Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's order, grants regular bail

In Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi passed an order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it reversed the order dated April 20, 2026 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court, and granted regular bail. Even according to the prosecution there was no recovery of weapon from the appellant. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "Hence, we are of the considered view that the Appellant is entitled for bail, released on regular bail. The appeal is allowed and the Impugned Order is hereby set aside. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be deemed fit and appropriate by the jurisdictional Court."

The appellant was arraigned as an accused in a FIR of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(1), 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He approached the Supreme Court for being enlarged on regular bail after his prayer made before the Trial Court and the High Court was negatived.

Supreme Court's order recorded that from the submissions of the advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the counter affidavit, it "emerged from the records that the allegation made in the complaint is the effect that appellant and co-accused had arrived at the informant’s house with firearms and lathis and it was alleged that appellant fired at the informant namely Binod Kumar causing a gunshot injury in left eye."

The counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the FIR is counter blast to the attack initiated by the informant side and in this regard, an FIR has been registered in FIR No.298 of 2025 by the appellant’s family alleging that the informant side had attacked with sticks and Binod Kumar had fired from country made pistol 6 to 7 times. Hence, the appellant sought for grant of regular bail. The advocates appearing for the parties, it emerged from the records that co-accused (had already been enlarged on bail). Although there was a specific allegation of firing against the appellant, the fact remains that, as per the averments made in the complaint that other co-accused also had carried the firearms.  

Earlier, in Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated April 20, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has fired and injured the victim, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." The petitioner had approached the High Court for bail in connection with a Koilwar P.S. Case No. 297/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 190, 191(2), 191(3), 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3) of B.N.S. and Section 27 of Arms Act. 

Section 190: Every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of a common object. 

Section 191(2): Rioting (using force or violence as an unlawful assembly of 5 or more people), punishable with up to 2 years imprisonment, a fine, or both. 

Section 191(3): Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon, punishable with up to 5 years imprisonment, a fine, or both.

Section 126(2): Punishment for wrongful restraint (voluntarily obstructing someone to prevent them from moving in a direction they have a right to go).

Section 115(2): Voluntarily causing hurt (physical assault/marpit), punishable with up to 1 year imprisonment, a fine up to ₹10,000, or both.

Section 109: Punishment for abetment if the act abetted is committed and no explicit provision is made for its punishment.

Section 352: Punishment for assault or use of criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation.

Section 351(2) and (3): Criminal intimidation; sub-section (3) applies if the threat involves causing death, grievous hurt, or destruction of property, carrying a higher imprisonment term (up to 7 years)

Section 27 of the Indian Arms Act of 1959: sets the penalties for using arms and ammunition illegally. The severity of the punishment depends on whether standard or prohibited weapons are involved and if the illegal use results in loss of life.

As per the prosecution case, petitioner is a accused of firing upon the victim and causing fire arm injury in the thigh. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that petitioner was falsely implicated in the case. It was also submitted that the injury was not on the vital part of the body of the victim. He submitted that he was no criminal antecedent in which he was on bail and he was in custody since December 29, 2025. The petitioner is the son of Baliram Rai, a resident of Chhotaka Chanda, Koilwar, Bhojpur. Now Supreme Court has granted bail to the petitioner. 

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Supreme Court to pronounce its verdict on the judgment passed by Justice Anjana Prakash led Division Bench in a murder case from Arara, Adapur, East Champaran

A criminal appeal, Dhrub Singh vs. The State of Bihar was filed in the Supreme Court on April 16, 2016 was filed against the judgment authored by Justice Anjana Prakash of Patna High Court as part of a Division Bench. It was registered on August 14, 2017. Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan heard the matter on January 23, 2025 and passed a 3-page long order. The arguments were concluded on August 21, 2026 and the order was reserved. The counsels appearing for the parties to file their respective written submissions by August 22, 2026.

In this case three appellants have prayed for bail pending the final disposal of their respective criminal appeals which are pending for final hearing before the Court. They were convicted for the offence of murder and their appeals by before the High Court also failed. Supreme Court took notice of the fact that in all eight accused were put to trial. One of the co-accused died during the pendency of the trial. The main accused who is said to have fired had already undergone the sentence of life imprisonment and was released. Out of six convicts, three were ordered to be released on bail by this Court vide orders dated August 10, 2022, December 5, 2022 and July 17, 2023 respectively. The order reads: "7. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are inclined to consider the plea of the three appellants before us for bail. 8. They have also undergone almost 9 years of sentence so far. Out of the three appellants, two of the appellants have undergone almost 9 years of sentence so far, whereas the third appellant has undergone 8 years & 5 months of sentence. 9. All the applications for bail stand allowed. 10. The appellants(convicts) are ordered to be released on bail subject to the same terms and conditions as imposed in the orders passed by this Court at the time of releasing the other co-accused on bail."

