Supreme Court set aside "cryptic order" by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar in Vandana Gupta case, which resulted in "travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgement dated July 21, 2025 wherein it allowed the appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta. The Respondent no. 2 is Vandan Gupta. The Division Bench concluded:"keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society." 

The judgement reads:"the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration. 28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled. She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before the appropriate forum."

The appeal arose by special leave emanates from the order dated January 18, 2024 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent No.2-accused 2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed and she was granted bail. The appellant-victim herein was the informant in the FIR. 

The prosecution case as against Vandana Gupta, Respondent No.2 was that she while being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih, Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation and mental torture. It was alleged that she used to send the ladies housed in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court recorded that during the course of investigation, few more ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against Vanadana Gupta, the respondent No.2. The application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected by the Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order dated July 10, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an
appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing the order passed by the Special Court. In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506 of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act vide order dated August 29, 2023. Notably, in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim in any prayer for bail essential. 

The appellant-victim approached the Supreme Court through the appeal by special leave to assail the order passed by the High Court. Her counsel contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men. It was also contended that unidentified men were allowed access into the protection home where they would take advantage of the helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours. 

Pursuant to the release of respondent No.2 on bail, she was reinstated in service, and she was heading another protection home within the State of Bihar. This approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He submitted that it was apparent that the concerned authorities of the State Government were hands in glove with the accused and had no intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct. Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on the female inmates. In case, respondent No.2 is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial. The counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.  

The standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of Bihar supported the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation, grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there was imminent threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 was allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However, on a pertinent query being posed,  standing counsel was not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working in a similar institution.

Supreme Court observed: "21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened."

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's  decisions in Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 wherein it cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows:
“18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118].

In Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 upon hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Mahila P.S. Case no. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected. The allegation against the appellant who was a Superintendent of Remand Home was that she used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that appellant was falsely implicated in this case. She had not taken the caste name of the informant in public view. No offence is made out under the provisions of the SC/ST Act against her. Notably, vide letter No. 836 dated February 16, 2022, one S.I.T. team was constituted for investigation of Mahila P.S. Case No. 13 of 2022 and Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 jointly and the investigation was started jointly but after investigation of the case, the police submitted final form No. 100 of 2022 due to insufficiency of evidence which is apparent from Annexure-3 of the petition itself and also the allegation which was alleged by the informant/victim upon this appellant was not found true. 

The Court order recorded that from perusal of the Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022, which was annexed in the petition as Annexure-5(page No-36) in which it was mentioned that no any drug abuse and rape/sexual exploitation have been made in that remand home. From perusal of the report of Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna, it was mentioned in para-5 that the nature of the informant/victim was quarrelsome. Moreover, the appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022. The appeal for bail was opposed by Special P.P. for the State and the counsel for the informant. By way of filing counter affidavit, it was mentioned in para-2 that "another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was also submitted that from a report of SP, Patna, few men used to come in girh by covering their faces and on the permission of this appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register."

Justice Panwar concluded:"....taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna."

Quashing this order by Justice Panwar, Supreme Court observed: "25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act."

 

As part of Division Bench Justice S. B. Pd. Singh sets aside judgment, decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj

"The essential ingredients in an offence of adultery are that: (i) There should be an act of sexual intercourse outside the marriage, and (ii) that such intercourse should be voluntary."

In Kiran Devi vs. Akhilesh Mishra & Anr. (2025), a miscellaneous appeal, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh passed a 17-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025 setting aside the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj in M.M. Case No. 176 of 2011 M.M. Case No. 176 of 2011 stands and dismissed the case. The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. 

The appeal was filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 impugning the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj, whereby the matrimonial suit, preferred by Akhilesh Mishra, the respondent No. 1, for a decree of divorce, on dissolution of marriage, was allowed subject to payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- as permanent alimony for life support of the appellant. The case of the respondent No. 1 as per petition filed before the Family Court was that the marriage of the appellant was solemnized with respondent No.1 in the month of May, 2005 as per the Hindu Rites and Custom. After the marriage, the appellant came to her matrimonial house and stayed there for few months and thereafter, she went to her parents’ house and stayed there for a year. The respondent-husband and his father made several attempts to take the appellant to her matrimonial house, but all the efforts went in vein. At last in June, 2006 the respondent No. 1 went to his Sasural along with some relatives on promise of his father-in-law and brother-in-law to sent the appellant with him but she did not come with the respondent No. 1. Subsequently, the respondent-husband came to know that appellant has illicit relationship with Ashok Sharma, the respondent No. 2 who often used to visit the house of the appellant. The respondent-husband also came to know that appellant was pregnant and a female child was born who died just after the birth. The respondent-husband made several attempts to reconcile the matter with the appellant but all his efforts went in vein. The appellant, thereafter filed complaint case in 2009 against the respondent-husband and other family members which was registered as Bhore P.S. case of 2010 under Sections 498(A), 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the this case, the respondent-husband and his father were rotting in jail for 6-7 months and ultimately after some time, on the intervention of relatives, a compromise was filed in the said case and appellant came to her Sasural but after sometime, the appellant went away from her Sasural with respondent No. 2. The respondent-husband also alleged that appellant and respondent-husband never cohabited since their marriage and appellant had completely deserted the matrimonial life of the respondent-husband. The respondent-husband, therefore, prayed that the marriage between the appellant and respondent No. 1 be declared dissolved and a decree of divorce be passed in his favour. 

In response to the summon/notice issued by the Court, appellant/O.P No. 1 appeared and filed her reply/written statement. In her written statement/reply, the respondent No. 1 had stated all the allegations levelled by the appellant against her is false, concocted and without any basis. She also stated that after the marriage in the year 2005, she went to the house of respondent-husband and started living in her matrimonial house but after sometimes, her in-laws family members started demanding dowry and torture
was inflicted for non-fulfillment of dowry demand. The appellant, in the meanwhile, conceived and a female child was born who died after birth. Thereafter, the respondent- husband and other family members started pressurizing the appellant for motorcycle and colour T.V. and ultimately, on April 20, 2009 they badly assaulted and ousted her from the matrimonial house. The father of the appellant and other relatives made several attempts and requested the respondent-husband and other in-laws to keep her at her matrimonial house but they denied to keep her at her matrimonial house. The appellant, thereafter filed Complaint Case No. 2761 of 2009 against the respondent-husband and other family members which was registered as Bhore P.S. Case No. 2 of 2010 under Sections 498(A), 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent-husband, thereafter filed a divorce case in 2009. In this case, a compromise took place and the respondent-husband was directed to keep the appellant with full dignity and honour. The appellant went to her matrimonial house and started living there but in the meantime, the respondent-husband got a job in Dubai and again appellant was tortured for demand of dowry. The respondent-husband again filed a divorce case in 2011 on the same very facts.

