Soon after her oath, one of the first few tasks, she is likely to undertake is to prepare the roster for the vacation bench of the Patna High Court. She will also be the Patrons-In-Chief of Bihar Judicial Academy, which provides training to judges of district judiciary. The academy considers only judges and retired judges to be its teachers. Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad is its current chairperson since January 13, 2026.
Notably, Justice Rai She completed her LLB in 1989. She will find several judges like Justice Prasad (1991 batch), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, Justice Sandeep Kumar, Justice Jitendra Kumar from her Campus Law Centre, Delhi University who studied there in early 1990s. Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha also studied law at Delhi University. The High Court's website does not provide the educational institutions of most of the other judges and their academic qualifications. Several years ago, Justice Rai was Registrar General of Sikkim High Court in 2006 and 2009.
Before her retirement, Justice Rai is likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court. The judges of the Supreme Court of India retire at the age of 65 years. The retirement age is constitutionally fixed and applies to all sitting judges, including the Chief Justice of India. This age limit is stipulated under Article 124(2) of the Constitution of India. The High Court judges retire earlier, at the age of 62 years.
Justice Rai was elevated to the bench of Sikkim High Court on April 15, 2015. On May 22, 2015 she delivered one of her earliest judgements as a judge in Subash Rai vs. State of Sikkim, wherein, she set aside the judgment and sentence of the Sessions Court, South Sikkim at
Namchi, in a Sessions Trial of 2014. sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five years. The trial court had convicted the appellant under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
The appellant had assailed the judgment and sentence of the Sessions Court, South Sikkim at Namchi, in Sessions Trial case in his appeal filed the High Court. The facts of the case which gave rise to the incident was that the appellant on November 22, 2013 entered the house of the victim after knocking on her door and enquired as to where she kept her money and gold jewellery. At the same time he assured her that in a short while he would return the amount of Rs.1000, which he owed her, from the total loan of Rs. 15,000. He then left the house, while the victim went to a room to lie down without bolting the door from inside. After sometime, the appellant again entered her house armed with an iron rod and rice cooker cable and attacked her on her head with the iron rod. She managed to snatch both articles from the appellant and dragged him out of her house. After hearing the submissions the Sessions Court had found prima facie materials against the accused, under Section 307 of the IPC, framed charge accordingly against Subash Rai, the appellant. The prosecution witnesses were examined and the Trial Court relying on the evidence so furnished, had convicted the appellant.
The Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that Trial Court had correctly appreciated the evidence on record and convicted the appellant and sentenced him accordingly. There is sufficient evidence on record to indicate that the appellant had prepared for the offence and had the "intention" and "knowledge" as required for an offence under Section 307 of the IPC. According to her, the evidence given by the victim was not demolished. She had drawn the attention of the High Court towards the decisions of the Supreme Court in Parsuram Pandey & Ors. vs. State of Bihar : 2004 (13) SCC 189 and Sagayam vs. State of Karnataka : 2000 (4) SCC 454 to contend that it was evident from the testimonies of the witnesses that there was no requirement to interfere with the decision of the trial court.
In Parsuram Pandey & Ors. (supra), relied on by the Learned Assistant Government Advocate, it has, inter alia, been held that Section 307 of the IPC clearly contemplates an act which is done with the intention of causing death, but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. That, the intention or knowledge of the accused, must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence of attempt of murder. That, intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by exercise of direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors such as from the nature of the weapon used, the nature and place where the injuries were inflicted, and the circumstances in which the incident took place. In the said case, one Parsuram and Bishram had opened fire indiscriminately in an open area where villagers were present and the villagers sustained simple injuries. None of the witnesses therein stated that the fire arm causing injuries was being used by any particular accused for causing injuries to them and in fact the injured persons had not seen the accused persons using the fire arms. The Court found no intention or knowledge to commit either murder or attempt to murder and acquitted the accused persons.
In Sagayam vs. State of Karnataka, it was held that to justify a conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, it was not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. An attempt, in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act foreboding death. It was sufficient in law if an intention is present coupled with an overt act in execution thereof such act being proximate to the crime intended and if the attempt has gone so far that it would have been complete, but for the extraneous intervention which frustrated its consummation. The Court in the said decision had held that there are different stages in a crime, first, the intention to commit it, second, the preparation to commit it and third, the attempt to commit it, if at the third stage the attempt fails, the crime is not complete but the law punishes for attempting the same.
