Supreme Court sets aside Patna High Court's order passed without considering charge-sheet etc

In Naveen Kumar Sah vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 6-page long order dated January 19, 2026, wherein, it concluded: ".....we are of the view that since the High Court was not apprised of the charge-sheet submitted after investigation, and the impugned order came to be passed without considering the charge-sheet and the materials collected in support thereof, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and the matter requires reconsideration by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.07.2025 is set aside. The writ petition of the petitioner (respondent no.7 herein), namely, Criminal Writ Case No.531 of 2024, shall stand restored on the file of the High Court to be dealt with afresh in accordance with law. 8. We clarify that parties shall bring on record of the High Court the charge-sheet and the materials submitted in support thereof. 9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order in Bijay Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar. Naveen Kumar Sah was the Respondent No. 7 in the High Court.

The Court granted leave and allowed the appeal. The appeal impugned judgment and order of the Patna High Court of Judicature at Patna dated July 14, 2025 by which the High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, quashed the first information report (FIR) under Sections 341, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (Arms Act).

The submission of the counsel for the appellant (complainant) was that prior to the date the order of the High Court was passed, the Investigating Agency had already submitted a charge-sheet indicting the accused of offences punishable, inter alia, under Sections 188, 290, 341, 323, 504 of the IPC; Section 26(1) of the Arms Act and Section 67 of I.T. Act, 2000. It was submitted that the High Court failed to consider the charge-sheet and the materials collected in support thereof before exercising its writ jurisdiction to quash the FIR.

In Mamta Shailesh Chandra vs. State of  Uttarakhand and others1 it was held that even if charge sheet had been filed, the Court could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the FIR, charge-sheet and other documents. Likewise, in Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.2, this Court held:

“19. No doubt, a petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of a police report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC, but when a police report has been submitted, particularly when there is no stay on investigation, the Court must apply its mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report before taking a call whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed or not. ..”

Justice Kumar had concluded:". It appears that the land of the petitioner was forcibly being used as informant and others as the informant has not been able to show any order of any authority declaring the land of the petitioner as aam rasta (common passage). If the land of the petitioner was being used as aam rasta (common passage) by the informant and others forcibly then the petitioner has a right of private defence and he has not exceeded that right. 8. In view of the above, I am of the view that the present F.I.R. is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, this criminal writ application is allowed and the F.I.R. vide Mojahidpur P.S. Case No.246 of 2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed." 

Supreme Court observed that the counsel for respondent no.7, though could not dispute that charge-sheet was submitted before the impugned order was passed, submitted that the allegations were false and malicious. Moreover, there was a dispute regarding a passage which the accused claims to be his own. Otherwise also, the allegations were only regarding a shot being fired in air. As the shot was allegedly fired from a weapon licensed to the accused, no offence was committed by the accused.

It noted:"Be that as it may, as it has been brought on record that before the date of the order of the High Court, a charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Agency, the same ought to have been brought to the notice of the High Court."

Supreme Court orders deposit of interim maintenance amount in wife's account instead of Treasury

In Abhyuday Dwivedi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justices Surya Kant and NK Singh passed a 2-page long order dated October 10, 2025. The order reads: ''It appears that the petitioner, with a view to harassing the wife, has been deliberately depositing the interim maintenance amount in the Treasury, instead of paying her either by way of demand draft or through RTGS in her account. The petitioner is directed to withdraw the entire amount deposited by him in the Treasury along with interest accrued thereupon and redeposit the said amount in the bank account of respondent No.2-wife. The Court concerned may permit him to withdraw that amount for the purpose of redepositing the same into the account of respondent No.2-wife. The bank account details are already known to the petitioner. The needful shall be done within one week, failing which this petition shall stand dismissed. 2. Hereafter, the interim maintenance of Rs.24,000/- per month shall be directly deposited by the petitioner into the bank account of respondent No.2-wife. 3. List on 27.10.2025 for compliance." The case arose out of impugned judgment and order dated February 7, 2025 in Abhyuday Dwivedi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) passed by Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey of the Patna High Court. The Respondent No. 2 is Prerna Singh. 

