Traffic Manager on contract, the petitioner entitled to all consequential benefits, termination order unsustainable in law: Justice Dr Anshuman

In Santosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman delivered a 11-page long judgement dated April 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order is stigmatic in nature and has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, subject to the outcome of any fresh decision taken by the respondents after due process." 

The five other respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar, Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Bihar State Road Corporation, Patna through its Managing Director, Phulwarisharif, Patna, Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna and Regional Manager, Bihar State Road Transportation, Gaya. 

The writ petition has been filed for quashing Letter No. 570 dated 19.02.2024 issued by Respondent No. 5, namely the Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, whereby the contractual engagement of the petitioner was terminated on the ground of alleged unauthorized absence from duty with effect from December 15, 2023. The petitioner had prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities to reinstate him on his post, as he remained willing and available to discharge his duties during the subsistence of the contractual period. The petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Traffic Manager on a contractual basis for a period of one year issued by the Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, pursuant to an advertisement issued by the Corporation. Prior thereto, an offer of appointment was issued by letter dated October 23, 2018, requiring the petitioner to execute a bond and submit an acceptance letter. The petitioner duly complied with the said requirements and joined his duties, which was formally accepted by Memo dated November 16, 2018. It was submitted that the petitioner continuously discharged his duties satisfactorily and no complaint was ever made against him. His contractual engagement was extended from time to time through various orders. Subsequently, by letter dated September 1, 2021, he was transferred from the post of Depot Superintendent to the Head Office, Patna. Thereafter, he was again transferred to Aurangabad Depot, where he assumed charge as Depot Superintendent and duly joined on June 17, 2022. During his posting at Aurangabad, the petitioner repeatedly requested the Regional Manager, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Gaya, through letters dated 16.05.2023, 18.06.2023, 01.07.2023, 29.08.2023, and 16.11.2023, to conduct physical verification of the store and accounts, apprehending possible manipulation by certain staff members. However, no such verification was undertaken despite repeated requests. It was further submitted that the petitioner sustained a fracture in his leg and, accordingly, submitted a leave application dated 10.10.2023 seeking leave from 12.10.2023 to 18.10.2023. Subsequently, vide letter dated 14.12.2023, the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, BSRTC, Patna directed all Regional Managers/Assistant Regional Managers (Accounts) to conduct physical verification of stores and accounts twice a month and submit reports, warning of strict administrative action in case of irregularities. Pursuant thereto, the Regional Manager, BSRTC, Gaya conducted verification at Aurangabad Depot and alleged financial irregularities amounting to Rs. 4,00,140/-. Consequently, an FIR bearing Town P.S. Case No. 896 of 2023 dated 15.12.2023 was lodged against the petitioner and one Rajeev Raj, an outsourced cashier.

The senior counsel submitted that the allegations were wholly misconceived. It was contended that the responsibility for maintaining cash, making entries in the account register, and depositing cash in the bank lies solely with the cashier, and not with the Depot Superintendent. The petitioner had no role in the alleged misappropriation. It was further submitted that by letter ated 15.12.2023, the petitioner was directed to stop work at Aurangabad Depot during the pendency of the enquiry and remain present at the headquarters. Thus, the allegation of unauthorized absence from 15.12.2023 is factually incorrect, as the petitioner was complying with official directions. However, without conducting any enquiry and without issuing any show cause notice, the respondent authority abruptly terminated the petitioner’s contract vide Memo dated 19.02.2024 on the ground of absence. It was submitted that such termination is arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice, and was serious civil consequences. The petitioner’s contractual tenure was valid up to 5.05.2024, and at the time of termination, the contract was still subsisting. 

The senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner had already been granted bail by the High Court vide order dated 13.05.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 24489 of 2024, with a direction to deposit Rs. 2,00,000/- in installments, which has been duly complied with. In such a backdrop, it was submitted that the impugned order was liable to be set aside, and the petitioner deserved to be reinstated to the post of Traffic Manager, as the post was still vacant.

To substantiate his submissions, senior counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Swati Pridarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2024) 19 SCC 128. He relied upon the judgment rendered in Bhola Nath vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95, wherein the Supreme Court held that the State, being a “model employer”, cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by continuing them on a purely contractual basis for an indefinite period so as to evade its obligations of regular employment. It was also held that abrupt discontinuation of long-serving employees merely on the ground of contractual nomenclature, and that too without a reasoned or speaking order, was manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

Justice Dr Anshuman observed that the impugned order was "passed without adherence to the principles of natural justice, is unsustainable in law."

Construction of a Pacca road over raiyati lands of petitioner cannot be permitted without consent of petitioner: Justice Sourendra Pandey

In Radha Raman Lal vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Madhubani & Ors. (2026), Justice Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated April 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"14. The petitioner is only aggrieved by the fact of construction of a pacca (concrete) road constructed on his land by government funds and it is the said issue which needs to be adjudicated....the construction of a Pacca road over the raiyati lands of the petitioner cannot be permitted, if the same has been done without any consent and willingness by the petitioner and the same needs to be demolished. 16. The District Magistrate, Madhubani is directed that he shall ensure that the concrete construction made on the land of the petitioner is demolished within a period of one month from the date of production/communication of this order. The state shall be at liberty to recover the amount used in such construction of road from the erring persons after fixing the liability. 17. The writ application is allowed."

Justice Pandey considered two issues which required adjudication in the writ application. One was as to whether government funds can be used to construct a P.C.C. Road over a Raiyati land? The other, whether a right of easement granted by the petitioner through a Panchnama can be withdrawn subsequently by getting the P.C.C. road demolished? 

The nine other respondents were:2. Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani, 3. Circle officer (C.O.) Block Bishfi, Madhubani, 4. Blok Development Officer, Block Bishfi, Madhubani, 5. LOk Shikayat Nivaran Padadhikari, Benipatti, Madhubani, 6. Superintendent of Police (S.P.), Madhubani, 7. Mukihya, Dilip Kumar Safi, Panchayat Singhia Purvi, Block Bisfi, Madhubani, 8. Binay Kumar Jha, 9. Yoganand Jha and 10. Abhilashanand Jha. 

The writ application prayed for protecting the interest of the petitioner by directing the respondents to remove the illegal construction of road from the private/khatiyani land of the petitioner; for directing the respondents to remove the illegal construction of the road which was constructed in connivance with the authorities without acquiring the land and also without taking consent from the petitioner;for directing the respondents to take action against the encroachers/respondents as per law and for any other consequential relief or reliefs for which the petitioner is found entitled during the course of hearing of this writ petition.

The facts which gave rise to the writ application was that the petitioner was the owner of the land namely 8732 (old) 15521, 16335 (new) situated at Itharwa, Block Bisfi, Madhubani and is in possession of the same however the private respondent in connivance with Ward Commissioner/Zila Parshad has constructed a P.C.C. road on the Raiyati land of the petitioner without taking any consent/acquisition of land by the Government, which was exclusively for the personal use of the private respondent.

The senior counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner acquired the land through Bandobasti and is paying rent to the government, which also found mention in Khatiyan. It was submitted that upon several representations filed by the son of the petitioner before officer-in-charge, Bishfi P.S., before Lok Shikayat Nivaran Padadhikari, Benipatti Sub-Division, Madhubani and also before Janta Darbar of the Chief Minister, who, thereafter, directed Circle Officer to send Government appointed Amin to measure the land, who submitted the report which was found in favour of the petitioner. It was also submitted that Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani directed the Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani to provide possession of land to the petitioner, who did not take action for the same and upon inquiry stated that he is seeking legal opinion of ADC, Madhubani. It was further submitted that District Magistrate, Madhubani instructed the Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani to comply with the same whereafter the said Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani fixed specific date for the petitioner to be present at site, so that encroachment be removed and possession be given but the Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani, himself, did not turn up.

Subsequently, Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani failed to provide any information and allegedly the land was encroached by respondents for giving benefit to one person and more so, no objection signature has fraudulently been taken from Binay Kumar Jha (private respondent) and he has also presented false facts before SDM Court.

It was submitted through the rejoinder that the construction took place on February 6-7, 2021 and an application was submitted with wrong Panchnama on October 29, 2021. The Panchnama itself suffered from a number of infirmities which cannot be legally acceptable. It was submitted that the petitioner acquired the land legally and was paying rent to the Government of Bihar. It was also submitted that no subsequent mention about use of land for transport was ever mentioned by respondents. The senior counsel submitted that since the land was not closed, the same was being used by people as a passage but that does not give right to the Mukhiya to use government funds to construct a concrete road over the same. The senior counsel prayed that the illegal construction of P.C.C. road be demolished.

