of Retired Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts of India vs. Union of India, Association of Retired Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts of India vs. Union of India and Virendra Datta Gyani vs. Union of India.

Grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception: Supreme Court's Constitution Bench

In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab (1980), the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench of Chief Justice Y.V Chandrachud and Justices P.N. Bhagwati, N.L. Untwalia, R.S. Pathak and O. Chinnappa Reddy set aside the substantial part of the judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court had rejected the appellants’ applications for anticipatory bail and provided eight propositions underlining the true legal position. The Supreme Court disagreed with seven out of the eight propositions of the High Court. It agreed only with proposition no. 2 formulated by the High Court which stated that "a ’blanket order’ of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed." The Judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Chief Justice Chandrachud on April 9, 1980. 

The Criminal Appeal arose out of a judgment dated September 13, 1977 delivered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The appellant was Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, a Minister of Irrigation and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab. He had filed for anticipatory bail in the event of their arrest in the context of grave allegations of political corruption against him.

The Supreme Court recalled the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, in its 41st Report dated September 24, 1969 which pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the Cr.P.C. to enable the High Court and the Court of Session to grant "anticipatory bail" in paragraph 39.9 of its report (Volume I). It was meant to be an enabling provision.

The Court drew on the decision in Gudikanti Narasimhulu vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, wherein Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer observed that "the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process. After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right."

The Court's judgement reads: We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde’s (V.M. Tarkunde) submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An overgenerous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficient provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not be found therein."

It relied on the decision in Nagendra vs. King Emperor (1924), wherein the Calcutta High Court observed that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the ’Meerut Conspiracy cases’ observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which observe a special mention. 

It also drew on the decision in K. N. Joglekar vs. Emperor wherein, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the Court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. 

It also recalled the decision in Emperor vs. H. L. Hutchinson where it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

The Court concluded that the conditions mentioned in Sections 437 and 439 of Cr.P.C cannot be read into the provisions of Section 438. It observed: "We do not see why the provisions of Section 438 should be suspected as containing something volatile or incendiary, which needs to be handled with the greatest care and caution imaginable. A wise exercise of judicial power inevitably takes care of the evil consequences which are likely to flow out of its intemperate use. Every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hall mark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. One ought not to make a bugbear of the power to grant anticipatory bail."

The Court observed that the filing of a First Information Report (F.I.R.) is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed. The anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested. An order of bail be passed under that section without notice to the public prosecutor. But notice should issue to the public prosecutor or the Government Advocate forthwith and the question of bail should be re-examined in the light of the respective contentions of the parties. The operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) need not necessarily be limited in point of time.The normal role should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.

 

Friday, August 30, 2024

Advocate General, Bihar gets cabinet minister status after amendment in Bihar Service Code

The Governor of Bihar has amended The Bihar Service Code, 1952 in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India to elevate the status of Office of The Advocate General, Bihar. 

The amendment reads: "The Office of The Advocate General, Bihar" shall be added after S.No.-33 at S.No.-34 in the list of Heads of Department of the Appendix-3 of the Bihar Service Code." It has been notified in the Bihar Gazette No. 856 on August 28, 2024. 

It implies that the Advocate General (AG) will now be deemed as the Head of Department of Government of Bihar. The upgradation of the AG Office into a separate department is a significant institutional change. AG has been designated him as head of the newly created department. AG  has been granted the status of Cabinet rank minister. During 2010-2015, he headed education department and later environment and forest department as State's cabinet minister.

Notably, a former legislator and minister, Prashant Kumar Shahi was re-appointed Advocate General in January 2023. His appointment was made after the resignation of Lalit Kishor, his predecessor. Shahi held the same post during 2005-2010. He is a law graduate from  B.H.U, Varanasi.

Article 165 of the Constitution of India makes a provision for the appointment of Advocate-General for the State. The provision reads:  "(1) The Governor of each State shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the State. 

(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor, and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or any other law for the time being in force.

(3) The Advocate-General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, and shall receive such remuneration as the Governor may determine. Conduct of Government Business."

The Law Manual states that "No person shall be appointed Advocate General unless he gives a declaration in writing that he is free from embarrassments." 

