Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment by Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a rape case

In Dheeraj Sahni vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 20-page long judgement dated May 7, 2026, wherein, set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 11, 2014 and order of sentence dated February 14, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a Sessions Case of 2012, which arose out of Khagaria (Muffasil) P.S. Case of 2012, whereby, the appellant was convicted under Section 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Singh observed that applying the settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, and bearing in mind that material contradictions between the version of the informant as set out in the F.I.R. and her deposition before the Court render her testimony unreliable, "this Court finds that the prosecution case does not inspire confidence. In the present matter, not only has the victim failed to support the allegations during trial and even failed to identify the appellant, but the sole testimony of the informant (P.W. 7) also suffers from material inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities. Further, the medical evidence, as deposed by the doctor (P.W. 6), clearly indicates absence of any injury or sign suggestive of sexual assault and does not corroborate the prosecution version. In such circumstances, where the ocular testimony is inconsistent and stands uncorroborated by medical evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and the conviction cannot be sustained." 

The appellant had preferred the appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated February 11, 2014 and order of sentence dated February 14, 2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Khagaria in a Sessions Case 2012, which arose out of Khagaria (Muffasil) P.S. Case of 2012, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and Rs. 5000 and the amount of fine shall be paid to the mother of the victim. 

The prosecution version was that the informant Pinki Devi, wife of Hare Ram Sahni, submitted a written report before the Superintendent of Police, Khagaria, on June 30, 2012, wherein she categorically alleged that on June 29, 2012 at about 1:00 p.m., while her daughters, namely Deepika Kumari, aged about 5 years, and Daizy Kumari, aged about 4 years, were playing in front of the house of Dinesh Sahni. The appellant who was son of Dinesh Sahni, allegedly lured the victim Deepika Kumari on the pretext of giving money and then took the victim along with her younger sister Daizy Kumari inside the room and committed rape upon her. On hearing the cry of her daughter, the informant rushed to the house and allegedly witnessed the accused through a window committing rape upon the victim. However, upon raising an alarm, the accused fled away through the roof. It was also alleged that the informant found her daughter lying naked, with dust on her body. Thereafter, the informant took her daughter (the victim). Subsequently, she went to the Police Station, where she was advised to approach the Sarpanch for redressal of her grievance. She approached the Sarpanch of the Gram Katchahari who did not meet her. On the basis of the written report filed by the informant before the Superintendent of Police, Khagaria, Khagaria (Mufassil) P.S. Case No. 329 of 2012 was lodged on June 30, 2012 under Section 376 of the I.P.C. against the sole accused, appellant hereof. After institution of the F.I.R., the Investigating Officer conducted investigation and found the case to be true under Section 376 of the I.P.C., and accordingly submitted charge-sheet before the court below. Thereafter, the Magistrate, upon perusal of the materials on record, took cognizance of the alleged offence on September 10, 2012, and the case was subsequently committed to the Court of Sessions on November 1, 2012. Pursuant to the conclusion of the trial, impugned judgment was passed. 

The amicus curiae, submitted that the testimony of Pinki Devi (informant), the Prosecution Witness No. 7, the informant, was not reliable and does not inspire confidence, so as, to sustain the conviction in the absence of independent corroboration. It was contended that the entire prosecution case rests upon her sole testimony and single identification. The informant was an interested witness, being the chachi of the appellant and they reside in the same house with a common courtyard giving rise to the possibility of prior animosity or ulterior motive, which the prosecution failed to dispel. The counsel drew the attention of the High Court to paragraph 22 of the case diary and submitted that, as per the description therein, the alleged place of occurrence had no door or window; however, PW-7 in her examination-in-chief deposed that the door was closed from inside and that she witnessed the occurrence by peeping through a window and thereafter instructed her younger daughter aged about 4 years to open the door. This material contradiction, it was urged, struk at the root of the prosecution case and rendered her version inherently unreliable. It was also submitted that the testimony of PW-7 suffered from serious improbabilities, inasmuch as her claim of having witnessed the occurrence through a window appeared doubtful. It was contended that, instead of raising an alarm and calling other family members, the informant allegedly instructed her minor daughter to open the door, who was unable to reach the bolt to unlock it. Moreover, the fact that the Investigating Officer did not find any such door at the place of occurrence renders the entire version unnatural and improbable. The counsel further submitted that the condition of the victim, as described by PW-7, finds no
corroboration from the medical evidence, which assumes significant importance in a case of this nature. It was also urged that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not recorded, and, more importantly, the victim child, in her deposition before the trial court, did not support the prosecution case and categorically stated that no wrongful act had been committed against her. The victim also failed to identify the appellant, who was admittedly her own cousin brother, thereby creating a serious dent in the prosecution case. The counsel submitted that the testimony of PW-7 cannot be said to be of sterling quality so as to form the sole basis of conviction. It was thus urged that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The relevant provisions of Sections 375, 376 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, which are as under:-
375. Rape.— A man is said to commit "rape" if he—(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:
(First.)— Against her will. 
(Secondly.) — Without her consent.
(Thirdly.) — With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom
she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt, 
(Fourthly.) — With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
(Fifthly.) — With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
(Sixthly.) — With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
(Seventhly.) — When she is unable to communicate consent.
Explanation 1.— For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2.— Consent means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception 1.— A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

376. Punishment for rape.— (1)Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine]

511. Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.—Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both. 
Illustrations
(a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a box, and finds after so opening the box, that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards the commission of theft, and therefore is guilty under this section.
(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z’s pocket. A fails in the attempt in consequence of Z’s having nothing in his pocket. A is guilty under this section.

