Patna High Court quashes order by Bihar State Information Commission, Circle Officer, Siwan, Sadar, directs DM, Siwan to search or reconstruct required document under RTI Act

In Md. Rizwan vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026),  Justice Raj Kumar delivered a 15-page long judgement dated August 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"19. Taking into consideration, that the application was made by the petitioner in 2009 for obtaining this document and till 2026 this small issue is yet to be resolved, matter must be set at rest and steps should be taken up by the authorities to comply with the directions of this Court within a period of eight weeks. 20. In view of discussions made above the writ petition stands allowed, orders passed by the appellate authority dated 06.01.2012 in Case No. 37744/2010-11 of State Information Commission and the letter dated 28.06.2011 issued by respondent no. 3/P.I.O.-cum-Circle Officer, Siwan, Sadar, are hereby quashed. 21. Respondents are thus directed to ensure compliance in view of the directions given in Paragraph-17 of this order. The entire exercise should be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of this order. 22. The writ petition stands/allowed/disposed of in view of observations made aforesaid." The other five respondents are:2. The District Magistrate, Siwan, 3. The Circle Officer, Circle Office Siwan Sadar, Siwan, 4. The Circle Inspector cum Kanoongo, Circle Office Siwan Sadar, Siwan, 5. The Halka Karamchari, Circle Office Siwan Sadar, Siwan and 6. The State Information Commissioner, Bihar State Information Commission, Patna.

Paragraph 17 of the judgement reads:"In this background, the writ petition is allowed with following directions:-(i) The District Magistrate, Siwan, Sadar/Circle Officer (respondent no. 3), Siwan Sadar are thus directed to conduct a physical search of the barwarda register from the Circle Office or the office of the D.C.L.R. or District records, Siwan within four weeks and if the same is not traceable, then the authorities should reconstruct the record on the basis of the entries in the revenue records.
(ii) Secondly, if the document is found torn or not legible, then it could be digitized or enlarged or typed by the expert and it could be given to the petitioner after being certified by the concerned Circle Officer. This exercise should be carried out by the respondent authorities expeditiously.
(iii) At this juncture, if the document is traced out by the authorities, a communication to that effect be made to the petitioner to inspect the document in question along with his counsel so that petitioner is also made aware of the actual status of the document in question. If the petitioner finds that the document is torn or document is not legible and as such it will be difficult on part of the authorities to reconstruct or get it typed, petitioner can duly inform the authorities about his decision to either receive or not receive this document. It is expected that authorities will take proper steps in complying with the order and petitioner shall lend full cooperation to the authorities. However, if the parties’ fail to arrive at a definitive
conclusion and are at an impasse, regarding the receipt or non-receipt of the documents or as to the status or condition of the documents in question, the concerned authorities shall be obligated to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, providing cogent reasons to the effect that the information could not be given despite making best efforts to furnish/reconstruct the same to the petitioner and despite ensuring full compliance to the directions issued in the light of this judgment."

The judgement was passed upon hearing the counsel for the petitioner, the counsel for the State as well as counsel for the State Information Commission. 

