Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Rana Vikram Singh set aside judgment, decree of dismissal passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad, in a matrimonial case

Either party to marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of the Act, may also present a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground and (i) there has been no resumption of co-habitation as between the parties for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties for marriage for a period of one year or upwards after passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal right in a proceeding to which they were parties.

 -Section 13(1-A), Hindu Marriage Act

In Ajay Kumar Raut vs. Soni Devi, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 5-page long judgment dated September, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"10. The respondents did not deny that after passing of the decree of restitution of conjugal rights, the marital relationship between the parties were restored. 11. On this ground alone, the appellant is entitled to get a decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 13[(1-A) (ii)] of the Hindu Marriage Act. 12. The learned trial Judge failed to consider the relevant provisions of law while dismissing the suit. The order impugned is not sustainable and the judgment and decree of dismissal passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad, in Matrimonial Case No. 26/2020 on 02.07.2024 is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. 13. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent is declared to be dissolved by a decree of divorce. Further, the Office is directed to draw the decree of divorce at the earliest." The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhari.

The miscellaneous appeal was directed against the judgment and decree of dismissal of a suit for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce, which was registered as Matrimonial Case No. 26 of 2020 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Aurangabad. The husband of the Opposite Party was the appellant before the High Court, challenging the judgment and decree of dismissal dated July 2, 2024.

The case of the appellant was that his marriage was solemnized with the Opposite Party on January 21, 2014. After the marriage, the Opposite Party came to her matrimonial home to lead conjugal life with the appellant but subsequently she left her matrimonial home. On two occasions she visited her matrimonial home, once after marriage and secondly to attain the Shradh Ceremony of her father-in-law in the year 2015. From the very beginning of her marriage, the Opposite Party used to insist the appellant to leave her parents and stay separately with her. The appellant was not agreeable to such proposal of the respondent. During the pendency of the suit at the intervention of the trial court the appellant brought the respondent to his home on May 25, 2016. But on May 28 2016, she called her parents and told that they assaulted the petitioner mercilessly under Civil Court Campus, Aurangabad over which an FIR being Aurangabad Town
P.S. Case No. 164 of 2016 was lodged. Since, then the parties are living separately. The respondent flatly refused to live with the appellant as his wife. She not only humiliated and harassed him but the appellant was subjected to cruelty by his wife. 

In the year 2015, the appellant filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In retaliation thereof the respondent filed a case under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. She also filed an application under Section 125 of the CrPC against the appellant. 

The suit for restitution was decreed in favour of the appellant on July 10, 2018. In spite of the said decree, the respondent did not come back to her matrimonial home to continue the conjugal life with the appellant. It is contended that the appellant is an unemployed diploma holder, he was trying to get some job but his mental stability was shattered by the respondent. The respondent contested the suit by filing written statement whereby and where-under she denied all material allegations brought by the appellant against her. Marriage between the parties was admitted in the written statement. She also made counter allegation of physical and mental torture inflicted by the appellant upon her. In support of his case the appellant adduced evidence, however, he was not cross-examined by the respondent/Opposite Party.The mother of the appellant deposed during the trial as PW-2 that she was cross-examined by the Advocate for the respondent. PW-3 was a neighbour of the appellant.The respondent deposed during trial as DW-1. In her evidence she stated that the appellant did not want to keep the respondent with full honour and dignity as his wife. Before marriage, he had illicit relation with another lady, namely, Pinky Kumari. Subsequently, Pinky filed a complaint on the basis of which Aurangabad Town P.S. Case No. 205/2013 under Section 376 of the IPC was registered against the appellant. Even after the decree passed in the suit for restitution of conjugal right the appellant never came to the house of the respondent to take her back to his house to stay as husband and wife. 

Justice Chaudhari recorded: "7. From the evidence on record it is also found that the respondent filed a case under Section 498A of the IPC and under Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. She also filed another application claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. Thus, it is on record that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is far from being happy and cordial."

Justice Chaudhary observed: "8. It is not in dispute that the appellant filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 19th September 2015. The said suit was registered as Matrimonial Case No. 136 of 2015 and it was decreed in favour of the petitioner on July 10, 2018."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, grants anticipatory bail due to compromise between informant, and appellant

In Shayam Mishra @ Shayam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page order dated August 25, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 5-page long order dated June 25, 2026 by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court in a case from Badhurupiya, Sugauli, East Champaran. Supreme Court's order reads: "5) Inasmuch as this case involves a complaint at the behest of the informant and a counter complaint at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and grant anticipatory bail to the appellant. 6) In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40755 of 2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court." 

The appellant is implicated as an accused in connection with F.I.R. No.480 of 2021 registered at P.S.: Sugauli, District: East Champaran, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 384, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC. He was aggrieved by the rejection of the anticipatory bail applications by the Trial Court and the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court. The Court was informed that "the matter has been resolved between the appellant and the informant, via compromise."

Prior to this, in his order Justice Jha had recorded the submission by the A.P.P. for the State, while opposing the prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner, wherein, it was submitted that considering all available materials, the prayer of first anticipatory bail of the petitioner was rejected and, therefore, there is no occasion to reconsider this second prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner without having any changed circumstances, which would amount to review of earlier order passed by learned coordinate Bench of this Court, which is not permissible under law. It was also submitted by the A.P.P. that the offence, as alleged, is not compoundable in nature and, therefore, compromise is of no bearing. 

Justice Jha had concluded: "8. In view of aforesaid factual submission and by taking note of the fact as prima facie on the basis of subsequent compromise for non-compoundable offence, the earlier rejection order, which was passed by one of the learned coordinate Bench of this Court, cannot be reviewed by this Court, accordingly, on second consideration also, prayer of anticipatory bail of the  petitioner stands rejected."

The High Court's order recorded that it was the second prayer of anticipatory bail, after rejection of his first anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated February 9, 2023 of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Cr. Misc. No. 2413 of 2023 dated February 9, 2023, wherein considering all available materials, as petitioner was specifically alleged to cause stab wound due to which the injured sustained grievous injury, his prayer of anticipatory bail was rejected. At the time of the rejection of the first anticipatory bail rejection, there was no compromise between the parties. 