The issues which were framed by the Trial Court are:-
1. Whether the case as framed is maintainable?
2. Whether the appellant has cause of action to file this case?
4. Whether the applicant is entitled to get decree for dissolution of marriage against the O.P ?
5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any other relief or reliefs?

The High Court considered the following points for determination in this appeal:-
(i) Whether the appellant is entitled to the relief sought for in his petition/appeal.
(ii) Whether the impugned judgment of Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna is just, proper and sustainable/tenable in the eyes of law.

Justice Singh observed:"we find that respondent-husband has deposed in his evidence that appellant-wife always used to make quarrel with him and his family members but no any specific instance of date has been mentioned in the plaint as well as in his evidence. He has also admitted in his evidence that prior to filing of this divorce case, there were no relationship between the appellant and respondent No. 1. The respondent-husband has also not brought on record any proof regarding illicit relationship of appellant with respondent No. 2. The respondent-husband has also not brought on record any cogent and reliable evidence which could show that appellant and respondent No. 2 are living in adultery. The respondent-husband has also not filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights which would reflect that he was interested to resume conjugal life with the appellant. The respondent-husband has also not explained as to why he has filed second divorce petition with same allegation as records show that before filing of the present divorce petition, the respondent-husband has also filed M.M Case No. 62 of 2009 which was compromised. So far as allegation of adultery is concerned, the record clearly suggests that only in order to make a legal ground in the divorce case, these baseless allegations have been levelled by the respondent-husband."

The High Court in relied on Supreme Court's decision in Samar Ghose vs. Jaya Ghose reported in 2007 (4) SCC 511 that a sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. More trivial irritations, quarrel, normal wear and tear of the married live which happens in day-to-day live would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in case of Narain Ganesh Dastane vs. Sucheta Naraih Dastane reported in, AIR 1975, SC, 1534. The relevant paragraph reads: 
"One other matter which needs to be clarified is that though under Section 10(1) (b), the apprehension of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party has to be reasonable, it is wrong, except in the context of such apprehension, to import the concept of a reasonable man as known to the law of negligence of judging of matrimonial relations. Spouses are undoubtedly supposed and expected to conduct their joint venture as best as they might but it is no function of a court inquring into a charge of cruelty to philosophise on the modalities of married life. Some one may want to keep late hours of finish the day's work and some one may want to get up early for a morning round of golf. The court cannot apply to the habits or hobbies of these the test whether a reasonable man situated similarly will behave in a similar fashion. 'The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an Individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances". The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to draw their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures."

Justice Singh observed:"....it is crystal clear that respondent-husband has failed to prove the cruel behaviour of the appellant towards him and his family members by the strength of cogent, relevant and reliable evidence, while burden of proof of cruelty rests upon the respondent-husband. Not even single incident with reference to specific date of alleged cruelty has been urged in the plaint before the Family Court. Moreover, wife (appellant) is still ready to live with the respondent-husband. Furthermore, alleged certain flimsy act or omission or using some threatening and harsh words may occasionally happen in the day-to-day conjugal life of a husband and wife to retaliate the other spouse but that cannot be a justified/sustainable ground for taking divorce. Some trifling utterance or remarks or mere threatening of one spouse to other cannot be construed as such decree of cruelty, which is legally required to a decree of divorce. The austerity of temper and behaviour, petulance of manner and harshness of language may vary from man to man born and brought up in different family background, living in different standard of life, having their quality of educational qualification and their status in society in which they live. 23. Thus, considering the above entire aspects of this case and evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, we find that respondent-husband has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty, much less, the decree of cruel behaviour of appellant which is legally required for grant of decree of divorce under section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act." 

The High Court's judgement reads: "24. So far as ground of adultery is concerned, adultery may be defined as the act of a married person having sexual intercourse with a person of opposite gender other than the wife or husband of the person. Under the present Hindu Marriage Act, adultery is laid down as one of the grounds for divorce or judicial separation.....26. The respondent-husband has not brought on record any proof to show that appellant was having illicit relationship with the respondent No. 2 nor he has proved that they were living in adultery and only in order to make a valid ground in the divorce petition, these allegations were levelled against the appellant without any supporting material evidence.

Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhyan passed a 3-page long order dated July 24, 2025, wherein it set aside the 3-page long order dated September 12, 2024 by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of Patna High Court who had rejected the bail prayer.

The appellant's counsel contended that this was a case based on circumstantial evidence. Even the cause of death as per the autopsy report was not clear. He pointed out that it has been admitted that the body was found in river water, therefore, possibility of death on account of drowning cannot be ruled out given the fact that the autopsy report showed that lungs were found filled with water. It was submitted that the appellant has suffered incarceration of over a period exceeding one year and there was no likelihood that the appellant would misuse the liberty of bail during the course of trial. The counsel for the State could not dispute that as per the autopsy report, the cause of death is not ascertainable. 

Supreme Court's order reads:"6. Having regard to the facts of the case as also the contents of the autopsy report brought on record, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we are of the view that the appellant has made out a case for release on bail during pendency of the trial on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order rejecting the bail prayer is set aside." It ordered that the appellant be released on bail.

Patna High Court had heard an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated April 23, 2024 and modification order dated June 12, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Special Case No. 392 of 2023 which arose out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 dated August 23, 2023 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 364, 365, 506, 302, 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

As per the prosecution case, It is alleged that the informant's grandson along with one Ganesh Kumar went to take bath in the Ganga River and she made suspicion that the appellant and the co-accused persons kidnapped her grandson with intent to kill and Pawan Kumar escaped.

