Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside cognizance order by Special Judge Vigilance, Patna in a corruption case against Assistant Engineer, Road Construction Department

In Shardendu Bhushan vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated August 11, 2026, wherein, he set aside and quashed the impugned cognizance order dated June 26, 2019 with all its consequential proceedings in view of Supreme Court order dated July 22, 2024 as passed in Shivendra Nath Verma vs. Union of India and the provisions of Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act. The respondent no. 2 is the Vigilance Department, Government of Bihar. Arvind Kumar was the counsel for the Vigilance. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of order dated June 26, 2019 as passed by Special Judge Vigilance Patna in Special Case No. 33 of 2015 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 01 of 2015 dated June 30, 2015 for the offences registered under sections 13 (2), r/w, 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 through which the Special Judge (Vigilance) Patna took cognizance against the petitioner by violating the section 19 (1) b of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018 in most mechanical way. 

As per prosecution case, petitioner who was appointed as an Assistant Engineer in the Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar, while functioning as a public servant, had acquired wealth through corrupt and illegal means by abusing his official position, and had amassed movable as well as immovable assets in his own name and in the names of his wife and children, which were substantially disproportionate to his known sources of income. It is alleged that petitioner joined the government service as an Assistant Engineer on December 13 2007 and continued in the capacity thereafter. During the relevant period, his total income from salary was assessed at Rs. 36,00,000/-, whereas his expenditure under various heads was assessed at Rs. 17,03,405/-, leaving a likely saving of Rs. 18,96,595/-. However, against the said likely savings, he was alleged to have acquired movable and immovable assets and made investments valued at approximately Rs. 2,77,79,000/- in his own name as well as in the names of his wife and children. It was also alleged that he had made substantial investments in a business being run in the name of his wife with the intention of routing his alleged illegal earnings. Accordingly, the total value of the movable and immovable assets was stated to be Rs. 2,77,79,000/-, which, as alleged in the FIR, was substantially higher than his likely savings of Rs. 18,96,595/- and was, therefore, treated as disproportionate to his known sources of income. 

The counsel for the petitioner raised single issue in support of his submission that cognizance was bad in eyes of law as same was taken in absence of sanction order. It was submitted that the legal provisions as available under Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018 categorically suggest that
no cognizance can be taken without sanction and relied upon legal report ofSupreme Court as passed in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335.

This submission was not disputed by the counsel appearing for the Vigilance. The counsel also referred to Court's order dated July 22, 2024 as passed in Shivendra Nath Verma vs. Union of India arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12708 of 2023. 6. It was accepted and admitted at the Bar that the competent authority has granted sanction vide order dated July 27, 2022. 

Justice Jha relied on the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335, which reads as under:-
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 

Justice Ansul' s order is not in favour of "media gag", does not prevent fair, accurate, objective reporting of pending court proceedings or publication of facts in alleged tender scam case

Did tender scam led to removal of Nitish Kumar as Chief Minister? 

In Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar through Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul passed a 7-page long order dated June 24, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"19. Having seen both sides of the coin, this court is clearly not in a view of media gag over the issue. However, the court would certainly direct for control over irresponsible reporting and imputation of guilt upon the petitioner without any initiation trial at all. 20. In that view of the matter the court issues following directions: Pending consideration of the present petition all print, electronic, digital and social media platforms shall be at liberty to report the factual developments concerning the case and proceedings before competent courts. However, none of the above would: (a) Describe the petitioner as guilty of the offences alleged. (b) Portray the petitioner as having committed the offences alleged. (c) Publish or broadcast material pertaining to determine criminal liability. (d) Use expressions imputing guilt like mastermind, scamster, kingpin or equivalent description conveying criminal responsibility. (e) Conduct media trials based upon alleged confessions, investigation material, unproved document whose evidentiary value is yet to be determined. (f) However, nothing in this order shall prevent fair, accurate and objective reporting of the proceedings pending before the court or publication of the facts. 21. The above restraint shall extend to digital publications, online portals, video streaming services, podcast, social media accounts, channels and other internet based platforms." The case is listed for further hearing on July 10, 2026.  

The order was passed upon hearing an application filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings pertaining to Special Vigilance Unit Case No. 05 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025. The counsel for the ED stated that in the round of litigation in connection with same FIR, the petitioner had filed Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 in which they were added as a party but in the application filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings they have not been added as a party. Notably, Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar through Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 was filed on May 8, 2025 and registered on May 14, 2025 for quashing the FIR. On the earlier occasion, by Justice Sandeep Kumar's order dated July 8, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement was ordered to be made party. Notably, this writ petition was withdrawn on April 18, 026.

The counsel for the petitioner was directed by Justice Ansul to add Enforcement Directorate as party respondent. 

The counsel for the ED sought time to file counter affidavit to bring the materials available on record. The counsel for the Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar also sought time to file counter affidavit. Justice Ansul directed that the counter affidavit must explain the reasons for delay of one year in conducting the raid after registration of FIR.

