Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment of 2013 by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Ara in a case of kidnapping for marriage

In Harendra Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 16-page long judgement dated June 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"24. The impugned judgment dated 18.04.2013 and order of sentence dated 20.04.2013 passed in Sessions Trial No. 149 of 2005 arising out of Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 by the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge II, Ara is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the above-named appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, as such, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him. 25. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 26. There shall be no order as to cost. 27. Office is directed to send back the lower court records along with a copy of the judgment to the learned District Court forthwith."

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the criminal appeal which was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2005. The case arose out of a Ara Nawada P.S.Case of 2003, by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge IInd, Ara, whereby the trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence committed under Section 366 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000.

The prosecution case was that the informant, Yogendra Yadav, while working in a Cotton Mill at Sapar, Rajkot (Gujarat), became acquainted with accused Nagendra Yadav, who was employed in the same establishment. On February 17, 2003, when the informant, along with his wife and minor son, was returning to his native village, Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and allegedly persuaded them to visit his residence at Ara Town. It was alleged that after reaching Ara on February 19, 2003 and staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, the informant found the very next morning that his wife, son and a box containing Rs.90,000/- were missing. Upon inquiry from the co-accused Ram Ayodhaya, he was informed that his wife and son had gone to the River Ganga and would return later, however, allegedly co-accused Ram Ayodhaya had allegedly served him food containing intoxicant and after consuming the same he remained unconscious for several days. The day he regained consciousness he found that his wife, son and the cash box were missing. Subsequently, on February 26,.2003, when the informant, along with witnesses had again approached the accused persons to know about the whereabouts of his son and wife, allegedly the accused demanded Rs.1,00,000/- to release his wife and son and in case of failure of fulfillment of the 
demand he had threatened that they would be killed, which led to institution of the complaint before the Chief Judicial  Magistrate.

The Magistrate directed the local police for investigation in exercise of power under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., pursuant to which Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 was registered for the commission of offences under Sections 364, 379, 328 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) against four accused persons, including the appellant. 

The police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 366, 364, 379 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code on November 26, 2023. Cognizance was taken on February 7, 2004, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on March 18, 2005. Charges were framed against the appellant on January 7, 2006 leading the conviction of the appellant upon completion of trial. 

The counsel of the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the main allegation is against co-accused Nagendra Yadav and the appellant were implicated solely because he is the brother of the co-accused, in spite of the fact, no material came against the appellant that he had participated in the alleged abduction of the informant’s wife or son and he had shared any common intention with the main accused, so as, to attract the provisions
of 120-B of the IPC. 

He referred to the testimony of Om Prakash Yadav, the P.W.1, the son of the informant. He in his examination-in-chief, gave varying versions regarding the circumstances in which his mother allegedly went away on her own, which creates serious doubt about the veracity of his testimony and the prosecution case as a whole. 

The counsel submitted that neither any witness nor any material was brought on record in course of trial to suggest that the victim was kidnapped by the appellant as would also appear from the deposition of the victim Meera Devi, the P.W.5, who is the victim and she also has not supported the prosecution story. 

P.W.5 in her statement in police custody that she on her own had accompanied the co-accused which demolishes the accusation of kidnapping and, as such, the prosecution having miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, renders the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence to be set aside.

APP appeared for the State. While opposing the appeal, he submitted that the District Court, after considering all the evidences on record and exhibits submitted on behalf of the parties during the course of trial, has erred no mistake in passing the order conviction against the appellant.

The conviction of the appellant is under Section 366 and Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. Section 366 reads: “Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.

Section 120B reads: "Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.  (2)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."