The writ application was filed seeking the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the final order dated January 6, 2012 passed in Case No. 37744/2010-11, by the State Information Commission, Patna, Bihar, issued under memo no. 11206 dated 11.01.2012, whereby and whereunder, the Respondent No. 6 has deemed it fit to drop the entire proceedings, while admitting the justification provided by PIO-cum-Circle Officer, Siwan, Sadar (Respondent No. 3), under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and as such refused to furnish the certified copy of the barwarda and Register- II to the petitioner. The petitioner also prayed for the quashing of the memo No. 605 ii dated 28.06.2011, issued by the Respondent No. 3, whereby the Respondent No. 3 refused to furnish the aforesaid documents to the petitioner, stating that since the requisitioned documents are not available in original and whatever is available is in an unreadable condition, therefore, a certified true copy of the same cannot be supplied. The writ petitioner had prayed for the issuance of a direction to the Respondent Authorities for the consideration of the petitioner’s objection dated July 30, 2011, preferred before Respondent No. 6. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated January 6, 2012 passed by the Respondent No. 6 is cryptic, unreasoned and non-speaking. He submitted that the impugned order was passed without considering the information supplied by the petitioner in the objection filed by him. It was submitted that it was the obligatory duty on part of the quasi-judicial authority, to pass a reasoned order with respect to the issues raised, for ensuring lawful adjudication. Hence, he submitted that the impugned order dated January 6, 2012 been passed against the mandate of the RTI Act, 2005. The counsel submitted that once request for information was sought under the terms prescribed under Section 6(1) of the RTI Act, the Public Information Officer is obligated to dispose of such request within a period of thirty days as envisaged under Section 7 of the RTI Act.It was also submitted the information which was sought by the petitioner did not fall within the purview of ‘exempted information’ within the meaning of Section 8 of the RTI Act. Based on the combined reading of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the RTI Act, it was contended that the respondents could not deny the furnishing of the information sought by the petitioner. On the factual aspect, learned counsel has pointed out the contradictory stand that unfolds on a bare perusal of the letter issued by Respondent No. 3 dated June 28, 2011, to the petitioner wherein, the P.I.O.-cum-Circle Officer/Respondent No. 3, Siwan Sadar refused the furnishing of the required document on the ground that it was not available in original and at the same time stated that the document in question was not legible/unreadable and therefore, a certified true copy of the same could not be supplied. Furthermore, this contradictory stand was reflected and would be apparent upon a plain reading of the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent No. 6, at paragraph-11, which showed that the respondents have acted in a contradictory and capricious manner. 

The counsel contended that the objection dated July 30, 201 filed by him with the writ application before Respondent No. 6, was not considered while passing the final order dated January 6, 2012 in Case No. 37744/2010-11, as the impugned order made no reference to the objection filed by the petitioner, and thus, it did not reflect any consideration on this issue. It was submitted that the impugned order suffered from the vice of illegality and unreasonableness. The counsel also pointed out that vide Annexure-9, he has specifically mentioned the details of the persons to whom the certified copy and copy of the barwarda and register-II pertaining to the same Halka and Tauzi have been issued from the Circle Office, Siwan, Sadar. This fact has not been denied by the respondents in their respective counter affidavits, as in response to the same they have only mentioned that the same was a matter of record. 

The counsel further submitted that the petitioner requires the required documents/information for submitting it before the concerned Court in Title Suit No. 106/1992 and thus, he required the documents in his support for the factual adjudication of the title suit, pending before the concerned court. He pointed out that there was no reason as to why the authorities could not grant him the requisite information or documents, when the same was a public document under Section 74 of Indian Evidence Act. The counsel also submitted that the plea of non-availability of records was unsubstantial and mala fide in as much as the State Information Commission has the power to conduct an inquiry, if it is satisfied that reasonable grounds warranting the same exist, before passing of a final order as enshrined under Section 18 (2) and (3) of the RTI Act. The counsel pointed out that the second appeal was filed by the appellant on May 18, 2010, but was disposed of only on July 30, 2011, i.e., almost after a year and it also in a way frustrated the mandate of Section 19(3) of the RTI Act. It was pointed out that in terms of Section 19(6) of the RTI Act, no time limit has been prescribed for the disposal of the second appeal and the same only stipulates that an appeal under sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 19 shall be disposed of within a period of 30 days or within such extended period not exceeding 45 days from the date of filing of such appeal. Thus, upon a combined reading of Section 19 and specifically sub-Section (6) it could be construed that the second appeal must also be disposed of within a period of thirty days or within such extended period not exceeding 45 days. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the judgment dated October 29, 2015 passed by the Karnataka High Court in Jayaprakash Reddy vs. Central Information Commission (In writ petition nos. 28310-28311 and 45540-45542 as well as the judgment dated July 7, 2010 by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Akhil Kumar Roy vs. The West Bengal Information Commission and Ors. in writ petition no. 11933 of 2010. In both the judgments, it has been categorically held that the second appeal should be decided within a period of 30 days or within such extended period not exceeding 45 days from the date of the filing of the appeal. 

