Amount determined for land acquisition compensation without any document is arbitrary, trial court judgment, decree set aside: Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey, Patna High Court

Patna High Court delivered 12 judgements on October 14, 2025 in Sri Gudar Sao vs. The State of Bihar, Garbhu Rai vs. Harihar Rai, Kumari Neelam Devi vs. Sri Satish Kumar, Sunila Devi vs. Pankaj Kumar, Alok Kumar vs. Smt. Anupama Singh, Phool Kant Mishra vs. The State Of Bihar, The Bihar Staff Selection Commission vs. Santosh Kumar Tiwari, Surendra Jha vs. The State Of Bihar & Ors., SIFY Digital Services Limited vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Baraa Fawzi Haameed AL Bayati vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar and Manoj Kumar vs. Krishna Mohan Kumar.

 

In Sri Gudar Sao vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 26-page long judgement dated October 14, 2025, wherein, he concluded: ''I am of the view that the learned trial court has arbitrarily decided the compensation and his conclusion was not based on the materials available on the record. The amount which he has determined for compensation was based merely on assumption without any document. 35. As such, considering above facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree of the learned trial court is set aside and in result, these appeals are allowed. 36. Office is directed to prepare the decree/award. 37. Let the records of the learned trial court with a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial court.'' Hetu Kishun, son of late Sri Gudar Sao pursued the case which commenced in 1994 in the High Court. 

   

All the three appeals were preferred against the judgment and decree dated October 14, 1993 passed in a Land Acquisition cases of 1990 passed by Sub-Judge 3rd, Patna whereunder the trial court awarded insufficient compensation with respect to the lands and houses which were acquired in these cases. The Land Acquisition Officer, Patna made a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act regarding adjudication for the adequacy of the compensation for the lands and houses acquired. There having common question of law and facts of 14 cases including these cases were taken together by the trial court. The facts leading to these cases are that about 01 Acre 15 Dismil of land along with houses standing over the same belonging to these awardees within the village- Mosimpur Kurtha P.S.- Fatwah, District- Patna acquired by the State of Bihar for the purpose of construction of approach road to Punpun bridge by a Gazette notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on August 16, 1980. Date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act for the same was on July 1, 1982 and the award of the lands and houses were made by the Collector on September 23, 1989 and the possession of the lands and the houses were taken on May 18, 1987 by the Collector. The compensation money for the bhith lands and homestead land acquired was paid to the awardees at the rate of Rs.96,000/- per acre i.e. Rs.3,000/- only per kattha. The Collector also paid the price of the houses to the awardees varying from Rs.3,690/- to Rs.2,31,750/-. The Collector also paid 30% solatium and interest on the amount of compensation to the awardees. The awardees received compensation money so awarded under protest to the effect that the compensation money awarded by the State of Bihar either for the lands or for the houses standing over the same was inadequate. Therefore, the Collector referred these cases to the court for adjudication of the adequacy of the quantum of the compensation.

 

According to the State of Bihar, compensation was already paid for the lands and houses standing thereon was proper and adequate. On the other hand, the awardees approached the court with their respective cases that the lands of the awardees lies within the notified area of Fatwah at the corner of the main road of Patna-Ranchi national Highway. It was also the case of the awardees that Land Acquisition Officer relied upon the sale deed which do not represent true and real market value of the lands under acquisition and left out the true and genuine sale deed of the locality representing higher price. They claimed the price of the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per kattha. They also made out their case that the Executive Engineer of the State failed to take into account the correct aspect of engineering in respect of making assessment of the value of the buildings of the awardees. He should have taken into account while determining the compensation of the buildings as to what would be real cost in erecting a building similar to existing building of the awardees at the time of notification. According to their cases, inadequate price of their buildings has been fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer on the basis of unscientific report of Executive Engineer. However, the awardees claimed the price of their respective houses varying from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.12,95,475/-. They also claimed compensation for damages done for their business premises. 

The counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that the Special Land Acquisition Judge-III committed error of law as also on the facts in deciding the claim of the appellants. The trial court did not appreciate correctly the pleadings of the parties, made wrong and illegal approach to the cases. It was submitted that the total houses of these awardees constructed over 0.045 acres have been acquired by the State of Bihar and paid Rs.2,10,257 and 25 paisa only which was received by the appellants/defendants under protest and they have claimed the rate of land at Rs.50,000/-per kattha and Rs.8,11,414 for the houses. Rs.28,000/- annual for the loss of business and Rs.90,000/- for loss of furniture and goods. It was also submitted that the awardees examined altogether 16 witnesses and they adduced documentary evidence, State of Bihar did not give any written submission nor did it examine any witness except OW-1, Mathura Pandey who only proved rate report over khatiyaan, sale statement, possession certificate. The trial court has not appreciated the evidence adduced by the appellants/defendants. It was submitted that the trial court has held in its judgment that “the aforesaid document in support of the price of the land determined by the State of Bihar have no evidentiary value and as such the aforesaid documents cannot be relied upon and in these circumstances the price of lands determined by the State of Bihar on the basis of sale figure mentioned in column 8 of the sale statement cannot be relied and adopted.”

 

The counsel for the appellants relied on decisions in i) (2010) 13 SCC 710, ii) (2012) 5 SCC 432 and iii) (2025) SCC Online SC 1519.

 

The Respondents/plaintiffs relied on certain citations, such as AIR 1977 SC 580, AIR 1977 SC 560, AIR 2010 SC 170, AIR 2004 SC 4532 :: 2004 AIR SCW 4255 and AIR 2004 SC 288 :: 2003 AIR SCW 6117.
 