On behalf of Respondent No. 1 to 3, the G.P.-18 submitted that the petition was barred by principle of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. It was submitted that the land appertaining to Khata No. 801 was recorded as Gairmajarua Khaas under cadastral survey and was not a raiyati land as claimed by the petitioner and the land was being used as passage for time immemorial and thus no consent was required for construction of P.C.C. road. It was submitted that Binay kumar Jha and Yoganand Jha had filed an application before Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani on October 29, .2021, wherein, they had produced a copy of panchnama dated January 8, 1979 stating that petitioner had admitted the passage for ingress and outgress and allowed the land to be used as road. It was submitted that petitioner had never acquired land from an ex-landlord or from the State and rent receipt did not create or extinguish the title. It was also submitted that in C.S, Khatiyan land was entered as Gairmajarua Khaas while in revisional survey Records of Rights, land is mentioned as raiyati land and no NOC was obtained from Circle Officer, Bishfi,
Madhubani hence direction was sought from Additional Collector for vacating the land in question. It was lastly submitted that upon question being posed on Circle Officer as to why the direction of Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani was not complied it was stated that the same could not be done on account of non availability of police force. The State relied on the panchanama dated January 8, 1979, whereby the petitioner was allowed passage and earlier Kharanja road was constructed and later P.C.C. road was constructed over the same. 

The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Madhubani, Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani and Circle officer (C.O.) Block Bishfi, Madhubani were was respodent no.s 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 

The counsel representing Binay Kumar Jha, the respondent No. 8 submitted that the petitioner tried to mislead the High Court by stating that the passage was his personal land however the same was being used for more than 40 years as Rasta, which the petitioner had himself permitted to the father of the answering respondent. It was submitted that with the efflux of time the said land being permitted to be used as Rasta (Passage) created a right of easement and therefore the same cannot be disturbed only because a P.C.C. road was constructed upon the same. He emphatically asserted that once the petitioner allowed the passage to be used for others the right of easement accrued to the respondents and as there was a Khranja road existing on the said land the same was converted into a concrete road and therefore there was no new change to the usage of the land and hence the writ petition is fit to be dismissed.

Justice Pandey noted that the land in question was a Raiyati land of the petitioner, which was not denied though the State has raised a vague question as to how a Gair Majarua Khas entry was converted into a Raiyati land. The ownership and possession of the petitioner was not denied and in fact the same was admitted, if the Panchnama is taken into consideration. The land being Raiyati Land and if there is no ‘No Objection’ from the petitioner granting permission to construct a Concrete road, government funds could not have been used for such construction. Such construction of road using raiyati lands of people are permissible only when the persons agree and willingly give their no objection for such construction. Hence, the construction of a road on such land is not permitted and was rightly directed to be removed.

With regard to the right of easement raised by the private respondent no. 8 on the basis of some Panchnama said to be executed way back in 1979, Justice Pandey observed that it "can be answered simply that the right of easement is enforceable and if the respondent no. 8 is aggrieved by any such action of the petitioner of denying him the right of passage as decided in the year 1979 then he can move a competent court of civil jurisdiction and claim his right. From the prayers made in this writ petition and also the pleadings this writ petition has not been filed to decide the rights of the parties and claim and counter claims with respect to the land in question and the same cannot also be decided in a writ jurisdiction hence the arguments being raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 cannot be looked into in the present proceedings, which is not even dealing with the said issue." 

Notably, under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, no person can be deprived of their property except by authority of law. The oral consent from a landholder is insufficient to permit road construction over private land. For any permanent road construction, the land must be acquired by the procedure prescribed in law, with compensation paid. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State cannot deprive a citizen on his property without sanction of law. The right to property as a constitutional and human right. No person can be deprived of his property without due procedure of law. The property can only be acquired for public purpose on payment of reasonable compensation in accordance with law. It has been held in Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh; (2020) 2 SCC 569, D.B. Basnett vs. Collector East District, Gangtok Sikkim and another; (2020), Sukh Dutt Ratra vs. State of H.P.; (2022), Kukreja Construction Co. vs. State of Maharashtra; (2024) and Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. State of Karnataka; (2025). 

In the case of Vidya Devi case, it has been held as follows: “12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution." 

In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chennai; (2005) 7 SCC 627, wherein this Court held that: “6. ... Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy; (2008) 15 SCC 517, this Court held that: “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.”
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors.; (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379, para 30)
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat; (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596 this Court held as follows: “48. ...In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession Under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the Rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. v. M.I.D.C. and Ors.; (2013) 1 SCC 353 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the Rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if
the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. v. M.I.D.C. and Ors.; (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: (SCC p. 359 para 11)
“11.There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, Under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”

Supreme Court has underlined that the State being a welfare State cannot be permitted to take a plea of adverse possession. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizen. 

Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) reconstituted with 12 members with Justice B.V. Nagarathna as its Chairperson

An Office Order dated April 30, 2026 issued by Kuntal Sharma Pathak, Registrar (J), Court & Building, Supreme Court's Administration General  Branch, in exercise of powers conferred by Clause 4(2) of the Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Regulations, 2013 states that Justice Surya Kant, the Chief Justice of India has re-constituted a 12-member,  Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) with effect from May 1, 2026. These Regulations came into force on July 17, 2013 in the backdrop of enactment of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 after it was assented by the President of India and publication in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, on April 23, 2013 and the framing of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, the Union Government made the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 29 of the Act which was published in the Gazette of India on December 9, 2013. 

The composition of the ICC is as under:-
1. Justice B.V. Nagarathna Chairperson
2. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Member
3. Ms. Kaveri, Registrar (J) [Officer in service of the Supreme Court of India], Member Secretary
4. Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate, Senior Member,  Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(b)], Member 
5. Ms. Nina Gupta, Advocate, Senior Member, Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(b)], Member
6. Mr. Soumyajit Pani, Advocate, Representative, Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(c)] ,Member
7. Ms. Sakshi Banga, Advocate, Representative, Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(c)], Member
8. Ms. Prabha Swami, Advocate-on-record, Representative, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association under Clause 4 (2)(d)], Member
9. Mrs. Sushma Rawat, Representative, Supreme Court Bar Clerks Association under Clause 4(2)(e)],
Member
10. Ms. Sneh Sharma, Founder, Vividhta Consulting, Nominee, Chief Justice of India under Clause 4 (2)(f)], Member
11. Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Advocate, Nominee, Chief Justice of India under Clause 4(2)(h)], Member and 
12. Ms. Maheravish Rein, Advocate, Nominee, Chief Justice of India under Clause 4(2)(h)], Member

Prior to this, there 11 members including Dr. Leni Chaudhuri, Executive Director, University of Chicago Centre in India Pvt. Ltd., the nominee of the Chief Justice of India and Bansuri Swaraj, Senior Advocate who are not there in the reconstituted committee.   

Earlier too, the ICC was chaired by Justice B.V. Nagarathna. But its Member Secretary was Sujata Singh, Registrar, [Officer in service of the Supreme Court of India]. Its nine members included: Justice  Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate, Nina Gupta, Advocate, Soumyajit Pani, Advocate, Sakshi Banga, Prabha Swami, Advocate-on-record, Bansuri Swaraj, Senior Advocate, Liz Mathew, Senior Advocate and Dr. Leni Chaudhuri, Executive Director, University of Chicago Centre in India Pvt. Ltd., the nominee of the Chief Justice of India. Prior to this Justice Nagarathna was made the Chairperson, GSICC by order dated September 18, 2024 of Chief Justice of India. Prior to Justice Nagarathna, Justice Hima Kohli was the Chairperson of the GSICC. 

Notably, a circular dated February 14, 2014 issued by Rachna Gupta, Registrar, Supreme Court had communicated that the first meeting of Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) headed by Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai was held in the Supreme Court's premises on December 9, 2013 to workout the modalities for the effective implementation of the "The Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013" and to take decision on related issues. In pursuance of the direction and with a view to sensitize the public to gender issues, it had informed that "The aggrieved women as defined in clause 2(a) of the Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013 may make a complaint in writing of sexual harassment at Supreme Court of India precincts to the GSICC through its Member Secretary - Ms. Rachna Gupta, Registrar. The contact details are:-Room No. First Floor (East wing), near Cash & Account-I Registry of Supreme Court of India Phone No. 011- 23381581, E-mail gupta.rachna@indianjudiciary.gov.in The Complaint shall be sent either by registered post, courier, speed
post or e-mail. It can also be handed over personally at the above said address. As required by Regulation 16 of the Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Womeri.at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013, the confidentiality of the inquiry proceedings shall be maintained."