It also states that "whenever an Advocate General is appointed, he shall on his appointment report to the Government: (i) the cases in which he can not represent Government owing to his having received instruction from the other party (ii) in case he is a Director or Advisor of a company, the fact of his being such a Director or Advisor." 

The Advocate General used to be appointed under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) to be the public Prosecutor for all cases before the High Court. Section 18 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 makes provision for public prosecutors. Section 20 (12) of BNSS states that the provisions of the Section 20 "shall not apply to the Advocate General for the State while performing the functions of a Public Prosecutor."

Under clause (2) of Article 165 of the Constitution, the Governor has also assigned, the following duties to the Advocate General, namely :-

(A) ADVISORY DUTIES
(i)To advise Government of any legal matter which may be referred to him for opinion.
(ii)To assist the Principal Legal Remembrancer in conveyancing work and to draft such instruments and other Legal documents as the Government may require.
(iii)To advise the Principal Legal Remembrancer in all such matters in which his opinion is sought.
(vi) To advise district officer (as per rule 94 infra) on any proceedings whether civil or criminal conducted by him or to be conducted by him, on behalf of Government.
(v)To advise, when required by Government, the Court of Wards in matters of civil nature in which litigation may arise or which are subject matter of pending litigation.

(B) LEGISLATIVE DUTIES
(i)To scrutinies such Drafts, Bills, as may be referred to him, for a scrutiny by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department and advise generally upon the proposed measures.
(ii)To report to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, any flaws in any law and any matter arising out of cases already, which, in his opinion should be brought to the notice of Government.
(iii)To attend, take part and speak in any proceeding of the State Legislative assembly, as provided in Article 177 of the Constitution, when requested by Government to do so.

(C) OTHER DUTIES
(i)To prepare briefs for use of counsel engaged to represent the Government in appeals and references (Civil or Criminal), before the Supreme Court.
(ii)To represent Government before the Supreme Court in all such cases in which the Government requires him to do so.
(iii) To represent State of Union Government in the High Court in the following matters/cases, namely :-
(a)All civil and criminal cases on the original side ;
(b)Such criminal cases which the High Court transfers to itself from any other court for trial;
(c)All letters patent appeals;
(d)Appeals by accused persons against capital sentences and against conviction for murder if any of its forms;
(e)Appeals preferred by Government against orders of acquittals ;
(f)Appeals filed by accused persons set down for bi-party hearing, in which the appellant is represented by a lawyer ;
(g)Revision petitions filed by Government ;
(h)Revision petitions filed on behalf of private persons and set down for bi-party hearing in which the applicant is represented by a lawyer;
(i)Proceedings regarding the transfer of cases, which have been set down for bi-party hearing;
(j)Any other proceedings in which his services may be required by Government.
Provided that his services shall not be requisitioned to defend a Government servant in the proceedings under contempt of Courts Act.
(iv)To appear in any court subordinate to the High Court, in any civil case, when specially directed by the Government.
(v)To represent Government in all suits, appeals, revisions, references and other proceedings of civil nature in which Government is a party before the High Court or Arbitration Tribunal.
(vi)To represent Government in any civil, criminal or quassi-judicial proceedings of special importance in the High Court, in any court or before any authority or Tribunal in the State, when so directed by Government.
(vii)To represent Government in all cases before the Board of Revenue of the State Industrial Tribunal, when so directed by the Government.
(viii)To represent the court of Wards in the High Court, in proceedings of civil nature, when so directed by the Government.
(ix)To represent Government in all departmental or other enquiries, when so required by the Government in writing.
(x)To represent a party before any court in a proceedings of public importance whether or not the State Government, is a party when so required by the State Government.
(xi)To represent the Union of India in such cases as may be directed by the State Government.
(xii)To report to the Government the result of all cases, together with his opinion, instituted or conducted by him at the instance of or on behalf of Government.
(xiii)To procure certified copies of any judgement or order passed by the High Court which may be required by Government or may contain comments on any action taken by Government; and
(xiv)To perform such other duties of a legal character as may be assigned to him by the Government from time to time and to discharge the duties imposed on him by any law for the time being in force.

The Advocate General is debarred from accepting brief from any private person in any criminal case in any court. He may accept a brief from a private person in any civil case in any court: Provided that such acceptance does not interfere with his duties under these rules, and is not a case in which Government or the court of Wards is a party. 