Justice Singh relied on Supreme Court's decision in Vijaya Singh & Anr. v State of Uttarakhand reported in 2024 INSC 905 to underline the settled law in regard to statement recorded under Section 164 and retraction during the course of trial. The statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can not be discarded, which finds reference in Paragraph No.31. It reads: “31. Having said so, we deem it fit to observe that a statement under Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a hat and on a mere statement of the
witness that it was not recorded correctly. For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate, to the effect that the statement being recorded is the correct version of the facts stated by the witness, forms part of every such statement and a higher burden must be placed upon the witness to retract from the same. To permit retraction by a witness from a signed statement recorded before the Magistrate on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would effectively negate the difference between a statement recorded by the police officer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In the present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and reliance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below.” 

Justice Sing also relied on the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Om Prakash reported in (2002) 7 SCC 745, wherein, the Supreme Court sounded a warning against offences of sexual nature against children, in Paragraph no.19. It reads: “19. Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases are not even brought to light because of the social stigma attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has been a steep rise in child rape cases. Children need special care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country's future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted…” 

Justice Singh's judgement referred to the decision in Pradeep vs. State of Haryana reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 777, it was held that the role of the trial Judge, when a case involves a child witness, becomes heightened. The Supreme Court held:“10. Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him with a view to ascertain whether the minor can understand the questions put to him and is in a position to give rational answers. The Judge must be satisfied that the minor is able to understand the questions and respond to them and understands the importance of speaking the truth. Therefore, the role of the Judge who records the evidence is very crucial. He has to make a proper preliminary examination of the minor by putting appropriate questions to ascertain whether the minor is capable of understanding the questions put to him and is able to give rational answers. It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.”

The judgement by Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi vs. State
of Gujarat, reported in, (2019) 17 SCC 523, wherein the Court held that a nine year old prosecutrix turning hostile would not be fatal blow to the prosecution case when other evidence can establish the guilt of the accused. 

In Ganesan vs. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, held that the sole testimony of the victim, if found reliable and trustworthy, requires no corroboration and may be sufficient to invite conviction of the accused also the reliance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below, the Court observed.
17. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether nine witnesses, namely:
1) PW-1 Leela Devi ( Co - Villager)
2) PW-2 Mahesh Tanti, ( Co - Villager)
3) PW-3 Dilip Kumar Tanti ( Co - Villager)
4) PW-4 Hare Ram Sahni, father of the victim
5) PW-5 Deepika Kumari (victim)
6) PW-6 Dr. Manju Kumari (Doctor)
7) PW-7 Pinki Devi (informant)
8) PW-8 Rajpati Devi ( Co – Villager)
9) PW-9 Dasrath Yadav ( Co – Villager)
18. The prosecution has also relied upon following
documents exhibited during the course of trial:
(i) Exhibit- 2- Medical Report
(ii) Exhibit-2/1- Pathology Report
19. On the basis of materials surfaced during the
trial, the appellant/accused Upon a meticulous examination of
the record, it appears that the PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 turned
hostile and the evidence of other prosecution witnesses (PWs)
are summarized as follows:
(I) P.W. 4 - Hare Ram Sahni, the father of the
victim, establishes that upon hearing an alarm (halla), he
proceeded to the appellant's door where he observed his
daughter in a nude state. He admitted in his cross-examination
that the appellant is his cousin-nephew and that they share the
same courtyard. Crucially, he conceded that no physical injuries
were found on the victim's body and clarified that his
understanding of the alleged assault was based entirely on the
account provided by his wife.
(II) P.W. 5, Deepika Kumari, the victim, stated that
she is aged about five years, but notably turned hostile to the
prosecution's case. In her testimony before the court, she
categorically denied the allegations set forth by her mother and
stated that no rape had been committed upon her. Furthermore,
she failed to identify the appellant.
(III) P.W. 6, Dr. Manju Kumari, - She deposed that
she conducted the physical examination of the victim. She did
not find any external injury on the victim’s body. She confirmed
that there was no medical sign or traumatic indicator of rape
found in the private parts of the victim.
(IV) P.W. 7, Pinki Devi, the informant and mother of
the victim, remained consistent with her initial version of the
incident as alleged in the F.I.R. She maintained in her testimony
that she was the sole eyewitness to the occurrence. However, it
was noted that she did not disclose the existence of any land
dispute between her family and the accused during her
deposition.
(V) P.W. 8, Rajpati Devi, - She serves as hearsay
evidence regarding the immediate aftermath of the incident. She
stated that she rushed to the spot upon hearing the cries of P.W.
7 and was informed by the informant at the scene that a rape had
been committed upon the child.
(VI) P.W. 9, Dashrath Yadav, testified as a formal
witness. While he successfully proved his signature on the
F.I.R., he did not provide any substantive evidence regarding the
commission of the alleged offense or the involvement of the
appellant.
 

