Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Supreme Court upholds judgement of conviction by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi, Samarendra Pratap Singh in a murder case

In Adalat Yadav etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K Singh delivered a 18-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it dismissed the appeals. The appellant-convicts before the Court were the father and son, namely Adalat Yadav and Anirudh Yadav. This appeals of 2019 were filed by Adalat Yadav, and Anirudh Yadav. Both challenging the 56-page long common judgment by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Samarendra Pratap Singh dated February 4, 2017 passed in Girdhari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2017), whereby the Division Bench had confirmed finding of conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai1 in terms of judgment dated November 22, 2011 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2019 sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 149 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also a fine of Rs.10,000/. These convicts were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years under Sections 307, 149 of the I.P.C. read with Section 120B of the I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.5000/. Apart from this, they were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Trivedi. 

On December 4, 2008 while Sunil Yadav @ Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-5/complainant) was homebound from the Begusarai Court along with his brother Ram Sharan Yadav (deceased), certain persons including two appellants/convicts surrounded them upon reaching the grocery store run by one Suresh Mahto. A-1 hurled abuses at them and stated that despite repeated directions/clear warnings given to them by Girdhari Yadav (who was also an accused before the High Court), against giving depositions in the murder case on one Mahesh Paswan, the deceased had refused to heed. He then fired his pistol, hitting the deceased on his head, making him fall to his death, instantly. A-2 had fired upon the deceased and, thereafter, other members of the group also opened fired on the complainant as also one Ganesh and Baidyanath Yadav, who were walking alongside the deceased and the complainant. The bullet fired by one Shivji Yadav, hit the complainant on his leg. A written complaint was lodged about the incident on the same day, resulting in registration of FIR Number 222/08 at Police Station Balia. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheets were filed in March 2009. The Trial Court convicted a total of 4 persons including the appellant-convicts while acquitting one Ram Balak Yadav. A perusal of the Trial Court judgment reveals that such a finding was arrived at upon a cumulative assessment of the testimonies of all the witnesses. 

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Trial court records withheld in Bihar, Supreme Court takes note of "incurable injustice" in a murder case, sets aside judgements by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Sanjay Sah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 10-page long order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained. The High Court was also in error in overlooking this crucial aspect and in confirming the conviction and sentences visited upon the appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and also the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated 25.01.2007 registered with Police Station–Adapur, District–East Champaran, Bihar) Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 shall stand restored on the file of the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, to enable fresh examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code strictly in accordance with the legal parameters applicable thereto. As we are informed that the appellants were on bail, prior to their conviction and sentencing, they would be entitled to the same relief pending the fresh exercise to be undertaken by the trial court. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed in the aforestated terms. The appellants shall be released on bail on such appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the trial court, pending the exercise to be undertaken by the trial court pursuant to this order. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The Appellant no. 2 was Awadhesh Kumar Gupta @Awadhesh Sah. The private Respondents were: Ram Sevak Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and  Srilal Sah. The tagged matters included Ram Sevak Sah vs. The State of Bihar and Mahanth Sah vs. The State of Bihar.

Although Supreme Court had directed the Registry to requisition the trial court records, being of the opinion that the aforestated judgments warranted interference, the Court records that "trial court records have not yet been received. Instead of awaiting receipt of the records, we deem it appropriate to resort to the alternative that is available to us, that is, to remit the matter to the trial court instead of undertaking adjudication of these appeals on merit." On January 21, 2026, the Court had ordered: "Registry shall requisition the trial court records at the earliest and undertake translation of documents in vernacular, if any. E-copies of the trial court records, once received, shall be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties." 

Earlier, on  September 2, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Kumar and Alok Aradhe had passed an order which recorded that the counsel for the State of Bihar had sought "some time to examine whether there was a separate examination by the trial Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, and if so, file a copy thereof. Registry may also call for the record of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if any, from the trial Court/High Court." In its order dated November 12, 2025, the Court recorded that Azmat Hayat Amanullah, counsel for the State of Bihar was present in the Court. "The learned counsel states that it would not be necessary to file a counter affidavit in this matter."

These appeals arose out of the 56-page long judgment dated March 6, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Nani Tagia in Ram Sevak Shah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), and 58-page long judgement in Laxman Sah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), confirming the conviction and the sentences visited upon the appellants, vide judgments dated August 27, 2016 and September 2, 2016, passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated January 25, 2007 registered with Police Station – Adapur, District – East Champaran, Bihar). The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment along with payment of fines. Both the High Court's judgements of the Division Bench were authored by Justice Shah. In the former Sanjay Sah, Awadhesh Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and Srilal Sah were the appellants besides Ram Sevak Shah. In the latter Inar Sah, Vijay Sah Son, Ajay Sah, Mahanth Sah and Ramekbal Sah were the appellants besides Laxman Sah.   

In the penultimate paragraph of his judgement in both Ram Sevak Shah case and Laxman Sah case, Justice Shah had concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence, which has been brought on record to prove the allegations levelled against the appellants beyond pale of any reasonable doubt as well as considering the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence of the prosecution, which has not been discredited during the course of cross-examination coupled with the postmortem report and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we find that there is no reason to create any doubt in our minds. We have examined the materials available on record and do not find any apparent error in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, hence, the same does not require any interference." 

The order reads: "We find from the material placed on record by the learned counsel for the appellants that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731, was brief to the point of being cryptic and was limited to just three questions. The first question was as to whether the accused had heard the statement of the witnesses. The second question was as follows:- “There is an allegation against you that on 24th February 2007 at 06.30 A.M., in village Harpur, police station Harpur, district East 1 For short “the Code”Champaran, you along with other accused for the fulfillment of a common purpose, killed Shivnath Shah, brother of Suresh Prasad, the complainant in this Case, by hitting with sticks, what do you have to say in this regard?” The third question was as to whether the accused had something to say in his defence. The aforestated three questions were posed to one of the accused/appellants, namely, Mahanth Sah. However, the same format was adopted for examination of the remaining accused. This is not in dispute. Needless to state, the aforestated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again." 

The Court referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of the Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused. 

The Court recollected its earlier decision by a 3-Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra”(1973) 2 SCC 793, wherein the in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was observed that great care is expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused. 

 

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Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court sets aside judgement authored by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi in a morder case from Rohtas

In Rajesh Upadhayay vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manmohan, N.V. Anjaria delivered a 24-page long judgement dated December 18, 2025, wherein it set aside the 6-page order dated August 28, 2024 authored by Justice Vipul M.Pancholi as part of Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sheo Narayan Mahto @ Sheo Narayan Singh @ Shiv Narayan Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2024).   

This appeal was filed in the High Court against the judgment of conviction dated April 3, 2024 and order of sentence dated April 9, 2024 rendered by the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge 19th, Rohtas at Sasaram in a Sessions Trial of 2022, which arose out of Baghaila P.S. case of 2021where-under and whereby, the Trial Court had convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offences under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offences under Sections 342/149 of the IPC, To undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 147 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offences under Sections 504/149 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of two year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 148 of the IPC. The appellant was also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.  