The Legal Aid counsel for the appellant relied on Supreme Court's decision n Jai Narayan Singh & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 62, it was held that "........Where four or five persons attack a man with deadly weapon it may well be presumed that the intention is to cause death. In the present case, however, three injuries are of simple nature though deadly weapons were used and the fourth injury caused by Suraj though endangering life could not be deemed to be an injury which would have necessarily caused death but for timely medical aid. The benefit of doubt must, therefore, be given to Suraj with regard to the injury intended to be caused and, in our opinion, the offence is not one under Section 307- IPC but Section 326- IPC......."The conviction of the accused in the said case under Section 307 IPC was set aside and he was convicted under Section 326 of the IPC.
Justice Rai observed:"13. It would be pertinent to mention here that for an offence under Section 307 of the IPC, it is essential that the accused has the "intention" or "knowledge", and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, and would be penalized in terms of the penalty given therein. Thus, this Section applies to an attempt to murder in which there has been not merely a commencement of an execution of the purpose, but the consummation thereof is hindered by circumstances beyond the will of the accused. The act committed by the accused must be an act capable of causing death in the natural and ordinary course of things. 14. In addition to the above, attempt, for the purposes of Section 307 IPC should emanate from a specific intent to commit the offence and this condition of mind may be gathered from direct or circumstantial evidence which includes the conduct of the accused. It may also be borne in mind that intention and knowledge are a man's state of mind and direct evidence thereof cannot be obtained except through his own confession. Thus, intention and knowledge clearly have to be inferred from the attending circumstances of the case such as motive, preparation, the weapon of offence used, persistence of the assault and the nature of the injuries caused, as also the location of the injuries."
She noted that although a spear thrust in the chest is likely to have fatal results, if the spear penetrates sufficiently deep, still however having regard to the nature of the injury, namely, that the thrust caused a punctured wound which only extended up to the pleural cavity and did not cause injury to the pleura or to the lungs or to any other vital organ of the body, it would be a doubtful case whether the hurt in question could be said to be of that category which has the effect of endangering life. Hence the proper section that would apply would be Sec. 324 I.P.C., namely, voluntarily causing hurt with dangerous weapons."
Justice Rai pointed out that the evidence clearly indicated that the injury inflicted on the victim was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to have caused her death. It is also evident that even after being injured, she was able to overpower the appellant and drag him outside. Had the appellant the intention of doing away with the victim, he could have repeatedly assaulted her with the iron rod, but there is no evidence of any persistent assault. It cannot be said that only on extraneous intervention the crime could not be committed. The evidence on record of PW-2 reveals that PW-1 had the rod, MOI in her hand which is also substantiated by the evidence of PW-4. PW-1 is a lady of about 60 years, while the appellant is a strapping lad of about 27 years, obviously the physical strength of the victim, PW1 would have been no match for the Appellant had he really had the intention to kill PW-1.
Justice Rai concluded:"27. Therefore, from an inference of the facts and attending circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that the Appellant and the victim had a free fight in which the Appellant managed to assault the victim, but in due course of time she overpowered him. 28. In view of the evidence on record and the discussions hereinabove, I am of the considered opinion that the offence committed by the Appellant does not fall under Section 307 of the IPC but fulfils the ingredients under Section 324 of the IPC. 29. Consequently, the Judgment of the Learned Trial Court convicting the Appellant under Section 307 of the IPC is set aside and so also the Sentence. 30. The Appellant is convicted of the offence under Section 324 of the IPC. 31. In consideration of the submissions on Sentence made by Learned Counsel for the Appellant, I am of the considered opinion that the following Sentence would meet the ends of justice. 32. The Appellant is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 17 months u/S 324 of the IPC, setting off the period of imprisonment already undergone by him as an under-trial-prisoner and after conviction. 33. He is also sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2500/- (Rupees two thousand five hundred) only, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further S.I. of 3 (three) months. 34. In the event that the Appellant has paid the fine imposed by the Learned Trial Court, the amount in excess of the fine imposed by this Court shall be returned to him." The judgement illustrates Justice Rai's keen sense of justice.