The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, aiming to provide a safe and secure working environment for women across all sectors was assented by the President of India and published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, on April 23, 2013. The Act covers all women, irrespective of age or employment status and extends its protection to both public and private sector workplaces, organized or unorganized, including domestic workers. The Act, 2013 is designed to be inclusive, intersectional and sector-agnostic. The interpretation of following key definitions enshrined in the Act, 2013 provides that the Act is unequivocally applicable to all women, irrespective of sector, employment status or nature of work. Its Hindi version is available here.

In Jaya Kodate v. Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University (2013), the Bombay High Court has held that “the definition of workplace is inclusive and deliberately kept wide by the Parliament to ensure that any area where women may be subjected to Sexual Harassment is not left unattended or unprovoked for."

Section 2(a) of the Act defines aggrieved woman  as any woman, of any age, whether employed or not, who alleges she has been subjected to sexual harassment at the workplace. This broad definition ensures that any woman present at a workplace regardless of her role is covered under the ambit of the Act. It also demonstrates the legislature's intention to provide statutory protection irrespective of her employment status.​

Section 2(f)- Definition of employee  includes persons employed on regular, temporary, ad hoc, or daily wage basis, either directly or through an agent, including volunteers or trainees. This includes contractual workers, apprentices, trainees, consultants and even unpaid interns. The definition ensures that economic dependency on the employer/ in-charge/ owner of a workplace is not a precondition for protection.

Section 2(g) of the Act defines employer as

1. in relation to any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit of the appropriate Government or a local authority, the head of that department, organisation, undertaking, establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit or such other officer as the appropriate Government or the local authority, as the case may be, may by an order specify in this behalf;
2. in any workplace not covered under sub-clause (i), any person responsible for the management, supervision and control of the workplace. (Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause “management” includes the person or board or committee responsible for formulation and administration of polices for such organisation);
3. in relation to workplace covered under sub-clauses (i) and (ii), the person discharging contractual obligations with respect to his or her employees;
4. in relation to a dwelling place or house, a person or a household who employs or benefits from the employment of domestic worker, irrespective of the number, time period or type of such worker employed, or the nature of the employment or activities performed by the domestic worker.

Under Section 2(o), the term workplace  is expansively defined to include government bodies, private sector organizations, non-governmental organizations and institutions carrying out commercial, professional, vocational, educational, entertainment, industrial, health services or financial activities. Accordingly, the Act applies to formal and informal sectors, organized and unorganized settings, and public and private spaces. It also covers home-based workers, field staff and women in transit for work purposes. 

Notably, the Internal Complaints Committee is an in-house redress mechanism to inquire into alleged complaints of sexual harassment in the institutions /organisations. Section 4 of the Act mandates that every employer of a workplace shall, by an order in writing, constitute a Committee to be known as the “Internal Complaints Committee”: and where the offices or administrative units of the workplace are located at different places or divisional or sub-divisional level, the Internal Committee shall be constituted at all administrative units or offices. The Internal Committees shall consist of the following members to be nominated by the employer, namely: —a Presiding Officer who shall be a woman employed at a senior level at workplace from amongst the employees, not less than two Members from amongst employees preferably committed to the cause of women or who have had experience in social work or have legal knowledge;one member from amongst non-governmental organizations or associations committed to the cause of women or a person familiar with the issues relating to sexual harassment: at least one-half of the total Members shall be women.

Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of Patna High Court 

Patna High Court has Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee which comprises of the Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Soni Shrivastava. Notably, the contact person for Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee, Patna High Court is Registrar, Establishment, Patna High Court who can contacted at sankalpvahini@nic.in 

Unlike the Supreme Court, which has 12 members, the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of Patna High Court has four members including Justice Soni Shrivastava, as the Chairperson. Its members are Rachna Shrivastava, Additional Registrar, Juvenile Justice Secretariat, Patna High Court, Surya Nilambari,  Advocate Patna High Court and Swapna, Deputy Registrar, Patna High Court.  

The Annual Reports of the High Court's Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee and the ICC do appear to be in public domain. 

The relevant judgments on the issue include: Punjab and Sind Bank & Ors. vs Mrs. Durgesh Kuwar 2020 SCC OnLine SC 774,  Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors. vs Uoi & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 311 delivered on October 19 2012, D.S. Garewal vs. Vimmi Joshi (2009) 2 SCC 210, Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A. K. Chopra AIR 1999 SC 625/1999(1) SCC 759 delivered on January 20, 1999 and Vishaka & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3011.   

In Dr Sohail Malik v Union of India (2025) 2025 INSC 1415, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi delivered a 54-page long judgement dated December 10, 2025 wherein, it held that "The phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act, cannot be interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against a ‘respondent’ may only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’; (ii) Such a restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act will run contrary to the scheme of the Act, specifically in light of the all-encompassing and wide definition which has been given to the term ‘workplace’ in Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, particularly in light of Section 2(o)(v) which expands the scope of ‘workplace’ to include any place visited by the employee ‘arising out of or during the course of employment’; (iii) Under Section 13 of the POSH Act, the recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to the ‘employer’ which shall then take a decision with respect to initiation of disciplinary action....(iv) In case the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace is conducting a fact-finding inquiry under the POSH Act, the employer of the ‘respondent’, even if it is a different department, must abide its duties under Section 19(f) of the POSH Act to swiftly cooperate and make available information upon a request by the ICC of the aggrieved woman’s workplace." Thejudgement was uathored by Justice Maheshwari. 

Also read: Supreme Court Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) reconstituted, reference to complaints omitted from GSICC Annual Report since 2022 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava suspend sentence, order release of appellant on bail during pendency of appeal on his personal bond

In Ranjit Kumar Jha @ Ranjit Jha vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava passed a 8-page long order dated April 29, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"....we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail during pendency of the appeal on his personal bond forthwith to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Samastipur in connection with Sessions Trial No. 17/2006/143/2006 arising out of Musarigharari P.S. Case No. 120 of 2000. 12. Fine, if any, imposed as part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 13. List this matter for further consideration on 14th May, 2026 at the top of the list." Justice Prasad has authored the order. 

The order reads: "8. It is evident on a bare reading of the affidavit of I.G., Prison, Bihar, Patna that the proposal sent by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur remained pending in the office of the Remission Board for more than 11 months. There is no explanation for this inaction. 9. We would like to know that who is responsible for keeping aside the proposal and not placing the same before the Remission Board for eleven months. How many applications are presently pending with the date of their pendency be placed before this Court.' 

Theorder reads: "10. We also call upon the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur as well as the I.G., Prison, Bihar, Patna to file their respective affidavits to show cause as to why this Court should not exercise its suo motu power as a Constitutional Court to award appropriate compensation to the appellant for his sufferings because of non-consideration of his case for grant of remission immediately after he became eligible for the same on completion of 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission and, in case, this Court comes to a conclusion that an appropriate amount of compensation is required to be given to the appellant, why such amount be not realised from the erring officials so that the Government Exchequer who is the custodian of the public money be not saddled with the burden of paying cost and compensation as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court in catena of judgments." 

In the appeal, the court considered the prayer of the appellant for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal. The appellant was convicted vide judgment dated October 29, 2009 and sentenced vide order dated November 6, 2009 by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Samastipur in connection with a Sessions Trial of 2006 which arose out of Musarigharari P.S. Case of 2000 for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1-B)a/27 of the Arms Act. He was ordered to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 

The court recollected its previous order dated April 17, 2026. It observed: "we are not required to examine the case of the appellant on merit for purpose of suspension of sentence and his release on bail during pendency of the appeal. It is an appeal in which the appellant being a poor person coming from lower strata of the society could not prefer an appeal for 16 years 2 months. Ultimately, with the legal assistance provided by the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee, the present appeal has been preferred. The order dated 17.04.2026 would throw some light on the facts and circumstances under which this appeal has been preferred." 

On April 29,, the court went through the affidavit filed on behalf of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur. In paragraph ‘6’ of his affidavit, it is stated: “6. That after completion of 20 years of life sentence, his proposal for premature release has been sent to Prison Head Quarter for consideration by State Sentence Remission Board vide Letter No-4126, dated-05-05-2025 by the office of S.K.R.B Central Jail Muzaffarpur, which however, is possible to be considered in next meeting by the Remission Board.” 

