In Rushan Praveen vs. Md. Firoz (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated May , 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 12.09.2018 passed by the learned Sub Judge-IX, Patna in Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The same is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity to the defendant/petitioner to contest the suit. It is further directed that the learned Trial Court shall proceed expeditiously as per settled law and decide the suit on its own merits after settlement of the issue, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. 18. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision application stands disposed of. 19. Any interim order, if operating, stands vacated."
The civil revision was filed by the petitioner under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act ( BBC Act) for setting aside the order dated September 12, 2018 passed in Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 by the Court of Sub Judge-IX, Patna, whereby the eviction suit filed by the plaintiff/opposite party came to be decreed under the special provisions of Section 14(4) BBC Act on account of non-filing of an affidavit by the defendant/petitioner seeking leave to contest the suit.
The case arose from the proceeding, wherein, the plaintiff/opposite party instituted Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 before the Court of learned Sub Judge-IX, Patna, asserting himself to be the landlord of the suit premises and alleging that the defendant had been inducted as a tenant therein on monthly rent of Rs.1,500/. The eviction of the defendant was sought on the ground of personal necessity as well as under the special summary procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the BBC Act. It was alleged in the plaint that despite requests, the defendant failed to vacate the premises, necessitating institution of the suit. The suit was thus registered and proceeded under the special provisions applicable to eviction on the ground of personal requirement.
The defendant/petitioner entered appearance in the suit and filed her written statement on December 2, 2013 contesting the claim of the plaintiff/opposite party in toto. It was stated that the suit was non-maintainable on the grounds of limitation, estoppel,waiver, and misjoinder/non-joinder of necessary parties, and also the defendant/petitioner specifically denied the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was further stated that the defendant/petitioner was the absolute owner in possession of the disputed land and house, having purchased the same through a registered sale deed dated October 13, 2003 from one Md. Jawed, who was the brother of the plaintiff/opposite party, and that the plaintiff himself had signed the said sale deed as a attesting witness at the time of its execution. It was stated that after such purchase, the opposite party/plaintiff constructed a pucca house over the land, got her name duly mutated in the government records, and was regularly paying rent, holding tax, and electricity charges, besides having obtained a possession certificate from the competent authority. It was also stated that the land of the opposite party was situated towards the north of the defendant’s/petitioner’s land and remains vacant, whereas the defendant was residing in her own constructed house along with her family members. It was stated that the plaintiff/opposite party, in collusion with a builder who was constructing an apartment in the vicinity, instituted the eviction suit with a view to grab the property of the defendant/petitioner and to compel her to sell the same. The defendant/petitioner, therefore prayed for dismissal of the eviction suit, stating that the provisions of the BBC Act are not applicable in the absence of any landlord-tenant relationship and that the plaintiff has no cause of action to institute the suit.
Upon consideration of the materials available on record and the procedural compliance under the special provisions of Section 14 of the BBC Act, the Trial Court held that although the defendant/petitioner had entered appearance and filed written statement, she failed to file the mandatory affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit as required under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act. The Trial Court also observed that in view of such non-compliance, the statements and grounds taken by the plaintiff/opposite party in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted by the defendant. The Trial Court vide the impugned order dated September 12, 2018 allowed the petition filed by the plaintiff under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act and held the plaintiff entitled to a decree of eviction. Accordingly, the Trial Court directed the defendant/ petitioner to vacate the suit premises and hand over peaceful and vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff/opposite party within a period of two months from the date of the impugned order, failing which the plaintiff/opposite party was given liberty to seek eviction of the defendant/petitioner through process of law.
Being aggrieved by this order of eviction controversy must be tested on the said vide the impugned order dated September 12, 2018 passed by the Trial Court in the Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013, the petitioner had filed the present Civil Revision petition before the Court.
The counsel for the petitioner assailed the order dated September 12, 2018 on the ground which was passed in a mechanical and summary manner without proper appreciation of the pleadings and materials available on record. It was submitted that although the petitioner had entered appearance promptly after service of summons and had filed her written statement on December 2, 2013 contesting the suit on merits, the Trial Court proceeded to decree the suit solely on the technical ground of non-filing of affidavit under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act. It was further submitted that such an approach defeats the principles of natural justice, particularly when the matter was already posted for settlement of issues and the defence of the petitioner was available on record.
The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the very foundation of the eviction suit, namely the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, is wholly absent in the case. It was submitted that the petitioner claimed to be the absolute owner in possession of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated December 16, 2003 executed by Md. Jawed, who was none other than the full brother of the plaintiff, and significantly, the plaintiff himself was an attesting witness to the sale deed. It was also submitted that subsequent mutation in government records, grant of land possession certificate, payment of electricity bill and holding tax, and construction of a pucca house over the purchased land clearly establish the independent right, title, and possession of the petitioner over the property. The counsel submitted that in such circumstances, the provisions of the BBC Act, which presuppose existence of tenancy, are not attracted at all.