The appellant-original complainant questioned judgment and order dated August 28, 2024 by the High Court, whereby the High Court had suspended the sentence imposed on respondent No.2 and released him on bail during the pendency of the Appeal. Supreme Court's judgment records that the appellant-informant’s father named Krishna Behari Upadhyay was murdered. As per the prosecution story, on December 11, 2021 at about 4.30 p.m., the appellant along with his father Krishna Behari Upadhyay reached at Mahavir temple of the village to light ‘Diya’ and to do ‘Arti’. At that time, the accused persons and the co-villagers Bashishthha Singh alias Munna Singh, Ajit Singh, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Sheo Narayan Mahto- respondent No.2 herein wielding the arms and weapons reached, at the temple. Hurling abuses, all of them surrounded the appellant and his father, telling said Krishna Behari Upadhyay that he was not performing Puja and was engaging in politics. The prosecution case was that  that Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay tried to close the main gate of the temple, but the accused persons pushed the gate and made a forcible entry inside the temple. Ajit Singh and Raghunandan Kumar caught hold of Krishna Behari Upadhyay and Munna Singh was stated to have fired at him with a revolver. It was stated respondent No.2 also had a country-made pistol with him and that he as well as another Rajesh Mehto alias Rajesh Kumar were instigatively uttering that the Pandit should be killed as he was excessively indulging in politics. Because of gun fire shots, Krishna Behari Upadhyay fell down inside the temple premises and was in a pool of blood. The appellant somehow managed to flee away from the place and informed his family members. Om Prakash Tiwari and Ritesh Mukhia who were the family members, as well as the other co-villagers reached at the place of the offence. They saw Munna Singh, Ajit Kumar, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Rajesh Kumar Mahto alias Rajesh as also respondent No.2-Sheo Narayan Mahto running away in the Eastern direction. Upon being taken to the hospital, Krishna Behari Upadhyay was declared dead. A Fardbeyan was given by the appellant on December 11, 2021, pursuant to which the police registered the First Information Report for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 504, 506, 302 and 120 (B), IPC, and for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act against the six persons, including respondent No.2. On February 2, 2022, respondent No.2 surrendered before the Trial Court. Chargesheet was filed on March 28, 2022. The Sessions Court convicted and sentenced respondent No.2. In the appeal proceedings before the High Court, respondent No.2 filed an application praying for suspension of sentence, which was allowed by the High Court and during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No.2 was ordered to be released on bail, suspending the sentence imposed on him.

The Supreme Court observed: "The High Court took the view that the role attributed to respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation, therefore, the sentence could be suspended....5. There is no escape from the fact that respondent No.2 is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC and is imposed with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life with payment of fine. He is also convicted for the offence under the Arms Act. Respondent No.2 had undergone incarceration so far for three years. His appeal has been awaiting final outcome....5.2. The nature of role played by respondent No.2 was the aspect weighed with the High Court in suspending the sentence awarded to him, the High Court was further persuaded itself to justify the suspension of sentence of respondent No.2 on the ground inter alia that that the FIR was sent to the Magistrate’s court after a gap of three days and that the original copy of the inquest report was not produced. 5.3 At the outset, it may be observed that the High Court was in evident error in resting upon the said two counts. Delay of three days in sending the copy of the FIR to the court of the Magistrate and the non-production of original copy of the inquest report could be said to be illogical considerations applied by the High Court, insofar as those aspects do not have any bearing on the credence of the prosecution’s case which was otherwise established on evidence before the Trial Court. These considerations could not have guided the application of mind of the High Court. 5.4 The High Court was swayed away to observe that the role played by respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation only. It may be true that respondent No.2 was instigator when the deceased Krishna Behari Upadhyay was shot at, however, it is revealed from the record and the evidence, which the High Court has also accepted and observed, that respondent No.2 also had with him a country-made pistol. 5.5 As stated above, respondent No.2 had pistol with him and he along with Rajesh Kumar and other accused persons had been shouting ‘kill him’ (Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay)." 

Justice Anjaria who authored the judgment observed:"Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending appeal and release of appellant on bail. Conceptually, there is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence." 

He relied on the decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Supreme Court had emphasized that "the Appellate Court is expected to record proper reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of sentence or the order appealed, further observed that before suspension of sentence could be ordered, there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects. It was stated that order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as matter of routine." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "It is also the settled principle that the Appellate Court should not reappreciate evidence at stage of Section 389, CrPC and try to pick some lacunae or loopholes here and there in the case of prosecution. The presumption of innocence of the accused which is a principle applied in criminal jurisprudence, holds good only until the accused is tried. Once the accused is convicted at the end of the trial, the presumption of innocence does not continue."

He relied on the decision in Shakuntala Shukla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.(2021) 20 SCC 818, the Supreme Court was considering the question of grant of bail during pendency of appeal at the instance of appellant who was convicted under Section, 302/149, 201 read with Section 120-B, IPC. It was observed inter alia that the High Court should be slow in granting bail to an accused convicted under Section 302/149, IPC and that once convicted, the presumption of innocence would vanish. ‘The High Court has not at all appreciated and considered the fact that the learned trial court on appreciation of evidence has convicted the accused for the offences under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-BIPC. Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial court, there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter. Therefore, the High Court shall be very slow in granting bail to the accused pending appeal who are convicted for the serious offences punishable under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-B IPC.’ (Para 11).

Justice Anjaria referred to the decision in Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr.(2023) 6 SCC 123, Supreme Court reiterated that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted only in exceptional cases more particularly so in cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC. It was further observed that the court should consider the relevant factors like nature of accusation made against the convict, the manner of commission of crime, the gravity of the offence, etc. Distinction was brought out between grant of relief of suspension of sentence in the cases where fixed term sentence is imposed versus the cases where the convicted person is sentenced to life imprisonment, by relying on its own decision in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai vs. State of Gujarat (1999) 4 SCC 421, ‘When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach.’ (Para 3)

Even in respect of cases where the sentence awarded is for a fixed term, Supreme Court in Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 421 observed that ‘there is a caveat that if there are exceptional circumstances, then the Court may decline to suspend the sentence even in cases where fixed term of sentence is imposed’. It was specifically observed that in respect of plea of suspension of sentence where the sentence is of life imprisonment, such relief has to informed by a gross and apparent error in the judgment of the Trial Court. ‘What could be those exceptional circumstances is not something exhaustive. It is for the Court concerned to look into those exceptional circumstances as may be pointed out by the State. However, the only consideration that should weigh with the appellate court while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment is that the convict should be in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone, his appeal deserves to be allowed and he be acquitted.’ (Para 16)

Justice Anjaria underlined that "The dictum that the benefit of suspension of sentence, if at all to be granted in the cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC, it has to be only in exception cases, is well settled in the catena of judgments. In Vijay Kumar vs. Narender & Ors.(2002) 9 SCC 366 it was observed that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC, the court should consider relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which crime is alleged to have been committed and the seriousness of offence. The view was reiterated in Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 281, Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Marashtra8, Gomti v. Thakurdas & Ors.9."