In Abhyuday Dwivedi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court had passed an order dated February 7, 2025, wherein, he had concluded:''The second  anticipatory bail petition is dismissed as not maintainable, but at the same time, it is observed that if the petitioner surrenders before the court below, it shall take endeavor to explore the possibility of restoration of the nuptial tie by taking recourse of mediation and conciliation process.'' The petitioner had apprehended his arrest in connection with Kalyanpur P.S. Case No. 297 of 2020, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 498(A), 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Court had disposed of the application. The Respondent No. 2 is Prerna Singh. 

As part of Division Bench Justice Sourendra Pandey set aside judgement of conviction by POCSO judge, Muzaffarpur

On September 26, 2025, Patna High Court delivered 26 judgements in Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Jyoti Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Chunnu Das vs. The State Of Bihar, Amar Yadav @ Amar Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Dipak Kumar Rai vs. The State of Bihar, Most. Lal Muni Devi & Ors vs. Murahu Singh, Lovely Kumari vs. Punit Kumar, Rahul Kumar Raushan vs. The State of Bihar, Sikandar Paswan @ Sikendar Paswan vs. The State of Bihar, Manishankar Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar  Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ajay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Ravindra Kushwaha vs. The State of Bihar, Jai Prakash Pandey vs. The State of Bihar, Satyendra Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Khushboo Sawayam Sidha Mahila Vikas Sawyamlambi Sahakari Samiti Limited vs. The State of Bihar, Lal Babu Ram vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Ram Ratan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Vinod Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, M/s Shubh Laxmi Tent House vs. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Rajendra Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sunil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Vigilance, Government of Bihar, Craig Allen Moore @ Crag Allen Moore vs. The State of Bihar through its Home Secretary, Patna, Vijay Bharti vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, and Brahmdeo Thakur vs. State of Bihar.  

In Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey delivered a 35-page long judgement dated September 26, 2025, wherein, it concluded: ''57. In the present case, as we have already observed, material contradictions among prosecution witnesses and the non-production of the alleged viral video make it difficult to convict the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The evidence which has been led by the prosecution does not stand to prove as contemplated under Criminal Jurisprudence and therefore possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out. As in the present case, we have seen that evidences contain material contradictions and the place of the occurrence being not proved without an iota of doubt. The circumstances which has been alleged by the prosecution thus remains in doubt. 58. In view of the aforesaid discussions and taking into account the various judicial pronouncements, we find that the conviction of the appellant cannot be upheld with the kind of evidence which is inconclusive and accordingly the conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be sustained and is, therefore, set aside giving him the benefit of doubt. 59. The appellant is in incarceration in connection with this case, so he will be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case. 60. This appeal is allowed.'' The judgement was authored by Justice Pandey. 

Justice Pandey relied on Supreme Court's decision in Raju & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2008) 15 SCC133, wherein the Court held that though the testimony of the victim is believable at par with that of an injured witness but her testimony cannot always be presumed to be gospel truth. He also relied on the decision in Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, wherein it was held that ''11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.'' 

The criminal appeal arose out of the judgment of conviction dated October 13, 2022 and the order of sentence dated October 14, 2022 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO(W), Muzaffarpur in connection with Mahila P.S. Case of 2021. By the impugned judgment the appellant/Suraj Kumar and co-accused Jyoti Kumar were convicted for the offences under Sections 341, 342, 323, 506/34 and 376(D) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of twenty years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 for the offences under Sections 376(D) IPC as well as under Section 6 of the POCSO Act; to undergo imprisonment for a term of one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 for the offence under Section 341 of the IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to also undergo imprisonment of one month for the offence under Section 323 of the IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to also undergo imprisonment of three months for the offence under Section 506 of the IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case was based on the written application dated 23.04.2021 given by the informant/victim (P.W. 1). In her written report she has stated that on April 7, 2021 at about 11:30 P.M. in the night while she went out of her house to attend the natural call, accused Jyoti Kumar and Suraj Kumar (appellant) forcibly made her to sit on the motorcycle and shutting her mouth took her towards Taraura Dam where both accused raped her one by one. Jyoti Kumar has also made video of the incident for which victim forbade him on which both of them slapped her. Victim also tried to raise alarm but on account of the place being isolated it was heard by none. Both the accused persons also threatened her to kill her father in case of disclosure of the incident to anyone. It was also alleged that the recorded video of the incident was made viral by the accused Jyoti Kumar. 