The counsel for the appellant had submitted before the High Court that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to land dispute. He submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that no specific caste name was called by the appellant hence no case was made out under section of the SC/ST Act. There is nothing except suspicion. It was also alleged that the said occurrence took place at 7:30 AM on 23.08.2023 and the postmortem of deceased commenced on March 24, 2023 at 8:00 PM in which no ante-mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased. The dead body was decomposed and rigor mortis was absent which indicated that the death of the deceased had taken place much before the alleged time of occurrence. The appellant had three criminal antecedents. The appellant was in custody since February 16, 2024.  The counsel for the informant and the Special Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the anticipatory bail petition of the appellant. It was stated that the eyewitness Pawan Kumar had made specific allegation against the petitioner and the co-accused persons. It was further stated that the accused persons were pressurizing the deceased to withdraw the case bearing Salimpur P.S. Case No. 166 of 2023 dated July 25, 2023 which was filed by the deceased against the co-accused persons and as the deceased did not compromise, he was brutally assaulted and thrown in the river.

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Justice Chandra Prakash Singh's order concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as the specific and heinous nature of allegation against the appellant, I am not inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 23.04.2024 and modification order dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (PoA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Spl. Case No. 392 of 2023 arising out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 and accordingly, the prayer for bail of the appellant is rejected." The respondent no. 2 was Bachchi Devi.  

It is noteworthy that although Justice Singh's order rejecting bail has been set aside, the Supreme Court has recorded in its order that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.  

Supreme Court sets aside bail order by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar which "resulted ino travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 16-page long judgement dated July 21, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"...it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside." The judgement authored by Justice Mehta sets aside the 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 delivered by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court in Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024).  

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Shabeen Ahmad vs.The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 which placed reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768, Justice Mehta observed:"we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration." The respondent no. 2 is Vandana Gupta.   

Vandana Gupta, had approached the High Court against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with a Mahila P.S. case of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the I.T. Act and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected.

The allegation was that Vandana Gupta, the appellant was a Superintendent of Remand Home who used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. The Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022 on Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna mentioned that "the nature of the informant/victim is quarrelsome". The appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022 before she was granted bail by Justice Pawar in January 2024.

The counter affidavit recorded that another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was submitted in the report of SP, Patna that few men used to come in Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna by covering their faces and on the permission of Vandana Gupta, the appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register. 

Justice Pawar had concluded:"Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed..." 

It emerges that Supreme Court's judgement has upheld the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna. 

Justice Mehta observed:"It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a case of such nature. 25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act." 

 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench upholds judgment of acquittal by Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya

In his 19-page long 20th judgement of the year dated June 17, 2025 in Munni Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Gaya & Ors. (2025), Justice Pancholi led Division Bench dismissed the appeal saying, "we are of the view that while passing the impugned order of acquittal, the learned Trial Court has not committed any error, as the prosecution has failed to prove the case against respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt." It was not inclined to entertain the acquittal appeal filed by the informant. The appellant/original informant had filed the appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated September 9, 2024 rendered by the Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya in Sessions Trial No.138/2022/950/2023, which arose out of Gurua P.S. case of 2020, whereby the respondents-accused, the residents of Auradih, Gurua, Gaya were acquitted by the Trial Court. The three private respondents who were acquitted were: Akhilesh Chaudhary Arjun Chaudhary and Pratima Kumari.

The Court's judgement records that APP submitted that "the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal and, therefore, in the present acquittal appeal filed by the informant, no interference is required. It is also submitted that State has not preferred any appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal."  

Justice Pancholi led bench relied on in paragraph no. 42 of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415. It reads: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; 
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

It also relied on paragraph no. 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605. It reads: “22. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal. It held that there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should
not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Drawing decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, Justice Pancholi observed:"it can be said that there is double presumption in favour of the accused, when the order of acquittal has been accorded by the Trial Court: Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law; Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 

The case began on August 3, 2020, at about 04:15 p.m., informant, Munni Devi's daughter Nirmala Kumar was returning from a Devi temple after offering her prayer. Pratima Kumari of her village started abusing her daughter. When her daughter forbade Pratima Kumari to do so, she caught hold of her hair and pulled her down. Arjun Choudhary, Akhilesh Choudhary and Phulesh Devi came and started assaulting her daughter. When the informant and Sarjun Chaudhary, her husband came there after hearing the alarm, Phulesh Devi caught her, pulled her down and started assaulting her on her breast by leg and assaulted her on her ear by means of iron rod due to which the ear of the informant was torn and started bleeding. Akhilesh Choudhary assaulted her husband on his head by means of iron rod due to which her husband fell down there and started vomiting blood and became unconscious. Thereafter, the accused persons had fled. The local people gathered there after hearing alarm and brought her husband to Gaya Hospital from where he was referred to Blue Diamond Hospital, Patna where her husband died during the course of treatment after two days.  Fardbeyan was given by the informant on August 5, 2020. After recording the fardbeyan of the informant, the concerned police officer, Agamkuan Police Station, Patna sent the same to Gurua Police Station, Gaya. 

The fardbeyan was recorded as formal FIR on August 12, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. The High Court noted that there was "delay in lodging the FIR and there is delay in lodging the formal FIR. No explanation has been rendered by the prosecution with regard to the same." The FIR was registered under Sections 341/323/302/504/34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Witch Practices Act against the respondents-accused as Gurua P.S. Case No.178/2020. The High Court observed:"Thus, there are serious lapses on the part of the concerned police authorities." The Investigating Officer, PW-7 in his deposition "specifically admitted that rod was not recovered or discovered. He did not find any blood at the place of occurrence."

During the trial, PW-1, Nirmala Kumari, who is daughter of the informant as well as the deceased, has mainly deposed in her examination-in-chief that Pratima Kumari, the fourth respondent/accused was standing on the way and telling that her mother was a dain (witch) and she obstructed fixing of her marriage. 

Notably, PW-3, Tetri Devi, mother of Sarjun Choudhary, the deceased deposed in her examination-in-chief that Sarjun Choudhary was her son who fell after consuming liquor and due to fall he died. The accused persons did not kill her son. The accused Akhilesh Choudhary and Pratima Kumari were her grandson and granddaughter. The police recorded her statement. She had given the same statement before the police saying her son fell in a drunken state and died. The Court noted that PW-3 "was not declared hostile and, therefore, the deposition given by the said witness is required to be considered as it is."