Justice Anjaria observed:"7. Looking to the crime scenario in the instant case, the murder of father of complainant-Pundit Krishna Behari Upadhyay took place inside the temple. The appellant complainant (PW2) in terms deposed that respondent No.2 had pistol in his hand. When all the accused persons came, the father of the appellant got frightened, went inside the temple. Thereupon, as is stated, the accused persons, including respondent No.2, pushed the door of the temple and made a forced entry inside, catching hold of Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay. The victim fell down having received gun shot injury to be in a pool of blood. As per the evidence appreciated by the Trial court leading to conviction of respondent No.2 under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC, the firearm was used by Munna Singh whereas respondent No.2 with pistol in his hand was instigating. Munna Singh and respondent No.2 had firearms with them. Respondent No.2 had with him a country-made pistol. 8. It is also to be noted that two of the accused persons are absconding." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "9. In the light of the above highlighted principles applied to the facts of the present case and having regard to the relevant considerations such as nature of accusation, events in the crime and even the attribution of role of the appellant, it has to be held that the High Court should not have suspended the sentence, and releases respondent No.2. A clear error was committed by the High Court. The participation and role played by respondent No.2 in the entire commission of offence has to be viewed as grave and could not have been discounted for its seriousness to suspend his sentence imposed upon conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC. 9.1 It goes without saying that observations in this order are limited to the aspect of suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 and releasing him on bail, not to influence the course of merit of the trial. 10. For foregoing reasons and discussion, impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 28.08.2024 suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 is hereby set aside. Respondent No.2 Sheo Narayan Mahto to is directed to surrender within ten days. The police authorities shall ensure that respondent No.2 is sent behind the bars within the above time permitted for surrendering. 11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed."

P.S.:Subsequent to the order of the High Court dated August 28, 2024, the last order in the case was passed on May 8, 2025 by Justice Pancholi led bench in Re.: I.A. No.01 of 2025. The 3-page long order reads:"The appellant/applicant has filed the present interlocutory application with a request that the Registry be directed to send back the Trial Court Records of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 & 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to the Court of learned ADJ-19th Rohtas, Sasaram....3. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has pointed out that one of the accused has been convicted by the Trial Court whose trial was separated and, therefore, the said accused has filed the criminal appeal before this Court. This Court called for the Trial Court from the concerned Trial Court and the record is with the Registry of this Court. However, trial of other co-accused, whose trial has been separated, is still pending before the Court and, therefore, the original record is required to be transmitted to the Trial Court. 4. In view of the aforesaid request made by the appellant/applicant, office is directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the trial of the other co-accused, which has been separated, can be proceeded further. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has shown willingness to pay the cost of the same. 5. In view of the aforesaid, Registry is directed to transmit the record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram forthwith by special messenger at the cost of the applicant (informant) of this interlocutory application. 6. Registry is also directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the proceedings in the present appeal may proceed further. 7. Accordingly, this interlocutory application, i.e., I.A. No.01 of 2025 stands disposed of."

Patna High Court delivered 5 judgements on Dec. 20, Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha restores 36 year old initial judgement of Trial Court, sets aside subsequent order, passed on High Court's order

Patna High Court delivered five judgements on December 20, 202 in Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, Ashok Singh vs. State of Bihar, Brij Kumar Pandey & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, Binod Sah vs. State of Bihar and Mainuddin Mian vs. State of Bihar.

In Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of the High Court delivered a 37-page long judgement in a 41 year old P.S. case, wherein, he concluded:"38. The impugned judgment of conviction dated  19.02.2004 and order of sentence dated 20.02.2004 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in Sessions Case No.58 of 1986 arising out of Barhiya P.S. Case No.161 of 1984, G.R. No.759 of 1984 is, hereby, set aside. 39. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. Appellants are acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Since all above-named appellants/accused are on bail, they are discharged from their liabilities of bail bonds. Sureties stand discharged. 40. Fine, if any, paid be returned to the appellants/accused henceforth."

The appeal was preferred by the appellants-convict under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) challenging the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 19, 2004 and order of sentence dated February 20, 2004 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in a Sessions case of 1986 which arose out of Barhiya P.S. case of 1984, G.R. of 1984, whereby the trial court had convicted all the appellants under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The appellants namely, Ram Sabad Paswan (since died), Rambhajju Paswan and Anuj Pawan @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs.3,000/- to each for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 

The appellant Ram Balak Paswan, Dasrath Paswan, Anuj @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died), Chunni Paswan and Bundi Ram were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 149 of the IPC, whereas all the appellants were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 148 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 147 of the IPC. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The case of prosecution, as per fardbeyan of informant namely, Ramprit Pawan (PW-4), recorded by Mr. Sohan Sah, Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station was that while informant was coming to his house after taking bath from the well of Thakurbari on October 8, 1984 at about 6.30 A.M., all the appellants-accused variously armed with lathi, bhala, gadasa and firearms were cutting the bamboos standing on the land which is situated towards east of the house of the informant. The informant Ramprit Pawan forbade them from cutting the same as proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC was pending between the parties with regard to the land on which bamboo clumps were grown. On objection, the appellants-accused became infuriated and appellant Dasrath Pawan ordered his associates to kill the informant, on which, the appellant-accused Ram Sabad Paswan (since died) fired from his country-made pistol, which hit to the informant in his back and front. The appellant Rambhajju Paswan also fired by his
country-made pistol, which hit to his right hand and shoulder as a result of which, the informant became unconscious and fell down on the ground. After some time, when he regained himself in hospital and he came to know that the accused jointly assaulted his brother Akshay Lal Paswan with garasa and lathi. The informant and his brother came to hospital for medical treatment at 10 A.M. on the same day. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station forwarded the fardbeyan to Barahiya Police Station for institution of a case. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Officer-in-charge, Barahiya Police Station lodged a case against the appellants-accused. 

After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellants-accused. The Jurisdictional Magistrate on the basis of materials collected during investigation, took cognizance of the offence and after compliance of Section 207 of the CrPC, committed the case to the court of sessions for trial and disposal in view of Section 209 of CrPC. 7. The Trial Court on the basis of materials as collected during the course of investigation explained charges to the appellants/accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, to which, they denied and pleaded ‘not guilty’ and claimed for trial. 8. To substantiate its case, the prosecution had examined altogether seven witnesses. 

Justice Jha noted: "12. It is pertinent to mention that the learned trial court initially acquitted the appellants/accused but, the informant being aggrieved with aforesaid judgment, preferred Criminal Revision No.523 of 1989 before this Court and in exercise of power under Section 401(3) of the CrPC, the High Court has set aside the judgment and remanded back to the learned trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7 to its correct extent. After hearing both sides, the learned trial court has convicted above-named appellants/accused and sentenced them in the manner indicated above." 