On the basis of this written application, Mahila P.S. Case No. 45 of 2021 dated April 23, 2021 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342,  376(D), 509, 506, 323/34 of the IPC and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act and Section 67(A) of the Information Technology Act.  After completion of investigation of the case, the Investigating Officer (the I.O.) submitted Chargesheet dated June 17, 2021 under Sections 341, 342, 376(D), 509, 506 and 323/34 of the IPC and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The cognizance of the offences under Sections 341, 342, 376(D), 323/34, 506/34 of the IPC and Section 4/6 of the POCSO Act and Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act was taken on July 9, 2021 against appellant Suraj Kumar. Charges were read over and explained to the appellants Suraj Kumar in Hindi to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The defence has examined eight witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and exhibited some documentary evidences in course of trial. There was only one Defence Witnesse, namely Anandi Devi. Thereafter, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. The appellant denied all  the allegations and took a plea that he was innocent.

The trial court after examining all the evidences available on the record found that in a case of sexual assault, it was not easy for a girl to disclose immediately to anybody. Therefore not reporting the matter to the police immediately alone cannot discredit the testimony of the girl which is otherwise cogent and trustworthy. The victim also supported the incident in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. trial court appreciated the fact that not finding spermatozoa on the body of the victim was just because the life of spermatozoa was generally for 72 hours which had already elapsed in this case at the time of her medical examination. According to the mark-sheet of the victim she was minor on the date of occurrence just one month short to the age of eighteen years. The trial court found that the defence could not shift the burden and the prosecution had successfully proved the fundamental facts of this case establishing the link between the offence committed and the accused committing the offence. The trial court on the FSL report, with respect of the leggings of the victim in which no blood or semen was detected, held that the cloth of the victim was seized after gap of number of days from the date of occurrence therefore it was quite  natural that the blood or semen could not be detected on the seized cloth. It ultimately concluded that the prosecution was able to prove the facts of this case of committing the offence of penetrative sexual assault upon the minor victim. When the victim resisted for making video of the incident she was threatened by the accused for not disclosing the incident to anybody otherwise her father will be killed and that was why she did not reveal about the incident to her family members until the video was made viral. The prosecution also proved the facts constituting the offences under Sections 323 and 506 of the IPC. The charge under Section 14(2) of the POCSO Act could not be proved by the prosecution for the reason of non-compliance of mandatory certificate under Sections 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act. The presumption under Sections 29 and 30 did not come in the aid of prosecution in this regard as well. 

Bela Singh, counsel for Bina Devi's daughter, the informant opposed the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant primarily on the fact that all the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution was able to prove the factum of the incident with the help of both oral and documentary evidence. She submitted that all the prosecution witnesses including the victim supported the case of the prosecution and there were minor contradictions which cannot be taken into account as the same is bound to occur because of the nature of offence committed against the minor victim. She also submitted that the family members of the victim through their deposition had corroborated the prosecution story without any infirmity in the same and therefore the conviction cannot be challenged on such ground. She submitted that as far as the submissions made on behalf of the appellant with regard to delay in lodging of the FIR was concerned, the same was immaterial as it was specifically stated by the prosecutrix that the two accused persons were threatening of dire consequences and also had threatened to make the video viral. It was because of such threatening that the victim could not gather strength to report the incident to her immediate family  members within time and therefore the delay in lodging of the FIR. She submitted that from the evidence on record the age of the victim girl was found to be within 18 years and therefore there was no quarrel with regard to her being a minor and therefore the conviction under the provisions of POCSO Act was justified. At last, she submitted that the present case involved two sequence of offences committed by the appellant i.e. firstly they committed rape upon the victim and recorded the same on mobile phone and thereafter made the said video viral. She submitted that in view of such incriminating circumstances the appellant does not deserve to be acquitted and there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of sentence and the appeal was fit to be dismissed. 