The second anticipatory bail petition was preferred on the sole ground that now this matter was compromised between the parties. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the occurrence was free-fight in nature and petitioner’s side had also received injury during the occurrence. It was also submitted that now the petitioner was selected in Group ‘D’ service of Indian Railway, therefore, in view of compromise, sending the petitioner to jail would not serve any purpose of justice. 

In support of his submission, the counsel had relied upon para 22 of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. Para-22 of the judgment reads:- “22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:-“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. 
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against
each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

Supreme Court's order vindicates the position of petitioner's the counsel Prateek Tandon and the persuasive value of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. It is apparent that Supreme Court has rejected the submission made by Nand Kishore Prasad, APP which is recorded in the order by Justice Jha. Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by APP's reasoning. 

Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Justice Valluri Kameswar Rao all set to be 49th Chief Justice of Patna High Court

The Supreme Court Collegium in its meeting held on August 6, 2026 has recommended elevation of Justice Valluri Kameswar Rao as the 49th Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. Justice Rao is currently serving on the Delhi High Court. He served as the judge of Karnataka High court from June 1, 2024 to May 29 2025 where he also served as Acting Chief Justice from May 29, 2025, until his repatriation to Delhi High Court on July 21, 2025. 

Before his repatriation to Delhi High Court, on July 14, 2025, as Acting Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court as part of a Division Bench Justice Rao directed the state government to file a status report on the probe into the alleged police encounter of Ritesh Kumar (35), a migrant laborer from Bihar who had been accused of raping and murdering a young girl in Hubballi. The police had shot dead the accused on April 13, 2025 within hours of the offence. Police claimed that he was killed while attempting to escape custody or during an attack on officers, shortly after his apprehension. Justice Rao passed the order upon hearing a petition filed by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Karnataka. The PUCL had moved the High Court with a prayer to direct the authorities to preserve the body of the deceased so that the evidence as may be required during the investigation is available, and if the body is cremated, the evidence would be lost and the rule of law would suffer. It was also prayed to issue directions to form a special team of autopsy, surgeons, and forensic experts, preferably from New Delhi or a state other than Karnataka, to undertake an independent examination and to do an autopsy of the dead bodies of both the deceased and the victim. The court directed the authorities to preserve the samples of the parts of the body collected during the autopsy to be made available as may be required for investigation. The court also directed the authorities to videograph the entire postmortem procedure. The Supreme Court laid down the guidelines in its judgment of 2014 to be observed by the police and other authorities in police encounter cases resulting in the death of persons. On March 2, 2026, the High Court directed an independent judicial inquiry, to be conducted by a judicial magistrate, into the alleged police encounter killing. A judicial inquiry was mandatory in cases of encounter deaths. The case was listed on June 8, 2026. Hubballi's alleged encounter has left many questions unanswered, it raises concerns over bypassing of due process. Justice Rao's role was crucial to the case of the Bihari migrant worker, which has sent a chilling message directed at the growing migrant population. 

In his first judgement April 29, 2013 as judge of the Delhi High Court in Ramesh Kumar vs.  Commissioner of Police & Ors. Anr. (2013), as part of a Division Bench, he delivered a judgement dated April 29, 2013, wherein, he dismissed the writ petition of  the petitioner, the Inspector (Investigation), P.S Lajpat Nagar (South District), New Delhi, who was suspended on August 7, 2007 and thereafter departmental enquiry was initiated against him. The petitioner had helped a person accused in FIR No.705/2007 namely Bala Singh for offences punishable under Sections 448, 427, 420, 468, 471, 506/34, IPC, P.S. Lajpat Nagar, to grab Naveen Kumar Bhatia's property in Lajpat Nagar. The proceedings initiated against the Inspector had culminated in a punishment order whereby the disciplinary authority had imposed the penalty of forfeiture of three years approved service permanently entailing proportionate reduction in pay. The appeal filed against the order was rejected by the appellate authority. The petitioner had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. 

Justice Rao drew on "Wednesbury unreasonableness test" enunciated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) for administrative law and the principles laid down in Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) vs. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, the famous GCHQ case. The Wedensbury test applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. This test refers to the scope of Judicial review if the case at hand passes the principles that the administrative action is (i) illegal , (ii) suffers from procedural improprieties, (iii) relevant matters not taken into account, (iv) irrelevant matters are taken into account. Under such circumstances, the administrative action will be considered as absurd or perverse or not bonafide and the administrative action is liable for judicial review. The CCSU Principle accepts the principles enunciated in the Wedensbury test but adds one more dimension that (v) if the administrative action defies logic, then there is scope for judicial review.

Justice Rao concluded: "....what has been proved is that the petitioner had made 79 plus 4 calls to Bala Singh for about one month prior to registration of FIR and few days thereafter. He could not prove that he had any family or friendly relationship with Bala Singh nor he could be able to prove that Bala Singh was a police informer. There is no reason for him to engage himself in conversation with Bala Singh on so many occasions. This would not, as observed by the Tribunal, 'augur well for a police officer'. To that extent, the punishment imposed on the petitioner would not be disproportionate. 9. Hence, we are of the view that the present petition filed by the petitioner is devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Rao.  

On his request, Justice Rao was transferred to the Karnataka High Court. 

In Smt. Mohini Kumari. A vs. The Commissioner & Ors. (2024), as part of the Division bench of the Karnataka High Court, passed an order dated June 26, 2024, wherein, he set aside the order dated April 3, 2018 by a Single Judge bench because he was of the view that "the learned Single Judge has erred in coming to the conclusion" regarding the direction for appointment of Smt. Chetana Rogannavar Rajaram. Smt. Mohini Kumari, the appellant had challenged the impugned order on the ground that, she was not made a party in the proceedings, although she had applied for the post of Typist with all necessary documents. Her application was considered by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education Department, Bengaluru, the respondent and she was selected. The Job Oriented Course (JOC) possessed by Smt. Rajaram was not declared as equivalent to that of Pre-University Course (PUC), by Government of Karnataka, the respondent no. 1. Justice Rao concluded that the impugned order of the Single Judge suffers from legal infirmity.