It is evident, the High Court had set aside the acquittal of the appellants/accused after hearing a criminal revision petition filed in 1989 and remanded back to the trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7. In compliance of the High Court's order, the trial court re-heared the case and convicted the appellants who were acquitted earlier. The name of the judge who had set aside the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court is not in public domain.

Being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants/accused/convicts preferred to appeal in the High Court. 

Justice Jha observed: "31. It appears that the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC of accused/appellants has been recorded by learned trial court in very cryptic and mechanical manner and same is not acceptable under law in view of legal ratio as settled through Sukhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab [(2014) 10 SCC 270]". In Sukhjit Singh's case Supreme Court has held: “10. On a studied scrutiny of the questions put under Section 313 CrPC in entirety, we find that no incriminating material has been brought to the notice of the accused while putting questions. Mr Talwar has submitted that the requirement as engrafted under Section 313 CrPC is not an empty formality. To buttress the aforesaid submission, he has drawn inspiration from the authority in Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar [(2009) 6 SCC 595 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 92]. Relying upon the same, he would contend that when the incriminating materials have not been put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC it tantamounts to serious lapse on the part of the trial court making the conviction vitiated in law. 11. In this context, we may profitably refer to a four-Judge Bench decision in Tara Singh v. State [1951 SCC 903 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491] wherein, Bose, J. explaining the significance of the faithful and fair compliance with Section 342 of the Code as it stood then, opined thus: (AIR pp. 445-46, para 30) “30. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the committal court and ask whether the statement is correct. A question of that kind is misleading. It may mean either that the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there is some mistake or misunderstanding despite the accurate recording. In the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. I do not suggest that every error or omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice.”

Justice Jha relied on the decision in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933], wherein Justice Bose speaking for a three-Judge Bench highlighted the importance of recording of the statement of the accused under the Code expressed thus: (AIR pp. 469-70, para 8) “8. Now the statements of an accused person recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342, Criminal Procedure Code are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial. It has to be remembered that in this country an accused person is not allowed to enter the box and speak on oath in his own defence. This may operate for the protection of the accused in some cases but experience elsewhere has shown that it can also be a powerful and impressive weapon of defence in the hands of an innocent man. The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box.” 

Justice Jha underlined that this principle has been reiterated in Ajay Singh vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 371] in following terms: (SCC pp. 347-48, para 14)  “14. The word ‘generally’ in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of
the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give.”

Justice Jha pointed that "32. From perusal of record, it appears that the Investigating Officer of this case has not been examined during the trial. In this context, it would be apt to reproduce relevant paragraph of the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Munna Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), which are as under:-.“38. First, statement of PW-3 under section 161, Cr. P.C. was recorded nearly 24 days after the incident. Since the Investigating Officer did not enter the witness box, the appellants did not have the occasion to cross-examine him and thereby elicit the reason for such delay. Consequently, the
delay in recording the statement of PW-3 in course of investigation, is not referred to and, therefore,
remains unjustified. The possibility of PW-3, being fixed up as an eye-witness later during the process
of investigation, cannot be totally ruled out”.

Justice Jha noted that though PW 4 was said to have reached the place of occurrence at 1.30 p.m. on 5-9-1985 and recovered a bullet in the blood oozing out from the injury at the hip of the dead body, no effort worthy of consideration appears to have been made to seize the weapons by which the murderous attack was launched. It is true that mere failure/neglect to effect seizure of the weapon(s) cannot be the sole reason for discarding the prosecution case but the same assumes importance on the face of the oral
testimony of the so-called eyewitnesses i.e. PW 2 and PW 3, not being found by this Court to be wholly reliable. The missing links could have been provided by the investigating officer who, again, did not enter the witness box. Whether or not non-examination of a witness has caused prejudice to the defence is essentially a question of fact and an inference is required to be drawn having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. The reason why the investigating officer could not depose as a witness, as told by PW 4, is that he had been sent for training. It was not shown that the investigating officer under no circumstances could have left the course for recording of his deposition in the trial court. 

Justice Jha observed: "It is worthy of being noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court considered the issue of non-examination of the investigating officer. In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the investigating officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. 33. It appears that the witness examined during trial are interested and related witnesses." 

He drew on paragraph No. 32 and 33 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through Nandlal vs. State of Chattisgarh (supra), which are as under:-“32. Undisputedly, the present case rests on the evidence of interested witnesses. No doubt that two of them are injured witnesses. This Court, in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [1957 SCC OnLine SC 13], has observed thus: “11. … Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.”

Justice Jha referred to paragraph no. 4 and 5 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shamsher Singh (supra), which are as under:- “4. On an appeal preferred by the accused-respondent, the aforesaid conviction has been set aside and he has been acquitted for the offence under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but has been convicted for the offence under Section 326 IPC and sentenced with imprisonment already undergone. 5. The High Court in acquitting the accused-respondent held that for an offence under Section 307 IPC, the court was obliged to see if the act was done with the intention or knowledge so as to cause death and since the facts do not prove such intention or knowledge on part of the accused-respondent, there cannot be an offence for attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC. It also observed that the intention has to be gathered from the entire circumstances of the case such as nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, severity of the blow or hurt, the part of the body where the injury was inflicted and so on and not merely from the end result”.

Justice Jha record4ed: "35. Taking note of aforesaid available evidence as surfaced during trial, it is an admitted position that occurrence was free fight in nature, where both parties received injuries. The case of appellant for same set of occurrence lodged by appellant side prior to this case. Police upon investigation submitted final form against appellants. Injuries of appellants, which was also of gunshot could not explain by prosecutions. I.O. of this case could not examined during trial, which also appears fatal for prosecution. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 deposed to arrived after actual occurrence. Allegation of firing appears general and omnibus out of testimony of PW-4, whereas same was stated in specified manner in FIR. PW-4 deposed that only two accused persons were carrying country-made pistol, whereas he was silent about Anuj Paswan (since died). All such unanswered events creates a doubt qua occurrence, which creates a serious doubts, the benefit of which must be extended to accused/appellants. 36. In view of aforesaid testimony of witnesses, who are related to informant (PW-4) cannot be wholly reliable as they appears interested witnesses in view of Nandlal’s case (supra). 37. Statement of appellants/accused also appears recorded in very cryptic and mechanical manner in view of Section 313 of the CrPC....." 

The judgement  concluded that the present appeal against appellant Nos. 2, 4 and 5 stands abated. "Now, this appeal survives against above-named four appellants only."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

Supreme Court recalls order of non-bailable warrant, directs release of Supan Rai, an from the judicial custody

In Baleshwari Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated October 10, 2025. The Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) was filed on September 21, 2024, registered on October 4, 2024 and verified on October 6, 2024. The Court recalled the order of non-bailable warrant and directed release of Supan Rai, the Respondent No. 2 from the judicial custody who is an accused for the offence/s punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(1) (r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Supreme Court's list of order, judgements and record of proceedings reveals that the Court passed orders on October 10, 2025, September 26, 2025, September 10, 2025, July 31, 2025, May 23, 025, April 28, 2025, March 28, 2025, March 25, 2025, February 21, 2025, February 17, 2025, February 4, 2025, January 2, 2025 and October 15, 2024. The Court's record of the I.A.s and SLPs mention the order dated April 18, 2024 passed in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors but the same is not there Court's list of order, judgements and record of proceedings.  

