Friday, April 26, 2024

High Court sets aside judgement of Special Judge, POCSO Act, Samastipur

In Pappu Sharma v. State of Bihar, the direction of the division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza reads: "In face of the Doctors’ evidence, there could be a little doubt that the victim was attempted to be violated but finding the accusation against the appellant to be absolutely without any basis, we are constrained to set aside the judgment and order of conviction. The appellant is acquitted of the charge. Since the appellant is in jail, he is directed to be released forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other case". In its order, Patna High Court's bench heard the appellant who was convicted for the offence under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 vide judgment dated July 13, 2017 passed by the Special Judge, POCSO Act, Samastipur in Dalsingsarai. 

By order dated July 18, 2017, the appellant, a resident of Rasidpur, PBachhwara, Begusarai was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for one year for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. No separate sentence was awarded for the offence under Section 376 IPC. 

The judgement records that an eight year old girl is alleged to have been sexually violated by the appellant. The mother of the victim (PW4) had lodged the F.I.R. on 14.06.2015 alleging that on June 13, 2015, there was a religious congregation in front of her house under a peepal tree, where many persons of the village had assembled. She along with her daughter (victim) and a toddler slept on a cot by around 8.00 P.M. At about 12 ‘O’ Clock in the night, when she got up from her sleep, she did not find her daughter (victim) around. She came out in search of her daughter but to no avail. Shortly thereafter, she found her daughter weeping in the garden. When she was asked, she disclosed before PW4 that a musician of the band party had brought her at that place and had sexually assaulted her. The accused person had run away. PW4 lifted her daughter and brought her home and inquired about the musician in the band party. She came to know that one Pappu Sharma/appellant of Begusarai was member of the band party. The appellant was confronted with the afore-noted allegation but he denied and ran away. The local Mukhiya was informed about the occurrence, who in turn informed the police. The victim was brought to Dalsingsarai hospital and after her treatment, PW4 lodged the F.I.R. with the Mahila Police in Samastipur.

Since the appellant was the only person about whom there was a doubt that he had committed the offence, he was chargesheeted and put on trial. The Trial Court after having examined nine witnesses on behalf of the prosecution convicted and sentenced the appellant.

The High Court observed that from the deposition of PW4 before the Trial Court, it appears that it was only on her guesswork that she had raised allegation against the appellant. In her examination in chief, she stated that somebody had taken her daughter and had sexually violated her. On being asked, the victim had told her that one boy had taken her to the garden and had physically violated her. During cross-examination, she admitted that her daughter only said that one musician had taken her to the garden. It was found out that the musician playing in the band party was Pappu Sharma (the appellant). His name was not taken by the victim. The mother of the victim did not even recognize the appellant.

The victim was examined. After testing her competence to depose through voir dire, the Trial Court recorded her statement. Voir dire test is a test to determine the maturity and capability of a minor to be a witness. In this test, a judge to test the mental capacity of a minor, asks him/her questions not related to the circumstances of the case. Although it is not a rule but evidence by a minor ought to be accompanied by corroborating evidence as given section 142 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court is cautious when there is a need to rely solely on a child’s testimony. The victim completely denied that the appellant who was standing in the dock, had committed any wrong act with her. She recognized the appellant but in no uncertain terms stated that he was not the person, who had caused trouble to her. The other witnesses, did not support the prosecution case and have been declared hostile. The grandfather of the victim denied the factum of rape of his granddaughter. 

The Court's order records that the victim was examined by Dr. Pushpa Rani and Dr. Hemant Kumar Singh, who found her to be between 7 to 8 years of age and there being strong evidence of sexual assault on her. Thus, there could be a possibility of the victim having been sexually violated but the accusation against the appellant was based on guess-work and some misgivings about his being the musician in the band party which was hired in the religious congregation. Had it not been the case, there would have been specific accusation against the appellant.

The High Court's bench led by Justice Ashutosh Kumar concluded that "it appears that it was only on the guess-work of the informant that the appellant was put on trial.




Justice Ashutosh Kumar led bench sets aside judgement of Additional District & Sessions Judge-IV, Siwan, aquits four of murder charges, directs release of convicts

In Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar and Dashrath Sahni v. State f Bihar, Patna High Court's bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza observed, "We are amazed as to how the Trial Court found evidence good enough to convict all the appellants for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. In the absence of any evidence worth its name, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against all the appellants. The conviction of the appellants are thus set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges." The other appellants are Bechu Sahni and Kanhaiya Sahni.

The Court's judgement reads: "Appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad [in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1031 of 2017] is in jail. He is directed to be released from jail forthwith, if not required or detained in any other case. Appellants/Dashrath Sahni, Bechu Sahni and Kanhaiya Sahni [in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 858 of 2017] are on bail. Their liabilities under the bail bonds are discharged....Let a copy of this judgment be dispatched to the Superintendent of the concerned Jail forthwith for compliance and record."

The appellants were convicted under Sections 341, 323, 504 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) vide judgment dated June 13, 2017 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge-IV, Siwan in Sessions Trial No. 393 of 2014 (G.R. No. 2700 of 2012), arose out of Darauli P.S. Case No. 67 of 2012. By order dated June 16, 2017, they were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (R.I.)) for one month under Section 341 of the IPC; R.I. for one year, to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer R.I. for three months under Section 323 of the IPC; R.I. for one year, to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer R.I. for three months under Section 504 of the IPC and R.I. for life, to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer R.I. for six months under Section 302 of the IPC. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 

It all began with the killing of one Bigan Bind and the injury of his son and nephew, viz., Kush Kumar Bin and Dhanu Bin in the occurrence. The accusation against appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1031 of 2017) was of assaulting the deceased on his head by means of a rami (iron rod). Kush Kumar Bin and Dhanu Bin are said to have been assaulted by appellants/Dashrath Sahni, Bechu Sahni and Kanhaiya Sahni. The deceased died after five days of the occurrence. 

The FIR was lodged by Kush Kumar Bind (as P.W. 9) who is the son of the deceased. He had alleged in his written report dated 25.07.2012 that a dispute had erupted between appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad and the deceased with respect to fixing of pegs in the water body for fishing. After a brief squabble, appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad gave a rami blow on the head of the deceased. He and Dhanu Bin were held back by appellants/ Dashrath Sahni, Bechu Sahni and Kanhaiya Sahni and were also assaulted by them. As a result of assault on the deceased, he received injuries on his head and fell down. The deceased was thereafter assaulted by all the appellants. In the meantime, many persons of the village arrived and seeing them, the appellants fled towards Darauli.

At the Trial, Kush Kumar Bind, the informant made a somersault and stated in his cross-examination that somebody else had drafted the written report and he was not aware of the contents of it. So far as the assault is concerned, he has supported the prosecution case to the extent of there being a dispute between the deceased and appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad with respect to fishing rights. The assault made on the deceased made him unconscious. He was taken to Darauli Hospital for treatment and from there, he was referred to Siwan and later to Patna, where he died. The death took place on July 31, 2012.

With respect to the enmity between the parties, Kush Kumar Bind admitted that appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad was the Mukhiya, whereas the deceased was a candidate for the post of secretary of the Fishing Cooperative Society. His candidature was being opposed by appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad. He has denied the suggestion that one Nandu Sahni had opposed appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad in the election for Mukhiya, in which election, the deceased was from the side of Nandu Sahni and that only on the asking of Nandu Sahni, the appellants have been made accused in this case. 

Dhanu Bind (as P.W. 6), who is the nephew of the deceased, was examined as P.W. 6. The sequence of events as narrated by him is different from the prosecution version. He stated before the Trial Court that he is an expert at fishing. For the dispute over fixing of pegs in the pond for the purposes of demarcating the area in which fishing could be done, a dispute had taken place when the appellants had started assaulting him. The deceased and P.W. 9 had come to his rescue, when the deceased fell down. Nobody had spoken about the occurrence to anyone. At the time of occurrence, only three persons, viz., the deceased, P.W. 7 and him were present. This is in stark contrast to the deposition of the informant (P.W. 9) who has claimed that many persons of the village had arrived immediately after the assault. He has also spoken about the association of the deceased with Nandu Sahni who had contested the election of Mukhiya and had lost to appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad.

The High Court observed, "It is very surprising that even though the deceased died in hospital and the post-mortem examination was conducted on his dead body, but neither the post-mortem report has been brought on record nor the doctor who had conducted the post-mortem examination has been brought to the witness-stand. The reasons for it remain completely unknown. The Trial Court has completely overlooked this fact and has discussed about the injury on head and one of the legs of the deceased."

The order notes that "The absence of post-mortem report and the evidence of the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, give a death blow to the prosecution case. We have also found that independent witnesses were unanimous in stating that the deceased died because of fall on a boulder. That apart, there is quite consistency in the deposition of the witnesses regarding the case having been filed at the instance of Nandu Sahni, who had his own axe to grind against appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad. Nandu Sahni had lost in the elections to the post of Mukhia to appellant/Ram Awadh Kishore Prasad. This postulate appears to be correct for the reason that even the informant had not written the FIR which formed the basis of prosecution. Someone else had done it and he had signed it."

Thursday, April 25, 2024

No Confidence Motion under Bihar Panchayat Raj Act must be considered: Patna High Court

In Munni Khatun v. State of Bihar and 22 others, Patna High Court's division bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Harish Kumar endorsed the submission of  Y. C. Verma, the senior counsel of the appellant, and directed that No Confidence Motion be considered immediately under Section 44 (3) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006.  

The final paragraphs of the judgement reads: "it is imperative that the No Confidence Motion be considered immediately. The No Confidence Motion will be considered on 26.04.2024 at 11:00 AM in the Panchayat Bhawan, in the presence of the Executive Officer....Whatever legal consequences follow, on the decision taken at the meeting will have to be scrupulously complied with." The judgement authored by the Chief Justice was delivered on April 20, 2024.  

The writ petitions filed by the Pramukh and Up-Pramukh from Fulwaria, Gopalganj against the No Confidence Motion being carried on January 12, 2024 were rejected by Justice Purnendu Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court due to undue delay of more than three months. It was also found that there was already an election scheduled on February 7, 2024, which was stayed. After dismissal of the writ petition there was an election scheduled on April 22, 2024. The petitions were filed by Ranjan Kumari Tiwari and Munni Khatun. Justice Singh had recorded that "No reason has been assigned for delay in approaching this Court." He had concluded that "The writ petitions deserve to be dismissed for having approached this Court after delay of nearly three months after the requisition dated 30.12.2023, was communicated to the petitioners and also in view of the fact that elections for the post of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh have been notified."

The division bench heard senior counsel for the private respondents and counsels for the State Election Commission and the State besides Verma, the senior counsel. 

The Court drew on Section 44 (3) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act which specifies that the requisition for a special meeting to consider the no confidence motion shall be presented to the Pramukh in writing with a copy to the Executive Officer of the Panchayat Samiti, by not less than one third of the total number of members elected directly from the territorial constituencies. The provision then provides that the Executive Officer should immediately bring the requisition to the notice of the Pramukh and the Pramukh should convene such meeting on a date falling within 15 days of such requisition. It is further provided that if the Pramukh fails to call the special meeting, the Up-Pramukh or the requisitionists themselves i.e. one third of the total number of members elected directly, could call for a specialmeeting. 

The Court observed that "the right of the Up-Pramukh or the requisitionists to call for a special meeting would arise only on the expiry of the first fifteen days."

The Court's judgement recorded that in the Munni Khatun case, the requisition was made on December 30, 2023 and the special meeting convened by the requisitionists, as notified by the Executive Officer to the Pramukh and Up-Pramukh was on January 12, 2024, within the fifteen days period.

The Court observed, "we are of the opinion that there is a clear statutory violation insofar as the convening of the meeting is concerned. However, the Pramukh has also failed to comply with the statutory obligation cast on the Pramukh, to call for a meeting within fifteen days; since till 12th, the 13th day, no meeting was scheduled. Since there is clear statutory violation in convening the meeting, where the No Confidence Motion was scheduled; we are of the opinion that the election convened on 22.04.2024 shall not be proceeded with."

Takshila Educational Society failed to avail alternative remedy, petition dismissed by High Court

In Takshila Educational Society v. The Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department, National Faceless Assessment, Centre, New Delhi, the division bench of Patna High Court observed, "The plea made of no oral hearing afforded has to be considered in the context of the option not having been exercised; which amounts to a waiver" in its judgement dated April 22, 2024. Takshila Educational Society, the petitioner is aggrieved with the assessment order dated March 22, 2024, passed without affording an opportunity of hearing. There is an appeal provided from the order, which has not been availed of. 

The petitioner sought an opportunity for a proper hearing. The senior counsel for the petitioner relied on a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-Tax Vs. Sri Jagdish Prasad Choudhary, (1995) 211 ITR 472X (Pat). Therein, the specific provision on which the dictum was laid was Section 18 (2) of the Wealth Tax Act, which reads as under: “18 (2) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) unless the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 

The Full Bench has held that the word “heard” occurring in Section 18(2) of the Act means to be heard “orally” and not a mere consideration of the case as made out in the written representation. Incidentally, it was also examined whether such an oral hearing can be given only on the request of the person concerned or whether under the scheme of the Act, there is an implied obligation of the concerned authority to offer an opportunity of oral hearing. It was found on the scheme of the Wealth Tax Act, specifically sub-Section (2) of Section 18 that even without a request there is an implied obligation on the authority.