Justice Rao enrolled as an advocate in March, 1991. He was designated as senior advocate by the Delhi High Court in January, 2010. He was elevated as Additional Judge of Delhi High Court on April 17, 2013 and as permanent judge on March 18, 2015. He was transferred as a judge of Karnataka High Court and assumed office on June 1, 2024. Justice Rao's roots of the family that is Andhra Pradesh, which his father left in the year 1954 and went to Delhi with his mother whom he married in 1951. 

Justice Rao disapproves of sealed cover jurisprudence which leads to a culture of opacity because a one-sided submission causes serious violation of natural justice.

Justice Soni Shrivastava orders no coercive action against POCSO accused, FIR was filed afte 37 days

In Rocky Kumar @ Rauki Kumar vs. .The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Soni Shrivastava passed a 2-page long order dated July 29, 2026, wherein, she directed that no coercive steps be taken against the petitioner in a case  under Section 376(D), 506/34 of IPC, section 3(i) (r) (S) (W) (1)/3 (2) (va) SC/ST Act and section 4 of the POCSO Act against the accused petitioner Rocky Kumar. The case is listed on September 2, 2026. 

Dr. Gopal Krishna, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was not sent up for trial and a final report was filed in his favour. However, during trial, summons has been issued under Section 358 of the B.N.S.S. The victim has filed the complaint after 37 days. Brajesh Kumar, the main accused is facing trial in the Court of Ravindra Kumar, District and Additional Sessions-cum-Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO), Sheikhpura who was in love with the victim. The petitioner had been named only because he used to study with the main accused in Biharsharif. 

Justice Shrivastava concluded:"4. In such view of the matter, issue notice to the opposite party no.2 by ordinary process as well as speed post with A/D for which requisites etc. must be filed within a week from today. 5. Call for a legible copy of the case diary along with the statement of the victim recorded under Section 183 B.N.S.S. from the Court of learned District and Additional Sessions-cum-Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO), Sheikhpura, in connection with Sheikhpura Mahila P.S. Case No. 50 of 2023....7.In the meantime, no coercive steps shall be taken "against the petitioner in the aforesaid case till further orders.

The prosecution case, in brief as per the written report of the informant namely Kiran Devi is that, on August 3, 2023 at about 2 PM, when her daughter/victim was feeding cattle near her house, accused persons Brajesh Raut and Rocky Kumar on a gunpoint grabbed the informant daughter's hand with bad intention and taken her to the abandoned house of Sanjay Raut through the Bathan of Uday Raut. When informant's daughter shouted, accused persons started threatening to kill her and gagged her mouth with a Gamchha. The accused persons one by one raped the informant's daughter due to which she became unconscious. After a while when she did not return, informant went to search her and when she reached near the house of Sanjay Raut, saw that accused Brajesh Kumar and Rocky Kumar were fleeing from the house of Sanjay Raut. The informant's another daughter Priti Kumari went inside the house and saw that informant's daughter victim girl was lying half naked and unconscious. After the incident, the victim was not in a state of sound mind to speak and remained quiet. After a long period of time, she told about the incident to her family members. The case was registered after 37 days. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner is quite innocent and he is falsely implicated in this case due to dirty village politics. It was submitted that the petitioner bears no criminal antecedent. It was prayed that petitioner may be given benefit of pre-arrest bail. 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order of cognizance by CJM, Gopalganj with all its consequential proceedings in a Complaint Case of 2016

In Kishori Devi vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page long judgment dated July 24, 2026 concluded that in view of factual and legal submissions and "by taking note of fact as the effective disputes between the parties, prima-facie appears land dispute being coparcener for which a title suit is already pending between the parties since 2013 i.e., Title Suit No.309/2013, where petitioners are coparcener, accordingly this court is convinced that present criminal case was filed out of oblique motive to settle the land dispute by lodging this criminal prosecution, which is prima-facie un-occasioned and unwarranted. Accordingly, by taking note of legal ratio as mentioned in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) & Rikhab Birani Case (supra), impugned order of cognizance dated 22.11.2017 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named petitioners arising thereof as passed in Complaint Case No. 3727 of 2016, pending before learned CJM, Gopalganj is hereby quashed and set aside. 10. Hence, this application stands allowed."

The quashing petition was preferred for quashing the order dated November 22, 2017 passed in TR No.2525/2017 which arose out of Complaint Case No. 3727/2016 passed by CJM, Gopalganj where cognizance was taken for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. 

Justice Jha recorded that despite repeated calls Dhrup Narayan Singh, the Opposite Party No. 2, failed to join the present proceedings. 

The prosecution case, as stated in the complaint petition, was that Mahanth Rai had four sons, namely Daroga Singh, Dharmnath Singh, Sipahi Singh and Kapildeo Singh. Kapildeo Singh died leaving behind two sons, Uday Narayan Singh and Dhup Narayan Singh, and two daughters, Radha Devi and Rema Devi,
while the other three sons died issueless. Dhup Narayan Singh had two sons, Krishna Pratap Singh and Chandan Kumar Singh, and three daughters, Kishori Devi, Rekha Kumari and Simple Kumari, of whom Kishori Devi was married to accused no. 5. It was alleged that accused no. 5, in connivance with others, falsely claimed Rakesh Ranjan Singh and his wife to be the son-in-law and daughter of Uday Narayan Singh and started executing sale deeds in respect of valuable ancestral lands without partition, compelling the complainant to institute Partition Suit No. 309/2013 before the Court of the Sub-Judge-XI, Gopalganj. Despite having knowledge of the pending partition suit, petitioner no(s). 1 and 2 allegedly executed a sale deed by falsely representing petitioner no. 1 as the daughter of Uday Narayan Singh, whereas she was in fact the daughter of the complainant. On April 26, 2016, when the complainant came to know about the alleged forgery and demanded return of the forged documents from petitioner no(s). 1 and 2, the accused persons allegedly assaulted him and forcibly snatched Rs.10,000/- and his mobile phone. 

The counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the ingredients for constituting offences under Sections 419, 323 and 504 of the IPC was not made out prima-facie and, therefore, cognizance as taken against the petitioners in the background of land dispute is appearing bad in the eyes of law. It was submitted that for the land dispute complainant preferred a Title Suit No. 309/2013 prior to lodging of this case, pending before the Court of learned Sub Judge-I, Gopalganj. It was also submitted that the accused/petitioners are coparcener and party of the said suit and to create unnecessary pressure or to settle personal vengeance out of oblique motive the present criminal case was lodged, which was completely un-occasioned and unwarranted and, therefore, cognizance order is fit to be quashed/set aside. The counsel submitted that cognizance should not be taken in such a mechanical manner. In support of his submissions learned counsel relied upon the reports of Supreme Court as available through State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335 and Rikhab Birani &  Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2025 SCC OnLine SC 823].

The paragraph no. 102 of the Bhajan Lal Case reads: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused. 
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 

The paragraph no(s). 19 and 20 of the Rikhab Birani Case reads: “19. It is the duty and obligation of the court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing process, particularly when the matter is essentially of civil nature. 13 The prevalent impression that civil remedies, being time-consuming, do not adequately protect the interests of creditors or lenders should be discouraged and rejected as criminal procedure cannot be used to apply pressure. 14 Failure to do so results in the breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to misuse and abuse of the legal process.20. In yet another case, again arising from criminal proceedings initiated in the State of Uttar Pradesh this Court was constrained to note recurring cases being encountered wherein parties repeatedly attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts by filing vexatious complaints, camouflaging allegations that are ex facie outrageous or are pure civil claims. These attempts must not be entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. Reference was made to a judgment of this Court in Thermax Limited v. K.M. Johny which held that courts should be watchful of the difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though there can be situations where the allegation may constitute both civil and criminal wrongs. Further, there has to be a conscious application of mind on these aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence on record and may even put questions to the complainant/investigating officer etc. to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations. The summoning order has to be passed when the complaint or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence. The summoning order should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.”

Patna High Court acquits murder convict, directs DGP, Bihar to initiate departmental proceedings against Mahesh Kumar Rajak, Investigating Officer for keeping material lacuna in prosecution case by his "improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation"

In Meghnath Choupal @ Medhnath Choupal Sharma vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "....we are not in a position to concur with the finding of the Trial Court. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. 16. The judgment and order of conviction dated 30th of May, 2018, and the order of sentence dated 31st of May, 2018, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura, are hereby set aside." It is apparent from the public record that Manmohan Sharan Lal was the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura at that time. 

Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. He observed:"2. Before we advert to the prosecution case, we are constrained to record that the instant appeal is a classic example of improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation on the part of the Investigating Officer keeping material lacuna in the prosecution case." 

The case was filed in the High Court on June 21, 2018. It was registered on July 2, 2018. The allegation against the appellant was of having shot dead the son of the informant. The A.P.P., had submitted that there was political rivalry between the parties and the young son of the informant has been shot at point blank range by the appellant. It was submitted that the appellant also was accused in eleven other cases under grave sections of the Indian Penal Code as well as the Arms Act. Further, it was submitted that there is direct identification of the appellant as the main assailant.  The murder took place on July 22, 2014, in the Madhepura district when the victim was intercepted and fatally shot on his way home from a funeral.

Notably, in its order dated April 12, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashwani Kumar Singh and Rajeev Ranjan Prasad had recorded: "In paragraph ‘8’ of the show cause reply filed on behalf of the State, a statement has been made that the appellant is a veteran criminal and he has been chargesheeted in as many as 12 cases. The case numbers are provided in paragraph ‘8’. Let the State file a supplementary affidavit clearly stating the present stage of all the 12 cases. The appellant shall also file an affidavit giving the present stage of the cases. List this matter on 13th May, 2022." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. 

Justice Chaudhary's judgement does not seem to factor in the fact about 12 criminal antecedents of the appellant.   

In his 3-page long order dated July 14, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah  and Purnendu Singh had concluded:"6. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and taking into account the materials and evidence which have come during trial, the Court is not inclined to allow the prayer for suspension of sentence and release of the appellant-applicant on bail during the pendency of the appeal." The order was authored by Justice Amanullah. 

The criminal appeal was filed against an order of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court at Madhepura in a Sessions Trial of 2014 which arose out of Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014 whereby and whereunder the Trial Judge by his judgement dated May 30, 2018 convicted the appellant for the offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC read with Section 27 Arms Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of life and also to pay fine of Rs. 50,000. For the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 1 year. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence are under challenge in the present appeal at the instance of the convict/appellant.

The prosecution case is that on July 22, 2014 at about 4:00 P.M., the informant, namely, Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji was returning to his house by a motorcycle after attending the last rites of his aunt. The son of the
informant was the pillion rider. While he was proceeding towards his house, he noticed near Chapariya Toll that some persons were following them on about four motorcycles. They crossed the motorcycle of the informant and registered them to proceed. The informant also stated that immediately thereafter, one Laltu Yadav and Birendra Choupal caught hold of him and placed a pistol beneath his ear. They instructed the informant not to raise any shout, failing which they would open fire at him. One Meghnand Choupal (the appellant), Bilash Mahto and Umesh Yadav caught hold of the son of the informant, namely, Anupam Ananad and Chandrahaas Choupal instructed them to bring Anupam to him. Chandrahaas was standing about 10 yards away on the western side from the place of occurrence. These named accused persons forcibly took away Anupam to Chandrahaas. When the informant requested Chandrahaas to release his son, the accused persons who caught hold of him assaulted him by fists and blows. At that time Chandrahaas told others that another vehicle is coming towards the place of occurrence. Hearing this, the motorcycle rider started their motorbike to proceed and on the instruction of Chandrahaas Choupal, Meghnad Choupal (the appellant) opened fire at the son of the complainant, touching pistol on his chest. All the accused persons then left the place of occurrence. The informant raised hue and cry and rushed towards his son, who was lying on the ground in pool of blood oozing out from his wound. The cousin brother of the informant, namely, Mantu Kumar and Rupesh Kumar were also present there. Subsequently, other relatives who went to attend the last ritual of the aunt of the informant appeared there and the injured was taken to Madhepura Hospital by a Scorpio Car. The Medical Officer examined him and declared him dead.