The trial court grappled with the following two issues: 

First issue :- The first issue was whether the compensation money awarded by the State of Bihar in respect of land was proper and adequate or it requires to be changes.

Second issue :- Second was whether the amount of compensation paid by the Collector in respect of the house of the awardees was proper and adequate and according to size, age and construction of the building under the acquisition. 

 

The trial court disbelieved the basis on which the compensation has been determined by the Collector. As the price of the land acquired has been determined solely on the basis of only one sale deed mentioned in column-8 of the sale statement as against average rate of all the sale deeds.

The counsel for the appellants/defendants argued that from perusal of the impugned judgment it emerges that the trial court relied on the decision of Supreme Court reported in AIR (1979) 472 in which it was held that ‘mere sale statement is not admissible in law’. Admittedly, the author of sale rate namely, Land Acquisition Officer was not examined in this case. The trial court did not rely upon the documents which were adduced by the respondents and categorically held that sale figures mentioned in Column-8 of the sale statement cannot be relied rather the trial court has relied on the sale deeds. The lands under the aforesaid sale deeds was situated in the vicinity of the acquired lands which fact was evident from survey map. The trial court also held that ‘it does not stand to my reason as to why this sale deed has not been taken into consideration by the Land Acquisition Officer. It was simply rejected on the ground that it was executed on competitive basis although there is no such evidence on the record, so the aforesaid sale deed has to be considered in this case.”

 

The counsel for the appellants/defendants submitted that recently in Manohar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, the Supreme Court held in Paragraphs 31, 38, 39 and 40, which reads:-
31. In the case of Anjani Molu Dessai (supra) this Court, while referring to two previous
decisions of this Court, held thus: 
"20. The legal position is that even where there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars, which is a bona fide transaction, will be considered. Where however there are several sales of similar lands whose prices range in a narrow bandwidth, the average thereof can be taken, as representing the market price. But where the values disclosed in respect of two sales are markedly different, it can only lead to an inference that they are with reference to dissimilar lands or that the lower value sale is on account of undervaluation or other price depressing reasons. Consequently, averaging  annot be resorted to. We may refer to two decisions of this Court in this behalf.

 

In M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur v. Collector, [(1 969) 1 Mad LJ 45 (SC)], a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the proper method for evaluation of market value is by taking the highest of the
exemplars and not by averaging of different types of sale transactions. 

 

The High Court relied on decision in State of Punjab vs. Hans Raj, [(1994) 5 SCC 734], wherein it was held: "4. Having given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed a grave error in working out average price paid under the sale transactions to determine the market value of the acquired land on that basis. As the method of averaging the prices fetched by sales of different lands of different kinds at different times, for fixing the market value of the acquired land, if followed, could bring about a figure of price which may not at all be regarded as the price to be fetched by sale of acquired land. One should not have, ordinarily recourse to such method. It is well settled that genuine and bona fide sale transactions in respect of the land under acquisition or in its absence the bona fide sale transactions proximate to the point of acquisition of the lands situated in the neighbourhood of the acquired lands possessing similar value or utility taken place between a willing vendee and the willing vendor which could be expected to reflect the true value, as agreed between reasonable prudent persons acting in the normal market conditions are the real basis to determine the market value.”

Now that the High Court has decided that trial court had arbitrarily decided the compensation without any document based on assumption, the judgment and decree of the trial court has been set aside and the office has been directed to prepare the decree/award, the same will have to be prepared with reference to the provisions under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. which is operational from January 1, 2014. 

 

Given the fact that the judgment and decree dated October 14, 1993 by the trial court in a 1990 case wherein the trial court had awarded insufficient compensation with respect to the lands and houses which were acquired, has been set aside by the High Court, it cannot be said that land acquisition proceedings were already been concluded. As a consequence, the appellants become entitled to benefits of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act  

  

Section 24 reads:''Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.'' 

  

The CAG's audit report of the Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar states that "The LA Act, 1894 and the Act, 2013, provides that in case the compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount with interest at the prescribed rates from the time of taking possession till it has been so paid or deposited. The Departmental circular of February 2009 provides that the land acquisition process can only be started after receipt of full cost of compensation from requiring body." 

 

Notably, the benefits of the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement provided in the Act have been extended in cases of land acquisition made under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule, namely,. 

1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958
2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 
3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 
4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 
5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885

6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978
7. The National Highways Act, 1956
8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962
9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
10. The Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948
11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957
12. The Electricity Act, 2003
13. The Railways Act, 1989

 

 

 

Supreme Court stays proceedings before Trial Court, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refused to quash FIR in a private dispute under corporate law

In Sarita Bajaj & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated July 18, 2025 staying further proceedings before the Trial Court. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court had passed a 20-page long judgement dated May 9, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....I have no other alternative but to hold that in the instant case, the F.I.R. being Kotwali P. S. Case No. 45 of 2024, dated 18th August, 2023, cannot be quashed. 32. The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. 33. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest."

Drawing on the judgement passed by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, Justice Chaudhari was "convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."  He observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

Sarita Bajaj, the Petitioner had invoked Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 at Kotwali Police Station in 2024 for the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Ajay Kumar Bajaj, Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to the Station House Officer of Kotwali Police Station, alleging inter alia, that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He also alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, along with other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. The parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. 

The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicated that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. It was confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, Petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. On February 27, 2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. 

On February 27, 2021, on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated August 30, 2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so. On February 27, 2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on February 28, 2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a resolution, dated August 31, 2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On April 3, 2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting.