The counsel for the petitioner stated that an FIR was registered and after more than a year of registration of FIR raid was conducted in the residential premises on May 27, 2026 and he was arrested on the same date. In the raid nothing incriminating was found against him still after arrest various television channels,
newspapers, online news portal and social media handles commenced extensive and lurid coverage of the case, broadcasting one sided narratives, unverified allegations and prejudicial content that portrays the petitioner as guilty even before commencement of trial. Several prime time news debates were conducted by prominent TV anchors wherein the petitioner was condemned, vilified and subjected to public humiliation without any opportunity to present his side. Such coverage has direct effect of influencing public opinion against the petitioner, prejudicing the minds of potential witnesses and creating an atmosphere inimical to fair trial. The counsel stated that in State of Maharashtra vs. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 386, it is stated that “A trial by press, electronic media or public agitation is the very antithesis of rule of law.”The decision in M.P. Lohia vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2005) 2 SCC 686 was referred, wherein, the Supreme Court held that it is not proper for the press or the electronic media to project a one-sided picture of events before the public in matters which are sub-judice. The Supreme Court's decision in Sahara India real Estate Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr. Reported in (2012) 10 SCC 603 was also relied upon, wherein, the Court held that the courts have the power to impose prior restraints on publications in exceptional cases where there exists a real and substantial risk.  

Justice Ansul observed: "13. It is to be seen that these news items are not only in the mainline press or Television channels but the social media platforms are flooded with news declaring the petitioner a guilty person without even initiation of the trial. 14. The petitioner may be accused of a serious case his rights to get a fair trial would not be ousted by the magnitude of the allegation i.e. levelled against him there are freedom of the press guaranteed under Article 19(1)(A) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) in the interest state security, public order, decency, morality, defamation and incitement to an offence. 15. Maligning the image of a person who is yet to be held guilty may come within the ambit of defamatory act, immoral act or even an indecent act. This is pre-judging the issue when the matter is sub judice. 16. In the case of Mahua Moitra decided on 23.02.2024 in W.P. (c) 2676/2024 an Office Memorandum dated 01.04.2010 issued by Government of India which is an advisory on Media Policy of Police. It stated while sharing information to the public through the media appropriate information as is professionally necessary is shared without hampering the process of investigation or issues of legal/privacy rights of the accused/victims and matters of strategic and national interest. 17. Apart from that Senior Counsel for the petitioner, counsel for the ED also expressed his ex-pleasure over the type of reporting that is going on with regard to the case and with regard to the recent trend of media trial. 18. This Court is clearly aware of the judgments passed in the case of Indian Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1985) 1 SCC 641 which established the idea of free press. In LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah (Prof.) reported in (1992) SCC 637 where the court held that in any set-up more so in a democratic set-up like ours dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon." 

Earlier, Justice Alok Kumar Pandey had passed an order dated March 31, 2026, which recorded the relief sought by the writ petition. The petition sought quashing of the First Information Report bearing Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05/2025 dated 30.04.2025 registered for the offences under Section 7A read with Section 8, Section 9 read with 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Section 3(2) read with 6(2) read with Section 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 as well as under Section 61 read with 318(4) read with 338 read with 340(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Justice Pandey's order reads: "2. When the query is asked what are the circumstances which reflect that the no offence, as alleged in the F.I.R., is made out against the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner does not give any specific reply and he seeks an adjournment on the ground that the main counsel is not available."

Notably, Justice Pandey's order dated April 18, 2026 records that "the counsel for the petitioner seeks permission for withdrawal of the instant criminal writ petition with liberty to raise his grievance before appropriate forum, at appropriate stage. 2. Permission, as prayed for, is accorded. 3. With the aforesaid liberty, the instant criminal writ petition stands dismissed as withdrawn."

By an order dated August 1, 2025 issued by the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, Patna, the immovable property of Rishu Shree, the petitioner has been attached and a number of bank accounts has also been freezed.

Notably, ED's press release dated November 26, 2025 reads:"Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Patna Zonal Office has conducted search operations at 09 locations across Ahmedabad, Surat, Gurgaon and New Delhi on 25.11.2025, under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 in a case related to a Patna based contractor Rishu Shree. During the search operations, cash of approx. Rs. 33 Lakh, digital devices, diaries, and several incriminating documents have been found and seized. ED initiated investigation on the basis of FIR registered by Special Vigilance Unit (SVU), Bihar against Rishu Shree and others. Rishu Shree, who’s firms work as contractors/subcontractors in various Bihar Government departments, such as Water Resources, Health, Public Health Engineering, Urban Development, Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation (BUIDCO), Education, Building and Construction, and Rural Works Department, is alleged to have a nexus with various Government officials to facilitate tenders for illicit personal gains. Earlier in this case, search operations were carried out at several travel agents and also at the residential premises of several Government officials in Patna. These searches had led to the seizure of a total of Rs.11.64 Crore (approx.) in cash, along with various incriminating documents and digital evidences. Further, assets to the tune of Rs.68.09 Crore belonging to Rishu Shree, his family members and entities were put under Provisional Attachment on 01.08.2025. Further investigation is under progress."

 

Buxar (Town) P.S. FIR of 2020 regarding alleged bribe of Rs 500, proceedings before Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna quashed for inexplicable inaction of 5 years, 10 months: Justice Ansul

In Ratneshwar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, he concluded:"14. The delay in this case is entirely attributable to the investigating agency. The petitioner has not caused it, has not absconded and has been present. Nothing has been placed before this Court to show any extraordinary or exceptional reason for five years and ten months of inaction. The burden which the Full Bench of this Court laid down in Madheshwardhari Singh(supra) has not been discharged by the State in any measure. 15. In the result, this petition is allowed. The FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated 05.09.2020 under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Town Police Station, Buxar, and all proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, are hereby quashed." 