On the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellant/accused was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against him, which he denied and showed his complete innocence. The record revealed that PW-1 Leela Devi, PW-2 Mahesh Tanti, and PW-3 Dilip Kumar Tanti were declared hostile during the trial as they did not support the prosecution case on material particulars, and nothing substantive transpired from their testimonies which could be said to corroborate or lend assurance to the version of the other prosecution witnesses. Their evidence does not advance the prosecution case with regard to the allegations of dowry demand, cruelty, or the alleged disappearance of the deceased. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses are not relevant qua establishing the guilt of the accused/appellants.

On a careful perusal of the evidence, facts, and law, it emerged that the prosecution case suffered from serious infirmities and lacks the degree of proof required to sustain conviction. P.Ws. 1, 2, and 3 have admittedly turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution case in any manner. PW-4 Hare Ram Sahni, father of the victim, was not an eyewitness and has clearly deposed that his knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence was based solely on what was narrated to him by P.W. 7, Pinki Devi, the informant and mother of the victim; he was also admitted that no injury was found on the body of the victim and that the parties are closely related, residing in the same premises with a common courtyard. P.W. 5, the victim
herself, who is the most material witness, had turned hostile and categorically denied the allegation of rape and even failed to identify the appellant in Court, thereby striking at the very root of the prosecution case. The medical evidence, as deposed by P.W. 6, Dr. Manju Kumari, did not support the prosecution version, as no external or internal injury or any sign suggestive of sexual assault was found on the victim. P.W. 8, Rajpati Devi was merely a hearsay witness, having reached the place of occurrence after the alleged incident and having derived knowledge only from the informant, while P.W. 9, Dashrath Yadav was a formal witness who has only proved the formal aspects of the case. Thus, the entire prosecution case essentially rests upon the sole testimony of P.W. 7, the informant, whose version, suffers from material contradictions, inherent improbabilities, and lack of corroboration from both ocular and medical evidence. In such circumstances, where the star witness (victim) has not supported the case, the medical evidence did not corroborate the allegations, and the independent witnesses turned hostile, it would be unsafe to base the conviction solely on the testimony of P.W. 7.

In the case, the most crucial aspect, namely, the statement of the victim, did not advance the prosecution case, rather, it creates a serious dent in it. It was an admitted position on record that the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not recorded at all, thereby depriving the prosecution of a vital piece of substantive corroborative evidence ordinarily relied upon in cases of this nature. Further, when the victim herself entered the witness box as P.W. 5 before the learned trial court, she did not support the prosecution version and categorically denied that any such occurrence had taken place. She also failed to identify the appellant, who is admittedly her close relative, thereby rendering the prosecution story highly doubtful. In the absence of a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., coupled with the victim turning hostile in court, the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution case stands considerably weakened, and no reliance
can safely be placed on the uncorroborated testimony of the informant (P.W. 7) to sustain the conviction.

The primary challenge in the present appeal lied in the fact that the material prosecution witnesses, including the victim (P.W. 5) and other independent witnesses, had not supported the prosecution case and were  declared hostile during trial. 

Justice Singh observed: "While it is a settled principle of law that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in total and that the Court may rely upon such portions of the evidence which find corroboration from other reliable material on record, the said principle does not aid the prosecution in the facts of the present case. Significantly, the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which could have lent some degree of assurance to the prosecution version, was admittedly not recorded. In such a situation, there remains no prior consistent statement of the victim before a judicial authority which could be used even for the limited purpose of corroboration. On the contrary, the victim, in her deposition before the learned trial court, has categorically denied the occurrence and has not supported the allegations levelled against the appellant. In the absence of any substantive or corroborative material, and particularly when the star witness has resiled from the prosecution case, the evidentiary foundation becomes too fragile to sustain conviction."

The judgement reads:"....it is evident from the medical evidence on record that the same does not provide any unimpeachable scientific support to the prosecution case so as to bridge the gaps created by the hostility of the witnesses. On the contrary, P.W. 6, the doctor who examined the victim, has categorically deposed that “no external injury was found on the body of the victim and there were no signs or indicators
suggestive of rape on her private parts.” The medical findings, thus, do not disclose any evidence of recent sexual assault or penetration. In such circumstances, where the medical evidence fails to corroborate the ocular version and does not indicate any genital injury or trauma, the evidentiary chain stands seriously weakened. In absence of any supportive medical findings, coupled with the victim turning hostile and denying the occurrence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to establish its case through reliable scientific or medical evidence.

Justice Singh referred to the decision in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 92, wherein, the Supreme Court held that when the version of the prosecutrix is not of sterling quality and is inconsistent with the medical evidence, and when the surrounding circumstances render the prosecution story doubtful, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The Court also held that conviction cannot be sustained where the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

 

Justice Soni Shrivastava quashes order by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in a rape case of 2021

In Md. Said Ali Ansari vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Soni Shrivastava of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated January 12, 2026 wherein, she quashed the order by Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in a Sessions Trial of 2021. The second respondent was Ravina Tabassum. Despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of her. Justice Shrivastava concluded:"....this Court is of the considered view that the present prosecution against the petitioner is not only frivolous and vexatious, but the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 375 of the IPC in order to prosecute the petitioner particularly for an offence under Section 376 of IPC is clearly and visibly not made out. In such view of the matter continuance of prosecution would amount to abuse of process of the Court, hence, the impugned order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur in S.Tr. No. 161 of 2021 (arising out of Jagdispur P.S. Case No.121 of 2019) is hereby quashed. 19. Accordingly, the present application filed by the petitioner is allowed." 