The counsel for the State submitted that barwarda is not a public document, as stated in paragraph-4 of their counter affidavit. It was argued that barwarda means a partition of tauzi by the ex-landlord amongst their co-sharers themselves and is an unsurveyed land of which Khatiyan was not prepared and therefore, barwarda in original was not available in Circle Office and it was not possible to furnish the certified copy of the same. It was also argued by the State that no Jamabandi has been created in respect of the barwarda land and in that context the State Information Commission vide final order dated January 6, 2012, issued in memo no. 11206, dated January 11, 2012, rightly closed the proceedings. 

The counsel appearing on behalf of the State Information Commission was also filed an affidavit and defended the impugned orders and has contended that the document was not available in original, rather the photocopy of the same is available in a very unreadable and torn condition and thus, it is a settled principle of law that no certified copy of a photocopy can be issued. Since the barwarda in original was not present in the Circle Office, Siwan, Sadar, hence, a certified copy of the same cannot be granted by the respondent authorities. The counsel also contended that the information had already been furnished after due consideration and a proper compliance of the order dated March 10, 2011 was made. In this view, reference has been drawn to paragraph-11 of the counter affidavit filed by the Respondent No. 6. The counsel of the State Information Commission also submitted that while passing of the impugned order, the State Information Commission had gone through the objections raised by the petitioner and after due consideration of the same had issued directions to the Public Information Officer-cum-Circle Officer for providing due justification under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act, 2005, and after considering entire materials on record has rightly dropped the proceedings. The counsel argued that the petitioner had not appeared before the appellate authority on the date of passing of the impugned order. The counsel for the State Information Commission contended that the barwarda was not a public document and further, in view of the fact that the document in original was not available, hence the certified copy of the said barwarda could not be furnished to the petitioner.

Justice Kumar considered the issue as to whether the barwarda could be given to the petitioner when the same was untraceable or present in an unreadable form and observed: "Coming to the etymology of the document in question, it is defined as an year wise rent payment and it may not be registered but is used to determine the rent paid by the co-sharers, which is used as proof in partition suits as well as for Order 20 Rule 20 of the CPC. It contains the details of the co-sharers and further regarding the rent paid by them to the extent of their share of the Khesra or as per payment register to identify the co-sharers paying rent. This document is a public document as defined under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, which can be used as an exhibit in a suit and as evidence under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act as it is a Government record and can also be adduced as a secondary evidence." 

Justice Kumar relied on para-8 of the decision rendered in Anil Kumar Shukla vs. Central Public Information Officer, Ministry of Human Resource and Development Department of Higher Education, Decision No. CIC/MOHRD/A/2018/129097/01715. It reads: “Prima facie, any public authority cannot deny the right of the appellant to get the information by putting forward an excuse of the file going missing. The defence of missing file cannot be accepted even under the RTI Act. If the file is really not traceable, it reflects on the inefficient management of files by the public authority. If the file could not be traced in spite of best efforts, it is the duty of the respondent authority to reconstruct the file or develop a mechanism to address the issue raised by the appellant.”

Patna High Court's judgement recorded that "Under Rule 80 of the Bihar Records Manual, 1960, it has been stipulated that the District Collector is responsible to account for all missing files. Section 4 (1) of the R.T.I. Act, 2005, also emphasises that Public Information Officers have a duty to maintain all records which facilitates furnishing of the information. In this regard, reference has been made to Rule 230 of the Bihar Records Manual, 1960 wherein it has been stipulated that when a document is found to be illegible, it may be destroyed only after the same has been personally inspected by the Collector/S.D.O. The authorities therefore are duty bound to assign the reason for the destruction of the document and accordingly a memorandum must be prepared stating the fact of destruction, the nature of document destroyed and the same must bear the signature of the Collector/S.D.O. Hence, there appears to be a complete violation of the Rule 230, of the Bihar Records Manual, 1960 on part of the respondent authorities.