The informant had already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in 2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated February 27, 2021 were forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs. Notably, certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition were not complied with or honoured by the informant. In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which has been registered as a Title Suit of 2023. Among other allegations, the informant alleged that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant also claimed that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. 

Under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. 

Besides this, an application was filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench in 2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400. 

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On November 8, 2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated December 4, 2023.

Notably, in the counter affidavit, filed by Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the Respondent No. 5, dated February 4, 2025, the High Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties falsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.. In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid.

However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. Later, Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Court, claiming that, as a Director of Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as August 2, 2021. In the application under Section 7 of IBC, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated September 20, 2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by NCLT, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to NCLAT New Delhi.

 

42 year old land compensation claim will have to be considered under Section 24 (1) (a), Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act

In Dharnidhar Mishra (dead) vs. of State Bihar & Ors. (2024), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy heard the matter which came up before it on the remand made by the Supreme Court by its order dated May 13, 2024. The High Court directed the State to give the details of the acquisition and the award if any passed. Dharnidhar Mishra was survived by Panchwarti Devi, Saroj Devi, Indira Kumari, Ranjana Devi, Kanchan Devi and Sushil Kumar Mishra, the residents of Hanuman Nagar, Bharbari, Rosera, Samastipur as petitioners. Besides the State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Road construction Department, Government of Bihar, the other three respondents were: District Magistrate-Cum-Collector Samastipur, District Land Acquisition Officer Samastipur and Circle Officer Hasanpur, Samastipur. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's order, a new division bench heard the matter. 

In compliance with the Supreme Court's order, the High Court's judgement dated August 29, 2024 recorded that the Advocate General conceded that no details are available with the Government. He submitted that the land in question was acquired for the purpose of State Highway. The possession has been taken and a Highway has also been constructed. The High Court observed: "In the above circumstances and also the fact that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short ‘the Act of 2013’) has come into force, we rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others; (2020) 8 SCC 129."

The writ petition was filed challenging an order dated January 8, 2019 passed in Misc. Case No. 02 of 2019 rejecting the claim for compensation against acquisition of the land of the writ-petitioners. The writ-petitioners contended that their land was acquired in L.A. Case No. 07 of 1976. Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court had held that the claim was filed after 42 years of acquisition and there was no document or notification filed, in connection with the acquisition of the subject land. The writ petition was dismissed. In the appeal filed, the Division Bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Satyavrat Verma had passed a judgement on February 7, 2023 which found on the basis of the categorical stand of the State that the subject land had been consumed and that the value of the land, as assessed by the State at Rs. 4,68,099/-, was to be paid. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which set aside the order of the Division Bench and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The Chief Justice led Division Bench which included Justice Partha Sarthy which considered the matter afresh observed: "It was found that the ground of delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court." Both the decisions by Justice Singh and Kumar of the High Court were set aside by the Supreme Court by its order dated May 13, 2024. 

The new division bench of the High Court observed: "It was also found that when the land of the appellant came to be acquired, the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 31 in Part-III of the Constitution; which could not be deprived without due process of law and only upon just and fair compensation. Even when the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. It was held so in Paragraph 18, which is extracted hereinbelow:- “18. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1].”

The Court specifically referred to Paragraph 366.1 of Supreme Court's decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others; (2020) 8 SCC 129, which reads: “366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1) (a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1- 2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.”

Drawing the Supreme Court's decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and others; (2020) 8 SCC 129, the High Court observed: "In the present case, admittedly there is no award made or rather; there is nothing produced on record to indicate an award having been made on the acquisition. In the above circumstances, the matter will have to be considered under Section 24(1)(a) and compensation will have to be determined under the provisions of the Act of 2013. 8. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 reads as under:“24(1)(a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or” 

The High Court concluded:"In the above circumstances, the compensation claim of the appellants will have to be considered under the Act of 2013 subject only to their establishing the title to the said land before the appropriate authority. The District Collector, Samastipur shall initiate proceedings under the Act of 2013 within a period of one month from today, determine the amount of compensation and if the appellants are satisfied, it will be disbursed. Further proceedings, if the appellants are not satisfied with the award, can also be taken under the Act of 2013. We make it clear that we have not observed anything about the title of the appellants which the appellants/legal heirs of the original owner will have to establish before the competent authority." With the above directions, the Letters Patent Appeal stands disposed of. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand closed."

The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Vinod Chandran. It was uploaded on the High Court's website on September 3, 2024. District Collector, Samastipur was supposed to initiate proceedings under the Act of 2013 within a period of one month from August 29, 2024. It not clear as to whether the Collector has complied with the High Court's judgement delivered in compliance with Supreme Court's order.

Also read: Patna High Court failed to inquire into 42 years of delay in determining basis of compensation for land acquisition by Bihar Govt: Supreme Court

High Court gets Namrata Tiwary as its second editor, and a member of its Internal Complaints Committee under Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

Namrata Tiwary has been appointed as the second editor of Patna High Court on January 15, 2025. She is one of the 99 officers of the High Court's Registry. She is a law graduate. As editor she is supposed to monitor all machine translation related activities. She entered judiciary through Bihar Superior Judicial Service on August 13, 2018. She will retire on July 31, 2035. Prior to her posting as editor, she was Principal Judge (Family Court), Muzaffarpur since February 7, 2024. She served as Principal Judge (Family Court), Kaimur, Bhabhua during May 11, 2022-February 6, 2024. She had served as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gaya during August 13, 2018.