The application was filed for quashing of of the order by the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhagalpur whereby and whereunder the petition dated October 26, 2021 filed by the petitioner under Section 227 Cr.P.C. to discharge the petitioner under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was rejected. The brief facts leading to the impugned order emanated from an F.I.R bearing Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 121 of 2019 dated April 26, 2019, registered under Section 341, 376, 379/34 of the IPC on the written statement of the informant Rabina Tabassum aged about 25 years, alleged inter alia that on the allurement and pretext of marriage, the informant was subjected to sexual exploitation by the petitioner for the last one year. The F.I.R further discloses that on April 22, 2019, on being asked by the petitioner to come along with him for getting married, she left her home along with cash and jewellery and went along with the petitioner to his maternal uncle’s house where they stayed in a room where the father of the petitioner had arrived and upon his assurance for marriage, she, along with the petitioner, came back to her village whereafter the mother of the petitioner also assured the informant’s parents about marriage which never happened. Hence, the present case was instituted stating in the F.I.R that other members of the family were also preventing the marriage to happen. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner and others and cognizance was taken thereupon under Section 376, 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC and after commitment of the case to the Court of Sessions, the petitioner filed the discharge application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. which stood rejected vide the impugned order dated November 17, 2021.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner assailed the impugned order primarily on the ground that no offence is made out against the petitioner, much less an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. He substantiated his submission on account of the fact that a bare perusal of the allegations made in the F.I.R itself would disclose that the petitioner and the informant/victim were having a relationship which was continued for the past one year and the informant being a 25 years old adult, as she herself claimed in the F.I.R, had entered into physical relationship with the petitioner with open eyes and there was no allegation of any threat perception or any force or coercion exercised upon her. He submitted that a relationship between two consenting adults would not bring the case within the ambit of Section 376 of IPC. He also submitted that even in the statement of the informant/victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she did not whisper a single word with regard to any sexual assault by the petitioner and had rather narrated the story in a different manner making reference to assurance given by the petitioner’s parents, specifically her mother about getting her married to the petitioner which was a definite pointer to the fact that there was a bona fide intention of marriage with Ravina Tabassum, the opposite party no.2 and there was no misconception of fact. The medical examination of the informant/victim was also referred to by the senior counsel to submit that the informant was an adult and upon vaginal swab examination, no spermatozoa was found, which was further indicative of the fact that medical evidence also did not corroborate the allegations made in the F.I.R by the informant. To buttress his submissions with respect to the offence under Section 376 of IPC not being made out, the senior counsel relied upon some recent judgments of the Supreme Court in (a) Jaspal Singh Kaural vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 756. (b) Surendra Khawse vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2025 INSC 1143), (c) Prashant vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2025) 5 SCC 764 

Justice Shrivastava observed: "9. After having heard the rival contentions of the parties and having considered the impugned order as also the material on record, the moot question which falls for consideration before this Court is as to whether there is sufficient material on record and grounds for proceeding against the petitioner, prosecuting him under Section 376 of the IPC. 10. Upon examining the contents of the F.I.R and the other materials on record, it is clear that the prosecutrix is a 25 years old adult and had entered into a relationship with the petitioner, which was continuing for the past one year leading to the inference that there was a consensual relationship between two adults. However, there is an allegation that sexual exploitation of the informant was done on the pretext of marriage. At this stage, it needs to be considered that there can be several reasons for developing physical intimacy between two consenting partners and the question of entering into a relationship under a misconception of fact needs to be established by way of specific assertion and material to show that the informant was made to enter into such relationship upon a false promise to marry and that she would not have done so in absence of such promise and assurance, coupled with the fact that the petitioner, in fact, never had any intention to marry the informant right from the inception. 11. The facts and materials disclosed in the present case, in no way, point towards any such intention of the petitioner to have sexually exploited her without intending to marry her. The prosecutrix has rather herself stated that it was due to the interference by the family members, including the parents of the petitioner, that impediments were caused in the marriage which could not fructify as a consequence of the same. It has to be kept in mind that there is a clear cut distinction between a ‘false promise’ to marry, which would come under the purview of misconception of fact as envisaged under Section 90 of the IPC and a ‘breach of promise’ which is a result of some supervening circumstances on account of which a promise earlier made has not been honored." 

She referred to a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Naim Ahmed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 15 SCC 385 wherein the distinction between a false promise to marry and a breach of promise was clarified. It reads: “21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.”

Justice Shrivastava observed: "12. The aforesaid issue of a woman engaging in sexual relations on the basis of misconception of fact amounting to rape and a breach of promise being distinct from a false promise has also been dealt with in several other judicial pronouncements rendered by this Court as also the Hon’ble Apex Court and such grounds have led to quashing of the entire prosecution. She recollected teh Supreme Court's decision in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein the legal position with regard to “consent” of a woman vis-a-vis “mis-conception of fact” arising out of a false promise to marry, was summarized . Paragraph 18 of the said judgment reads:“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

She added: "14. Upon analysis of the facts of the present case, it can be safely concluded that there is nothing on record to indicate that it is only on account of a false promise to marry that the prosecutrix had engaged herself in a physical relationship with the petitioner and thus, existence of any such assurance or promise to marry cannot be said to bear a direct nexus with the decision of the informant to engage in any sexual act. 15. This Court cannot also loose sight of the fact that the informant, who by virtue of her age and maturity, was capable enough to take her independent decisions and engaging in a sexual relationship with the petitioner was a conscious and informed choice made by the informant, being in a position to assess the morality or immorality attached to the act in which she indulged with the petitioner without there being any force or coercion upon her. Such a willful conduct would lead to only an inevitable conclusion of her willingness in carrying a relationship, including physical intimacy with the petitioner, as
such, her consent was totally voluntary. A criminal prosecution under Section 376 of IPC cannot be permitted to be initiated and to continue merely on account of the reason that a cordial and consensual relationship between a consenting couple does not materialize and fructify into a marital relationship...."