But the High Court was not persuaded by her arguments. After hearing the counsels of both the parties, the judgment was reserved on September 17, 2025. The criminal appeal was filed in the High Court on February 15, 2023 and registered on February 24, 2023.  

Earlier, on September 8, 2025, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Prasad and Pandey has passed an order. It reads: "These two appeals were called out earlier on 4th September, 2025. On that day, none appeared for the parties. 2. Today, when these appeals have been called out, learned counsel for the informant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State are present but no one appears on behalf of the appellants. 3. In these circumstances, we appoint a Panel lawyer from the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee. 4. Mr. Manoj Kumar No. 1, learned Advocate is present in the Court. We request him to represent the appellants."  

Prior to that High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and A. Abhishek Reddy had passed a 5-page long order dated February 15, 2024, wherein, it had observed: ''6. Considering the nature of accusation against the appellants/applicants and the materials collected against them, we have not been persuaded to suspend their sentences during the pendency of the appeals. 7. The prayer for suspension of sentence of both the appellants/applicants is, accordingly, rejected. 8. However, considering the period of custody of the appellants/applicants and the mandate of Section 374(4) Cr.P.C., we deem it appropriate to give these appeals an early hearing." The order was authored by Justice Kumar. 

It seems to be a fit case for appeal in the Supreme Court.    

Supreme Court set aside "cryptic order" by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar in Vandana Gupta case, which resulted in "travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgement dated July 21, 2025 wherein it allowed the appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta. The Respondent no. 2 is Vandan Gupta. The Division Bench concluded:"keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society." 

The judgement reads:"the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration. 28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled. She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before the appropriate forum."

The appeal arose by special leave emanates from the order dated January 18, 2024 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent No.2-accused 2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed and she was granted bail. The appellant-victim herein was the informant in the FIR. 

The prosecution case as against Vandana Gupta, Respondent No.2 was that she while being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih, Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation and mental torture. It was alleged that she used to send the ladies housed in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court recorded that during the course of investigation, few more ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against Vanadana Gupta, the respondent No.2. The application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected by the Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order dated July 10, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an
appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing the order passed by the Special Court. In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506 of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act vide order dated August 29, 2023. Notably, in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim in any prayer for bail essential. 

The appellant-victim approached the Supreme Court through the appeal by special leave to assail the order passed by the High Court. Her counsel contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men. It was also contended that unidentified men were allowed access into the protection home where they would take advantage of the helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours. 

Pursuant to the release of respondent No.2 on bail, she was reinstated in service, and she was heading another protection home within the State of Bihar. This approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He submitted that it was apparent that the concerned authorities of the State Government were hands in glove with the accused and had no intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct. Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on the female inmates. In case, respondent No.2 is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial. The counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.  

The standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of Bihar supported the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation, grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there was imminent threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 was allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However, on a pertinent query being posed,  standing counsel was not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working in a similar institution.

Supreme Court observed: "21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened."

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's  decisions in Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 wherein it cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows:
“18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118].

In Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 upon hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Mahila P.S. Case no. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected. The allegation against the appellant who was a Superintendent of Remand Home was that she used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that appellant was falsely implicated in this case. She had not taken the caste name of the informant in public view. No offence is made out under the provisions of the SC/ST Act against her. Notably, vide letter No. 836 dated February 16, 2022, one S.I.T. team was constituted for investigation of Mahila P.S. Case No. 13 of 2022 and Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 jointly and the investigation was started jointly but after investigation of the case, the police submitted final form No. 100 of 2022 due to insufficiency of evidence which is apparent from Annexure-3 of the petition itself and also the allegation which was alleged by the informant/victim upon this appellant was not found true. 