Justice Singh observed: "12. To constitute the offence of abduction, it must be shown that a person was unlawfully taken away or induced to move from one place to another either by the use of force or through deceitful means. The essence of the offence lies in the intention with which the accused acts. It is the accused's conduct, volition and underlying purpose that are determinative of whether the offence is made out. The crucial issue in every case is the intention accompanying the act of taking or inducing the woman to leave a particular place. Once the requisite criminal intent on the part of the accused is established, the offence stands complete irrespective of whether the intended object was ultimately achieved and regardless of whether the woman subsequently consented to marriage or sexual relations. 13. It is a well-settled principle that, for bringing home a charge under Section 366 IPC, the prosecution must establish not merely that the woman was taken or induced to move from one place to another, but also that such inducement was effected by force or deceitful means and was accompanied by the requisite criminal intent contemplated under the provision. The prosecution is further required to prove that the abduction was committed with the intention that the woman may be compelled to marry any person against her will, or that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or with the knowledge that such consequences were likely to follow. Mere proof of abduction, by itself, is insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 366 IPC. The gravamen of the offence lies not only in the act of taking away the woman but also in the specific purpose and intention behind such act. Therefore, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving that the abduction was for one of the purposes enumerated under Section 366 IPC, a conviction under the said provision cannot be legally sustained.

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2018) 6 SCC 664, wherein, it observed that to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case which is reproduced hereinafter:“16. In order to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case. Once the necessary intent of the accused is established, the offence is complete, whether or not the accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.

The judgement reads: ".....to constitute an  offence under Section 366 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge under Section 366 IPC is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 IPC, the court cannot hold the accused guilty and punish him under Section 366 IPC.” This proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yousuff vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2021) 16 SCC 461. 

Justice Singh explored as to whether the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 366 and 120-B of the IPC was justified. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether four witnesses. P.W.1 – Om Prakash Yadav: P.W.1 is the son of the informant and one of the alleged victims. In his deposition, he stated that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) along with his parents, accused Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and persuaded them to visit Ara. According to him, after staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, he and his mother were taken away by accused Nagendra Yadav and were kept at different places, including Kudhwa Tola and Mumbai. He also stated that when they later came to Buxar Railway Station, he met his father, whereupon the accused persons fled away with his mother. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was a student of Class V at the relevant time and supported the fact that he had stayed with his mother at Kudhwa Mohalla and Mumbai. The trial court found his testimony corroborative of the evidence of P.W.2, Yogendra Yadav, the Informant. 

P.W.2 identified his signature on the complaint petition. He substantially reiterated the allegations made in the complaint petition. He deposed that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) on February 17, 2003 along with his wife and son, accused Nagendra Yadav persuaded them to visit Ara Town. After reaching the khatal of the accused persons and taking meals, he went to sleep and on waking found his wife and son missing. He stated that accused Ram Ayodhaya informed him that they had gone to the Ganga for bathing and worship. He further alleged that after consuming food provided by the accused persons, he became unconscious for several days and, upon regaining consciousness, found that his wife and son were still missing. He also deposed that the accused persons later demanded Rs.1,00,000/- for their release. In cross-
examination, he stated that Meera Devi was his second wife and that he had married her in the year 1995 after separating from his first wife. The trial court found that his evidence regarding the stay at the khatal and subsequent disappearance of his wife and son remained substantially unshaken.

P.W.3–SurendraYadav, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He denied having any knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been interrogated by the police in connection with the case. Nothing material supporting the prosecution case could be elicited from his evidence.

P.W.4–Vindhyachal Yadav was also declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the
alleged occurrence and did not support the prosecution version. His evidence did not advance the prosecution case in any manner.

P.W.5 – Meera Devi, the alleged victim and the second wife of the informant according to the prosecution case did not support the prosecution version and was declared hostile. She stated that she had never married the informant and also alleged that her statement recorded before the Magistrate had been made under pressure from the police. She specifically denied the prosecution allegation that accused Nagendra Yadav had forcibly abducted her after administering poison to the informant. Her evidence was completely contrary to the prosecution case and substantially weakened the allegation of kidnapping.

P.W.6 – Daya Ram Singh @ Dayanand Yadav was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been questioned by the police regarding the incident. No material supporting the prosecution case emerged from his testimony.

P.W.7 – Singhasan Yadav was also declared hostile. He denied knowledge of the occurrence and did not support the prosecution case. His evidence was of no assistance to the prosecution.