In Dhrub Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra delivered a 20-page long judgment dated December 9, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"16. As for alternative argument of considering the case of non-assailants, even while we are inclined to disbelieve the prosecution case in so far as the Appellant Chunnu Singh having ordered Appellant Pappu Singh to fire is concerned, but fact remains that all the accused variously armed had come together and fired which makes out a case of accused having common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased. In such circumstances, we find no merit in such submission. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same is dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

The appellant Pappu Singh was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 I.P.C., 2 years R.I. under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act and also fine of Rs.3000. 

The appellant Dhrub Singh and Appellant Dharmender Singh @ Tarzan Singh @ Tarzan and appellant Dharmendra Singh were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C., 2 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years rigorous imprisonmentunder Section 27 of the Arms Act with a fine of Rs.3000/. The appellant Chunnu Singh @ Subhash Chandra Singh @ Subhash Chander Singh and appellants Brajesh Singh and Subhash Singh were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 I.P.C. and one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147 I.P.C. by judgment dated 29.11.2010 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in a Sessions Trial of 2002.

The case of the prosecution according to the Informant Kundan Kumar (P.W.7), son of the deceased, was that on April 19, 2001 at about 2.30 p.m. he left home along with the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh, their Sepoy Chandeshwar Singh, co-villager Bhagirath Thakur and cousin Nilesh Kumar Sharma for their agricultural farm. When they were in the middle of Arara village and Laxmipur School at about 03.30 p.m. suddenly 7-8 persons came, who were identified as Chunnu Singh, Pappu Singh, out of which Chunnu Singh told Pappu Singh to fire at the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh and he did so on taking position from the back, on account of which his father fell down. Just then Appellant Dhrub Singh fired at him but he was somehow saved. They all started running but Brajesh Singh ordered that everyone should be killed else they would go to the police, at which Appellants Dharmendra singh @ Tarzan and Dharmendra Singh started firing but their shots did not hit them. They noticed a patrolling party approaching, at which the accused started fleeing, saying that the deceased had been killed which needed to be reported to Madan Singh that the work had been accomplished. They then took the deceased to Dunkan Hospital, Raxaul but the doctor declared him dead. The dead body of his father was brought home. The motive for the occurrence was that the daughter of Major Harendra Singh had been kidnapped on August 29, 2000 by his co-villager Ramesh Singh. The past Mukhiya Madan Mohan Singh, Dharmendra Singh son of Madan Mohan Singh, Chunnu Singh, Dharmendra Singh @ Tarzan, Subhash Singh, Sanjeet Singh, Manoj Singh, Arvind Singh, Brajesh Singh had come to his village and proposed to his father that he was a reputed person and he should try to use his influence for recovering the girl. His father had made enquiry but it was found that Ramesh Singh had fled away with the girl, on account of which the girl was not recovered. Madan Mohan Singh had felt insulted on account of the inability of the Appellant and had started instigating others that the deceased had played with the reputation of their villagers. On September 12, 2000 Adapur P.S. case was instituted in regard to the case aforesaid. His brother Sanju Dubey (P.W.5) was also sought to be implicated in the case but final report was submitted in his regard. Then in another case, namely, Adapur P.S. case of 2000, once again his name was given but final report was submitted. His cousin brother Satyendra Dubey was a candidate for Mukhiya election and there was every chance of his winning which had caused apprehension in the mind of Madan Mohan Singh, the previous Mukhiya, Arera, who had got the deceased killed. This information was given in the presence of Nilesh Kumar (P.W.2) and Hridesh Dubey (P.W.3) at 06.45 p.m. at home. 