 

Also read: Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024, set aside judgment of 1991

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside judgement by Justice Yashwant Varma led Bench which had set aside verdict of Single Judge of Delhi High Court

In Interstate Construction vs. National Projects Construction Ltd (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan directed against the judgment and order dated August 1, 2023 passed by Delhi High Court's Division Bench of Justice Yashwant Varma in FAO (OS) (Comm) No.175 of 2021. The 34-page long judgement was delivered on May 15 2025. It was authored by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan. 

Justice Varma had allowed the appeal of National Projects Construction Corporation Limited,(NPCC) or the respondent hereinafter, filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 after setting aside that part of the judgment and order dated August 2, 2021 passed by a Single Judge of the High Court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act upholding the directions contained in paragraph 58(b) of the award dated October 28, 2020 as well as setting aside the directions of the arbitral tribunal as contained in paragraph 58(b) of the said award.

The respondent had engaged the services of the appellant for executing a contract relating to Ramagundam Super Thermal Power Project, Ramagundam, District Karimnagar in the then composite State of Andhra Pradesh. In this regard, two separate work orders were issued. 

Thereafter, contract agreement was entered into between the parties. As per clause 4 of the conditions of contract read with clause 15 of the special conditions attached to the work orders, all the disputes and differences between the parties were to be settled by way of arbitration. 

It is stated that appellant had completed the contract work in the year 1987. The respondent had paid the appellant the contractual dues after withholding certain sums on account of recoveries. The appellant disputed such recoveries. The appellant also raised certain claims which were not accepted by the respondent. 

In view of such disputes and differences, appellant invoked the arbitration clause by issuing notice dated May 17, 1993.

The respondent did not take immediate steps for appointment of an arbitrator. After considerable delay, by communication dated October 7, 1997, respondent appointed Shivamoy Ghosh, Additional General Manager, NPCC, Madras Sector, Chennai as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the subject dispute.

The appellant filed statement of claims before the learned arbitrator on January 20, 1998 claiming an aggregate amount of Rs.4,46,29,404.00 along with pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 24 percent per annum till final realization of the amount. 

The appellant sought for a direction from the  arbitrator to the respondent to supply various documents related to the dispute. However,  arbitrator only permitted the appellant an opportunity to inspect the documents and did not issue any direction to the respondent for supply of copies.

The aggrieved thereby, appellant filed a petition under Section 14 of the 1996 Act before the High Court seeking termination of the mandate of the  arbitrator and for appointment of a new arbitrator in his place. This petition was registered as OMP No. 214/2002. By order dated October 11, 2004, Single Judge terminated the mandate of Shivamoy Ghosh and appointed Shri A.S. Chandhiok, Senior Advocate, as the sole arbitrator.

The respondent challenged the said order of the Single Judge dated  October 11, 2004 before the Division Bench of the High Court in FAO (OS) No.241/2004. By order dated February 2, 2005, Division Bench appointed Shri L.R. Gupta, retired Director General of CPWD as the sole arbitrator.

Before L.R. Gupta, the arbitrator, respondent while filing its reply to the statement of claims filed by the appellant, also challenged the authority of one Jagdish Raj Yadav to file the claim on behalf of the appellant. In this regard an application dated February 23, 2007 was filed before the arbitrator. The arbitrator dismissed the said application vide the order dated August 3, 2007.

This order was challenged by the respondent before the learned Single Judge of the High Court by filing a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, being OMP No.537/2007.

Notably, L.R. Gupta resigned as the sole arbitrator on June 23, 2008. 

By order dated January 30, 2007, Single Judge disposed of the petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act bearing OMP No.537/2007.

The appellant filed a petition under Section 15 of the 1996 Act before the High Court being OMP (T) (Comm) No.30/2018 seeking appointment of an arbitrator in place of L.R. Gupta who had resigned. The said petition was disposed of by the Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated May 31, 2018 reconstituting the arbitral tribunal by appointing Justice R.C. Jain, a former Judge of the High Court, as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the disputes between the parties. 

The new arbitrator held the first hearing on May 3, 2019 and finally pronounced the award on October 28, 2020. While the arbitral tribunal allowed the claims of the appellant under several heads, we are concerned with the contentious part of the award relating to payment of interest (claim No. 7).

The respondent filed a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the Single Bench of the High Court for setting aside the award dated October 28, 2020. The same was registered as OMP (Comm) No. 78/2021. By the judgment and order dated August 2, 2021, Single Judge partly allowed the petition by setting aside the award with regard to future interest at the rate exceeding 9 percent per annum from the date of the award till the date of payment. 

The aggrieved by the judgment and order dated August 2, 2021 passed by the Single Judge, respondent preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act before the Division Bench of the High Court which was registered as FAO (OS) (Comm) No. 175/2021. In the appeal, senior counsel for the respondent (which was the appellant before the Division Bench) clarified that the challenge would be restricted to the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal insofar the issue 9 of interest was concerned. This was further clarified by submitting that the challenge was not with respect to the rate of interest or award of interest for the pre-reference/past period. 

Grievance highlighted was against the directions contained in sub-paragraph (b)(i) of paragraph 58 to the extent of the arbitral tribunal stipulating that interest for the period mentioned therein would be leviable not merely on the principal amount as awarded but upon the said amount inclusive of the amount of interest relating to the pre-reference/past period. Likewise, arbitral tribunal awarded interest on identical terms in subparagraph (b)(ii) of paragraph 58 which was objected to. Division Bench of the High Court vide the judgment and order dated August 1, 2023 (impugned judgment) allowed the appeal by setting aside the directions contained in paragraph 58(b).

Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed the related SLP (C) No.23235/2023 before the High Court. By order dated October 19, 2023, the Court issued notice. In the hearing held on February 25, 2025, leave was granted. 

There was no challenge by either parties to the award on merit, challenge of the respondent being confined only to the interest part. 

