Division Bench upholds judgement by Justuce Harish Kumar in a land acquisition compensation case from Araria

In Pramod Kumar Mandal vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms De -partment, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh, and Rajesh Kumar Verma passed a 20-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"11. The limited issue which arises for consideration before this Court in the present appeal is as to whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from any illegality, infirmity or perversity warranting interference by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction....It is not in dispute that the acquisition in question was undertaken by invoking the urgency provisions contained in Section 40 of the Act, 2013. Sub-section (3) of Section 40 contemplates payment of eighty per cent of the compensation as estimated by the Collector before taking possession. Thus, the payment made at that stage cannot, by itself, be treated as the final determination of compensation, particularly when the award contemplated under Section 37 of the Act, 2013 had not yet been prepared and approved. Section 40(4) further empowers the appropriate Government, in cases where the urgency provision is invoked, to direct that the provisions of Chapters II to VI shall not apply and permits a declaration under Section 19 to be made accordingly. 13. In this regard, the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge in Girish Kedia vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 and analogous cases, decided on 29.11.2024, is directly relevant. In the said decision, this Court, while considering the very same acquisition proceedings, held that the initial payment made under Section 40(3) was on the basis of an estimate and that the process of acquisition could not be treated as finally concluded in the absence of an award under Section 37. The learned Single Judge also noticed the Government instructions providing for verification of the nature, category and rate of the acquired land through the Six Men Committee. 14. The contention of the appellant that the respondents had no authority to undertake such verification merely because the earlier notifications described the land as residential, therefore, cannot be accepted at this stage. The question of the correct nature and valuation of the land would necessarily have a bearing upon the final determination of compensation, which is yet to be crystallised by a final award. The principle that executive instructions cannot supplant statutory provisions, does not advance the case of the appellant, since the exercise undertaken by the respondents is not shown to be contrary to the Act, 2013; rather, it is directed towards determination of the correct compensation in accordance with the statutory scheme. 15. We also find no substance in the submission that the appellant is without any statutory remedy against the determination ultimately made by the acquiring authority. Section 64 of the Act, 2013 specifically provides for a reference to the Authority at the instance of a person interested who has not accepted the award, including an objection relating to the amount of compensation. The provision, therefore, operates upon the making of an award and provides a statutory mechanism for questioning the determination contained therein. 16. In the present case, admittedly, the final award has not yet been prepared and approved. Consequently, the appellant cannot invoke Section 64 at this stage merely to challenge the ongoing process of determination of the compensation. At the same time, this does not deprive the appellant of the statutory remedy. Once the award is prepared, if the appellant remain aggrieved by the determination of the nature of the land or the amount of compensation, it would be open to the appellant to avail the remedy available under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, subject to the requirements and limitation prescribed therein. The Authority  constituted under the Act has original jurisdiction over a reference made under Section 64. 17. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant upon the order dated 14.03.2022 passed by the LARRA, Purnea in Land Acquisition Reference Case No. 01 of 2019 also does not alter the position. The said proceeding arose in its own factual context and, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, the order passed by the Authority cannot, in the absence of identical facts and circumstances, be treated as determinative of the nature of the land involved in the present case. More importantly, the question presently before us concerns the authority of the respondents to undertake determination before the final award is prepared. 18. It is well settled that executive power encompasses governmental functions which remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away, though such power cannot be exercised in contravention of the Constitution or any law. In the present case, the exercise undertaken by the respondents for verification of the nature and valuation of the acquired land, in the absence of a final award, cannot be said to be contrary to the statutory scheme. 19. We, therefore, are of the view that the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the statutory scheme of the Act, 2013 and has rightly declined to interfere with the ongoing determination of the compensation. However, as rightly noticed in the impugned order, any recovery of the differential amount has to be undertaken strictly in accordance with law as observed by learned Single Judge and after finalisation of the award. The appellant shall remain at liberty to avail the statutory remedy under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, if aggrieved by the award ultimately passed. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. The issue framed is answered against the appellant. 21. Accordingly, the present intra court appeal stands dismissed. 22. The observations and directions contained in the impugned order shall continue to operate." The judgement was authored by Justice Singh.  

The other six respondents were: 2. The Principal Secretary, Land Acquisition Department, Govt. of Bihar, 3. The Director, Land Acquisition and Rehabitation Department, Govt. of Bihar, 4. The District Magistrate/Collector, Araria, 5. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Araria, 6. The District Land Acqusition Officer, Araria and 7. The Excutive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division,
Araria.

Justice Singh led bench passed the order upon hearing the intra court appeal against the 36-page long judgement dated December 10, 2024 passed in Madan Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), whereby the writ petition preferred by the writ petitioner (appellant herein) came to be dismissed. The facts are that a total area of 456.01.200 acres of land situated in 64 villages falling under four Anchal areas, namely, Narpatganj, Forbesganj, Kurshakanta and Sikta, was proposed to be acquired by the State Government for construction of the Indo-Nepal Border Road. Pursuant thereto, Notification dated May 11, 2016 was issued under Section 11(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which was published in the official gazette as well as in the newspapers. Thereafter, notification dated May 12, 2016 was issued under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013, containing the declaration and summary of rehabilitation and resettlement in respect of the land proposed to be acquired. In the course of the acquisition proceedings, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Araria called upon the landowners to furnish documents relating to their title and interest in the land, possession certificates, rent receipts and other relevant particulars. The appellants submitted the requisite documents and affidavits. Thereafter, possession of the acquired land was taken and compensation along with solatium was paid to the landowners on different dates. The acquired land was subsequently handed over to the concerned agency for construction of the Indo-Nepal Border Road, and the road was constructed over the acquired land and put to public use.Subsequently, in the year 2017, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Araria, acting upon certain complaints, initiated an enquiry into the nature of the acquired lands. By Memo dated July 28, 2017, the landowners were informed that, according to the enquiry conducted by a committee constituted for the purpose, the lands in question were agricultural in nature, whereas compensation had been paid treating them as residential lands. The landowners were called upon to appear before the Collector and submit their response. Some of the landowners accordingly appeared and submitted their replies. Thereafter, on the basis of the report of a six-member committee, the District Land Acquisition Officer issued Memo dated March 17, 2018 calling upon the landowners to repay the alleged excess amount of compensation on the ground that the lands were agricultural in nature and that compensation had been paid treating the same as residential lands. The said subsequent action for recovery of the differential amount became the subject matter of challenge before the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 6876 of 2018. 

The Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition by observing as follows: “8. Similar issue as has been raised in this batch of writ petitions have come up for consideration in C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 (Girish Kedia Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and other analogous cases wherein this Court having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the learned Advocate for the petitioners as well as the State respondents and after anxiously perusing the materials available on record vide its order/judgment dated November 29, 2024 dismissed all the writ petitions with certain observations. 9. In the ends of justice, this Court deems it proper to encapsulate the relevant paragraphs of the said decision [C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 (Girish Kedia Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.)], which also governed the issues raised in the present batch of the writ petitions: "25. Undisputedly the land, in the question, was acquired from Raiyats/petitioners for constructing road over Indo-Nepal Border under the Emergency Provision of Section 40 of the Act, 2013. Section 40 of the Act, 2013 deals with the Special powers in case of urgency to acquire land in certain cases. 26. Section 40 (1) clearly stipulates that in cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of thirty days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 21, take possession of any land needed for a public purpose: 27. Sub-Section 3 of Section 40 makes it clear that before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall tender payment of eighty per cent of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the person interested entitled thereto. 28. Sub-Section 4 of Section 40, which would be relevant in the present matter needs to be quoted hereinbelow: "(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub - section (3) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that any or all of the provisions of Chapter II to Chapter VI shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 19 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the preliminary notification under sub-section (1) of section 11. 29. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is explicit that the appropriate Government is Empowered to direct that any or all of the provisions of Chapter II to Chapter VI shall not apply, and, if it does so direct that a declaration made under section 19 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the preliminary notification. The initial payment of compensation is only based upon estimation done by the Collector. 30. Admittedly after issuance of notification under Section 11(1) of the Act, 2013 immediately further notification under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013 as contemplated to invoke the Emergency provisions under Section 40 of the Act, 2013 has been issued on 12.05.2016. 31. From cumulative reading of both the notifications issued under Section 11(1) and Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013, it is axiomatic that the land, in question, is acquired under the Emergency Provision of Section 40 of the Act, 2013 and thus the social impact assessment study provided under Section 4 and the provisions of hearing of objections under Section 15 of the Act, 2013 shall not be applicable; in as much as the compensation paid by the Collector was based upon estimation. Thus any acquisition proceeding commenced under Section 40 of the Act, 2013 excludes the provision of Chapter II to Chapter VI, if otherwise it is directed under Section 19 of the Act, 2013. 32. In view of the aforesaid facts, the submission of the learned Advocates for the petitioners to the effect that at all the stages, as discussed above, the nature of land as to whether it is residential or agricultural have brought to the attention of the acquisition authority and such an important aspect would not have been eluded the attention of the authorities while carrying out such an exercise with ground level, in the opinion of this Court does not stand substantiated.  33. It is noteworthy that the Government of Bihar in the Department of Revenue and Land Reforms vide its letter contained in Memo No. 450 dated 12.04.2017 and further in Memo No. 150 dated 15.02.2018, brought on record by way of counter affidavit, issued under the signature of Principal Secretary of the concerned Department communicated to all the Collectors of the State of Bihar in public interest that to resolve the dispute with regard to acquisition of the land and its nature, category or the rate, a committee was required to be constituted under the Chairmanship of the District Magistrate. Accordingly, Government of Bihar took a decision to constitute a Six Men Committee consisting of District Magistrate, Additional Collector-cum Rehabilitation and Resettlement Officer, District Land Acquisition Officer, District Sub-Registrar, Representative of Requisitioning Authority, Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer. The aforenoted letter also made it clear that after publication of notification under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013 and before issuance of notice upon the affected land holders/raiyats, there shall be a proper inspection of the notified land and thereupon the rate of the land shall be determined. 34. In Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1955 SC 549, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The executive Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution.  35. In the case of J & K Public Service Commission vs. Narinder Mohan (Dr), reported in (1994) 2 SCC 630, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the executive power could be exercised only to fill in the gaps but the instructions cannot and should not supplant the law, but only supplement the law. Accordingly exercising of Executive power cannot be in contravention of the Constitution or any other law. 36. While executive power is circumscribed by the limits imposed by the Constitution, and by any other law, this does not imply that executive power can be exercised only when there is a law already in existence. The executive's powers are not restricted solely to carrying out the laws passed by Parliament. It includes other functions such as supervising general administration, formulation, and execution of policy, etc.  37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also consistently held that such clarificatory circulars cannot amend or substitute principal legislation. But if the principal legislation made thereunder is silent, then the Government can issue clarifications to supplement principal legislation by issuing instructions. 38. In the case in hand, the notification under Sections 11(1) and 19(1) of the Act, 2013 have been issued on 11.05.2016 and 12.05.2016 before issuance of the aforenoted letters, nonetheless the modalities as contemplated there, in the letters of the State Government is not in any manner contrary to the prescriptions as provided under the Act, 2013. 39. It is axiomatic that administrative decision which is not based on a dispute between the two parties and which is not rendered after hearing the parties, does not operate as res judicata. The party affected by it as also the authority making the decision are amenable to review the same. The interests of fairness to individuals whose interests will otherwise be directly and prejudicially affected may lead the Courts to attribute binding effect to administrative acts and decisions which the competent authority wishes to repudiate or rescind. Indeed, it would seem that the legal competence of administrative bodies to
rescind their decisions depends at least as much on considerations of equity and public policy as on conceptual classification (Prof. S.A.De Smith in his "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", 3rd Edn.). 40. Any administrative decision, there is no legal obligation upon the person charged with the duty of reaching the decision to consider and weigh submissions and arguments or to collate any evidence, to solve any issue. The grounds upon which he acts, and the means which he takes to inform himself before acting, are left entirely to his discretion. Subsequently, not only administrative action, but also administrative decision can be reviewed to redress injustice caused thereby. It is implicit in this principle that in redressing injustice to one injustice should not be caused to some other.  41. The law is well settled that any amount paid/received without the authority of law can always be recovered barring exceptions of extreme hardships or prohibited under any Statute/ Rules, but not as a matter of right. In such situation, law implies an obligation on the payee to repay the money, otherwise it would amount to unjust enrichment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on various occasions held that the excess payment of public money which is often described as "tax payers money" belongs neither to the officers who have effected over-payment nor that of the recipients. Possibly, effecting excess payment of public money by officers, may be due to various reasons like negligence, carelessness, collusion, favouritism etc. because and payments have been received by the recipients also without any authority of law. This Court is also not unmindful of the fact that the land of the petitioners have been acquired by the State Government in terms of the prescription of Act, 2013 and thus they should be compensated adequately in commensurate with the valuation of the land. In case, the land holders get less payment against the value of their acquired land, it would be certainly transgress the statutory and constitutional right to property as mandated under Article 300A of the Constitution, but once they receive excess payment to the value of their land, it would certainly amount to unjust enrichment. 42. In view of the above, this Court does not find any error in the action of the respondents in determining the nature of the land and its rate, if the same was found to be unjust, all the more, the Government is entitled to review an administrative decision, if the same is unjust and contrary to law; that too, in the case in hand, when the process of acquisition is yet to be finalized by preparation and approval of the award under Section 37 of the Act, 2013. 43. This Court does not find that it is a case where the Collector has reviewed his order; on the contrary, the process has completed inasmuch as award has never been never been prepared and approved. The compensation paid to the petitioners were only based upon estimation; Later on having apprised and acquainted with the mistake committed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the other responsible authorities, the same has been rectified by constituting a Six Men Committee and action has been taken against the erring officials. 45. So far the contention of the petitioners that in case of difference of opinion on the point of nature of the land, such dispute is always amenable to Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the LARRA') is concerned the same does not find any substance The Act, 2013, in the facts of this case. especially Section 51 of the Act provided a forum i.e. LARRA to adjudicate the disputes relating to acquisition of land, compensation payable and the preparation of compensation of which interested persons have made different claim. If there would have been any dispute with regard to the determination of the nature of the land, such a dispute may be referred to the jurisdiction of the said authority having sufficient mechanism available for redressal of grievance of any of the parties to a land acquisition proceeding, which might have arisen in relation to any issue associated with such proceeding.  46. There is no dispute that if the Collector comes to the conclusion that the lands, question, are agricultural, but the compensation has been paid by treating it as Pesidential, in such circumstances, the aggrieved party was supposed to take recourse to the remedy available, as provided under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 by getting the matter referred to the said authority, only if there is an award and parties are aggrieved and not accepted the award. 47. Section 64 contemplates under the Act, 2013 empowering the Collector to refer the dispute to the Authority, if any person interested, who has not accepted the award may by written application require that the matter be referred for determination of the Authority, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation. Section 64 (2) of the Act, 2013 mandates that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken, provided that such application shall be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; and in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 21, or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. 48. Perusal of the prescriptions as contemplated under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, clearly indicates that to invoke this provision it is absolutely necessary to challenge the award, if any person interested has not accepted the award. In the case in hand, it is the admitted position that award has not even been approved till date. 49. Reliance of the petitioner on a decision of this Court in the case of Dhan Jee Pandey (supra) has no application in the case in hand as that was the case where land was acquired under the National Highway Authority Act, 1956, which is a self contained code and, moreover, there was already an award passed by the competent authority, but later on a decision has been taken by the State to get the excess amount refunded, which had already been paid, on account of having found the nature of the land agriculture instead of residential. 50. This Court has also gone through the materials on record and found that before reassessment/determination of the land, in question, the land owners have been noticed and many of them filed their response, thus, the contention of the petitioners' that no notice or any opportunity was given prior to determination of land also does not get supported form the record. 51. In view of the aforesaid facts, circumstances and the position in law, this Court does not find any merit in this batch of the writ petitions. Let the award may be passed within a period of three months, if not passed till date after completing all the formalities. Suffice it to observe that the petitioners would have the liberty to assail the same in accordance with prescription, as provided under the Act, 2013, if any person interested has not accepted it. 52. Now coming to the legality of the impugned action of the respondent Collector to the extent whereby, apart from directing the petitioners to ensure the payment of deferential amount of compensation; for the said purpose has frozen the Bank accounts of the petitioners, this procedure is apart from illegal and arbitrary, do not have any sanction of law. Thus this Court deprecate such action. However, the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to recover the differential amount by taking recourse of Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 or through any other Act, in accordance with law, after finalization of the award, but without any interest accrued thereupon, as the petitioners were never at fault. 53. All the writ petitions stand dismissed with the aforesaid observation. Apart from the issues finally adjudicated, as noted hereinabove, in C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 and other analogous cases, the petitioners have also placed reliance upon an order passed by the LARRA in Land Acquisition Reference Case No.1 of 2019, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 14.03.2022 holding one of the land holder, namely, Sushila Devi, entitled to get/receive the compensation amount for her acquired land, being Residential in nature and, accordingly, the office was directed to prepare the award. Suffice it to observe that any order passed by the LARRA in a case, which was referred by the competent authority under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 is dependent upon the specific facts and circumstances of the said case and cannot be treated as a binding precedent unless the land holders would be able to show that his/her/their case(s) is/are identical to the said case. It has also not been disclosed to this Court as to whether in such case, there had been an award passed by the concerned Collector or not. So far the jurisdiction and power of the LARRA is concerned, the same has been duly considered by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 (Girish Kedia Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and other analogous cases, especially in paragraph nos. 45 to 49." 