The Court's judgement reads: "4. Juxtaposed with the above provision, we have to consider Section 144B(vii), which reads as under: “(vii) the assessee or any other person, as the case may be, shall file his response to the notice referred to in clause (vi), within the time specified therein or such time as may be extended on the basis of an application in this regard, to the National Faceless Assessment Centre;”

When one looked for Section 144 B (vii) in the  Income Tax Act, 1961, it was noticed that the entire Section 144 B has been "Omitted by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987" as per its Section 51 with effect from April 1, 1989. The omitted provision dealt with "Reference to Deputy Commissioner in certain cases".

Drawing on these omitted provisions, the Court observed: "5. Hence, under the scheme of the Income Tax Act, specifically after the faceless assessment was brought into force, a request has to be made for an oral hearing. There is a specific option provided, which has to be ticked in the affirmative, to make the request while uploading the objection. Unless the request is made, the faceless assessment would be concluded without an oral hearing, which again is as per the scheme of the Act. We do not think that the dictum of the Full Court applies here. We also notice that there is a provision for appeal where all the facts can be argued in person. The appellate authority also has sufficient power to get a report from the Assessing Officer, after affording an opportunity of hearing before the Assessing Officer." These observations require re-consideration in the light of the omitted provisions which appear to have erroneously been cited.   

The Court drew on the judgement of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Limited (2005) 6 SCC 499 to ascertain the contours of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the scope to interfere with appellable orders, as laid down by the Supreme Court. The Court has held that if an assessee approaches the High Court without availing the alternate remedy, it should be ensured that the assessee has made out a strong case or that there exists good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. It was clarified that the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy. The High Court can always refuse the exercise of discretion if there is an adequate and effective remedy elsewhere. 

It observed: "The High Court can exercise the power only if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or due procedure required for the decision has not been adopted. The High Court would also interfere if it comes to a conclusion that there is infringement of fundamental rights or where there is failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders and proceeding are wholly without jurisdiction or when the vires of an Act is challenged." The judgement was authored by Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

The High Court reserved the liberty of the petitioner to approach the appellate authority. The period during which the writ petition, was pending, from April 10, 2024, till April 22, 2024 shall not be reckoned as delay.

Computerisation should not violate principles of natural justice, High Court sets aside the assessment order of the Income Tax Department

In District Bar Association, Supaul v. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department, Patna High Court's bench of Chief Justice and Justice Harish Kumar set aside the assessment order of the Income Tax Department. The judgement observes, "We make it clear that the assessment order is set aside only on violation of the principles of natural justice and we have not looked at the merits of the assessment at all."

The petitioner was aggrieved with the assessment order passed on 27.03.2023 without providing adequate opportunity for being heard. The writ petition has been filed merely on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. The request for adjournment made by the petitioner dated March 4, 2023 was filed in the portal of the Income Tax Department. Despite that, an assessment order was passed without affording any opportunity of hearing. 

Notably, the Department filed a response specifically contending that "no such request for adjournment was received in the portal of the Department." In compliance with the order of the Court, the petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit dated December 14, 2023, wherein "an auto generated mail issued from the portal of the Income Tax Department, that the request for adjournment for submission to notice under 147 is successfully submitted." The Department objected to it stating that the request for adjournment has to be uploaded in the assessment module of the “ITBA portal”, which has not received any request for extension of time. Although the Income Tax Department submitted that the adjournment request was not received in the ITBA portal but it did not disown the mail which was  issued by it. 

The Court observed that there is nothing to point out that suitable instructions were issued by the Department to the assesses to upload the adjournment requests in a particular portal. "The computerisation is to facilitate expeditious assessment and it cannot result in such gross violations of principles of natural justice." 

The judgement was authored by Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran. The Court set aside the order dated March 27, 2023. Its direction dated April 23, 2024 reads: "The Income Tax Officer, Ward-3(4), Saharsa, who has filed the counter affidavit in the writ petition, shall on receipt of the certified copy of the judgment, facilitate the opening of the portal so as to enable filing of objections. The petitioner shall file the objections and after affording a personal hearing, the matter shall be considered afresh."

Jharkhand residents languising in Buxer jail after conviction in NDPS case, High Court to hear them on May 9

The matter related to suspension of conviction over nine quintals of ganja came up for hearing before the division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza. The counsel for Shankar Yadav, the second convict and the first appellant sought adjournment. The first appellant, a resident of Jharkhand is in Ara jail. Dr. Gopal Krishna, the counsel for Pritam Lakra (22), the second convict and the second appellant made a brief submission about how Lakra is not covered under offences under Section 20 (b) (ii) (C) and Section 25 of Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985 because Lakra, the resident of Jhrakhand is not a cultivator, producer, manufacturer, possessor, seller, purchaser, transporter, importer,  exporter or user of ganja. He is not the owner or occupier or controller or user of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance. Therefore, he does not have the agency to knowingly permits it to be used for the commission of offence under NDPS Act by any other person.

The counsel for Pritam Lakra informed the High Court about Nav Kumar Ojha, the third convict in the case who is languishing in Buxer jail without any legal assistance because of extreme poverty and unsound mental health of his wife. He submitted that the Court may direct the Legal Services Authority to provide legal aid to Ojha, the resident of Jhrakhand. Justice Ashutosh Kumar led bench asked Dr. Krishna, the counsel to get vakalatnama from Ojha and provide free assistance. The counsel agreed to do so. The case is listed for hearing on May 9, 2024.       

Section 20 of the NDPS Act deals with punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plants and cannabis. It states that "Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,—(a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable..."  Section 20 (ii) b of the NDPS Act states that where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. Section 20 (ii) (C) states that where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b), and involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees. 
The judgement of the the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur reveals that Pritam Lakra, the helper of the truck is not covered under the ambit of Section 20 (ii) (b) (C) of the NDPS Act because there is nothing on record to show that he is a cultivator of any cannabis plant or producer, manufacturer, possessor, seller, purchaser, transporter, inter-State importer, inter-State exporter or user of cannabis. It is apparent that the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur committed an error in convicting him under Section 20 (ii) (b) (C) of the NDPS Act.

As to Section 25 of NDPS Act which deals with the punishment for allowing premises, etc., to be used for commission of an offence. It states that "Whoever, being the owner or occupier or having the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, knowingly permits it to be used for the commission by any other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act, shall be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence." This provision too was substituted by the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 with effect from October 2, 2001. 

A careful reading of Section 25 of NDPS Act shows that Lakra, the helper of the  truck in question is not covered under the ambit of Section 25. It seems that the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur committed an error in convicting him under Section 25.
Notably, Section 20 (b) (ii) (C) of the NDPS Act was substituted by the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 with effect from October 2, 2001. There were over 40 amendments made in the original NDPS Act, supposedly to address certain obligations specially in respect of the concept of ‘controlled delivery’ arising from the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs andPsychotropic Substances 1988 to which India is one of the 87 signatories out of 192 parties since March 27, 1990. Prior to that India amended the NDPS Act for the first time in 1989. The UN Convention came into force on November 11, 1990, in accordance with Article 29(1) of the Convention. The NDPS Act was amended in 2014 as well. Some 25 amendments were made under the 2014 legislation.   


Wednesday, April 24, 2024

Out of 1541 judicial officers, seven judges suspended by Patna High Court

Out of a total of 1541 judicial officers, seven judges have been suspended by Patna High Court.   

Out of 90 District and Sessions Judges, two are under suspension:

1. RAJ KUMAR- II, Principal Judge (Family Court), Khagaria, Posting Date: 11-Sep-2020

2.  DHARMENDRA KUMAR JAISWAL, District and Sessions Judge, Supaul, Posting Date: 04-Mar-2023

Out 400 Additional District and Sessions Judges, 3 are under suspension:   

1. AVINASH KUMAR- I, Additional District and Sessions Judge
 Supaul, Posting Date: 05-Aug-2022

2. ARUN KUMAR- I, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chapra
Posting Date: 11-May-2022

3. SATYA PRIYA ANAND, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hilsa
Posting Date: 11-May-2022

Out of 275 civil judge senior division, one is under suspension:

1.  SAVITA RANI, Civil Judge (Sr.Div.)-cum-A.C.J.M., Ara, Posting Date: 12-Dec-2019

Out of 776 civil judge junior division, one is under suspension:

1. ASHUTOSH KUMAR- III, Civil Judge (Jr. Div.)-cum-J.M. I Class, Barh, Posting Date: 18-Sep-2014

Tuesday, April 23, 2024

Patna High Court's Chief Justice convenes a Full Court Reference after the demise of Justice Syed Rafat Alam

Patna High Court's Chief Justice condoled the sad demise of Justice Syed Rafat Alam (73), ex- judge of the High Court and the ex-Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court and Allahabad High Court. It has convened a Full Court Reference in the Centenary Hall of the Court. He passed away on April 22, 2024. He was a judge of Patna High Court only for 20 days in November 1994. He was elevated as permanent judge of the Patna High Court on November 8, 1994 and was transferred to Allahabad High Court on November 28, 1994 within 20 days of appointment. There no record of any judgement or order authored by him on the Patna High Court's website. His name does not feature in the names of the judges who wrote judgements or orders. 

Justice Syed Rafat Alam was born on August 8, 1950. He graduated in Art with Honours from St. Columbus College, Hazaribagh in the year 1970 and did LL.B. from Patna Law College, Patna. He enrolled as an Advocate on April 1, 1975. He practised in Patna High Court in constitutional, civil taxation, labour and university matters. He worked as standing counsel for the State of Bihar. He also served as the standing counsel for the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna University and Magadh University. He served as Part Time Lecturer in Law Faculty of College of Commerce, Patna from 1983 till his elevation as Judge of the High Court.

Justice Alam's appointment as Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court was challenged before the Court's Lucknow bench of  Justices Pradeep Kant and Ritu Raj Awasthi. The petition filed by Asok Pande, an advocate of Allahabad High Court'’s Lucknow Bench. Pande challenged the appointment of Justice Alam on the ground that he had worked as a judge in the Allahabad High Court for over 10 years. As per the petition, the transfer of Justice Alam from Madhya Pradesh High Court to Allahabad High Court “was against the settled policy adopted by the government in posting the Chief Justices of the High Court”. The petition also claimed that as per the government’s policy,a judge is not posted as a Chief Justice of that High Court where he had worked for a long time or has originated. The Court dismissed the petition. It observed that “the writ petition did not raise any grievance worth being considered under Article 226 of the Constitution and is based on irrelevant,misconceived and uncalled for pleadings”. A legal practitioner of such a long standing should have exercised restraint in filing such a petition”. Justice Alam took oath as as Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court on August 5, 2011. He retired on August 7, 2012.

Earlier, Justice Alam was elevated as Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh in 2009. Prior to that he was appointed as Acting Chief Justice from 30/12/2004 to 10/01/2005, 16/01/2005 to 18/02/2005, 27/01/2007 to 06/03/2007 and 09/03/2009 to 19/03/2009. He was  appointed as Chief Justice of High Court of Madhya Pradesh on December 20, 2009.

On the very next day of his retirement as Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, Justice Alam was appointed as Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) on August 8, 2012. As Chairman of CAT, he authored 126 orders including judgements

He was appointed as one of the administrators of the Jammu & Kashmir Cricket Association by Jammu & Kashmir High Court. He was the Chairman of Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission (UPHRC) from April 7, 2016 till August 7, 2020.

As a judge of High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Allahabad, chairman of CAT and UPHRC, Justice Alam wrote many judgements, orders and recommendations. As Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, he was part of the benches that delivered 6333 judgements. 

Common Cause, a civil society organisation had written to him when he was Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court on November 3, 2011 regarding conformity of Allahabad High Court (Right to Information) Rules, 2006, with Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005. Common Cause had jointly filed a PIL in the Supreme Court in March 2008 to expedite the dispensation of justice and reverse the trend of a mounting backlog of court cases. It had sought information on the status of pendency of cases in various jurisdictions in January, 2009. It found that the RTI rules framed by several High Courts, including the Allahabad High Court, deviated from the letter and spirit of the RTI Act. Such rules seemed to be designed to discourage the citizens from using the RTI Act. It filed a complaint under Section 18(f) of the Right to Information Act,  2005, before the Central Information Commission (CIC) with a view to bring the rules framed by High Courts in conformity with the spirit of the RTI Act, which passed a favourable order. Common Cause had presented a petition to Justice Alam pointing out significant deviations in the Allahabad High Court (Right to Information) Rules, 2006, with reference to the RTI Act and the recommendations of the Central Information Commission in respect of these rules contained in its decisions of July 26, 2010 and September 23, 2010. It underlined that the recommendations of the CIC were ignored by the Allahabad High Court. In an earlier decision in the same complaint filed by Common Cause, the CIC had stated: “Consequently, the other issue regarding proactively disclosure of pending cases in various courts under Jurisdiction of High Court of Allahabad, the Commission in light of the provision u/s 25(5) of the Act, hereby recommends the Registrar, High Court of Allahabad to envisage a system by which such information should be proactively disclosed in public interest” on July 26, 2010. But no action was taken by the Allahabad High Court on this recommendation by the CIC. The petition concluded that all rules made under the RTI Act must be within the ambit of the RTI Act and aim to achieve its objective and not hinder it. It is a basic tenet of jurisprudence that the Acts of Parliament must be construed according to their object and intent. It urged that the RTI rules, which do not accord with the spirit of the RTI Act, may be re-formulated in the light of the recommendations of the CIC and in the larger interest of operationalising the  fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression, of which, right to information is an intrinsic and inalienable part. It requested Justice Alam to ensure that the rules so revised are uploaded on the High Court’s web site.