While holding that appellant was entitled to award of interest for the pre-reference period i.e. from the date on which the cause of action arose till filing of the claim before the arbitral tribunal as well as for the pendente lite period and also for the future period, arbitral tribunal agreed with the respondent that no interest should be awarded to the appellant for the period when there was absolute laches on the part of the appellant. The Arbitral tribunal held that for the period from 01.01.2009 till 31.12.2016, that is for a period of about eight years, there was complete laches on the part of the appellant. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal declared that appellant would not be entitled to any interest for the aforesaid period.

The respondent filed a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the High Court impugning the arbitral award dated 28.10.2020. Vide the judgment and order dated 2.08.2021, Single Judge upheld the claims awarded by the arbitral tribunal. On the question of interest, Single Judge framed the question as to whether interest awarded by the arbitral tribunal was exorbitant and unsustainable. The Single Judge held that arbitral tribunal’s decision to award pre-reference interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum did not warrant any interference. As regards pendente lite interest,  Single Judge while noting that arbitral tribunal had awarded 12 percent interest per annum for the period from 20.01.1998 till 31.12.2008 and again from 01.01.2017 till 28.10.2020, justified the decision of the arbitral tribunal not to award interest for the period from 01.01.2009 to 31.12.2016 as during this period the appellant was remiss and did not pursue its claim before the arbitral tribunal diligently. On the rate of interest, Single Judge held that interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum could not by any stretch be considered to be exorbitant or unreasonable but held that 18 percent future interest from the date of the award till the date of payment granted by the arbitral tribunal was ex facie erroneous as according to learned Single Judge the interest rate should have been 2 percent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award.

Therefore, this portion of the award was set aside by the Single Judge; instead Single Judge awarded future interest holding that it could not have been in excess of 9 percent per annum. Therefore, Single Judge partly allowed the petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act to the extent of setting aside the award of future interest at a rate exceeding 9 percent per annum from the date of the award till the date of payment.

This brought the Court to the impugned judgment and order dated 01.08.2023. We have already noted about the limited nature of challenge made by the respondent during the hearing of the appeal filed under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The senior counsel appearing for the respondent clarified that the challenge to the award stood restricted to the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal insofar the issue of interest was concerned. He clarified that the challenge was not with respect to either the rate at which interest was awarded or the grant of interest for the pre-reference/past period. The grievance was confined to the directions contained in paragraph 58(b)(i) of the award and the similar nature of interest in paragraph 58(b)(ii) inasmuch as the arbitral tribunal proceeded to award interest on identical terms: on the principal amount plus the amount of interest for the pre-reference/past period. Thr Division Bench referred to Section 31(7)(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act as well as placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sayeed Ahmed and Company Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh  lite period have been subjected to further levy (2009) 12 SCC 26 and came to the following two conclusions:

i)Section 31(7) recognizes only two periods for which interest may be awarded. The two periods are, firstly from the date on which the cause of action arose till passing of the award and secondly from the date of the award till actual payment. Therefore, the distinction between pre-reference/past period and pendente lite period no longer existed. The period from the date of cause of action i.e. July, 1987 till the date of the award dated 28.10.2020 would constitute the period contemplated under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act. The period commencing from the date of award till payment would be the second period within the meaning of Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act. 

Therefore, the arbitral tribunal committed an illegality in awarding interest for three periods: pre-reference/past periods, pendente lite and for the future period.

ii) Arbitral tribunal committed further illegality in forging the principal amount with interest as would be evident from paragraph 58(b) of the award. Interest awarded for the pre-reference period as well as for the pendente lite period have been subjected to further levy of interest for the said periods by adding the interest amount with the principal amount awarded. This amounted to levying compound interest which is impermissible. Accordingly, the directions contained in paragraph 58(b) were set aside by the Division Bench.

In the Court's considered view, the reasonings given by the Division Bench are fallacious. We say so for the reasons mentioned hereunder. Section 31 of the 1996 Act is the relevant provision.

It deals with the form and contents of arbitral award. Section 31 has eight sub-sections. Sub-section (7) is central to the debate and after the amendment with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. 

The Court observed:"We are unable to agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench. Even in Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) relied upon by the Division Bench, the Bench held that Section 31(7) had carved out two periods, the first period being from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made and the second period being from the date of award till the date of payment. As regards the first period, the Bench clarified that it includes the pre-reference period plus pendente lite period. Though the arbitral tribunal had granted interest for three periods: pre-reference period, pendente lite and post award period, the first two period basically comprises of the period contemplated under clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section 31. It is another matter that the arbitral tribunal awarded varying degrees of interest for the two sub-periods: 18 percent per annum for the pre-reference period and 12 percent as pendente lite, excluding from the said period, the period of eight years when the appellant was found to be remiss in pursuing its claims before the arbitral tribunal. This is also permissible as we shall explain.

Therefore, Sayeed Ahmed and Company (supra) does not exclude or does not say that interest should not be granted for the pre-reference period. All that it explains is that Section 31(7)(a) has joined the two periods of interest: pre-reference and pendente lite."

It added: "This position has been clarified by a recent decision of the High Court in Pam Developments Private Limited Vs. State of West Bengal (2024) 10 SCC 715 After extracting Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, the High Court held that power of the arbitrator to grant pre-reference interest, pendente lite interest and post award interest under Section 31(7) of the 1996 is now fairly well settled. The Bench, thereafter, culled out the following legal propositions in this regard highlighting the difference in the position of law qua the Arbitration Act, 1940 vis-à-vis the 1996 Act."

This position has been further explained by a recent decision of this Bench in North Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. S.A. Builders Ltd. (2024) SCC Online SC 3768. After adverting to Section 31(7) of the 1996. Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court explained it as under:

36.1. From a minute reading of sub-section (7), it is seen that it has got two parts: the first part i.e. clause (a) deals with passing of award which would include interest up to the date on which the award is made. The second part i.e. clause (b) deals with grant of interest on the ‘sum’ awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

The Court noted that the Bench had observed that under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, an arbitral tribunal has the power to grant – (i) pre-award (ii) pendente lite (iii) post-award interest. The Bench explained the reason for award of such interest in the following manner:

From the provisions contained in Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, it is evident that an arbitral tribunal has the power to grant (i) pre-award (ii) pendente lite (iii) post-award interest. Intention behind awarding pre-award interest is primarily to compensate the claimant for the pecuniary loss suffered from the time the cause of action arose till passing of the arbitral award. 