Justice Prasad observed: "6. It is evident from the statement made by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur that he has not clearly stated about the completion of 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission which is the condition required to be fulfilled for purpose of sending the case of a convict to the State Sentence Remission Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Remission Board”). We call upon him to make a clear statement as to when did the appellant complete 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission. 7. The I.G., Prison, Government of Bihar has filed an affidavit from which it is crystal clear that only after this Court passed its order on 17.04.2026, the Remission Board got awaken from slumber and the file of this appellant was moved in a hurry." 

The order reproduced paragraphs ‘10’ and ‘11’ of the affidavit by the I.G. Prison, wherein he stated: “10. That the proposal of the appellant for pre-mature release was put before the remission board in its meeting dated 21.04.2026. 11. That the Bihar State Sentence Remission Board in its meeting dated 21.04.2026 considered the proposal of the appellant and after due consideration sent their remarks to the competent authority for his decision and approval.”

Supreme Court stays execution of death sentence of appellants confirmed by Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sourendra Pandey

In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 13-page long judgement dated April 27, 2026, wherein, it wrote: "4. The execution of the death sentence of the appellant(s) shall remain stayed pending the hearing and final disposal of the present appeal(s). 5. The original record of the case be summoned from the Trial Court and the High Court. A copy of the translated record shall be supplied to the counsel for the parties."The order was passed upon hearing the proceedings which arose from the 67-page long judgment and order dated January 22, 2026 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference No.2/2024 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.691 of 2024. The matter will come up for hearing after twenty weeks. The case to High Court from the District Court, Rohtas.  

In the High Court, Ansul, senior counsel who had represented the informant had submitted that the records  showed that the Investigating Officer had not acted fairly and had created a mess by deliberately omitting to do what ought to have been done. It was submitted that the accused persons/defence cannot be allowed to take benefit of such acts or omissions of the prosecution which seem to have been deliberately done to favour the accused persons, otherwise it would amount to give premium to the accused for the wrongs of the prosecution which in the present case was apparently committed designedly to favour the appellants.  The senior counsel had relied upon paragraph 13 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the  Ram Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (1998) 4 SCC 517 and Harendra Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in (2023) 13 SCC 563,wherein, the Supreme Court had held that the three main stakeholders in a criminal trial, namely, the Investigating Officer, Public Prosecutor, and the Judiciary, all utterly failed to keep up their respective duties and responsibilities cast upon them. The Supreme Court had taken note of the subsequent conduct of the accused and had drawn adverse inference. The  Supreme Court had taken judicial notice of the judgment in the habeas corpus petition regarding conduct of the accused, the investigating agency, the Public Prosecutor and the Presiding Officer conducting the trial. 

The High Court was persuaded my the senior counsel's arguments, but the Supreme Court does appear to be persuaded. 

The order dated April 27 reads: "14. The Registry shall forthwith communicate this order to all the High Courts through their respective Registrar Generals; Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority; and Member Secretaries of Legal Services Authorities of all the States and Union Territories for necessary compliance."

The Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench referred to its earlier 122 page long judgement dated May 20, 2022 in Manoj & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1 (2023) 2 SCC 353, by the Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela. M. Trivedi wherein, it stated that the Court in the context of death reference cases, has underscored that while reformation is a foundational goal of criminal punishment, repeatedly affirmed in its jurisprudence, the absence of a structured and measurable framework, coupled with the inadequate implementation of meaningful prison reforms, has significantly hampered the system’s ability to achieve genuine rehabilitation. The judgment was authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat. 

The Court proposed the formulation of practical guidelines to aid courts in systematically collecting and evaluating mitigating circumstances, moving beyond vague considerations such as general conduct or family background, and thereby enabling a more informed assessment of an accused’s potential for reformation, while also serving as a precursor to a comprehensive legislative framework. Crucially, the Court emphasized that it is incumbent upon trial Courts to consider such mitigating circumstances at the earliest possible stage of proceedings in cases involving a potential death sentence, so as to ensure a balanced sentencing approach and to avoid slipping into a purely retributive response driven by the brutality of the crime, an outcome that the Court observed has become increasingly common by the time such matters reach the appellate stage.

The 3-Judge Bench observed :".....we are constrained to take note of a troubling trend being presented in multiple cases wherein reports on mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not being called for at the earliest stages of proceedings in a case involving a potential death sentence, namely, at the stage of sentencing before the trial Court or even at the stage of the reference for confirmation before the High Court. This omission creates a piquant situation in which such crucial material is, for the first time, sought only at the stage of appeal before this Court, thereby causing a long gap and avoidable delay in the collection of information essential for a proper, timely and informed determination on the question of sentence. Delayed consideration of these factors undermines the very objective of a balanced sentencing process and impedes the meaningful application of reformative principles."

It added: "12. It is also necessary to note that in a significant number of cases involving a potential death sentence, the quality of defence afforded to the accused remains inadequate, resulting in ineffective legal representation at crucial stages of the proceedings. Such deficiencies are often reflected in lackadaisical investigation and slackness in trial proceedings. There is hardly any attempt to collect data relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, thereby depriving the Courts of a complete and balanced perspective necessary for a just determination and imposition of sentence. The absence of competent and effective prosecution and defence not only undermines the fairness of the process but also increases the risk of a disproportionate, unjust, and uninformed sentencing outcome. This state of affairs renders it expedient to strengthen the legal aid framework in such cases, by ensuring the provision of skilled and adequately resourced legal representation, so that the accused is effectively assisted and the Court is meaningfully aided in discharging its functions in accordance with constitutional principles. 13. In wake of the above discussion and the concerns noted in the preceding paras particularly in relation to the ineffective consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the need to ensure meaningful legal representation in cases involving a potential death sentence, the following directions are being issued: - A. The report pertaining to aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall, as a matter of course, be called for by the trial Court itself once the accused is convicted, prior to the determination of sentence.
B. In the event such a report has not been called for or placed on record before the trial Court, the High Court shall mandatorily call for the same at the stage of admission of the death reference.
C. The concerned authorities shall ensure that such reports are comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated timeframe so as to avoid any delay in the adjudicatory process, and to aid and enable the Courts to undertake a meaningful, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing exercise. Upon receipt of such report, the Court concerned shall afford adequate opportunity to the parties to peruse the same and to advance oral submissions thereon. In cases where the reports procured by the trial Court are found to be ineffective or lacking in proper details, the High Court would be at liberty to call for a fresh report.
D. In every death sentence confirmation reference brought before the High Courts and this Court, the Legal Services Committee concerned shall assign a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two advocates having a minimum of 7 years practice, to represent the convicted person. Such
representation shall be provided irrespective of whether the convict has engaged private counsel, so as to ensure full and effective assistance to the Court in matters involving death penalty, which necessitate a careful balancing of the interests of justice, societal concerns, and the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation. The appointed legal team shall be furnished with the complete case records and afforded adequate time to prepare, conduct research, and present a comprehensive assessment of mitigating circumstances. The legal aid team so appointed shall work in cohesion with the representing private counsel, if any.
E. Each High Court, under the aegis of the High Court Legal Services Committee, shall constitute and maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters.
F. The National Legal Services Authority shall frame and circulate appropriate guidelines identifying the relevant fields of enquiry for gathering mitigating circumstances and may engage trained teams, including legal and social science professionals, to undertake fieldwork involving interaction with the convict, their family, and relevant authorities, for the purpose of collecting detailed information regarding background, antecedents, socio-economic conditions, mental health status, and other relevant factors. Such information shall be made available to the appointed legal team, which shall, in turn, place before the Court a holistic and well-documented account of the convict’s potential for reformation along with all pertinent mitigating and aggravating circumstances to assist in a just and informed determination of sentence."