P.W.8 – Paras Nath Yadav, (referred to as P.W.9 in portions of the trial court judgment) was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied having any knowledge of the alleged incident and did not support the prosecution version. Nothing favourable to the prosecution could be elicited from his evidence.

Justice Singh recorded that on the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellants/accused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against them, which they denied and show their complete innocence. 

Justice Singh observed:"....I find that the learned trial Court has erred in concluding that the present appellant, Harendra Yadav, shared the common intention or was a party to any conspiracy with the co-accused, Nagendra Yadav, so as, to attract the allegations under Sections 366 and 120B IPC. 22. From the evidence available on record, it transpires that the main allegation of taking away the victim is directed against co-accused Nagendra Yadav. Significantly, the alleged victim, P.W.5 (Meera Devi), has herself not supported the prosecution case and has categorically denied that she was forcibly abducted by the accused persons. She has further denied material aspects of the prosecution story and has not attributed any overt act whatsoever to the present appellant. Mere relationship of being brother of the co-accused and his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be established that there was prior meeting of mind for establishing offence under Section 366 and 120(B) of I.P.C without any independent corroboration."

The judgement reads: "23. The record further reveals that P.Ws.3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution to rest substantially upon the testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2. Even their evidence does not disclose any specific act on the part of the appellant indicating that he had induced, compelled, or deceived the victim into going from one place to another, nor is there any material to establish that he possessed the requisite intention contemplated under Section 366 IPC. Likewise, there is no cogent evidence demonstrating any agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the co-accused so as to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. From the records of the case and the testimony of the victim herself, it is evident that no specific allegation has been levelled against the appellant so as to attract the ingredients of the aforesaid offences. In such circumstances, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial Court is not borne out of the evidence on record."

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, grants bail in a rape-murder case

In Dheeraj Jha @ Dheeraj Kumar @ Raghav vs. The State of Bihar, Supreme Court's Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 5-page long order dated March 25, 2026 setting aside the order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court noted that upon completion of investigation the appellant was chargesheeted only for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and not other offences. The appellant was the superior of the deceased. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 of the IPC were not made out and in any case, the deceased committed suicide pursuant to an alleged extra-marital affair with the appellant. Considering the aforesaid submissions made, we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant, particularly, by taking note of the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant and the facts governing the case. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court. 

In his 3-page long order dated December 1, 2025, Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh rejected the prayer of the petitioner who sought bail in a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 328, 376D and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per prosecution case, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with another co-accused, namely Dheeraj Jha, committed rape with the wife of informant and thereafter, administered her poison due to which, during course of treatment, she died. The senior counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. Informant was not an eye witness of the occurrence. As a matter of fact, wife of informant and the petitioner used to work at the same Office and on the alleged date and time of occurrence, wife of informant was getting unconscious and therefore, this petitioner, along with co-accused Dheeraj Jha, took her to a hospital and her husband was also informed. Moreover, charge-sheet had already been submitted and petitioner was in custody since November 19, 2024. The petitioner had got no criminal antecedents. A.P.P. for the State and
learned counsel for the informant had submitted that petitioner was named in the F.I.R. with specific accusation that he, along with another accused person, committed rape with the victim and administered her poison. On the way to hospital, the victim herself narrated the whole incident to the informant. Justice Singh had concluded: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, specific and direct nature of accusation and gravity of offence, the prayer for grant bail of to the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, considering the fact that the petitioner is in custody since 19.11.2024, the learned trial court is directed to
expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Supreme Court set aside "cryptic order" by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar in Vandana Gupta case, which resulted in "travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgement dated July 21, 2025 wherein it allowed the appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta. The Respondent no. 2 is Vandan Gupta. The Division Bench concluded:"keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society." 

The judgement reads:"the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration. 28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled. She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before the appropriate forum."

The appeal arose by special leave emanates from the order dated January 18, 2024 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent No.2-accused 2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed and she was granted bail. The appellant-victim herein was the informant in the FIR. 

