In Aruna Kumari vs. The Economic Offences Unit (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it observed:"We are taken by surprise that the currency notes got destroyed by rodents. 9. We wonder how many such currency notes recovered in this type of offences get destroyed as they are not kept at a safe place. Its a huge revenue loss for the State. 10. Besides, the explanation offered for the destruction of the currency notes also does not inspire any confidence. 11. We shall look into this issue as and when the main matter is taken up for hearing." The Court had granted exemption to Aruna Kumari, the lady Child Development Programme Officer (CDPO) from surrendering.
The SLP arose out of 36-page long final judgment dated February 19, 2025 in The Economic Offences Unit Through Superintendent of Police, EOU, Patna, Bihar (2026) Govt Appeal (SJ) No. 18/2019 passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhury of Patna High Court. The appellant was represented by senior advocate Vishwanath Pd. Singh and advocate Soni Shrivastava.
The petitioner is a lady. At the relevant point of time she was serving as a CDPO. She was put to trial for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) respectively, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Trial Court acquitted the petitioner of all the charges. The department went in appeal before the High Court. Justice Chaudhury had reversed the acquittal and held the petitioner guilty of the alleged offence. He observed:"57. Section 13 (1) (d) speaks about criminal misconduct by public servant if he (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage or (b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office.58. In order to prove the charge under Section 13(1)(d), it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused demanded illegal gratification."
The High Court's judgement recorded that the accused was apprehended immediately after she received illegal gratification. The bribe money was recovered from the purse of the accused. Post trap memo has been marked exhibit. From the post trap memo, it is found that when the hands of the accused were washed, the water turned pink as a result of Phenolphthalein powder mixed in the hands of the accused when she received the money and had kept it inside the purse. The purse was also washed and the water turned pink. The said water was seized and forensic report confirms presence of Sodium Carbonate and Phenolphthalein powder in the water.
Y.V. Giri, the senior advocate for the respondent had submitted thatthe prosecution failed to prove that the accused was given bribe of Rs. 10,000/-, when the de facto complainant herself told that she gave seven numbers of currency notes of Rs. 1,000/- denomination. Thus, the Economic Offence Unit had Rs. 7,000/- in their hand and therefore the story of demand of Rs. 10,000/- does not arise at all. It was for the prosecution to prove that the accused demanded illegal gratification and she accepted the same. He relied on the Supreme Court's decision in P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 1 to submit that when the criminal charge and the charge in disciplinary proceeding which was initiated against the respondents were based on same allegation and same set of evidence and the department proceeding ended in favour of the respondent, criminal charge on the same set of evidence cannot stand. Notably, Aruna Kumari was exonerated in the departmental inquiry. The trial Court too has acquitted her.
In Raja & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 506, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the scope of interference with a judgment of acquittal in view of the ratio laid down in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court could not ordinarily interfere therewith though its view may appear to be the more probable one. The appellate court is under an obligation to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then to decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. The Appellate Court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial court and that it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any, and significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the Trial Court.
In Krishan Chander vs. State of Delhi, reported in 2016 (3) SCC 108, Supreme Court has held that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Mere production of tainted money recovered from the accused along with positive result of phenolphthalein test, sans the proof of demand of bribe, is not enough to establish the guilt of a charge under Section 7 of the Act, made against the accused.
The High Court observed: "It is immaterial whether it was Rs. 7,000/- or Rs. 10,000/-. The evidence on record unerringly shows that the accused demanded and obtained illegal gratification."
It is unclear as to how the evidence of demand of Rs 10, 000 was established beyond any reasonable doubt. Was the money to the tune of Rs 10, 000 taken out from the government's treasury for its utilization as tarp money? If Rs 10, 000 was taken for the purpose of trapping the accused, why was only Rs 7, 000 given to her? These questions seem to have have remained unanswered.
Justice Chaudhury had concluded:"60. On careful perusal of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to produce satisfactory evidence to prove payment of bribe and to show that the accused has voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. Therefore, the learned trial Judge committed error in recording order of acquittal in favour of the accused. 61. In view of the above discussion I hold on careful consideration of evidence on record as well as the submission made by the learned Sr. Counsels for the parties that the appellant has been able to bring home the charge against the accused under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 62. In this regard, this Court records that it is immaterial to consider that the accused is entitled to get benefit of doubt on the ground that departmental proceeding against her was dismissed. 63. For the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the respondent shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and was also liable to fine. 64. For the offence punishable under Section 13(1) (d), the respondent shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than four years but which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. 65. The respondent is, therefore, convicted accordingly."
He relied on Supreme Court's decision in C.K. Damodaran Nair vs. Govt. of India, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 477 to conclude that trial Judge committed error in recording order of acquittal in favour of the accused, but did not refer to the relevant paragraph of the Supreme Court's judgement.
The Supreme Court's order reads: "The substantive order of sentence passed by the High Court is ordered to be suspended, and the appellant shall be released on bail subject to terms and conditions that the Trial Court may deem fit to impose. 7. We have also taken notice of something which we should not ignore."