In view of the orders passed by the Supreme  Court in matters involving capital punishment, the 3-Judge Bench issued the following directions: a. The respondent-State of Bihar shall place before this Court the report(s) of all the Probation Officers relating to the appellant(s) within a period of sixteen (16) weeks. 
b. The Superintendent of Prison, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall submit a report with regard to the nature of work which have been performed by the appellant(s) while in jail and a report with regard to the conduct and behaviour of the appellant(s) while in jail within a period of sixteen (16) weeks. 
c. The Superintendent of Prison, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall also get done the psychological evaluation of the appellant(s) from the Government Medical Hospital. The report of the evaluation shall be submitted to this
Court through the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar within a period of period of sixteen (16) weeks.
d. Ms. Devika Rawat, Associate (Mitigation) and Ms. Sana Vohra, Associated with the Square Circle Clinic, NALSAR University of Law, are permitted to have access to the appellant(s) –Aman Singh and Sonal Singh respectively, who are presently lodged in Buxar Jail, Bihar, to conduct multiple in-person interviews for the purpose of collecting information relevant to sentencing and to submit a Mitigation Investigation Report on behalf of the appellant(s) through the appellants’ Advocate-on-Record within twenty (20) weeks. 
e. The Superintendent, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall ensure that, for the sake of confidentiality, these interviews shall be conducted in a separate interviewing space without any prison official or police staff being within
earshot distance, and audio recorders be permitted to be used to record the interviews.
f. The person(s) nominated by Ms. Devika Rawat and Ms. Sana Vohra are permitted to accompany them to translate during the interview. 
g. Ms. Devika Rawat and Ms. Sana Vohra are granted permission to obtain documents pertaining to the appellant(s), including but not limited to medical records, jail conduct, certificates of any educational, vocational or employment opportunities undertaken, etc. that the appellant(s) may wish to submit for the purpose of sentencing information.
7. The Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the Standing Counsel for the State
of Bihar, who shall, in turn, ensure that the order is communicated to the relevant authorities for compliance. The Registry shall, in addition, send a due intimation to all the concerned authorities immediately for compliance.
8. All the reports shall be duly compiled and placed before this Court on the next date of hearing. 

Also read:Division Bench led by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad confirms death sentence in a case from Rohtas, Justice Sourendra Pandey authors concurring opinion, two accused persons still absconding 

Patn High Court orders impleadment of District Magistrate, Rohtas, directs "status quo" with reard to orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas

In the case Shashi Shankar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Anr. (2026), Justice Ajit Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated April 27, 2026. The order reads: "Issue notice to the respondent no.2 under both processes i.e. registered cover with A/D as well as ordinary process, for which requisites etc. must be filed within two weeks. Two weeks’ time is granted to the respondents to file counter affidavit. 4. List this case on 12.05.2026. 5. In the meantime, status quo as on today shall be maintained." The Court's direction regarding addition of the District Magistrate, Rohtas at Sasaram as respondent no.3 was complied with during the course of day. The Respondents no. 2 is Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas.  The Tribunal is constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the primary law regulating road transport in India. 

The Court passed the order upon hearing the I.A.s praying for stay on the orders of the Tribunal, expunging the adverse remarks against the Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section and for urgent hearing of the case.

Meanwhile, on April 21, 2026, the Tribunal heard the Execution Case no. 01/2014, Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Sanjay Kumar Gupta, and passed an order wherein, it has shifted the penalty of Rs 10,000 from Collector, Rohtas to Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section.  The case was listed for hearing before the Tribunal on April 28, 2026.   

Notably, Section 165 of the Act lays down that the State Government, by notification in the official gazette, may constitute one or more Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Section 166 of the MV Act specifies that an application for compensation in case of accident may be made by the person who has sustained the injury, or the owner of the property, or, the agent duly authorised by the person injured, or, iv. Any or all Legal representatives of the deceased. 

Section 168 of the Act deals with the power of the Claims Tribunal to grant an award by determining the amount of just compensation which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or by any of them, as the case may be. Thus, a conjoint reading of Section 165, 166 and 168 clearly provides that in case of any accident, the person injured or his agent (in case of injury) or the legal representative of the deceased (in case of death) shall file an application under section 166 before the Claims Tribunal specifying all the facts and circumstances of the case and the Claims tribunal, after hearing the parties may pass an award determining the amount of just compensation in favour of the aggrieved person. Provided there is no legal fault at the hands of the driver or owner of the vehicle, in practical discourse the amount of compensation is always paid by the insurance company which is holding the Third Party Risk Insurance Policy of the Vehicle. 

Section 173 provides for the statutory right of appeal wherein the claimant/s can challenge the award passed by the Claims Tribunal by preferring an appeal before the concerned High Court within 90 days from the date of the passing of the award.

Section 174 of the Act, reads: "174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue. - Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue."

The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between the claimant or claimants on one side and the insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants.

Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate is be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Section 168 (3) of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal exercises powers under Section 47 and Order 21 Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Significantly, what is barred by Section 175 of  the M.V. Act, 1988, is the jurisdiction of Civil Court and not the procedure to be applied under Civil Procedure Code. 

Supreme Court sets aside Justice Purnendu Singh's indefensible order ridden with glaring infirmities, requests High Court's roster bench to decide the case afresh, within 1 month

In Anjani Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated April 202, 026, wherein, it condoned the delay, granted leave and allowed the appeal after taking note of the order dated October 9, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It concluded: "4. The impugned order speaks for itself. The infirmities are so obvious and glaring that the same neither warrants detailed exposition nor is there any necessity to issue notice to the respondents. 5. The impugned order being indefensible, is set aside. We request the roster Bench of the High Court to decide Criminal Miscellaneous No.60503 of 2024 afresh upon granting due opportunity of hearing to the parties and in accordance with law, as early as possible and, subject to its convenience, within a month from date of receipt of a copy of this order. 6. We keep all contentions on merits open for being urged by the parties before the roster Bench."

In the impugned 2-page long order dated October 10, 2025 in Anjani Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Singh had observed:"2. The present quashing application has been notified on “Urgent Mentioning” made on behalf of the petitioner. 3. In spite of repeated calls, no one has appeared on behalf of the parties. 4. I proceed to pass order on merit on the basis of materials available on the record. 5. The present quashing application has been filed for for following issues:-'For setting aside/quashing of cognizance order dated 18.12.2023 passed in complaint case No. (C)1252/2023 by Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate XIII, Saran whereby cognizance has been taken under Section 420/466/471 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code for complaint filed for alleged offence under Section 194, 420, 466, 468, 469, 471, 504 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code and all other consequential proceeding.' 6.The charge-sheet was submitted on 29.09.2020 and the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate XIII, Saran took cognizance under Section 420, 466, 471 and 120B of the IPC having found sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused persons. 7. This Court finds that the instant case is one of the cases in which the parties may exercise to settle their dispute amicably and the learned District Court may also give opportunity to them, so that they can settle their dispute outside the Court. 8. The present quashing application stands disposed of with the aforesaid liberty."

Supreme Court detected obvious and glaring infirmities in Justice Singh's order and requested the roster bench to hear the case afresh. 

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey upholds order transferring Ritlal Yadav from Adarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna to Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur

In Ritlal Rai @ Ritlal Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered as 35-page long judgement dated April 27, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"this Court is of the considered view that the impugned action has been taken strictly in accordance with law. The decision-making authority has been duly exercised by the competent officer, and the subsequent communication thereof cannot, in any manner, be construed as an impermissible delegation of power. The procedural safeguards mandated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India stand duly observed and no prejudice or infraction of the petitioner's rights is made out. The transfer of the petitioner, founded upon relevant material including administrative recommendations and security considerations, reflects a bona fide and reasoned exercise of statutory power. The contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner is devoid of substance and unsupported by the legal position. Hence, the petitioner has not made out a case so as to interfere with the impugned order and the contention of the learned counsel for the State is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of the given facts and circumstances of the present case. 42. Accordingly, in the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned order calls for no interference and stands affirmed in law. Consequently, the present criminal writ petition stands dismissed." 

The other five respondents were: Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar, Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, District Magistrate, Patna and Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna.

Ritlal Yadav, the petitioner had prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ/s, order/s, direction/s, quashing the order dated October 30, 2025 issued by the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna, purportedly in exercise of powers under Section 29(3) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 read with Rule 781(vii) of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012, whereby the earlier transfer order dated April 30, 2025, transferring the petitioner from Adarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna to Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur (Tritya Khand) was extended for a further period of six months, on the basis of the report/recommendation of the District Magistrate, Patna and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. The petitioner prayed for a writ in the nature of Mandamus, or any other appropriate writ/s, order/s, direction/s, commanding the respondents to declare the impugned order dated October 30, 2025 as illegal, void and non est in the eye of law, to restrain the Respondents from giving effect to or acting in furtherance of the impugned order dated October 30, 2025 and to hold and declare that the impugned order cannot operate or be given effect to, the same being in the teeth of the judicial order dated August 7, 2025 passed in a Special Case of 2018 by the District and Additional Sessions Judge-III cum Special Judge, M.P./M.L.A. Court, Patna and to direct the Respondents to lodge and keep the petitioner at Adarsh Central Jail, Beur, Patna, and not at Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur.