The Court order recorded that from perusal of the Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022, which was annexed in the petition as Annexure-5(page No-36) in which it was mentioned that no any drug abuse and rape/sexual exploitation have been made in that remand home. From perusal of the report of Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna, it was mentioned in para-5 that the nature of the informant/victim was quarrelsome. Moreover, the appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022. The appeal for bail was opposed by Special P.P. for the State and the counsel for the informant. By way of filing counter affidavit, it was mentioned in para-2 that "another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was also submitted that from a report of SP, Patna, few men used to come in girh by covering their faces and on the permission of this appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register."

Justice Panwar concluded:"....taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna."

Quashing this order by Justice Panwar, Supreme Court observed: "25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act."

 

Supreme Court sets aside bail order by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar which "resulted ino travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 16-page long judgement dated July 21, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"...it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside." The judgement authored by Justice Mehta sets aside the 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 delivered by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court in Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024).  

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Shabeen Ahmad vs.The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 which placed reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768, Justice Mehta observed:"we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration." The respondent no. 2 is Vandana Gupta.   

Vandana Gupta, had approached the High Court against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with a Mahila P.S. case of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the I.T. Act and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected.

The allegation was that Vandana Gupta, the appellant was a Superintendent of Remand Home who used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. The Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022 on Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna mentioned that "the nature of the informant/victim is quarrelsome". The appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022 before she was granted bail by Justice Pawar in January 2024.

The counter affidavit recorded that another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was submitted in the report of SP, Patna that few men used to come in Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna by covering their faces and on the permission of Vandana Gupta, the appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register. 

Justice Pawar had concluded:"Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed..." 

It emerges that Supreme Court's judgement has upheld the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna. 

Justice Mehta observed:"It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a case of such nature. 25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act." 

 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench upholds judgment of acquittal by Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya

In his 19-page long 20th judgement of the year dated June 17, 2025 in Munni Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Gaya & Ors. (2025), Justice Pancholi led Division Bench dismissed the appeal saying, "we are of the view that while passing the impugned order of acquittal, the learned Trial Court has not committed any error, as the prosecution has failed to prove the case against respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt." It was not inclined to entertain the acquittal appeal filed by the informant. The appellant/original informant had filed the appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated September 9, 2024 rendered by the Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya in Sessions Trial No.138/2022/950/2023, which arose out of Gurua P.S. case of 2020, whereby the respondents-accused, the residents of Auradih, Gurua, Gaya were acquitted by the Trial Court. The three private respondents who were acquitted were: Akhilesh Chaudhary Arjun Chaudhary and Pratima Kumari.

The Court's judgement records that APP submitted that "the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal and, therefore, in the present acquittal appeal filed by the informant, no interference is required. It is also submitted that State has not preferred any appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal."  

Justice Pancholi led bench relied on in paragraph no. 42 of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415. It reads: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; 
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

It also relied on paragraph no. 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605. It reads: “22. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal. It held that there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should
not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Drawing decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, Justice Pancholi observed:"it can be said that there is double presumption in favour of the accused, when the order of acquittal has been accorded by the Trial Court: Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law; Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 

The case began on August 3, 2020, at about 04:15 p.m., informant, Munni Devi's daughter Nirmala Kumar was returning from a Devi temple after offering her prayer. Pratima Kumari of her village started abusing her daughter. When her daughter forbade Pratima Kumari to do so, she caught hold of her hair and pulled her down. Arjun Choudhary, Akhilesh Choudhary and Phulesh Devi came and started assaulting her daughter. When the informant and Sarjun Chaudhary, her husband came there after hearing the alarm, Phulesh Devi caught her, pulled her down and started assaulting her on her breast by leg and assaulted her on her ear by means of iron rod due to which the ear of the informant was torn and started bleeding. Akhilesh Choudhary assaulted her husband on his head by means of iron rod due to which her husband fell down there and started vomiting blood and became unconscious. Thereafter, the accused persons had fled. The local people gathered there after hearing alarm and brought her husband to Gaya Hospital from where he was referred to Blue Diamond Hospital, Patna where her husband died during the course of treatment after two days.  Fardbeyan was given by the informant on August 5, 2020. After recording the fardbeyan of the informant, the concerned police officer, Agamkuan Police Station, Patna sent the same to Gurua Police Station, Gaya. 