Notably, 84th report of the Law Commission of India (1980) dealt with rape and allied offences. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) deals with rape. Section 64 of BNS deals with punishment for rape. The BNS replaced the IPC from July 2, 2024.

Death Reference case under POCSO Act decided in 2022 by Patna High Court's Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ashwani Kumar Singh reaches Supreme Court

F.I.R was registered in 2018 with Phulwarisharif Mahila Station under sections 376, 376(b), 120(B), 504, 506, 354(D) IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of POCSO Act 

In ZZZ vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. etc. (2025), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard a Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) which arose out of the impugned final judgment and order dated October 19, 2022 in Death Reference No. 3/2021, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 218/2021 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 285/2021 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ashwani Kumar Singh. The two other respondents in the Supreme Court are: Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania and Abhishek Kumar. The Court had condoned the delay and issued notice by its order dated July 14, 2025. It came up before Supreme Court's Registrar Ms. Sujata Singh on September 15, 2025. 

The High Court's 48-page long judgement dated October 19, 2022 in The State of Bihar vs. Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania (2022) was authored by Justice Prasad. It was heard and decided along with Abhishek Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2022).

Justice Prasad had concluded: "73. To this Court, it appears that this case cannot be equated with the cases where there is kidnapping, rape and murder of victim. It has been submitted that in the case of Pappu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2022(2) BLJ 231(SC) which was case of rape and murder of a child sentence of death was commuted to life imprisonment. 74. Considering the aforesaid submissions and materials on the record, this Court while sustaining the conviction of the appellant-Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania converts it from 376 (DB) IPC to Section 376 IPC. Accordingly his sentence is modified and he is awarded rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) for the offence under Section 376 IPC. His conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is also upheld, however, in view of Section 42 of the POCSO Act no separate sentence is awarded for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He is further sentenced under Section 506 IPC for two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only). All the sentences shall run concurrently. 75. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 are, thus, allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.76. In consequence thereof Death Reference No. 3 of 2021 made by the learned trial court under Section 366 Cr.P.C. is rejected."

The appellants in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Patna in Special POCSO Case No. 186 of 2018 (arising out of Mahila P.S. Case No. 136 of 2018 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376 (b), 504, 506, 354(D), 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 6, 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The trial court had convicted them for the offences under Sections 376(DB) IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 120(B) IPC. As far as appellant Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 was concerned, he was also convicted under Sections 506 IPC. The appellant Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania was awarded capital punishment / death penalty for the offence under Section 376(DB) under Section 6 of POCSO Act and a fine of Rs. 01 lakh. He was sentenced rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 05 thousand under Section 506 IPC. After awarding the death penalty the trial court made a reference under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the High Court for confirmation of the death penalty. The reference has been registered as Death Reference Case No. 03 of 2021 and the same is under consideration together with the two appeals. The appellant Abhishek Kumar in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 was awarded a term of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50 thousand for the offence under Section 376(DB) read with Section 120(B) of the IPC. 

A first information report was registered on September 19, .2018 with Phulwarisharif Mahila Station giving rise to P.S. Case No. 136 of 2018 under sections 376, 376(b), 120(B), 504, 506, 354(D) IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of POCSO Act. The informant was mother of the victim girl. It was alleged in the written complaint that the victim ‘X’ aged about 11 years was a student of New Central Public School, Phulwarisharif. She was studying in Class V for about one year. The School Principal Arvind Kumar (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021) sexually exploited the victim girl and by making her video, under threat that the same will be made viral, he was blackmailing her. It was alleged that in this act one teacher of the school namely, Abhishek Kumar aged about 26 years (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021) was also helped the principal. The informant alleged that there was a bed room of the principal adjacent to the class room and in the name of checking of writing, the victim girl was being taken to the said room where she was exploited. The victim girl, disclosed that her principal called her on the pretext of checking of writing through Abhishek and then he indulged in wrong act. This led to stoppage of menstruation of the victim. She had a bout of vomiting which led to a suspicion in the mind of of her mother. She got her pregnancy tested wherein the pregnancy was confirmed. The alleged act were done under threat of a knife.  

Supreme Court set aside "cryptic order" by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar in Vandana Gupta case, which resulted in "travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgement dated July 21, 2025 wherein it allowed the appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta. The Respondent no. 2 is Vandan Gupta. The Division Bench concluded:"keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society." 

The judgement reads:"the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration. 28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled. She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before the appropriate forum."

The appeal arose by special leave emanates from the order dated January 18, 2024 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent No.2-accused 2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed and she was granted bail. The appellant-victim herein was the informant in the FIR. 