Justice Kumar also concluded: "14. What comes out in this matter for adjudication is that the respondents have not denied that the document/barwarda was falling within the parameters or purview of an exempted information within the meaning of Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005. On the one hand, while the authorities have categorically mentioned that the document in the original was not present at the Circle Office, Siwan, Sadar, but at the same time they have mentioned that a photocopy of the same was available in an unreadable and torn condition. These two statements are contradictory to each other and strikes at the core of the object underlining the R.T.I. Act, 2005. It is also taken into consideration by this Court that the objection filed by the petitioner vide Annexure-9 to the writ petition in which it was mentioned that the other persons, who had made applications for the procuring this barwarda document had been handed over the documents in question. Although, no averments have been made by the concerned authorities denying the claim or the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 15. In the background of these facts, this Court is of the opinion that it is the statutory duty of the public authority to maintain all records which can facilitate the furnishing of information under the R.T.I. Act, 2005. It is also not in dispute that if original is damaged, then a secondary evidence can be created by a typed transcript prepared by Anchal Amin and attested by Circle Officer from the Lagan Rasheed as well as Khesra copy of the land pertaining to the said barwarda. 16. It is incumbent upon the authorities to maintain the records manual. The document being torn or not being legible or untraceable cannot be a ground to deny the furnishing of information which is a public record. The State cannot take advantage of its own failure to preserve records."

The counsel had further pointed out the provision of Section 19 of the R.T.I. Act, wherein, no time frame has been stipulated for disposing of the second appeal. The counsel referred to the judgments reported in Jayaprakash Reddy and Akhil Kumar Roy (supra) in which it has been held that the appeals should be decided within a period of 45 days as it would be travesty of justice if the appeals are kept pending and undecided for a long period. The judgement reads: "This Court is of the view that a second appeal must be decided within a period of 30 days or within such period not exceeding 45 days as decided through various judgments referred above so that, the person seeking information is not left remediless." 

 

Buxar (Town) P.S. FIR of 2020 regarding alleged bribe of Rs 500, proceedings before Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna quashed for inexplicable inaction of 5 years, 10 months: Justice Ansul

In Ratneshwar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, he concluded:"14. The delay in this case is entirely attributable to the investigating agency. The petitioner has not caused it, has not absconded and has been present. Nothing has been placed before this Court to show any extraordinary or exceptional reason for five years and ten months of inaction. The burden which the Full Bench of this Court laid down in Madheshwardhari Singh(supra) has not been discharged by the State in any measure. 15. In the result, this petition is allowed. The FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated 05.09.2020 under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Town Police Station, Buxar, and all proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, are hereby quashed." 

Prior to the judgement, Justice Ansul had passed an order dated March 24, 2026 directing the respondents  "to conclude the investigation within a month. If the investigation is not concluded within a month, the Court will be constrained to apply its mind towards quashing of the F.I.R on the grounds of delay in submission of charge-sheet." 

The other six respondents were: 2. District Magistrate, Buxar, Additional Collector, Buxar Bihar 4. The Superintendent of Police, (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna, 5. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna, 6. S.H.O. Town Police Station, Buxar and 7. Senior Treasury Officer, Buxar. In its order dated June 16, 2026, it was recorded that "Till 21.04.2026 the investigation was not concluded." despite High Court's order. The case was regarding an alleged bribery. The Buxar police failed to trace the recipient of the Rs 7500, the alleged bribery amount.  

The judgement relied on paragraph 27 and paragraph 50 of the judgement by High Court's Full Bench of 19th Chief Justice Surjit Singh Sandhawalia, Justices S. Shamsul Hasan and Ram Nandan Prasad in Madheshwardhari Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324, which considered the question whether the right to a speedy public trial is applicable only to the proceedings in court stricto sensu or includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. 