On the basis of the complaint, S.H.O. Shankarpur Police Station, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak took up the investigation by registering Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014, dated July 23, 2014. It appeared from the Lower Court Record that the investigation of this case culminated in filing charge-sheet under Section 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant Meghnad Choupal and one Bilash Mahto. After filing of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and subsequently it was transferred for trial and disposal to the Court of the ddl. Sessions Judge, 2nd at Madhepura. The prosecution examined all 8 witnesses, including the informant (P.W. 8), The Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem (P.W. 6) and the Investigating Officer (P.W. 7). Amongst other witnesses, P.W. 2, Tarni Sharma, was declared hostile by the prosecution. Only P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav claimed to be the eye-witness of the occurrence and on the basis of his evidence, the Trial Court held the present appellant guilty for committing offence under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and convicted and sentenced him accordingly. Other witnesses being P.W. 3 Rajendra Sah, who is a signatory to the seizure list. P.W. 4 Rupesh Kumar who is the cousin brother of the informant and he did not see the occurrence. P.W. 5 Rajesh Kumar is also a seizure list witness but so far as the incident is concerned, his evidence is in the nature of hearsay. P.W. 7 is the I.O. and P.W. 8 Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji is the informant of the case. 

On perusal of the LCR, the High Court found that the Trial Judge relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 alone and convicted the appellant on the ground that the Court can even hold an accused guilty on the basis of solitary evidence of one eye-witness only. In support of his contention, he referred to series of decisions, viz, Jarnail Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab -2009 (9) SCC 719, Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar vs. State of Maharashtra-AIR 2008 SC 927, Ramji vs. State of Bihar-2007 (57) ACC 385 (SC), Syed Ibrahim vs. State of Andhra Pradesh-AIR 2006 SC 2908, Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.-2005 1 SCC 184 and Chhitar Lal vs. State Of Rajasthan-2003 6 SCC.

Justice Chaudhary observed:"At the foremost, we inclined to record that the informant who’s the author of the case did not support his case and did not utter even a single word against the appellant involving him in committing the offence. Surprisingly enough, the informant was not declared hostile by the prosecution. Therefore, his examination in-chief stands firm on the ground and when an incident took place in presence of the informant, the FIR was lodged by the informant as an eye-witness. His contrary evidence on dock suffers most. The Trial Court held that P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav is the eye-witness of the incident. However, Trial Court failed to consider the cross-examination of P.W. 1 when he stated that he saw the deceased in injured condition. He received his injury on his chest. Thus, if the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of P.W. 1 are taken together for appreciation, a doubt arises as to whether P.W. 1 was present
at the place of occurrence before the deceased received injury or he appeared after the victim suffered gun-shot injury and was lying with blood oozing out from the wound. If we accept the version of P.W. 1 to be true during the cross-examination, then we find that P.W. 1 also reached the place of occurrence after the deceased received the gun-shot injury. 9. In view of such contradiction, we are not in a position to hold that the evidence of P.W. 1 is of sterling character." 

Justice Chaudhary drw on the Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep @Deepu vs. State of NCT Of Delhi reported in 2012 (8) SCC 21, wherein, it described a sterling witness. It reads: "22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

The decision was subsequently followed in a judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Nirmal Premkumar & Anr. vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 260. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "11. In view of the discrepancies pointed out, we are not in a position to hold that the P.W. 1 is a witness of sterling character and only on the basis of sole evidence of P.W. 1, the appellant could be convicted. There are series of lacunae in the prosecution case. During trial, the seizure list witness was not confronted with their signatures on the seizure list. Though they deposed but their signature on the seizure list was not marked exhibit. In his cross-examination, P.W. 5 stated that he put his signature on a blank paper under the instruction of the Investigating Officer. 12. There is no doubt that the victim of this case received gun-shot injury and succumbed to the said injury on the way to Madhepura Hospital." 

The judgement reads: "From the evidence of Investigating Officer, we find that he seized one motorcycle, one Samsung Mobile phone and an empty cartridge from the place of occurrence. Surprisingly enough, the ownership of the motorcycle was not asserted by the I.O. Had it been asserted at least this Court could have come to a conclusion as to whether any of the FIR named accused persons were present at the spot and left his motorcycle after the occurrence. Ownership of Samsung Mobile Phone was also not asserted. The empty cartridge was not sent to Forensic Laboratory to ascertain as to whether the said empty cartridge was used to commit murder of the son of the informant. These were primary duties of the I.O. for investigation of a case like this. It appears to us that either the I.O. did not know the basic principles of investigation or purposefully withheld the evidences which could have been brought during investigation to save the accused persons. 13. In our view, the process of the investigation by the I.O. of this case is a clear instance of dereliction of his duty. Therefore, we direct Director General of Police, Bihar Patna to initiate departmental proceeding against the Investigating Officer, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak, who was
posted as S.H.O. Medhapur Police Station on 22nd of July, 2014. Due to lackadaisical investigation, both the Trial Court and this Court are deprived of having best evidence against the real culprits of the incident."

Revision petition is partly allowed, conviction by Nalanda trial court upheld, sentence awarded reduced to the period already undergone: Justice Arun Kumar Jha

In Bipin Singh @ Bipin Kumar Singh vs.The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement date June 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"If the facts were appreciated in the light of the evidence and two subordinate courts recorded a concurrent finding, there is very little scope for this Court to interfere in the matter in revision. 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and considering the fact that the petitioner has already undergone seven months of incarceration in this case and further considering the fact that he has no criminal antecedent and he is facing this lis from the last 19 years, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if, while upholding the conviction of the petitioner, the sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 8. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner under the aforesaid section is affirmed and he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The fine sentence is affirmed. 9. Accordingly, this revision petition is partly allowed. 10. The petitioner is already on bail. He is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds." 

This criminal revision was preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 10, 2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif in Criminal Appeal of 2016, which arose out of a Complaint Case of 2007 and trial of 2016. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 21, 2016 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif was affirmed. The petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000.