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the manner of occurrence has not been proved by the prosecution on account of various factors, one of which is that important witnesses, such as, patrolling party and the Doctor at Dunkan Hospital have not been examined. P.W.2 and P.W.7 have stated that they did not see anyone while they were walking behind each other during or after the occurrence and hence their depiction of the manner of occurrence is not proved. Further independent witnesses, even by way of hearsay, have not been examined and only interested witnesses, who are somehow related with the deceased, have been produced by the prosecution. The Investigating Officer has committed various lapses including not establishing the place of occurrence and the inquest report and the map prepared by him are contrary to each other. He also did not find any holes in the clothes which the deceased was wearing nor blood on him. He did not produce the blood stained earth nor did he seize the clothes on the person of the deceased and the witnesses, who are said to have carried the deceased to the patrolling party, nor did he send the same. In fact, neither the Informant nor P.W.1 was present at the place of occurrence as is evident from the evidence of P.W.6. Even though it is a case of direct evidence, since the prosecution has brought forth motive for the occurrence they were duty bound to conclusively prove the same. The prosecution case suffers on this count as well. The Doctor’s evidence also further disproves the prosecution case inasmuch as the injuries found on the deceased appear to have been caused while a person would be in a supine position and the time of occurrence in his opinion being about 36 hours before the examination does not match with the prosecution case. The further submission is that the deceased’s own agnates had a grudge with the deceased and there is every possibility of him having been killed by them. In the alternative, the argument is also that there is specific allegation of firing against Appellant Pappu Singh on the orders of Chunnu Singh but no overt act is alleged with regard to the rest of the accused persons and hence they deserve to be acquitted. 

In her judgement, Justice Prakash had observed: "15. On looking into the records of the case, we find that soon after the occurrence a protest petition had been filed against the Investigating Officer that he was making a collusive investigation which explains as to why he did not record the statements of independent witnesses nor send the blood stained earth for chemical examination, nor seize the blood stained clothes on the person of the deceased or the witnesses. In such circumstances, the argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the manner of occurrence or the presence of the witnesses for the aforesaid reason has to be rejected. As for the manner of occurrence, we find that the consistent evidence is that all the witnesses were walking behind each other and suddenly the accused persons sprang upon them and shot at the deceased from the back, on account of which he fell down on his face. From their evidence the fact that they did not hear any accused before the firing or even during the firing is well explained since from the manner narrated it appears that the occurrence had not taken place within minutes. In such circumstances, when Pappu Singh was not being seen before firing at the deceased from the back and the rest firing at the witnesses to scatter them off or even to kill them is well plausible. Also the fact that scratches were found on the face of the deceased further corroborates the prosecution case that after the firing from the back the deceased had fallen on his face. As for the injuries being oval or circular has no meaning in the present case since it is most natural that a person’s hand would shake and not be completely stable while firing is made within a split of second especially when the target is moving. The doctor no doubt stated in his cross examination that when he said that the occurrence had taken place within 36 hours he had meant that it could be within 24 to 36 hours, is not acceptable by the Court. Once he has stated in his examination-in-chief that it was within 36 hours it certainly means that it was within 36 hours and such minute timing of death so precisely could not be given by him especially when he has mentioned that rigor mortis was present."

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in Devnath Rai murder case from Maner

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 5-page long order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"The order passed by the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 8. The appellant shall be released on bail....".  The High Court's order was passed by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra. Supreme Court recorded:" 4. In this case, it appears that Vinay was an injured witness. His statement was not recorded at the time when the petition was filed and therefore, hearing on this petition was deferred to enable the Trial Court to record the statement of Vinay. 5. We have been informed that the statement of Vinay has been recorded in the trial and he has not identified the appellant as one of the participants in the incident....7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed." Notably, Shiv Kumari Devi, the informant, the wife of Late Devnath Rai, the victim who has allegedly been killed has not been made a party. She has not been able to rope any advocate to represent her in the Supreme Court. 

Earlier, in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated July 7, 2025, wherein, he had refused to grant bail in a murder case. He had concluded:"6 Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the nature and gravity of the offence as alleged against the petitioner as also taking into account the materials available in the case diary, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the prayer for bail of the petitioner, above named, is rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously." The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 from Maner  instituted for the offences under Sections 140(1), 109, 61(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Shiv Kumari Devi was not made a party in the case in the High Court. She was not able to rope any advocate to represent her in the High Court to represent her.