At present, she is also one of the three members of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted under Section 4 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013. The ICC is headed by Justice Gunnu Anupama Chakravarthy. The third member is Surya Nilambari, Advocate of the High Court. The email provided for Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Committee, Patna High Court is: sankalpvahini@nic.in which appears to be the email of Registrar (Establishment), Patna High Court, not of the Committee.  

 

The Home page of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Committee, Patna High Court displays the name of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Anupama Chakravarthy, not of the members of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Committee, Patna High Court. 

Section 4 of the Act deals with the constitution of Internal Complaints Committee. Section 4 (1) reads: Every employer of a workplace shall, by an order in writing, constitute a Committee to be known as the “Internal Complaints Committee...” Section 4 (2) reads: The Internal Committees shall consist of the following members to be nominated by the employer, namely: — (a) a Presiding Officer who shall be a woman employed at a senior level at workplace from amongst the employees: Provided that in case a senior level woman employee is not available, the Presiding Officer shall be nominated from other offices or administrative units of the workplace referred to in sub-section(1): Provided further that in case the other offices or administrative units of the workplace do not have a senior level woman employee, the Presiding Officer shall be nominated from any other workplace of the same employer or other department or organisation;
(b) not less than two Members from amongst employees preferably committed to the cause of women or who have had experience in social work or have legal knowledge;
(c) one member from amongst non-governmental organisations or associations committed to the cause of women or a person familiar with the issues relating to sexual harassment: Provided that at least one-half of the total Members so nominated shall be women. 

Section 4 (3) reads: "The Presiding Officer and every Member of the Internal Committee shall hold office for such period, not exceeding three years, from the date of their nomination as may be specified by the employer."
Section 4 (4) reads:"The Member appointed from amongst the non-governmental organisations or associations shall be paid such fees or allowances for holding the proceedings of the Internal Committee, by the employer, as may be prescribed."
Section 4 (5) reads: "Where the Presiding Officer or any Member of the Internal Committee,—(a) contravenes the provisions of section 16; or (b) has been convicted for an offence or an inquiry into an offence under any law for the time being in force is pending against him; or (c) he has been found quilty in any disciplinary proceedings or a disciplinary proceeding is pending against him; or (d) has so abused his position as to render his continuance in office prejudicial to the public interest, such Presiding Officer or Member, as the case may be, shall be removed from the Committee and the vacancy so created or any casual vacancy shall be filled by fresh nomination in accordance with the provisions of this section."

Prior to appointment of Namrata Tiwari as editor, Shweta Kumari Singh was appointed as the first editor of Patna High Court by the Chief Justice of the High Court. She has been transferred and posted as Principal District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur. Her appointment as editor was made subsequent to creation of one post of the editor by the General Administration Department, Government of Bihar. A notification dated April 4, 2024 was issued by P. K. Malik, Registrar General, High Court in this regard. 

 

Notably, Brajesh Kumar Singh, Additional District and Session Judge, Aurangabad been transferred but Mukesh Kumar, Additional Principal Judge, Katihar who was appointed as Sub-editor of the High Court by the Chief Justice since April 10, 2024 remains in his position. 

In place of Brajesh Kumar Singh, now Anand Kumar Singh has been appointed as Sub-Editor, Patna High Court since February 1, 2025. He is a law graduate recruited through B.P.S.C. He entered judiciary through Bihar Subordinate Judicial Service on May 10, 2007. He will retire on December 31, 2038..

 

In a routine transfer, Nivedita Kumari, Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jehanabad since December 19, 2024 has been appointed as a Research Officer of the Juvenile Justice Secretariat, Patna High Court. She has a Masters in Law. Her posting date at the the High Court is January 28, 2025. In another routine transfer, High Court has appointed Kajal Jhamb, Principal District and Sessions Judge, Khagaria as Registrar (Administration) by its notification dated February 15, 2025. She has a Masters in Law. She was directed to make over charge of her present assignment in consultation with Prajesh Kumar, Registrar (Administration), Patna High Court, Patna and to join her new assignment soon thereafter. It seems she is yet to join in her new position. The list of officers of the Registry does not mention her name.   

Also read: Supreme Court Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) reconstituted, reference to complaints omitted from GSICC Annual Report since 2022

Supreme Court Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) reconstituted, reference to complaints omitted from GSICC Annual Report since 2022

‘Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to work with dignity, which is a universally recognised basic human right…’
- Supreme Court of India in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241

By its Office Order dated March 7, 2025, in exercise of powers conferred by Clause 4(2) of the Gender Sensitisation & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Regulations, 2013, the Chief Justice of India has re-constituted the Supreme Court Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC). The committee is chaired by Justice B.V. Nagarathna. Its Member Secretary is Sujata Singh, Registrar, [Officer in service of the Supreme Court of India], Its nine members include: Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate, Nina Gupta, Advocate, Soumyajit Pani, Advocate, Sakshi Banga, Prabha Swami, Advocate-on-record, Bansuri Swaraj, Senior Advocate, Liz Mathew, Senior Advocate and Dr. Leni Chaudhuri, Executive Director, University of Chicago Centre in India Pvt. Ltd., the nominee of the Chief Justice of India. Justice Nagarathna was first made the Chairperson, GSICC by order dated September 18, 2024 of Chief Justice of India. Prior to Justice Nagarathna, Justice Hima Kohli was the Chairperson of the GSICC.