The Full Bench held: “27. … it is held that the right to speedy public trial is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as  well......Xxx 50. A sharp note of caution must be sounded. The aforesaid finding must not be misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than seven years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought to be laid down is the extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed and the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established. Really, I am somewhat hesitant in spelling out even the aforesaid outer time limit which, perhaps, errs on the side of strictitude. But since we are following binding precedent, the same has to be unreservedly accepted. Nor is it sought to be laid down that in a lesser period than seven years an accused person would not be able to establish circumstances pointing to the patent prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the guarantee of speedy public trial under Art. 21. That is a question which can be properly considered and adjudicated where it may expressly arise. In both the cases before us the delay is admittedly even far beyond the outer limit of seven years. What indeed is sought to be laid down here is that beyond this period of seven years the continuation of the investigation and trial would bring in the weightiest presumption that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is violated and the prosecution should be halted in its tracks. This would per se be indicative of prejudice. Thereafter the burden would automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of the State to show that such grave delay was either entirely the handiwork of the accused himself or was occasioned by such special and exceptional circumstances so as to merit condonation thereof. A criminal prosecution by the State cannot be allowed to become an inquisitorial persecution of the accused. Nor cap, a fair speedy trial be allowed to become an unending travail for him....Xxx 52. … it is held that an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. It is further held that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art. 21.” 

Justice Ansul noted that the constitutional foundation underlying this position was laid by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, which held that the procedure under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just, and that a procedure which is not so is void. Building on that, the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 held that “no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21” and that “the State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources.” 

The judgement referred to the judgement by Supreme Court's Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 which crystallised this into a set of propositions at paragraph 86, the governing ones being that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and encompasses all stages including investigation, and that ordinarily where this right is found to have been infringed the charges shall be quashed. 

Notably, applying these principles to a corruption matter arising from this State, the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Das vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 held at paragraphs 7 to 9 that “cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay” and that while interference at the investigation stage is ordinarily not called for, “it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of time.” Similary, In Ramanand Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 153, the Supreme Court quashed prosecution in a corruption matter from this State after finding that following an initial raid no action was taken for six years and that the prosecution, which had dragged on for thirteen years in all, had become a travesty of justice. In Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, which concerned a matter from this State where investigation had proceeded fitfully over seventeen years, the Court reiterated at paragraph 25 that where the right to speedy trial is infringed the charges may be quashed. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for quashing of the FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated September 5, 2020 and the entire proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, both arising out of alleged offences under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

The petitioner, Ratneshwar Kumar, was a Data Entry Operator (Grade-A) at the Buxar Treasury and has been dismissed from service. On July 22, 2020, one Saryu Ojha, a pensioner, visited the Treasury and was paid his pension on the same day. This appeared to be the event at the heart of this prosecution, though what is curious is that the FIR was not registered on that date, nor was any complaint made anywhere near that date. A video surfaced on social media on August 28, 2020, more than a month later of the said occurrence, purporting to show the petitioner receiving money from Saryu Ojha. The  District Magistrate, Buxar, upon noticing the video, directed the Additional Collector to hold an enquiry. The Additional Collector returned a finding against the petitioner vide letter dated September 4, 2020 and recommended registration of a case. Accordingly, the Senior Treasury Officer, Ajmal Ali Ansari, addressed a written complaint vide letter dated September 5, 2020 to the SHO, Town Police Station, Buxar, and the present Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 came to be registered under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Investigation was entrusted to CI Mukesh Kumar Shree.  