Pushpa Devi, the opposite party no. 2 had filed a complaint case alleging therein that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner in the year 1987. At the time of marriage, her parents had given cash amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- and some ornaments. After her marriage, the petitioner and his family members demanded a motorcycle and due to non-fulfillment of their demand, they started harassing the opposite party no.2. Thereafter, Rs.40,000 was given by the parents of the opposite party no.2 for purchasing motorcycle. After birth of a female child, the accused persons became more violent and increased torture of the complainant. The accused persons including the petitioner also made an attempt to burn the complainant to death by pouring kerosene oil, but she anyhow escaped and returned to her paternal house. Thereafter, the present complaint case was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgments of conviction and orders of sentence was bad in law as well as on facts. The appellate court and the trial court had failed to appreciate that all the complainant witnesses are closely related to each other and, thus, they all are highly interested witnesses. Therefore, their testimonies are not trustworthy. Hence, the petitioner should have been acquitted from the charges levelled against him on this score alone. The counsel also submitted that there is no independent witness of alleged offence. The counsel submitted that the trial court did not examine the evidence of the witnesses minutely and came to an erroneous finding and hence, the judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed by the courts below were not sustainable. Moreover, the petitioner was continuously facing the ordeal and miseries of the prolonged criminal proceeding against him for the last more than 18 years, although he was been paying the amount of maintenance and also paid arrears amount of maintenance to the opposite party no.2 and no useful purpose would be served to put the petitioner behind the bar.  The counsel also submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties and the petitioner has fulfilled all the conditions put by the opposite party no.2 towards amicable settlement of the matter and the father of the petitioner has executed a sale deed for two bigha of land in favour of opposite party no.2 towards full and final settlement and mutation of the said land is also being done in the name of opposite party no.2. Therefore, it was prayed by the counsel that the judgments and orders of the courts below be set aside and the revision petition may be allowed. If the Court is not inclined, then in that case the sentence awarded to the petitioner may be reduced to the period already undergone by him.

Sections 420, 406 IPC cannot travel together, Police, courts failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or violation of contractual terms: Supreme Court

In Rikhab Birani vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  passed a 15-page long judgement dated April 16, 2025 observed that "The chargesheet in the present case is bereft of particulars and details required and mandated in terms of Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It merely reproduces the contents of the FIR which makes reference to the payments made as well as the allegation that in the revenue records, the godown in question was recorded in the name of Rakesh Birani, the son of the appellant, Rikhab Birani. It is noted that the appellant, Rikhab Birani, informed the complainant that Rakesh Birani had expired. The complainant had then requested refund of money, etc. However, the FIR does not state the material and evidence available and collected during the course of the investigation to establish the offences under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Clearly, the ingredients of the aforesaid are not established and made out. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment/order and allow the present appeal quashing the FIR and the resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet."

The judgement reads:"We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations on the civil rights of complainant-respondent No.2. We are also constrained to impose costs of ₹50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) on the State of Uttar Pradesh as, in spite of repeated judgments/orders of this Court, we are being flooded with cases of civil wrongs being made the subject matter of criminal proceedings by filing chargesheets, etc. These costs will be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh...."

The Court observed:"We are constrained to pass this detailed speaking order, as it is noticed that, notwithstanding the law clearly laid down by this Court on the difference between a breach of contract and the criminal offence of cheating, we are continuously flooded with cases where the police register an FIR, conduct investigation and even file chargesheet(s) in undeserving cases. During the last couple of months, a number of judgments/orders have been pronounced by this Court, especially in cases arising from the State of Uttar Pradesh, deprecating the stance of the police as well as the courts in failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard to and violation of contractual terms; and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are quite different and requires mens rea at the time when the contract is entered into itself to not abide by the terms thereof."

In V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.(2009) 3 SCC 78, the Court observed that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of contract. 

Similar judgements have been delivered in S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960  Hari Prasad Chamaria vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128. 

Supreme Court reverses bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in SC/ST Act case from Nawada

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay, issued notice returnable on August 24. The order reads: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail in connection with Excl. Spl. SC/St Case No. 37/22 arising out of complaint case no. 37/2022 pending before Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Nawadah, Bihar, subject to their executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each, with one or more sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. However, the Petitioners are directed to cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so. List again on 24th August, 2026." 

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachu Das (supra), appellants’ prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail is rejected and this appeal stands dismissed. " 

In this case reliance was placed upon the decision dated February 3, 2014 by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471, wherein, the Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi considered the offence under Section 3(1), as well as the bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and, it concluded: "Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 

The Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State and counsel for Ram Binita Devi, the complainant/Respondent No. 2 submitted before the High Court that the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellants is not maintainable, as cognizance had already been taken by the trial court for the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 

The appeal in the Patna High Court was filed for setting aside order dated September 25, 2024 passed by the Special Judge, Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (POA) Act, Nawada in A.B.P. No. 2442 of 2024, which arose out of a complaint case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504, 506, 354B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, whereby the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants was rejected. Now the order by the trial court and by Justice Singh of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court. 

 

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava set aside verdict by Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga in POCSO G.R. Case of 2019

In Sadir Quaraishi @ Md Sadir vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 40-page long judgement dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"53. In ultimate analysis, we are of the opinion that the learned trial court has erred in appreciation of the evidences available on the record. The conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the learned trial court. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 54. This appeal is allowed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The appeal was preferred for setting aside the judgment of conviction dated July 1, 2023 and order of sentence dated 05.07.2023 passed by Exclusive Special Judge (POCSO Act), Darbhanga in POCSO G.R. Case of 2019 which arose out of Jalley P.S. Case of 2019. By the impugned judgment, the appellant wasc onvicted for the offences punishable under Section 376 AB of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. By the impugned order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years with a fine of Rs. 30,000/- under Section 376 AB of the IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 

The prosecution case was based on the fardbeyan of the informant (maternal uncle of the victim). In his fardbeyan, the informant had alleged that two years ago, his sister was murdered by her in-laws and his brother-in-law was sent to jail. They had four children whom the informant brought to his house and some
of the children were with his relatives. One amongst the four children ‘X’ (victim) resided with the informant and studied there. The informant took care of the house. The informant had stated that there was a marriage in his sasural so he had gone there. It was alleged that on April 6, 2019, there was a marriage in the neighbourhood of the informant in which his niece was playing with other children. Sadir Qureshi resident of the same village took informant’s niece to his place by luring her and raped her. The niece came home crying and bleeding. Informant’s mother, who was herself a heart patient, became unconscious and could not tell anyone about the incident. When the informant came home, he gathered information about the incident, after which he went to police station to lodge complain. Informant had brought clothes of the victim along with the application. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant, FIR was registered. After investigation, police submitted chargesheet dated May 31, 2019 against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376 IPC and Section 4/6 of the POCSO Act. 6. The trial court vide order June 19, 2019 took cognizance of the offences against appellant. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant in Hindi which he denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges were framed vide order dated November 15, 2019 for the offences. In course of trial, the prosecution examined eight witnesses and got exhibited certain documents.