The prosecution case as against Vandana Gupta, Respondent No.2 was that she while being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih, Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation and mental torture. It was alleged that she used to send the ladies housed in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court recorded that during the course of investigation, few more ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against Vanadana Gupta, the respondent No.2. The application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected by the Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order dated July 10, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an
appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing the order passed by the Special Court. In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506 of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act vide order dated August 29, 2023. Notably, in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim in any prayer for bail essential. 

The appellant-victim approached the Supreme Court through the appeal by special leave to assail the order passed by the High Court. Her counsel contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men. It was also contended that unidentified men were allowed access into the protection home where they would take advantage of the helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours. 

Pursuant to the release of respondent No.2 on bail, she was reinstated in service, and she was heading another protection home within the State of Bihar. This approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He submitted that it was apparent that the concerned authorities of the State Government were hands in glove with the accused and had no intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct. Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on the female inmates. In case, respondent No.2 is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial. The counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.  

The standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of Bihar supported the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation, grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there was imminent threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 was allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However, on a pertinent query being posed,  standing counsel was not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working in a similar institution.

Supreme Court observed: "21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened."

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's  decisions in Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 wherein it cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows:
“18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118].

In Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 upon hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Mahila P.S. Case no. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected. The allegation against the appellant who was a Superintendent of Remand Home was that she used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that appellant was falsely implicated in this case. She had not taken the caste name of the informant in public view. No offence is made out under the provisions of the SC/ST Act against her. Notably, vide letter No. 836 dated February 16, 2022, one S.I.T. team was constituted for investigation of Mahila P.S. Case No. 13 of 2022 and Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 jointly and the investigation was started jointly but after investigation of the case, the police submitted final form No. 100 of 2022 due to insufficiency of evidence which is apparent from Annexure-3 of the petition itself and also the allegation which was alleged by the informant/victim upon this appellant was not found true. 

The Court order recorded that from perusal of the Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022, which was annexed in the petition as Annexure-5(page No-36) in which it was mentioned that no any drug abuse and rape/sexual exploitation have been made in that remand home. From perusal of the report of Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna, it was mentioned in para-5 that the nature of the informant/victim was quarrelsome. Moreover, the appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022. The appeal for bail was opposed by Special P.P. for the State and the counsel for the informant. By way of filing counter affidavit, it was mentioned in para-2 that "another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was also submitted that from a report of SP, Patna, few men used to come in girh by covering their faces and on the permission of this appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register."

Justice Panwar concluded:"....taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna."

Quashing this order by Justice Panwar, Supreme Court observed: "25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act."

 

Supreme Court sets aside bail order by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar which "resulted ino travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 16-page long judgement dated July 21, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"...it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside." The judgement authored by Justice Mehta sets aside the 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 delivered by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court in Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024).  

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Shabeen Ahmad vs.The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 which placed reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768, Justice Mehta observed:"we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration." The respondent no. 2 is Vandana Gupta.   

Vandana Gupta, had approached the High Court against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with a Mahila P.S. case of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the I.T. Act and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected.

The allegation was that Vandana Gupta, the appellant was a Superintendent of Remand Home who used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. The Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022 on Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna mentioned that "the nature of the informant/victim is quarrelsome". The appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022 before she was granted bail by Justice Pawar in January 2024.

The counter affidavit recorded that another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was submitted in the report of SP, Patna that few men used to come in Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna by covering their faces and on the permission of Vandana Gupta, the appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register. 

Justice Pawar had concluded:"Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed..." 

It emerges that Supreme Court's judgement has upheld the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna. 

Justice Mehta observed:"It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a case of such nature. 25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act." 

 

FIR under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 & provisions of IPC quashed: Justice Sandeep Kumar

Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar quashed F.I.R. registered for the offence under Sections 323, 341, 376, 376-D, 420, 313, 120-B, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under section 67 of the Information Technology Act and all the consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid F.I.R. including the order dated January 6, 2023 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1st, Danapur. The Magistrate had passed the order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for registration of the F.I.R.. 

In his 34-page long judgement in Sanjeev Hans vs. The State of Bihar & Ors (2024). Justice Kumar examined as to whether the offence of rape is made out against the petitioner or not besides non-compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C.

The other respondents were: Director General of Police, Patna, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Rupaspur Police Station, Patna and Gayatri Kumari of Kataiya, Jamhur, Aurangabad.

Gayatri Kumari, the complainant is a practicing advocate in Allahabad High Court. She was practicing in Patna High Court from 2009 to 2015. In the month of February, 2016 while the complainant was staying at the residence of Senior Advocate Gajendra Prasad Yadav situated at Golden Plaza Apartment, Chitkohra for getting her case mentioned, a junior advocate namely, Shiv Nandan Bharti introduced her to Gulab Yadav, who was an M.L.A. It has also been alleged that said Gulab Yadav lured her by saying that he will get make her member of Women Commission and asked her to come to meet him along with her bio-data at his residence situated at Flat No.401, Bindeshwari Apartment. It is alleged that when the Complainant reached the house of said Gulab Yadav, he raped her at gun point and when the complainant was going to register F.I.R. then Gulab Yadav asked his servant Lalit to bring vermilion and put the same on the forehead of the complainant and said that they were married and they will get their marriage registered and asked for some time to get divorce from his first wife. 