Sunday, April 21, 2024

Conviction under Section 302 converted to conviction under Section 304 Part-II of IPC: High Court

Upon hearing a criminal appeal, Patna High Court's division bench of Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza observed, "we convert the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 to one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC" in Ram Dular Singh v. State of Bihar (2006).

The Court found that since the attack was without an intention of causing death but surely with the knowledge that it would have caused such injury which might result in death, the appellant, a resident of Kaimur cannot escape the liability under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC for manslaughter and not murder. 

The Court concluded that "if the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period of custody which he has already undergone, it would sufficiently meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. The conviction of the appellant/Ram Dular Singh is converted into one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and the sentence is modified to the period of custody that he has already served." 

Prior to the judgement, the appellant was released on bail after having remained in jail for about five and a half years. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. 

Saturday, April 20, 2024

High Court's Division Bench reinstates Panchayat Teacher, modifies and sets aside order of Single Judge Bench

Patna High Court's division bench of Chief Justice and Justice Harish Kumar reinstated a Panchayat Teacher. The judgement modified and set aside judgements of the High Court dated April 28, 2022 passed by a Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 17954 of 2019 and C.W.J.C. No. 21685 of 2019 dismissing both the writ petitions filed by Sitamarhi residents Gopal Kumar and Shankar Kumar with a direction to the State Government not to consider any one of them for the post of Teacher and to relieve, any one, who is working on any such post. The Single judge had imposed a cost of Rs.50,000/- to each one of the appellants. The Court has recorded that Shankar Kumar had filed his application form under the category of unreserved without caste certificate and Gopal Kumar's application form was filed under reserved category with his caste certificate.  The report submitted by the State officials also is in support of the contention of the appellant Gopal Kumar and negates the case of appellant Shankar Kumar.

The division bench examined the judgements of the High Court dated April 28, 2022 passed by Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma of Single Judge bench. It observed" "this Court is of the considered view that it explicitly deals with the manipulation on the part of the appellant Shankar Kumar and no substantive materials have been found suggesting involvement of the appellant Gopal Kumar in manipulating any document/record." It concluded: "this Court finds that the order rejecting the claim of the appellant Gopal Kumar is not sustainable in any view and accordingly this Court would set aside the order of the learned Single Judge to that extent, which rejected the claim of the appellant Gopal Kumar. So far as the rejection of the claim of the appellant Shankar Kumar is concerned, this Court does not find any error in the impugned order and thus, in our considered opinion, it does not require any interference. However, after taking a lenient view, this Court also would set aside the order to the extent of a cost of Rs.50,000/- imposed on each of the appellants.

The Court directed the respondents including the State of Bihar through its Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Education Department to reinstate Gopal Kumar in service as Panchayat Teacher, the appellant with effect from the date he has been ousted from service after treating the services of the appellant as continuous with effect from his first joining. But it made it clear that he shall not be allowed any monetary benefit for the period he has not discharged any duty and remained out of service. It also made it clear that the earlier period of the appellant Gopal Kumar shall be computed for all other purposes, except the monetary benefit. The judgement was authored by Justice Harish Kumar.

Thursday, April 18, 2024

Justice Ahutosh Kumar bench aquits Brind Manjhi of murder charges

Upon hearing the counsel for the appellant and the respondent in Brind Manjhi v. State of Bihar, Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza bench of Patna High Court gave the benefit of doubt to the appellant and set aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence by Additional Session Judge XIII, Patna. The appellant was acquitted of the charges raised against him. He was in custody for about twelve and half years by now. The Court directed him to be released forthwith from jail, if not required or detained in any other case. A copy of the judgment is required to be dispatched to the Superintendent of the concerned Jail for compliance and record. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) vide judgment dated October 21, 2019. By this order he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life, to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- under Section 302 IPC and RI for three years, to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-under Section 201 IPC. The case arose out of PS. Case No.-123 Year-2011, Thana: Patliputra, Patna.

The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The appellant is the sole person put on trial for having murdered a ten year old boy. The mother of the deceased, viz., Manju Devi had lodged the FIR on June 25, 2011 at about 11:15 AM, alleging that on the previous day, at about 6 O'clock in the evening the deceased had brought some articles from the Kirana shop and had thereafter gone out to the house to play as also to pick up rags. When the child did not return after two hours, a search was made for him but to no avail. 

On June 25, 2011, she learnt that the dead body of a boy is lying near Rajapur Bridge near the brick-kiln of one Puneshwar Singh. The young boys of the village and her father-in-law/Sidheshwar Manjhi went to see the dead body and finding it to be the dead body of her son, brought it back. About 15 days prior to the occurrence, the appellant, her neighbour, had fought with the family and had also threatened that he shall decimate the entire family. Therefore, she suspected that the appellant along with his associates had killed the deceased by puncturing him with sharp/ pointed weapon.

The mother of the deceased found that he had been attacked at many places on his neck by a pointed object. She had also participated in the blockade of the road. She was told that the appellant had called the deceased and had lured him for giving tomatoes and biscuits. She was candid enough to tell the Court that neither she nor anyone of the grass-scrapers, who had first seen the dead-body lying on the sands, had seen the act of killing.

From the deposition of the investigator, it became very clear to the Court that while the dead-body was kept on the road and the traffic was blockaded, there was no reference of the appellant as the possible perpetrator of the crime. All that the crowd was asking for was compensation for the family of the deceased. 

The Court noted that the mother of the deceased did not have any suspicion on the appellant when at 10 O’clock in the morning of June 25, 2011, when she had submitted the missing report. It appears that it was only later that the family of the deceased realised that there had been some dispute in the past, a fortnight ago, when the appellant had threatened to decimate the family.

The Court observed: "It could only be a bluster or a brutum fulmen and nothing more." The judgement concluded that "We find that beyond suspicion, there is no other material to justify the conviction of the  appellant." The judgement was authored by Justice Ashutosh Kumar.

Patna High Court publishes Action Plan to reduce cases pending for two- three decades in district courts

Worried about the potential erosion of public confidence in the judiciary that can arise from delays in delivery of justice, Supreme Court Committee for "Model Case Flow Management Rules for Trial Courts, District Appellate Courts , High Courts and to suggest a Plan for Reduction of Arrears in the High Courts and District Courts" has expressed concern regarding huge number of cases "which have been pending for long periods, some for over two and even three decades."

The Action Plan for managing and reducing case arrears in district judiciary incorporates the following principles:

a) Prioritization of Long-Standing Cases: Special emphasis on identifying and resolving cases that have been pending for excessively long periods, such as over 10, 20 or 30 years. 

b) Accelerating the Progression of Cases to Finalization: This principle emphasizes the urgency of moving cases towards a timely conclusion. [It involves not only prioritizing the resolution of long-standing cases,
particularly those over I 0, 20 or 30 years old, but also ensuring that newer cases do not age into these categories.

c) Equitable Case Distribution: Ensure a balanced distribution of cases among judges, taking into consideration the complexity and nature of cases, to prevent overburdening and promote efficient resolution.

d) Effective Handling of Unready and Stayed Cases: Implement strategies for expediting and managing cases that are unready or are stayed by Higher Courts.

e) Effective Utilization of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Encourage the use of mediation and Lok Adalat to resolve disputes with more effective pre-Lok Adalat sittings in old cases.

f) Use of Technology: Leverage NJDG and related tools for better case management, including case tracking systems, to enhance efficiency.

g) Managing Undated Cases: Address the issue of 'undated' cases. Implement measures to ensure that cases do not remain without a scheduled date, facilitating their timely progression and resolution.

h) Adequate Human Resources Support to Judicial Officers: Strengthen the district judiciary by providing sufficient ministerial staff support to judicial officers. This includes ensuring that courts have stenographers, and other essential staff who can assist m case management and other administrative duties.

i) Regular Monitoring and Review: Implement a system for the continuous monitoring of case progress and regular review meetings to assess the effectiveness of action plan.

j) Stakeholder Engagement: Involve bar association and agencies to address procedural delays.

k) Responsive Adaptation: Tailor strategies to meet the specific circumstances of each district, allowing for flexibility and adaptation of the action plan to local scenarios.

The 17 page long Action Plan for Arrears Reduction in District Judiciary (APAaR-DJ) states that "this situation calls for an effective approach to address the issue of delays. lt also noticed that a substantial number of cases are currently in 'unready' state for various procedural reasons, thereby delaying their resolution. Additionally, the prevalence of cases that are stayed by higher courts adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of reducing pendency."

Wednesday, April 17, 2024

Supreme Court's anger, Bihar Governor and Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act

Bihar Governor Buta Singh vacated the bungalow in New Delhi after the rebuke from the Supreme Court's bench of Justices B. N. Agarwal and A. K. Mathur on October 24, 2005. The court had asked the government to “throw out” illegal occupants from the government's bungalows while hearing a case related to overstaying by several politicians on government premises in violation of rules and regulations. Buta Singh vacated the 9 Lodhi Estate house and formally handed it over to authorities. Justice Agarwal had observed: “Buta Singh is Governor of Bihar. What is he doing here? How can he be occupying a house here. Throw him out.” 

The government had submitted two lists with 465 names of VIP defaulters to the Court. The first list included those who were staying illegally and the other gave names of dignitaries who were living in houses bigger than their entitlement. 

Buta Singh got singled out as his name figured on top of the list which was submitted to the Court. The controversial Governor was facing criticism from the Opposition parties over his recommendation to dissolve the hung Bihar Assembly. Notably, Prime Minister had expressed displeasure in public about Bihar Governor’s role. 

Notably, the government was not able to file its detailed affidavit on the issue of making the offence of trespassing under Section 441 of the IPC cognisable and non-bailable to give more teeth to the government agency in dealing with the problem. Justice Agarwal headed bench had earlier asked the central and state governments to make their stand clear on making Section 441 a cognisable and non-bailable offence – as Orissa and Uttar Pradesh have done.

In July 2023, Bihar government imposed penalties on several MLAs, who held ministerial berths for “overstaying” at bungalows meant for ministers, even after allotment of houses to them as legislators. 

Significantly, Parliament has cleared a legislation—Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 2019 has been enacted for speedy eviction of unauthorised occupants of government accommodation. It came into effect from September 16, 2019. The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Rules, 2019 were notified on September 25, 2019. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs has been allocated the task of its implementation of this law under the First Schedule of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 as amended up to January 5, 2022. 

Justice Agarwal retired in October 2009 after a nine-year tenure. Fourteen years after his rebuke, this law was enacted to deal with the eviction of unauthorised occupants. It is not clear as to whether this law has been effective on the ground. There is a need for a White Paper on the implementation of this law to ascertain whether it is being implemented without discrimination based on party affiliations.

Tuesday, April 16, 2024

Judgements of Patna High Court in NDPS cases

In Guddu Singh v. State of Bihar (2018), Justice Ashutosh Kumar set aside the judgment and order of conviction dated February 13, 2017 and February 15, 2017 respectively, passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge-Cum-Special Judge, Motihari, East Champaran, in N.D.P.S. Case No. 01 of 2015/30 of 2016, arising out of Chhauradano P.S. Case No. 150 of 2014.  

Guddu Singh, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)ii(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), 1985 by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge-Cum-Special Judge, Motihari, East Champaran. He was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years, to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- for such offence and in default of payment of fine to further suffer  simple imprisonment for one year. The appellant was found to be in possession of two kilograms of Ganja. The police submitted charge-sheet after investigation, whereupon the cognizance was taken and the appellant was tried for the offences.

Justice Kumar observed that "it is clearly revealed that there has been violation of Sections 41, 42, 52 and 55 of the N.D.P.S. Act and standing instructions of the N.C.B. with respect to search, seizure and sampling. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has not been able to bring home the charges against the appellant for the offence in which he has been convicted, beyond all reasonable doubts."

He concluded that "the appellant/Guddu Singh has remained in jail since 29.12.2014, i.e. for more than three years. This Court, therefore, has no option but to accord the benefit of doubt to the appellant. The appeal succeeds. The appellant/Guddu Singh is acquitted of all charges. He is in jail. He is directed to be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other criminal case. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Superintendent of concerned jail for necessary compliance." The judgement was delivered by Justice Ashutosh Kumar on March 30, 2018 

In Shiv Shankar Dixit vs. Union of India 2017 (1) PLJR 671, seized articles were placed before the Magistrate after three months from the occurrence. No cogent evidence was produced that alleged quantity of Ganja was seized from the conscious presence of the appellant. There was noncompliance of Section 52A of the NDPS act The Prosecution relied on the confession of the accused recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS act. The accused in his confession statement has only said that he did not know that there was Ganja in the vehicle and indicated that Devi sau told him that there was bearing in the vehicle which was to be handed over to one Khan at Barh. He also said in his confession statement that Devi Sau was actual driver who had handed over the steering of the vehicle to the accused and had left the vehicle on the pretext of clearing the Jam. The confession statement was found to be exculpatory in nature and was not found admissible. The accused was accordingly acquitted by the High Court.