The judgement records that petitioner has multiple criminal cases pending against him, which includes 11 cases mentioned in para 22 of the writ petition, 25 cases as per entry register dated November 23, 2025 and 8 cases as per entry register dated February 10, 2020 and on the said aspect administrative decision was taken to transfer and the confidential report of Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna was quite evident in the light of the facts and circumstance of the case. 

The judgement reads: "The settled principle encapsulated in the Latin maxim delegatus non potest delegare that a delegate cannot further delegate-applies only where there is a transfer of decision-making authority. In the present case, no such transfer has occurred. The decision stood duly taken by the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna in exercise of his statutory powers. The Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region), Bihar, Patna has neither exercised independent discretion nor assumed any decision-making role, but has merely communicated the decision so taken. In these circumstances, the aforesaid maxim has no application. 37. A plain reading of the impugned order clearly
establishes that, upon due approval of the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, the order was communicated under the signature of the Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region), as is evident from Annexure-P/1. The impugned order is, in substance, a continuation of the earlier order of  incarceration in the said jail, pursuant to the petitioner's prior transfer vide Memo No. 3161 dated 30.04.2025, and has been issued only after obtaining the requisite approval of the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services. 38. Notably, no objection has been raised by the petitioner on the aspect of such approval. The impugned order also discloses the reasons necessitating the continuation of the earlier arrangement, founded upon the communications of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. In particular, reliance has been placed on the recommendation contained in Letter No. 2517/General dated 30.10.2025 of the District Magistrate, Patna, and Letter No. 14159/confidential dated 29.10.2025 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. The extension was necessitated on account of credible information regarding criminal conspiracy during the petitioner's stay in Model Central Jail, Beur, Patna. 39. A bare perusal of the relevant provisions makes it clear that the concerned authority has merely communicated the order upon obtaining due and requisite approval from the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna. The Assistant Inspector General, Prisons (Region), Bihar, Patna has not exercised any independent decision-making authority but has acted strictly in accordance with such approval, and the order bears his signature only by way of formal communication."

Justice Pandey observed: "It is, therefore, evident that the communication of the order cannot be equated with delegation of power, as sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Notably, the petitioner has not disputed the factum of prior approval by the Inspector General, Prisons and Correctional Services, Bihar, Patna."

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava set aside judgement by Exclusive Special Judge-II (NDPS), Muzaffarpur in a NDPS case from 2003

In Surendra Prasad vs. The Union of India through Custom Commissioner, Muzaffarpur (2026), Patna and Dilip Kumar Sah vs. The Union of India through DRI, Muzaffarpur (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 42-page long judgement dated April 2, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement of conviction dated June 27, 2024 and the order of sentencing dated July 1, 2024 delivered by Exclusive Special Judge-II (NDPS), Muzaffarpur. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The concluding paragraph of the judgement reads:"50. We observe that Panchnama (Exhibit ‘3’) in itself cannot be taken as a piece of evidence to prove the prosecution case. The contents of the Panchnama were required to be proved by the prosecution through cogent oral as well as documentary evidence. The prosecutor cannot be allowed to become a judge in his own case, therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to discharge their burden beyond all reasonable doubts. We have no iota of doubt that the accused persons in this case laid down sufficient foundation to create doubt in the prosecution story. 51. In result, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order are liable to be set aside and the appellants have made out a case for their acquittal giving them the benefit of doubt. The impugned judgment and order of the learned trial court are hereby set aside. 52. These appeals are allowed. 53. The appellants are in jail, therefore, they shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case." 

Both the appeals were preferred for setting aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence in a  in a NDPS Case of 2023 which arose out of DRI Case 2003. By the impugned judgment, the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act and were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen years years each with a fine of Rs.50,000/- each under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act.

The prosecution is that the complainant, who was an Intelligence Officer at Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Muzaffarpur, had alleged that on November 16, 2003 on the basis of specific information, he had intercepted one truck bearing Registration No. WB-25-2127 along with occupant of the truck, namely, Loki Rai and Dilip Kumar Sah at Chandani Chowk, Muzaffarpur. On search, in presence of independent witnesses, 28 bags or 56 packets of Ganja weighing 539 kgs (gross weight) or 525 kgs (Net Weight) was recovered from the truck which was concealed below the consignment of 64 bags of cattle feed. The recovered 525 kgs of Ganja and the Truck, which was used as mode of conveyance for transportation of Ganja, were seized under Section 42(c) of the NDPS Act. 

The 64 bags of cattle feed used for concealment of Ganja was also seized. It was also alleged that these accused persons in their voluntary statement tendered before the independent witnesses admitted their guilt as regards their conscious involvement in trafficking of Nepali Ganja. They also stated that the Ganja was loaded on the truck at Laxmipur, Raxaul, Bihar in their conscious knowledge by the person, namely, Surendra Ji of Durga Transport and Yugal Mistry near Sona Cinema, Raxaul and the Ganja was to be delivered at Fatuha to a person, namely, Ram Prawesh at Fatuha Danapur. They could not disclose the complete address of the said Ram Parwesh and stated that they had to park the vehicle near Kacchi Dargan at Fatuha and had to deliver Ganja to the agent of Ram Prawesh on the direction of Yugal Mistri. They also stated that they were carrying Ganja from Raxual to Fatuha consciously for transportation charges of Rs.15,000/-. These named accused persons were arrested and forwarded to judicial custody on November 17, 2003. 

It was further alleged that in course of follow up action, the accused Surendra Prasad was apprehended and subsequently arrested on November 18, 2003 and forwarded to judicial custody on November 19, 2003 for associating in trafficking of Ganja. It was also stated that the seized ganja was sent for chemical analysis to the Central Revenue Control Laboratory wherein it was reported by the Chemical Examiner, C.R.C.L. New Delhi, vide end F.N.-1/ND/R/2003-CLD-299(N)/24.11.2003 dated 24.11.2002 that the same is “Ganja” within the meaning of NDPS. It was stated that in course of inquiry/investigation conducted, the accusation against (i) Loki Rai and (ii) Dilip Kumar Sah, the accused persons, who were members of big smuggler syndicate operating from Nepal and indulged in smuggling of Nepali ganja into India, were fully established. Further from the statement of the accused Loki Rai, it appeared that the accused Surendra Prasad, was also involved in the case.

The trial court took cognizance of the offences under Sections 20, 23 and 25 of the NDPS Act agaisnt (1) Loki Rai, (2) Dilip Kumar Sah and (3) Surendra Prasad vide order dated February 27, 2004. Thereafter, vide order dated October 26, 2009, records of the accused Loki Rai was split off. Charges were read over and explained to the accused persons in Hindi to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, vide order dated September 12, 2012, charges were framed against (1) Dilip Kumar Sah and (2) Surendra Prasad under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c), 23 and 25 of the NDPS Act. In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as three witnesses and exhibited several documentary evidences.. Thereafter, the statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in which they denied the allegations and pleaded innocence.

The trial court held that the prosecution had proved the charge under Section 20(b)(ii)c of the NDPS Act
against these appellants beyond all reasonable doubts, however, prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 23 and 25 of the NDPS Act. Accordingly, the appellants were convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. 

The senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the case was registered by the DRI on the basis of a search and seizure based on a secret information which was said to have been received by Rajesh Kumar Shrivastav, an Intelligence officer of DRI, the complainant/informant (PW-2). However, there is no compliance with Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act, the very search and seizure procedure has not been conducted in accordance with law. The seizure list witnesses were not produced in course of trial. The Seizing Officer who prepared the test memo only on November 17, 2003 recorded that one sample was prepared on November 16, 2003 and the same was dispatched on November 17, 2003. The statements made in the panchnama that three samples were prepared of 50 gm each stood falsified from the test memo.

The report of the chemical examination was not duly tendered in evidence and the author of the documents did have not come in the doc. Even PW-2 did not tender it in accordance with law, therefore, the very admissibility of Exhibits ‘5’ and ‘6’ was doubtful.

It was also submitted that it would appear from the trial court’s records that on November 17, 2003, the arrest memo, seizure memo, panchnama, voluntary statement, fardbeyan were produced in the trial court. The two arrested accused were also produced who were taken into judicial custody. On that day the I.O. did not produce the samples, if any prepared by him. The I.O. did not produce the test memo (Exhibit ‘4’) which was said to have been prepared by him on November 17, 2003. No inventory was prepared and produced. The I.O. did not seek any permission from the trial court to send the samples of ganja prepared by him to a designated forensic science laboratory.