Justice Prasad referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Pradeep vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2023 SC 3245, wherein, the Supreme Court has held that the conviction only on the testimony of a child witness who does not inspire confidence is not safe. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads: “8. It is a well-settled principle that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of
caution and prudence. A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring. However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness. The Court must make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness. The Court must apply its mind to the question whether there is a possibility of the child witness being tutored. Therefore, scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution.”

The judgement recorded: "No one has appeared on behalf of the informant despite service of notice." 

Supreme Court upholds judgement by Justices A. M. Badar, Sandeep Kumar in a murder case from Bhojpur

In Sunil Roy vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sandeep Mehta and  Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 15, 2026, wherein, it upheld the 79-page long final judgment dated February 27, 2023 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices A. M. Badar and Sandeep  Kumar in Bharath Roy & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2023). 

The High Court had dismissed Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 518 of 2014 Bharath Roy & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 583 of 2014 Shakuntla Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2023) preferred by the petitioner and the co-accused and had upheld the judgment dated April 16, 2014 rendered by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No. 370 of 2012 convicting the accused persons including the petitioner herein for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment for life till their natural death along with fine of Rs.2,00,000/- payable by each accused. For the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the accused were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/- payment by each of them. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Badar. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-33 of 2012, Chaori Thana, Bhojpur. Sunil Roy was the petitioner no. 3 in the High Court. 

The co-accused Bharath Roy, Uma Shankar Roy alias Uma Roy and Shakuntla Devi, did not prefer any special leave petition for assailing their conviction, only the petitioner-Sunil Roy was before the Supreme Court by way of the instant special leave petition. The case involves brutal murder of five persons, amongst which two were real brothers of accused No. 1 Bharath Roy, two were his nephews and one was his sister-in-law. 

Supreme Court concluded: "7. The case of the prosecution has been well proved by the ocular testimony of PW-1 Akash Kumar @ Vikky Kumar and PW-4 Rubi Kumari, both of whom received injuries in the same incident. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not in a position to convince the Court that the reliance placed by the trial Court and the High Court on the testimony of these two witnesses was unjustified or that the witnesses were not present at the spot. As a matter of fact, the presence of the witnesses at the spot is well established and corroborated by the fact that both of them received injuries in the very same incident. 9. Two competent Courts have recorded concurrent findings of the facts in convicting the petitioner as well as the co-accused and affirming their conviction. The judgments rendered by the Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity and are rather based on sound and thorough appreciation of evidence available on record and assign detailed reasons for arriving at a finding of guilt against the accused persons. 10. In this background, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed as being devoid of merit."

Justice Badar's judgement reads:"41. Culpable homicide is a genus and murder is its species. The Indian Penal Code practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. Culpable homicide of the first degree is the gravest form which is defined as 'murder' and is made punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The next may be termed as 'culpable homicide of second degree', which is made punishable under first part of Section 304 of the IPC. The last degree of culpable homicide is 'culpable homicide of third degree' which is made punishable under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. Barring the cases covered by an exception to Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if an act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. Otherwise, for making out the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the prosecution is firstly required to establish that a bodily injury is present on the victim. Secondly, the prosecution is required to establish nature and size of the injury on the victim. Then the prosecution is enjoined to prove that there was intention to inflict the particular injury, by adducing clear and cogent evidence for clarifying that such an injury was not accidental or unintentional. Possibility of injury of other kind intended by the appellant/accused is required to be ruled out. Lastly, the prosecution has to establish that the injury so caused was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If all these factors are established, then only the offence defined under Section 300 of the IPC and punishable under Section 302 of IPC is made out. Similarly, it is well settled that in the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code all the ingredients of offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. Indian Penal Code are lacking, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code. Section 307 of Indian Penal Code does not take into consideration the effect of the act of the accused except as a measure of punishment to be imposed on him. In order to constitute the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code actus reus and the requisite mens rea both must concur and the intention precedes the act attributed to the accused. The offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is made out when the accused have intended to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention does any overt act towards commission of murder. In order to establish the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, the prosecution is required to establish the intention or knowledge of committing murder and doing of an act towards it. Thus, Section 307 of the IPC contemplates intention or knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention." 

The High Court's Division Bench had concluded:"....the accused persons had inflicted blows of sharp cutting weapons on vital parts of bodies of all five deceased persons. As seen from the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution, deaths of Kamlesh Roy, Bikash Roy, Vijay Roy, Satyendra Roy and Shanti Devi were resulted because of cardio respiratory failure caused by haemorrhage and shock due to injuries sustained by them on vital parts of their body such as neck, chest and abdomen. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that blows of sharp cutting weapons were inflicted by the accused persons on the victims with an intention to cause death of their victims. Seat of injury and the weapons used for causing wounds so also the force by which the blows were given on the victims makes it clear that the accused persons were knowing that they were likely to cause death of the victims by inflicting blows by sharp edged weapons. Therefore, the prosecution has established that in furtherance of their common intention, the appellants had caused murders of five victims, thereby committing the offence punishable u/s 302 R/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, it is proved from evidence on record that in furtherance of their common intention the accused persons had attempted to commit murder of P.W.1 Akash Kumar @ Vikky Kumar by inflicting blow of sharp cutting weapon on his chest leading to his hospitalization for a one and half month at P.M.C.H., Patna. The blow was inflicted on his chest with sufficient force making the intention to eliminate him crystal clear. Thus, the prosecution has also proved commission of the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 43. As we have carefully gone through the entire case laws relied by the appellants and as we have acted upon the ratio which can be culled out from those rulings, we are not intending to reproduce the ratio by quoting relevant paragraphs from those judgments, for burdening this otherwise lengthy judgment. 44. In the result, both these appeals are devoid of merit and they are accordingly dismissed." 