In Parmanand Choubey vs. State of Bihar 2017 (2) PLJR 540, a petition for release of vehicle was rejected by the District Judge on the ground that any conveyance used to carry any Narcotic Drug or Psychotropic substance is liable for confiscation under sub section 1 or sub section 2 of the NDPS act and also on the ground that since investigation was still pending, it will not be proper to release the vehicle. It was held that section 60(3) of NDPS act does not put a bar for release of vehicle during the pendency of investigation or trial by the court.

In Muneshwar Pandit vs. State of Bihar 2018 (1) PLJR 494, the Patna High reiterated the law laid down in State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Chandra AIR 2005 SC 2221 and observed that when a person is about to be searched the requirement of section 50 would be that the officer proposing to effect the search cannot act in a dual capacity: first as an officer authorized under section 42 to search a person and second as the Gazetted officer in whose presence the option of search is given to the accused. Officer conducting the search cannot discharge the dualfunction both under section 42 and section 50 of the NDPS Act. The informant has said in his testimony that the SDM was leading the raiding partyand it was in his presence that the seizure and sampling was done but the SDM wasnot examined and even his signature was not available on the seizure list. Moreover,the seized Ganaja was kept in 9 packets but the seal was available only on 6 packets.There was unexplained delay of 20 days in sending the samples to the FSL. The seizure witnesses also denied having any knowledge of the seizure. All these circumstances were found to be fatal to the prosecution case and led to the acquittal of the accused.

In Ram Narayan Shah vs. Union of India 2018 (1) PLJR 386, 200 grams of Heroin was found hidden between the speedometer and visor of the bike from which two samples of 5-5 grams each (S1 and S2) were drawn and sealed with the department seal at the spot. The rest 190 grams were of the recovered substance was heat sealed in transparent polythene packet and was put in a paper envelope and sealed by the department seal which was signed by the seizing officer, independent witnesses and the owner of the goods. Even though the samples were produced before the court but the original seized articles were not produced. The sample taken from the seized bulk was on record and the report of the FSL on the sample taken stated that the sample was that of Heroin and Morphine and the certificate of the articles seized was also proved. These facts coupled with the confessional certificate of the accused under section 67 was found sufficient for conviction of the accused even though the original contrabands that were seized were not produced before the Court.

In Tuntun Gope vs State of Bihar 2018 (1) PLJR 777, charas was alleged to have been recovered from the possession of the accused in presence of BDO. The statement of the BDO showed that he reached the place of occurrence after the seizure. The informant has not said anything in his report about asking the accused for taking his search and about consent by the accused for his search before the magistrate/gazetted officer. There is nothing on record to indicate that the informant made the accused aware that B.D.O. Fatuha is present before him. There is nothing on record to indicate that the informant informed the accused about his right of being searched before a gazatted officer or a magistrate. The seized contraband was sent to F.S.L. for examination on 16.11.2013 while the same wa seized from the possession of the accused on 9.11.2013. The whereabout of the contraband for these seven days was not explained. The seizure and arrest were not reported by the Informant to the Senior Police Officers within 48 hours and thereby Section 57 of the NDPS Act was not complied. The seized contraband was not produced before the trial court and no explanation was given. Benefit of Doubt was given to the accused.

In Raj Kumar vs. State of Bihar 2018 (2) PLJR 214, seized Charas was not kept in Malkhana, the sample was not sealed, sample was not prepared in presence of the Magistrate even after appointment of Magistrate and the seized material was sent to laboratory examination after about one and half years of its seizure. The independent witnesses were not examined and the remaining witnesses were all police officers. No explanation was provided by the prosecution for non-production of the Charas as an exhibit in the trial. The contention of the prosecution that the confession of the accused recorded under section 67 of the Act is sufficient for awarding punishment also did not find favour with the Court since the accused was kept at SSB camp for 24 hours and therefore presumption can be drawn that the confession was not voluntary. Hence the accused was acquitted.

In Bhulan Das vs. State of Bihar 2018(2) PLJR 361, seizure list witnesses were not examined by the prosecution. Instead, defence has examined one of them as defence witness. The said witness has not supported the prosecution case of raid of the houses of the appellants by the police personnel and recovery and seizure of the contrabands from their house. There is nothing on record to show that on receiving the secret information and making the sanha entry, the informant had sent either the information or the copy of the sanha entry to the immediate superior officer. Thus, there was utter violation of Section 42 (2) of NDPS act. There was nothing on record to show that the seized Ganja was either sealed at the place of occurrence by the informant or at the police station by SHO as none of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has stated so. This aspect creates serious doubt about the seizure of the contraband, its quantity and taking of the sample and sending the same to FSL. The samples were not collected from each packet of the seized Ganja separately nor by mixing the contents of each packets together. All these aspects were found to be fatal to the prosecution case and accordingly the case was found fit for acquittal of the accused.

In Sharawan Prasad vs. State of Bihar 2018 (3) PLJR 93, no evidence was offered to show the search and seizure was made in front of any gazatted officer or magistrate. Sampling was also not done as per standing order no:01/98 or 01/89 issued under the section 52A. The seized article was sent for examination after a month of seizure. There was violation of section 57 of NDPS act. The informant himself was the investigating officer of the case. All these circumstances were found sufficient for the acquittal of the accused, the case.

In Amit Kumar vs. State of Bihar 2018 (3) PLJR 90,, possession of any of the drugs covered under the schedule H & H1 without any, license attracts the offence punishable under the NDPS act. Huge quantities of Corex Cough Syrup, Fortwin Inj. & Ativan Tabs. were recovered from the shop of the accused. These drugs contained ingredients specified in schedule H & H1. The accused had license only to sell schedule C & C/1 drugs. Therefore, the order rejecting discharge petition of the accused was affirmed by the Court.  

In Md. Samsul vs. Union of India 2018 (4) PLJR 261, the seizure list witnesses were not examined. The search was carried on information received but this information was not recorded in writing. Inventory of seized Ganja was not proved and entry register of Malkhana where the seized Ganja was kept and from where it was set to have been taken out for destruction was not proved, as such there was no compliance of section 52(A)(2) and of section 50 of the NDPS act. None of the provision regarding search, seizure, preparation of inventory and destruction of contraband articles, certification etc. were followed. Hence conviction and sentence were set aside.

Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh sets aside conviction judgement under NDPS Act by 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, West Champaran

In Pintu Bhagat vs. State of Bihar, Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh of Patna High Court set aside the judgment of conviction dated June 15, 2010 and the order of sentence dated June 23, 2010 passed by the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, West Champaran at Bettiah in Tr. No. 15 of 2008, arising out of Kangli P.S. Case No. 25 of 2007. The judgement of the High Court was passed on July 27, 2015. 

The appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii) (C), 22(b) and 23(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh for each of the offences and in default thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for two years for each of the offences. The sentences awarded against the appellant were ordered to run concurrently.

The Court noted that the seized drugs were neither sealed nor sample taken on the date of seizure. 25 packets were alleged to have been seized while sample was taken from only 01 packet. Seized articles were not weighed and there was discrepancy in the statement of the witnesses regarding sending of sealed articles to the Police station. Photograph of the drugs were not taken nor representative sample was drawn in presence of any magistrate. Keeping the seized articles in unsealed condition for over a month, taking substances out of it in absence of accused or any independent witness for sampling and sealing of the sample by general seal create suspicion of tampering. The procedure laid down under Sections 52, 55 and 57 were not followed. 

Justice Singh concluded: "I am constrained to say that the investigation in this case is perfunctory and on important aspects of the matter the evidence is highly discrepant and unconvincing. Therefore, the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to believe that any article was ever seized from the possession of the appellant and, if seized, the same were charas."

The case was registered on December 28, 2007 in respect of an occurrence which took place in the night intervening between 27.12.2007 and 28.12.2007 on the basis of a written report submitted by one Raghunath Bori to the Officer-in-charge of Kangli Police Station. In the night on December 27, 2007 at Sikta Indo-Nepal Border near the old canal, which is 1.5 km away from Border Pillar No. 407 of village-Kathiya Mathiya, at about 11 p.m. in the night, seven persons were seen coming from the Nepal side carrying hand bags. On suspicion, when he asked to stop, they started running away. While running away, four of them fell down. It is further stated that the miscreants started firing on SSB Personnel. The SSB Personnel also took position and overpowered one of the miscreants, but other miscreants managed to escape taking advantage of dense fog and darkness of night. On inquiry, he disclosed his name as PintuBhagat, the appellant. On search of the bag recovered from the appellant, 25 packets of charas, each containing about 500 gm, wrapped in plastic covers, which were further kept in a gunny bag and further in a hand bag were recovered. 

On receipt of the written report of the informant, Kangli P.S. Case No. 25 of 2007 was registered on December 28, 2007 at 1.10 p.m. under Sections 21, 22, 23 of the NDPS Act and 27 of the Arms Act by the Station House Officer, Surendra Ram, who took up investigation of the case himself.

After holding the trial and hearing the parties, the trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court did not appreciate the evidences led on behalf of the prosecution in correct perspective. The contraband articles seized in the case were never produced before the Court. Even the Malkhana register was not produced during trial in order to prove safe custody of the contraband alleged to have been seized from the possession of the appellant. The chemical examiner, who issued the FSL report, was not examined during trial. The seizure list was neither prepared
at the spot nor the articles recovered were ever sealed in presence of the appellant. Even according to the prosecution case, sample was taken from only from one packet out of the 25 packets of contraband said to have been seized from possession of the appellant. It is not known from which packet the sample was taken. Hence, it cannot be said what were the contents of the other 24 packets which were neither produced before the court during trial nor any sample was drawn from them. There is no evidence that the contraband seized was ever weighed. The trial of the appellant was vitiated for total non-compliance of Sections 42, 52-A, 55 and 57 of the Act.

The Court observed that "From the record, it is clear that the seized articles were neither sealed nor sample was drawn on the date of seizure i.e. 27.12.2007. Even on 28.12.2007 when the seized articles were produced before the Surendra Ram, they were neither sealed nor were sample drawn in presence of the accused. The S.H.O., Surendra Ram (P.W. 9), has deposed that he kept the seized articles in the Malkhana of the police station but he has not stated that they were kept in the Malkhana in sealed condition. The Malkhana register was not produced in court in order to show the date of entry of the seized contraband in the Malkhana. The S.H.O., Kangli deposed that sample was drawn from one of the packets and it was properly sealed before sending it to the Forensic Science Laboratory, but it would appear from the record that the production-cum-seizure memo did not carry any seal impression."

The Court noted that "according to the prosecution case, 25 packets were recovered. It is an admitted case of prosecution that sample was taken from only one packet. Why the sample could not be taken from the other packets alleged to be seized has neither been stated nor been explained by the prosecution during trial."

The Court found that from the record that the charge sheet in the case was submitted on February 25, 2008 and the FSL report was received in the court almost two years thereafter on February 8, 2010. It was taken into evidence by the trial court under Section 293 of the Code. A copy of the FSL report was never supplied to the accused. A perusal of the report would demonstrate that the tin dibba sent to the FSL contained pieces of dark brown solid rectangular shaped substances. The dark brown solid rectangular substances contained in tin dibba were found to be charas containing Tetra Hydro Cannabin (T.H.C.). The report further describes that Tetra Hydro Cannabin is chief intoxicating ingredient of charas.

The order record that "There is no cogent evidence that the seized articles were ever weighed, as no balance and weight were used to weigh the articles. Even the weight of the sample sent to the FSL has not been disclosed by the informant in the deposition. The FSL report (Ext. 6) does not indicate the weight of the sample sent to the FSL. The remnants of the sample were not sent back. What happened to the 24 packets seized from the appellant is not known; what happened to the packet from which sample was drawn is also a mystery." The Court doubted the veracity of the prosecution case.

Justice Singh observed that "I find substance in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions prescribed under Sections 52, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act have not been followed by the investigating agency in the present case. It would be evident from a reading of Section 55 of the NDPS Act together with Section 52(3) of the NDPS Act that it is the officer-in-charge of the police station who takes charge of the person arrested as also the article seized and supervise the proceedings. He has to seal the contraband articles with his own seal, and then get them deposited at the police station for the safe custody either himself or through some officer, and in that event allow that officer to put his seal also on the packets sealed with his seal. There is no evidence that the S.H.O. of Kangli Police Station had ever put his seal on the seized articles or on the sample sent to the FSL. Though the S.H.O. has stated in his deposition that the same was sealed, there is no evidence whose seal was put on the sample."

He further observed that "In my opinion, the legislature had never contemplated that articles or samples recovered under the provisions of the NDPS Act would be kept unsealed, or they would be sealed with general seal. It would be evident from the record that the sample alleged to have been sent to the FSL had not been sent with any special seal."