He further submitted that the I.O. filed the application in the trial court for appointment of a Magistrate for certification of inventory and drawal of samples. From Exhibit ‘6’ which is the certification paper bearing signature of the Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, it would appear that a formal certification was done by the Magistrate on December 13, 2004. In the column showing description of goods, ganja was shown with a quantity of 56 packets for 525 kg clearly suggesting that no sample was prepared out of the ganja produced before the Magistrate for certification. This would create doubt over the sanctity of the document (Exhibit ‘6’). The Magistrate was not examined. Had the I.O. (PW-2) prepared the sample on November 16, 2003 by taking 50 gm from 3 different packets, the weight of the ganja could not have remained the same as stated in Exhibit ‘6’.

It was submitted that the very preparation of the sample of ganja was highly doubtful. Samples were taken only from three packets. It was not prepared in presence of the accused in terms of the Standing Order No. 1 of 1988 dated March 15, 1988. The test memo did not bear any signature of the forwarding officer. The Exhibit ‘5’ showed that date of receipt of ganja in laboratory is November 24, 2003 but the quantity received in the laboratory was said to be 32.7 gm only. Who took the samples to the laboratory was not known. 

It was submitted that in this case, even as the certificate issued by the Magistrate (Exhibit ‘6’) showed that the representative sample was drawn, no representative sample was produced before the trial court either for sending the same to the FSL or as material exhibit after destruction of the ganja in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act. This creates huge doubt over the mandatory compliance with the provisions of law which are in the nature of safeguards provided to the accused.

Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surepally Srinivas vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (now State of Telangana) reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 683 and the judgments of the Patna High Court in the case of Aslam Ansari vs. The State of Bihar and Another in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 137 of 2023, Lakshaman Mahto vs. The State of Bihar in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 338 of 2016.

Justice Prasad observed:"....this Court finds that the search and seizure of the truck and the contraband in question was conducted on the basis of a prior secret information that one truck bearing Registration No. WB-25-2127 was coming with some cattle feeds beneath which ganja has been concealed. Rakesh Ranjan (PW-1), who was posted as Intelligence Officer in DRI, Muzaffarpur on 16.11.2003, was a member of the team which had chased the truck, stopped it and had participated in the search, seizure and sampling procedure. He has stated in his evidence that the secret information was recorded by R.K. Shrivastava in DRI-I. R.K. Shrivastava has been examined in this case as PW-2. In his examination-in-chief, he has not stated that he had recorded the secret information. This DRI-1 has not been produced by the prosecution. In the kind of the evidence on this aspect of the matter, the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that there is non-observance with the mandate of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act, is correct." 

Justice Prasad referred to the decision in Karnail Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2009) 8 SCC 539, wherein, the Supreme Court held as under:
“35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 2 SCC 513: 2000 SCC (Cri) 496 did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2 nor did Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 692: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1217 hold that the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows: (a) The officer on receiving the information [of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 42] from any person had to record it in writing in the register concerned and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1).
(b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior.
(c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the
recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency. 
(d) While total non-compliance with requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance with Section 42.
To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending of a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of Section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer  does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.”

The decision in Karnail Singh's case has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Darshan Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2016) 14 SCC 358. Paragraphs ‘13’ to ‘15’ of the said judgment reads: “13. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondent, we are of the view that the mandate contained in Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act, requiring the recording in writing, the details pertaining to the receipt of secret information, as also, the communication of the same to the superior officer are separate and distinct from the procedure stipulated under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the NDPS Act provides that a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class or any Magistrate of Second Class specially empowered by the State Government may issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under Chapter IV. Sub-section (2) of Section 41 refers to issuance of authorisation for similar purposes by the officers of the Departments of Central Excise, Narcotics, Customs, Revenue Intelligence, etc. Sub-section (1) of Section 42 of the NDPS Act lays down that the empowered officer if he has a prior information given by any person, should necessarily take it down in writing, and where he has reason to believe from his personal knowledge, that offences under Chapter IV have been committed or that materials which may furnish evidence of commission of such offences are concealed in any building, etc. he may carry out the arrest or search, without warrant between sunrise and sunset and he may do so without recording his reasons of belie. The two separate procedures noticed above are exclusive of one another. Compliance with one, would not infer compliance with the other. In the circumstances contemplated under Section 42 of the NDPS Act the mandate of the procedure contemplated therein will have to be followed separately, in the manner interpreted by this Court in Karnail Singh case and the same will not be assumed, merely because the Station House Officer concerned had registered a first information report, which was also dispatched to the Superintendent of Police, in compliance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 14. In the above view of the matter, it is not possible for us to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent State that the registration of the first information report at the hands of the Station House Officer, Police Station Shahar, Panipat and its communication to the Superintendent of Police, Panipat would constitute sufficient compliance with the mandate of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. 15. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are satisfied that Section 42 of the NDPS Act was not complied with at all, insofar as the present controversy is concerned. Thus viewed, Conclusion (d) recorded in para 35 of the judgment rendered in Karnail Singh case2 would fully apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, and we are left with no other option, but to set aside the conviction and the sentence of imprisonment of the appellant-accused Darshan Singh. Ordered accordingly. The appeal stands allowed.”

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision, Justice Prasad observed: "30. In the facts of the present case, this Court would record that there is no compliance with the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) of the NDPS Act. 31. It is further found from the evidence that the search of the truck was conducted in presence of two witnesses, namely Sudhir Kumar and Nagendra Chaudhary, who were the residents under Brahmpur Police Station in the district of Muzaffarpur, their complete address is not available in the seizure list and they have not been examined in course of trial. No plausible explanation has been furnished by the prosecution for non-examination of the two seizure-list witnesses. The seizure memo (Exhibit ‘1’) shows the place of seizure “Muzaffarpur, Bihar”. PW-2 admits it. Thus, it is evident that the actual place where truck was stopped and search was conducted has not been recorded by the seizing officer. As per the complainant (PW-2), 56 packets kept in 28 sacks were recovered from the truck and these packets were containing ganja. In his examination-in-chief, PW-2 has stated that at the time of seizure, no one else was there. He has stated that from the seized ganja, three samples of 50-50 gram were taken out and the samples were kept in a yellow colour plastic on which he, the two accused Lauki Rai and Dilip Kumar Sah and the two independent witnesses had put their signature. He has admitted in the cross-examination in paragraph ‘11’ that he had opened two packets of ganja and had taken out the sample. It is, thus, evident from the deposition of the complainant (PW-2) that the samples were not taken from all the packets. In this regard, the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the sampling was not done in accordance with the Standing Order No. 1 of 1989 dated 13th June, 1989 issued
by the Anti-Smuggling Unit, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, appears correct." 

Clause 2.2 of the Standing Order reads:- “2.2 All the packages/containers shall be serially numbered and kept in lots for sampling. Samples from the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances seized, shall be drawn on the spot of recovery, in duplicate, in the presence of search witnesses (Panchas) and the person from whose possession the drug is recovered, and a mention to this effect should invariably be made in the
panchnama drawn on the spot.”

In Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 16 SCC 417, the Standing Order came for consideration before the Supreme Court. It has been held that the guidelines mentioned in the said Standing Order should not only be substantively complied with, but in a case involving penal proceedings, the rigours of such guidelines may be insisted upon. 

Justice Prasad recorded: "Here, it is worth mentioning that in this case even though PW-2 claims to have prepared three samples of 50 gram each out of two packets only, he had not produced the samples in the court and had not sought any direction for sending the sample to the designated laboratory. In paragraph ‘17’, PW-2 has stated that the seized ganja was not produced in the court. In paragraph ‘18’, he admits that no prior permission was obtained for sending the sample for examination. PW-2 has stated in paragraph ‘24’ of his deposition that he had seized 525 kg of ganja and the committee had destroyed the same. The defence suggested to this witness that if 525 kg of ganja was seized and the same has been destroyed, it means no sample was taken out. PW-2 denied the suggestion, but at this stage when this Court goes through the trial court’s records, it is found that the prosecution has brought on record page no. 43, serial no. 2 of Godown Entry Register (Exhibit ‘9’) to show that ganja was kept in the godown vide entry no. 2. The quantity of ganja is being shown as 525 kg in 25 bags. The prosecution case is that ganja seized were 56 packets in 28 bags/sacks, therefore, there is not only a difference in respect of the bags shown in the godown register (Exhibit ‘9’), the quantity shown being 525 kg would create a huge doubt as to whether three samples of 50 gram each were taken out."