On January 2, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed an order reads:'' 2. Let bailable warrant of Rs.25,000/- be issued against the respondent no.2 for remaining present before this Court on 04.02.2025, either personally or through an Advocate. 3. The bailable warrant be executed through the SHO of the concerned Police Station.'' It recorded: ''Nobody appears for the respondent no.2 though duly served.'' 

On February 4, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order which reads: ''1. None has filed appearance on behalf of the respondent No.2, though the bailable warrant issued by the Court vide the order dated 02.01.2025 has been served. 2. Hence, let the non-bailable warrant be issued against the respondent No.2, to be executed through the SHO of the Police
Station concerned. 3. List on 21.02.2025.''

On February 17, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench passed an order in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2332/2025 which arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 13, 2024 in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 3487/2024 passed by the Patna High Court in Baleshwari Devi vs. The State of Bihar  and Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 2353/2025 which arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 13, 2024 in CRASJ No. 3698/2024 passed by the Patna High Court. It issued notice and tagged both the petitions with SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024.    

On February 21, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 13924/2024. It reads: ''The learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the non-bailable warrant could not be executed as the respondent no.2 is not found at the given address. He seeks more time to get the whereabouts of the respondent no.2 to serve the non-bailable warrant.'' In Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2332/2025 and other connected matters, its order reads:''As per the office report, notice could not be issued to the respondents as the counsel for the petitioner(s) has not filed spare copies. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) shall do the needful in that regard. However, liberty is sought on his behalf to serve the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-State. Liberty, as sought for, is granted. Learned counsel for the respondent-State seeks time to file vakalatnama and counter affidavit.'' The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated August 22, 2024 in CRLA(SJ) No. 3192/2024 passed by the Patna High Court. 

On March 25, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order which reads: ''1. The matter has been taken up on oral mentioning being done by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 – State, though not listed today on the board. 2. According to him, pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 21.02.2025, the respondent No.2 – accused has been arrested and has been brought to this Court. 3. Let the respondent No.2 be taken into judicial custody of the concerned jurisdictional Court. 4. The SLP be listed in normal course.'' The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated August 22, 2024 in CRLA(SJ) No. 3192/2024. 

On March 28, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed an order which reads:'' 1. Let the notice be issued to the respondents. 2. Additionally, liberty is granted to serve notice upon the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar. 3. Tag alongwith SLP (Crl.) No.13924 of 2024.'' 

On April 28, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order, which reads: "1. It appears that pursuant to the non bailable warrant issued by this Court, respondent no.2 in SLP(Crl.) No. 13924/2024 was arrested and now, he is in judicial custody. 2. It appears that respondent nos.2 and 3 in SLP(Crl) No. 4153/2025 and respondent no.2 in rest of the matters, are not served. 3. Let fresh notice be issued to the unserved respondents, to be served through the concerned SHO, returnable after three weeks."

On May 23, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order in SLP (Crl.) Diary No(s). 2135/2025. The order reads: "Delay condoned. 2. Application for exemption from filing Official Translation is allowed. 3. Issue notice. 4. Tag with SLP (Crl.) No. 13924 of 2024."  The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 20, 2024 in CRASJ No. 3726/2024 passed by the Patna High Court.

On July 31, 2025, Supreme Court's Record of Proceedings states that ''Respondent no.1 is duly represented. Despite service being complete, none has entered appearance for respondent no.2. Let the matter be processed for listing before the Hon’ble Court, as per rules. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any'' in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 and 8371/2025. 

The order in SLP(Crl.) Nos.2353, 2358 and 2332/2025 reads:'' Respondent no.1 is duly represented. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any. Service report with regard to respondent no.2 from concerned S.H.O has not been received. Issue reminder. List again on 10.09.2025.'' In SLP(Crl.) No.4153/2025, the order reads: ''Respondent no.1 is duly represented. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any. Service report with regard to respondent nos.2 and 3 from concerned S.H.O has not been received. Issue reminder.''

On September 10, 2025 also the Supreme Court had passed an order.  

After Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh passed a 3-page long order dated August 22, 2024 in Supan Rai vs. The State of Bihar Patna & Anr. (2025). Justice Singh had set aside the impugned order dated June 24, 2024 passed by the Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in a P.S. case of 2024 against the appellant. The criminal appeal was allowed and the appellant, was directed to be enlarged on bail. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. The Respondent No.2 is Baleshwari Devi, wife of Harbans Ram, resident of Maksudpur, Ward No. 03, Shahpur, Patna. The criminal appeal was filed before the Single Judge of the High Court on July 4, 2024. It was registered on July 10, 2024. 

The Supreme Court recorded: ''It is a case where the petitioner being the complainant has come forward to file this instant petition. Even as per the case of the prosecution, a group of 18 persons came and attacked the deceased and several other persons were injured. Admittedly, only one gun was used at the time of the incident. The main accused is stated to have been absconding.'' It observed: ''Taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, coupled with the fact that no specific overt act is attributed against respondent No.2, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file an application for cancellation of bail, if the subsequent development warrants the same. Accordingly, the order of non-bailable warrant issued to the respondent No.2, stands recalled, and he is directed to be released from the judicial custody, as per the terms and conditions already imposed upon him by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition stands disposed of in above terms.''   

Justice Singh of the High Court had passed the order after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 24, 2024 passed by the Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur, Patna P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(1) (r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

According to the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to ulterior motive. He also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellants. There is no specific allegation of firing against the appellant. The appellant had no criminal antecedent as stated in the bail petition. 

The counsel for Baleshwari Devi, the respondent no. 2 as well as Special Public Prosecutor for the State was opposed the bail petition of the appellant in the High Court. 

Justice Singh had concluded: "6. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail...." 

Notably, Supreme Court too has directed the release of Supan Rai ''from the judicial custody in terms and conditions already imposed upon him by the High Court'' but it granted liberty to Baleshwari Devi saying, "However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file an application for cancellation of bail, if the subsequent development warrants the same." The order dated October 10, 2025 concluded: ''The Special Leave Petition stands disposed of in above terms. Accordingly, IA No. 245017/2025 also stands disposed of.'' It is noteworthy that SLP(Crl.) No. 013924/2024 was heard along with Interlocutory Application No.(s) 231152/2024, 231153/2024, 231155/2024, 281558/2024 with SLP (Criminal) No.(s) 2332/2025, 2353/2025 and 2358/2025.

