Chairman, Bar Council of India requests Chairman, Co-ordination Committee of three Associations of Patna High Court to recall call for boycott of court's work

Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman, Bar Council of India (BCI) passed an order dated May 8, 2026 in response to notice/resolution dated May 7, 2026 issued by the Chairman, Co-ordination Committee of the three Associations of the Patna High Court and its other office bearers. The notice/resolution was brought to the notice of the BCI. The notice had called upon members of the Bar to abstain from professional duties on May 11, 2026 from 10.30 a.m. onwards. The BCI stated that members of the Bar may have genuine grievances. They may hold meetings, deliberate upon such issues and place their grievances before Chief Justice of the Patna High Court or any appropriate authority in a respectful and institutional manner. However, any call for abstention from court work, boycott of courts or suspension of professional duties is impermissible in law and contrary to the settled judgments of the Supreme Court. Advocates are officers of the Court and no grievance can justify obstruction of judicial work or prejudice to litigants. 

BCI requested Yogesh Chandra Verma, the octogenarian senior advocate, member of Bihar State Bar Council and Chairman, Co-ordination Committee of the three Associations to forthwith withdraw and recall the notice/resolution dated May 7, 2026 insofar as it calls upon members of the Bar to abstain from professional duties on May 11, 2026 or on any other date. They shall not issue, circulate, enforce or act upon any call for abstention, boycott or suspension of court work. The concerned Associations are at liberty to hold a peaceful and dignified meeting and to seek an appropriate meeting with the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court for redressal of their grievances, provided that court work is not obstructed and no advocate is prevented, persuaded or pressurised from appearing before any Court. The concerned Associations shall immediately issue a fresh notice/publication stating that the earlier call for abstention from professional duties has been recalled. 

BCI's order reads:"Non-çompliance with this order or any attempt to enforce abstention from work may invite appropriate action in accordance with law and the Rules govèrning professional conduct and discipline. Let a copy of this order be communicated immediately to The Hon'ble Convenor and Member, Co-ordination Committee of the three Associations of Patna High Court, the office bearers of the concerned Associations, the Chairman, Bihar State Bar Council and the Registrar General, Patna High Court, for information and necessary action."

Co-ordination Committee of three Advocate Associations Patna High Court recalls its call for boycott of judicial work on May 11  

Responding to the request of the BCI, the Co-ordination Committee of the three Advocate Associations of the Patna High Court met in an extra ordinary meeting on May 9, 2026 at 1:30 PM in the Bar Association Hall, to discuss the request and direction of the Bar Council of India communicated vide its letter dated 08.05.2026. It decided to recall its call for boycott of judicial work but reiterated its grievance.

Also read:Patna High Court's Co-ordination Committee of three Advocate Associations flag rift between Bar and Bench, point out uncharitable, uncouth, abusive, insulting behaviour of judges 

Supreme Court reverses regular bail rejection order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Niraj Kumar @ Niraj Kumar Mandal vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K  Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 4-page long order dated May 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "...considering all the attending circumstances, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail. (iv) Accordingly, we direct to release the petitioner on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court."

The court passed the order upon hearing the special leave petition filed against the order of rejection of regular bail by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court and to seek bail. 

Supreme Court observed:"After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances in which the victim was of 47 years of age at the date of incident and the allegation is not supported by the medical evidence. Learned counsel for the respondent-State oppose the prayer only on the ground that after rejection of the anticipatory bail in 2014, the accused surrendered in 2025."  

Earlier, in Niraj Kumar @ Niraj Kumar Mandal vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order date December 18, 2025, wherein, he denied regular bail in the rape case. He concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and the gravity of the offence, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected. If the trial is delayed by the prosecution, the petitioner may renew his prayer for bail."   

The petitioner sought regular bail in connection with Mahila (Sachivalaya) P.S. Case  of 2013 registered for the offence under Sections 376, 379/34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per the prosecution case, the allegation against the petitioner was that he along with others forcibly kidnapped the victim lady and committed rape with her. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner was innocent and had not committed any offence. The petitioner was in custody since June 16, 2025. He also submitted that the petitioner was named in the case on the basis of the confessional statement of one Ravi Kumar. 

Supreme Court reverses order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Praveen Kumar in a murder case from Bihta, Patna

In Pankaj @Phakkad @Phakkad @ Pankaj Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated May 7, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly, the period of incarceration already undergone by the petitioner, which is more than four years and nine  months, and the fact that the pending appeal is likely to take substantial time for disposal, with the admitted case of the prosecution that the petitioner was not present at the time of occurrence, we are inclined to suspend the sentence of the petitioner and grant bail to the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court.  Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail, on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court, in connection with FIR No.704 of 2017 date 15.09.2017 registered with Bihta Police Station, Sub Division Danapur, District Patna, Bihar." 

The Court observed:"In the event the Trial Court or the State finds that the petitioner is delaying the conclusion of trial, it will be open for them to approach this Court for recall of this order. The Special Leave Petition and pending applications are disposed of accordingly."

Earlier, in Pankaj @Phakkad @Phakkad @ Pankaj Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Praveen Kumar had passed a 9-page long order dated February 17, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"17. In presence of the entire evidences showing the
conspiracy in the commission of the murder of Nirbhay Singh, who was the President of the Local Traders Association and the deposition of the witnesses showing that it was because he was opposing demand of rangdari by the criminals, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case for grant of suspension of sentence and release on bail. Prayer is rejected." The order was authored by Justice Prasad.

The appellant had approached the High Court for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal. Justice Prasad had relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr. reported in (2023) 6 SCC 123 reiterated in the case of Janardan Ray vs. The State of Bihar and Anr.passed in Cr. Appeal Nos. 1892-1893 of 2025 on 9th April, 2025. The High Court was of the considered opinion that "at this stage there are prima facie materials on record showing close connection of the appellant with the main assailant of the deceased. The electronic evidences on the record and the evidence of the IO (PW 6) are such that this Court cannot go into a threadbare discussion into the same in order to grant benefit of suspension of sentence to the appellant. 16. The case of the appellant is clearly distinguishable with that of Chandan Kumar @ Chandan Singh as pointed out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State."

The appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 120B read with 302/34 and 326/34 of the Indian Penal Code vide judgment dated August 1, 2022 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge-XXIV, Patna, in Sessions Trial No. 81B of 2018 (CIS No. 1260081 of 2018), which arose out of Bihta P.S. Case of 2017, and sentenced, vide order dated August 8, 2022, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the offences under Sections 120B read with 302/34 and 326/34 and a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he had to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

The prosecution story is based on the fardbeyan of Ajay Kumar (PW 4), who is the brother of the deceased. In his fard-beyan, the informant had stated that his family was engaged in business, he was five brothers and they have a cinema hall in Bihta known as ‘Uday Chitra Mandir’. On September 15, 2017, in the evening, he and his brother were getting the cleanliness of the hall and the nearby areas. At about 05:45 PM, when both of them were in front of the main gate of the cinema hall and his brother, Nirbhay Singh, was at a distance of ten steps ahead to him, all of a sudden firing started. The informant found that his brother Nirbhay Singh was surrounded by three persons, who were armed with pistols. The brother of the informant fell down on the road. The informant ran towards his brother, who had fallen down and was in pool of blood, the criminal involved in the occurrence fled away raising the weapons in their hands towards the kerosene oil depot of Raj Kumar Singh. The informant gave some description of the miscreants who were fleeing away. He disclosed that his brother had no enmity with anyone and that he can identify the criminals on seeing them. It appeared from the materials on record that in course of investigation, it was revealed that the main assailant Amit Singh, this appellant and some others were involved in the occurrence. So far as this appellant is concerned, it has come in the evidence that the main assailant Amit Singh was using the whatsapp number of the mobile phone of this appellant. The appellant has been convicted with the aid of Section 120B IPC.