As per prosecution case, the accusation against the accused persons including the petitioner is to have killed the Informant’s husband and disappeared his dead body. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and had committed no offence as alleged against him and has falsely been implicated in the present case merely on the basis of suspicion. The petitioner has not committed any offence as alleged in the F.I.R. The informant is not the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that there was delay of one day in lodging the F.I.R. that too without there being any plausible explanation for the same, which created doubt in the veracity of the prosecution case. It was submitted that nothing incriminating was recovered from the conscious/physical possession of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no direct or specific allegation of any overt act against the petitioner rather the same is general and omnibus in nature. The petitioner had two criminal antecedents and is languishing in judicial custody since December 3, 2024 without any rhymes or reason.The A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioner. He had stated that the in this case, the injured Vinay Kumar was the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence who have supported the prosecution case. The petitioner, in his confessional statement, had also confessed his guilt. The petitioner  was named in the F.I.R. and, hence, he did not deserve bail. 

Shivkumari Devi is a permanent resident of Lodipur Jeevarakhand Tola, Vyapur Police Station, Maner, Patna. She informed the Maner Police that the incident occurred when her husband Devnath Rai and his friend Vinay Kumar, s/o Murari Rai of Lodipur had gone to Om Sai brick kiln to smoke at around 10 pm on August 5, 2024. At that time, a notorious criminal who is currently lodged in Beur Jail—1. Sagar Rai (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Lodipur Ganga Tola) and 2. Umashankar Yadav alias Shankar Kumar (son of the late Chandeshwar Rai; resident of Lodipur, currently residing at R.P.S. Mor, Bailey Road, Rupaspur Police Station)—conspired to recruit other notorious criminals into their fold. These recruits are: 3. Dharmendra Kumar (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Ganga Tola, Lodipur Bagicha), 4. Lalu Kumar (Dharmendra’s nephew; son of Buddhadev Rai; resident of Chakiya Tola, Chhitnava), and 5. Daroga Rai (son of the late Manik Rai; resident of Lodipur Buddha Tola). 6. Dhora Rai (son of Phudi Rai, alias Pahalban Singh; resident of Vyapur, Purvi Gali) and 7. Munna Rai (son of an unknown person; resident of Bhaggu Tola, Vyapur)—all belonging to the Maner Police Station area, District Patna—suddenly arrived by boat at the Om Sai Brick Kiln, where my husband and his friend, Vinay Kumar, were already present. All the assailants began firing with various weapons they were carrying, with the intent to kill. As a result, her husband and his friend, Vinay, were shot in the leg; Vinay Kumar then ran into the bushes to save his life. After being shot, her husband fled and hid inside the office of the Om Sai Brick Kiln. Inside the office, my husband and a staff member of the kiln—Mohan Rai (son of Shri Sukan Rai, resident of Lodipur, Maner Police Station, Patna)—locked the door from within. Then, all the named perpetrators approached the office while firing indiscriminately and began shooting at the door. Some of the perpetrators climbed onto the roof of the office and started removing the roof tiles. Mohan Rai, one of the named accused, was ordered to open the door; he complied, and then—acting in concert with the other accused—he joined them in murdering my husband. Subsequently, all these perpetrators disposed of my husband's body. Her husband's friend, Vinay Kumar, witnessed the entire incident while hiding in the bushes. Therefore, she request the SHO, Maner P.S. to please take necessary legal action against all the named eight accused persons. Manoj Kumar is the I.O.  of the case. 