The counsel for the appellant had submitted that the land in question was duly inspected and surveyed prior to acquisition and was treated as residential land in the reports preceding the acquisition. The notifications dated 11.05.2016 under Section 11(1) and 12.05.2016 under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013 also described the land as residential. Compensation was thereafter determined accordingly, paid along with solatium, possession was taken and the land was utilised for construction of the Indo-Nepal Border Road. It was submitted that after completion of the acquisition proceedings and utilisation of the land for the public purpose, the respondents could not have reopened the nature of the land on the basis of a subsequent committee report and sought recovery of the alleged excess compensation by treating the land as agricultural. It is, therefore, submitted that the subsequent recovery proceedings are without jurisdiction and the Single Judge erred in declining to interfere with the same. 

The counsel for the respondents had submitted that the compensation paid to the appellant was found to have been determined on the basis of an incorrect classification of the acquired land as residential, whereas upon subsequent enquiry the land was found to be agricultural in nature. It is submitted that the respondents, upon coming to know of the discrepancy, were justified in verifying the nature of the land and taking steps for recovery of the excess amount paid to the appellant. The impugned action, therefore, calls for no interference.

In Madan Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), judgement by Justice Harish Kumar had concluded:"the issue raised in the present batch of writ petitions have already been duly answered in the case of Girish Kedia (supra), all these writ petitions stand dismissed in similar terms."

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Dr. Anshuman set aside judgment of conviction by Special Judge (POCSO Act), Aurangabad, acquits accused in case of kidnapping and alleged rape in 2015 due to inconsistencies in victim's evidence, lack of corroborative medical evidence, fabricated allegations

In Deepak Kumar @ Sunny vs. State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 23-page long judgement dated March 18, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "26. On careful appreciation of evidence, we can categorize the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution into three categories:(i) victim being the eye-witness of the incident, (ii) PW-2 to PW-5 as family members of the victim hearsay witnesses and, (iii) PW-7 to PW-9 expert witnesses.  27. Evidence of the hearsay witnesses is of little or no significance, as they did not even see the appellants forcibly taking away the victim on the night of 15.05.2015. The victim's evidence is not wholly reliable; rather, it is mostly unreliable, because there is no explanation as to why the victim remained silent regarding the alleged commission of rape by the appellants in the course of her statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC. Thus, the Court is at liberty to hold that the story of rape was subsequently manufactured by the victim. It is needles to say that when there are two views which the Court can arrive at upon assessment of evidence, the view that supports the innocence of the accused shall be accepted. 28. Thirdly, the expert opinion does not suggest any recent commission of rape within three days prior to the medical examination of the victim. On the contrary, the medical report indicates that the victim had prior sexual experience. 29. In view of above finding, we are of the firm opinion that the evidence on record is not sufficient to support the order of conviction and sentence of the appellants. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. Consequently, the appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them and are set at liberty. They are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds. If they are in custody, they shall be released forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with any other case." The case was filed in the High Court on August 1, 2018 and registered on August 8, 2018. It was heard along with Yogendra Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar.It was heard by eight different judges during September 2018-February 2026. The arguments were concluded and judgement was reserved on February 25, 2026. 

Prior to the verdict, a Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Jitendra Kumar has passed a 6-page long order dated July 23, 2024, wherein, it had concluded:10. Considering the nature of allegation against the appellants, we are not inclined to suspend their sentence during the pendency of the appeal, notwithstanding the  fact that two other co-accused persons/coconvicts have been released on bail by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. We say so for the reason that the victim has not named those co-convicts in her deposition before the Trial Court and thus, their cases are different from the appellants. 11. The prayer for suspension of sentence of the appellants is rejected. 12. However, looking at the mandate of Section 374 (4) of the Cr.P.C., we deem it appropriate to direct the Registry for preparing the paper book of this case and getting this case listed for final hearing within first five case in the second week of November, 2024, commencing from 11th of November, 2024." Subsequently, Justices Ashutosh Kumar became the Chief Justice of Guwahati High Court. Therefore, Division Bench of Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman heard and adjudicated the matter.    

Both the criminal appeals filed by the convicts had challenged the judgment of conviction dated May 3, 2018 and order of sentence dated May 10, 2018 passed by the  Special Judge (POCSO Act), Aurangabad in GR Case No. 864 of 2015/46 of 2015 arising out of Amba P.S. Case No. 40 of 2015.

The appellants had challenged their conviction under Section 366A of the IPC where they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years with fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default of payment of fine further imprisonment for three months and under Section 376D of the IPC sentencing the appellants to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 50,000/- as well as section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) awarded thereunder. The trial court directed that the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. The principle grounds urged assailing the impugned judgment are misappreciation of evidence by the learned trial court, undue reliance on interested family witnesses, material contradictions between the victim's statement under Section 164 of the CrPC and her deposition in Court, absence of independent corroboration, lack of medical support for forcible gang rape and the Investigating Officer's finding that the case was unfounded against appellant Yogendra Singh.