The Court noted that Section 52-A of the NDPS Act comes into play after recovery of the contraband item. Justice Singh found that "photographs of the drugs or substances so seized were never taken. Even, the representative sample was not drawn in presence of any Magistrate. The seized charas was never produced in the court. There is no evidence to show that seized articles were kept in safe custody in the police station. In absence of any inventory, the photographs of the charas and any list of samples drawn under Sub-section (2) of Section 52-A and certified by the Magistrate, it would be difficult for the court to place reliance on the prosecution case regarding recovery of charas. The entire action of the prosecution in conducting the search, seizure, sampling etc. is contrary to the mandate of law. What is curious to note in the present case is that the guidelines given in the Act under Sections 52(3), 52(4) and 55 of the NDPS Act have been given a complete go-bye by the investigating agency. Further, Section 57 of the NDPS Act relates to reporting of arrest and seizure to immediate superior officer. The evidence shows that the same has not been done."

It emerges that the procedural errors on the part of the prosecution proved fatal to their case. 

Criminal appeal of Jharkhand residents in NDPS case related to 9 quintals of ganja is before the High Court

A criminal appeal filed on June 23, 2023 related to the conviction of two out of the three residents of Jharkhand, namely, Shankar Yadav, driver of a truck and Pritam Lakra, the Khalasi (helper) who have been found guilty of offences under Section 20 (b) (ii) (C) and Section 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985 came up for hearing before Patna High Court's bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Khatim Reza. on April 4, 2024. Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakra are incarcerated in Buxar jail. 

The owner of the truck which carried the ganja, Nav Kumar Ojha, the third convict is languishing in the Buxer jail without the benefit of legal representation due to extreme poverty. 

Notably, there were four accused in this NDPS case. Bijendra Kumar Rai (26), Dahiyawa, Chhapra city, Saran, Bihar, fourth one, was acquitted by Virendra Kumar Choubey, Additional District Sessions Judge-VIII, Ara on May 09, 2023 in NDPS Case No. 06 of 2021. Granting benefit of doubt with regard to accusations under Section 20 (b) (ii) (C) and Sections 25 and 29 of NDPS Act, he acquitted Bijendra Kumar Rai, a resident of Bihar and released him from judicial custody.

Also read: Patna High Court seized with NDPS case of 2021, driver Shankar Yadav was to get Rs 15,000, Pritam Lakra worked pro bono

Notably, Bijendra Kumar Rai was given notice under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. He gave his statement on February 2, 2021. In his statement, he had admitted that he is involved in the smuggling of ganja. He revealed that he had placed an order for sending 9 quintal of ganja to Sundar Rao. Sundar Rao had agreed to give it at the rate of Rs 1200/kg. Following which he contacted Nav Kumar Ojha and asked him to bring the ganja from Odhisa to Chhapra. For this work he promised a sum of Rs 5 lakh. Nav Kumar Ojha who agreed with this offer. He left Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakra in Odisha on his scorpio on January 25, 2021 and instructed them to bring the ganja laden truck to Bihar. After that Nav Kumar Ojha kept giving location of the truck to Bijendra Kumar Rai. Bijendra Kumar Rai met Nav Kumar Ojha on the evening of February 1, 2021 near Lalita Hotel. The story of 9 quintal of ganja will remain incomplete without factoring in the role of Bijendra Kumar Rai .            

Prior to this on February 22, 2024 the Court had passed an order saying, "Since a prayer for suspension of has sentence been made in the memo of appeal, Mr. Sujit Kumar Singh, the learned APP shall put in the written objection by the next date. Re-notify this appeal on receipt of the Trial Court Records on 4th of April, 2024." The order was authored by Justice Ashutosh Kumar. 

Meanwhile, Trial Court Record was received by the High Court on April 2, 2024 via letter dated March 30, 2024 from Additional Session Judge VIII in compliance with the Court's order dated February 22, 2024. The counsels for petitioners are: Ravindar Kumar, Rajesh Roy and Gopal Krishna. The counsels for the respondents are: Sujit Kumar Singh, Krishna Nandan Singh, Kumar Sachin and Bindhyachal Rai. 

Also read: Prayer for suspension of conviction of Shankar Yadav, Pritam Lakra admitted in Patna High Court

When the matter came before the bench on April 4, 2024, Bindhyachal Rai, the counsel for the Union of India through the Intelligence Officer sought "three weeks’ time to put in the written response against the prayer for suspension of sentence of the appellants during the pendency of this appeal." The Order reads: "Let that be done positively by the next date. Re-notify this appeal on 25th of April, 2024." The order was authored by Justice Ashutosh Kumar. 

Section 20 of the NDPS Act deals with punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plants and cannabis. It states that "Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,—(a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable..."  Section 20 (ii) b of the NDPS Act states that where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. Section 20 (ii) (C) states that where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b), and involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees. 
A careful perusal of the judgement of the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur reveals that Pritam Lakra, the helper of the truck is not covered under the ambit of Section 20 (ii) (b) and (C) of the NDPS Act because there is nothing on record to show that he is a cultivator of any cannabis plant or producer, manufacturer, possessor, seller, purchaser, transporter, inter-State importer, inter-State exporter or user of cannabis. It is apparent that the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur committed an error in convicting him under Section  20 (ii) (b) and (C) of the NDPS Act.

Section 25 of NDPS Act deals with the punishment for allowing premises, etc., to be used for commission of an offence. It states that "Whoever, being the owner or occupier or having the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, knowingly permits it to be used for the commission by any other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act, shall be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence." This provision too was substituted by the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 with effect from October 2, 2001. 

A bare reading of Section 25 NDPS Act shows that Pritam Lakra, the helper of the  truck in question is not covered under the ambit of Section 25. It seems that the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur committed an error in convicting him under Section 25.    


Thursday, April 11, 2024

Chief Justice appoints Shweta Kumari Singh as the first editor of Patna High Court

Shweta Kumari Singh has been appointed editor, Patna High Court by the outgoing Chief Justice of the High Court. The editor is supposed to monitor all machine translation related activities with effect from the date she assumes charge of her office. She is the first editor of the High Court.

This appointment has been made subsequent to creation of one post of the Editor by the General Administration Department, Government of Bihar. A notification dated April 4, 2024 was issued by P. K. Malik, Registrar General, High Court in this regard. The editor has taken charge with effect from April 4, 2024.

Prior to her current appointment, she was Principal Judge, Family Court, Ara from August 2, 2023 till April 3, 2024. Before that she was Additional District and Sessions Judge Motihari  from May 11, 2022 to August 1, 2023. She was also Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ara from October 8, 2018 till May 10, 2022. She was recruited directly from the Bar. She was born on May 20, 1976. She is a law graduate. She is due to retire on May 31, 2036. 

Notably, Brajesh Kumar Singh, Additional District and Session Judge, Aurangabad and Mukesh Kumar, Additional Principal Judge, Katihar have been appointed as Sub-editors of the High Court by the Chief Justice with effect from April 4, 2024.

Sunday, April 7, 2024

Limits of courts and judicial system for the movements of social change: Dr. S. Muralidhar

Text of the  Prof. M. N. Karna Memorial Lecture on "The Court, Justice System & Social Movements" delivered by Dr. S. Muralidhar, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court, Ex-Chief Justice, Orissa High Court.


I am honoured to be invited to deliver the first Prof. M. N. Karna memorial lecture. When his son Tarun sent me the invitation, I was a bit hesitant and wondered if a person in the field of law could undertake the not so easy task of speaking in memory of a stellar academic in the field of social sciences that Prof Karna was. But after getting a peek into the rich array of achievements of this highly respected academic, and in particular his range of interests, I understood that he would be rather pleased with this attempt at an inter- disciplinary approach to the topic chosen for today’s lecture. My fascination with sociology began rather late in my journey with the law but it enriched my understanding of many of the core sociological issues concerning race, caste and class that law and, in particular, constitutional law, has to grapple with. Prof. Karna’s active participation in various social movements around the issues of social and economic justice, democratic rights and secularism would have made him the ideal expert for legal scholars to turn to in order to broaden their understanding of how sociological insights may explain the genesis and development of the law relating to society. His not being around is a loss not just the field of sociology but to law as well.

Before I begin, some caveats might be in order. The topic that I have chosen is indeed much vaster than I imagined and so what follows is but a broad sketch, with no claims whatsoever to being comprehensive or exhaustive. Also, it cannot claim to be totally objective either. My understanding is shaped largely by my exposure to the interplay of law and society through four decades in the field of law – nearly two of those as a lawyer. I must disclose that I was a lawyer in some of the cases I will be discussing, on the side of those resisting the might of the state. This includes the cases involving the tribals displaced on account of the dams over the Narmada, the victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster, and the case concerning manual scavengers and sewer workers. Also, having spent over 17 years as a judge of the High Court, I am less sanguine than I was when I went over to the Bench about the judiciary’s capacity at finding solutions to the complex problems of law and society thrown up by the policy decisions of the state in the name of development. In fact, I increasingly find myself on the side of those concerned about the judiciary’s capacity to contribute in no small measure to those problems. While I certainly don’t hold a brief for the court, I think its decisions at all levels merit critical appraisal.


 Let us begin by examining where we stand today as a country and as a people. I shall refer to three reports by international organisations that have consistently, over a decade or more, undertaken quantitative analysis of the performance parameters of countries worldwide. These reports are available in the public domain. While they may not be entirely accurate, they do serve a useful backdrop against which we may begin to examine the topic on hand.

I begin with the Human Development Report for 2023/2024 titled ‘Managing Interdependence in a polarised world’. For the benefit of the audience, it will be useful to recall that the HD Index (HDI) measures human development in countries by analyzing their performance in three dimensions -Health, Education, and standard of living. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita.

In 2022 India’s rank was 134 out of 191 countries. It was far below Russia (56, belonging to the group of Very High HD Countries) and China (75), Sri Lanka (79), Bhutan (89), South Africa (110) Philippines (113) [who fall in the High HD countries group) and is even below Bhutan (125) and Bangladesh (129) in the Medium HD Group). Among the countries in the South Asian sub-continent, only Nepal (146) Pakistan (164) and Afghanistan (182) are blow India.

The HD Report notes that “Recent conflicts and geopolitical tensions have surged. The impacts of conflicts spill beyond not only geographical boundaries but also generational boundaries, with the wars in Gaza, Ukraine and Yemen reversing human development gains made over generations and curtailing prospects for entire cohorts of young people.” It notes: “Emerging from conflicts, persecution and human rights violations, the number of people forced to flee their homes reached 108 million, the highest level since World War II and two and a half times the number in 2010. And this does not include the latest displacements—Palestinians in Gaza and the Armenia refugee crisis, among others. One in five children globally lives in or is fleeing conflict. Millions of people, including children, who have been forced to flee their homes due to no fault of their own could live a life of dignity if countries (involved or not involved in conflicts) could find mutually agreeable solutions for displaced people.

What we are witnessing at home is apparently a global trend. The HD Report observes: “In recent years political movements that advocate the domestic over the international and question the need for global cooperation have gained traction in many countries. These movements are characterized by narrative frames that contrast what is purported to represent the interests of the general population with what serves an established elite, in what has been described as an anti-elite theory of society. Rather than ideology based, these views centre on people’s “moral” superiority over a corrupt elite. Some variants include identity-based organized views, such as nativist movements based on the superiority of one race or ethnicity, or movements that favour strong leaders without checks and balances.” It talks of the ‘emerging democracy paradox’: nearly 9 in 10 people believe that democracy is a fundamental pillar of political systems. But support for leaders who may bypass the fundamental rules of the democratic process has markedly increased. Today, more than half of those polled express support for such leaders.

I next turn to the Social Progress Index allows us to assess a country’s success in turning economic progress into improved social outcomes. The Social Progress Index framework focuses on three distinct (though related) questions:

1. Does a country provide for its people’s most essential needs?

2. Are the building blocks in place for individuals and communities to enhance and sustain wellbeing?

3. Is there opportunity for all individuals to reach their full potential?

In terms of the Social Progress Index 2024, India ranks 111 out of 170 countries with an overall score of 58.06. It is pertinent to note, India has slipped 4 ranks from where it stood last year. While the index lauds our nation’s efforts in areas like Usage of clean fuels and technology for cooking, Access to online governance, and gender inclusivity among others, it also indicates the need to improve in areas like child stunting, sanitation and hygiene, and press freedom etc. 

I last turn to the World Happiness Report which is a study launched in 2012 to support the United Nations’ sustainable development goals. People in 143 countries and territories are asked to evaluate their life on a scale from zero to 10, with 10 representing their best possible life. Results from the past three years are averaged to create a ranking. India ranked 126 out of 143 countries, behind Libya, Iraq, Palestine, and Niger. In India, older adults with secondary or higher education and those of dominant social castes report higher life satisfaction than counterparts without formal education and those from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. India’s older population is the second largest worldwide, with 140 million Indians aged 60 and over, second only to its 250 million Chinese counterparts. Additionally, the average growth rate for Indians aged 60 and above is three times higher than the overall population growth rate of the country. Lower satisfaction with living arrangements, perceived discrimination, and poor self-rated health were important factors associated with low life satisfaction among older Indians.