Her compliant was registered on August 6, 2024. It reads:"सेवा में थानाध्यक्ष महोदय, मनेर थाना पटना। विषयः. मेरे पति देवनाथ राय के हत्या कर लाश गायब करने के संबंध में आवेदन। महाशय, विनम्रपुर्वक निवेदन के साथ कहना है कि मैं शिवकुमारी देवी पति देवनाथ राय सा० लोदीपुर जीवराखंड टोला पा० व्यापुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना कि स्थायी निवासी हूँ। मेरे पति देवनाथ राय एवं मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार पिता श्री मुरारी राय सा० लोदीपुर दोनो मिलकर दिनांक 05.08.024 को समय लगभग 10:00 बजे रात्रि में ओम साई ईंट भट्ठा पर धुमने गये हुए थे। उसी समय एक कुख्यात जो वेउर जेल में बंद है 1. सागर राय पिता काशी राय सा० लोदीपुर गंगा टोला एवं 2. उमाशंकर यादव उर्फ शंकर कुमार पिता स्व० चंदेश्वर राय सा० लोदीपुर वर्तमान पता R.P.S मोड़ बेली रोड थाना रूपसपुर इन दोनो साजिश करके कुछ कुख्यात अपराधियो को अपने मेल मे लाकर अपराधि का नाम 3. धर्मेन्द्र कुमार पिता काशी राय सा० गंगा टोला लोदीपुर बगीचा 4. लालु कुमार (धर्मेन्द्र के भगिना) पिता बुद्वदेव राय सा० चकिया टोला छितनावा 5. दरोगा राय पिता स्व0 मानिक राय सा० लोदीपुर बुद्वाटोला 6.ढोरा राय पिता फुदी राय उर्फ पहलबान सिंह सा० व्यापुर पुर्वी गली 7. मुन्ना राय पिता नामालुम सा० भग्गु टोला व्यापुर सभी थाना मनेर जिला पटना ने नाव से एकाएक ओम साई ईट भट्ठा पर पहुँचा जहा पहले से मेरे पति एवं उनके दोस्त विनय कुमार बैठे हुए थें। सभी अपराधी अपने अपने हाथ मे लिये कई तरह के हथियार से जान मारने कि नियत से फायरिंग करना शुरू कर दिया । जिससे मेरे पति एंव पति के दोस्त विनय को पैर में गोली लगी तब मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार जान बचाने के लिए झाड़ी में जाकर छिप गया। और मेरे पति गोली लगने के बाद ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के ऑफिस मे भागकर छिप गया। ऑफिस के अंदर मेरे पति के साथ ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के स्टॉफ 8. मोहन राय पिता श्री सुकन राय सा० लोदीपुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना दोनो ईंट भटठा के ऑफिस के अंदर दरवाज बंद कर लिया। तब सभी नामित अपराधी अंधाधुंध फायरिंग करते हुए ऑफिस के पास आकर दरवाजा पर गोली चलाने लगा। ओर कुछ अपराधी ऑफिस उपर चढ़कर खपड़ा हटाने लगा।नामित अभियुक्त मोहन राय को दरवाजा खोलने को कहा गया। जिसपर मोहन राय ने दरवाज खोल दिया जिसपर सभी उक्त अभियुक्त के साथ मोहन राय भी मिलकर मेरे पति कि हत्या कर दिया। और उक्त सभी अपराधी मिलकर मेरे पति के शव को ठिकाने लगा दिया। जिस घटना को घटित होते मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार ने झाड़ी से छुपकर देखा। अतः श्रीमान् से प्रार्थना है कि सभी नामजद 08 अभियुक्तो के विरूद्ध आवाश्यक कानुनी करवाई करने कि कृपा कि जाय। इसके लिए में श्रीमान् कि सदा आभारी रहूंगी। आपकी विश्वासी (शिवकुमारी देवी)". 

Will Shiv Kumar Devi, wife of Devnath Rai get justice? Isn't it a case where a habeas corpus petition should be filed in the High Court? 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava suspend sentence, order release of appellant on bail during pendency of appeal on his personal bond

In Ranjit Kumar Jha @ Ranjit Jha vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava passed a 8-page long order dated April 29, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"....we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail during pendency of the appeal on his personal bond forthwith to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Samastipur in connection with Sessions Trial No. 17/2006/143/2006 arising out of Musarigharari P.S. Case No. 120 of 2000. 12. Fine, if any, imposed as part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 13. List this matter for further consideration on 14th May, 2026 at the top of the list." Justice Prasad has authored the order. 

The order reads: "8. It is evident on a bare reading of the affidavit of I.G., Prison, Bihar, Patna that the proposal sent by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur remained pending in the office of the Remission Board for more than 11 months. There is no explanation for this inaction. 9. We would like to know that who is responsible for keeping aside the proposal and not placing the same before the Remission Board for eleven months. How many applications are presently pending with the date of their pendency be placed before this Court.' 

Theorder reads: "10. We also call upon the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur as well as the I.G., Prison, Bihar, Patna to file their respective affidavits to show cause as to why this Court should not exercise its suo motu power as a Constitutional Court to award appropriate compensation to the appellant for his sufferings because of non-consideration of his case for grant of remission immediately after he became eligible for the same on completion of 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission and, in case, this Court comes to a conclusion that an appropriate amount of compensation is required to be given to the appellant, why such amount be not realised from the erring officials so that the Government Exchequer who is the custodian of the public money be not saddled with the burden of paying cost and compensation as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court in catena of judgments." 