The fardbeyan was recorded as formal FIR on August 12, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. The High Court noted that there was "delay in lodging the FIR and there is delay in lodging the formal FIR. No explanation has been rendered by the prosecution with regard to the same." The FIR was registered under Sections 341/323/302/504/34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Witch Practices Act against the respondents-accused as Gurua P.S. Case No.178/2020. The High Court observed:"Thus, there are serious lapses on the part of the concerned police authorities." The Investigating Officer, PW-7 in his deposition "specifically admitted that rod was not recovered or discovered. He did not find any blood at the place of occurrence."

During the trial, PW-1, Nirmala Kumari, who is daughter of the informant as well as the deceased, has mainly deposed in her examination-in-chief that Pratima Kumari, the fourth respondent/accused was standing on the way and telling that her mother was a dain (witch) and she obstructed fixing of her marriage. 

Notably, PW-3, Tetri Devi, mother of Sarjun Choudhary, the deceased deposed in her examination-in-chief that Sarjun Choudhary was her son who fell after consuming liquor and due to fall he died. The accused persons did not kill her son. The accused Akhilesh Choudhary and Pratima Kumari were her grandson and granddaughter. The police recorded her statement. She had given the same statement before the police saying her son fell in a drunken state and died. The Court noted that PW-3 "was not declared hostile and, therefore, the deposition given by the said witness is required to be considered as it is."

 

Also read: Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024, set aside judgment of 1991

High Court endorses decision of Additional Sessions Judge-III, Siwan in a murder case

On October 1, 2024, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh  Kumar and Jitendra Kumar approved the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Siwan in a murder case of February 2017. The Trial Court had found three accused, namely, Deeplal Rai, Anil Rai and Krishna Rai guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 341/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). They were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each under Section 302 of the IPC and simple imprisonment for one month under Section 341 of the IPC. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. The Trial Court had also recommended Siwan District Legal Services Authority to pay compensation to the victims of the crime, namely, Kunti Devi, Pratima Kumari and Sita Kumari as per Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 under Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC). There were four accused in the case but the case of Shiv Kumar, one of the accused was separated for conducting inquiry regarding his juvenility.

In Diplal Rai  vs. The State of Bihar, the High Court observed that the Trial Court was right in directing Siwan District Legal Services Authority to pay compensation to the victim of the crime becuase the commission of murder has been well proved by the evidence on record. The deceased, Dularchand Rai was done to death by injury caused by knife and he is survived by his widow Kanti Devi and his two daughters, Pratima Kumari and Sita Kumari. There is no dispute that the widow/informant Kanti Devi and two daughters Pratima Kumari and Sita Kumari are victims in terms of Section 2 (wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. PC), as per which the victim includes legal heirs of the deceased. The judgement was authored by Justice Jitendra Kumar.

Section 2 (wa)  reads: "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression "victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir. This definition was inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008.

The High Court observed: "The widow has lost not only her husband but even her dependency on him. The two daughters have also lost their father losing not only love and affection of their father but even their dependency upon him. Hence, the widow and her two daughters deserve succor from the State, who has failed to protect the fundamental right of the deceased to live. Accordingly, all the victims are entitled to get compensation as per Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 as made under Section 357A Cr.PC." 