Justice S. B. Pd. Singh sets aside order by Sub Judge, Bagaha in a Partition Suit of 2017

In Pradeep Kumar Pandey @ Dr. Pradeep Kumar Pandey vs. Alok Kumar Pandey & Ors. (2026), Justice S. B. Pd. Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 8, 2026, wherein, it set aside the impugned order dated April 6, 2023 passed in a Partition Suit of 2017 and directed the plaintiffs to lead their evidence first. However, he may exercise their option in terms of Order XVIII Rule 3 of C.P.C. 10. Accordingly, the instant Civil Misc. No. 576 of 2023 stands disposed of. 

The Civil Miscellaneous Application was filed for setting aside the order dated April 6, 2023 passed in Partition Suit of 2017, whereby and whereunder the court below had allowed the petition filed by the plaintiff (Respondent No. 1) and directed defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 5 to produce their witnesses on the next date. 

The plaintiffs had instituted Partition Suit in 2017 in the court of the Sub Judge, Bagaha, seeking a declaration that there exists unity of title and unity of possession between the plaintiff and the defendants over the suit property, wherein the plaintiff claims 6/20 share, and for passing of a preliminary decree for partition, followed by carving out a separate takhta of his share. It was also submitted that after appearance, a joint Written Statement was filed on behalf of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and a separate Written Statement was filed on behalf of Defendant No. 5, wherein it has been stated that the suit is not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary parties. It was also stated in the Written Statement that partition had already taken place with respect to certain properties in the year 1988, and the allegation regarding subsistence of joint family and unity of title and possession had been specifically denied on the ground that the same ceased in the year 1988 itself. It was also submitted that the plaintiff filed a petition on December 9, 2022 in a Partition Suit  of 2017 stating therein that, upon perusal of the Written Statements filed by Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 5, it was evident that partition in the family of the petitioner’s father and his sons had already taken place in the year 1988, and thus there was no unity of title and unity of possession between the parties. On this basis, the plaintiff prayed before the court for issuance of a direction to Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 5 to adduce their evidence first, in view of the alleged admission in the Written Statements. The petition was allowed by the impugned order dated April 6, 2023, which is under challenge before the High Court. 

The counsel for the petitioner/defendant submitted that under Order XVIII Rule 1 of the C.P.C., the right to begin is conferred upon the defendant, provided the case falls within the ambit of the said provision. Order XVIII Rule 1 of the C.P.C. reads: “1. Right to begin – The plaintiff has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and contents that either in point of law or on some additional facts alleged by the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the relief which he seeks, in which case the defendant has the right to begin.” 

The counsel for the petitioner/defendant also submitted that, ordinarily, the burden of proof lies upon the party who asserts a fact. But in this case, since the plaintiff had sought partition, the onus to begin the evidence lied upon the plaintiff and not upon the defendant. It was also submitted that the “right to begin”
envisaged under Order XVIII Rule 1 cannot be construed as a “duty to begin.”

The counsel placed reliance upon the judgment in Mohammad Janangir @ Mohammad Jahangir Alam vs. Sajda Khatoon, reported in 2007 (4) PLJR 100. Paragraph 5 of the said judgment is reads: “5. The general rule as to plead and prove is that one who pleads must prove. The exception being where the pleading of one is admitted by the adversary. In such an event, the person pleading the fact is relieved of his obligation to prove the pleading as it is admitted. The rational of Order XVIII Rule 1 is based on these two principles put together. It is to be seen that once the defendant admits the facts as pleaded by the plaintiff then the plaintiff is relieved of proving his case. The obligation would then normally travel to the defendant to plead his case first. The requirement of Order XVIII Rule 1 is first that there should be an admission of facts by the defendant as plead by the plaintiff which facts in spite of admission would not entitle the plaintiff to any relief or would disentitle the plaintiff to any relief on a separate set of facts pleaded by the defendant. Primarily, there has to be first admission of facts by the defendant. Secondly, it would be seen that this provision only gives a right to the defendant to begin whether he exercises that right or not the option is his. If Order XVIII Rule 1 made it obligatory on part of the defendant to begin then the section would be worded otherwise. The section is only conferring a right on the defendant but does not make it obligatory, for if it was to operate as an obligatory responsibility then it can simply be drafted as “the defendant shall proceed” and not “ that the defendant has the right to begin”. The words would be “that the defendant had the duty to begin”.”

Justice Singh noted that the judgment in Chandradeo Singh & Ors. vs. Moti Devi & Ors. reported in 1992 1 BLJR 280 was also relevant. "8. On the anvil of the aforesaid principle, and upon perusal of the entire factual matrix of the case, it appears that the “right to begin” cannot be construed as a “duty to begin,” and the defendants cannot be compelled to adduce evidence first. Rather, it is the plaintiff who has asserted his
claim and sought partition; therefore, the plaintiff is required to lead evidence in the first instance, followed by the defendants." 

Patna High Court's Co-ordination Committee of three Advocate Associations flag rift between Bar and Bench, point out uncharitable, uncouth, abusive, insulting behaviour of judges

The Co-ordination Committee of the three Associations of the Advocates of the Patna High Court has issued the following statement:

The Co-ordination Committee met in extraordinary situation which due to notice dated 7th May 2026 issued under the signature of Registrar General-In-Charge. The Members of Co-ordination Committee unanimously and unequivocally resent and express their anguish against such notice. 1- That Bar of Patna High Court of late has felt that there is a growing rift between the Bar and Bench. The behavior of judges with lawyers in court proceedings, to say the least, are uncharitable, uncouth often abusive insulting and hitting below the belt. The proceedings in many courts are such that it appears that the judges are a repository of all knowledge as to law and otherwise. What to talk of young members even senior members are often afraid to appear before certain judges. 2- The members of Bar see the aforesaid notification as a reflection of their feelings towards the Bar. The co-ordination committee unanimously resolved that the members of the Bar are requested to abstain from their the professional duties on 11.5.2026 form 10.30 am onwards. The signatories to the statement include chairman, co-ordination committee, Advocates Association, Bar Association and Lawyer's Association. 

 

Notably, Registrar General-in-Charge had issued a notice dated May 7, 2026 which reads: "This is for information to all concerned that all earlier orders with regard to pick up and drop facility to the vehicles of the Learned Advocates/Doctors and Officials of State Dispensary/Officers & Staff of the Court and such beneficiaries, in the premises of the Court beyond the barrier is hereby recalled with immediate effect. They shall use the facility of Battery Operated Carts (available at Gate Nos. 2 & 3 of the Court) for their movement up to their designated places, after parking their vehicles at the designated parking places near Gate Nos. 2 & 3 of the Court. Only official vehicles of the Court and vehicle(s) of the Learned Advocate General may be moved beyond the barrier and parked within the premises of the Court."

In the coordination committee meeting, many lawyers also expressed displeasure over the order issued by the High Court on May 7, which banned taking vehicles inside the campus due to barricading.

Advocates asked as to how will the old and infirm lawyers get down from their vehicle near the High Court gate and go to the lift. A battery operated vehicle has been arranged by the High Court, but elderly people and women lawyers cannot board that vehicle because it is high from the ground. According to the notice, except the High Court vehicle and the Advocate General's vehicle, other vehicles are not allowed inside, due to which there is a lot of anger among the lawyers. It seems although all are equal as per the Constitution of India, some are more equal than others. 

The notice issued by the three advocate associations, appear to be related to the provisions of Section 16 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It reads:"16. Contempt by judge, magistrate or other person acting judicially.—(1) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, a judge, magistrate or other person acting judicially shall also be liable for contempt of his own court or of any other court in the same manner as any other individual is liable and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly.(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to any observations or remarks made by a judge, magistrate or other person acting judicially, regarding a subordinate court in an appeal or revision pending before such judge, magistrate or other person against the order or judgment of the subordinate court."

Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment by Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a rape case

In Dheeraj Sahni vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 20-page long judgement dated May 7, 2026, wherein, set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 11, 2014 and order of sentence dated February 14, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a Sessions Case of 2012, which arose out of Khagaria (Muffasil) P.S. Case of 2012, whereby, the appellant was convicted under Section 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Singh observed that applying the settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, and bearing in mind that material contradictions between the version of the informant as set out in the F.I.R. and her deposition before the Court render her testimony unreliable, "this Court finds that the prosecution case does not inspire confidence. In the present matter, not only has the victim failed to support the allegations during trial and even failed to identify the appellant, but the sole testimony of the informant (P.W. 7) also suffers from material inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities. Further, the medical evidence, as deposed by the doctor (P.W. 6), clearly indicates absence of any injury or sign suggestive of sexual assault and does not corroborate the prosecution version. In such circumstances, where the ocular testimony is inconsistent and stands uncorroborated by medical evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and the conviction cannot be sustained." 

The appellant had preferred the appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated February 11, 2014 and order of sentence dated February 14, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a Sessions Case 2012, which arose out of Khagaria (Muffasil) P.S. Case of 2012, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and Rs. 5000 and the amount of fine shall be paid to the mother of the victim. 

The prosecution version was that the informant Pinki Devi, wife of Hare Ram Sahni, submitted a written report before the Superintendent of Police, Khagaria, on June 30, 2012, wherein she categorically alleged that on June 29, 2012 at about 1:00 p.m., while her daughters, namely Deepika Kumari, aged about 5 years, and Daizy Kumari, aged about 4 years, were playing in front of the house of Dinesh Sahni. The appellant who was son of Dinesh Sahni, allegedly lured the victim Deepika Kumari on the pretext of giving money and then took the victim along with her younger sister Daizy Kumari inside the room and committed rape upon her. On hearing the cry of her daughter, the informant rushed to the house and allegedly witnessed the accused through a window committing rape upon the victim. However, upon raising an alarm, the accused fled away through the roof. It was also alleged that the informant found her daughter lying naked, with dust on her body. Thereafter, the informant took her daughter (the victim). Subsequently, she went to the Police Station, where she was advised to approach the Sarpanch for redressal of her grievance. She approached the Sarpanch of the Gram Katchahari who did not meet her. On the basis of the written report filed by the informant before the Superintendent of Police, Khagaria, Khagaria (Mufassil) P.S. Case No. 329 of 2012 was lodged on June 30, 2012 under Section 376 of the I.P.C. against the sole accused, appellant hereof. After institution of the F.I.R., the Investigating Officer conducted investigation and found the case to be true under Section 376 of the I.P.C., and accordingly submitted charge-sheet before the court below. Thereafter, the Magistrate, upon perusal of the materials on record, took cognizance of the alleged offence on September 10, 2012, and the case was subsequently committed to the Court of Sessions on November 1, 2012. Pursuant to the conclusion of the trial, impugned judgment was passed. 

The amicus curiae, submitted that the testimony of Pinki Devi (informant), the Prosecution Witness No. 7, the informant, was not reliable and does not inspire confidence, so as, to sustain the conviction in the absence of independent corroboration. It was contended that the entire prosecution case rests upon her sole testimony and single identification. The informant was an interested witness, being the chachi of the appellant and they reside in the same house with a common courtyard giving rise to the possibility of prior animosity or ulterior motive, which the prosecution failed to dispel. The counsel drew the attention of the High Court to paragraph 22 of the case diary and submitted that, as per the description therein, the alleged place of occurrence had no door or window; however, PW-7 in her examination-in-chief deposed that the door was closed from inside and that she witnessed the occurrence by peeping through a window and thereafter instructed her younger daughter aged about 4 years to open the door. This material contradiction, it was urged, struk at the root of the prosecution case and rendered her version inherently unreliable. It was also submitted that the testimony of PW-7 suffered from serious improbabilities, inasmuch as her claim of having witnessed the occurrence through a window appeared doubtful. It was contended that, instead of raising an alarm and calling other family members, the informant allegedly instructed her minor daughter to open the door, who was unable to reach the bolt to unlock it. Moreover, the fact that the Investigating Officer did not find any such door at the place of occurrence renders the entire version unnatural and improbable. The counsel further submitted that the condition of the victim, as described by PW-7, finds no
corroboration from the medical evidence, which assumes significant importance in a case of this nature. It was also urged that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not recorded, and, more importantly, the victim child, in her deposition before the trial court, did not support the prosecution case and categorically stated that no wrongful act had been committed against her. The victim also failed to identify the appellant, who was admittedly her own cousin brother, thereby creating a serious dent in the prosecution case. The counsel submitted that the testimony of PW-7 cannot be said to be of sterling quality so as to form the sole basis of conviction. It was thus urged that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The relevant provisions of Sections 375, 376 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, which are as under:-
375. Rape.— A man is said to commit "rape" if he—(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:
(First.)— Against her will. 
(Secondly.) — Without her consent.
(Thirdly.) — With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom
she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt, 
(Fourthly.) — With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
(Fifthly.) — With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
(Sixthly.) — With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
(Seventhly.) — When she is unable to communicate consent.
Explanation 1.— For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2.— Consent means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception 1.— A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

376. Punishment for rape.— (1)Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine]

511. Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.—Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both. 
Illustrations
(a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a box, and finds after so opening the box, that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards the commission of theft, and therefore is guilty under this section.
(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z’s pocket. A fails in the attempt in consequence of Z’s having nothing in his pocket. A is guilty under this section.

Justice Singh relied on Supreme Court's decision in Vijaya Singh & Anr. v State of Uttarakhand reported in 2024 INSC 905 to underline the settled law in regard to statement recorded under Section 164 and retraction during the course of trial. The statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can not be discarded, which finds reference in Paragraph No.31. It reads: “31. Having said so, we deem it fit to observe that a statement under Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a hat and on a mere statement of the
witness that it was not recorded correctly. For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate, to the effect that the statement being recorded is the correct version of the facts stated by the witness, forms part of every such statement and a higher burden must be placed upon the witness to retract from the same. To permit retraction by a witness from a signed statement recorded before the Magistrate on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would effectively negate the difference between a statement recorded by the police officer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In the present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and reliance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below.” 

Justice Sing also relied on the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Om Prakash reported in (2002) 7 SCC 745, wherein, the Supreme Court sounded a warning against offences of sexual nature against children, in Paragraph no.19. It reads: “19. Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases are not even brought to light because of the social stigma attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has been a steep rise in child rape cases. Children need special care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country's future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted…” 

Justice Singh's judgement referred to the decision in Pradeep vs. State of Haryana reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 777, it was held that the role of the trial Judge, when a case involves a child witness, becomes heightened. The Supreme Court held:“10. Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him with a view to ascertain whether the minor can understand the questions put to him and is in a position to give rational answers. The Judge must be satisfied that the minor is able to understand the questions and respond to them and understands the importance of speaking the truth. Therefore, the role of the Judge who records the evidence is very crucial. He has to make a proper preliminary examination of the minor by putting appropriate questions to ascertain whether the minor is capable of understanding the questions put to him and is able to give rational answers. It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.”

The judgement by Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi vs. State
of Gujarat, reported in, (2019) 17 SCC 523, wherein the Court held that a nine year old prosecutrix turning hostile would not be fatal blow to the prosecution case when other evidence can establish the guilt of the accused. 

In Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, held that the sole testimony of the victim, if found reliable and trustworthy, requires no corroboration and may be sufficient to invite conviction of the accused also the reliance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below, the Court observed.
17. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether nine witnesses, namely:
1) PW-1 Leela Devi ( Co - Villager)
2) PW-2 Mahesh Tanti, ( Co - Villager)
3) PW-3 Dilip Kumar Tanti ( Co - Villager)
4) PW-4 Hare Ram Sahni, father of the victim
5) PW-5 Deepika Kumari (victim)
6) PW-6 Dr. Manju Kumari (Doctor)
7) PW-7 Pinki Devi (informant)
8) PW-8 Rajpati Devi ( Co – Villager)
9) PW-9 Dasrath Yadav ( Co – Villager)
18. The prosecution has also relied upon following
documents exhibited during the course of trial:
(i) Exhibit- 2- Medical Report
(ii) Exhibit-2/1- Pathology Report
19. On the basis of materials surfaced during the
trial, the appellant/accused Upon a meticulous examination of
the record, it appears that the PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 turned
hostile and the evidence of other prosecution witnesses (PWs)
are summarized as follows:
(I) P.W. 4 - Hare Ram Sahni, the father of the
victim, establishes that upon hearing an alarm (halla), he
proceeded to the appellant's door where he observed his
daughter in a nude state. He admitted in his cross-examination
that the appellant is his cousin-nephew and that they share the
same courtyard. Crucially, he conceded that no physical injuries
were found on the victim's body and clarified that his
understanding of the alleged assault was based entirely on the
account provided by his wife.
(II) P.W. 5, Deepika Kumari, the victim, stated that
she is aged about five years, but notably turned hostile to the
prosecution's case. In her testimony before the court, she
categorically denied the allegations set forth by her mother and
stated that no rape had been committed upon her. Furthermore,
she failed to identify the appellant.
(III) P.W. 6, Dr. Manju Kumari, - She deposed that
she conducted the physical examination of the victim. She did
not find any external injury on the victim’s body. She confirmed
that there was no medical sign or traumatic indicator of rape
found in the private parts of the victim.
(IV) P.W. 7, Pinki Devi, the informant and mother of
the victim, remained consistent with her initial version of the
incident as alleged in the F.I.R. She maintained in her testimony
that she was the sole eyewitness to the occurrence. However, it
was noted that she did not disclose the existence of any land
dispute between her family and the accused during her
deposition.
(V) P.W. 8, Rajpati Devi, - She serves as hearsay
evidence regarding the immediate aftermath of the incident. She
stated that she rushed to the spot upon hearing the cries of P.W.
7 and was informed by the informant at the scene that a rape had
been committed upon the child.
(VI) P.W. 9, Dashrath Yadav, testified as a formal
witness. While he successfully proved his signature on the
F.I.R., he did not provide any substantive evidence regarding the
commission of the alleged offense or the involvement of the
appellant.
 

On the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellant/accused was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against him, which he denied and showed his complete innocence. The record revealed that PW-1 Leela Devi, PW-2 Mahesh Tanti, and PW-3 Dilip Kumar Tanti were declared hostile during the trial as they did not support the prosecution case on material particulars, and nothing substantive transpired from their testimonies which could be said to corroborate or lend assurance to the version of the other prosecution witnesses. Their evidence does not advance the prosecution case with regard to the allegations of dowry demand, cruelty, or the alleged disappearance of the deceased. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses are not relevant qua establishing the guilt of the accused/appellants.

On a careful perusal of the evidence, facts, and law, it emerged that the prosecution case suffered from serious infirmities and lacks the degree of proof required to sustain conviction. P.Ws. 1, 2, and 3 have admittedly turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution case in any manner. PW-4 Hare Ram Sahni, father of the victim, was not an eyewitness and has clearly deposed that his knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence was based solely on what was narrated to him by P.W. 7, Pinki Devi, the informant and mother of the victim; he was also admitted that no injury was found on the body of the victim and that the parties are closely related, residing in the same premises with a common courtyard. P.W. 5, the victim
herself, who is the most material witness, had turned hostile and categorically denied the allegation of rape and even failed to identify the appellant in Court, thereby striking at the very root of the prosecution case. The medical evidence, as deposed by P.W. 6, Dr. Manju Kumari, did not support the prosecution version, as no external or internal injury or any sign suggestive of sexual assault was found on the victim. P.W. 8, Rajpati Devi was merely a hearsay witness, having reached the place of occurrence after the alleged incident and having derived knowledge only from the informant, while P.W. 9, Dashrath Yadav was a formal witness who has only proved the formal aspects of the case. Thus, the entire prosecution case essentially rests upon the sole testimony of P.W. 7, the informant, whose version, suffers from material contradictions, inherent improbabilities, and lack of corroboration from both ocular and medical evidence. In such circumstances, where the star witness (victim) has not supported the case, the medical evidence did not corroborate the allegations, and the independent witnesses turned hostile, it would be unsafe to base the conviction solely on the testimony of P.W. 7.

In the case, the most crucial aspect, namely, the statement of the victim, did not advance the prosecution case, rather, it creates a serious dent in it. It was an admitted position on record that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not recorded at all, thereby depriving the prosecution of a vital piece of substantive corroborative evidence ordinarily relied upon in cases of this nature. Further, when the victim herself entered the witness box as P.W. 5 before the learned trial court, she did not support the prosecution version and categorically denied that any such occurrence had taken place. She also failed to identify the appellant, who is admittedly her close relative, thereby rendering the prosecution story highly doubtful. In the absence of a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., coupled with the victim turning hostile in court, the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution case stands considerably weakened, and no reliance
can safely be placed on the uncorroborated testimony of the informant (P.W. 7) to sustain the conviction.

The primary challenge in the present appeal lied in the fact that the material prosecution witnesses, including the victim (P.W. 5) and other independent witnesses, had not supported the prosecution case and were  declared hostile during trial. 

Justice Singh observed: "While it is a settled principle of law that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in total and that the Court may rely upon such portions of the evidence which find corroboration from other reliable material on record, the said principle does not aid the prosecution in the facts of the present case. Significantly, the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which could have lent some degree of assurance to the prosecution version, was admittedly not recorded. In such a situation, there remains no prior consistent statement of the victim before a judicial authority which could be used even for the limited purpose of corroboration. On the contrary, the victim, in her deposition before the learned trial court, has categorically denied the occurrence and has not supported the allegations levelled against the appellant. In the absence of any substantive or corroborative material, and particularly when the star witness has resiled from the prosecution case, the evidentiary foundation becomes too fragile to sustain conviction."

The judgement reads:"....it is evident from the medical evidence on record that the same does not provide any unimpeachable scientific support to the prosecution case so as to bridge the gaps created by the hostility of the witnesses. On the contrary, P.W. 6, the doctor who examined the victim, has categorically deposed that “no external injury was found on the body of the victim and there were no signs or indicators
suggestive of rape on her private parts.” The medical findings, thus, do not disclose any evidence of recent sexual assault or penetration. In such circumstances, where the medical evidence fails to corroborate the ocular version and does not indicate any genital injury or trauma, the evidentiary chain stands seriously weakened. In absence of any supportive medical findings, coupled with the victim turning hostile and denying the occurrence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to establish its case through reliable scientific or medical evidence.

Justice Singh referred to the decision in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 92, wherein, the Supreme Court held that when the version of the prosecutrix is not of sterling quality and is inconsistent with the medical evidence, and when the surrounding circumstances render the prosecution story doubtful, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The Court also held that conviction cannot be sustained where the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

 

Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Murder convict suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia, "cannot be kept in jail for all times to come": Supreme Court

In Md. Shafeeque vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardowala and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it recorded that counsel appearing for the State brought to it the Court's notice that the State Government has declined to grant remission to the petitioner-convict. 

The order reads:"2. We are informed that the convict is not in a stable state of mind. He seems to be suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia. 3. We are further informed that the convict is being treated for the ailment in the jail hospital. 4. We are mindful of the fact that he is undergoing sentence past almost 21 years. 5. We want some material to be brought on record in the form of medical certificates, etc. so as to understand the exact nature of the ailment with which the petitioner is suffering and what is the way out. 6. Assuming for the moment that the petitioner is suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia, he cannot be kept in jail for all times to come. 7. We need to find some way out to tackle this problem. 8. List immediately after ensuing summer vacations." 