In the appeal, the court considered the prayer of the appellant for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal. The appellant was convicted vide judgment dated October 29, 2009 and sentenced vide order dated November 6, 2009 by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Samastipur in connection with a Sessions Trial of 2006 which arose out of Musarigharari P.S. Case of 2000 for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1-B)a/27 of the Arms Act. He was ordered to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 

The court recollected its previous order dated April 17, 2026. It observed: "we are not required to examine the case of the appellant on merit for purpose of suspension of sentence and his release on bail during pendency of the appeal. It is an appeal in which the appellant being a poor person coming from lower strata of the society could not prefer an appeal for 16 years 2 months. Ultimately, with the legal assistance provided by the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee, the present appeal has been preferred. The order dated 17.04.2026 would throw some light on the facts and circumstances under which this appeal has been preferred." 

On April 29,, the court went through the affidavit filed on behalf of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur. In paragraph ‘6’ of his affidavit, it is stated: “6. That after completion of 20 years of life sentence, his proposal for premature release has been sent to Prison Head Quarter for consideration by State Sentence Remission Board vide Letter No-4126, dated-05-05-2025 by the office of S.K.R.B Central Jail Muzaffarpur, which however, is possible to be considered in next meeting by the Remission Board.” 

Justice Prasad observed: "6. It is evident from the statement made by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur that he has not clearly stated about the completion of 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission which is the condition required to be fulfilled for purpose of sending the case of a convict to the State Sentence Remission Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Remission Board”). We call upon him to make a clear statement as to when did the appellant complete 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission. 7. The I.G., Prison, Government of Bihar has filed an affidavit from which it is crystal clear that only after this Court passed its order on 17.04.2026, the Remission Board got awaken from slumber and the file of this appellant was moved in a hurry." 

The order reproduced paragraphs ‘10’ and ‘11’ of the affidavit by the I.G. Prison, wherein he stated: “10. That the proposal of the appellant for pre-mature release was put before the remission board in its meeting dated 21.04.2026. 11. That the Bihar State Sentence Remission Board in its meeting dated 21.04.2026 considered the proposal of the appellant and after due consideration sent their remarks to the competent authority for his decision and approval.”

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri sets aside judgment of conviction by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Sasaram, Rohtas in a murder case of 2001

In Janardan Singh @ Janardan Singh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 20-page long judgement dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"64. ....the points for determination are answered in following words:(i) The prosecution has not been able to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. (ii) The identity and participation of the appellants have not been established by reliable and cogent evidence. (iii) The conviction of the appellants with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable. (iv) The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 65. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. 66. The judgment of conviction, dated 06.07.2018 and the order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 80 of 2003 are set aside. 67. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 68. The appellants are on bail. They are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds." Justices Chaudhuri authored the judgement. 

These appeals arose out of the judgment of conviction, dated July 6, 2018 and the order of sentence, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Sasaram, Rohtas, in a Sessions Trial of 2003, which arose out of Karakat P.S. Case of 2001. The Criminal Appeal by Janardan Singh @ Janardan Singh Yadav also arose out of the same judgment.

The prosecution case, as disclosed in the fardbeyan of the informant Keshav Singh, is that on 18.11.2001, the informant along with several other persons was travelling in a jeep. When the vehicle reached near Belwai, it was allegedly intercepted by a group of about fifteen persons, who were said to be armed with firearms. 5. It is alleged that the said persons surrounded the jeep and, upon identifying the occupants, opened indiscriminate fire. As a result of the firing, the driver of the jeep, Raju Pandey, along with other occupants, sustained fatal injuries. Some persons also received injuries. 6. In the fardbeyan, several accused persons, including the appellants, were named as participants in the occurrence. The allegation against them is that they acted in concert and took part in the firing upon the occupants of the jeep. On the basis of the fardbeyan, Karakat P.S. Case was instituted under Sections 302, 307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After registration of the case, investigation was taken up and, upon completion thereof, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and was registered as a Sessions Trial of 2003. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The accused persons denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 11. In course of trial, the prosecution examined a number of witnesses in support of its case. The prosecution relied mainly upon the testimony of the informant and other alleged eye-witnesses, including those who claimed to have sustained injuries in the occurrence. 12. It appears from the record that some of the witnesses did not support the prosecution case in its entirety and were declared hostile. The statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they denied the allegations and asserted that they have been falsely implicated.