Throughout human history there have been violent conflicts in the name of religion, race, sovereignty. These have in turn been met with mass uprising and revolts, and of course social movements. We are all aware of the French Revolution, the labour movements in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the civil rights movement in the United States (and now the Black Lives Matter movement) which continues to fight for a life of dignity for the African Americans, the suffragette movement which was a precursor to the women’s movement, the Anti apartheid movement in S Africa and so on. These have played a very significant role in the shaping of an international legal humans rights order, thus deeply impacting lived lives of millions world over. These have enshrined in the international law lexicon the basic human values of liberty, freedom, equality, dignity and justice. 

India too has been witness to social movements and their natural extension – mass movements- throughout its history, where the collective voice of the people resisting state excesses and clamouring for change has been heard and responded to in a variety of ways by those in power. In the 19th century we have had many social reform movements that responded to caste and class inequalities. These included the Brahmo Samaj and its offshoot the Arya Samaj movement and later the Theosophical Society with the avowed object of resisting and demanding abolition of child marriages. These movements built the momentum resulting in a law abolishing child marriages being passed in 1929. In the pre-independence era we saw the Vaikom Satyagraha led by Sree Narayana Guru in Kerala and E V Ramaswamy Periyar and the Mahad satyagraha led by Babasaheb Ambedkar which led to passing of a law permitting temple entry to all castes. Then we saw the political movements like the champaran movement and the salt satyagraha which had a deep impact on raising social consciousness and catalysing the growth of the freedom struggle. Many of these movements had an impact on how laws were made, enforced and how courts decided cases. Soon after independence we had the launch of the Bhoodan and Gram Dan movements of Acharya Vinoba Bhave in which many participated and donated large tracts of land with the avowed object of of redistribution among the landless. This inspired a whole set of land reform laws. The peasant movements, the Dalit movements, the women’s movements, the movement of backward classes, the Chipko movement in Uttarakhand to save trees, the backlash in the form of the anti Mandal agitation have shaped the laws and policies on reservations and have had a telling influence on the approach of the judiciary to issues of quotas in education and in government jobs. The movements of the past have inspired events of the present. The tribal revolt led Birsa Munda in Jharkhand and the Telangana movement of the late 1940s were the inspiration for the formation of the separate states of Jharkhand in 2000 and Telangana in 2014.

In 2008 began the India against Corruption movement which in 2012 saw the emergence of a political formation, the Aam Aadmi Party. In the recent we past witnessed two major protests that gained worldwide attention. One was the anti CAA protests, which though unsupported by the courts gained worldwide attention and slowed the implementation of the law by at least four years. The other has been the farmers’ agitation against the proposed farm laws which had a surge of support from a wide cross-section and was able to withstand repeated attempts by the state to discredit and disband it through coercive tactics. The movement ultimately compelled the government to withdraw the three Bills. Throughout history, therefore, social movements have had a lasting impact on law making, law enforcement and advancement of human values of freedom and dignity. There have been, and continue to be, regressive social movements too. The resurgence of the far right and fundamentalist forces world over serves to remind us that unless democracy and freedoms in particular are practised with persistent zeal, they may be lost too easily.


In this lecture, however, I cannot obviously attempt to paint a wide canvass. I will focus therefore on contemporaneous social and mass movements in India which have arisen as a response to the policies and laws of the State that have privileged development over the lives of the lesser privileged and vulnerable populations in India. I began by referring to the three reports to generally make the point that economic progress even in the medium HD countries like India is accompanied by increasing inequalities in society. Concerns over the growing inequalities in Indian society brought about by a model of development that has excluded large sections of the population, have been voiced in judgments of our Supreme Court. In one decision delivered in 2010, which reviewed the government's decision to give the right to explore offshore oil reserves to a private corporation, it was observed: 

"The neo-liberal agenda has increasingly eviscerated the State of stature and power, bringing vast benefits to the few, modest benefits for some, while leaving everybody else, the majority, behind. As we cast a glance across the face of our land, the greater incidence of social unrest, and movements for greater self determination, seem to occur by and large in states and regions that have plenty of natural wealth and paradoxically suffer from low levels of human development." 

In July of the same year another bench of the Court remarked: 

"It is very often the process of development that most starkly confirms the fears expressed by Dr. Ambedkar about our democracy. A blinkered vision of development, complete apathy towards those who are highly adversely affected by the development process and a cynical unconcern for the enforcement of the laws lead to a situation where the rights and benefits promised and guaranteed under the constitution hardly ever reach the most marginalized citizens." 

However, the above response should not be mistaken to be the general view of the judiciary as a whole in relation to the issues of law and development in the country. On the contrary, I seek to demonstrate that the response of the judiciary has been uneven, and at times even unprincipled. While in some instances, the response has been informed by reason, at other times utilitarian pragmatism appears to have been the approach. Yet, the judiciary has not been able to ignore the voices brought forth into the public discourse, and therefore into court spaces, by social movements. I will briefly touch upon how social movements have shaped and have been shaped by judicial decisions and these in turn have helped shape public opinion. They have helped ask for greater transparency and accountability from institutions of governance. They have ushered in and developed in a positive way, changes in the fabric of social welfare legislations. While there have been and will continue to be sceptics questioning the competence and legitimacy of judicial intervention in areas of executive and legislative policy, it leaves optimists like me with the hope that this is but a work in progress in what many perceive as a fledgling democracy.


Role of the Judiciary

I will now seek to briefly trace the evolution of the role of the judiciary in seeking to recognize, protect and enforce basic rights, including social rights. Overcoming its initial phase of conservatism in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of India in the Fundamental Rights case in 1973 held that what was fundamental in the governance of the country was no less significant than that which was fundamental in the life of an individual. It declared that the justiciable fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution and the non-justiciable and 'aspirational' DPSP in Part IV were not divisible but complementary.

This led progressively the Supreme Court to declare in 1977 in the now celebrated decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that the doctrine of substantive due process was integral to the chapter on fundamental rights. The negative right to life under Article 21 restrained the state from denying a person’s right to life and liberty except according to procedure established by law. The further requirement now was that such law had to be “just, fair and reasonable.” In subsequent decisions, the court proceeded to expand the content of the right to life to include “the right to live with human dignity and all that goes with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and comingling with fellow human beings.” These decisions laid the foundation for the evolution of the social rights jurisprudence.

Public Interest Litigation

In the late 1970s the Supreme Court innovated the public interest litigation (PIL) jurisdiction. The Court wanted to be seen as an institution that worked for the people. The Court realised that if the justice system had to remain relevant to large masses of underprivileged and disadvantaged people, who could not afford to reach the Court, the Court must reach out to them. It ought not to wait for them to knock at its doors. In a sense the Court was seeking legitimacy for its own constitutional role to make social justice a reality for the masses. PIL was seen by the Court as an extended arm of the legal aid movement which would be the constitutional tool to achieve social justice.

In the PIL jurisdiction, any public-spirited person can bring causes affecting not necessarily herself, but a class of persons, before the constitutional courts. The petitions could be informal. The procedures are also flexible. PIL is considered non-adversarial. The focus is on problem solving. The Court is not restrained by having to make choices among binary options. The Court in its PIL jurisdiction has been able to adopt creative ways of overcoming the law versus policy hurdle. Typically, it will issue orders and retain the case to monitor their enforcement. It has explained this technique as 'continuing mandamus.' Where the subject matter is technical, it will ask for reports from experts. It will rope in amicus curiae to help it navigate the technical and legal terrain. The PIL jurisdiction has grown over the years and forms the centrepiece of the Court's functioning. PIL has provided social movements a space in which to get courts to engage with issues of law and society, law and development and people’s access to justice. It has helped raise issues of transparency, accountability and answerability of institutions to the rule of law.

I wish to illustrate what I have just said with certain instances. The first concerns two large dam projects, the next mining projects in two different tribal areas and lastly the issue concerning the right to dignity and health of sweepers and sanitation workers. The issues in these cases were examined on the touchstone of constitutional and statutory provisions including those pertaining to land acquisition, protection of the environment and the rights of forest dwellers.

The Tehri Dam Project

The first case I propose to discuss is the challenge brought forth to the construction of a major multi-purpose dam at the confluence of the Bhagirathi and Bhilangana rivers (both being tributaries to India's longest river: the Ganges) in the Garhwal region of the Himalayas in the northern State of Uttaranchal. The project was first challenged in 1985 in a PIL by a group of concerned public spirited citizens. They based their grounds of challenge on the grave risk the project posed to the safety of the local population, and the irreversible damage to the ecology and environment. They pointed out that the dam was located in a seismic zone that was prone to earthquakes. The threat of the dam breaking and flooding towns and cities downstream was not improbable.

The Government however informed the Court that its expert bodies had unanimously ruled that the dam was safe from all points of view and environmental clearance had been granted on that basis in July 1990.

In a judgment delivered in November 1990, the Supreme Court deferred to the opinion of the Government and its experts. It said that in matters of policy the government was in the best position to decide what was good for the people. The case was dismissed.

Less than a year thereafter on 21st October 1991 an earthquake measuring 6.1 on the Richter scale struck the region. Two villages in the region were completely destroyed and around 2000 persons were killed. The dam which was under construction suffered cracks. But the experts ruled out the possibility of any significant damage to the structure. The Supreme Court was again approached by a group of experts in 1992 in yet another PIL questioning the decision to proceed with the dam. In particular they wondered how environmental clearance could have been given for the project without all the relevant tests being carried out. The petitioners also contended that the environment clearance was conditional upon pari passu implementation of the rehabilitation of the displaced project affected persons. They insisted that in the absence of the rehabilitation of those affected, the construction of the dam ought not to be permitted.

The petition came to be decided only in September 2003 more than a decade after it was filed. This time by a majority of 2:1 the Court again negatived the challenge. Two of the three judges constituting the majority declined to order a re-examination by experts of the safety of the dam. They held that "when the government or the authorities concerned after due consideration of all view points and full application of mind took a decision, then it is not appropriate for the court to interfere. Such matters must be left to the mature wisdom of the Government or the implementing agency. It is their forte… The consideration in such cases is in the process of decision and not on its merits.”

According to the majority, it was too late in the day to question the decision to construct a large dam. The benefits of such dams were "too well known". It might even improve the environment of areas where the canal waters would reach. As regards the rehabilitation issue, the majority accepted the version of the Government that there was “substantial compliance with all the conditions” The majority left it to the High Court of the region to monitor the fulfillment of the conditions for environment clearance.

The third dissenting Judge differed on both aspects of safety as well as rehabilitation. Applying the precautionary principle of international environmental law that had become part of the domestic law, he held that “it is only after 3-D non-linear analysis of the dam is completed and the opinion of the experts on the safety aspects is again sought that further impoundment of the dam should be allowed.” He acknowledged that “there are economic costs as well as social costs and environmental costs involved in a project of construction of a large dam. The social cost is also too heavy. It results in widespread displacement of local people from their ancestral habitat and loss of their traditional occupations. The displacement of economically weaker sections of the society and tribals, is the most serious aspect of displacement from the point of view of uprooting them from their natural surroundings. Absence of these surroundings in the new settlement colonies shatters tier social, cultural and physical links.”

The conflict of rights in the context of dams and power projects was also noticed. The dissenting judge pointed out that "in the march of progress, the humblest and the weakest should not be left behind." He added that to remove a man living in the hills and rehabilitate him in the plains is like "taking a fish from the river and putting it into an artificial reservoir or an aquarium where it might survive but can never be happy." The judge pointed out: "Such less-advantaged group is expected to be given prior attention by a welfare State like ours which is committed and obliged by the Constitution, particularly by its provisions contained in the preamble, fundamental rights, fundamental duties and directive principles, to take care of such deprived sections of people who are likely to lose their home and source of livelihood.” [The update as of May 2023 is: Tehri oustees lack basics': HC seeks state govt reply]

The Sardar Sarovar Project

The Narmada river in central India which flows for a length of 1312 kms, most of it through the Vindhya ranges. The river begins in Amarkantak in the state of Madhya Pradesh and flows into the Arabian Sea in Gujarat. A 'staircase'' of dams involved 30 big dams, 135 medium dams and 3000 small dams are to be constructed at various points on the river. The dams are to provide a variety of needs, from generating electricity to reaching water to water scarce regions of Gujarat and Rajasthan. The downside is that over 300,000 persons, a sizeable percentage of them tribals in Madhya Pradesh, have faced displacement.

The largest of these dams is the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) named after a popular political figure who was also India's first Home Minister. The 455 ft. high dam is expected to submerge 37533 hectares of land. Much before the work on the SSP started, the inter-state River Water Disputes Tribunal gave an Award in 1977 mandating pari passu rehabilitation of the project affected persons. Those losing lands were to be given a larger area of land elsewhere. But this was long drawn out and unsatisfactory. A PIL case was brought before the Supreme Court of India in 1994 by a non-governmental mass-based organisation called the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), representing those affected by the SSP and other large and small dams across the Narmada. NBA questioned the environmental clearance given to the SSP. It was located in a seismically active area. They demanded that a fresh environmental appraisal in the terms of the new stringent norms laid down by statute in 1994 be undertaken. NBA also highlighted the severe hardship faced by the tribal population in Madhya Pradesh. They were losing their habitat. They would be unable to preserve their culture and customary practices. Further, there were glaring procedural irregularities in the land acquisition process. NBA also argued that until there was full rehabilitation of those affected, in terms of the Tribunal's Award, prior to the submergence of their habitats, the project should not be allowed to continue.