She alleged that Gulab Yadav called the complainant to Pune to show the papers of the Court, by which divorce has been granted. On July 8, 2017 when thec complainant reached Hotel Bestil then Gulab Yadav introduced her to Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner and both raped her after mixing some intoxicating substance in her food. When the complainant regained her consciousness, Gulab Yadav showed her the video of her rape and sent the same on her mobile and threatened her to make the video viral. The complainant got scared and started to live in Allahabad and when she missed her periods, she informed Gulab Yadav about the same but Gulab Yadav asked her to take medicine for abortion which she consumed, however, she had to get admitted in hospital due to medical condition. Thereafter, Gulab Yadav got the complainant admitted in Rahul Judicial Classes, Delhi and arranged for her stay in a hostel in Mukherji Nagar, Delhi. 

She also alleged that Gulab Yadav used to call the complainant at different hotels and raped her where Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner also used to accompany Gulab Yadav. It has also been alleged that on February 13, 2018 at Ashoka Hotel, on February 14, 2018 at Park Avenue hotel and on March 27, 2018 at Le’ Meriden hotel, she was gang raped and resultantly she conceived and when she informed the accused about this, the accused persons threatened her. Out of fear, the complainant vacated her hostel and started living in Shalimar Bagh, Delhi where she gave birth to a male child on October 25, 2018 and when she informed this fact to Gulab Yadav, he told that it can not be his child as he has undergone vasectomy and said that the child is of Sanjeev Hans. When the complainant tried to contact Sanjeev Hans, he did not speak with her and since then the complainant is hiding from the accused persons as they are quite influential. It has further been alleged that the complainant went to Rupaspur Police Station for registering the F.I.R., but the Police did not register the F.I.R. by saying that the accused persons are quite influential and then the complainant sent the complaint to Superintendent of Police, Patna on October 28, 2021, however no action was taken in this regard. 

The complaint case was filed by the complainant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Danapur, Patna for lodging the F.I.R. The Magistrate in his order dated November  18, 2021 recorded that the complainant has not produced any document in support of her claim of compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, called a report from the concerned Police Station. Despite granting sufficient opportunity, the complainant did not appear for recording her S.A. and resultantly, the Magistrate vide order dated September 20, 2022 dismissed the complaint case under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. Being aggrieved by the same, the complainant approached the High Court by way of filing Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 has disposed of the said petition with certain directions. 

The relevant part of the order dated December 12, 2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 reads as under:-

“Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State, this Court finds that there is no dispute with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this case, police was conducting a preliminary enquiry into the matter and a report was required to be sent to the learned ACJM Court at Danapur. The said report has been submitted or not is not within the knowledge of learned counsel for the State.

Be that as it may, this Court is of the considered opinion that once the matter was pending at the stage of preliminary enquiry and the report had been called for from the police, the learned ACJM should not have acted in haste in taking up the enquiry at his level by treating it as a complaint case.

The Magistrate vide order dated 06.01.2023  allowed the prayer of the petitioner to send the complaint petition under sectionn156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the Police for registration of the F.I.R and accordingly, the present F.I.R. has been lodged. The Investigating Officer of the case has filed an application in the Court of learned A.C.J.M.-1, Danapur for deputing a Magistrate so that blood sample of Gulab Yadav, the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 and the petitioner be collected for DNA test but the Magistrate vide order dated 06.03.2023 has rejected the prayer of the Investigating Officer by holding that he has no jurisdiction to pass an order for DNA test. 

The counsel for Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 that respondent no.5 is a practicing advocate and Gulab Yadav and present petitioner used to commit rape with her. Since Gulab Yadav has undergone vasectomy, the presumption goes to establish that the petitioner is the biological father of the son of the respondent no.5. Thus, the DNA test of the petitioner and the son of the respondent no.5 is required in order to determine the biological father of the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5.

The judgement reads: "This Court can consider the quashing of the F.I.R. for preventing the abuse of the process of the Court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice and in my opinion, it is a fit case for interference in view of glaring facts of the case. This Court finds that it is a malafide prosecution because of some dispute... "

The Court observed:"From reading of the complaint petition, I find that the complainant has not filed any affidavit as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme in the aforesaid case and she has also not filed any document with the complaint petition showing compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, on account of non-compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C., the direction for registration of the F.I.R. vide order dated 06.01.2023 is against the law laid down by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt. The learned Magistrate though recorded non-compliance of the provisions of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. on 18.11.2021 but, has proceeded to pass the order dated 06.01.2023 for registration of the F.I.R. Before the learned Magistrate passed an order for registration of the F.I.R., he had passed an order for preliminary enquiry. On 18.11.2021, the learned Magistrate directed for calling for a report from the concerned Police Station through Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna in light of the complaint petition. On 11.05.2022, the Police submitted an application saying that the Police was directed to submit the report after conducting the enquiry outside the State. Thereafter, the case was started as a complaint case and because of the nonappearance of the complainant on a number of days, the complaint was dismissed on 20.09.2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 has set aside the orders dated 12.05.2022 and 20.09.2022 passed by the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, on 06.01.2023, the preliminary enquiry report of the police was opened in the Court, which was submitted in a sealed cover, and after considering the same, the learned Magistrate directed for registration of the F.I.R. 