The judgement recorded that "certain witnesses connected with the investigation and medical examination
were not examined during the course of trial." The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had succeeded in proving the occurrence and the participation of the accused persons therein. The Trial Court placed reliance upon the evidence of the eye-witnesses and held that the accused persons had acted in furtherance of their common intention. Accordingly, the accused persons were convicted under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Upon conviction, they were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, along with other sentences. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "55. Mere presence in a group, without clear evidence of participation and shared intention, is not sufficient to attract liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the absence of clear and cogent evidence establishing common intention, the application of Section 34 IPC becomes unsustainable. 56. Upon a cumulative assessment of the evidence on record, this Court finds that while the occurrence of firing resulting in death and injuries stands established, the participation of the appellants has not been proved with the degree of certainty required in criminal law. 57. The evidence against the appellants is general in nature, lacks specific attribution of roles, and suffers from inconsistencies and deficiencies. The presence of hostile witnesses and the non-examination of material witnesses further weaken the prosecution case. 58. In such circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellants. 59. It is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and if two views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted, as held in paragraph no. 25 of Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgement in case of Kali Ram v. State of  Himachal Pradesh, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808...." 

It reads; 25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm
conclusion or so timid that is is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us  recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 227 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886] a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures." 

The judgement reads:"60. The prosecution has succeeded in proving the occurrence, but has failed to prove the role of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. 61. On perusal of the evidence on record, we find that during the trail only 09 witnesses were examined. Out of them, two injured witnesses supported the prosecution case in course of their evidence. PW-1, Vinod Singh only identified Jaj Yadav; PW-2, Rajendra Singh identified accused Vinod Yadav and Bali Yadav. Thus, all the assailants were not identified by the witnesses. Informant was not examined during trial. The Medical Officer, who conducted postmortem of the deceased was also not examined. Therefore, the cause of death of the deceased has not been established. The I.O. of this case was also not examined. 62. In the absence of their evidence, it would be highly risky to affirm conviction of the accused persons on the basis of evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, specially because it is established that there was political and caste related rivalry between the accused persons and the witnesses and the deceased. 63. No explanation has been furnished by the prosecution for withholding such a material witness. The non-examination of such a material witness assumes significance and casts a serious doubt on the prosecution case, particularly when the case rests primarily on ocular evidence.

Justice Chaudhary relied on paragraph no. 156 of Supreme Court's decision in Masalti vs. State of U.P. reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30, wherein, it cautioned that in cases involving a large number of accused, conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of general and omnibus allegations without specific evidence of individual participation. Paragraph 15 reads: “15. Then it is urged that the evidence given by the witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and since no specific part is assigned to all the assailants, that evidence should not have been accepted. This criticism again is not well-founded. Where a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of the assailants. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault."

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Partha Sarthy, gnoring Court's 3-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb?

In Dhan Jee Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices R. Mahadevan and A. Amanullah delivered a 21-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law....The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law." The judgement was authored by Justice Mahadevan. The impugned 5-page long order dated order dated November 22, 2024 in Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ vs. The State of Bihar (2024) was authored by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Partha Sarthy. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-4/2016.  

Justice Prasad had authored the High Court's order. His reasoning appears defensible in the light of the decision in Union of India v. KA Najeeb AIR 2021 SC 712, 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on February 1, 2021. The relevant part of para 18 of the judgement reads:

“... at the commencement of proceedings, courts are expected to appreciate the legislative position against grant of bail but the rigours of such provision melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence…”

The decision in Najeeb's case “lays down the constitutional approach arising from Article 21, whereas Watali (supra) explains the statutory approach arising out of Section 4-3(D)(5) of UAPA” (para 21 of Mohamad Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC Online Del 4623. In its decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, delivered by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2019.

  

The judgement by Justice Mahadevan reads: "A perusal of the record indicates that the prosecution case is founded on ocular evidence, which has been duly appreciated and accepted by the trial Court. Without considering the same in a proper perspective, the High Court erred in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 and released him on bail. 19. The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. 20. It is further evident that the High Court has embarked upon a selective consideration of certain aspects of the prosecution case, which in substance amounts to a premature reappreciation of evidence. Such an approach is directly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Om Prakash Sahni (supra). 21. As held in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (supra), undue weight cannot be accorded to the period of incarceration or the pendency of the appeal in isolation, particularly where the conviction is founded on credible evidence. 22. The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. 23. Additionally, material has been placed to indicate that Respondent No. 2 has allegedly attempted to intimidate the appellant by issuing threats and initiating false cases. The explanation offered on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that such allegations are motivated, does not inspire confidence of this Court, particularly at this interlocutory stage. 24. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the nature of the evidence as accepted by the trial Court, the absence of any apparent infirmity in the judgment of conviction, and the settled legal position governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, warrants interference by this Court." 