He is debarred from accepting a brief on behalf of a legal practitioner or an Advocate in proceeding taken against him under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 (XVIII of 1879) or under the Advocate Act, 1961 (XXV of 1961) or under other similar enactment for time being in force. He shall not accept appointment as a director or as an advisor to any company without the sanction of Government. He shall not give legal advice to a private person on matters in which his interest is adverse to Government. He shall not give advice in any case to private persons in his opinion, he is likely to be called upon to advice Government in the case. He shall not accept brief from any person, whether a petitioner or a respondent, challenging the decision regarding a candidate to local bodies or to the State Legislature or Parliament. 

The Advocate General may not withdraw from a prosecution which he has been directed by Government to initiate, without prior concurrence of the department which directed him to initiate the Proceeding, nor may be withdraw from a prosecution initiated by him suo-motu without prior concurrence of the Law and Legislative Affairs Department.


Thursday, August 29, 2024

Tenure of Bihar State Law Commission and its Chairman extended

Pursuant to a cabinet decision dated August 21, 2024, the tenure of former jufge of the Patna High Court Vinod Kumar Sinha, the Chairman, Bihar State Law Commission has been extended for three years. This has been notified on August 22, 2024 in the Bihar Gazette Number 840. 
 
Prior to this Sinha was chairman of Bihar Human Rights Commission during July 2000-July 6, 2023. He joined Bihar Superior Judicial Service as Additional District & Sessions Judge in the year 1997. In course of his Judicial Career in Superior Judicial service, he discharged his duties efficiently as District Judge, Samastipur Judgeship and Legal Remembrancer, Government of Bihar. Before his elevation as judge of the High Court, he was holding the office of Registrar General, Patna High Court from the year 2014. He was elevated as an Additional Judge of Patna High Court on December 9, 2016. He retired from the High Court on April 22, 2020.
 
The term of Bihar State Law Commission has also been extended for three years. The Commission was constituted on September 7, 2000 for three years. Earlier, its tenure was extended on September 5, 2003, November 10, 2006, December 24, 2009, September 19, 2012, September 3, 2015, October 15, 2018 and September 7, 2021. Notably, Bihar State Litigation Policy-2011 was finalized after factoring in views received from the Bihar State Law Commission. The policy was framed in the light of the recommendations of 13th Finance Commission.  

Tuesday, August 27, 2024

Supreme Court grants bail to K. Kavitha, the Telangana lawmaker, quashes Single Judge Bench judgement of Delhi High Court

The judgement in the bail application case of K. Kavitha vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2024) and Enforcement Directorate was reserved by the Single Judge Bench of Justice Swarna Kanta Sharma of Delhi High Court on May 28, 2024. The 41-page long judgement was delivered on July 1, 2024. Justice Sharma's judgement concluded: "this Court is of the view that no case for grant of regular bail....is made out at this stage." 

This judgement of the High Court has been quashed and set aside by a 3-page long order of the Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan on August 27, 2024 in Enforcement Directorate vs. K. Kavitha (2024).

The High Court judgement reads:"....as far as benefit of proviso to Section 45 is concerned, when it is the case of applicant herself that she is a well-educated and accomplished woman, who has remained Member of Parliament, Member of Legislative Council, etc., this Court is bound to keep in mind the observations of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra). The material collected by the Directorate of Enforcement, which has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs has pointed out that the applicant herein was one of the chief conspirators in the entire conspiracy relating to formulation and implementation of new Excise Policy of Delhi. In fact, some other accused persons were working on behalf of the applicant and as per her instructions, as noted in the preceding discussion. Thus, Smt. K. Kavitha cannot be equated to a vulnerable woman who may have been misused to commit an offence, which is the class of women for whom the proviso to Section 45 of PMLA has been incorporated, as held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra). Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that Smt. K. Kavitha is not entitled to the benefit of proviso to Section 45 of PMLA."  

The proviso to Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 confers a discretion on the Court to grant bail where the accused is a woman. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "The impugned judgment and order dated 01.07.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Bail Application No.1675 of 2024 and Bail Application No.1739 of 2024 are quashed and set aside." Kavitha was arrested by ED on March 15, 2024 and subsequently by CBI. The apex Court found the reasoning of the Single Judge Bench of Delhi High Court regarding "vulnerable woman" for denying the benefit of Section 45(1) of the PML Act to be totally misdirected.