The moment the enquiry report was opened by the learned Magistrate on 06.01.2023, before directing for registration of the F.I.R., the fact that the complainant/informant claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and she gave birth to a child claiming to be the son of Gulab Yadav was well within the knowledge of the Court as well as the complainant /informant. The complainant / informant while filing the complaint / FIR has not disclosed the true facts i.e. she was treating herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav, whenever she was hospitalized she claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and when a boy was born the name of Gulab Yadav was disclosed by the complainant/informant saying that the father of her son is Gulab Yadav. These materials have been collected by the Police during the enquiry and they have been suppressed by the complainant / informant in her complaint/F.I.R.

From reading of the F.I.R., it appears that the complainant / informant has made allegation against two persons i.e. Gulab Yadav and the present petitioner. The date of occurrence mentioned in the complaint/F.I.R. is from February, 2016 to the date of filing of the complaint petition i.e. 16.11.2021. Initially, the allegations are levelled against Gulab Yadav who is said to have committed rape with the complainant/informant. The name of the petitioner is mentioned for an occurrence which is said to have taken place on 08.07.2017 at a Hotel in Pune alleging that the complainant was sexually assaulted by both the accused persons and Gulab Yadav made a video of the same and thereafter threatened her of making the video viral. Further allegations levelled in the complaint/F.I.R. primarily against Gulab Yadav and the complainant/informant has mentioned the name of the petitioner as an accomplice of Gulab Yadav and has alleged that he also used to commit rape with her. The complainant/informant is admittedly a lawyer practicing since 2009 and the complaint has been filed after about five years of the alleged incident of rape.

The complainant has waited for five years to file the complaint and there is no satisfactory explanation for the delayed filing of the complaint petition.

The petitioner herself is a grown-up woman, who is practicing Law and as per her own statement she was in a relationship with Gulab Yadav. 

Supreme Court grants decree of divorce under Article 142(1) of Constitution

In it's 73 page long judgement, in Rinku Baheti vs. Sandesh Sharda, Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Pankaj Mithal observed:"The provisions in the criminal law are for the protection and empowerment of women but sometimes are used by certain women more for purposes that they are never meant for. In recent times, the invocation of Sections 498A, 376, 377, 506 of the IPC as a combined package in most of the complaints related to matrimonial disputes is a practice which has been condemned by this Court on several occasions." 

The Court allowed the application filed by the respondent-husband under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India is allowed and the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Consequently, the criminal cases and the consequential proceedings pending against respondent-husband for offences punishable under Sections 354,376, 377, 420,498A,503, 506, 509 of the IPC and Sections 66 and 67 of the IT Act, 2000, filed by the petitioner are quashed.The criminal case and the proceedings for offences punishable under Sections 360, 427, 452, 454, and 457 of the IPC also stand quashed. 

It added: "In certain cases, the wife and her family tend to use a criminal complaint with all the above serious offences as a platform for negotiation and as a mechanism and a tool to get the husband and his family to comply with their demands, which are mostly monetary in nature." 

It underlined that "The women need to be careful about the fact that these strict provisions of law in their hands are beneficial legislations for their welfare and not means to chastise, threaten, domineer or extort from their husbands."

The judgement was delivered on December 19,2024. Prior to this on December 10, 2024, the Court had taken note of the tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of matrimonial discord by misusing provisions like Section 498-A IPC in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana. In May, 2024, the Court observed in Dolly Rani vs. Manish Kumar Chanchal that at Hindu Marriage is a sacred institution, not a social event for "song and dance" and "wining and dining".  The Court recalled it's earlier decisions in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana (2024) , Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand, (2010), Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, (2006), Shakti vs. Anita (2023), Kiran Jyot Maini vs. Anish Pramod Patel, (2024), Vinny Paramvir Parmar vs. Paramvir Parmar (2011). 

The Court directed the respondent to pay the petitioner a sum of ₹ 12 crores only which shall be paid within one month. The litigation cost for the petitioner was ₹3 lakhs is to be paid along with the payment of permanent alimony. The petitioner was directed to vacate from the premises belonging to respondent’s father at Pune and Bhopal,within two months from the date of receipt of the amount of permanent alimony. The judgement was authored by Justice Nagarathna. 

Supreme Court stays Patna High Court's order denying pre-arrest bail in a rape case

In Gopal Mahto vs. The of Bihar and Others (2024), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court heard the case of the petitioner who apprehended arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 386, 376, and 511 of the IPC. The other respondent is Kavita Devi. The prosecution case was that on the point of knife the petitioner committed rape with the victim. In this case from Balapar, Rosera, Samastipur, the trial court disbelieved the petitioner who claimed that he was falsely implicated in the rape case due to a land dispute and the claim of clean antecedent. The trial court took cognizance only under Section 354 of the IPC. The Court's order has recorded that "No independent witnesses have supported the prosecution case." Justice Singh's order reads: "Considering the nature of accusation and gravity of offence, prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is rejected." 

A SLP was filed in the Supreme Court on August 16, 2024. On September 4, 2024, Court's bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sanjay Karol passed an order. It reads: "Till the next date of hearing, the petitioner shall not be arrested in connection with C.R. No. 517/2022 pending on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rosera, Bihar." On December18, 2024, the Court's order stated that "Interim order, passed earlier, shall continue till the next date of hearing." The next date of hearing is on January 7, 2025.