Prior to the judgement, Justice Ansul had passed an order dated March 24, 2026 directing the respondents  "to conclude the investigation within a month. If the investigation is not concluded within a month, the Court will be constrained to apply its mind towards quashing of the F.I.R on the grounds of delay in submission of charge-sheet." 

The other six respondents were: 2. District Magistrate, Buxar, Additional Collector, Buxar Bihar 4. The Superintendent of Police, (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna, 5. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna, 6. S.H.O. Town Police Station, Buxar and 7. Senior Treasury Officer, Buxar. In its order dated June 16, 2026, it was recorded that "Till 21.04.2026 the investigation was not concluded." despite High Court's order. The case was regarding an alleged bribery. The Buxar police failed to trace the recipient of the Rs 7500, the alleged bribery amount.  

The judgement relied on paragraph 27 and paragraph 50 of the judgement by High Court's Full Bench of 19th Chief Justice Surjit Singh Sandhawalia, Justices S. Shamsul Hasan and Ram Nandan Prasad in Madheshwardhari Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324, which considered the question whether the right to a speedy public trial is applicable only to the proceedings in court stricto sensu or includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. 

The Full Bench held: “27. … it is held that the right to speedy public trial is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as  well......Xxx 50. A sharp note of caution must be sounded. The aforesaid finding must not be misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than seven years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought to be laid down is the extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed and the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established. Really, I am somewhat hesitant in spelling out even the aforesaid outer time limit which, perhaps, errs on the side of strictitude. But since we are following binding precedent, the same has to be unreservedly accepted. Nor is it sought to be laid down that in a lesser period than seven years an accused person would not be able to establish circumstances pointing to the patent prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the guarantee of speedy public trial under Art. 21. That is a question which can be properly considered and adjudicated where it may expressly arise. In both the cases before us the delay is admittedly even far beyond the outer limit of seven years. What indeed is sought to be laid down here is that beyond this period of seven years the continuation of the investigation and trial would bring in the weightiest presumption that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is violated and the prosecution should be halted in its tracks. This would per se be indicative of prejudice. Thereafter the burden would automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of the State to show that such grave delay was either entirely the handiwork of the accused himself or was occasioned by such special and exceptional circumstances so as to merit condonation thereof. A criminal prosecution by the State cannot be allowed to become an inquisitorial persecution of the accused. Nor cap, a fair speedy trial be allowed to become an unending travail for him....Xxx 52. … it is held that an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. It is further held that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art. 21.” 

Justice Ansul noted that the constitutional foundation underlying this position was laid by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, which held that the procedure under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just, and that a procedure which is not so is void. Building on that, the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 held that “no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21” and that “the State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources.” 

The judgement referred to the judgement by Supreme Court's Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 which crystallised this into a set of propositions at paragraph 86, the governing ones being that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and encompasses all stages including investigation, and that ordinarily where this right is found to have been infringed the charges shall be quashed. 

Notably, applying these principles to a corruption matter arising from this State, the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Das vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 held at paragraphs 7 to 9 that “cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay” and that while interference at the investigation stage is ordinarily not called for, “it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of time.” Similary, In Ramanand Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 153, the Supreme Court quashed prosecution in a corruption matter from this State after finding that following an initial raid no action was taken for six years and that the prosecution, which had dragged on for thirteen years in all, had become a travesty of justice. In Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, which concerned a matter from this State where investigation had proceeded fitfully over seventeen years, the Court reiterated at paragraph 25 that where the right to speedy trial is infringed the charges may be quashed. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for quashing of the FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated September 5, 2020 and the entire proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, both arising out of alleged offences under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

The petitioner, Ratneshwar Kumar, was a Data Entry Operator (Grade-A) at the Buxar Treasury and has been dismissed from service. On July 22, 2020, one Saryu Ojha, a pensioner, visited the Treasury and was paid his pension on the same day. This appeared to be the event at the heart of this prosecution, though what is curious is that the FIR was not registered on that date, nor was any complaint made anywhere near that date. A video surfaced on social media on August 28, 2020, more than a month later of the said occurrence, purporting to show the petitioner receiving money from Saryu Ojha. The  District Magistrate, Buxar, upon noticing the video, directed the Additional Collector to hold an enquiry. The Additional Collector returned a finding against the petitioner vide letter dated September 4, 2020 and recommended registration of a case. Accordingly, the Senior Treasury Officer, Ajmal Ali Ansari, addressed a written complaint vide letter dated September 5, 2020 to the SHO, Town Police Station, Buxar, and the present Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 came to be registered under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Investigation was entrusted to CI Mukesh Kumar Shree.  

The Court found that no specific demand is mentioned in the FIR therein, no occasion of acceptance is identified, no sum was described as a bribe, and no time or place where illegal gratification was said to have changed hands finds mention. The date of occurrence is recorded as August 28, 2020, being the date the video went viral, and not the date the pension was paid. The complainant, Ajmal Ali Ansari, was the petitioner’s superior officer at the Treasury and was plainly not present at the place of occurrence , where the alleged transaction between Ratneshwar Kumar and Saryu Ojhais said to have taken place. Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 require, at their very threshold, proof of acceptance or obtaining of undue advantage and such undue advantage must pass from an identifiable person to a public servant. But in this case, the only person from whom it is alleged to have passed is Saryu Ojha himself. It is in the context of that statutory requirement that the investigative record becomes fatal to the prosecution. Saryu Ojha’s statement was recorded during investigation. The Court considered that statement. Saryu Ojha, the alleged source of the bribe, the man whose visit to the Treasury on July 22, 2020 gave rise to this entire case, stated that he has no recollection of having paid any illegal gratification to the petitioner. Without his testimony implicating the petitioner, the essential ingredient of the offences alleged simply does not arise.