 

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V.R. Krishnaiyer and N.L. Untwalia in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 held:"The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court." Justice Mahadevan's judgement has taken note of  

Justice Mahadevan relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Court held that suspension of sentence in serious offences must not be granted as a matter of routine, and that the appellate court must apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the findings recorded by the trial Court. The relevant paragraphs are: “6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said Court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.….9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while passing the impugned order." Notably, Justice Mahadevan's judgement does not refer to the subsequent decision of 2021 in Najeeb's case.  

It is crystal clear from the decision in Najeeb's case that the settled position of law is that the restriction on grant of bail will hold at the initial stages, but as time progresses the statutory restrictions, which “draw this justification on the premise that trial in such cases would be concluded expeditiously” gets diluted. It has been underlined by the Bombay High Court in Vinay Vivek Aranha vs. Union of India and another, (BA 2641/2021).

Significantly, a judgement delivered in ignorance of a relevant statutory position is deemed to be per incuriam. In para 183 of the Supreme Court's decision in AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602) held that a decision set aside would “demand the decision of its precedent value”. In para 41 of its decision in State of UP and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139) cited from page no. 153 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. that a “decision passes sub-silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present in its mind”. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 682), it held that the “Supreme Court may not be said to declare the law on these subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind”.

The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the appellant/informant challenging the judgment and order dated November 22, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1180 of 2018, whereby, the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal, had suspended the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Respondent No. 2, Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ and released him on bail. The prosecution case was that on the basis of the written information (fardbayan) of the appellant /informant, namely Dhan Jee Pandey, Buxar P. S. case dated January 4, 2016 was registered under Sections 302, 307, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against Respondent No. 2 and other accused persons. It was alleged that on January 4, 2016 at about 04.15 p.m., the appellant, along with his elder brother (deceased), Ramashankar Pandey @ Jhamman Pandey, was proceeding towards his village on a motorcycle. On the way, they stopped at a betel shop located at the village chatti. At that time, the appellant’s father-in-law, Mukteshwar Mishra, also arrived and engaged in conversation with the appellant at a short distance from the shop. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 along with other accused persons reached the spot and began abusing the deceased. Immediately thereafter, two accused persons, namely Shiv Jee Pandey and Ghanshyam Pandey, caught hold of the deceased, while the others took out firearms. Shiv Jee Pandey then fired a gunshot at the head of the deceased, causing fatal injuries. The other accused persons also fired at the appellant, who narrowly escaped. Thereafter, all the accused fled the scene on motorcycles. The deceased succumbed to the injuries and died on the spot.

Upon hearing the interlocutory application, the appellant Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ wherein he had renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal, in his order, Justice Prasad had concluded: "....we are of the opinion that in the kind of the allegations against the appellant and the materials in which he has been convicted showing that he along with other had caught hold of the deceased, the allegation being general in nature and he has already spent six years seven months in incarceration but the appeal has not been listed for hearing, we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail, during pendency of the appeal, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.D.J.-II-cum-Special Judge, Excise Court, Buxar in connection with Sessions Trial No.265 of 2016 arising out of Buxar (I) P.S. Case No.4 of 2016. 10. The fine, if any, imposed as a part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 11. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only prima- facie and tentative for the purpose of suspension of sentence and bail only which would not cause prejudice to the either parties."

 

While rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion, the Justice Prasad of High Court in his order dated January 21, 2020 had observed that the Court was not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. But at the subsequent stage, the the Couryt became inclined because the appellant had already remained in incarceration for over six years seven months and since the rejection of his prayer for bail more than 4½ years had gone past but the appeal had not yet been listed for hearing. 

 

The Supreme Court's Justice Mahadevan "emphasised that reasons must be recorded in writing, reflecting due consideration of relevant factors, and that orders granting suspension of sentence should not be passed mechanically." 

 

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SLP (Crl.) 5416/2024, Supreme Court in its decision dated August 28, 2024 upheld the principle laid down in Balchand of bail being the rule and jail being the exception--- through which it can be deduced that in cases of arrest by ED as well, the natural bail principle is to follow. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in a PMLA matter in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022). Notably, the decision in the case of Prem Prakash relied upon a decision by three justices in Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1964 SC 828 but failed to mention that after the decision in the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal came the Constitution Bench's decision in Badku Joti Savant AIR 1966 SC 1746.