The test memo (Exhibit ‘4’) was prepared on November 17, 2003 by R.K. Shrivastava (PW-2). In column ‘4’, the date and place of seizure was shown as “16.11.2003 Muzaffarpur”. In column ‘5’, date of drawal and dispatch of sample has been shown as “16.11.2003 and 17.11.2003”. In column ‘6’, number of sample and marking on each of them for identification has been shown as “One, sealed with the seal of “Directorate of Revenue Intelligence”.” From the test memo (Exhibit ‘4’), it is evident that only one sample of 50 gram (approx) has been shown, which was sealed with the seal of the Directorate of Revenue, Intelligence. The date of drawal of the sample is 16.11.2003, but the sample drawn and sealed by PW-2 on 16.11.2003 was not produced in the court with the other documents on 17.11.2003. 

According to PW-2, the dispatch of sample was made on 17.11.2003, admittedly, no prior order was obtained from the court for sending the sample to a designated laboratory. PW-2 claimed in his deposition that samples were prepared in presence of the accused, but there is no evidence of preparation of samples in the presence of the accused, which is again in violation of the provisions of the Standing Order and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Aambale (supra). 

In the latter part of the test memo (Section-II) which is meant for use in the laboratory, the date of receipt in the laboratory is 24.11.2003 and the net weight found in the laboratory as shown is 32.7 gm. This part (Section-II) has been shown signed by a Chemical Examiner and an Analyst. This was marked Exhibit ‘5’, at the instance of the complainant (PW-2). On perusal of Exhibit ‘4’ and Exhibit ‘5’ together, it appears that while PW-2 was shown preparation of a sample of 50 gram on 16.11.2003 and dispatched the same to the laboratory on 17.11.2003, the same was received in the laboratory on 24.11.2003. What was the mode of dispatch, whether it was sent through any special messenger is not evident from the deposition of PW-2. The net weight found in the laboratory was 32.7 gram, whereas the sample prepared is said to be of 50 grams (approx). Here, this Court finds that the seizing officer has, while filling up Exhibit ‘4’, recorded the quantity of sample as “50 gram (approx)”, it means he was only tentative with regard to the weight of the sample. His approximate weight shown in Exhibit ‘4’ is not correct as per the information furnished in
Exhibit ‘5’. This would create huge doubt over the sampling procedure. We have already mentioned hereinabove that PW-2 claimed that he had prepared three samples, what happened to the other two samples is not known. 

We further find that Exhibit ‘5’
has been proved by the complainant (PW-2) in course of his
deposition. He has stated that the test report had come to him from
the laboratory. PW-2 has not even mentioned who is the author of
Exhibit ‘5’ and by what mode he had received the test report
(Exhibit ‘5’). PW-2 has admitted in paragraph ‘23’ of his
deposition that he had not mentioned about taking out of sample in
the seizure list. The defence has suggested that the fact that 525 kg
of ganja was seized and the same quantity was destroyed only
shows that no sample was taken out. Although, the complainant
(PW-2) has denied this suggestion but to this Court it appears that
the defence has been able to create doubt in the prosecution case.
The Inspector-cum-Godown In-charge (PW-3), who has proved
the entry in the godown register (Exhibit 9), has stated that the
seized articles were entered in the register of the year 2004-2005 at
page no. 43 at serial no. 2. He has stated that in this case on
13.12.2004, in presence of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Muzaffarpur, sample was taken out. He produced the
envelope (Material Exhibit No. ‘1’). On perusal thereof, we do not
find any seal and signature. In his cross-examination, this witness
has admitted that in the godown entry, there is no mention that
sample was taken out. He has admitted that on the envelope there
is no signature of any of the accused or the witnesses and on the
envelope there is no mention of the weight. 

Justice Prasad recorded:"...this Court finds that the ganja which was seized on 16.11.2003 was neither produced in the court nor any permission was taken from the court to keep the ganja in a designated godown. Only in the year 2004-2005 register, an entry has been produced to show that the ganja was kept in the godown but the chain of possession of the ganja, where those were kept during all this period from 16.11.2003, has not been established by the prosecution.

35. So far as the evidence against Surendra Prasad
(appellant in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1013 of 2024) is
concerned, it is the statement of the complainant (PW-2) that
Surendra Prasad was not present at the place of occurrence, he was
not explained the ramification of the statement under Section 67
and PW-2 had not given any certificate that his statement may go
against him. He had not seized anything from the possession of
this appellant. PW-2 has stated in paragraph ‘15’ of his deposition
that he had recorded statement of the arrested persons under
Section 67 in the DRI Office, Muzaffarpur. Dilip Shah had stated
that ganja was loaded near Laxmipur Raxaul by Surendra
Transport. Dilip Shah had not said that who were the persons who
got loaded the ganja and he had not stated about the charges for
transportation. It is evident that the implication of this appellant is
solely on the basis of the vague statement of Dilip Kumar Shah.
PW-2 himself says that Dilip Kumar Shah had stated about a
person named Surendra Kumar, but he admits in paragraph ‘21’
that he could not verify the name and address of the persons,
namely Surendra and Jugal Mistry. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the prosecution has not at all brought any material,
much less reliable piece of evidence, to connect Surendra (the
appellant in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1013 of 2024), as the
person who had loaded the ganja.

Justice Prasad referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Surepally Srinivas (supra) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the case of Kashif (supra) and Bharat Aambale (supra). In case of Surepally Srinivas, the Court observed: “13. In Bharat Aambale (supra), this Court held that the purport of Section 52-A, NDPS Act read with Standing Order No. 1/89 extends beyond mere disposal and destruction of seized contraband and serves a broader purpose of strengthening the evidentiary framework under the NDPS Act. This decision stresses upon the fact that what is to be seen is whether there has been substantial compliance with the mandate of Section 52-A and if not, the prosecution must satisfy the court that such non-compliance does not affect its case against the accused. This is also what has been held in Kashif (supra). 

The judgement records that the certificate dated  13.12.2004 (Exhibit ‘6’) showed Godown Entry No. 2/NDPS/04/05 dated 20.07.2004 only demonstrates that from 16.11.2003 to 20.07.2004, the seized contraband was not lying in the godown then a question arises as to in whose custody the contraband was lying during this period. We have already seen that the packets seized were not serially numbered and samples were drawn only from two packets, at no point of time the seized contraband or the samples were produced in the court although the certificate (Exhibit ‘6’), which is prepared in a given format, talks of drawing of representative sample, the statement nowhere shows the quantity of the representative sample drawn, if any, in presence of the Magistrate. The learned Judicial Magistrate seems to have done only a formality in the name of certification, he has not been brought to depose in course of trial.

Justice Prasad noted:"This Court finds that the learned trial court has relied upon the recorded statement of the seizure list witnesses without giving any opportunity to the defence to cross-examine them. This procedure adopted by the learned trial court to rely upon the statement of the seizure list witnesses recorded by the complainant (PW-2) is contrary to the fundamental principles of law in India. The judicial pronouncement on the subject is very clear."

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2021) 4 SCC 1, wherein, it discussed the fundamental rights and the NDPS Act, Justice Prasad observed that “the first most important constitutional protection provided in the fundamental rights chapter so far as these cases are concerned is provided by Article 20(3), which is the well-known right against self-incrimination. Article 20(3) reads as follows: “(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” He added:" 48. The majority view has held that the NDPS Act is to be construed in the backdrop of Article 20(3) and Article 21. Several safeguards are contained in the NDPS Act, which is of an extremely drastic and draconian nature. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the interpretation of a statute like the NDPS Act must be in conformity and in tune with the spirit of the broad fundamental right not to incriminate oneself and the right to privacy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of Section 67 of the NDPS Act keeping in view Sections 42 and 53. The case laws on the subject have been reviewed. 

Paragraphs ‘81’ to ‘85’ of the judgment from Tofan Singh (supra) case reads:“81. It is important to remember that an officer in charge of a police station, when he investigates an offence, begins by gathering information, in the course of which he may collect evidence relating to the commission of the offence, which would include search and seizure of things in the course of investigation, to be produced at the trial. Under the scheme of the NDPS Act, it is possible that the same officer who is authorised under Section 42 is also authorised under Section 53. 

Justice Prasad referred to The observations of the Constitution Bench in Mukesh Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 10 SCC 120 are, therefore, to the effect that the very person who initiates the detection of crime, so to speak, can also investigate into the offence—there being no bar under the NDPS Act for doing so. This is a far cry from saying that the scheme of the NDPS Act leads to the conclusion that a Section 67 confessional statement, being in the course of investigation, would be sufficient to convict a person accused of an offence.”