The counsel also submitted that even otherwise, the Trial Court has failed to satisfy itself regarding the existence of bona fide requirement or any legally sustainable ground for eviction, as no documentary or oral evidence was adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case. It was submitted that neither any rent receipt nor any lease deed was brought on record, nor was the plaintiff examined as a witness to prove the pleadings. The counsel also placed reliance on settled principles of law and submitted that mere pleadings
cannot be treated as proof and even in a proceeding under Section 14, the Court is under an obligation to scrutinize the genuineness and bona fides of the claim. In order to support his averments he relied on the judgment of the Cordinate Bench of the High Court in Abhimanyu Prasad Sah vs. Murlidhar Bhawsinghka 1998 (1) PLJR. It was submitted that the impugned order, having been passed without such judicial scrutiny and in disregard of the materials on record, was unsustainable in law and fit to be set aside.
Justice Malviya observed:"....this Court finds that the scope of interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, particularly under Section 14(8) of the B.B.C Act, is limited. It is well settled that this Court, while exercising revisional powers, does not act as an Appellate Court to reappreciate evidence but is required to examine whether the impugned order suffers from any jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, or perversity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, interference is warranted only when the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are contrary to law or have resulted in manifest injustice. The revisional power is supervisory in nature and cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction; interference is permissible only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity in the exercise of such jurisdiction. 10. Upon consideration of the records, it is not in dispute that the eviction suit was instituted under the special procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the BBC Act and that the defendant/petitioner had entered appearance and filed her written statement within time. It is equally admitted that no separate affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit, as mandated under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act, was filed by the defendant....11. Moreover, it is clear that for the applicability of the Section14(4) of the BBC Act, tenancy must be undisputed and the relationship of the landlord and tenant is established but in the instant case tenancy has denied."
The judgement reads:"...it is implied that tenancy is neither admitted not established in the present case so the requirement of section 14 (4) of the BBC Act is not applicable in the fact and circumstances of the instant case. The learned Trial Court has proceeded on the technical aspect of the Section 14(4) of the BBC Act, while allowing the petition of the plaintiff and decreeing the suit. 13. Moreover, this Court finds that the matter does not rest merely on technical non-compliance. From the written statement and materials brought on record, a serious dispute has been raised with regard to the very existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The specific stand of the defendant is that she is the purchaser of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed executed by the brother of the plaintiff/opposite party, and that the plaintiff himself is an attesting witness to the said transaction. The defendant/petitioner has further asserted her independent title and possession over the property supported by mutation, possession certificate, and payment of government dues. Such pleadings, going to the root of the maintainability of the eviction suit under the BBC Act, could not have been lightly brushed aside without judicial scrutiny."
Justice Malviya drew on the legal position in this regard stands conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh reported in (2014) 9 SCC, wherein, it held: “The revisional court does not have the power to re-appreciate evidence. The jurisdiction is confined to examine whether the findings of fact recorded by the court below are according to law and do not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error.”
Justice Malviya observed that it is well settled that "even in a proceeding under Section 14 of the BBC Act, though summary in nature, the Court is not absolved of its duty to satisfy itself regarding the existence of essential ingredients for eviction, particularly the relationship of landlord and tenant and the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff/opposite party. The deeming provision under Section 14(4) of the B.B.C. Act cannot be stretched to the extent of permitting a decree in cases where foundational facts themselves are seriously disputed and are not supported by any evidence. In the present case, it appears that no documentary evidence, such as rent receipts or lease agreement, was produced by the plaintiff/opposite party, nor was any oral evidence led to substantiate the claim of tenancy or personal necessity. 15. It is also pertinent to note procedural aspect of section 14(4) of the BBC Act are meant to advance the cause of justice and not to frustrate it, and that Courts should ordinarily lean in favour of deciding matters on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice on technical grounds. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, was required to adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach while passing the impugned order. Position of law is well settled that courts should ordinarily lean in favour of adjudication on merits rather than dismissal on technicalities."
The High Court drew on the legal principle laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Aroush Motors, reported in 2025 INSC 1202, which held: “The object of the procedural rules is to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it and when the rigid adherence to technicalities of procedure causes injustice, courts have to come to the rescue by adopting a liberal approach. The courts cannot countenance a situation where substantial justice is sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity. Where substantial justice is at stake, technicalities must give way to ensure that the litigant is afforded sufficient opportunity to defend. The present controversy must be tested on the said principle.”
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