Amba P.S. Case No. 40 of 2015 was registered on May 16, 2015 on the basis of a complaint lodged by the father of the victim, (hereinafter called as the 'informant'), alleging inter alia that in the night of 15/16 May 2015 at about 12:00 at midnight her minor girl (name of the victim girl is not disclosed and she is described as victim), then aged about 15/16 years, was kidnapped from her house situated at Village Balia within P.S. Amba in the District of Aurangabad. It was alleged by the informant that the covillagers, namely, Yogendra Singh, Deepak Kumar Singh @ Sunny, Rahul Kumar, Pradeep Singh and Sonal Kumar kidnapped her for the purpose of illicit intercourse or to marry her illegally. The trial court's record shows that the victim was rescued on May 18, 2015 near the Haat (market) situated by the side of a Shiva Temple in the same village in early morning. Her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC was recorded on May 20, 2015. The victim was medically examined on May 19, 2015 by a Medical Board. The accused persons were arrested. The I.O. examined available witnesses and recorded their statement under Section 161 of the CrPC and on conclusion of investigation, the I.O. submitted charge sheet against Deepak Kumar Singh and Rahul Kumar Singh while final report was submitted against the accused Yogendra Singh, Pradeep Singh and Sonal Kumar. On the basis of the said charge sheet, cognizance was taken against the charge-sheeted accused persons on January 5, 2016. Since the offence punishable under Section 366A/376D of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act are exclusively triable by the learned Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the learned Special Court under the POCSO Act for trial and disposal.

The following case laws were referred:

    Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra 1990 (1) SCC 550

    Ganesan v. State (2020) 10 SCC 573

    Krishna Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130

    Naresh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 7 SCC 171

    Nirmal Premkumar v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police 2024 INSC 193

    Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21

    Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2020) 3 SCC 443

    State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [(1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210 : AIR 1990 SC 658]

    Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614

    Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191

       Evidence in Trial Court

    7. The victim girl was examined during trial as PW-1. She deposed in her evidence that on 15.05.2015 at night she was sleeping on the roof of their house with her mother and other family members. She woke up hearing some sounds coming from the ground floor. She thought that her grandfather was asking for water. She came down and found that someone was knocking at the entrance door of their house. She opened the door immediately, appellant Deepak Kumar Singh, Rahul Kumar and Sonal Kumar gagged and blind-folded her. She was forcibly taken in a four-wheeler to some distance and confined her to a dark room. PW-1 further deposed that the appellants repeatedly raped her one by one for three days. On 17.05.2015, Yogendra Singh and 2/4 other persons visited the said house where she was confined and the appellants discussed about either releasing her or committing her murder. The appellants also threatened her that she and her family members would be killed if she discloses the incident. One Pradeep Singh also threatened her. On the next day in the early morning she was again blind-folded and dropped at a place. The victim could understand that she was dropped in front of a Haat situated by the side of a Shiva Temple of their village. Then after 2/3 minutes of her release, police arrived at the spot and rescued her and took her to the local police station.

    8. During investigation of the case, she made statement under Section 164 of the CrPC. In her statement she identified all the accused persons and narrated the incident which had alleged been committed upon her by the appellants. In her crossexamination she denied that she was having any romantic relationship with any of the appellants or that she tried to implicate the appellants falsely. It is important to note at this stage that the deposition of PW-1 appears to be consistent with the evidence of other witnesses in relation to the charge of kidnapping, but lacks precision regarding the place where she was allegedly confined. It is important to note that the deposition of PW-1 is materially inconsistent with her previous statement under Section 164 of the CrPC which described only a story of kidnapping by three persons without any mention of rape by the appellants or giving threats to her. This omission goes to the root of the offence under Section 376D of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

    9. PW-2, is the mother of the victim. It is ascertained from her deposition that on 15.05.2015, she woke up from her sleep at about 02:00 am at night and found her daughter (victim herein) who was sleeping by her side missing. She also discovered that the main gate of the house was open. On her call, other family members of the house woke up and they conducted search for the victim in the village. It is also found from her deposition that she was previously threatened by appellants, namely, Deepak Kumar Singh, Rahul and Sonal not to make a fuss or the girl would be killed. On the following morning also, the family members of the victim vigorously searched to find out the girl. During such time, Yogendra Singh and Pradeep Singh threatened the husband of PW-2. thereafter, he lodged FIR in the local police station. The victim was recovered on 18.05.2015 in the morning. She narrated the entire incident to her parents and other family members. PW-2 came to know from her that she was taken to a dark room by a car and the appellants committed rape upon her. However, the medical officer did not find any external or internal injury on the person of the victim.

    10. PW-3, Baban Singh is the grandfather of the victim. In his deposition he stated on oath that he woke up from sleep at about 2:30 am on 15.05.2015 to learn that the victim was missing with the main gate of their house open. He also took part in conducting search in their village for the victim girl and received threats from Yogendra and Pradeep not to make a fuss or the victim would be killed. The evidence of all the witnesses on the prosecution is consistent about her recovery on 18.05.2015. The witness also stated that the victim was sexually assaulted by the appellants but the medical officer did not find any injury. PW-4 is the father of the victim on the basis of whose fard beyan, Amba P.S. Case No. 40 of 2015 was registered on 16.05.2015. It appears from the statement made in the FIR that in the dead hours of night of 15.05.2015, he woke up hearing the call of his wife and came to know that the victim was missing and entrance door of his house was open. He and other family members conducted search of the victim in the village and heard a rumour that the victim might be kidnapped by Rahul, Deepak @ Sunny and Sonal. He further deposed that he asked about the matter to Yogendra Singh, father of Depak but Yogendra Singh and one Pradeep threatened him seeing that his daughter would be killed. On the 18.05.2015 victim was recovered, then only he came to know that the appellants confined her in a room and committed rape on her for three days. It is pertinent to note that the informant did not state anything about receiving threats from Yogendra Singh and Pradeep in her FIR. No such statement was also made by him before the police.

    11. The evidence of PW-5, Amit Kumar is the same as that of the evidence of other witnesses.

    12. From the evidence of PW-6, S.I. Surrendra Prasad, conducted investigation of the case. It appears that after registration of Amba P.S. Case No. 40 of 2015 on 16.05.2015, he conducted raid to recover the victim girl and on 18.05.2015, she was recovered from a place in her village near the Haat in front of a Shiva Temple. The victim had no injury mark in person. Her medical examination was conducted on 19th May 2015 and statement of the victim under Section 164 of the CrPC was recorded on 20.05.2015.

    13. It is already recorded that in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC the victim did not state anything about the commission of rape by the appellants and that Yogendra Singh and Pradeep Singh visited the room where she was confined and talked to the appellants either about her release or committing her murder. In her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, the victim stated her age as 17 years.

    14. PW-7, Dr. Vikas Kumar Singh, PW-8, Dr. Bibhuti Prasana and PW-9, Dr. Rina Kumari where posted at Sadar Hospital Aurangabad. They constituted a Medical Board to examine the victim medically. From the evidence of PW-9, Dr. Rina Kumari, it appears that she examined the victim on 19.05.2015 at about 01:10 pm. She did not find any marks of violence on the body, back, breast, thigh or in and around the private part of the victim. She also found ruptured hymen and vagina admitting one finger easily. There was no abnormal discharge, bleeding, injury on her vulva, vagina, perineum, etc. The patient did not make any complaint of tenderness or bruising. The Medical Board opined that she had undergone sexual act. From the Radiological as well as Dental Report, PW-7 and PW-8 opined that the approximate age of the victim is between 15 and 16 years.

    15. The FIR and relevant medical records were duly exhibited during trial. Defence case as disclosed from the crossexamination of the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution and examination of the accused persons under Section 313 of the CrPC appears to be complete denial of the allegation made out against them. The defence also examined two witnesses, One Ramashish Mahto was explained as DW-1. He is the resident of the same village. He deposed that as per his knowledge goes, no incident took place with the daughter of the informant on the night of 15.05.2015 and the appellants were falsely implicated in this case.

    16. PW-2, Sanyog Kumar Singh is the son-in-law of Pradeep Singh. It is ascertained from his evidence that he was present in Balia from 07.05.2015 to 18.05.2015. He denied that the victim was kidnapped by the appellants. According to him, the victim remained at home throughout and the entire prosecution's case is false.

    Decision by the Trial Court.