The prosecution case as against Vandana Gupta, Respondent No.2 was that she while being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih, Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation and mental torture. It was alleged that she used to send the ladies housed in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court recorded that during the course of investigation, few more ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against Vanadana Gupta, the respondent No.2. The application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected by the Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order dated July 10, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an
appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing the order passed by the Special Court. In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506 of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act vide order dated August 29, 2023. Notably, in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim in any prayer for bail essential. 

The appellant-victim approached the Supreme Court through the appeal by special leave to assail the order passed by the High Court. Her counsel contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men. It was also contended that unidentified men were allowed access into the protection home where they would take advantage of the helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours. 

Pursuant to the release of respondent No.2 on bail, she was reinstated in service, and she was heading another protection home within the State of Bihar. This approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He submitted that it was apparent that the concerned authorities of the State Government were hands in glove with the accused and had no intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct. Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on the female inmates. In case, respondent No.2 is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial. The counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.  

The standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of Bihar supported the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation, grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there was imminent threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 was allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However, on a pertinent query being posed,  standing counsel was not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working in a similar institution.

Supreme Court observed: "21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened."

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's  decisions in Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 wherein it cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows:
“18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118].

In Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 upon hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Mahila P.S. Case no. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected. The allegation against the appellant who was a Superintendent of Remand Home was that she used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that appellant was falsely implicated in this case. She had not taken the caste name of the informant in public view. No offence is made out under the provisions of the SC/ST Act against her. Notably, vide letter No. 836 dated February 16, 2022, one S.I.T. team was constituted for investigation of Mahila P.S. Case No. 13 of 2022 and Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 jointly and the investigation was started jointly but after investigation of the case, the police submitted final form No. 100 of 2022 due to insufficiency of evidence which is apparent from Annexure-3 of the petition itself and also the allegation which was alleged by the informant/victim upon this appellant was not found true. 

The Court order recorded that from perusal of the Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022, which was annexed in the petition as Annexure-5(page No-36) in which it was mentioned that no any drug abuse and rape/sexual exploitation have been made in that remand home. From perusal of the report of Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna, it was mentioned in para-5 that the nature of the informant/victim was quarrelsome. Moreover, the appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022. The appeal for bail was opposed by Special P.P. for the State and the counsel for the informant. By way of filing counter affidavit, it was mentioned in para-2 that "another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was also submitted that from a report of SP, Patna, few men used to come in girh by covering their faces and on the permission of this appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register."

Justice Panwar concluded:"....taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna."

Quashing this order by Justice Panwar, Supreme Court observed: "25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act."

 

Supreme Court sets aside bail order by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar which "resulted ino travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 16-page long judgement dated July 21, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"...it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside." The judgement authored by Justice Mehta sets aside the 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 delivered by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court in Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024).  

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Shabeen Ahmad vs.The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 which placed reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768, Justice Mehta observed:"we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration." The respondent no. 2 is Vandana Gupta.   

Vandana Gupta, had approached the High Court against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with a Mahila P.S. case of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the I.T. Act and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected.

The allegation was that Vandana Gupta, the appellant was a Superintendent of Remand Home who used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. The Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022 on Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna mentioned that "the nature of the informant/victim is quarrelsome". The appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022 before she was granted bail by Justice Pawar in January 2024.

The counter affidavit recorded that another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was submitted in the report of SP, Patna that few men used to come in Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna by covering their faces and on the permission of Vandana Gupta, the appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register. 

Justice Pawar had concluded:"Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed..." 

It emerges that Supreme Court's judgement has upheld the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna. 

Justice Mehta observed:"It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a case of such nature. 25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act." 

 

Granting relief to Syed Shahnawaz Hussain in a rape case, Delhi High Court's Justice Neena Bansal Krishna says, “protecting” will always weigh more than “punishing”

Brother of Syed Shahnawaz Hussain is married to the complainant 

In P (Complainant) vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Syed Shahnawaz Hussain (2024), Justice Neena Bansal Krishna of of Delhi High Court observed: "“Innocent until proven guilty” coupled with the rigorous standard of "establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” forms the foundational tenet of our criminal justice administration. The acquittal of guilty individuals, while regrettable, is a lesser evil compared to the horror of condemning the blameless. When the delicate scales of justice are tipped with utmost care, “protecting” will always weigh more than “punishing”" in a case pertaining to offences under Sections 376/328/506 of Indian Penal Code 1860, against Syed Shahnawaz Hussain, the respondent no. 2, the former Member of Parliament. The judgement was delivered on August 2, 2024.