The case against the petitioner begins and ends with Saryu Ojha. But his statement does not support it. Ujjawal Ojha, who is the grandson of Saryu Ojha and the person who made and spread the video, gave a written statement before the Police Inspector, Town Anchal, Buxar. In that statement, as appears from the record, he stated that his grandfather had given a total of Rs. 8,000/-, out of which Rs. 500/-was given to the petitioner towards petrol and vehicle hire charges, and that no illegal gratification was paid to Ratneshwar Kumar. He also stated that the video was made due to a misunderstanding. Shrikant Ojha and Ramakant Ojha, both sons of Saryu Ojha, also stated to the police that their father had given no illegal gratification and that whatever money passed hands was on account of transport expenses. 

Justice Ansul recorded: "In the considered opinion of this Court, there is not even one person with direct knowledge of the events of 22.07.2020 who has supported the case that any bribe was paid. The prosecution rests entirely on a video, and the maker of that video has retracted.  9. Apart from the merits, there is the independent question of the delay in investigation. The FIR was registered on 05.09.2020. Today is 23.06.2026, which makes it five years and ten months. The pen drive which carries the viral video, the sole piece of material evidence in this entire prosecution, has not been sent for Forensic Science Laboratory examination. No chargesheet has been filed. No charge has been framed before the learned Special Judge till date. The order dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in Special Case No. 22 of 2020, which is Annexure-2 of the petition, reflects that even nearly three years after registration of the FIR, the final form had not been submitted. When the matter was taken up before this Court on the last date, the SDPO appeared and disclosed that the pen drive had been acquired, however no explanation was offered for the delay of five years and ten months of an inactive investigation." 

Justice Ansul recollected that Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339, decided on November 20, 2025, held that “investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed.”

The judgement referred to Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 laid down the categories of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised, and two of those categories are squarely attracted here. One is where the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support thereof do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused. The other is where continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 

The Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held at paragraph 36 that “the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the appellants herein.”

Justice Ansul clarified that he has not overlooked the position taken in Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta vs. B. Srinivas, (2008) 8 SCC 580 that mere delay in investigation does not by itself furnish universal ground for quashing and that each case must be evaluated on its own facts. That is precisely what has been done here. The present order does not rest on the ground of delay alone. It rests with equal force on the merits of the case as disclosed by the material collected during investigation, which does not make out any offence under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner.

Earlier, the case was before Justice Sandeep Kumar and Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. 

Patn High Court orders impleadment of District Magistrate, Rohtas, directs "status quo" with reard to orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas

In the case Shashi Shankar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Anr. (2026), Justice Ajit Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated April 27, 2026. The order reads: "Issue notice to the respondent no.2 under both processes i.e. registered cover with A/D as well as ordinary process, for which requisites etc. must be filed within two weeks. Two weeks’ time is granted to the respondents to file counter affidavit. 4. List this case on 12.05.2026. 5. In the meantime, status quo as on today shall be maintained." The Court's direction regarding addition of the District Magistrate, Rohtas at Sasaram as respondent no.3 was complied with during the course of day. The Respondents no. 2 is Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas.  The Tribunal is constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the primary law regulating road transport in India. 

The Court passed the order upon hearing the I.A.s praying for stay on the orders of the Tribunal, expunging the adverse remarks against the Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section and for urgent hearing of the case.

Meanwhile, on April 21, 2026, the Tribunal heard the Execution Case no. 01/2014, Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Sanjay Kumar Gupta, and passed an order wherein, it has shifted the penalty of Rs 10,000 from Collector, Rohtas to Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section.  The case was listed for hearing before the Tribunal on April 28, 2026.   

Notably, Section 165 of the Act lays down that the State Government, by notification in the official gazette, may constitute one or more Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Section 166 of the MV Act specifies that an application for compensation in case of accident may be made by the person who has sustained the injury, or the owner of the property, or, the agent duly authorised by the person injured, or, iv. Any or all Legal representatives of the deceased. 

Section 168 of the Act deals with the power of the Claims Tribunal to grant an award by determining the amount of just compensation which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or by any of them, as the case may be. Thus, a conjoint reading of Section 165, 166 and 168 clearly provides that in case of any accident, the person injured or his agent (in case of injury) or the legal representative of the deceased (in case of death) shall file an application under section 166 before the Claims Tribunal specifying all the facts and circumstances of the case and the Claims tribunal, after hearing the parties may pass an award determining the amount of just compensation in favour of the aggrieved person. Provided there is no legal fault at the hands of the driver or owner of the vehicle, in practical discourse the amount of compensation is always paid by the insurance company which is holding the Third Party Risk Insurance Policy of the Vehicle. 

Section 173 provides for the statutory right of appeal wherein the claimant/s can challenge the award passed by the Claims Tribunal by preferring an appeal before the concerned High Court within 90 days from the date of the passing of the award.