    17. This Court at the very beginning of the judgment has recorded that the trial court on appreciation of the evidence on record convicted the accused persons/appellants and sentenced them of various descriptions for the offence punishable under Section 366A of the IPC and Section 376D of the IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

   Findings of the Division  Bench of the Hgh Court

    18. It is found from the evidence of PW-2 to PW-5 that their evidence is absolutely hearsay in nature. Except the victim, none of the above-mentioned witnesses are the eye-witness of the occurrence. They did not see the appellants knocking at door of the informant at dead hours of night on 15.05.2015. They did not see the victim girl opening the door or that three miscreants, namely, Rahul Kumar, Deepak Kumar Singh @ Sunny and Sonal gagged and blind-folded her and forcibly took her by a car and confined her in a dark room. They heard the incident from the victim girl after she was recovered on 18.05.2015 by the police.

    19. It is needless to say that in plethora of cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in a case of sexual assault, the evidence of the victim is of utmost importance. The victim's evidence cannot be equated with the evidence of accomplice. She is a victim of crime. A victim does not generally make a false statement regarding commission of an offence at the cost of her virginity and womanhood. In Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1990(1) SCC 550, the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized the position of law regarding appreciation of evidence of a prosecutrix in the following words:-

        "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted. The degree of proof required must not be higher than is expected of an injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in the following passage:

        "It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the court finds that the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that other corroboration may not be necessary."

        With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation."

    20. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged by the father of the victim when she was missing. Therefore, he did not know whether the victim had been ravished or not. According to the prosecution's case and the statements of the witnesses, the family members of the victim came to know about the commission of sexual assault by the appellants only after she was recovered. It is already recorded that she was recovered on 18.05.2015. Her medical examination was done on 19.05.2015 and the victim made her first statement recorded judicially under Section 164 of the CrPC on 20.05.2015. Surprisingly enough, she did not make any allegation of the commission of rape by the appellants before the learned Magistrate. Except for the allegation of kidnapping, she did not utter a single word. This is where serious abnormalities lie between the prosecution's case, the initial statement of the victim under Section 164 of the CrPC, and her subsequent evidence on oath.

    21. The victim herself stated that she was about 17 years old at the relevant point of time. The Medical Board, by way of an ossification test and dental examination, found her approximate age to be between 15 and 16 years. From the report of PW-9, Dr. Rina Kumari, we find that the victim was welloriented, therefore, when a girl aged about 15-17 years was kidnapped and she was raped repeatedly by three appellants for three days, it is natural and probable that she would at least resist the perpetrators of offence from committing such heinous act. In her evidence, she stated the appellants committed rape upon her against her will forcibly, if there is a forcible physical relationship upon a girl by three persons for three days, there must be some injury marks on different parts of her body. But the medical officer (PW-9) did not find any mark of violence on her body. On the other hand, she found old rupture of hymen and the vagina easily admitting one finger meaning thereby the victim had previous experience of sexual intercourse.

    22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 SC 614, laid down "three categories" for appreciating the testimony of a single witness. When the evidence of witness in Court is inconsistent with her earlier statement under Section 164, witness false into the third category of neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In such cases, the Court must exercise caution and cannot convict an accused on that testimony alone. It must look for corroboration in material particulars from independent sources. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision categorized the witnesses into three categories. They are as (i) wholly reliable witness, (ii) wholly unreliable witness and, (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The Court can base its conviction on the basis of evidence of a single wholly reliable witness. No conviction is based on wholly unreliable witness. In case of neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable witness, Court must exercise caution and cannot convict on that testimony alone.

    23. The law on the point of appreciation of evidence of a particular witness has developed in course of time. In Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the term "sterling witness". The Hon'ble Apex Court further describes the nature and quality of sterling witness in the case of Rai Sandeep (supra) in paragraph no. 22 and held as under:-

        "22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged."

    24. In Ganesan v. State reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573, the issue which came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court is as to whether in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction on sole evidence of the prosecutrix. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the following paragraphs of Vijay v. State of M.P., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 191 :-

        "5. Shri. Anip Sachthey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the prosecutrix was a major and it was a case of consent. He has further submitted that conviction cannot be based on the sole deposition of the prosecutrix. There is no other evidence to corroborate her version. The prosecutrix's statement suffers from material discrepancies. On the date of examination of the prosecutrix no physical injury was found on her person or on her private parts. The prosecutrix had given the most improbable and unacceptable version of events that the appellant continued to rape her for about two hours. Then one another accused raped her for about an hour. Also, in spite of the fact that the appellant and others had been arrested on the next date of the incident, the investigating officer did not conduct the test identification parade. The prosecutrix was examined on the next day i.e. on 7-12-1988 by Dr. Rupa Lalwani, Medical Officer (PW 3), and the said medical officer referred her for a radiological test to determine her age, but the report of the said test has never been brought on record. Thus, an adverse inference is to be drawn against the prosecution. The appeal deserves to be allowed. The appellant had falsely been enroped in the crime.

        6. On the other hand, Shri. Siddhartha Dave along with Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing for the State of M.P., vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the incident. The non-production of the report of the radiological test and not holding the test identification parade would not discredit the investigation or the prosecution case. The non-existence of any injury on the person of the prosecutrix cannot be a ground to disbelieve her version. The prosecutrix had such a social background that she did not have any sense of time, duration, etc. and, thus, she was not able to give a precise account of each activity of the incident. She had lost her father; and was an uneducated, rustic villager, who came from a very poor family. The discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses or the prosecutrix are such that the same are not sufficient to demolish the prosecution's case. In a rape case, an accused can be convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

        7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

        8. Before we proceed to examine the impugned judgments of the courts below and the facts of the case, it may be desirable to refer to the settled legal principles which have to be applied in the instant case.

        9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain [(1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210 : AIR 1990 SC 658] this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under : (SCC p. 559, para 16)

        "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."

    25. Thus, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court not only in Ganeshan (supra) but also in Krishna Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana reported in (2011) 7 SCC 130 that to hold an accused guilty for commission of offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and of sterling quality. The said principle has subsequently being followed in Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, Naresh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 7 SCC 171 and Nirmal Premkumar v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police reported in 2024 INSC 193.

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna who is an amicus curiae in the special laws/courts matter observed: "The conviction was reversed due to material contradictions between the victim's Section 164 statement and deposition, alongside a lack of medical evidence and independent corroboration."

Amount determined for land acquisition compensation without any document is arbitrary, trial court judgment, decree set aside: Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey, Patna High Court

Patna High Court delivered 12 judgements on October 14, 2025 in Sri Gudar Sao vs. The State of Bihar, Garbhu Rai vs. Harihar Rai, Kumari Neelam Devi vs. Sri Satish Kumar, Sunila Devi vs. Pankaj Kumar, Alok Kumar vs. Smt. Anupama Singh, Phool Kant Mishra vs. The State Of Bihar, The Bihar Staff Selection Commission vs. Santosh Kumar Tiwari, Surendra Jha vs. The State Of Bihar & Ors., SIFY Digital Services Limited vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Baraa Fawzi Haameed AL Bayati vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar and Manoj Kumar vs. Krishna Mohan Kumar.

 

In Sri Gudar Sao vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 26-page long judgement dated October 14, 2025, wherein, he concluded: ''I am of the view that the learned trial court has arbitrarily decided the compensation and his conclusion was not based on the materials available on the record. The amount which he has determined for compensation was based merely on assumption without any document. 35. As such, considering above facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree of the learned trial court is set aside and in result, these appeals are allowed. 36. Office is directed to prepare the decree/award. 37. Let the records of the learned trial court with a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial court.'' Hetu Kishun, son of late Sri Gudar Sao pursued the case which commenced in 1994 in the High Court. 