The case arose out of impugned final judgement dated April 4, 2016 by Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra  in Md. Shafeeque vs. The State of Bihar (2016). The judgement reads: "12. On going through the evidence, which we have mentioned above, it appears that occurrence had taken place at 7.00 pm. in the evening at the door of the Informant, who was competent to see the occurrence. The matter was reported soon thereafter at 9.00 pm. at the Police Station, which was 5 kilometers away. The manner of occurrence, described by the Informant, is fully corroborated by the hearsay evidence of P.W.1 Sher Mohammed, P.W. 2 Md. Javed, P.W. 3 Md. Motibul and also the independent witness, Dr. Satyendra Kumar Singh (P.W.6), who found such injuries. No doubt, injury report of Noorsaba (P.W. 4) has not been brought on record but that does not appear of any importance, where the charge of 302 I.P.C. for causing the death of the deceased is concerned. We also take note of the fact that the Investigating Officer has not been examined, but there appears no contradiction of any of the witnesses on any point whatsoever which would have made prosecution case untrustworthy to any extent or of having caused prejudice to the Appellant. 13. In the result, finding no merit in the Appeal, the same is dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

The appellant was convicted under section 302 of the I.P.C. by a judgment dated February 4, 2015 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Purnea in connection with a Sessions Case of 2007 and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 50000/. The case of the prosecution, is that according to Noorsaba Begam (P.W.4), mother of the deceased child is that on March 29, 2007 when her son Sohail Raza was playing with rest of the children outside, suddenly the Appellant Md. Shafeeque came with the big dagger and cut his neck. Thereafter, she learnt that another child Jilani had also been assaulted by the same Appellant. He was caught by the villagers while fleeing away with dagger.
This information was given on the same day immediately within three hours at the Police Station. During trial, the prosecution examined 7 witnesses, wheres Defence examined three witnesses. The High Court found  no merit in the appeal.

P.W. 1 Sher Mohammed as also P.W. 2 Md. Javed and P.W. 3 Md. Motibul, who is father of P.W. 5 Jilani also injured in the present case are hearsay witnesses, who corroborated the fact of the Appellant suddenly assaulting the deceased Sohail Raza aged about 4 years causing his death and also causing injury to Jilani
(P.W.5). There is nothing in their cross-examination to discredit their evidence in any manner. P.W. 4 Noorsaba is the mother of the deceased, who repeated the facts given in the First Information Report to the Police Station to the extent that on the date of occurrence, while here son aged about 4 years was playing outside, suddenly the appellant came with a dragger and assaulted him on the neck and fled away. Thereafter, she went to the Police Station along with her husband and got recorded the fardbeyan. In cross-examination, she stated that it was night time when she reached the Police Station and the Investigating Officer had come next day to her villager. P.W. 5 Jilani, injured witness, who was aged about
12 years on the date of deposition and capable of understanding, stated that on the date of occurrence while he was playing suddenly he saw the appellant coming with a blood stained knife. Thereafter, he assaulted him on the neck and his hand and ran away. He was treated at Sadar Hospital, Purnia. He confirmed that his son and his father Md. Motibul (P.W. 3) were examined as witness. 

The High Court observed: "There is nothing in the cross-examination which is of note." 

The High Court's judgement recorded that P.W. 6 Dr. Satyendra Kumar Singh found the following injuries on the person of the deceased: On external examination –
(i) Rigor mortis was present in all limbs.
(ii) Sharp cut wound on interior part of neck cutting trachea esophagus and carotid arteries
(iii) 2” x ½” sharp cut wound on the right shoulder
(iv) ½” x ¼” sharp cut wound over left shoulder joint.
On Dissection –
Head - NAD, Neck as mentioned above, chest –heart – all chambers are empty, lungs pale, abdomen– liver/spleen/kidney – pale, stomach contains semidigested food. Small and large intestine – gas and fasces. Urinary bladder –empty.
Time elapsed since death - Within 24 hours. Cause of death was due to hemorrhage and shock due to above mentioned injuries caused by sharp cutting weapon.
10. P.W. 7 Barik and P.W.8 Md. Munshi have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile. 
11. D.W. 1 M. Kumar Harijan and D.W. 2 Md. Ameer had stated that the Appellant had not caused the death of the deceased and DW. 3 Himat had stated that the Appellant was mentally unbalanced.

Earlier, by order dated April 20, 2015, the High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice L. Narasimha Reddy and Justice Sudhir Singh had declined to grant bail to the appellant. 

The High Court's order reads:"Though it is represented that the appellant is in prison since last 8 years in connection with Sessions Case No.797 of 2007 arising out of Amour P.S. Case No.29 of 2007, pending in the court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Purnea, for the present we are not inclined to grant bail. Prayer for bail is rejected. It is left open to the appellant to renew his request after six months." 

Also read:5 year old mental health act case tagged with "In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report", a Suo Motu PIL

Supreme Court modifies anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Putul Rai @ Putul Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court has deprecated the practice of the High Court to direct the applicant to surrender and apply for regular bail while rejecting the anticipatory bail prayer. 5. In such circumstances, we do not find a good reason to entertain the prayer for anticipatory bail. However, we deem it appropriate to expunge the direction in the impugned order which requires the petitioner to surrender and apply for regular bail though, it goes without saying that if the petitioner has been required by the Complaint Court to appear before it, the petitioner must comply with such a direction. 6. With the aforesaid observations, this special leave petition stands disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order dated February 9, 2026 was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar.  

Justice Kumar's order had rejected the anticipatory bail application and the petitioners were directed to surrender before the Court concerned within a period of two weeks from the date of the order.

Supreme Court observed:"2. It is not stated that the Court where the complaint proceedings are pending has issued coercive processes, such as non-bailable warrant, to secure the presence of the petitioner. In such circumstances there exists no material for the petitioner to apprehend her arrest." 

It recalled it decision in Om Prakash Chhawnika alias Om Prakash Chabnika alias Om Prakash Chawnika vs. State of Jharkhand and Another 2026 SCC OnLine SC 676, wherein, the Court observed:“10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in connection with a Complaint Caseof 2023 instituted under Sections 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code  As per prosecution case, the allegation against the petitioner and her husband was that they had entered into agreement for sale and have cheated the complainant of Rs. 14,60,000/.  The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner was innocent and she was the wife of co-accused, Bhushan Rai, who was granted anticipatory bail by the Court below. He submitted that the petitioner also deserves anticipatory bail. Since the petitioner had not taken any amount, she was entitled for grant of bail. It was also submitted that she being the wife of the co-accused was not involved in the crime. 

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra

In Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 2-page long order dated May 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"5. We are informed that out of nine accused persons, all the four lady accused have been released on bail. The High Court initially had protected the petitioner from any coercive steps being taken against him. 6. In the overall view of the matter, particularly the genesis of the occurrence and the fact that they all are  neighbors, we are persuaded to exercise our discretion in favor of the petitioner. 7. We order that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the FIR, referred to above, he shall be released on bail by the IO subject to terms and conditions that he may deem fit to impose. 8. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter furnish fresh bonds to the Trial Court." Prior to that the allowed the exemption applications.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court through SLP after being denied anticipatory bail by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra of the Patna High Court in connection with the First Information Report of 2025 registered with Singhaul Police Station,  Begusarai for the offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2) and 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 respectively.

Supreme Court took "notice of the fact that in the FIR, nine persons have been named as accused. Out of nine, four are ladies." It observed: "4. It is evident on plain reading of the FIR, the other materials on record and also the impugned Order passed by the High Court that the accused persons and the prosecution witnesses are neighbors. On the date of the incident, they picked up a fight which ultimately led to an assault. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused persons attempted to commit murder. Whether it is a case of attempt to commit murder or not will be looked into by the Trial Court in the course of trial."

In his order dated February 11, 2026, Justice Mishra had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail. As per prosecution case, on the alleged date of occurrence, the named accused persons including petitioner came to the house of informant Aarti Kumari and started beating her and her husband. The petitioner was alleged to have assaulted the informant’s husband with iron rod on back of his head due to which he fell down and thereafter all the accused persons assaulted him with bricks and stone as a result of which the husband of informant sustained injuries. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to dirty village politics. The informant and the petitioner were agnates. The petitioner had clean antecedent. A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner by contending that there was direct allegation of assault to the husband of informant on his head with iron rod against the petitioner causing head injury. He further submitted that the injury report showed that the injury caused to the injured was found to be grievous in nature. Therefore, the petitioner did not deserve anticipatory bail. In such a backdrop, Justice Mishra was not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 

Supreme Court grants bail in a case of 22 kg of ganja

In Rajadurai vs. The State of Tamil Nadu (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, upon hearing the SLP of the petitioner who was denied regular bail by Madras High Court in connection with the First Information Report for the offence punishable under Sections 8(c) 20(b) (ii) (c) and 29(1) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, concluded:"....we are persuaded to exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioner. 5. We order that the petitioner be released on bail forthwith, if not required in any other case, subject to the terms and conditions that the Trial Court may deem fit to impose."