In one of her last judgements, as the senior-most judge of the Sikkim High Court, Justice Rai delivered a 32-page long judgement dated April 6, 2026 in Puspa Mishra & Ors, vs. State of Sikkim & Ors. (2026) she grappled with the Sikkim’s unique constitutional protections and the property rights of Sikkimese women. The 101 petitioners who were by birth Sikkimese women, married to non-Sikkimese men, who are citizens of India. They were aggrieved by a notification dated June 7, 2018, of the Land Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Government of Sikkim, which provides that any document regarding transfer of property, presented for registration by a Sikkimese woman, married to a non-Sikkimese, may ordinarily be registered. But “………… ownership of her property, on her demise, shall be governed as per the existing rules and regulations prevailing in the State”. According to the petitioners, “the existing rules and regulations” referred to in the notification was the “Married Women‟s Property Regulation, 1962” (Regulation of 1962), which provides that a Sikkimese woman married to a non “Sikkim Subject”, shall have no right to acquire any immoveable property or any interest in such property, in the territory of Sikkim, subsequent to her marriage. It was submitted that the Regulation of 1962, was never enforced in the State and despite being only an executive order, seeks to debar the children of Sikkimese women married to non-Sikkimese, from holding property in the State of Sikkim, which was discriminatory, mala fide and arbitrary. They were also aggrieved by the non-issuance of Certificate of Identification (COI) to their progeny, on account of the petitioners‟ marriage to non-Sikkimese, thereby depriving their children of all facilities and rights available to COI holders, including their right to obtain Government employment in the State. The petitioners prayed a writ or order or direction or declaration that on the death of a Sikkimese woman, married to a non-Sikkimese, her property shall devolve upon and owned by her children (sic.) duly quashing the part of the notification dated 7/6/18 namely “The ownership of the property on her demise shall be governed as per the existing rules and regulations prevailing in the State.”
The petitioners had also prayed for a writ or order or direction or declaration that the children of Sikkimese women marrying to non-Sikkimese (sic.) shall not be debarred from getting employment under the Government of Sikkim. They sought a writ or order or direction or declaration that, the offsprings of the Sikkimese women marrying to non-Sikkimese (sic.) shall be issued with Certificate of Identification and other similar documents with right of inheritance of immovable properties and all other benefits receivable from the Government like all other Sikkimese persons. They prayed for a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ/order/direction or declaration that husband‟s SSC/COI so far claimed by the Respondents from Sikkimese women shall no longer be claimed from them for procurement of employment and for other purposes under the Government of Sikkim or in any region whatsoever. The petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ/order/direction directing the state respondents in particular the Land Revenue & Disaster Management Department as well as District Collectors/ Registrar/ Sub-Registrar of four districts to register any deed of sale, gift, lease or will and/or any instrument of transfer of immovable properties from the names of Sikkimese women married to non-Sikkimese men to the names of their children.
Notably, Sikkim is the 22nd State of the Indian Union with a population of 6,10,577 as per the Census of 2011. Prior to the 36th Amendment Act to the Constitution of India by which Sikkim became a part of the Indian Union, the erstwhile Kingdom of Sikkim was a protectorate of India with Defence, External Affairs and Communications under the Government of India. The then Monarch, known as the Chogyal, promulgated the Sikkim Subject Regulation, 1961, clearly defined the status of Sikkim Subjects and to make provision for the acquisition and loss of such status.
Justice Rai examined the provisions under Article 14 of the Constitution which provides that the State
shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of laws within the territory of India. The Article prohibits
discrimination and mandates that all persons shall be treated equally
before the law, it is thus a declaration of equality of all persons
within the territory of India implying the absence of any special
privilege in favour of any individual. The guarantee of equal protection
of law and equality before the law, nonetheless does not prohibit
reasonable classification. The million dollar question is whether Sikkim
State has legislated within permissible classification based on
intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons that are grouped
together, from others, who are left out of the group. Notably, she dwelt on the provisions under Article
15 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth. The provision therefore makes room
for gender equality. She factored in the provisions under Article 16 of the Constitution of India which guarantees
equality of opportunity in public employment prohibiting discrimination
on enumerated grounds.
The petitioner's counsel had drawn her attention towards Supreme Court's decision in Association of Old Settlers of Sikkim and Others vs. Union of India and Another (2023) 5 SCC 717, wherein, she observed that, pursuant to the merger of Sikkim with India, Sikkim Subjects and all Sikkimese domiciled in the territory of Sikkim became Indian citizens, there cannot be a discrimination vis-à-vis Sikkimese woman marrying a non-Sikkimese.