From the Archives:A Memorandum No. 641/2025 dated February 19, 2025 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna with reference to Office Memorandum No. 441/Vi.Co. Dated 202/2025 (sic) SLP(Crl.) 13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. on the subject ''Regarding compliance of the order dated 18.04.24(sic) passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court New Delhi in PS Shahpur Case No.147/24'' from SHO Police Station, Shahpur, Patna is in public domain. It reads: ''Sir, With reference to the above mentioned subject, it is to be respectfully apprised that in the light of the points mentioned in the order dated 18.04.24 (sic) passed in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors. by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, New Delhi, in PS Shahpur Case No.147/24, a non-bailable warrant NBW has been  received for arresting accused Supan Rai son of late Jodha Rai resident of Maksudpur, Ward No.03, Police Station Shahpur, District Patna and producing him before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.'' 

 

SHO Police Station, Shahpur, Patna wrote: ''When I conducted continuous raids for the arrest of the above accused, it was found that he does not reside at home. After collecting information, it was found that he lives somewhere else due to fear of arrest, yet I am conducting raids at various places for his arrest. As soon as he is arrested, he will be produced before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted for information.''

 

High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ajit Kumar upholds trial court's judgment in murder case against Manoj Manzil & 18 Others

Judgement records that in written application by informant, 24 persons and other unknown persons were named as accused, ex-MLA, Manoj Manzil's name figured at Serial No. 18 

In Manoj Manzil vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ajit Kumar delivered a 72-page long judgement dated October 7, 2025, wherein, it upheld upon the judgment of conviction dated February 13, 2024 and the order of sentence dated February 13, 2024 passed by Special Judge of M.P/M.L.A. Court-cum-Additional Sessions Judge-III, Bhojpur at Ara in Sessions Trial No. 123 of 2019 which arose out of Azimabad, Bhojpur P.S. Case No. 51 of 2015. The judgment was delivered after hearing the three appeals against the judgement by the Special Judge. The High Court's Division Bench did not find any perversity in the findings of the trial court. The judgements of the High Court's Division Bench was authored by Justice Prasad. It is one of the nine judgments delivered by the High Court on October 7, 2025. 

The other eight judgments were delivered in Ranjeet Sah  vs. The State of Bihar, Ramesh Prajapati vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Malvika Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Ram Gopal Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Sanjeev Kumar Tiwari @ Sanjeev Kumar Tiwary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Gopal Krishna Tiwary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Amitabh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. and Shamsher Singh Awadhwale vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. 

In Manoj Manzil case, the trial court had convicted all the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 364 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 149 IPC. The appellants have been ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 302/149 IPC and in case of default in payment of fine, they have to also undergo three months simple imprisonment. For the offence under Section 364/149 IPC, they have to undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each. For the offence punishable under Section 201/149 IPC, they have to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each. All the sentences are to run concurrently. 

The judgement has five sections, namely, Prosecution Case, Findings of the Learned Trial Court, Submissions on behalf of the Appellants, Submissions on behalf of the State and Consideration. From page no. 30, page no. 24 onward, the High Court provided its "consideration" and findings till the final para no. 60 at page no. 72.    

In the penultimate para of his judgment, Justice Prasad wrote:''Thus, the plea of the defence that the dead body was an unclaimed body which has been connected with the present case would not inspire confidence of this Court. There is no evidence at all that any Insurance claim was obtained by PW-8. We have already taken note of the judgment in the case of S. Kaleeswaran (supra) which says that conviction may take place even if the dead body is not found. Once PW-8 has been found to be a wholly reliable witness, his evidence with regard to killing of his father by the appellants at the place of occurrence and then the fact that the dead body could not be traced despite hectic search by him, his family members and the I. O. (PW-9) fully proved the prosecution case beyond all reasonable doubts.''  

Justice Prasad concluded: "In ultimate analysis we find no plausible reason to interfere with the judgments of the learned trial court. All these appeals would fail, they are dismissed accordingly. 58. Appellant Manoj Manjil in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 216 of 2024, appellants (1) Ravindra Chaudhary, (2) Guddu Chaudhary and (3) Rohit Chaudhary in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 237 of 2024 and appellants (1) China Ram, (2) Manoj Chaudhary, (3) Nand Kumar Chaudhary, (4) Bharat Ram, (5) Triloki Ram, (6) Prem Ram, Babban Chaudhary, (8) Pawan Chaudhary, (9) Gabbar Chaudhary, (10) Ram Bali Chaudhary, (11) Shiv Bali Chaudhary, (12) Ramadhar Chaudhary, (13) Sarvesh Chaudhary, (14) Ramanand Prasad, (15) Tanman Chaudhary, (16) Prabhu Chaudhary, (17) Jai Kumar Yadav, (18) Nandu Yadav and (19) Chandra Dhan Rai of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 510 of 2024 are on bail, their bail bonds are cancelled. 59. They are directed to surrender before the learned trial court within one week from today to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial court, failing which learned trial court shall immediately take appropriate coercive measures to secure their custody."

The informant (PW-8), namely, Chandan Kumar Singh in his written application had alleged that his father, namely, Jay Prakash Singh was abducted and after his murder his dead body has been hidden. The informant and his father were coming together when (1) China Ram, (2) Bharat Ram, (3), Triloki Ram, (4) Prabhu Chaudhary, (5) Ramanand Prasad, (6) Chandraghan Ram, (7) Jai Kumar Yadav, (8) Nandu Yadav, (9) Tantan Chaudhary, (10) Manoj Chaudhary, (11) Sarvesh Chaudhary, (12) Pavan Chaudhary, (13) Nand Kumar, (14) Ram Bali, (15) Guddu Chaudhary, (16) Gabbar Chaudhary, (17) Prem Ram, (18) Manoj Manjil, (19) Jawahir Paswan, (20) Baban Chaudhary, (21) Ramadhar Chaudhary, (22) Ravindra Chaudhary, (23) Shiv Bali, (24) Rohit Chaudhary, and other unknown persons caught the informant’s father when his Aam Sabha had come to an end. While returning home, they caught hold of his father and started assaulting him by lathi, danda, bricks and stones instigating to kill him as he belongs to an upper caste. The informant somehow saved his life. The accused persons assaulted his father mercilessly as a result whereof he died on the spot. They also hid his dead body. The time of the occurrence was about 06:00-06:30 Hours. 

On the basis of this written application, Azimabad P.S. Case No. 51 of 2015 dated August 22, 2015 was registered under Sections 364/34, 302, 201 IPC against the accused persons. After investigation police submitted first chargesheet being Chargesheet No. 70 of 2015 dated December 31, 2015 under Sections 364/302/201/34 IPC against Manoj Manjil and Manjoj Chaudhary who were in custody and 14 others showing them absconder keeping investigation open against other accused. Thereafter, a supplementary chargesheet being Chargesheet No. 26 of 2016 dated May 31, 2016 was submitted under Sections 364/302/201/34 IPC against (1) Ramadhar Chaudhary, (2) Sarvesh Chaudhary, (3) Chandra Dhan Rai, (4) Ramanand Prasad keeping investigation open against other accused. Another supplementary chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 08 of 2018 dated January 31, 2018 was submitted under Sections 364/302/201/34 IPC against (1) Jai Kumar Yadav, (2) Nandu Yadav and (3) Prabhu Chaudhary. 