Section 376 deals with punishment for sexual assault. The relevant part of the section reads: "1 (a) whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2) commits sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. (b) If the sexual assault is committed by a person in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant or by a near relative of the complainant, he/she shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to life imprisonment and shall also be liable to fine."

Section 328 deals with the offence of causing hurt by means of poison, etc., with intent to commit and offence" It reads: "Whoever administers to or causes to be taken by any person any poison or any stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug, or other thing with intent to cause hurt to such person, or with intent to commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

Section 506 deals with the punishment for criminal intimidation. It reads: "Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprison­ment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprison­ment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."

It was alleged by the lady complainant that on April 12, 2018 during the BJP dharna in Delhi, the lady received a call from Syed Shahnawaz Hussain to meet him at Roshan Tent House, New Khanna Market, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi at about 06:00 P.M., to accompany him to his Farmhouse in Chhatarpur where his brother and his brother‟s wife, Mrs. Lama Hussain would also be present, to sort out the ongoing difference/issues between her and his brother Shri Syed Shabbaz Hussain. Allegedly, when she reached the Farmhouse along with Hussain, she was asked by him to switch off her mobile phone. Thereafter, Hussain gave her some eatables and cold drinks, on consumption of which she lost her consciousness. Taking advantage of the situation, he raped her till late night. He then threatened to tarnish her image by circulating her explicit/sexual videos recorded by him and even threatened to kill her and her family members. The complainant reported the incident through the complaint dated April 22, 2018 to Station House Officer, Police Station Mehrauli, New Delhi and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, South Delhi as well as Complaint dated April 26, 2018 to Commissioner of Police, whereby she sought registration of an FIR under Section 376/328/506 of IPC 1860, against Hussain.

Despite several calls on Number 100 and Number 112 to Delhi Police and being called to the Police Station several times, no FIR was registered against Hussain. All her complaints to Police (Vigilance Department) at Barakhamba Road, Delhi and also to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Commissioner, did not result in any action either against Hussain or against the Police Officers involved in protecting him. 

Subsequently, a Complaint was filed under Section 156 (3) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), 1973 read with Section 200 Cr.P.C. before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Court, Delhi. After consideration of the allegations made by the complainant, the Metropolitan Magistrate finding that the allegations in the Complaint disclosed commission of cognizable offence, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of U.P. & Ors (2008), directed the registration of FIR vide order dated July 7, 2018. The Metropolitan Magistrate directed the recording of statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C and for the medical examination of victim/complainant and Hussain, the accused. Despite the order, no FIR was registered by the Station House Officer, Police Station, Mehrauli. The police continued to protect the accused, who was also able to commit theft of documents from the Saket Court, in connivance with the police officials.

Hussain challenged the order dated July 7, 2018 before the Session Court, Saket Court, Delhi on July 9, 2018 through his revision petition. The Court of Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-01 (South), Saket Courts, New Delhi dismissed the Revision Petition by order dated July 12, 2018. He approached the High Court by filing a quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but was dismissed on August 17, 2022 by Justice Asha Menon in CRLMC No. 3456/2018. This case was filed and registered on August 18, 2022 in the Supreme Court and verified on August 20, 2022. It was decided by Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta. The apex Court was not inclined to interfere with the order and judgment passed by the High Court. It dismissed special leave petition of  Syed Shahnawaz Hussain by its order dated January 16, 2023. The order dated July 7, 2018 of Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Court directing registration of FIR was upheld.