Section 174 of the Act, reads: "174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue. - Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue."

The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between the claimant or claimants on one side and the insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants.

Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate is be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Section 168 (3) of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal exercises powers under Section 47 and Order 21 Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Significantly, what is barred by Section 175 of  the M.V. Act, 1988, is the jurisdiction of Civil Court and not the procedure to be applied under Civil Procedure Code. 

Supreme Court suspends substantive order of sentence passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhury, vindicates judgement by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah

In Aruna Kumari vs. The Economic Offences Unit (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it observed:"We are taken by surprise that the currency notes got destroyed by rodents. 9. We wonder how many such currency notes recovered in this type of offences get destroyed as they are not kept at a safe place. Its a huge revenue loss for the State. 10. Besides, the explanation offered for the destruction of the currency notes also does not inspire any confidence. 11. We shall look into this issue as and when the main matter is taken up for hearing." The Court had granted exemption to Aruna Kumari, the lady Child Development Programme Officer (CDPO) from surrendering. 

The SLP arose out of 36-page long final judgment dated February 19, 2025 in The Economic Offences Unit Through Superintendent of Police, EOU, Patna, Bihar  (2026) Govt Appeal (SJ) No. 18/2019 passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhury of Patna High Court. The appellant was represented by senior advocate Vishwanath Pd. Singh and advocate Soni Shrivastava. 

The petitioner is a lady. At the relevant point of time she was serving as a CDPO. She was put to trial for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) respectively, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Trial Court acquitted the petitioner of all the charges. The department went in appeal before the High Court. Justice Chaudhury had reversed the acquittal and held the petitioner guilty of the alleged offence. He observed:"57. Section 13 (1) (d) speaks about criminal misconduct by public servant if he (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage or (b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office.58. In order to prove the charge under Section 13(1)(d), it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused demanded illegal gratification." 

The High Court's judgement recorded that the accused was apprehended immediately after she received illegal gratification. The bribe money was recovered from the purse of the accused. Post trap memo has been marked exhibit. From the post trap memo, it is found that when the hands of the accused were washed, the water turned pink as a result of Phenolphthalein powder mixed in the hands of the accused when she received the money and had kept it inside the purse. The purse was also washed and the water turned pink. The said water was seized and forensic report confirms presence of Sodium Carbonate and Phenolphthalein powder in the water. 

Y.V. Giri, the senior advocate for the respondent had submitted thatthe prosecution failed to prove that the accused was given bribe of Rs. 10,000/-, when the de facto complainant herself told that she gave seven numbers of currency notes of Rs. 1,000/- denomination. Thus, the Economic Offence Unit had Rs. 7,000/- in their hand and therefore the story of demand of Rs. 10,000/- does not arise at all. It was for the prosecution to prove that the accused demanded illegal gratification and she accepted the same.  He relied on the Supreme Court's decision in P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 1 to submit that when the criminal charge and the charge in disciplinary proceeding which was initiated against the respondents were based on same allegation and same set of evidence and the department proceeding ended in favour of the respondent, criminal charge on the same set of evidence cannot stand. Notably, Aruna Kumari was exonerated in the departmental inquiry. The trial Court too has acquitted her.  

In Raja & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2016) 10 SCC 506, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the scope of interference with a judgment of acquittal in view of the ratio laid down in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court could not ordinarily interfere therewith though its view may appear to be the more probable one. The appellate court is under an obligation to consider and identify the error in the decision of the trial court and then to decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. The Appellate Court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the trial court and that it has to exercise its discretion very cautiously to correct an error of law or fact, if any, and significant enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the Trial Court. 

In Krishan Chander vs. State of Delhi, reported in 2016 (3) SCC 108, Supreme Court has held that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Mere production of tainted money recovered from the accused along with positive result of phenolphthalein test, sans the proof of demand of bribe, is not enough to establish the guilt of a charge under Section 7 of the Act, made against the accused. 

The High Court observed: "It is immaterial whether it was Rs. 7,000/- or Rs. 10,000/-. The evidence on record unerringly shows that the accused demanded and obtained illegal gratification." 

It is unclear as to how the evidence of demand of Rs 10, 000 was established beyond any reasonable doubt. Was the money to the tune of Rs 10, 000 taken out from the government's treasury for its utilization as tarp money? If Rs 10, 000 was taken for the purpose of trapping the accused, why was only Rs 7, 000 given to her? These questions seem to have have remained unanswered.  

Justice Chaudhury had concluded:"60. On careful perusal of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to produce satisfactory evidence to prove payment of bribe and to show that the accused has voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. Therefore, the learned trial Judge committed error in recording order of acquittal in favour of the accused. 61. In view of the above discussion I hold on careful consideration of evidence on record as well as the submission made by the learned Sr. Counsels for the parties that the appellant has been able to bring home the charge against the accused under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 62. In this regard, this Court records that it is immaterial to consider that the accused is entitled to get benefit of doubt on the ground that departmental proceeding against her was dismissed. 63. For the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the respondent shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and was also liable to fine. 64. For the offence punishable under Section 13(1) (d), the respondent shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than four years but which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. 65. The respondent is, therefore, convicted accordingly." 

He relied on Supreme Court's decision in C.K. Damodaran Nair vs. Govt. of India, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 477 to conclude that trial Judge committed error in recording order of acquittal in favour of the accused, but did not refer to the relevant paragraph of the Supreme Court's judgement. 