The contraband involved in the case was 22.950 kgs of ganja. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that her client was in judicial custody past more than one year. 

The Court was informed that although charge was framed by the Trial Court yet till this date not a single witness has been examined. The FIR was registered with Kottampati Police Station, Madurai, Tamil Nadu. 

Supreme Court expresses angusish due to non-compliance of its order by State Legal Services Authorities for Legal aid

"Legal aid, simply put, refers to the provision of free or affordable legal services to individuals who lack the economic or social capacity to access justice through conventional means. It rests on the idea that equality before the law must be real and not symbolic. Legal aid helps ensure that rights are not confined to those who can afford legal representation, but are available to all, including the poor and marginalized. In this sense, it plays a crucial role in making legal protections meaningful. In India, the concept of legal aid is closely tied to the vision expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution, which promises justice be it social, economic, and/or political, along with equality of status and opportunity, and affirms the secular character of the State. Social justice, in this context, requires the State to reduce structural inequalities and protect vulnerable groups from exclusion and exploitation. Legal aid contributes directly to this goal by enabling disadvantaged individuals to assert their rights and seek remedies against injustice. Political justice, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring meaningful participation in democratic processes and equal access to institutions of governance. Without access to legal advice and representation, many citizens would find it difficult to exercise these rights effectively, whether in matters of voting, representation, or challenging arbitrary state action. The commitment to secularism further strengthens the case for legal aid, as it demands that the legal system remain neutral and accessible to all individuals irrespective of religion, ensuring that justice is administered without discrimination or bias. This commitment was given a clear constitutional expression through the insertion of  Article 39A by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. Article 39A directs the State to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity and to provide free legal aid so that no individual is denied access to justice due to economic or other disadvantages. While the legacy of the 42nd Amendment remains contested because of its enactment during the Emergency period from 1975 to 1977, Article 39A is arguably one of its most constructive and enduring contributions. It firmly situates access to justice within the Directive Principles of State Policy. Over time, the Judiciary has further strengthened this framework by linking legal aid to Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Courts have interpreted this right to include fair legal procedures and access to legal representation, thereby reinforcing the centrality of legal aid in a just legal system. On the whole these developments show that legal aid in India is not merely a matter of policy, but a constitutional responsibility that advances the broader ideals of justice, equality, secularism, and fairness envisioned in the Preamble."

-Supreme Court's order dated April 16, 2026 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2026)

"we consider it appropriate to have views of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) for laying down a step by step procedure for ensuring intimation of an adverse order/judgment to the accused; seeking whether he intends to file an appeal; informing the accused of his right to legal aid, and taking steps to ensure that an appeal is filed. It is also necessary to ensure a monitoring mechanism for following whether due intimation and certification is being done."

-Supreme Court's order dated October 24, 2017 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2017)

"We find that there is an usual inordinate delay in this matter in which legal aid is involved. Such delay has been noticed in several cases where the legal aid authorities are involved. It is important to find out where such inordinate delays occur and to issue directions for preventing such delay." 

-Supreme Court's order dated May 5, 2017 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2017)

In Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar Through Home Department (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Sanjay Karol and N. K. Singh passed an order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it wrote:"For ensuring compliance with the directions issued vide judgment dated 16th April, 2026, Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned senior counsel (Amicus Curiae) would prepare and circulate an implementation format for necessary compliance.
2. Let the needful be done within a period of one week from today. 3. List on 25.05.2026."

Earlier, the same bench had passed a 29-page long order dated April 16, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay. The order wass authored by Justice Sanjay Karol. While dealing with an appeal by the appellant, who had challenged the judgment of conviction and sentence to death awarded to him and confirmed in terms of Criminal Appeal No. 425 of 2002 passed by Patna High Court, as per judgment dated February 20, 2014, the Supreme Court in terms of its order dated May 5, 2017 noticed that inordinate delay was affecting matters in which legal aid was involved. It made an effort to find out the cause for the same and issued necessary directions.

Its order dated January 19, 2021 reads: “We have noticed that in the special leave petitions filed by Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC) on behalf of the convicts, there is an inordinate delay which becomes difficult to condone. Needless to say, the situation brings about a lack of even handedness
in dealing with matters of condonation of delay. We see no reason why these delays should continue to occur particularly with the availability of tools provided by information and communication technology which are easily available. In this matter, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted a report dated 15.01.2021 in consultation with the SCLSC on measures to curb the delay. Valuable as that report is, we consider it appropriate to constitute a Committee comprising of certain experts who would examine all the suggestions and responses which may be received by it from the High Courts as well as the other stakeholders. In view of the other suggestions (Annexure B) by NALSA and the response submitted by various High Courts, we find it appropriate to constitute a Committee comprising of Secretary (Ministry of Home Affairs), Government of India, Director General, National Informatics Centre, Member (Process), E-Committee, Supreme Court of India and Member Secretary, NALSA. The Committee shall examine the aforementioned suggestions/responses and submit a report with regard to digitization, translation and electronic transmission of records to facilitate access to justice and timely filing of appeals/SLPs by the convicts, by utilizing the Information and Communication Technology tools, within four weeks. We have also gone through the Module and the Note dated 16.10.2019 as per the report for timely filing of appeals/SLPs of convicts though the Legal Services Institutions. We therefore direct the High Courts to submit their responses to the Committee through their Registrars General within two weeks. The Committee shall submit its report within two weeks’ thereafter. The Secretary General of this Court shall coordinate meetings of the Committee....”

By order dated May 23, 2025, certain questions were put to the Secretary of the SCLSC, and he was required to file an affidavit in that regard. The questions are as follows :-“i. What is the current pendency upto 30.05.2025, i.e. out of the total requests received by the SCLSC so far. How many cases have been filed, and how many are under consideration? ii. What has been the year wise average days of delay in filing petitions of applicants under each category of applicants as provided under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, after Operation Cleanup in the year 2018? iii. Is there adequate infrastructure and staff to deal with the load of SCLSC? iv. What are the reasons for delay, and how have those delays been addressed? v. What is the status of online connectivity between the SCLSC with other stakeholders like High Courts, Prisons, Panel Counsels etc?”

In response to these queries, the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, submitted in affidavit dated July 14, 2025. In response to direction (i) i.e., “what is the current pendency, upto May 30, 2025, for the total requests received by the SCLSC, how many cases have been filed and how many cases are under consideration”, the data taken from the SCLSC website portal revealed that a total of 4062 legal aid applications/requests were received in 2024, out of which 1972 cases were assigned to Panel Advocates and in 906 cases legal aid was refused/closed. There was no legal aid application pending with SCLSC. During January 1, 2025-May 30, 2025, a total of 3305 legal aid applications/requests were received. Out of which 1819 cases were assigned to Panel Advocates and in 476 cases legal aid was refused/closed There were 688 cases in which legal aid application were pending with SCLSC. The data of total cases assigned to the Panel Advocates for the period between Jnauary 1, 2025 to May 30, 2025 is as per the information available on the SCLSC website portal and manual record as the data of newly increased panel advocates was yet to be updated. As per information available on the SCLSC website portal is 745 and manual record is 1074. The updated data of the actual cases filed/pending before the Supreme Court was not available on the SCLSC website portal as there was no official intimation or updating on the login IDs by the panel advocates post assignment. 

 In response to directions/query (ii), i.e. the average year wise delay in filing petitions of applicants under the categories enumerated under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, after the Operation Cleanup in the year 2018, it was submitted that the feature providing for the information regarding the delay caused in the filing of petition is not available on the SCLSC website portal. 