The Court found that no specific demand is mentioned in the FIR therein, no occasion of acceptance is identified, no sum was described as a bribe, and no time or place where illegal gratification was said to have changed hands finds mention. The date of occurrence is recorded as August 28, 2020, being the date the video went viral, and not the date the pension was paid. The complainant, Ajmal Ali Ansari, was the petitioner’s superior officer at the Treasury and was plainly not present at the place of occurrence , where the alleged transaction between Ratneshwar Kumar and Saryu Ojhais said to have taken place. Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 require, at their very threshold, proof of acceptance or obtaining of undue advantage and such undue advantage must pass from an identifiable person to a public servant. But in this case, the only person from whom it is alleged to have passed is Saryu Ojha himself. It is in the context of that statutory requirement that the investigative record becomes fatal to the prosecution. Saryu Ojha’s statement was recorded during investigation. The Court considered that statement. Saryu Ojha, the alleged source of the bribe, the man whose visit to the Treasury on July 22, 2020 gave rise to this entire case, stated that he has no recollection of having paid any illegal gratification to the petitioner. Without his testimony implicating the petitioner, the essential ingredient of the offences alleged simply does not arise.

The case against the petitioner begins and ends with Saryu Ojha. But his statement does not support it. Ujjawal Ojha, who is the grandson of Saryu Ojha and the person who made and spread the video, gave a written statement before the Police Inspector, Town Anchal, Buxar. In that statement, as appears from the record, he stated that his grandfather had given a total of Rs. 8,000/-, out of which Rs. 500/-was given to the petitioner towards petrol and vehicle hire charges, and that no illegal gratification was paid to Ratneshwar Kumar. He also stated that the video was made due to a misunderstanding. Shrikant Ojha and Ramakant Ojha, both sons of Saryu Ojha, also stated to the police that their father had given no illegal gratification and that whatever money passed hands was on account of transport expenses. 

Justice Ansul recorded: "In the considered opinion of this Court, there is not even one person with direct knowledge of the events of 22.07.2020 who has supported the case that any bribe was paid. The prosecution rests entirely on a video, and the maker of that video has retracted.  9. Apart from the merits, there is the independent question of the delay in investigation. The FIR was registered on 05.09.2020. Today is 23.06.2026, which makes it five years and ten months. The pen drive which carries the viral video, the sole piece of material evidence in this entire prosecution, has not been sent for Forensic Science Laboratory examination. No chargesheet has been filed. No charge has been framed before the learned Special Judge till date. The order dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in Special Case No. 22 of 2020, which is Annexure-2 of the petition, reflects that even nearly three years after registration of the FIR, the final form had not been submitted. When the matter was taken up before this Court on the last date, the SDPO appeared and disclosed that the pen drive had been acquired, however no explanation was offered for the delay of five years and ten months of an inactive investigation." 

Justice Ansul recollected that Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339, decided on November 20, 2025, held that “investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed.”

The judgement referred to Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 laid down the categories of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised, and two of those categories are squarely attracted here. One is where the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support thereof do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused. The other is where continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 

The Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held at paragraph 36 that “the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the appellants herein.”

Justice Ansul clarified that he has not overlooked the position taken in Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta vs. B. Srinivas, (2008) 8 SCC 580 that mere delay in investigation does not by itself furnish universal ground for quashing and that each case must be evaluated on its own facts. That is precisely what has been done here. The present order does not rest on the ground of delay alone. It rests with equal force on the merits of the case as disclosed by the material collected during investigation, which does not make out any offence under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner.

Earlier, the case was before Justice Sandeep Kumar and Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. 

Acting Chief Justice led bench sets aside judgement of Justice Mohit Kumar Shah but does not order return of arms and license

In Md. Kaisar Warsi vs. The State of Bihar Through the Home Secretary & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 8-page long judgement dated May 12, 2025 setting aside the 13-page long judgement dated September 5, 2023 by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah of the High Court which had upheld orders of District Magistrate, Saharsa and Commissioner, Saharsa regarding cancellation of license under Section 17 of the Arms Act. 