The High Court's order records that the complainant was pressurized her to compromise with the accused. The police persons had also threatened and pressurized the witnesses of complainant. Several witnesses were also beaten mercilessly by the Police. This is supported by Sangeeta Singh, the witness who has filed a criminal complaint against the Mehrauli Police/SHO/Investigating Officer and other accused persons which is pending in the Saket Court, Delhi. It also recorded that the Investigating Officer/SHO Police Station Mehrauli, under the undue influence of the Hussain, tried to save him from this case and filed the false Report/Cancellation Report dated April 25, 2023 in the FIR No. 85/2023 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Court, Delhi.

A Protest Petition was filed by the complainant against the Cancellation Report dated April 25, 2023 before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Rouse Avenue Court, Delhi. The Court through its order dated October 10, 2023 allowed the protest petition filed by the complainant and rejected the Cancellation Report filed by the Investigating Agency. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cognizance took cognizance under Sections 376/328/506 of IPC, 1860 thereby summoning the accused person to face trial for the offences. Notably, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate referred to the judgments in the case of Phool Singh vs. The State of M.P., decided vide Crl. Appeal No. 1520/2021 by the Apex Court vide Judgment dated 01.12.2021, Santhosh Moolya & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 479/2009 and Ganesan vs. State (Represented by its Inspector of Police), Criminal Appeal No. 680/2020, wherein it has been observed that the sole testimony of the victim or prosecutrix, if reliable, is sufficient to convict an accused and it requires no corroboration.

The order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was challenged by Hussain in a Criminal Revision Petition the Session Court, Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi. The Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Rouse Avenue Courts set aside the Summoning Order dated October 10, 2023 of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate through its order dated December 16, 2023. Additional Sessions Judge observed that there is no quarrel with the proposition of law that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if reliable, can be sufficient to convict the accused, but the entire focus of all the judgments of the Apex Court is on the reliability of the testimony.

The lady petitioner, the complainant challenged this order in the High Court. She contended that the Hussain has concealed material facts and did not place on record the orders of the High Court and Supreme Court because through those Orders, his petitions, which were essentially on the same grounds, had already been dismissed. She further averred that it is a settled law that in the rape case, the conviction can be done on the basis of medical evidence and also the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge, Rouse Avenue Courts, failed to appreciate that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and medical report of the victim which support the prosecution case and make it a fit case for summoning the accused and to proceed with the trial for offences made out. The present Revision Petition was filed to challenge the legality, correctness and propriety of the order dated December 16, 2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge in accepting the Cancellation Report.

In its judgement the High Court has recorded that "the alleged incident was of 12.04 2018 while the complaint has been made on 22.04.2018 i.e., after about ten days" after she could gather courage to make the complaint despite this "the FIR got registered only by the intervention of the Court right upto the Apex Court" when Hussain did not find any favour. The FIR No. 85/2023 was eventually registered "after about five years" in regard to the alleged incident of April 12, 2018.  

The High Court observed that the "sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be the basis of conviction but has a caveat that it must be of sterling quality and absolutely reliable. To ascertain the credibility and reliability of the testimony of the prosecutrix, the surrounding circumstances as deciphered during investigation, also require equal consideration." It grappled with the question as to "whether the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer shakes the credibility of the testimony and creates a grave suspicion that the alleged offences could not possibly have occurred."

The judgment concluded:"the overwhelming independent ocular, documentary and scientific evidence collected during the investigations, whereby the presence of the respondent no.2 and complainant on the date of the alleged incident at the place of alleged incident i.e. Sharma Farmhouse is completely ruled out, the possibility of the commission of alleged offence is rendered zilch. Hence, conclusion of the learned Additional Sessions Judge in accepting the Cancellation Report has to be upheld. In view of the foregoing discussions, there is no infirmity in the impugned Order dated 16.12.2023 and the Revision Petition is hereby dismissed."

Unanswered India Gate Question

"India Gate" is mentioned on five occasions in the judgment.   