The Supreme Court's order reads:  "The substantive order of sentence passed by the High Court is ordered to be suspended, and the appellant shall be released on bail subject to terms and conditions that the Trial Court may deem fit to impose. 7. We have also taken notice of something which we should not ignore." 

Supreme Court's order reproduced the High Court's observation in impugned judgment, wherein it observed in paragraph 53 as under:-

“53. P.W. 5 lodged the complaint before the Economic Offence Unit only after she was illegally demanded to pay bribe of a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. It is true that the prosecution failed to produce the currency notes that were seized from the possession of the accused on the ground that the envelop containing seized money was destroyed by rats and rodents. But during trial, P. S. Malkhana register was produced and proved as exhibit. In Malkhana register, receipt of an envelop containing bribe money in connection with the instant case was duly recorded. Thus, there is no doubt that seized money was produced in Malkhana register but as a result of improper condition of Malkhana and lack of up to date preservation system, the envelop along with currency notes were destroyed by rodents. For destruction of the seized money, which was recovered from the possession of the accused, the prosecution case cannot be held to be not proved. In many cases, seized articles may not be produced during trial for one reason or the other. Even the subject matter of offence, sometimes cannot be recovered by the investigating agency in many cases, corpus delicto, is destroyed by the offenders. Even under such circumstances an accused can be convicted if other surrounding circumstances point at the guilt of the accused without any reasonable doubt.” 

It appears strange that the High Court observed that it was immaterial whether there was recovery of Rs. 7,000/- or Rs. 10,000/ given the fact that if Rs 10, 000 was demanded and obtained by the accused, then unless the remaining Rs 3, 000 is traced, conviction of Aruna Kumari cannot be deemed conclusive. The evidence adduced by the witnesses that the black purse which allegedly contained the bribe money, was not produced in Court. It was the case of the prosecution that Rs, 10,000, the seized currency notes were kept in a paper packet in police Malkhana. However, during trial, the seized money could not be produced by the prosecution on the ground that the envelop, containing money, was destroyed by rats and rodents.

Prior to the judgement by Justice Chaudhury, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah had passed a 8-page long judgement dated January 23, 2020 upon hearing the appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Special judge, Vigilance (Trap), Patna in Special Case No. 52 of 2014, which arose out of Economic Offences Unit Case No. 31 of 2014 by which Aruna Kumari had been acquitted of charges under Sections 7/13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Justice Amanullah had observed: "6.....the Court finds that the view taken by the Court below cannot be said to be unjustified or perverse. 7. In matters like the present, there is inbuilt protection given to the accused, that is, of the case against the accused being proved beyond reasonable doubt. This is based on the constitutional mandate. The prosecution has to bring home the charges and prove it to the level that the Court finds that such allegation has been proved to a point which would be acceptable to a prudent man. Stricter the law, the requirement of compliance with the procedure prescribed also are to be applied equally strictly while considering such cases. In the present case, the allegation of the opposite party having accepted a bribe, obviously visited her with serious penal consequences and, thus, clearly when a Court of law was called upon to adjudicate the matter arising out of such exercise, it had to be conscious of its responsibility to consider the matter objectively. Perusal of the judgment does not indicate that any issue has been left undiscussed. This objection has also not been raised by learned counsel for the appellant." 

Justice Amanullah added: "8. Coming to the issue of non-production of order constituting the trap team, which is one of the grounds for giving benefit of doubt to the accused (respondent), in the considered opinion of the Court, carries weight. Persons in official capacity are said to have acted to trap a person demanding bribe for acting in official pending matters/proceeding before the officer."

Justice Amanullah observed: "In the present case, the complaint was made by an Anganbari Sevika, that for closing a proceeding against her the accused was demanding a bribe for which complaint was made before the Economic Offences Unit. 9. The first and foremost requirement was to constitute a team to look into the matter. Upon such team being constituted, in accordance with law, by the Competent Authority, members of the team have the jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter of cross checking, preparing pre-trap memo followed by the exercise of actual trap and thereafter followed by a post-trap memo etc. When admittedly, before the Court there was no document to show that the trap team which had conducted the exercise was the team constituted by the Competent Authority to do so, the Court rightly has not gone on the self statement made by the concerned persons that they were members of such trap team. Where law presumes that there are orders on paper with regard to a certain fact, the original or its copies, which are admissible under law, have to be produced before the Court and proved in the manner required in law and only upon the same being done, the Court is required to take cognizance and accept the same. In the present case, when no such document was ever produced before the Court, the doubt with regard to the constitution of a trap team and action of the members who had conducted the exercise becomes open to speculation." 

Justice Amanullah had pointed out that "when the complainant herself during her cross-examination before the Court, has changed her version and the prosecution, had declared her to be hostile and thereafter proceeded to cross examine her, in which also statements contrary to the prosecution case have been made by the complainant, the authenticity and reliability of such witness clearly being doubtful, but necessarily, the benefit has to go to the accused. The Court having done that on this score also, cannot be faulted. Further, the prosecution during trial had produced some torn notes which were alleged to have been seized from the opposite party. The same being few in number, that too, in a torn condition, obviously raises serious doubts with regard to them being the notes which were sized from the possession of the opposite party. This by itself may be sufficient to raise bona fide doubt with regard to the authenticity of the recovery made from the opposite party of the so called bribe money, especially when the independent witnesses of search and seizure were also not examined. 11. Thus, on the basis of a combined effect of the facts and circumstances discussed by the Court below, it coming to the conclusion that reasonable doubts have been created with regard to the prosecution story, for which, in law, the benefit has to accrue to the accused, this Court does not find any error in the same which would require interference."