The Supreme Court of India in a verdict delivered in October 2000 rejected the petition by a majority of 2:1. The majority adverted to two competing public interests: the right of the inhabitants of the water starved regions of Gujarat and Rajasthan to water for drinking and irrigation on the one hand and the rights to shelter and livelihood of over 41,000 families comprising tribals, small farmers, fishing communities facing displacement on the other. The SSP did not require re-examination either on the ground of its cost-effectiveness or in regard to the seismicity aspect. The area of justiciability was confined to the rehabilitation of those displaced by the SSP. The majority was of the view that at the rehabilitation sites the tribals "will have more, and better, amenities than those enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream of society will lead to betterment and progress.” Even while it was aware that displacement of the tribal population “would undoubtedly disconnect them from the past, culture, custom and traditions,” the majority explained it away on the utilitarian logic that such displacement “becomes necessary to harvest a river for the larger good.”

The majority opinion further highlighted the two principal concerns of the justiciability debate – legitimacy and competence. It declared that “if a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not malafide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the functions of the executive.” Further, “whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it is to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken.” The Court outsourced the examination of the grievances of the project affected regarding failure by the State to provide the promised rehabilitation to non-judicial Grievance Redressal Authorities.

The dissenting judge, however, found that environmental clearance for the project as required by the law that underwent significant change in 1994 was absent. He directed that till such clearance was accorded “further construction work on the dam shall cease.” He further noted that: “The many interim orders that this court made in the years in which this writ petition was pending show how very little had been done in regard to the relief and rehabilitation of those ousted. It is by reason of the interim orders, and, in fairness, the cooperation and assistance of learned counsel who appeared for the states, that much that was wrong has now been redressed.” He insisted that till environmental impact was again assessed, and there was pari passu rehabilitation of the displaced persons, the further construction should stop.

I pause here to take stock of the key issues that emerged from the two cases I have discussed. First, the decisions re-kindle the debate about the legitimacy and competence of courts to adjudicate cases involving enforcement of social rights. In both cases there was a lack of unanimity among the judges on (a) whether a large dam is necessarily a good thing and (b) whether the court can review the government's decision on that question. While the majority opinion in both cases deferred to the wisdom of the executive on this aspect, the dissenting judges did not buy into the utilitarian logic of the 'greatest good of the greatest number'. If the weak and vulnerable were going to further weakened, what about the role of the Court as a guardian of constitutional rights of the oppressed?

On the aspect of environment clearance, again the utilitarian logic prevailed with the majority. For the dissenters there were two distinct aspects that mattered. One of course was the safety of the dam in an area prone to earthquakes. The other was the destruction of forests that were ecologically sensitive and the biological diversity of which was irreplaceable. Then there was the question of the legal principles on which the reasoning should be based. For the majority judges in both cases, a dam was not a polluting unit, and therefore did not have to meet the stringent environment standards. In the Tehri case, the dissenting judge referred to the Rio Declaration and international environment law principles to support his reasoning.

A third issue, which I consider significant, is the process by which the Court reached the decision in each case. The Court never got to hear the affected persons first hand. There were no visits to the areas affected. The Court preferred pragmatism to principle when it asked the individual grievances to be examined by non-judicial bodies. In fact I wonder what would the result might have been if the Court had, instead of sitting in Delhi which was thousands of miles away from the area, held the hearings where the submergence was happening? What if it had heard the oral testimonies of the people affected speaking in their own voices and language, rather than their lawyers in English? The Court did not think it necessary to put in place any public hearing processes that would be based on the principle of prior informed consent of the people affected. There was no facilitation of meaningful dialogue or engagement between the State and the affected persons. The proceedings were marked by mutual disbelief and mistrust between the state and the affected people. The State used its coercive police power to quell the protests, even where they were peaceful. The NBA which was a spontaneous support of most of the ousters faced repression and coercion at the hands of the State. Nevertheless, the media and international attention it garnered helped when the fresh land acquisition law was enacted in 2013. More of this, later. The Narmada case is a reminder that economic and social rights are inextricably linked to civil and political rights. The Courts cannot and should not attempt to compartmentalise them. The short video clip that I wish to share, helps us understand the plight of the ousters as articulated in their own voices.

The full rehabilitation of the Project Affected Families, relocated to Gujarat, remains incomplete even after four decades. In Jalsindhi Vasahat in Sankheda taluka of Chhota Udepur district, those displaced from Jalsindhi in present-day Alirajpur in Madhya Pradesh, have been settled since 1985. Speaking in a dialect of Gujarati, 150 families here mostly earn their livelihood from supplying milk or working as farm labourers. S Devajiya Ugrania, 65, says he moved to the settlement in the 1980s at the age of 25. Surrounded by residents, who nod in agreement, Ugrania says, “We have heard that the SSPA is merging the villages into the panchayats. We have no problem with that. But who will provide us with the promised government jobs and water supply before we are merged? The villages are facing a water crisis too and are not in a position to accommodate more people… These issues should be resolved; the able adults should be handed out the jobs that were promised and we will happily merge into the panchayats.”

The Lafarge and Niyamagiri Hills cases

I now move to two other cases. Although in these two cases also the persons affected most were tribals, the projects were to benefit private corporations located outside India. The other distinguishing feature is that both projects were located in exclusive tribal areas which are called 'scheduled areas'. Typically, these are pristine regions which are biologically diverse and rich in mineral resources.

I will digress a bit here to discuss the Fifth and Sixth Schedules to the Constitution of India. These contain provisions that preserve the traditions, customs and laws of tribals located in 'scheduled areas'. The Sixth Schedule applies to states in the north-eastern region of the country, where the tribals are in numerical majority. The Fifth Schedule applies to other areas in the country where the tribals reside, although they are in a numerical minority. One common feature is that in these scheduled areas there cannot be a transfer of land from a tribal to a non-tribal, which also includes the State and its entities. However, there has been no clarity on whether the land acquisition law could be used by the State to acquire lands in scheduled areas.

The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 or FRA, enacted in 2006 recognises the rights of traditional forest dwellers or adivasis to reside within forest areas and access its resources for their traditional means of survival. Importantly, it envisages a mandatory consultative process involving prior informed consent, with the affected tribals whose habitats are sought to be taken over for 'development' purposes.

It is the above background, that we turn to the third and fourth cases. Lafarge, a French company, was granted lease of lands for mining of limestone. The lands were located in a Sixth Schedule area in Meghalaya in India close to the border between India and Bangladesh. The limestone would be carried by conveyor belt across the border and processed in a factory established by Lafarge in Bangladesh.

In this case too, the challenge raised in the Supreme Court of India was to the environment clearance granted for the mining lease to be operated. The process envisaged by the Environment Protection Act required the project proponent (Lafarge) to prepare and submit an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report. This would be followed by public hearings in the area where the affected residents could raise their objections to the EIA.

In this case since the petitioners argued that the local villagers had not consented to the mining project, the Supreme Court ordered a fresh set of hearings to be conducted and called for a report from the forest authorities in Meghalaya. After perusing the report, the Court was satisfied that a meaningful and informed hearing had taken place. It appeared that the tribals of the village themselves desired the limestone deposits should be exploited scientifically and for commercial purposes. In its judgment delivered in 2011 the Supreme Court remarked that "it cannot be presumed that the tribals are not aware of principles of conservation of forests." The environment clearance was upheld.

Now to the last case. Vedanta Alumina Ltd., a company based in the United Kingdom, proposed to set up in Lanjigarh in Odisha a refinery to manufacture aluminum. The raw material was bauxite which is available in abundance on the top of the Niyamagiri Hills. The area is the habitat of the traditional forest dwellers the Dongria Kondhs. This is a scheduled area protected under the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.

There were two major questions that arose. One was whether the environment clearance was rightly granted for the bauxite mining project by the government? The other was whether the permission under the prevailing forest laws could be given for diverting biologically rich forest land for mining purposes? The tribals here contended that the top of the Niyamagiri Hills where bauxite was found in abundance was a sacred place of worship and therefore could not be touched.

The expert Committees set up by the Government of India found that the mandatory provisions of the FRA which required prior informed consent of the tribals through public hearings and consultation had not taken place. Even the alumina refinery had not complied with the conditions of environmental clearance. Interestingly, in the Supreme Court, while the project proponent was supported by the local state government of Odisha, the public interest petitioners were supported in their stand by the central government.

The approach of the Supreme Court of India in this case was refreshingly different. In a judgment delivered in April 2013, it held that the traditional forest dwellers "have a right to maintain their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands." Further, after extensively referring to domestic and international law on the subject the Court held that if the bauxite mining project, in any way, "affects the religious rights of the Dongria Kondhs, especially their right to worship their deity, known as Niyam Raja, in the hill top of the Niyamagiri range of hills, that right has to be preserved and protected". It mandated that public hearings had to be held in every one of the 14 villages in the area. A judicial officer was asked to be an observer at every such meeting and to certify that it took place uninfluenced by the project proponent or the state government. The central government was asked to take the final decision after the villagers had put forth their points of view.

The aftermath was that the unanimous view of the villagers was that the permission for the bauxite mining project should be refused. People’s collective will prevailed, as the short video clip I am going to play shows. The central government had to therefore also refuse permission. The project proponent through the state government tried to petition the court again in 2016 for a fresh set of public hearings. The court refused this request.

There is a post note to this. In October 2023 a fresh EIA hearing was attempted in Sijimali in Rayagada district. This has left the villagers disenchanted. Prafulla Samantara, noted environmental activist, said, “the administration handled the public hearing in a suspicious manner. Hundreds of people were waiting outside the venue to speak their hearts out. Sensing overwhelming resistance against the project, the public hearing was winded up within two hours.”

Both the Lafarge and the Niyamagiri Hills cases saw the Indian Supreme Court giving importance to the views of the local affected population and not simply deferring to the executive standpoint on what was the greater common good. The insistence on prior informed consent of the affected population restored the perception of the court as an institution that will protect and enforce the rights of the less privileged. The usual arguments of whether to promote industrial activity in a certain region being in the realm of executive policy, did not impress the Court. The resort to international covenants to meaningfully interpret the scope of the rights of indigenous persons to their customary forms of worship and traditions under the domestic law is a significant aspect of the Niyamagiri Hills case.

The outcome in the two cases may have been different but the Court insisted on the strict adherence to the process of consultation and dialogue with the affected populations on the principle of prior informed consent. The difference in the approach of the court in the two cases involving dams and these two cases is palpable.

The Safai Karamchari Andolan Case

I would like also to refer to another remarkable decision delivered by the Supreme Court of India in a class action litigation brought forth by the Safai Karamchari Andolan, a campaign for protection and enforcement of the fundamental right to dignity of the over 700,000 manual scavengers in the country. After ten years of perseverance, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark judgment acknowledging the history of indignity and injustice they had been subject to. Not only did the Court acknowledge the injustice resulting from the non-implementation of the 1993 legislation that prohibited the operation of dry latrines and manual scavenging but clarified that the subsequent statute viz., in no way, neither dilutes the constitutional mandate of Article 17 nor does it condone the inaction on the part of Union and State Governments under the 1993 Act. What the 2013 Act does in addition is to expressly acknowledge Article 17 and Article 21 rights of the persons engaged in sewage cleaning and cleaning tanks as well persons cleaning human excreta on railway tracks. Apart from issuing a series of direction to the Railways to sop using sanitation workers for cleaning railway tracks of excreta, the Supreme Court ordered that the families of all persons who have died in sewerage work (manholes, septic tanks) since 1993 have to be identified and compensation of Rs.10 lakhs has to be paid for each such death to the family members depending on them. (This has recently been revised to 30 lakhs). This is a beginning of a new phase in their struggle. It is certainly not the end, but an important milestone in the course of their struggle which they have rightly taken control of. It has done something remarkable to their sense of self-worth and dignity. The build-up to the above verdict was a nation-wide Maila Mukti Yatra undertaken by the sanitation workers themselves. They unequivocally asserted that they would be the makers of their own destinies. Let us hear them speak about this. (a video clip was played)

Social movements in the areas of civil liberties (for e.g. the PUCL), health (the Jan Swasthya Abhiyan), rights of agricultural labour ((Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity) have been able to bring forth PIL cases in Courts for enforcing, even if they do not expressly articulate it as such, certain ‘minimum core obligations’. This is in the context of the right to health where it held the right to emergency medical treatment and primary health care as part of the right to life (Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samiti case); in the context of the right to food where it recognised the right to minimum nutritional content required for human sustenance (PUCL Case) and in the context of shelter where it upheld the right to procedural fairness in the context of forcible evictions (the Olga Tellis Case).