The trial court vide order dated March 15, 2019 took cognizance of the offences under the mentioned Sections and committed the records to Sessions Court. Thereafter, Sessions Trial No. 123 of 2019 was registered.

The charges were read over and explained to the appellants in Hindi to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, accordingly, vide order dated April 13, 2022, charges were framed under Sections 364/34, 302/34 and 201/34 IPC. Thereafter, the statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. The appellants denied all the allegations and took a plea that they are innocent.

Justice Prasad has recorded: ''The defence has not adduced any oral or documentary evidence.''

The trial court had relied upon paragraph ‘6’ of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1973) 2 SCC 793, to arrive at a conclusion that the prosecution has proved and established its case beyond all reasonable doubts. Accordingly, it had passed the judgment of conviction.

The senior counsel for the appellants had submitted that the FIR was lodged belatedly on 22.08.2015 with respect to an incident which took place in the evening of August 20, 2015. The FIR at once alleged both kidnapping (implying that the complainant’s father was still alive) and being killed on the spot. Two days after the alleged incident, the FIR was registered both under Sections 304 and 302 read with 201 IPC. 

Responding to this submission, Justice Prasad observed: ''The same issue of delay in registering FIR came to be considered more recently in Hariprasad v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2024) 2 SCC 557. In the said case, there was a delay of over one year and three months in lodging of the FIR. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the settled legal position that the receipt and recording of the information report by the police is not a condition precedent to set into motion a criminal investigation as held in Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala reported in (1973) 3 SCC 114 and it was held that no doubt unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR may give rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version.'' He also noted:''This Court is of the considered opinion that on the face of the evidence of PW-8 and PW-9 who are trustworthy witnesses of the prosecution, the delay in registration of the FIR and sending the same to the jurisdictional court would not prove fatal to the prosecution.''

Justice Prasad relied upon paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Animireddy Venkata Ramana and Ors. vs.Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 2008 SC 1603, to assert that Supreme Court's observations ''duly answers the plea of the defence that the FIR in this case would be hit by Section 162 CrPC.''  

With regard to submission of counsel for the appellants which drew on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2020) 19 SCC 165 to submit that in this case the sole testimony of PW-8 is not a cogent and reliable piece of evidence to base the conviction of the accused on his testimony, Justice Prasad observed:''We have found that the facts of the present case are quite different and distinct.'' 

As of part of the Division Bench, Justice Prasad observed: We find that the informant (PW-8) is a natural witness of this case and he has withstood the test of cross-examination so well that we find his testimony cogent and reliable. The law is well settled that the testimony of a single witness may be found sufficient to prove the prosecution case. We would rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 SC 614." He referred to para ‘10’ of the  judgment in this regard. He also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Lallu Manjhi vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2003) 2 SCC 401, wherein, it  reiterated that one credible witness would outweigh the testimony of number of other witnesses of indifferent character. 

Justice Prasad was impressed with these submissions of counsel for the appellants who contended that the prosecution witnesses were related witnesses, therefore, it would not be safe to rely upon their evidences. The submission was that Badgaon is a very large village with panchayat functionaries and a formal post of Chaukidar was there but no independent witness came to support the prosecution case. Justice Prsad drew on Supreme Court's decision in Mallanna vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 8 SCC 523, wherein, it held that merely because witnesses are related and interested and not injured, their evidences cannot be discarded if they are natural witnesses and their testimonies are otherwise found to be credible, especially when they support the prosecution case in material particulars. Justice Prasad observed: ''In this case, we cannot lose sight of the fact that one of the accused in this case was a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Agiaon Constitutency and in the present day circumstances where normal people are afraid of becoming a witness in a criminal case, absence of an independent witness cannot be taken as fatal to the prosecution.'' 

The senior counsel for the appellants submitted that since the alleged murder and hiding the body is central to the prosecution case, the body that was recovered by police eight days later and in some other area, must have first been shown to belong to the complainant’s father but there was no effort to match the body with the complainant’s father. It was submitted that there was enough indicators to prove that it was some other totally unconnected body that was randomly recovered and sought to be joined to this case. To strengthen his submission, Senior Counsel submitted that the postmortem report indicated that the body belongs to a man in age younger (40-45 years) while the postmortem report (Exhibit ‘1’) stated that son claims his father was around 55 years. The trial court had relied upon the family’s identification without giving the reasons and it recorded that the medical evidences corroborates the ocular version. It was submitted that the postmortem’s age estimate contradicted the family’s 55 year claim and decomposition made visual identification inherently unsafe. It was also submitted that the postmortem report did not indicate any injuries matching the one described in the prosecution case. If dozens of people had assaulted the deceased with rod, stones and bricks, surely the body would indicate multiple fractures and severe injuries. The cause of death with respect to the recovered body is shown as strangulation which does not match the allegations. The time of death was stated to be between 23rd and 25th August, 2015 which does not match the facts of the present case. 

The senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the dead body was displaying heightened stage of putrefaction and decomposition. It was bloated and discoloured and the prosecution witnesses did not identify it explicitly and categorically. The prosecution witnesses claim to have recognized him through vague criteria like a mark on stomach, hair cut and hair dye. It was submitted that in such advanced putrefaction with bloating, skin slippage/discolouration, any small scar would be distorted/obscured. It was pointed out that the samples of skin, nails and hair were collected from the complainant and his brothers and from the dead body and sent for the DNA testing, however, the results were never submission is that since the FSL report was never produced to confirm the identity. His submission is that since the FSL report was never produced, an adverse inference should be drawn for withholding the best (‘DNA’) evidence. 

Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Kaleeswaran vs. State by the Inspector of Police Pollachi Town East Police Station, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu reported in (2022) 17 SCC 699, senior counsel submitted that in the said case it was held that since the superimposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like the DNA report or the postmortem report, it would be very risky to convict the accused believing the identification of the dead body of the victim through the superimposition test. In the present case, even a superimposition test was not done. The postmortem report indicated every sign of it being a third person’s body not matching in age, or other descriptions. 

On the use of superimposition technique in Indian investigation, senior counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pattu Rajan vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2019) 4 SCC 771. 

The senior counsel submitted that in the present case, PW-1 states that there were 100-150 people in the group. He also said that he recognized people from his own village but did not recognize outsiders. PW-3 stated that there were 200 people present on the spot. The Investigating Officer has admitted that ‘Badgaon’ is a very large village with Panchayat functionaries and a formal post of Chaukidar, however, none has been examined. Thus, there was not a single independent witness amongst the prosecution witnesses. No test identification parade was held to identify the outsiders to the village who were not known to the prosecution witnesses. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Masalti and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30 (paragraph ‘16’) and in BusiKoteswara Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2012) 12 SCC 711 (paragraphs ‘13’ and ‘15’) to submit that in a case that pertains to an offence involving a large number of offenders, the Court has held that conviction may be sustained only if it was supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent kind of the incident. In Golbar Hussain and Others vs. State of Assam and Another reported in (2015) 11 SCC 242 (paragraphs ‘10’ and ‘11’), it has been held that when two witnesses contradict each other then unless one of their statements is otherwise corroborated by an independent witness, the accused will have to be granted the benefit of doubt. 