The appellant/writ petitioner was a holder of arms license. On March 19, 2021, he was served with a notice by the District Magistrate, Saharsa asking him to explain within 24 hours as to the number of cartridges purchased and spent for a period of 15 years ranging from 2005 to 2020. It appeared from the notice that in the official records, evidence was available of purchase of 1350 cartridges, the last of the purchases having been made on December 25, 2020. The appellant petitioner replied that over a period of 15 years, the cartridges have been spent on special days as also for checking up the fitness of the weapon and he is in possession of 48 cartridges as on that date. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Saharsa by his order dated August 5, 2021, assumed that the writ petitioner has violated the condition of not indulging in celebratory firing, cancelled the license of the petitioner. This order was sustained by the appellate authority and both the orders were validated by Justice Shah, the Single Judge of the High Court. The reasoning adopted by him in upholding these orders was that even though proscription on celebratory firing was incorporated in the Arms Act only in the year 2019 but then, an additional condition in the Arms Rules, namely, Sub-Clauses -7, 8 and 9 of Arms Rules of 2016, having been violated, the holder of license lost his right for holding such fire-arm and the District Magistrate, Saharsa was perfectly within his rights to cancel his license under Section 17 of the Arms Act.

The High Court's Division Bench observed:"We are not in agreement with the aforenoted logic and reason provided by the learned Single Judge. Section 17 provides the power to the Licensing Authority to vary the conditions subject to which the license has been granted, except such of them as has been prescribed and may for that purpose require the license holder by a notice in writing to deliver up the license to it within such time as may be specified in the notice. A Licensing Authority may, by order in writing suspend a license for any such period which he thinks fit or revoke a license. If the Licensing Authority is satisfied that the holder of the license is prohibited by the Arms Act or by any other law for the time being in force from acquiring, possessing or carrying any arms or ammunition or is of unsound mind or is for any other reason unfit for a license or if it is necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the license or if the license was obtained by fraud and suppression of material information or if any of the conditions of the license has been contravened. The license could also be revoked or suspended if a license holder fails to comply with the notice under Section 17 requiring him to deliver up the license. It appears that none of these conditions were available for the cancellation of license of the appellant /writ petitioner."

The Bench further observed:"We are also surprised at the contents of the notice given to the appellant asking him to explain within 24 hours, on day to day basis for fifteen years the details of the occasions on which the cartridges purchased by him were spent. We have perused the reply furnished by the appellant, which does not specifically admits of the appellant having spent the cartridges on celebratory firing after 2019. All that the explanation discloses is that 1350 cartridges were acquired over a long period of time from different sources under the license and were spent on special days as also for the purposes of checking the fitness of the weapon so that it is not rendered unfit by disuse. Based on the aforenoted explanation, a police report was called for from the Superintendent of Police, wherein also, no adverse report came against the appellant. Without any further notice to the appellant to deliver up his license and the fire arm and intimating him the reason for proceeding to cancel his license, the license was cancelled only on the ground of having used the weapon for celebratory firing."

Although Justice Shah noted that the proscription of celebratory firing was brought into the statute from the year 2019, he only relied upon three of the clauses, namely, 7, 8 and 9 of Arms Rules of 2016 to justify the order of cancellation of license and its validation by the appellate authority.

Notably, it was recorded in the Justice Shah's judgement that the petitioner had submitted that prior to the amendment of the Arms Act, 1959, which came into effect from December 14, 2019, celebratory firing was not prohibited. It was also submitted that only with effect from that day, Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 was amended and sub-section (9) was added thereto, which reads as follows:-
“(9) Whoever uses firearm in a rash or negligent manner or in celebratory gunfire so as to endanger human life or personal safety of others shall be punishable with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which lakh, or with both.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “celebratory gunfire” means the practice of using fire-arm in public gatherings, religious places, marriage parties or other functions to fire ammunition.]” 

It was submitted that since celebratory firing was not prohibited prior to December 14, 2019, the petitioner could not have been penalized by cancelling the arms license, hence the order dated August 5, 2021, passed by the District Magistrate, Saharsa, as also the appellate order dated June 3, 2022 was fit to be set aside.