In his judgement, Justice Amanullah had concluded:"....the Court finds that the delay in filing of the appeal is due to deliberate laches on the part of the appellant which does not persuade the Court to condone such limitation. 16. Accordingly, on the ground of limitation as well as on merits, both Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 2019 as also Government Appeal (SJ) No. 18 of 2019 stand dismissed." Notably, only aodvocate Soni Srivastava had appeared on behalf the appellant, Economic Offences Unit through the Superintendent of Police, EOU, Patna.  

Supreme Court sets aside judgment by Justice Arun Kumar Jha, directed him to decide the appeal on merits in a corruption from Muzaffarpur

In The State of Bihar Through Vigilance vs. Sudha Singh (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. K. Singh delivered a 17-page long judgement dated March 20, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 19-page long judgment dated September 27, 2023 in Sudha Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar Through Vigilance (2023). The High Court had heard the appeal filed under Section 17 of the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 by the appellants against the judgment and order dated August 5, 2013 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Authorized Officer, Special Court No. 1, Muzaffarpur in Confiscation Case No. 06 of 2012, whereby and where under the trial court had passed an order for confiscation of the property of the appellants as per description in Schedule A and B of the petition under Section 13 of the Act. 

A Vigilance P.S. Case was instituted in 2009 under Sections 7/13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Sections 409, 201, 120B of the Indian Penal Code against
appellant no. 2/opposite party no. 1 and another on the basis of complaint received from one Rajeev Ranjan. The allegation against opposite party no. 1, the Inspector, Weights and Measurement, Muzaffarpur was for demanding bribe. A raid was conducted and opposite party no. 1 and another person were caught red handed while accepting bribe of Rs.1,700/- from the complainant. After conducting enquiry, the authorities came to know that opposite party no. 1 had amassed property worth Rs.10,50,501/- which was disproportionate to his known source of income. After submission of charge sheet in Vigilance P.S. Case of 2009, a regular FIR bearing Vigilance P.S. Case dated August 10, 2009 under Sections 7/13(2) read with section 13(1)(E) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was instituted against opposite party no. 1. During investigation it was found that opposite party no. 1 had amassed movable and immovable property in his own name as well as in the names of his wife (appellant no. 1 herein), sons and other family members. After further investigation the disproportionate assets have been found to be worth Rs.12,96,516/-. A charge sheet was submitted in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 84 of 2009 before the court of Special Judge, Vigilance-I, Patna. Thereafter, application has been moved before the learned Authorized Officer under Section 13 of the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 and prayer has been made for confiscation of property as shown in Schedule A and B of the petition.  Notices were issued and served upon three opposite parties and O.P. Nos. 1 and 2 are the appellants in the instant appeal. Opposite Party No. 3 died before investigation of the case and her death certificate was brought on record. 

The Authorized Officer considered the material before him partially allowed the confiscation in favour of the State holding that except for certain items in Schedule A and B, rest of the items were acquired by illegal means by O.P. No.1/Appellant No. 2. Being aggrieved by the order dated August 5, 2013 of the Authorized Officer, the appellants had filed the appeal in the High Court. 

The counsel of the appellant had submitted before the High Court that after death of the public servant confiscation proceeding does not remain maintainable since the case of the prosecution would not fall under Section 13 of the Act, 2009 and the properties of Sudha Singh, the appellant no. 1 cannot be confiscated by the State Government as the appellant no. 1 was not a government servant and she was not accused in vigilance case. He also submitted that after death of concerned public servant, the confiscation proceeding cannot proceed in respect of alleged disproportionate assets acquired by him in absence of statutory provisions and on this aspect learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court dated February 4, 2015 passed in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 225 of 2014, Parmeshwari Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance.

The issue raised by the appellant before the High Court was as to whether the confiscation proceedings could continue against the appellant after the death of public servant against whom there was allegation of acquiring disproportionate assets since the vigilance case against public servant was dropped whereas the other appellant before the High Court was not even accused in the case lodged under the Prevention of Corruption Act and was not proceeded under the Act of 2009.  

Justice Jha had observed:"If the statutory provisions do not provide for continuance of proceeding even after death of public servant against whom the proceedings for acquisition of disproportionate assets has been initiated and who has been facing trial under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and undergoing trial in the Act of 2009, no reliance of any of the authorities cited supra would be of help to the State since the facts and the law are quite different from the decision cited above. Similarly, the legal heirs of deceased public servant could not be substituted in his place for the purpose of continuation of confiscation proceedings. Moreover, the contention that the proceedings under Act, 2009 are civil in nature would not cut much ice since the Act of 2009 is a complete code and when it does not provide for
such situation, this Court cannot read something which is not there and prescribe a procedure which has not been provided by the legislature in its wisdom. So reliance placed on Shiv Shankar Varma & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance (supra) is misconceived and not applicable to the facts of this case."