   

All the three appeals were preferred against the judgment and decree dated October 14, 1993 passed in a Land Acquisition cases of 1990 passed by Sub-Judge 3rd, Patna whereunder the trial court awarded insufficient compensation with respect to the lands and houses which were acquired in these cases. The Land Acquisition Officer, Patna made a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act regarding adjudication for the adequacy of the compensation for the lands and houses acquired. There having common question of law and facts of 14 cases including these cases were taken together by the trial court. The facts leading to these cases are that about 01 Acre 15 Dismil of land along with houses standing over the same belonging to these awardees within the village- Mosimpur Kurtha P.S.- Fatwah, District- Patna acquired by the State of Bihar for the purpose of construction of approach road to Punpun bridge by a Gazette notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on August 16, 1980. Date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act for the same was on July 1, 1982 and the award of the lands and houses were made by the Collector on September 23, 1989 and the possession of the lands and the houses were taken on May 18, 1987 by the Collector. The compensation money for the bhith lands and homestead land acquired was paid to the awardees at the rate of Rs.96,000/- per acre i.e. Rs.3,000/- only per kattha. The Collector also paid the price of the houses to the awardees varying from Rs.3,690/- to Rs.2,31,750/-. The Collector also paid 30% solatium and interest on the amount of compensation to the awardees. The awardees received compensation money so awarded under protest to the effect that the compensation money awarded by the State of Bihar either for the lands or for the houses standing over the same was inadequate. Therefore, the Collector referred these cases to the court for adjudication of the adequacy of the quantum of the compensation.

 

According to the State of Bihar, compensation was already paid for the lands and houses standing thereon was proper and adequate. On the other hand, the awardees approached the court with their respective cases that the lands of the awardees lies within the notified area of Fatwah at the corner of the main road of Patna-Ranchi national Highway. It was also the case of the awardees that Land Acquisition Officer relied upon the sale deed which do not represent true and real market value of the lands under acquisition and left out the true and genuine sale deed of the locality representing higher price. They claimed the price of the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per kattha. They also made out their case that the Executive Engineer of the State failed to take into account the correct aspect of engineering in respect of making assessment of the value of the buildings of the awardees. He should have taken into account while determining the compensation of the buildings as to what would be real cost in erecting a building similar to existing building of the awardees at the time of notification. According to their cases, inadequate price of their buildings has been fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer on the basis of unscientific report of Executive Engineer. However, the awardees claimed the price of their respective houses varying from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.12,95,475/-. They also claimed compensation for damages done for their business premises. 

The counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that the Special Land Acquisition Judge-III committed error of law as also on the facts in deciding the claim of the appellants. The trial court did not appreciate correctly the pleadings of the parties, made wrong and illegal approach to the cases. It was submitted that the total houses of these awardees constructed over 0.045 acres have been acquired by the State of Bihar and paid Rs.2,10,257 and 25 paisa only which was received by the appellants/defendants under protest and they have claimed the rate of land at Rs.50,000/-per kattha and Rs.8,11,414 for the houses. Rs.28,000/- annual for the loss of business and Rs.90,000/- for loss of furniture and goods. It was also submitted that the awardees examined altogether 16 witnesses and they adduced documentary evidence, State of Bihar did not give any written submission nor did it examine any witness except OW-1, Mathura Pandey who only proved rate report over khatiyaan, sale statement, possession certificate. The trial court has not appreciated the evidence adduced by the appellants/defendants. It was submitted that the trial court has held in its judgment that “the aforesaid document in support of the price of the land determined by the State of Bihar have no evidentiary value and as such the aforesaid documents cannot be relied upon and in these circumstances the price of lands determined by the State of Bihar on the basis of sale figure mentioned in column 8 of the sale statement cannot be relied and adopted.”

 

The counsel for the appellants relied on decisions in i) (2010) 13 SCC 710, ii) (2012) 5 SCC 432 and iii) (2025) SCC Online SC 1519.

 

The Respondents/plaintiffs relied on certain citations, such as AIR 1977 SC 580, AIR 1977 SC 560, AIR 2010 SC 170, AIR 2004 SC 4532 :: 2004 AIR SCW 4255 and AIR 2004 SC 288 :: 2003 AIR SCW 6117.
 

The trial court grappled with the following two issues: 

First issue :- The first issue was whether the compensation money awarded by the State of Bihar in respect of land was proper and adequate or it requires to be changes.

Second issue :- Second was whether the amount of compensation paid by the Collector in respect of the house of the awardees was proper and adequate and according to size, age and construction of the building under the acquisition. 

 

The trial court disbelieved the basis on which the compensation has been determined by the Collector. As the price of the land acquired has been determined solely on the basis of only one sale deed mentioned in column-8 of the sale statement as against average rate of all the sale deeds.

The counsel for the appellants/defendants argued that from perusal of the impugned judgment it emerges that the trial court relied on the decision of Supreme Court reported in AIR (1979) 472 in which it was held that ‘mere sale statement is not admissible in law’. Admittedly, the author of sale rate namely, Land Acquisition Officer was not examined in this case. The trial court did not rely upon the documents which were adduced by the respondents and categorically held that sale figures mentioned in Column-8 of the sale statement cannot be relied rather the trial court has relied on the sale deeds. The lands under the aforesaid sale deeds was situated in the vicinity of the acquired lands which fact was evident from survey map. The trial court also held that ‘it does not stand to my reason as to why this sale deed has not been taken into consideration by the Land Acquisition Officer. It was simply rejected on the ground that it was executed on competitive basis although there is no such evidence on the record, so the aforesaid sale deed has to be considered in this case.”

 

The counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that recently in Manohar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, the Supreme Court held in Paragraphs 31, 38, 39 and 40, which reads:-
31. In the case of Anjani Molu Dessai (supra) this Court, while referring to two previous
decisions of this Court, held thus: 
"20. The legal position is that even where there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars, which is a bona fide transaction, will be considered. Where however there are several sales of similar lands whose prices range in a narrow bandwidth, the average thereof can be taken, as representing the market price. But where the values disclosed in respect of two sales are markedly different, it can only lead to an inference that they are with reference to dissimilar lands or that the lower value sale is on account of undervaluation or other price depressing reasons. Consequently, averaging  annot be resorted to. We may refer to two decisions of this Court in this behalf.

 

In M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur v. Collector, [(1 969) 1 Mad LJ 45 (SC)], a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the proper method for evaluation of market value is by taking the highest of the
exemplars and not by averaging of different types of sale transactions. 

 

The High Court relied on decision in State of Punjab vs. Hans Raj, [(1994) 5 SCC 734], wherein it was held: "4. Having given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed a grave error in working out average price paid under the sale transactions to determine the market value of the acquired land on that basis. As the method of averaging the prices fetched by sales of different lands of different kinds at different times, for fixing the market value of the acquired land, if followed, could bring about a figure of price which may not at all be regarded as the price to be fetched by sale of acquired land. One should not have, ordinarily recourse to such method. It is well settled that genuine and bona fide sale transactions in respect of the land under acquisition or in its absence the bona fide sale transactions proximate to the point of acquisition of the lands situated in the neighbourhood of the acquired lands possessing similar value or utility taken place between a willing vendee and the willing vendor which could be expected to reflect the true value, as agreed between reasonable prudent persons acting in the normal market conditions are the real basis to determine the market value.”

Now that the High Court has decided that trial court had arbitrarily decided the compensation without any document based on assumption, the judgment and decree of the trial court has been set aside and the office has been directed to prepare the decree/award, the same will have to be prepared with reference to the provisions under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. which is operational from January 1, 2014. 

 

Given the fact that the judgment and decree dated October 14, 1993 by the trial court in a 1990 case wherein the trial court had awarded insufficient compensation with respect to the lands and houses which were acquired, has been set aside by the High Court, it cannot be said that land acquisition proceedings were already been concluded. As a consequence, the appellants become entitled to benefits of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act  

  

Section 24 reads:''Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.'' 