Justice Shah's judgement recorded that the petitioner had submitted his reply dated April 3, 2021, stating therein that he has used 1302 cartridges in between the years 2005 to 2020, for not only testing his rifle but also on the occasion of Eid and Deepawali. His judgement reads: "This Court finds that the amendment in the Arms Act, 1959 has come into force with effect from 14.12.2019, whereby sub-section (9) has been added to Section 25, which prohibits celebrating firing, hence, considering the fact that the petitioner has submitted his reply dated 03.04.2021, admitting therein that he has engaged in celebratory firing on the occasion of Eid and Deepawali in between the years 2005 to 2020, he is definitely liable for penal consequences/cancellation of his arms license, inasmuch as the year 2020 is definitely covered by the aforesaid amendment. Nevertheless, this Court finds that under the old Arms Rules, 1962, certain conditions have been prescribed as pre-requisites for possessing arms license and one of the conditions is that the licensee shall not carry any arms to a fair, religious procession or other public assemblage or within the campus or precincts of any educational institutions, meaning thereby that no arms can be taken to a religious procession or in marriage festivities. In fact, the amended Arms Rules, 2016, which undeniably covers the present case, also postulates various conditions required to be adhered to for possessing an arms license and the same not only prohibits carrying of fire-arms to a fire-arm free zone or in a public place but also prohibits brandishing of fire-arms in public place or firing fire-arms in any public place on the occasion of marriage, public assembly, fair or procession or any public event."

Justice Shah's judgement pointed out that "the petitioner has admitted to celebratory firing on the occasion of Eid and Deepawali festival, apart from having engaged in such firing on the occasion of marriage ceremony as is apparent not only from the reply of the petitioner dated 03.04.2021, but also from the order dt. 03.6.2022, passed by the Commissioner, Koshi Division, Saharsa and from the report of the Police Officer, Sour Bazar Police Station annexed as annexure-4 series to the writ petition, which has been heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, wherein it has been stated that the petitioner has himself informed the said police officer that on the occasion of Eid and other festivals as also on the occasion of marriage ceremonies, he has been engaging in firing in the air." 

Justice Shah's concluded:"this Court finds that the petitioner has not only violated the conditions prescribed for the purposes of possessing an arms license, as postulated under the Arms Rules, 1962 and the Arms Rules, 2016 but has also contravened Section 25 (9) of the Arms Act, 1959, as amended with effect from 14.12.2019, thus the license of the petitioner has rightly been cancelled by the District Magistrate, Saharsa, by the impugned order dt. 05.08.2021. Consequently, the appellate order dated 03.06.2022 also does not suffer either from jurisdictional error or any illegality. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned, hereinabove, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition, hence the same stands dismissed."

Based on documents on record, Justice Shah's judgement had inferred that the petitioner had admitted that he has been engaging in firing in the air on the occasion of Eid and other festivals as also on the occasion of marriage ceremonies even after 2019. 

The Division Bench pointed out that "In the absence of any adverse report and nothing specific in the explanation of the appellant of having admitted to celebratory firing after 2019, the decisions of the authorities, namely, the District Magistrate and the Commissioner appear to be totally unwarranted and based on complete non-application of mind."

The Division Bench concluded:"For the aforenoted reasons, we set aside the orders passed by the District Magistrate, Saharsa dated 05.08.2021 and the Commissioner dated 03.06.2022 in appeal and the judgment of learned Single Judge upholding the aforenoted two orders. However, we direct the District Magistrate, Saharsa/respondent no. 7 to serve a fresh notice to the appellant, within a period of 30 days from today and seek explanation from him as to why his license be not cancelled for having resorted to celebratory firing from 2019 onwards. After the explanation is received and the police report confirms that there had been violation of anyone of the conditions of license, a reasoned order by the District Magistrate shall be passed within a further period of 90 days, which shall be made known to the appellant forthwith. There would be no necessity of returning the arms and license to the appellant in the meanwhile. The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above." The other six respondents were: Divisional Commissioner Koshi Division, Saharsa, Superintendent of Police, Saharsa, Additional District Magistrate, (Arms) Saharsa, District Arms Magistrate, Saharsa,  S.H.O. Sour Bazar Police Station, Saharsa and District Magistrate, Saharsa respectively. The judgement of the Division Bench was authored by Justice Kumar.