With regard to the reference of the senior counsel to the decision of the Supreme Court in Masalti case, Justice Prasad observed: ''Supreme Court has, in fact, reiterated the settled legal position that quality of evidence matters and not the number of witnesses who give such evidence. It, however, says “But sometimes it is useful to adopt a test like the one which the High Court has adopted in dealing with the present case.” He added: "In our considered opinion, Masalti (supra) case would not help the appellants in the present case.'' 

The counsel for the appellant Manoj Manzil had argued that the testimonies with regard to the role of the appellants were not at all reliable and were conflicting. 

Responding this submission, Justice Prasad observed that  PW-8 who was accompanying his father at the time of occurrence had specifically stated that Manoj had caught hold of his father and slammed him down on the Kharanja Road and started assaulting him by lathi. In his cross-examination on behalf of Manoj Manjil, there is no suggestion that Manoj Manjil was not present among the persons who had come running to the father of the informant and had assaulted him. PW-1 also stated that Manoj Manjil had slammed down his father on the Kharanja Road. He stated that he had seen him with others assaulting his father. Similarly, PWs-2, 3 and 4 all attributed specific role to Manoj Manjil. 

Justice Prasad relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh reported in (1974) 3 SCC 277, wherein, it held that a criminal trial concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of crime with which he is charged. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. He quoted para 23 of the judgment in Jagir Singh's case. It reads: “23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” Justice Prasad has underlined that he had to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. 

Relying on this principle, Justice Prasad observed: ''we have found that on the date of occurrence, there was a meeting of Malle party in the Badgaon village in which Manoj Manjil who was local MLA from Agiaon Constituency was present. The statements were being made in the sabha against a caste. It has come in the statement of the prosecution witnesses that one Satish Yadav was killed and in the revenge of said occurrence, the accused persons caught hold of Jai Prakash Singh, assaulted him and took him away who could not be traced despite hectic search made by police immediately after receipt of the information as recorded hereinabove. The defence has not either by the pattern of the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing any evidence tried to create any dent on the prosecution version that Manoj Manzil and other accused persons named by the prosecution had caught hold of the father of PW-8 and had assaulted him whereafter he was abducted. We, therefore, take a view that even this argument of learned counsel for the appellant Manoj Manzil would not impress this Court.''

The senior counsel had submitted that the testimonies with regard to the role of the appellants were not at all reliable and were conflicting. PW-1 stated only that the accused appellants were wrestling the complainant’s father on the ground. PW-2 only makes very broad based and general allegation saying that the appellants were part of a large crowd that was taking the complainant’s father. No specific role was attributed to the appellant Manoj Manjil who was admittedly part of a large group of persons. PW-3 mentioned that the accused collectively gave almost a hundred lathi blows to his father causing his head to split, however, the recovered body exhibited no such signs. PW-3 did not name the people who caused this particular injury. PW-4 alleged that the appellant was wrestling and shoving and also using rods and stones in the presence of many other people. PW-8 alleged wrestling on the ground and hitting with a rod while several other people were assaulting him with stones and bricks even if believed, none of those matches to any form of assault that may result in strangulation or chocking. On these grounds, submissions were made to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the trial court and acquit the appellants.

The counsel for the appellant made submissions that the findings of the trial court with regard to the identity of the dead body were completely erroneous. With regard to senior counsel's submission drawing on Supreme Court's decision in S. Kaleeswaran vs. State by the Inspector of Police Pollachi Town East Police Station, Coimbatore District, Tamil Nadu reported in (2022) 17 SCC 699, in this case it was held that the superimposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like the DNA report or the postmortem report, Justice Prasad observed that on going through the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Kaleeswaran, the High Court noticed that in that case admittedly, the entire prosecution case rested on the circumstantial evidence. In that case the Supreme Court was appreciating the evidences keeping in view the well-settled principles known as five golden principles laid down by the Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116. The Supreme Court had outlined the conditions which were required to be fulfilled, before a case based on circumstantial evidence against an accused can be said to be fully established. The case was based on theory of last seen together. The dead body or the skeleton remains of dead body was found after almost five months from the date of incident. The prosecution case was that the dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, therefore, in that context, the Supreme Court observed inter alia “….. It is true that in the case based on circumstantial evidence, if the entire chain is duly proved by cogent evidence, the conviction could be recorded even if the corpus is not found, but when as per the case of prosecution, the dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.”

Justice Prasad observed: ''On a bare reading of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would be evident that the prosecution case in the present case is completely different and distinct. At first instance, it is not based on circumstantial evidence. The dead body has not been recovered from the place shown by an accused. In this case, the dead body has been found within seven days of the occurrence and the accusation against the appellants is based on direct evidence. The prosecution witnesses have attributed the assault and abduction of Jai Prakash Singh to the appellants. It is evident from the judgment in S. Kaleeswaran (supra) that even in a case based on circumstantial evidence, if the entire chain is duly proved by cogent evidence, the conviction should be recorded even if the corpus is not found. That principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Kaleeswaran (supra) only helps the prosecution in this case.'' 

As to senior counsel's reliance upon para 22 and 23 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pattu Rajan vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2019) 4 SCC 771, Justice Prasad responded:''52. We are afraid that the judgment in the case of Pattu Rajan does not help the appellants from any point of view. In the present case, a bare perusal of the written information submitted by the informant (PW-8) would show that there is a specific allegation of assault and thereby causing death of Jay Prakash Singh at the place of occurrence and thereafter taking away of his dead body by the appellants. In such circumstance, police has rightly investigated the case taking the offence under Sections 364 and 302 IPC committed in course of the same transaction. The judgment in the case of Pattu Rajan (supra) would rather help the prosecution in answering the plea of the defence that non-production of DNA evidence would lead to an adverse inference against the prosecution.'' 

He quoted para 49 to 52 of the decision in Pattu Rajan's case and drawing on the observations of the Supreme Court, Justice Prasad concluded: ''It is evident on bare reading of the aforesaid paragraphs that absence of DNA evidence would not lead to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution in the present case on the face of the other cogent and reliable evidence on the record.'' 

The submissions made on behalf of the appellants could not convince the High Court's Division Bench about the innocence Manoj Manzil and others. Now only Supreme Court can consider the appeal of Manoj Mazil and other appellants. 

The ripple created by the judgment is likely/unlikely to have some electoral impact in the Bihar's assembly election in Bhojpur/Shahabad region.       

Also read: Patna High Court sets aside judgement by Vinay Prakash Tiwary, the trial court judge in Satyanarayan Sinha murder case, reverses acquittal of Rit Lal Yadav