He added:"Moreover, when Section 19 of the Act, 2009 itself provides that upon acquittal by the Special Court or in case of modification or annulment or the order of confiscation under Section 15 of the Act, the money or the property is liable to be returned to the person affected, such order needs to be withdrawn when the proceedings are dropped or cannot result in conviction due to death of the accused whose property is attached. Since the appeal is deemed to be continuance of trial and presumption of innocence of the accused would continue and could not vanish upon the death of the accused, so hardly find any merit in the submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the State." 

Justice Jha concluded:"The confiscation proceedings were initiated against the appellants after issuance of notice under Section 14(1) and (2) of Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009. After proceedings, the learned Authorized Officer partially allowed the application filed by the State through Public Prosecutor for confiscation of property. Since the appellant was never accused in the case lodged under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the deceased-appellant was the sole accused in the case, in absence of any provision to sustain the proceeding in case of death of public servant who illegally acquired the wealth
disproportionate to his known source of income, confiscation proceeding could not be continued. Moreover, there is no provision under the law for substitution of legal heirs or continuance of trial against opposite party when the public servant has died, such proceeding could not continue against the present appellant. Therefore, the order of learned Authorized Officer against the present appellant for confiscation of properties could not be upheld since it has not remain maintainable. 17. In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated 5th August, 2013 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge -cum- Authorized Officer, Special Court No. 1, Muzaffarpur in Confiscation Case No. 06 of 2012 become unsustainable against the appellant, Sudha Singh, and is liable to be set aside and, hence, the same is set aside." 

Supreme Court heard the appeal at the instance of the State of Bihar which took exception to the judgment by Justice Jha, which was allowed in favour of Sudha Singh, the Respondent, setting aside attachment proceedings against the respondent on account of the fact that her husband, namely Ravindra Prasad Singh, the main accused in two FIRs viz., Vigilance P.S. Case No.52/2009 under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and 409, 201, 120-B, Indian Penal Code 18602 Vigilance P.S. Case No. 84/2009 under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(e), Prevention of Corruption Act, had passed away on January 18, 2018. The High Court had held that the Bihar Special Courts Act (BSCA), 2009 had no provision to continue confiscation proceedings, upon the death of the public servant and as such, continuation thereof will lead to a travesty of justice. 

Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the confiscated properties in the name of a closed relative/spouse can continue to remain confiscated with the State, upon the death of the public servant. 

The case of the State was that the Justice Jha’s holding of proceedings of confiscation being automatically set aside on account of death of the accused is erroneous for the same does not flow from the statute. The only situations contemplated for refund of confiscated money or property are- the modification/ annulment
of the order of confiscation by the High Court in appeal or the accused is acquitted by the Special Court; the position in Bihar Special Courts Act is different and distinct from the Prevention of Corruption Act for it provides that if the accused public servants or family members are unable to explain the circumstances of the property being in their possession and ownership, the same are confiscated which is different from
attachment during pendency of trial; confiscation proceedings are not per se criminal proceedings as per Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar 2016 (3) SCC 183 and as such the general principle of abatement of criminal proceedings upon death of the accused, will not apply.  

Justice Karol found the answer to the question: when does a proceeding before a Court of law, abate in Gurmail Singh vs. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684, wherein Justice C.T Ravikumar observed as under: "27. The term 'abatement' or 'abate' has not been defined in CrPC. In the said circumstances, its dictionary meaning has to be looked into. As relates criminal proceedings going by the meaning given in Black's Law Dictionary, 10th Edn., abatement means “the discontinuation of criminal proceedings before they are concluded in the normal course of litigation, as when the defendant dies”. Thus, it can be seen that the meaning of “abatement” can only be taken in criminal proceedings as “discontinuation of such proceedings owing to the death of the accused/convict pending such proceedings”. In short, it would reveal that an appeal against conviction (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) would abate on the death of the appellant as in such a situation, the sentence under appeal could no longer be executed. 28. The abatement is certainly different from acquittal and a mere glance at the proviso to Section 394(2) CrPC, will make this position very clear. The said proviso reads thus: “Provided that where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the appellate court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate.”

Justice Karol observed: "....we may observe that it is a settled position in law that a non-public servant can be proceeded against when the initial case is registered under Section 13 of PC Act by virtue of Section 107 of Indian Penal Code." He added: "Section 15 BSCA itself provides that confiscation order be made after hearing the delinquent officer or any other person through whom the property or money in question is being held. When it provides that the other person in the equation can also be prosecuted insofar as the illegitimately procured property or money is taken away, the plain requirement is that at the time of initiation of the proceedings the person on whom proceedings under Section 13 of the PC Act are to be initiated, must be alive and noticed about such proceedings. The death of such a person does not extinguish the fact that confiscation order has been made after hearing the parties. 12. The BSCA is a special statute, enacted by the State legislature after having received Presidential assent therefor. The Act itself provides for the situations in which the money/property confiscated thereunder can be returned to the owner, making the legislative intent fairly clear and obvious. They are: (a) modification or annulment of the confiscation order by the High Court or (b) acquittal by the Special Court. In other words, no other possibilities have been accounted for."

Justice Karol pointed out that "the only path available to High Court was to decide the respondent’s appeal on merits for that route is the only one available to reach the two possibilities contemplated under this Act." The argument that "the BSCA does not provide for substitution of Legal representatives and so the proceedings cannot continue. Such a submission is entirely misconceived for the respondent had also been put to notice right at the inception of proceedings along with the delinquent officer."