The procedure for grant of legal aid was brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Court which is as under:
(a) The SCLSC has made provisions for receiving the applications from the persons seeking legal aid services, both in physical form and through the SCLSC online portal (sclsc.gov.in).
(b) The legal aid application can also be submitted through:
(i) the High Court Legal Aid Services Committee (HCLSC) or;
(ii) the district legal aid authorities or;
(iii) jail authorities or;
(iv) NALSA Portal or;
(v) Directly from the litigant.

There is a mandatory check list of documents which are necessary for the purpose of consideration of grant of legal aid before approaching the Supreme Court. The persons seeking legal aid can seek assistance of the HCLSC for completion of documents. On completion of documents, the cases are then referred to the screening committees, consisting of Senior Advocates, to render an opinion on the merits of
the applications. The cases of applicants under judicial custody are directly assigned to the panel advocates.

On November 29, 2014, under the Chairmanship of Justice T. S. Thakur, Judge, Supreme Court of India & Executive Chairman, NALSA a resolution was passed which reads: “3. All matters that are required to be filed before the Supreme Court be processed and prepared by the High Court Legal Services Committee, including translations of documents and that SLSAs transfer adequate funds to High Court Legal Services Committees for preparation and translation of documents before dispatch to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee for filing.”

In terms of the circular dated April 13, 2015 issued by the SCLSC adopting the circular issued by NALSA dated February 19, 2015), all legal aid cases which are to be filed before the Supreme Court, are to be prepared and processed by the HCLSC, before they are dispatched to SCLSC for filing.

On completion of documents the matters which are civil in nature or criminal in nature confined to the cases pertaining to the complainant, quashing, transfer, etc. are referred to the Screening Committee consisting of Senior Advocates to render opinion on the merits of legal aid applications. The cases recommended by the Screening Committee are processed further. The cases of persons under judicial custody/prison are directly assigned to the panel advocate for filing the matter before the Supreme Court. The assignment letter assigning the case to the panel advocates specifically stipulates to file the case within 15 days. There is a Login ID of each Panel Advocate and the legal aid applications along with documents which are scanned and indexed are also available in the respective Login IDs immediately on assignment. The panel advocates and the legal aid applicant can communicate directly on the address and
contact number of both given in the assignment letter. However, there is no timely official communication by the panel advocate regarding the filing of the case before the Supreme Court or the orders passed by the Supreme Court till the submission of bill and return of documents by Panel Advocate to SCLSC after disposal of the matter. 

In response to directions (iii), i.e., availability of adequate infrastructure and staff to deal with the load of SCLSC, it was submitted that SCLSC is well equipped with infrastructure and staff.

In response to directions (iv), i.e., the reasons for delay, and how have those been addressed, it is submitted that the reasons for delay are broadly identified as under:
(a) Submission of legal aid application after delay by the legal aid applicant;
(b) submission of incomplete documents by the legal aid applicant;
(c) delay caused by the panel lawyers in filing the petitioner after assignments of the matter.
(d) Translations of vernacular documents, custody certificate to be obtained from jailors, retrieving records from the high court in case of appeals, collating information from the litigant/ or next friend in case of death of parties are some of the causes for delay.

There are various methods adopted by SCLSC to curb the delays which are as under:-
There was a massive campaign initiated in January  2025 (Mission Mode). vide letter dated January 10, 2025, the Director General of Prisons and Member Secretaries of High Court Legal Services Committees and the State Legal Services Authorities were communicated with the decisions of the Chairman, SCLSC requesting to collect the data with respect to: 
▪ Matters in which High Court has upheld the conviction but inmate has not yet filed appeal.
▪ Matters is which the prisoners have remain in jail for half/more than half of sentence period and bail prayer rejected by the High Court but inmate has not yet moved to Supreme Court.
▪ Prisoners whose remission/pre-mature release has been rejected by the state sentence review board and writ against that order has also been rejected by the High Court but inmate has not yet moved Supreme Court. 

It was requested to send the details of prison inmates covered under aforesaid three categories and willing to avail legal services of Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Thereafter, reminders were sent on February 6, 2025 and February 19, 2025 to the authorities for furnishing the requisite data in pursuance of the MISSION MODE. Further, a letter dated March 5, 2025 was sent to the Authorities to provide complete documents with respect to the inmates whose names were mentioned in the data collected and who were willing to avail legal aid services.

A video conference chaired by Justice Suryakant, the then Chairman of SCLSC was held on April 1, 2025 with the Chairpersons of all the State Legal Services Authorities and High Court Legal Services Committees regarding MISSION MODE. The letter dated April 5, 2025 was sent to all the Concerned Authorities requesting to expedite furnishing of the documents. Then another letter dated April 5, 2025 was sent to all the Concerned Authorities in pursuance of the Video Conferencing dated April 1, 2025 to constitute a team of 5 Panel Advocates for visiting the jails to create awareness among the inmates and submit a stage wise report to SCLSC. The letter dated May 3, 2025 was sent to the Registrar Generals of all the High Court communicating the virtual interaction scheduled on May 5, 2025 at 5.30 P.M. of the then Chairman, SCLSC with the Chief Justices of High Courts, Executive Chairperson of SLSAs and HCLSCs. 

It was submitted that, after the successful implementation of Mission Mode, SCLSC is now receiving legal aid applications along with documents from the various Legal Services Authorities to provide legal aid to the jail inmates. The panel of Advocates in the category of AOR, Non-AOR and Arguing Counsel was reconstituted by expanding the panel and additional advocates have been taken on the panel and the number is increased. An additional category of Assisting Counsels was introduced who will provide assistance to the AORs, Non AORs and Arguing Counsels to ensure timely filing and assistance in preparation of the cases. The number of the Screening Committee increased for expeditious grant of legal aid. In response to directions (v), i.e. the status of online connectivity between SCLSC is as under:
• The facility of online connectivity through video conferencing and intercommunication with the High Court Legal Services Committee, Prisons, Panel Counsel, etc. is available on the SCLSC web portal i.e.,
sclsc.gov.in.
• Separate Login IDs are allotted to the HCLSCs, SLSAs, DLSAs, TLSAs, Prisons, Panel Counsels and any communication is immediately is shown in the respective Login IDs.
• The stakeholders including the legal aid applicants can apply for counseling/meeting through video conferencing and on receipt of such application a date and time is given on which the said counseling/meeting can be facilitated.
The status of the legal aid applications submitted by the legal aid applicant can be checked on the SCLSC web portal.”

The order reads: The Supreme Court Legal Service Committee, sought directions from this Court in the following terms as recorded in order dated September 1, 2025. There appears to be some laxity on part of the authorities to furnish affidavits in terms of our order which anguish us (order dt 16.09.2025 to be picked) and as such we had requested the Learned Amicus Curiae to interact with the Chairpersons of the Legal Service Authorities and furnish the requisite information in tabular form."

The order dated September 1, 2025 reads: 
“I. For High Court Legal Services Committee (HCLSC) a. In cases where the applicant has directly approached the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC), the HCLSC must transmit the complete Paperbook filed before the High Court and the Courts below within seven days of the requisition from SCLSC. 
b. In cases where application for legal aid is forwarded from the HCLSC to SCLSC when the applicant has approached the HCLSC, the HCLSC should ensure that the complete Paperbook of the High Court and Courts below is accompanied along with the forwarding letter.
c. In cases where the matter referred to is not a criminal matter and/or the applicant is not in judicial custody, the HCLSC must forward the duly signed/identified vakalatnama and attested affidavit within seven days of receipt of the same from the SCLSC.
d. The HCLSC shall also send the soft scanned copies of all the documents to SCLSC.