Conflict of interests in PIL cases 

While PIL has provided space to social movements to articulate their demands, there have been instances of the jurisdiction being invoked by groups working at cross purposes. A typical example is a court intervention in a PIL at the instance of an environment protection group which results in loss of livelihoods and access to resources to vulnerable groups like fisher folk or forest dwellers. Another instance is residents in apartments in middle-class urban localities invoking their fundamental right to housing and seeking forced eviction of slums in the neighbourhood thus depriving the slum-dwellers of their rights to shelter, livelihood and a bundle of associated inter-dependent ESC and civil and political rights. The Courts have then to ensure that the basic minimum protection of the Constitutional guarantees of the slum-dwellers are not sacrificed on the altar of protection of the rights to housing of the apartment-dwellers. A conservative approach could be to ask whether the slum-dwellers have a right to continue to dwell on private or public land? The human rights sensitive approach would be to ask whether prior to their eviction, alternative arrangements have been made to ensure that their displacement does not result in deprivation of a whole bundle of rights apart from the right to shelter which might include the right to health, the right to the livelihood, the right to education of children in the slums and so on. This changed approach signals the importance of respecting the economic and social rights and not viewing them in isolation. The Delhi High Court has in two cases (Sudama Singh and Ajay Maken), adopted this approach by drawing upon both the international human rights law and South African jurisprudence on meaningful engagement with the affected communities. This has been described by Prof Roberto Gargarella of Argentina as an instance of adoption of a deliberative democratic approach. Nevertheless, the overall contribution by the judiciary to developing a jurisprudence around protection and enforcement of ESC rights cannot be gainsaid. 


Law as an instrument of social change and social movements as a driver of legal change

Civil society groups have either emerged from or have been principal supports to social movements, as we saw during the anti CAA protests and the protests by farmers against the proposed farm laws a couple of years ago. They have been involved in mobilising, organising and educating various interest groups to articulate their concerns in the public domain, helping them to engage with institutions and those in power. Whether it is a gathering of the Narmada dam oustees spearheaded by the NBA, or the groups of Bhopal gas victims, they have been a force to reckon with politically.  These mass movements have perhaps contributed in no small measure to law and policy making in both the international and national spheres. In the last four decades, there has been a persistent groundswell of mass movements and civil society campaigns around recognition, protection and enforcement of a range of ESC rights. This has contributed in large measure to the legislature in India according statutory recognition of the minimum core elements of economic and social rights by enacting a series of legislations like the rural employment guarantee legislation that fixes the daily wage and the number of days of work to afford a decent standard of living to rural households, the National Food Security legislation that mandates States to provide minimum nutritional levels and within the larger group identify the more vulnerable ones  like children, lactating mothers, the elderly and those living below the poverty line as being entitled to these basic minimum nutritional food.

In the context of land acquisition, a newer form of the legislation was enacted in 2013 which sets down the basic minimum standard of what could constitute shelter in a rehabilitation colony and provides for taking of land to be replaced by arable land. The legislation providing the right to information also came about as a result of sustained campaign by a grassroots movement in Rajasthan. This ‘bottom up approach’ to law making also saw the enactment of the FRA in 2016 which recognises the rights of traditional forest dwellers. The slum improvement laws and other transitory laws applicable in major metropolises have acknowledged the acute need for shelter among the millions of homeless persons including street dwellers and ordered a moratorium on evictions. Even the right to health has been increasingly acknowledged in State policy as ‘entitlements’. These have come through greater awareness, intense campaigns by people’s movements. Another example of a people’s movement leading to making of a law is the Anna Hazare led movement against corruption leading to the passing of the Lok Pal (or Public Ombudsman) Act. The Association for Democratic Reforms has through consistent campaign brought about greater transparency in electoral politics, and has been instrumental in getting the scheme of electoral bonds invalidated by the Supreme Court of India. The women’s movement in India has been instrumental in bringing about laws that recognise and seek to alleviate the peculiar disadvantages faced by victims of rape, of domestic violence, of sexual harassment at the workplace, of discrimination in the matter of payment of wages and maternity benefits.

ESC rights legislations have also been shaped by the international human rights law instruments themselves. With the enactment of the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 which set up the National Human Rights Commission, the Indian Parliament has formally incorporated the international covenants into domestic law. Section 2 (d) of the Act defines ‘human rights’ to mean “the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India.” Section 2 (f) defines ‘international covenants” to include both the ICCPR and the ICESCR apart from other treaties ratified by India. The CEDAW,the Child Rights Conventionand the Disabilities Rights Conventionhave influenced the corresponding domestic law in a major way.

The mere enactment of a law is not a complete solution to the problem it seeks to tackle. The law has to be worked and that too effectively. Selective and half-hearted approaches to implementation can compound the problem. Yet, statutes and Covenants do perform an important task of norm setting. Further the international Covenants like the ICESCR and ICCPR have helped provide a jurisprudential basis for Courts to identify ‘deliberately retrogressive measures’ by State and to apply ‘reasonableness standards’ in evaluating the actions of the State. They help us understand that principle and not pragmatism has to be the basis for judicial decisions if they have to have a lasting impact. The ICESCR has also underscored the need to provide adequate access to information. For instance, the environmental protection legislation in India mandates the conduct of environmental impact assessment (EIA) hearings and the Land Acquisition Legislation of 2013 mandates the holding of social impact assessment hearings prior to green signalling projects involving large scale acquisition of land resulting in possible displacement. Courts have been insisting on strict compliance of the procedures in the holding of the EIA hearings which are expected to disseminate adequate information regarding the projects to the affected people prior to their being approved.

The role of the global multi-national corporations and businesses in dictating the outcomes at the treaty negotiations has also been widely commented upon.  In India the Bhopal Gas Disaster of December 1984 was a stark reminder of our unpreparedness to deal with a situation of mass torts resulting from the careless acts of a multi-national corporation which was unable to be made accountable for the over 4,000 deaths and several lakh injured as a result of leak of a deadly MIC gas from the plant in Bhopal. Our legal system was unequal to meet the enormous challenge of enforcing the civil and criminal liability of the MNC, the Union Carbide Corporation. In 2017 the Committee on ESC rights issued a General Comment No. 24 which recognises the State’s obligation to adopt legal and regulatory frameworks that provide for effective oversight of business activities, and to ensure that businesses are held accountable for any violations of human rights. General Comment No. 24 also recognizes the important role of businesses themselves in respecting human rights and emphasises the need for meaningful engagement and consultation with affected communities in the development and implementation of business activities. It highlights the importance of businesses carrying out human rights due diligence, and of providing effective remedies for individuals and communities who have been negatively impacted by their activities.


In this the penultimate part of my talk, I attempt to understand the issue of engagement of social movements with the courts through the lens of jurisprudence. In other words, the theoretical framework that can explain why what is happening is happening.

In his article ‘Constitutional change, Courts and social movements’, Douglas deJaine points out how the Labour, Civil Rights and women’s movement shaped constitutional norms and in turn have been shaped by those norms. He argues that in Courts “constitutional meanings can be asserted and defended. Courts therefore offer opportunities for extrajudicial actors to articulate and hone a variety of constitutional visions. Courts eventually validate meanings that have become reasonable through the course of continued debate and persuasion. New constitutional meaning becomes authoritative not because the court decided so independently but because social movements have persuaded political forces, opinion leaders, the public and the judges that the new position is reasonable and in fact correct. In this way constitutional change is a bottom-up process in which courts are not leading but instead responding to external changes.”

Claims once thought unthinkable become reasonable not because of the new-found wisdom of judges but because of the ways in which social movement activism shapes popular and elite understandings of the meaning of constitutional values. Even a decade ago, one could not have imagined that there would be open public debate on the rights of the LGBT community. Judicial intervention in these areas has undoubtedly opened up the spaces for dialogue.There is a churning. The NALSA judgment is another example of the Court playing a major role in not only highlighting the plight of a special interest group but ushering social change through law.

And yet, Court intervention is but one many strategies that interest groups have to advance the cause of the repressed. It has to be combined with constant engagement, dialogue, advocacy and some times contestation with other actors, state and non-state. Social legal scholars engaged in legal mobilisation and cause lawyering often remind us that social movement advocates neither put all their hopes in courts nor look to courts to single-handedly produce change. Instead these advocates view litigation as a significant but partial tactic - one that works in conjunction with other tactics and deeds rather than displaces other forms of mobilisation. They come to the courts in the expectation that it might provide them the democratic space in which to articulate and test the persuasive strength of the group’s claims. Numerical and other minorities present their concerns and importantly seek and obtain information concerning themselves, which might otherwise be routinely denied to them by an opaque, and inaccessible state. They can compel the state and other opposing interest groups to acknowledge their presence, their issues. Courts might also facilitate such marginalised groups convert their constitutional claims into enforceable legal entitlements.

Professor Roberto Gargarella of Argentina too sees courts as being the proper spaces for experimentation in deliberative democratic practices. Courts, he believes, can while adjudicating social rights foster dialogue between the state and the people. He states: “Judicial decisions in the area of social rights should contribute to integrate groups that were improperly marginalized by the political system; or by forcing political authorities to justify their decisions in a more solid way." He has spoken of popular and dialogic constitutionalism as a preferred approach. He is sceptical of the checks and balances approach which he sees as being institution centric, limiting and not facilitating meaningful dialogue. Recently, however, Prof Gargarella has expressed doubts whether dialogic processes, without equality (where all participants in the dialogue are on a equal footing) deliberation (which he describes as exchange of ideas) and inclusion (where no affected set of people are left out), can achieve the desired result. He is not sanguine about the judiciary's attempts at ordering public hearings in structural cases. There is, he says, too much dependence on the good will and discretion of sensitized judges. He believes that the 'top down' attitude of the judges persists. For him, simply having provisions in the Constitution that facilitate social justice is not enough. The "engine room" of the Constitution has to undergo changes he says.

There are other jurists who require to be heeded. Legal scholar Professor Karl Klare talks of ‘transformative constitutionalism’ as being the guiding principle for ushering a more equal and equitable society. This he says involves “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction." After studying a decade’s work of the South African Constitutional Court, Klare has this to say to the judges: “future generations will not judge the Constitutional Court by how closely it followed traditional strategies of analysis, but rather by the extent to which it contributed to the many issues of social and political transformation – equality, social justice, democracy, multiracialism and dignity.”


The task of the social movements going ahead

One can safely estimate that for every ‘success’ in court there may have been several prior and later failures. And some of the successes could be ‘qualified’ successes. We should recall here the critiques around the decisions of Brown v. Board of Education of the US Supreme Court, Grootboom of the S African Constitutional Court and Olga Tellis of the Indian Supreme Court. There is a justified misgiving that in these decisions the Courts only went that far and no further.

Civil society groups (CSGs) in India, as perhaps elsewhere in the world, are aware that having a law enacted, or having a judgment in their favour, that recognises, protects and provides a mechanism for enforcement of ESC rights is but the first step in a long struggle for realising the emancipatory function of these instruments of social change. There has to be a continuous engagement with the organs of the State – be it the government of the day, the legislature or the judiciary – to make the law work for the people. CSGs are neither complacent because of their momentary victories or despondent because of failed attempts at persuading courts and legislatures. They know that this is a work in progress. That coming generations will and should pick up the baton from where they leave it. Fact gathering, public hearings, demanding accountability, transparency, going back to the Court for enforcement of its decisions are all part of a bouquet of strategies that require to be deployed over a period of time for realising the full potential of the laws that have come about as a result of long years of sustained campaign. Nothing can and should be taken for granted. And there is a teaching that has to be imparted for later generations to keep the democratic traditions alive.

It is in this context that the moves to curb the activities of CSGs especially those working in the area of poverty alleviation, by cutting off their sources of funds and subjecting them to intense scrutiny by law enforcement agencies must come in for critical comment. History teaches us that since CSGs do practice a form of left-leaning alternative politics, not unsurprisingly they have met with countervailing moves from state and corporate interest groups to have their own CSGs or co-opt those already in the fray. And then there are religious and caste formations jostling for space in this so-called non-political space. India has its share of social movements morphing into political formations with the demasking facilitated by a conducive  combination of circumstances. All of this in a vibrant democracy is par for the course. Where social movements eschew the temptation to share power with political formations, subject themselves to strict scrutiny for democratic and transparent practices, be prepared to share information of their sources of funding and their expenditure in the public domain, will garner the trust and confidence of the constituents they are working for. We still have in our midst organisations and individuals remaining steadfast in their adoption of Gandhian ideals. Of course, Father Stan Swamy’s example is a grim reminder that this by itself is not a guarantee against arbitrary state action.  

The democratic spaces in our country are undoubtedly ‘noisy’ but it is important that amidst the churning and the chaos we are able to forge forward with a clarity of vision. While a democratic form of government is no doubt an essential prerequisite for the realization of human rights, unless people constantly work the Constitution, keep asserting their rights and freedoms and demand the recognition, protection and enforcement of ESC rights, the realization of human rights would remain aspirational and not emancipatory. It is then an imperative for social movements and definitely the CSGs to comprise those who are prepared to internalise the constitutional values enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution at a personal level and be constantly reminded of the expectation and promise of the practice of ‘constitutional morality’. 

Let us then, in the end, be inspired by this stirring speech delivered by the principal architect of our Constitution on 17th December 1946 in the Constituent Assembly.  The lecture ended with the playing of Dr Ambedkar’s speech in the Constituent Assembly.