It is apparent that the URL of contact details of the GSICC that so far that it has not been revised in  the light of the Office Order dated March 7, 225. The Court's website provides details of 19 volunteers which seems to indicate that SCGSICC is operating in an ad hoc manner since 2014. The SCGSICC Regulations were notified in the Gazette of India on August 6, 2013. It provided its first 5-page long Annual Report on January 31, 2014. The SCGSICC was constituted by Office Order dated November 26, 2013. Its first chairperson was Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai, Supreme Court of India. Rachna Gupta, Additional Registrar was its first Member Secretary. The first members of the SCGSICC included Justice Madan B, Lokur, Supreme Court of India, L. Nageswara Rao, Senior Member of Supreme Court, Bar Association, Indu Malhotra, Senior Member of Supreme Court Bar Association, Bina Madhavan, Supreme Court Bar Association, B. Sunita Rao, Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association, Madhu Chauhan, Supreme Court Clerks Association, Bharti Ali, Co-Director, HAQ: Centre for Child Rights (nominated by Chief Justice of India),  and Prof. (Dr.) G. Mohan Gopal, Director, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, New Delhi, (nominated by Chief Justice of India.

The GSICC was reconstituted by order dated July 9, 2021 by the Chief Justice of India, the Committee was reconstituted with  Justice Indira Banerjee as new chairperson. By order dated September 28, 2022, GSICC was reconstituted with Justice Hima Kohli of Supreme Court of India as its Chairperson. She retired from the Supreme Court of India on September 1, 2024. 

The object of the SCGSICC is to fulfill a very important public function of sensitizing the public to gender issues and to address complaints made with regard to sexual harassment in the precincts of the Supreme Court. The first meeting of the SCGSICC was convened on December 9, 2013 in the Committee Hall, Judges Chamber Area, Supreme Court of India. In this meeting an Internal Sub-Committee of three members was constituted in terms of Clause 9 (1) of the 2013 Regulations. The three members were Indu Malhotra, Senior Advocate, L. Nageshwar Rao, Senior Advocate and Bharti Ali, Co-Director, HAQ. Two complaints were received by the GSICC from aggrieved women lawyers which were submitted to the Internal Sub-Committee. The Internal Sub-Committee initiated the process of examining the two complaints. As far as the Complainant in GSICC No. 1/2013 was concerned, her statement was video-recorded on December 12, 2013. The Complainant in GSICC No. 2/2013 appeared on December 16, 2013 and the video-recording of her statement was deferred at her request. Both the complaints were pending disposal with the internal sub-committee as per its first Annual Report. The second Annual Report revealed that in the first case Respondent No. 1 accepted to be admonished and the complaint against him was allowed to be simply dropped. In the second case,  Respondent No. 2 was debarred entry into the Supreme Court precincts for a period of six months. It was also decided about Respondent No. 2 that the order passed by the then Chief Justice of India against the respondent be intimated to Bar Council of Karnataka as the respondent being the member of the said Bar Council, and the punishment so imposed was also ordered to be uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court of India.

Two more complaints were filed in the year 2014. The Internal Sub-Committe for inquiring into the two complaints was re-constituted by the GSICC. Complaint No. 3 was withdrawn by the complainant. With respect to Complaint No. 4, the GSICC had observed that the complaint was actually the copy of the writ petition already pending adjudication before Delhi High Court. It was decided that since competent authority is already seized of the matter, GSICC should not interfere with the said proceedings and the complaint was accordingly filed. 

A representation was received from a complainant who had intervened in a writ petition filed by Ms. X in Delhi High Court. She raised her contention for developing a mechanism to deal with the complaints of sexual harassment against the judges. It was unanimously decided by GSICC that since the jurisdiction of GSICC is confined only to such acts of sexual harassment as have occurred within the precincts of Supreme Court of India the representation was not be considered as her grievance was against her Senior Officers in Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) where she herself was an Officer. The grievance was sub-judiced before the Competent Court and the contention about the mechanism as prayed for was also the part of the prayer in the writ petition. Hence, the representation of this aggrieved women was also filed by GSICC. The second Annual report dated January 31, 2015 revealed that no complaint of any aggrieved women is pending inquiry before the Internal Sub Committee of GSICC. The subsequent Annual Report revealed that in the year 2015, no complaint is received by any 'women' being aggrieved of being sexually harassed within the precincts of Supreme Court of India.

The Annual Report of 2016 revealed that three complaints were received by the GSICC from aggrieved women within the precincts of Supreme Court of India. One complaint filed by an employee of the Registry of the Supreme Court of India was held as not maintainable. Inquiry into the other complaints is under process.  

The Annual report of 2017 reported that inquiry into the complaint filed in the year 2016 was under process and the same was concluded. One complaint was received by the GSICC from aggrieved woman within the precincts of Supreme Court of India which was disposed of. 

The Annual Report of 2018 refers to five complaints received by the GSICC from aggrieved women. Out of the five complaints, three complaints were disposed of and two complaints were pending. 

The Annual Report of 2019 reported about the two complaints pertaining to the year 2018 which were received by the GSICC from aggrieved women. They were disposed of in 2019. One complaint was received in 2019 which was found to be fake.

The Annual Report of 2020 reported four complaints received during the year 2020. The Complaint No. 1/2020 was received on February 13, 2020. It was filed on March 17, 2020 because the details of the complaint was not received by GSICC. The Complaint No. 2/2020 was received on March 26, 2020 and filed on August 31, 2020 as the respondent was an unidentified lawyer. The Complaint No. 3/2020 was received on May 21, 2020. It was reported to be in process and at the stage of completion. The Complaint No. 4/2020 was received on June 8, 2020. It was filed on July 16, 2020. It was found not maintainable.  