 

Why is ED hiding Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) which was used to start money-laundering investigation under PMLA against Newsclick

No offence of cheating, criminal breach of trust or criminal conspiracy made out against Prabir Purkayastha and Newsclick: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna 

In M/S PK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors and related matters, Justice Neena Bansal Krishna of Delhi High Court delivered a 41-page long judgment dated May 29, 2026, wherein, she held that the charges made in the FIR registered under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code on allegations that NewsClick, a news entity received foreign direct investment (FDI) from a US-based entity, Worldwide Media Holdings LLC, through an allegedly inflated share valuation structure for which ED had subsequently registered a money laundering case on the basis of the FIR failed to disclose offences of cheating, criminal breach of trust or criminal conspiracy.

Justice Krishna concluded: "130. It has been held that if the FIR under predicate offence is quashed, the ECIR automatically, is liable to be quashed. Consequently, the complete ECIR is also quashed. 131. Once the ECIR itself is quashed, the prayer for supply of the copy of the ECIR has become infructuous. 132. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the aforesaid three Writ Petitions a re allowed. The FIR No. 0116/2020 and the ECIR bearing E CIR/14/HIU/2020 are hereby, quashed and W.P. (Crl.) No. 1129/2021, is hereby disposed of, as infructuous." Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) is an internal document used by the ED to start a money-laundering investigation under the PMLA.

The judgement reads: "124. ....even if all the averments maden in the FIR are admitted, no offence under Sections 420/406 IPC is made out. From the response of ED also, it is evident that they are trying to claim that the offence under Section 120B IPC, is still made out. However, on what basis the criminal conspiracy is being alleged is not explained, except that Prabir Purkayastha and Jason Pfetcher, had entered into an agreement. 125. Merely because the parties entered into an agreement is not sufficient to constitute criminal conspiracy, unless the ED is able to show what is the illegal objective or the means which have been adopted by the Petitioners and the other persons which can be termed as criminal conspiracy. 126. The response of the ED itself reflects that even if the entire allegations against the Petitioners are admitted, no offence is disclosed in the FIR. Pertinently, extensive investigations have been carried out by ED for about a year and a half and Petitioners as well as its employees have been summoned and examined many a times, but nothing incriminating till date has been found or placed on record. Aside from bald assertions of there being a criminal conspiracy, there is not a whisper of any incriminating allegation, which would even remotely suggest the commission of the offence punishable under Section 4 PMLA."

Justice Krishna relied on the judgement of Division Bench of the High Court in Harish Fabiani & Ors. vs. Enforcement Directorate &Ors. 2022:DHC:3892-DB, wherein, it held:"The Hon'ble Supreme Court has been clear and categorical in its reasoning as evident from the para extracted above. The undeniable sequitur of the above reasoning is that firstly, authorities under the PMLA cannot resort to action against any person for money laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed; secondly, the scheduled offence must be registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum; thirdly, in the event there is already a registered scheduled offence but the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or quashing of the criminal case of the scheduled offence, there can be no action for money laundering against not only such a person but also any person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. In other words no action under PMLA can be resorted to unless there is a substratum of a scheduled offence for the same, which substratum should legally exist in the form of a subsisting (not quashed) criminal complaint/inquiry or if it did exist the accused has since been discharged or acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction."

Justice Krishna also referred to Supreme Court's decision in para 253 of the judgement in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1 which reads: “253. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.”

Justice Krishna also recollected that relying on the above principles, Calcutta High Court in M/s Nik Nish Retail Ltd. & Anr vs. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Govt. of India & Ors, held, “The quashing of FIR of regular case automatically created a situation that the offences, stated and alleged in the FIR has no existence; thus the “Scheduled Offence” has also no existence after quashing of the FIR. When there is no “Scheduled Offence”, the proceeding initiated under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 cannot stand alone.”

The judgement recorded that two years have passed since the registration of impugned ECIR in 2022. The Petitioner No. 2 and various employees of Petitioner number one joined investigations on numerous occasions in 2021, after which they we're not summoned even once between September 2021 to June 2022. The manner in which the investigation was conducted clearly showed that "the same is a fishing and roving exercise in the financial affairs of the Petitioners without the existence of any offence."

Justice Krishna observed that while ED had alleged that it is investigating into alleged violations under FEMA, "but no summons or notice of inquiry under FEMA, has been received by the Petitioners till date. All the summons issued to the Petitioners are only under the PMLA and it is for the first time that ED has claimed that it is also investigating the Petitioners under FEMA as well. No copy of ECIR has been provided and the Petitioners are not even aware of the provisions and the statutes under which they are being investigated."

The judgement recorded that ED had claimed that mala fide of the Complainant is immaterial in the investigations after the registration of ECIR, but this contention is also misconceived and untenable in law. The Petitioners have a constitutional right to a free and fair investigation and mala fide registration of impugned ECIR and mala fide investigation being conducted by ED hampers the investigations. Moreover, in terms of of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari (1970), where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide or are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the same is bound to be quashed. Not only are the present proceedings only mala fide, but also an arbitrary attack and abuse of powers on the free and impartial journalism of the Petitioners.

The judgement records: "122. While the ED has contended that ECIR is an internal document and the copy of the same cannot be provided to the Petitioners, the ED has failed to appreciate that even in the case of Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary (Supra), Supreme Court has not held that ED can, as a matter of right, reject the request for supply of ECIR. It has merely stated that it is not mandatory that, in each case, ED shall supply the copy of ECIR and non-supply of ECIR will not constitute violation of the Constitutional right of the Accused." 

Significantly, the judgement also records: "123. Further, the ED has filed an Application bearing Criminal M.A. No.9589/2021, dated 22.06.2021 in Criminal W.P. (Crl.) 1129/2021, in which it was submitted that ED has decided to supply the copy of ECIR to the Petitioners herein. Thus, it cannot now turn back and change the legal position. Pertinently, no copy of ECIR has been supplied to the Petitioners till date despite the aforesaid submission of the ED. It is, therefore, submitted that the ECIR and all the proceedings emanating therefrom may be quashed."

The million dollar question is: who is/was afraid of the sunlight.