  

The CAG's audit report of the Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar states that "The LA Act, 1894 and the Act, 2013, provides that in case the compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount with interest at the prescribed rates from the time of taking possession till it has been so paid or deposited. The Departmental circular of February 2009 provides that the land acquisition process can only be started after receipt of full cost of compensation from requiring body." 

 

Notably, the benefits of the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement provided in the Act have been extended in cases of land acquisition made under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule, namely,. 

1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958
2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 
3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 
4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 
5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885

6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978
7. The National Highways Act, 1956
8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962
9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
10. The Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948
11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957
12. The Electricity Act, 2003
13. The Railways Act, 1989

 

 

 

Patna High Court's Division Bench upholds judgement by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a case against Maintenance Tribunal order

In Shailesh Kumar @ Azad & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary Co-operative Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha delivered a 17-page long judgement dated October 9, 2025, wherein, it upheld the 23-page long judgment by Justice Sandeep Kumar, the Single Judge of the High Court. It found that there there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings of the Maintenance Tribunal order dated March 14, 2020, the Collector-cum-District Magistrate in Senior Citizen Appeal order dated June 10, 2022, and the judgment dated January 29, 2024 by Single Judge. It dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgement of the Single Judge. 

The Division Bench affirmed the judgment by the Single Judge in Shailesh Kumar @ Azad & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Co-operative, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2022). The judgement of the Division Bench was authored by Justice Alok Kumar Sinha.  

The writ petition was filed for quashing of the order dated June 10, 2022 passed in a Senior Citizen (Misc.) Appeal by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna whereby the Collector had set aside the order of Chairman cum Sub Divisional Officer, Patna Sadar, Patna. The petitioner had prayed for issuance of direction in the nature of mandamus upon the respondents authority to not disturb the family of the petitioners as the petitioners are living along with their family members. The counsel for the appellants, submitted that the very initiation of proceedings under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the appellants are not “children” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act, but nephews of the complainant senior citizen. 

The counsel urged that the property in dispute constitutes a joint family property, and issues of ownership, partition, and entitlement are already sub judice before the competent Civil Court. Despite this, the Maintenance Tribunal, in a summary proceeding under Section 23, assumed to decide complex questions of title and possession, which lie outside its limited statutory domain. The appellants defence and supporting documents, including the written reply, the registered family settlement deed, and the revenue receipts establishing possession, were disregarded, and the appellants were erroneously treated as mere licensees or permissive occupiers. It was also submitted that the interlocutory applications filed during pendency demonstrated the continuing prejudice suffered by the appellants due to the impugned orders. It was further contended that eviction or dispossession under Section 23 cannot be ordered mechanically, and the Tribunal is bound to act fairly and in consonance with statutory limitations. On these premises, it was urged that the orders of the Tribunal, affirmed by the Single Judge, were vitiated by jurisdictional error, disregard of material evidence, and misapplication of the Act, and therefore warrant interference in this LPA appeal. 

The counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal were fully within jurisdiction and in strict consonance with the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. It was argued that the appellants are in permissive occupation of the property, without any vestige of independent title, and cannot resist the lawful claim of the senior citizen. The Tribunal, by its order dated July 20, 2022, after due notice and hearing, recorded categorical findings that the senior citizen was entitled to recover possession and rent. It was also submitted that the so-called family settlement deed and revenue receipts carry no legal sanctity and were rightly disregarded. The subsequent affidavit and revenue entries, even if considered, did not confer any title, as eligibility and rights must be determined on the basis of settled ownership, not unilateral claims.

The Division Bench framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the learned Single Judge, in affirming the order of the Maintenance Tribunal dated March 14, 2020 and the Collector-cum-District Magistrate dated 10.06.2022, erred in law on the ground of alleged  violation of the principles of natural justice?
2. Whether the Maintenance Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, acted within the statutory limits in directing eviction of the appellants from the property in question?
3. Whether the appellants’ asserted independent rights based on family arrangement, partition claims and revenue records can be adjudicated within the summary jurisdiction under “the 2007 Act” ?
4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the beneficial object and mandate of “the 2007 Act” require sustaining the Tribunal’s order as affirmed by the learned Single Judge?

As to issue no. 1, the Division Bench found that the appellants had urged that the proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal were conducted in breach of the principles of natural justice. It was contended that the Tribunal did not grant them sufficient opportunity to place their defence, that their written submissions and supporting documents such as revenue receipts and family arrangement were brushed aside, and that the Tribunal’s order dated March 14, 2020 proceeded in undue haste. It was further argued that the Single Judge, while dismissing CWJC No. 10426 of 2022 on January 29, 2024, failed to appreciate such infirmities. On the other hand, the record reveals that notices were duly served upon the appellants; they entered appearance, participated in the proceedings, and filed written replies together with annexures in support of their stand. The Maintenance Tribunal considered those submissions before passing a reasoned order of eviction on March 14, 2020. The Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna, upon hearing both sides, affirmed the same by order dated June 10, 2022 in Senior Citizen Appeal No. 01/2020–21. Thereafter, the Single Judge, by judgment dated January 29, 2024, independently examined the matter and dismissed the writ petition. 

Justice Sinha observed: "It is well settled that the essence of natural justice is fairness in action, not a ritualistic adherence to technicalities." He recollected that the Supreme Court in Union of India v. W.N. Chadha, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 260, observed that “the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula; their applicability depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and once a fair opportunity is afforded, the complaint of violation cannot be entertained.”

Justice Sinha also drew on Supreme Court's decision in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Dy. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 8 SCC 519, the Court reiterated that natural justice is not an “unruly horse” but a
principle to ensure that no one is condemned unheard, and that what is required is “substantial fairness of procedure.” Where participation has been afforded and considered, the plea of denial fails.

The High Court's Division Bench applied the above principles to the present case. Its judgement reads:''it is evident that the appellants were heard at every stage. Their plea of denial of opportunity is belied by their own participation and submission of documents before both the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority. The learned Single Judge rightly recorded that the appellants sought to expand the limited scope of jurisdiction under “the 2007 Act" into a forum for deciding title and partition disputes, which is impermissible. Accordingly, we hold that no violation of principles of natural justice is made out.''

With regard to issue no. 2, the Division Bench observed that the order of the Maintenance Tribunal dated May 5, 2023, directing eviction of the appellants from the scheduled premises, was affirmed by the Appellate Authority on 10.06.2022 and by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated November 21, 2023. The appellants contend that the Tribunal travelled beyond the statutory limits of Section 23 of “the 2007 Act" by venturing into questions of ownership, partition, and title, which are matters pending adjudication before the competent Civil Court. It was urged that Section 23 only permits the Tribunal to annul transfers made subject to a condition of maintenance, and does not extend to ordering eviction or dispossession.

The counsel appearing for the respondent senior citizen submitted that “the 2007 Act" is a beneficial legislation and the Tribunal, being a statutory forum, is empowered to pass all consequential directions necessary to secure the residence, dignity, and peaceful possession of senior citizens. It was contended that the appellants, being nephews and not “children” within the meaning of Section 4, lack locus to resist the
proceedings. Their claim of joint ownership, if any, is a matter for the civil court, but cannot dilute the protective jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Reliance was placed on the Collector-cum-District Magistrate’s order dated 10.06.2022 affirming the Tribunal, and the Single Judge’s judgment dated November 21, 2023, upholding the same.