Justice Rai pointed out that the view expressed by the Supreme Court was that, Section 10 (26AAA) proviso of the Income Tax Act, 1961, should not have discriminated against Sikkimese women, only because a Sikkimese woman who, though, may have had her name registered in the Register of Sikkim Subjects, married a non-Sikkimese, that too only on or after 01-04-2008, as there is no justification for such exclusion.
She observed: "In my considered view, this finding will not support the case of the Petitioners progeny as the observation is limited to the “Sikkimese woman” whose name is in the Sikkim Subjects Register and does not in any manner discuss about whether the children of Sikkimese women, married to a non-Sikkimese, would be entitled to such exemption. 16. Women in Sikkim having to submit “marital status” before obtaining Government employment in Sikkim, necessarily flows from the reasons as explained in the Notification dated 25-02-1961" which is Notification of 1969 and the difference between a “Sikkimese national” and “non-Sikkimese national” having been explained at length in State of Sikkim vs. Surendra Prasad Sharma & Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 282 which needs no further clarity.
Justice Rai concluded:"Ergo, this Court is of the view that every branch of the Government be it the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary, each has a defined role and is expected to operate within the ambit of the boundaries set out for them. The separation of powers essentially is to ensure that there is no overlapping or encroachment by one branch into the working of another branch. 24. In the instant matter, the old laws of Sikkim being protected laws as clearly laid down in the special provision for Sikkim viz., Article 371F(k) of the Constitution and duly saved by the Adaptation of Sikkim Laws (No.1) Order 1975, cannot be tinkered with by this Court for the reasons which have been discussed in extenso. In my considered view, it falls in the domain of the Executive and the Legislature. The Court surely cannot arrogate to itself powers that are reserved for the Legislature nor can it interfere in Executive policy decisions. 25. In light of the foregoing detailed discussions, the Writ Petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed and disposed of." She underlined that the High Court cannot legislate.
In Dawa Tamang vs. Maita Kumar Tamang @ Maitay and Anr. (2026), in a 6-page long final order dated April 21, 2026 passed by Justice Rai upon hearing an application for revision under Article 227 of Constitution of India concluded that the petitioner "ought to be afforded an opportunity by the Learned Trial Court to re-file the application, filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by incorporating the correct legal provision, for seeking leave of the Court to file additional documents. 14. The Learned Trial Court shall thereafter consider the Petition as per law. 15. Civil Revision Petition stands disposed of accordingly." Justice Rai vacated the stay of the proceedings in Title Suit No.09 of 2024, granted vide High Court's order dated February 19, 2026. The petitioner herein, (Defendant No.1 before the Trial Court) had impugned the order of the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pakyong, Sikkim, dated November 27, 2025, in Title Suit No.09 of 2024 (Maita Kumar Tamang vs. Dawa Tamang), vide which, the Trial Court had rejected an application of the Petitioner filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to file additional documents. The petition was rejected inter alia on the ground that an erroneous provision of law was invoked by the Petitioner, as the CPC provided a specific provision for seeking leave of the Court to fill additional documents, post the filing of the Written Statement. The additional documents sought to be filed by the petitioners were the electricity bills in the name of the Petitioner/Defendant from June, 2007 to April, 2024 and the Voter Identity Cards issued by the Election Commission of India pertaining to Masini Tamang and Maita Kumar Tamang (the Respondent No.1), to fortify the Petitioner’s contention of impersonation by the Respondents. It was the submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that, merely because a wrong provision of law was cited, the prayer of the Petitioner ought not to have been rejected by the Court since relief could have been granted sans the technicality. He relied on the decision in Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja (D) by Lrs. vs. Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah & Ors. Civil Appeal No.10521 of 2013 decided on October 4, 2019. The Supreme Court has held that, it is well settled that, mere non-mentioning of a provision is not fatal to the application if the power to pass such an order is available with the Court.
Justice Rai observed: "11. The entire exercise of a trial in a Title Suit is to get to the crux of the matter and to provide even handed justice to the litigating parties. Justice must be seen to be done and the Court should not be weighed down by technicalities." She relied on Supreme Court's decision in Sugandhi (dead) by Legal Representatives and Another vs. P. Rajkumar represented by his power agent Imam Oli (2020) 10 SCC 706, wherein, the Court categorically propounded :“9. It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under sub-rule (3).”
Justice Rai referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Rani Kusum (Smt) vs. Kanchan Devi (Smt) and Others (2005) 6 SCC 705, wherein, the Court observed:“14. Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.”