The Annual Report of 2021 does not refer to any specific complaint received by GSICC.  

The 33-page long Annual Report of 2022 recorded the deliberations of the GSICC on December 14, 2022 regarding amendments to the GSICC Regulations but t was kept in abeyance for the time being. The Chairperson directed that the Registrar(s) of some High Courts like Delhi, Bombay and Karnataka to send the GSICC Regulations applicable in the respective High Courts so that the same can be referred to by the sub-committee and incorporated to make the current Rules more workable. It was decided to sensitize male members of the Bar and court clerks about maintaining non intrusive distance from lady advocates in court. The issue of overcrowding in the Court Rooms need to be addressed in order to find out ways to make it more conducive and safer for lady members of the Bar. But the Annual Report fails to refer to complaints received by GSICC during 2022.  

The 44-page long Annual Report of 2023 does not refer to any specific complaint received by GSICC.

The 40-page long Annual Report of 2024 does not refer to any specific complaint received by GSICC. 

Between 2014-2021, all the Annual reports used to refer to specific complaints received by GSICC. It is inexplicable as to why this practice was discontinued after Justice Kohli. Justice Nagarathna has continued with the practice of omitting any reference to complaints received by GSICC initiated by her predecessor. When the Annual Reports used to be 5-10 pages long til 2021, they referred to specific complaints received by GSICC. In the interest of transparency, GSICC ought to revert to pre-2022 practice of referring to specific complaints.    

Gender Sensitization and Sexual Harassment of Women at Supreme Court (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Guidelines, 2015 have been framed in exercise of powers conferred under Regulation 14(1) of the Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013 the GSICC hereby frames the following Guidelines for conducting an Inquiry by the Internal Sub-Committee set up under Regulation 9 of the 2013 Regulations. 

A 93-page long Handbook on “The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 with The Gender Sensitisation & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal), Regulations, 2013 was prepared in May 2016. It is a compilation of the relevant Act, Regulations and relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and Indian Penal Code. This Handbook has been issued by the Competent Authority of the Supreme Court of India on administrative side.

Under Regulation 8 of The Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal), Regulations, 2013, the format of the compliant has been provided. 

Supreme Court's Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) has provided its email: membersecy.gsicc@gmail.com. Drawing lessons from Hillary Clinton's private email server controversy wherein 30 thousand emails and email attachments sent to and from her private email server while she was Secretary of State, Government of USA, it is high time private email server like gmail are avoided by GSICC and Courts. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench modifies judgement of Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Land Acquisition Fair Compensation case

We must ask: "why statements are acceptable in 'development' discourse that would be considered absurd in academic settings, but also why many acceptable statements from the realm of academic discourse - or even from that of common observation - fail to find their way into the discursive regime of 'development'"

-James Ferguson (1990). The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press. p. 67.

It seems all is fair in war, government, for "public purpose", and development. Warmongering, governmentality, veil of public purpose,  governmentality and  developmentality manifest themselves in myriad deceptive ways.

The judgement of Patna High Court's division bench by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy reminds one of insights from The Anti-Politics Machine, the book by James Ferguson. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. He observed: "the direction of the learned Single Judge that it should be done first and then compensation be paid, would not be practical in the sense that updating the Circle Rates require time and in the present circumstance, time would be the essence especially if seen in the context of the land owners who have been divested of their land who would require money urgently for their resettlement" in Ranjeet Kumar and others vs. The State of Bihar & others (2025). Besides the State of Bihar, there were 16 respondents. In a batch of petitions, the 71-page long judgement of the division bench concluded:"We, therefore, modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge and direct that the MVR/Circle rates of 2014 must be updated, which would be an independent exercise which shall be carried out by the State after observing the due process in that regard but the payment of compensation to the land owners would not be contingent on such updation as it would take long time. Thus the appeals on behalf of the land owners are dismissed whereas the appeals preferred by the State and the PMRC are allowed to the extent indicated above." PMRC refers to Patna Metro Rail Corporation. 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge had passed his 125-page long judgement and order on December 21, 2023 after hearing the petitioners who were land as well as the house owners, whose properties were acquired for the construction of Patna Metro Rail Depot, having a total area of 75.96 acres of land, in two mauza, i.e. Pahari and Ranipur. They had approached the High Court for quashing of the land acquisition notice, issued under Section 11 (1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with regard to 15.95 acres of land, situated in mauza Pahari and 23.35 acres of land, situated in mauza Ranipur, having a total area of 75.96 acre. the petitioners had prayed for setting aside the Social Impact Assessment Report prepared by the Development Management Institute, Patna. They had also prayed for quashing of the formation of Technical Expert Committee, constituted under Section 7 of the 2013 Act as well as quashing of the report of the Technical Expert Committee, dated June 30, 2021. They sought quashing of the order dated February 2, 2022 passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna, by which objections filed by the petitioners were rejected, for quashing the paper publication, under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. They also sought quashing of the award, dated August 4, 2023, prepared in L. A. Case No. 29/2021-2022, under Sections 23 and 30 of the 2013 Act. 