Notably, the complainant's submission stating that "IO/Police SHO Police Station Mehrauli, has intentionally not produced the CDR Report/CCTV footage of India Gate which is important evidence to prosecute respondent No. 2" which  Special Judge has failed to appreciate is recorded in paragraph 21 of the judgement, has not been disputed.  At paragraph 72 of the judgement which provides details about the "Additional Contentions of the Petitioner", it is recorded that "The complainant in the Petition has raised a ground that the IO/SHO Police Station Mehrauli has not produced the CDR report/CCTV Footage of India Gate which is important evidence to corroborate that after the incident, she was abandoned at India Gate, in the middle of the night after the incident."  

The judgement of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna reproduces the response of the I.O. at paragraph 73-74 without engaging with it. 

The text with regard to I.O's submission reads: "The I.O. in the Cancellation Report has explained this aspect by stating that the CDR records of her mobile phone, which was with her, clearly reflect that her presence at India Gate has not been confirmed by the location charts. She was seen to be present at various places in Dwarka on the date of the incident and at even the alleged time of incident which is 10:00 PM to 10:30 P.M., her Cell-ID location is of Sector 22, Dwarka at 22:31:42 hrs. In light of the above discussion, when it is evident that the complainant was at different places in Dwarka throughout the day and when the mobile number has not been denied by the complainant, there arises no question that the CDR of the mobile phone would incorrectly reflect her location, since a person cannot be present at two locations at one time, the CCTV footage of India Gate would not be of any assistance in the present case. Further, even if the CCTV would have reflected her presence at India Gate, it could not have provided any assistance in proving the alleged incident of rape or commission of the alleged offence." 

This does not seem to answer the India Gate question by any stretch of imagination. Will this question be examined when there is an appeal against the High Court's judgement?  

Influence of High Court's observation on Sayed Sahahbaz Hussain and his wife on pending case before Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, Delhi

In paragraph 65-70 of the judgement records that it was also the claim of the petitioner that Sayed Sahahbaz Hussain, brother of Syed Shahnawaz Hussain had also raped her in the year 2013 in regard to which she had met the Syed Shahnawaz Hussain, who was a Member of Parliament at that time. The complainant/prosecutrix even approached the Delhi Commission for Women in the year 2016 with the above allegation of rape by the brother of Syed Shahnawaz Hussain, the respondent No. 2 and she had also alleged that she was forcibly made to convert her religion by signing papers of conversion and even a fake Nikahnama in the name of complainant/prosecutrix and Syed Shahbaz Hussain, was prepared. She stated by her that in regard to the said incident involving the brother of the respondent No. 2, she had made a complaint under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for registration of an FIR, though it was dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. It was subsequently allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge in revision, but since the same was done with issuing notice to Syed Shahnawaz Hussain, respondent No. 2, the High Court set the order aside and remanded it back which is pending adjudication before Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, Delhi.

The judgement also records that Syed Shahbaz Hussain, disclosed that the complainant/petitioner had sought his help for some NGO work which he had given her and she had visited his house on few occasions, but suddenly she started posting some objectionable posts on social media about him and blackmailing him for money and fraud and also extended threats to implicate him in false rape case. She even started pressuring him to divorce his wife and to marry her. When he refused to accede to her illegal demands, she made a complaint in Women Commission, Delhi making false allegations of rape against him on the pretext of marriage and forcible conversion etc. He denied having any relationship with the complainant/petitioner. He also disclosed to the Investigating Officer that under the pressure and threats and on a promise made by the complainant/prosecutrix to withdraw her complaints against him, he agreed to marry her and they both got married on January 10, 2017, but she continued to blackmail and threaten him and even visited his house on various occasions and created scene, resulting in filing of different complaints in the local Police Station and registration of some FIRs against her at Police Station Sarita Vihar and Jamia Nagar. He also stated about continuous extension of threats and the cross complaints given or filed by them against each other to different authorities. The statement of Lama Hussain, wife of the respondent No. 2 also deposed and gave the statement on similar lines.

Delhi High Court's observation on Sayed Sahahbaz Hussain and his wife, the complainant is germane to the case pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, Delhi. 

Link between property dispute and allegations of sexual assault?

The reference to property dispute in the context of allegations of sexual assault by the lady complainant finds passing reference in the judgement. The relationship between the possibility of property dispute and allegations of the assault has not be examined at any stage of the judicial process.