Supreme Court's order reproduced the High Court's observation in impugned judgment, wherein it observed in paragraph 53 as under:-
“53. P.W. 5 lodged the complaint before the Economic Offence Unit only after she was illegally demanded to pay bribe of a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. It is true that the prosecution failed to produce the currency notes that were seized from the possession of the accused on the ground that the envelop containing seized money was destroyed by rats and rodents. But during trial, P. S. Malkhana register was produced and proved as exhibit. In Malkhana register, receipt of an envelop containing bribe money in connection with the instant case was duly recorded. Thus, there is no doubt that seized money was produced in Malkhana register but as a result of improper condition of Malkhana and lack of up to date preservation system, the envelop along with currency notes were destroyed by rodents. For destruction of the seized money, which was recovered from the possession of the accused, the prosecution case cannot be held to be not proved. In many cases, seized articles may not be produced during trial for one reason or the other. Even the subject matter of offence, sometimes cannot be recovered by the investigating agency in many cases, corpus delicto, is destroyed by the offenders. Even under such circumstances an accused can be convicted if other surrounding circumstances point at the guilt of the accused without any reasonable doubt.”
It appears strange that the High Court observed that it was immaterial whether there was recovery of Rs. 7,000/- or Rs. 10,000/ given the fact that if Rs 10, 000 was demanded and obtained by the accused, then unless the remaining Rs 3, 000 is traced, conviction of Aruna Kumari cannot be deemed conclusive. The evidence adduced by the witnesses that the black purse which allegedly contained the bribe money, was not produced in Court. It was the case of the prosecution that Rs, 10,000, the seized currency notes were kept in a paper packet in police Malkhana. However, during trial, the seized money could not be produced by the prosecution on the ground that the envelop, containing money, was destroyed by rats and rodents.
Prior to the judgement by Justice Chaudhury, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah had passed a 8-page long judgement dated January 23, 2020 upon hearing the appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Special judge, Vigilance (Trap), Patna in Special Case No. 52 of 2014, which arose out of Economic Offences Unit Case No. 31 of 2014 by which Aruna Kumari had been acquitted of charges under Sections 7/13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Justice Amanullah had observed: "6.....the Court finds that the view taken by the Court below cannot be said to be unjustified or perverse. 7. In matters like the present, there is inbuilt protection given to the accused, that is, of the case against the accused being proved beyond reasonable doubt. This is based on the constitutional mandate. The prosecution has to bring home the charges and prove it to the level that the Court finds that such allegation has been proved to a point which would be acceptable to a prudent man. Stricter the law, the requirement of compliance with the procedure prescribed also are to be applied equally strictly while considering such cases. In the present case, the allegation of the opposite party having accepted a bribe, obviously visited her with serious penal consequences and, thus, clearly when a Court of law was called upon to adjudicate the matter arising out of such exercise, it had to be conscious of its responsibility to consider the matter objectively. Perusal of the judgment does not indicate that any issue has been left undiscussed. This objection has also not been raised by learned counsel for the appellant."
Justice Amanullah added: "8. Coming to the issue of non-production of order constituting the trap team, which is one of the grounds for giving benefit of doubt to the accused (respondent), in the considered opinion of the Court, carries weight. Persons in official capacity are said to have acted to trap a person demanding bribe for acting in official pending matters/proceeding before the officer."
Justice Amanullah observed: "In the present case, the complaint was made by an Anganbari Sevika, that for closing a proceeding against her the accused was demanding a bribe for which complaint was made before the Economic Offences Unit. 9. The first and foremost requirement was to constitute a team to look into the matter. Upon such team being constituted, in accordance with law, by the Competent Authority, members of the team have the jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter of cross checking, preparing pre-trap memo followed by the exercise of actual trap and thereafter followed by a post-trap memo etc. When admittedly, before the Court there was no document to show that the trap team which had conducted the exercise was the team constituted by the Competent Authority to do so, the Court rightly has not gone on the self statement made by the concerned persons that they were members of such trap team. Where law presumes that there are orders on paper with regard to a certain fact, the original or its copies, which are admissible under law, have to be produced before the Court and proved in the manner required in law and only upon the same being done, the Court is required to take cognizance and accept the same. In the present case, when no such document was ever produced before the Court, the doubt with regard to the constitution of a trap team and action of the members who had conducted the exercise becomes open to speculation."
Justice Amanullah had pointed out that "when the complainant herself during her cross-examination before the Court, has changed her version and the prosecution, had declared her to be hostile and thereafter proceeded to cross examine her, in which also statements contrary to the prosecution case have been made by the complainant, the authenticity and reliability of such witness clearly being doubtful, but necessarily, the benefit has to go to the accused. The Court having done that on this score also, cannot be faulted. Further, the prosecution during trial had produced some torn notes which were alleged to have been seized from the opposite party. The same being few in number, that too, in a torn condition, obviously raises serious doubts with regard to them being the notes which were sized from the possession of the opposite party. This by itself may be sufficient to raise bona fide doubt with regard to the authenticity of the recovery made from the opposite party of the so called bribe money, especially when the independent witnesses of search and seizure were also not examined. 11. Thus, on the basis of a combined effect of the facts and circumstances discussed by the Court below, it coming to the conclusion that reasonable doubts have been created with regard to the prosecution story, for which, in law, the benefit has to accrue to the accused, this Court does not find any error in the same which would require interference."
In his judgement, Justice Amanullah had concluded:"....the Court finds that the delay in filing of the appeal is due to deliberate laches on the part of the appellant which does not persuade the Court to condone such limitation. 16. Accordingly, on the ground of limitation as well as on merits, both Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 2019 as also Government Appeal (SJ) No. 18 of 2019 stand dismissed." Notably, only aodvocate Soni Srivastava had appeared on behalf the appellant, Economic Offences Unit through the Superintendent of Police, EOU, Patna.
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