Earlier two depots were to be constructed in mauza Aitwarpur and mauza Ramchak Bairiya, but subsequently it was decided to construct only one depot, at mauza Pahari and Ranipur. The Cabinet of the State of Bihar approved the Patna Metro Rail Project on October 9, 2018. Rail India Technical and Economic Service (RITES) had given the proposal for two depots. On September 3, 2019, the work of construction of Metro Rail and Depot in Patna was given by Patna Metro Rail Corporation Limited (PMRCL) to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and the same was approved by State of Bihar. The agreement between PMRCL and DMRC was entered on September 25, 2019. The DMRC made changes in the line alignment of the Patna Metro on February 8, 2020 and also changed the location of metro depot from two locations to one locations, i.e. mauza Pahari and Ranipur, which are under acquisition. The lands have been acquired under the general provisions of the 2013 Act. The Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, issued an Office Order on March  17, 2020, in which reasons for relocation of the Metro depot from two depots to one depot, has been mentioned that there shall be large number of demolition of houses at previous location, drainage system, seamless integration of I.S.B.T. and the Metro depot, and further 11.6 Hectares for the purpose of Property Development Area. The revised detailed project report has been approved by the State Government and the Union Government.

Justice Sinha had framed the following questions for considerations by the Court:

(a) Whether the provisions of the 2013 Act have been followed for acquiring the land, in question?

(b) Scope of rehabilitation and resettlement, if any

(c)Whether the property development area and the depot area are integral part of the PMRP?

(d) Whether the PMRP, including the property development area, is a project of larger public interest?

Justice Sinha had also  considered the question as to how to ascertain the just and fair compensation, which the petitioners and others are entitled. He observed: "The price of the land in Patna has skyrocketed and increased manifold, but the M.V.R./circle rate of the area has not been revised for many years. The Court has been informed that the compensation has been fixed on the M.V.R./circle rate prevalent in the year 2014. The M.V.R./circle rate is provided for the purpose of payment of stamp duty, but that cannot be made a basis to determine the actual price of the market value of the property. The purchasers, while purchasing the land, in the sale deed, quote the consideration amount on the basis of the M.V.R./circle rate and not the actual price paid for the purchase of the land.

The judgement of Justice Sinha reads:"let the M.V.R./circle rate, which has not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised by taking into consideration the relevant factors, including the opinion of the Expert. The concerned respondents are further directed to re-fix the compensation amount, payable to the petitioners, based upon the revised M.V.R./circle rate. Justice Sinha recorded that recommendations of the Expert Committee, have not been considered by the State Government, including the recommendation of the Expert Committee on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement, accordingly, I direct the State Government and the Collector, Patna, to consider the recommendation of the Expert Committee, and to take decision on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement of the land/house losers, as per Section 31 of the 2013 Act." He concluded that these "exercises must be completed by the respondents within the maximum period of six months from today. "

The Single Judge on the issue of breach of Rule -11 (3) of Rules of 2014 mandating that public hearing must be announced three weeks in advance through daily newspaper and clear 21 days time is required to be given to the landholders, had held that from the materials put forth by the parties, it transpired that in the public hearing during the course of preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report by the Development Management Institute, Patna, 111 persons had participated but according to the State, 250 people as well as representatives of Ward No. 56 had participated and that there was substantial compliance of the provisions except some procedural lapses here and there.

In the opinion of the Single Judge, the Social Assessment Impact Report clearly stated that the positive impact had a higher quotient than negative impact.

With respect to the opposition regarding non-consideration of alternative sites suggested by the land owners, the Single Judge was of the view that the same was considered but not found to be suitable as the site suggested for construction of depot would have incurred extra cost ranging between 500-700 crores and that no interference was required since the construction work has started at the selected site and the progress was to the extent of 44%.

Majority of the land owners, it was found, had already received compensation to the tune of Rs. 130 crores. The suitability of land, the learned Single Judge agreed, fell in the domain of the acquiring agency as also the agency executing the project and they are the best judge to decide the suitability and feasibility of the project including the site selected. Relying on Ramji Veerji Patel case, it was held that it was not open to the Court to examine the aspect of suitability and the Court substituting its opinion with that of the acquiring and executing agency.

With respect to the objection regarding the formation of the Expert Committee for appraisal of Social Assessment Impact Report as mandated under Section 7(2) (b) of 2013 Act, the revelation by the Advocate General that the proposal of the Expert Committee was not considered by the State Government as it was not found to be viable, was taken into account.

The argument with respect to the property development area component of the project not being relatable to public purpose, it was held that in view of the reason that Metro Rail Policy, 2017 contemplated provisions for enhancement of revenue of the Metro rail projects and included commercial/property development at stations and on other urban land which could be used as key instruments for maximizing revenue in Metro rail/railway systems in the cities, no fault could be found. The exemplars were drawn from Hongkong and Tokyo. It was found from the records that while conceiving of the project, the State had taken into all the above factors which would increase the non-fair box revenue which was in sync with the Metro Rail Policy, 2017 and hence the construction and development of property development area was held to be part of the public purpose and it was complementary to each other and therefore integral to the scheme of PMRP. 

It was thus concluded, in view of the judgment in Godrej & Boyce vs The State Of Maharashtra case, that even if there are some irregularities in the procedure followed by the acquiring authority for infrastructural project, the Courts, in exercise of their extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to interfere, especially when the project is of public importance. In matters of land acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice and public interest intermingle.

The Single Judge, therefore, refused to interfere with the process of acquisition.

However, while considering the issue of just and fair compensation to which the land owners would be entitled, a direction was issued that the MVR/Circle Rates which had not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised after taking into consideration the relevant factors including the opinion of the experts and then re-fix the compensation amount payable to the land owners based upon the revised MVR/Circle Rate.