Justice Sinha observed: "we are unable to accept the appellants plea of jurisdictional excess. Section 23(1) of “the 2007 Act" provides that where a senior citizen transfers property subject to the condition of maintenance, such transfer shall be deemed void if the transferee fails to provide the same. The Supreme Court in Samtola Devi vs State of Uttar Pradesh SLP No. 26651 of 2023, para 31and para 32 states that “31. The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction of persons from any premises owned or belonging to such a senior person. It is only on account of the observations made by this Court in S. Vanitha vs.Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens. The Tribunal thus had acquired jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act which otherwise provide for treating the sale of the property to be void if it is against the interest of the senior citizen. 
32.The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court in Urmila Dixit (supra). However, even in the aforesaid case the court has only held that in a given case, the Tribunal ‘‘may order’’ eviction but it is not necessary and mandatory to pass an order of eviction in every case. The Appellate Tribunal has not recorded any reason necessitating the eviction of Krishna Kumar or that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is expedient to order eviction so as to ensure the protection of the senior citizen.”

The Division Bench of the High Court relied on judgements of the Supreme Court. In its Judgment dated January 2, 2025 passed in Urmila Dixit Case-Civil Appeal No.10927 of 2024, the Supreme Court held that Tribunals under “the 2007 Act" are competent to direct eviction as an incident of enforcing statutory protection. In the recent case of Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional Collector & Ors., the Supreme Court has reiterated that the Tribunal may direct for eviction where such relief is essential to give under “the 2007 Act".

The High Court's Division Bench observed: "In the present case, the Tribunal did not purport to adjudicate title, partition, or ownership, which remain pending before the civil court. Its direction of eviction was a necessary measure to restore possession and ensure the senior citizen’s right to live with dignity and security. The learned Single Judge, in affirming the Tribunal’s order, therefore, committed no error in appreciating the limited but effective jurisdiction conferred by Section 23. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Tribunal acted within its statutory mandate, and its order of eviction, having been affirmed by both the Appellate Authority and the learned Single Judge, does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference."

With regard to issue no. 3, the High Court's Division Bench examined whether the appellants’ asserted  independent rights based on family arrangement and revenue records can be adjudicated within the Tribunal’s limited, summary jurisdiction under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007?  The appellants contended that their rights in the scheduled property flow from the family settlement deed and supporting revenue receipts, dated 19.12.2022. It was urged that these materials demonstrate an independent claim of ownership and that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge erred in treating the appellants as mere permissive occupants. According to the appellants, their claim required adjudication in the proceedings under Section 23 of “the 2007 Act".

The respondents' counsel argued that proceedings under “the 2007 Act" are summary in nature and do not extend to adjudicating intricate questions of title, partition, or ownership. The appellants, being nephews and not “children” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act, had no locus to resist proceedings before the Tribunal on the basis of alleged independent title. It was submitted that the proper forum for asserting such rights is the competent Civil Court, not the Maintenance Tribunal, whose jurisdiction is confined to ensuring protection of senior citizens’ property and residence.

Justice Sinha observed:"we find merit in the respondents’ submission. Section 23 of “the 2007 Act" is designed to safeguard senior citizens against neglect and to protect their possession and property where transfers are made subject to a condition of maintenance. The jurisdiction is protective, summary, and limited, and does not extend to resolving competing civil claims of title or partition. In the present case, the Tribunal correctly declined to adjudicate the appellants’ claim of rights under the alleged family arrangement and revenue entries, holding such matters to be beyond its scope. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated January 29, 2024, also observed that the appellants were attempting to expand the summary proceedings under “the 2007 Act" into a substitute for civil litigation, which is impermissible. We accordingly hold that the appellants’ asserted independent rights, even if supported by documents such as family settlement or revenue receipts, are matters for adjudication by the civil court, and cannot be determined in proceedings under “the 2007 Act". The Tribunal and the learned Single Judge were correct in confining themselves to the statutory jurisdiction and in refusing to entertain these collateral claims."

As to issue no. 4, the High Court's Division Bench examined whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the beneficial object and mandate of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 require sustaining the Tribunal’s order as affirmed by the Single Judge.  The appellants urged that the Tribunal, by order dated March 14, 2020, travelled beyond the scope of Section 23 of the 2007 Act by directing their eviction from the scheduled property. It was argued that the Act is primarily intended to secure monetary maintenance and not to divest possession of property, and that the Single Judge, by judgment dated January 29, 2024, erred in treating the Act as a basis for dispossession. 

The counsel for the respondents submitted that “the 2007 Act" is a welfare legislation enacted with the avowed object of protecting senior citizens from neglect, harassment, and deprivation of their property. It was contended that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction must be construed purposively, so as to secure the right of senior citizens to reside peacefully and with dignity, and that eviction of unauthorized occupants is a necessary incident of that protection. Reliance was placed upon S. Vanitha vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730, Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2022) 1 SCC 705, as well as recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court dated January 2, 2025 in Urmila Dixit Case (Supra) and dated September 12, 2025 in Kamalakant Mishra Case.

Justice Sinha observed:''we find that the object of “the 2007 Act" is to ensure not only provision of monetary maintenance but also protection of life, dignity, and residence of senior citizens. Section 23 confers jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to declare void transfers of property where maintenance is not provided, and by necessary implication, to pass orders restoring possession and evicting unauthorized occupants where the continued occupation impedes the rights of senior citizens. In S. Vanitha case (supra), the Supreme Court emphasized that though the Tribunal cannot adjudicate intricate civil disputes, it is empowered to pass eviction orders where occupation of relatives or others frustrates the statutory mandate. Similarly, in Sudesh Chhikara case (supra), the Court held that proceedings under the Act are protective and must be interpreted purposively to secure effective relief for senior citizens.'' He recollected that the Supreme Court, in Kamalakant Mishra vs. Additional Collector & ors. SLP(CIVIL)D no. 42786 of 2025 delivered a judgment dated September 12, 2025, wherein, he reiterated that “Tribunals constituted under “the 2007 Act" may direct eviction where such relief is essential to give effect to the protection envisaged for senior citizens,” stressing that the statute would otherwise be rendered otiose. All these decisions underscore that the legislative intent is to provide real and effective protection to senior citizens against neglect or exploitation.

Relying on these principles, Justice Sinha concluded:''we are of the view that the Tribunal, in directing eviction of the appellants, acted squarely within the protective ambit of “the 2007 Act". The appellants, being nephews and not “children” under Section 4, have no statutory right to resist proceedings, and their alleged claims of co-ownership were rightly left to the civil court. The Tribunal’s order was necessary to secure the complainant’s right to peaceful possession of his residential property, and the learned Single Judge correctly affirmed that view by judgment dated 29.01.2024. Accordingly, we hold that the beneficial object and mandate of “the 2007 Act" require sustaining the orders of the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. The appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.''

In the penultimate paragraph of the his judgment, Justice Sandeep Kumar had concluded:''6. From the prayer made in the Partition Suit, it appears that the petitioners have claimed only 18 paise share in the suit properties including the house in question" which was in the name of Rajendra Prasad, the respondent no.5. He added: ''The partition suit is yet to be decided. The petitioners by filing a suit cannot change the character of the property. The lease deed is in favour of respondent no.5 and unless and until the share of the petitioners is decided by a competent court, the house in question cannot be treated as a joint family property. Further, in the partition suit the petitioners have prayed for recovery of possession and therefore, it appears that the petitioners are not in possession of the property in question. The respondent no.5 being a senior citizen is being harassed by the petitioners by simply filing a Partition Suit and the claim of the petitioners is yet to be decided by the District Court. Therefore, I am of the view that merely by filing a Partition Suit, the house/property acquired and owned by the respondent no.5 cannot be interfered with by the petitioners."

Justice Kumar concluded:''27. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Patna in Senior Citizen (Misc.) Appeal No.01 of 2020-21 cannot be interfered with as there is no infirmity in the same. This writ petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly, it is dismissed. The interim order dated 10.08.2022 is hereby vacated." The High Court's Division Bench has upheld the judgement.