Further, this is also to ensure that the arbitral proceeding is concluded within a reasonable period to minimise the impact of the pre-award interest as well as interest pendente lite; thereby promoting efficiency in the arbitration process. Similarly, grant of post-award interest also serves a salutary purpose. It primarily acts as a disincentive to the award debtor not to delay payment of the arbitral amount to the award holder.

Thus, what Section 31(7)(a) has done is that there is now a statutory recognition of the power of the arbitral tribunal to grant pre-reference interest from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made. There was a vacuum in the Arbitration Act, 1940 as there was no such provision for granting pre-reference interest. It was through judicial pronouncements that such power of the arbitrator to grant pre-reference interest was conferred. Now under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act, such power is statutorily recognized.

A careful and minute reading of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act makes it clear that the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to include in the sum awarded interest at such rate as it deems reasonable on the whole or any part of the money awarded for the whole or any part of the period from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made. 

The Supreme Court excluded that part of the sentence ‘on the whole or any part of the money’ from its analysis since it thought it was not relevant to the controversy. If we exclude this portion, what then becomes discernible is that the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to include in the sum awarded : firstly, interest at such rate as it deems reasonable; and secondly, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. This would mean that the arbitral tribunal can exclude a period from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made for the purpose of grant of interest, as has been done in the present case. It would also mean that the arbitral tribunal can grant interest for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. It can be a composite period or the said period can be further sub-divided, as done in the present case i.e. from the date of cause of action to filing of the claim and from the date of filing of the claim till the date of the award excluding the period when the appellant was found to be remiss. It would also mean that there can be one rate of interest for the whole period or one or more rates of interest for the sub-divided periods as has been done in the instant case.

In Court's opinion, this would be the correct approach to interpret Section 31(7)(a), given the scheme of the 1996 Act.

That being the position, we are of the view that the Division Bench had fallen in error by holding that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to award interest for two periods i.e.pre-reference and pendente lite when the statute provides for only one period viz. from the date when the cause of action arose till the date of the award. The view expressed by the High Court is not the correct interpretation of Section 37(1)(a) of the 1996 Act as explained by us supra as well as in Pam Developments Private Limited (supra) and S.A. Builders Ltd. (supra).

The Supreme Court dealt with the second issue on which the High Court set aside the directions of the arbitral tribunal contained in paragraph 58(b) of the award. According to the Division Bench, the arbitral tribunal had committed an illegality in forging the principal amount with interest while computing the awarded amount on which future interest is to be paid. Interest awarded for the past period could not have been subjected to further levy of interest during the pendente lite or post award period on merger with the principal amount as this would amount to levy of compound interest.

This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra.

In State of Haryana vs. S.L. Arora (2010) 3 SCC 690, a 2-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that as regards pre-award period,interest has to be awarded as specified in the contract and in the absence of any contract, as per the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. However, with regard to the post-award period, the interest is payable as per the discretion of the arbitral tribunal and in the absence of exercise of such discretion, at the mandatory statutory rate of 18 percent per annum. Award of interest like award of cost are ancillary matters. Therefore, the expressions sum for which the award is made and the sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award contextually refers to the award on the substantive claims and not ancillary or consequential directions relating to interest or cost. It was held that arbitral tribunals did not have the power to award interest upon interest or compound interest either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period.

A 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. vs. Governor, State of Orissa (2015) 2 SCC 189 opined that it was not possible to agree with the conclusion in S.L.Arora (supra) that Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act does not require that interest which accrues till the date of the award be included in the sum from the date of the award for calculating the post award interest. Justice Bobde (as His Lordship then was) authoring the majority opinion was of the view that the conclusion reached in S.L. Arora (supra) did not seem to be in consonance with the clear language of Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) declared that S.L.Arora (supra) was wrongly decided in that it held that a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral tribunal and the reference to the award on the substantive claim did not refer to interest pendente lite awarded on the sum directed to be paid upon award and that in the absence of any provision of interest upon interest in the contract, the arbitral tribunal did not have the power to award interest upon interest or compound interest either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period. It has been clarified that the ‘sum’ includes the principal as adjudged together with the interest granted.

A three-Judge Bench of this Court in UHL Power Company Ltd. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116 declared that the judgment in S.L. Arora (supra) has since been overruled by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra). The majority view in Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) is that post-award interest can be granted by an arbitrator on the interest amount awarded.

This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions (please see Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (2022) 9 SCC 286 and Morgan Securities and Credits Private Ltd. vs. Videocon Industries Limited (2023) 1 SCC 602.

In S.A. Builders (supra), this very Bench of the Court after a thorough analysis of Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act had come to the following conclusion:

It emerged from the analysis that "the ‘sum’ so awarded by the arbitral tribunal which may include interest from the date when the cause of action arose to the date of the award, would carry further interest of 18 percent from the date of the award to the date of payment unless the arbitral award otherwise directs (referring to the pre 23.10.2015 position). Thus, the legislative intent is that the awarded sum whether inclusive of interest or not, in case included, then from the date of cause of action to the date of award, would carry further interest from the date of the award to the date of payment."

The Court concluded: "It has been held that the sum awarded would mean the principal amount plus the interest awarded from the date of cause of action upto the date of the award. The sum awarded in Section 31(7)(a) would mean principal amount plus the interest awarded. Thereafter, as per Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, the sum (principal amount + interest) would carry further interest at the rate of 2 per cent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award to the date of payment. Therefore, in view of the clear legal position delineated as above, impugned judgment of the Division Bench dated 01.08.2023 cannot be sustained."

Supreme Court modifies conditional order of bail delivered by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh because dispute is civil in nature

 

In Prince Raj vs. The State of Bihar and Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta modified order of Single judge Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court dated September 20, 2022 to set aside the condition of deposit. The second respondent was Rajeev Kumar. 