In cases where the legal aid applicant is in judicial custody and approaches SCLSC through HCLSC, the Vakalatnama and custody certificate (with complete particulars) duly attested and signed by the Jail Authority/Jail Superintendent must be sent (digital and hard copy) to HCLSC within three days from the receipt of request received from the Prison in mate. The HCLSC shall send the Paperbook, true copy of order passed by the High Court and the lower courts records, alongwith documents received from the Jail (Vakalatnama, Custody Certificate and duly attested affidavit hard as well as scanned copy) to SCLSC within seven days from the date of receipt of request from SCLSC.

As and when the Advocate or the SCLSC sends a request for any additional document, the same must be sent to the SCLSC within seven days from the request received in this regard.

Order dated September 16, 2025 reads: “We express our anguish in the manner in which the statutory authorities have not chosen to respond to the orders passed by this Court. 2. Under these circumstances, we request Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned amicus curiae, to personally get in touch with the Chairman
of all the State Legal Services Authorities with a further request to them, ensuring necessary compliance of the order before the next date of hearing.”

Supreme Court's order underlined that the development of the concept of legal aid through judicial pronouncements is important to note for the purposes of the directions issued in this Judgment. At the outset, it be noted that in Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration 2 (1978) 4 SCC 494 held that prisoners do not surrender their fundamental rights at the prison gate. In that context, let us proceed further. The most recognizable name in the line of cases of this Court, furthering the Directive Principles of State Policy as mentioned in Article 39A of the Constitution of India, is Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81, in which the Court held that the speedy trial to be a facet of Article 21 and free legal aid is an essential component of fair, just and reasonable procedure in law. It was emphasized that the State had an obligation to ensure access to justice and that the Court was required to take steps to provide legal representation and expedite criminal trials. Even before this, in the year 1978, this Court in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot vs. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 held that the right to counsel was a fundamental right traceable to Article 21. We take note of another case from the same year i.e., Khatri (II) vs. State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627 in which it was held that free legal aid is a fundamental right and that it attaches from the moment the accused is first produced before a Magistrate and not only at the commencement of the trial. Further, it was held that the right to legal aid does not depend on a request to that effect from the accused, thereby placing a positive obligation on the State to provide the same. Most recently, this Court in Suhas Chakma vs. Union of India 2024 INSC 813 speaking through K.V. Viswanathan, J. extensively dealt with this issue of systemic deficiency in access to free legal aid for prisoners, particularly the under trials. 

Supreme Court concluded: "10. We have given careful consideration to the SOP and the proposed directions. We are of the considered view that this SOP is a result of in depth deliberations conducted by the “stakeholders” or “major players in the game”, that being the case the same deserves consideration by all the High Courts on the administrative side, so that, necessary changes to the procedure in place, can be
adopted in furtherance of the aims of the SOP. As such, it is directed that a copy of this order be placed before the learned Chief Justice of the High Court, for necessary consideration and appropriate action at their end.
11. While implementation of the entire breadth of the SOP is left to the wisdom of the High Courts, we do hereby direct that the timelines mentioned under Heading 5 of the SOP shall be treated as binding. This is for the purposes of streamlining the filing of appeals in cases where the respective Legal Services Committees are required to take lead. This, it is our hope, will go a long way in addressing the structural gaps that had prompted this Court to take forward the present proceedings apart from dealing with the death reference from which they emanated.
12. Regarding the issue of translators, while we do not issue any directions, we may only observe that the poor quality of translation has engaged the attention of this Court, recently, on quite of few occasions, indicating that some sort of structural change is necessitated in this regard. The respective High Court may
seriously examine and take decision on paragraph 6 of the SOP within a time bound period, i.e., not more than four weeks.
13. The aspect of monitoring and accountability as delineated in paragraph 8 of the SOP ensures that there is effective monitoring and ‘keeping tabs’ on the functioning and processes to be undertaken by the Legal Services Committees of the respective High Courts. Let the necessary constitution of the committee be carried out at the earliest. The Standing Committee/Administrative Committee, may appoint the members either by itself or after consulting the Full Court, as may be warranted. The Member Secretary of HCLSC shall be an ex-officio member. In so far as the constitution of the committee for this Court is concerned, the Member Secretary, SCLSC is directed to bring this order to the notice of the learned Executive Chairman, SCLSC and solicit orders thereon as may be deemed suitable by such authority.
14. On the aspect of coordination with jail authorities and inter-agency communication, the suggestions made in the SOP (para 9) shall be implemented forthwith as far as practicable. The last aspect delineated upon therein i.e., delay explanation (para 13-SOP), in our view, is a necessary change that will enable the tabling of the actual time taken in the process of filing the appeal. It is as such directed that the said format shall be incorporated forthwith into the necessary documentation. We hereby grant two weeks from the date of this order for it to be incorporated after which any appeal filed by HCLSC shall necessarily contain the same.
15. Suggestions ‘b’ and ‘d’ of the learned amicus curiae reproduced in paragraph 9 of this order shall be read as directions issued by this Court.
16. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to circulate a copy of this order to the Registrars General of all the High Courts, who shall ensure a copy of the same is placed before the Learned Chief Justices and the Executive Chairpersons of the State Legal Service Committees, for necessary follow up action and requisite changes as may be required.

In its order Court had directed that the status report/compliance report be filed by all concerned institutions including the National Informatics Centre, by April 30, 2026. The matter was fixed for further consideration on May 4, 2026.

Earlier, in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2014), Justice Akhilesh Chandra of Patna High Court had delivered a 4-page long judgement dated February 20, 2014, wherein, he concluded:"6. In such type of incident with a female, the statement of the victim itself is sufficient to establish the guilt even  without any corroboration unless and until anything strongly otherwise is shown, but as stated, in the case in hand, there appears nothing to disbelieve her. Consequently, finding no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as recorded by the trial court, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 7. The solitary appellant is required to serve the remaining period of sentence and the appellant is on bail, hence, his bail bond is cancelled. 8. The learned trial court will take due steps for taking the appellant into custody." 

The solitary appellant had preferred the appeal against his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/, as awarded by Sessions Judge, Begusarai vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence respectively dated 20th & 23rd Day of July, 2002 in Sessions Case No. 169 of 1991 arising out of Sahebpur Kamal P.S.

The prosecution case was based on the Fardbeyan of P.W.1 recorded on 22nd September, 1990 at 10.30 hours is that in the previous evening at about 6.00 p.m. while she was visiting her field found the appellant getting crops grazing by his animals, which was object, but bluntly refused by the appellant to get the animals out from there. However, while the prosecutrix was returning she was got hold from behind by him (appellant), who not only slapped her but also subjected to rape. She could be released only when on alarm raised other co-villager were found coming. She on return intimated the incident to her husband (P.W.6) and, thereafter, on the following day got the case was instituted. 

The judgement recorded that the appellant had tried his best to obstruct smooth proceeding of the trial on 3 - 4 occasions and he misused the privilege of bail for substantial period. However, the prosecution could be able to examine altogether eight witnesses and produced documentary evidence like Injury Report, F.I.R. and Case diary of S. Kamal 103/90. Out of the total eight prosecution witnesses examined, three prosecution witness, P.W.2, Umesh Sao, P.W.3, Sone Lal Sah and P.W.4, Prabhu Sah, were declared hostile, out of whom, P.W.3 and P.W.4 could be examined three years after examination of P.W.1 & P.W.2. P.W.5, Sita Ram Yadav, at whose field the offence was committed, had come to state about the condition of crops subsequent to incident. He had heard about the incident and is not an eye-witness, but whatever he said about the physical features that remain intact. 

P.W.6, namely, Rajendra Sao, was the husband of the prosecutrix, not an eye-witness, got such information through his wife (P.W.1) and denied the suggestion of false implication at the instance of one Sitaram Yadav with whom the appellant was at inimical terms. P.W.7, Dr. Baidehi Kumari, examined the prosecutrix but found no injury, proved her report, Exhibit.1. P.W.8, Bhuneshwar Yadav, was a formal witness, proved Exhibits 2 and 3.  

The solitary witness, the Prosecutrix, P.W.1, namely, Soni Devi, who stated the prosecution version and from her entire statement nothing appeared to disbelieve her. Her statement, stating the miseries faced by her at the hands of appellant remained intact.