Section 357 A reads: "Victim compensation scheme.-- (1) Every State Government in co-ordination with the Central Government shall prepare a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.
(2) Whenever a recommendation is made by the Court for compensation, the District Legal Service Authority or the State Legal Service Authority, as the case may be, shall decide the quantum of compensation to be awarded under the scheme referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) If the trial Court, at the conclusion of the trial, is satisfied, that the compensation awarded under section 357 is not adequate for such rehabilitation, or where the cases end in acquittal or discharge and the victim has to be rehabilitated, it may make recommendation for compensation.
(4) Where the offender is not traced or identified, but the victim is identified, and where no trial takes place, the victim or his dependents may make an application to the State or the District Legal Services Authority for award of compensation.
(5) On receipt of such recommendations or on the application under sub-section (4), the State or the District Legal Services Authority shall, after due enquiry award adequate compensation by completing the enquiry within two months.
(6) The State or the District Legal Services Authority, as the case may be, to alleviate the suffering of the victim, may order for immediate first-aid facility or medical benefits to be made available free of cost on the certificate of the police officer not below the rank of the officer in charge of the police station or a Magistrate of the area concerned, or any other interim relief as the appropriate authority deems fit." 

The High Court referred to some principles of appreciation of evidence before concluding its judgment. It is settled principle of law that the evidence of any relative or family members cannot be discarded only on account of his or her relationship with the deceased. The evidence of such witnesses has to be weighed on the touchstone of truth and at most the court is required to take care and caution while appreciating their evidence. In this regard, one may refer to the following judicial precedents:
(i) Abhishek Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1358;
(ii) Yogesh Singh Vs Mahabeer Singh & Ors; (2017) 11 SCC 195;
(iii) Mano Dutt and another Vs. State of UP;(2012) 4 SCC 79;
(iv) Daulatram Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 (1) JIJ 1;
(v) State Vs. Saravanan, (AIR 2009 SC 152);
(vi) State of U.P. v. Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73;
(vii) Namdeo Vs. State of Maharashtra,(2007) 14 SCC 150;
(viii) State of A.P. Vs. S. Rayappa,. (2006) 4 SCC 512;
(ix) Pulicherla Nagaraju Vs. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444;
(x) Harbans Kaur Vs. State of Haryana; (2005) 9 SCC 195;
(xi) Hari Obula Reddy and Ors. Vs. State of AP, (1981) 3 SCC 675
(xii) Piara Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 452 

It is also settled principle of law that prosecution case cannot be thrown out or doubted on the sole ground that the independent witnesses have not been examined because as per experience, civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. The Court is therefore required to appreciate the evidence of even related witnesses on its own merit, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witnesses. (Refer to Appabhai and another Vs. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241).

This is also settled principle of law that minor discrepancies, contradictions, improvements, embellishments or omissions on trivial matters not going to the root of the prosecution case should not be given undue importance. But if they relate to material particulars of the prosecution case, the testimony of such witnesses is liable to be discarded. In this regard, one may refer to the following judicial precedents:
(i) C. Muniappan & others Vs. State of T.N.,(2010) 9 SCC 567;
(ii) State of U.P. Vs. Krishan Master, (AIR 2010 SC 3071);
(iii) Appabhai & Anr. Vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1988 SC 696;
(iv)Shivaji S. Bobade & Anr Vs. State Of Maharashtra, (1973 AIR 2622);
(v) Sanjay Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 1077;
(vi) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dal Singh, (2013) 14 SCC 159;
(vii) Smt. Shamim Vs. State (GNCT of Delhi), 2018 (4) PLJR 160;
(viii) S. Govidaarju Vs. State of Karnataka, 2013 (10) SCALE 454
(ix) Narotam Singh vs. State Of Punjab And Anr. (AIR 1978 SC 1542)
(x) Leela Ram Vs. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525;
(xi) Subal Ghorai and Ors. Vs. State of WB, (2013) 4 SCC 607;
(xii) Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195. 

In its 27 page long verdict, the High Court ordered that if Siwan District Legal Services Authority has not paid the compensation to the victims, "it is directed to pay the compensation to the victims without losing further time within two months from the receipt of this order. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to Siwan District Legal Services Authority also."