The case is related to police station Jakkanpur, Patna. Rajeev Kumar, the petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 420, 406, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. By filing supplementary affidavit dated September 16, 2022, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner is ready to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 85 lacs to the informant in next 15 months in installments. The petitioner stated that amount claimed by the informant in the First Information Report is also the subject matter of title suit no. 211 of 2021. The counsel for the informant had submitted that payment made by the petitioner may not prejudice case of the informant. Considering the undertaking of the petitioner given in the supplementary allowed. In the event of arrest/surrender within six week, the High Court had enlarged the petitioner on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate I cum Sub-Judge I, Patna in Jakkanpur Police Station Case No. 367 of 2021, subject to the conditions laid down under section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure along with following conditions:
Receipt of payment of Rs. 5 lacs to the informant would be furnished by the petitioner at the time of processing of bail bond.
Rest amount of Rs. 80 lacs would be paid by the petitioner in next 15 months in installments.

The High Court made it clear that if the petitioner violates the conditions of the bail order, the court below shall cancel his bail bonds.

The Supreme Court's 3-page long order dated May 7, 2025 reads:"we are, prima facie, of the view that the dispute is civil in nature and, as such, the High Court has rightly granted protection to respondent no.2. 6. Since the appellant himself has expressed that the condition of deposit is prejudicing his right, we accordingly set aside the condition of deposit. However, the relief of interim protection granted by the High Court to respondent no.2 shall remain as it is. The impugned order passed by the High Court stands modified to the above extent."

The grievance of the appellant was that the High Court having directed respondent no.2 to make the deposit is in effect prejudicing the right of the appellant in a suit for specific performance pending before the Civil Court. 

Supreme Court dismisses husband's special leave petition, orders transfer of fixed deposit of Rs.1,00,000/ with interest to account of wife

In Ram Kishore Singh @Ram Kishore vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar passed an order on April 30, 2025. It reads:"In the instant special leave petition, notice was issued on 02.04.2024 only with respect to mediation subject to payment of cost of Rs.1,00,000/- which is lying with the Registry of this Court in Fixed Deposit. 2) Later, the matter was referred to mediation on 24.01.2025. As per the report received from the Supreme Court Mediation Centre, the mediation remained unsuccessful. 3) After hearing learned counsel for the parties and due to the fact that limited notice was issued for mediation which remained unsuccessful, we are not inclined to entertain the present special leave petition. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed. ....4) On supplying the account details of the complainant-respondent No.2 within three days to the Registry, the amount lying in the fixed deposit along with interest, if any, shall be transmitted in her account". The order was passed after the receipt of the mediation report. The respondent no. 2 is Raushani Kumari, a resident of Chandmari, Motihari and the wife of the petitioner.

This case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated February 13, 2024 passed by Justice Patna High Court which had arisen out of police case in 2022 in Mahila Thana, East Champaran. The application before the High Court was filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing order dated July 19, 2022 passed by SDJM, Sadar Motihari, East Champaran whereby he had taken cognizance under sections 498(A), 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner in connection with Mahila P.S. Case pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Sadar Motihari, East Champaran.

The prosecution case, was that the wife of the petitioner had filed the case, alleging that on November 30, 2013, her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner, and her father gave her ornaments worth Rs. 2,50,000/-, clothes and furniture, and cash of Rs. 10–12 lakh. After marriage, she had gone to her matrimonial house, and after 4-5 days of hearing about the cheating of her husband on another girl, at the instigation of her in-laws, her husband started demanding a four-wheeler. On this issue, her husband (the petitioner), Harikant Singh (the father-in-law), Kunti Devi, Shyam Kishore Singh (Devar), and Kanhaiya Kishore Singh (Devar) started torturing her; for that, they abused her and threatened to kill her. Her husband tried to kill her with his licensed revolver. After acknowledging the same, her parents tried to pacify the matter. In the meantime, from wedlock, six-year-old Om Kumar (son) and a one-year-old daughter (Ananya) were born, but they did not stop torturing. In the year 2020, her husband went to Patna to leave her and their children. He did not want to talk and provide expenses. He always used to talk about another marriage. In 2021, he ousted her, taking all her belongings. After settlement, she went to Sasural at Muzaffarpur, but on January 12, 2022, they ousted her and always threatened to kill her and her family members. Her husband is a police personnel, and he was posted at the District Head Quarter Motihari, C.I.D. Department. The petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the husband of Opposite Party No. 2, and no such occurrence, as alleged in F.I.R., has ever taken place. The petitioner has never committed any torture or demanded any dowry from OP No. 2. It is next submitted that the marriage is about more than 11 years old, and out of wedlock, two children were born who are presently aged about 8 years and 2 and a half years. It is also asserted and submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is not aggrieved by his wife but is aggrieved further submits that the petitioner has been implicated in more than three cases by the Opposite party No. 2. He submitted that the petitioner was ready and willing to keep Opposite Party No. 2, as his wife, with honour and dignity. The counsel of the Opposite party No. 2 submitted that there was specific allegation against this petitioner that he, along with other co-accused persons, not only assaulted the Opposite party No. 2 but also abused her on several occasions for non-fulfillment of the demand of dowry and lastly, in the year 2018 also, the petitioner demanded dowry, and on refusal, the petitioner threatened the opposite party No. 2 on the point of pistol. Therefore, it was prayed on
behalf of opposite party no. 2 that the petitioner should be put on trial. 

The High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had concluded: "Considering the rival submissions of the parties and materials available on record, the Court is of the opinion that there is direct and specific allegation against this petitioner of committing torture, assault, and abuse to opposite party No. 2. As such, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the order impugned which warrants any interference by this Court." The petition was dismissed. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench seeks ballistic report of the pistol in a challenge against order of Justice Harish Kumar

In Vjay Prasad Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Manoj Misra passed an order which deemed it "appropriate to direct the learned counsel for the State to bring on record the ballistic report with regard to the pistol said to have been recovered from Sudama Sahani @ Sudama Sahni, as also the details with regard to the SIM Card being used at the relevant time/CDR, if the same has been recovered relating to Ramesh Mahto." The matter is to be listed on July 30, 2025. 