Justice Rai drew on the Supreme Court's decision in M/s Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Aroush Motors and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2181, wherein, it reiterated:“2. The present controversy can be encapsulated in words of the Hon’ble Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer: “Procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress”
Relying on these decisions of the Supreme Court which are revelatory of its stand, Justice Rai concluded that, "a litigant should not be denied substantial justice on grounds of technicalities". Patna High Court is all set to welcome the judge who is a proponent of substantial justice beyond the impediment of technicalities.
As a Patron-in-Chief of the Bihar Judicial Academy, Justice Rai may seek a report on the functions of the Academy regarding its comprehensive training and learning facilities for the judicial officers, orientation course/s for newly recruited civil judges and other newly recruited judicial officers, refresher courses for civil judges (junior and senior division), additional district judges, district judges and other judicial officers, legal workshops and seminars at the district headquarters or other places, facilitation of study materials, conferences, seminars, lectures and research in the matters relating to justice delivery system specially with a view to reduce pendency of cases, dissemination of information to judicial administration, training programme for judicial officers and Court Management, Case Flow Management and court technology (Computers), judicial education to judicial officers, ministerial staff of the High Court and the civil courts, publication of papers, books journals etc. various facets of law, in Court Management, Justice Delivery System and Administration of Justice, establishment of liaison with other expert research Institutes/Universities and also with other bodies for the purpose of improving administration of justice, training programme for law officers of the government in the High Court and civil courts, research work in the field of law and its allied branches and rules related to High Court, civil courts and recommending the same the High Court, training within India or abroad and to publish magazine including notes of latest important judgment of the Supreme Court and Patna High Court and publication of Articles and the activity of the academy, books, monographs, journals etc.
During July 1, 2023-June 31, 2024, the Bihar Judicial Academy conducted 60 training sessions physically, and 22 training sessions virtually. Special workshops for District Judiciary on the New Criminal Laws – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023 were also conducted. During the period July 1, 2023-June 30, 2024, 563 victims were allotted compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme. Legal Services Authorities at Bihar conducted High Level Committee Meeting in which direction was given to Chief Judicial Magistrates for conducting review meeting under section 16 of Juvenile Justice Act. The new Patron-in-Chief of the Academy may ascertain whether review meeting under section 16 of Juvenile Justice Act was conducted by Chief Judicial Magistrates. The Academy's Board of Governors includes Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Mohit Kumar Shah, Gunnu Anupama Chakravarthy, Harish Kumar and Alok Kumar Pandey. The Academy's library has 2243 books only.
Notably, in the name of publications, the academy's website has only four old issues of Juris-Ray, a journal of Bihar Judicial Academy from 2021 and 2022 are available on its website. The journal's oldest issue seems to be from 2013, i.e. ten years after the establishment of the Academy. Justice Rai may ascertain whether the professional training of judicial officers of the Academy equips them to undertake editing work of the journal. The details about the judicial officer who is the current editor of Juris-Ray, the journal is not in sight. It seems the publication of the journal has been stopped. This state of affairs at the Academy is crying for attention.
Justice Rai may also inquire about the role of the judicial officers who are editor and sub-editors of the Patna High Court and to ascertain whether their professional training equips them to undertake editing work. During a short span of two years since April 2024, four judicial officers (Shweta Kumari Singh, Namrata Tiwary, Ramakant and now Sanjay Agarwal) have been made editor, Patna High Court. Anyone who is familiar with the work of an editor knows that if editors are changed at such a rapid pace, no institutional memory gets created. The High Court has record of their educational background of these judicial officers. Justice Rai may find out whether these officers have studied mass communication where editing is taught or whether tthey been trained to undertake editing of journals and judgements?
Justice Rai will also be part of the Patna High Court's Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee which comprises of the Chief Justice and Justice Soni Shrivastava. The committee is yet to publish its annual reports. It is yet to comply with provisions under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 or draw lessons from Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Regulations, 2013. Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) too is yet to re-start the publication of its annual reports.
Sikkim High Court is all set to give her Full Court farewell reference to her. In 2021, at the Full Court reference on the elevation of Chief Justice J. K. Maheshwari as a judge of the Supreme Court, Justice Rai had concluded her address with the promise that God has given in the Bible's Book of Isaiah, Chapter 43 Verse 2. It reads:
“When you pass through the waters,
I will be with you;
And when you pass through the rivers,
They will not sweep over you.
When you walk through the fire,
you will not be burned;
the flames will not set you ablaze.”
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