Patna High Court's Justice Harish Kumar had heard the case which arose Motihari, East Champaran. The petitions of Ramesh Mahto and Sudama Sahani were heard together and the order was passed on November  20, 2024. The application for grant of bail to the petitioners who are in custody in connection with Motihari Town Case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 120B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

The prosecution alleged that on June 26, 2024 while the informant and his elder brother, Suresh Prasad Yadav, went on his four wheeler and reached near a railway crossing, in the mean time, two unknown miscreants who were standing there, opened fire, due to which the informant’s brother sustained gun shot injury. After causing fire arm injury, both the miscreants sat on one Apache motorcycle alongwith one pillion rider and fled away. The fire arm injuries sustained to the deceased proved fatal.The petitioners' counsel contended that the FIR was instituted against unknown miscreants, however, during the course of investigation the name of the petitioners sprung up on the confessional statement of co-accused persons; save and except the confessional statement, there is no other material suggesting the involvement of the petitioner in the crime. It was also contended that during the course of investigation various other co-accused persons have been apprehended, but they did not disclose the name of the petitioners in causing the murder of the deceased. So far the petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 62213 of 2024 is concerned, the only material which has come during the course of investigation is that before the occurrence, the petitioner had conversation with one of the co-accused person, whose mobile was allegedly fallen at the place of occurrence in course of fleeing. So far the petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 64450 of 2024 is concerned, during the course of investigation it has come that on the confessional statement of Harishankar Paswan, the weapon which is said to be used in the crime, has been recovered from the house of the petitioner. It is lastly contended that now the investigation of the crime is complete and the chargesheet has been submitted and, as such, there is no chance of tampering with the evidence or threatening the witnesses. The petitioners undertake that they will fully cooperate in the proceeding of the Court. 

Regard being had to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and considering the materials collected
during the course of investigation apart from the criminal antecedent of the petitioner, the Court is not acceded to the prayer of the petitioners for the present, however the Court directed that the petitioners shall be released from the custody after framing of the charge in the afore-noted case on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Motihari, East Champaran.

Supreme Court grants relief to Soni Kumari in a case of dowry death

In Soni Kumari @ Menka Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court rejected the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner who was apprehending her arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 304B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The petitioner along with other accused persons are accused of killing the daughter of Ashok Kumar Jha, the informant. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case. He submitted that the petitioner is the sister of the husband of the deceased. He submits that there is no specific allegation against the petitioner. He further submits that petitioner has no criminal antecedent. APP for the State and opposite party no. 2 opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioner was also involved in the case and investigation is going on. The order reads: "I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. Accordingly, her prayer for anticipatory bail is rejected..."

The case is pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Danapur. The case arose from Sahpur Thana in Patna district. The bail application was filed in the High Court on August 17, 2024.

A special leave to appeal (criminal) has been filed in the Supreme Court on January 8, 2025 and registered on January 17, 2025 against High Court's order dated December 5, 2024. On January 24, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and K.V. Viswanathan passed an order saying, "no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner" who is a resident of Mithapur, Jakkanpur, Patna.

Patna High Court quashes "local bailors" condition for Pakistani citizen for bail of Khadija Noor

In Khadija Noor vs. The State of Bihar (2025), on March 3, 2025, Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court set aside and quashed qua condition imposed as above qua local bailors through order dated October 18, 2022 by Additional  Sessions Judge XII, Sitamarhi. The  criminal miscellaneous application was filed for quashing of one of the condition of bail, as imposed through order dated October 18, 2022, arising out of a case registered for the offences under Section 467, 468, 471, 420, 34 of the IPC and 14 of Foreigners Act, 2004.

The trial court had imposed a condition that “both the bailors" should be local resident of Sitamarhi”. The petitioner admittedly a Pakistani citizen and, has been in custody since October 8, 2022, even after granting the bail for want of local bailors.  

Y.C. Verma, senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner entered into the territory of India to solemnize her marriage with one Sayed Hyder, a resident of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. While entering in the Indian territory through Indo-Nepal border, she was apprehended and booked under provisions of law. He submitted that Sayed Hyder who is proposed “groom” of petitioner is ready to stand as a bailor for the petitioner and his one brother or other close family members are also ready to stand as another bailor for petitioner, who are also the resident of Hyderabad and are Indian citizen but due to above condition they are not in position to stand as bailors for petitioner. He submitted that certain fundamental rights are even available to foreign citizens and even after granting bail keeping petitioner in jail since last more than 2 years is amounting to violation of her fundamental rights just in want of local bailors. It was pointed out that it is a classical case of territorial and geographical biasness when a citizen of this country residing in Hyderabad is ready to stand as sureties and bailors for this petitioner. 

In support of his submission, the senior counsel took shelter of para no. 33 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through Moti Ram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1978) 4SCC 47. He relied upon legal report of Supreme Court as available through Girish Gandhi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2024) 8 SCR 561 where he mainly relied upon para 24 and 26 of the case. 

The petitioner after granting bail remained in custody for more than 2 years in want of “local bailors” despite of the availability of bailors from other parts of this country trial court/ concerned court is directed to release the petitioner on bail where one of the bailor shall be Sayed Hyder frim Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh and the other bailor shall be the brother of Sayed Hyder in terms of para 11 of the petition, with following conditions:-

(i) Both the bailors are directed to surrender their passport in original before the learned trial court, if they had or to make statement on affidavit that they are not the holder of the Indian Passport, in case, they don’t have it.

(ii)  trial court must be satisfied with the identity of both bailors as aforesaid through their Adhaar Card, PAN Card and also voter card before accepting the bail bond.

(iii) D.G.P. of the State be also informed to direct local SHO to remain vigilant, where petitioner and bailors must report to local police once in a month during pendency of the trial.

(iv) Sayed Hyder, must undertake on affidavit that during pendency of trial, he must keep petitioner with all her dignity, safety and care with him.

(v) Sayed Hyder is directed to ensure the presence of petitioner in the Court as and when required by the court during the pendency of the trial.

(vi) In case of any illness of petitioner and also in case of any unforeseen event, Sayed Hyder must report to local SHO, immediately and also the ld. trial court.

(vii) Considering the fact as petitioner is a Pakistani citizen trial court is directed to conclude the trial at its  earliest, preferably within one year.

(viii) If the occasion arises, trial court upon acquittal or conviction, after completion of sentence (subject to any order of appellate court), must take immediate steps, to deport petitioner from country for Pakistan, in accordance with law. 

Also read: Sitamarhi Trial Court seeking "local bailor" from a Pakistani citizen for bail, Patna High Court to hear case of Khadija Noor