While assailing the judgment of the Single Judge, Amit Sibbal, the Senior Advocate appearing virtually argued that even though right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right after the 44th amendment of the Constitution, it continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300A and therefore any expropriatory law which deprives a person of his property nust be in line with the overarching principles of law and must be just fair and reasonable. The exercise of power of eminent domain ought to be construed narrowly in favour of a person’s right to his property. It was argued that the land owners would not do good by challenging the public purpose behind the acquisition proceedings. The challenge thus is primarily to the manner in which the proceedings were concluded with complete disregard to the statutory safeguards. Whether the land is to be acquired under the Act, under the new law cannot be a unilateral decision. The process has to be humane, informed and transparent with least disturbance to the owners of the land and the affected families and the deprived persons would be entitled to just and fair compensation.

In this context, it was argued that Social Impact Assessment study is not a mere formality and the Single Judge has erred in law in being satisfied about substantial compliance of the provision, looking aside procedural lapses here and there.

Relying on Urban Development Trust, Bikaner vs. Gordhan Das (dead) Through LR (2024) 3 SCC 250; Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs.Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. (2024) 10 SCC 533; D.B.Basnett vs. Collector, East District Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 569; Dinesh & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2024) SCC Online SC 937; Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal (2012) 2 SCC 25; Rajesh K vs. Managing Director, Kerala Rail Development Corporation (WP(C) 41009/22 (Kerala High Court) and Manekbben Rama Tandel vs. The Collector, Daman, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli & Daman and Diu & Ors.(MANU/MH/1796/2023), it was argued that the importance of property rights and requirements of strict adherence to procedure cannot be ignored or by-passed or else the entire acquisition proceeding gets vitiated.

Taking the argument of “acquisition by ambush” further, which is impermissible, it was pointed out that there was complete disregard to the procedural safeguards under Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 19 in as much as there was no finding or analysis with regard to land being the bare minimum land required for public purpose.

Even with respect to rejection of the alternative places where the depots could be constructed, it was argued that it was not prudent to discard such suggestions as the land suggested viz.

The Sahara land, Gair Mazarua lands and a dumping yard in close vicinity to the selected site would have caused minimum displacement and minimum requirement to resettle and rehabilitate human heads. It would have reduced the cost of acquisition for the Government. The rejection was not based on any sound reason.

A special grievance was made with respect to only three days having been given for voicing the objection in place of clear 21 days and that also at a time when the State was swept by COVID -19 pandemic. A special reference was made to the letter of one Councilor viz. Kismat Devi of Ward No. 56, where she had highlighted the difficulties faced by the affected people of the area and inefficacy and the infirmities in the S.I.A. study being conducted by the State.

Even if the argument on behalf of the State that 250 people had participated in the public hearing, the persons affected were numbering around 1300.

Section 15 of the 2013 Act provides the right of the people affected by the land being acquired under Section 11 notification to raise objections with respect to the suitability of the land being acquired and the findings of the S.I.A. study report. The objections raised by the displaced persons are stated to have been mechanically rejected without due consideration. The Single Judge having lightly dealt with the lapses suggested that it was not understood that the preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report and its vetting by the Special Expert Committee are the heart and soul of the Act and represent the very purpose of the humane, participative, informed and transparent process of land acquisition envisaged under the scheme of the Act. The argument of the State as also PMRCL regarding nonsuitability of the alternative site was not based on any pleadings on affidavit or any minutes of the meeting of a technical body or any data or reasoning. The dumping yard displacing none, in fact, could have been shifted elsewhere and that land which in itself would have sufficed the purpose could have been selected as the site in fact in one of the writ proceedings sometimes in the year 2012, the High Court had directed the State to consider relocating the dumping yard as it was within the municipal limits and was causing hazards and other health hazards. 

The Supreme Court and High Courts have recognised that the expression " public purpose " is not capable of precise definition. The concept of "public purpose finds mention in article 31(2) of the constitution of india. 

In University of Bombay v. municipal commr. of the city of Bombay, I.L.R.16 Bom. 217, it has been held that acquisition of land comes with the purview of public purpose if it is meant for providing suitable accommodation to the public servant.

In Radha Binode v. Surendra Nath, 105 I.C. 377, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing road facilities in municipal areas is public purpose.

In State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji, A.I.R 1956, S.C. 294, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation for homeless is public purpose. 

In Iftikher Ahmed v. state of M.P, A.I.R. 1961 M.P 140, it has been held that acquisition of land for establishment of slaughter house for maintaining supplies of food in locality is public purpose.

In Ganga Prasad Verma v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 22, it has been held that acquisition of land for resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons is public purpose. 

In Walliammal v. state of Madras and Others, 1967 Mad 334: (1965) 2 Mad. 388: (1966) 79 Mad. LW 702, it has been held that acquisition of land for opening of a burial ground is public purpose.

In Guru Shiddawwavitra Sangayya v. state of Mysore, 1968 Mys 127, it has been held that removal of timber shops from the scattered places in the city area to a place outside the city area for the establishment of timber market comes under public purpose. An acquisition is for public purpose when it involves an element of public utility, provides public good and aims for social welfare. Acquisition need not be an acquisition which benefits each and every member of the public.

The 2013 Act which came into force on January 1, 2014 defines public purpose. The Act is applicable when the land is acquire by the government for its own use, including land acquired for public sector undertaking. The land is acquired by the land with the intention of transferring it for the use of private company for the specific stated public purpose. The acquisition of land by the government for immediate and declared use by private companies for public purpose.

The definition of public purpose is provided in the 2013 Act. Under Section 2 (1) (a) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for strategic purposes relating to naval, military, air force, and armed forces of the Union, including central paramilitary forces or any work vital to national security or defence of India or State police, safety of the people. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (i) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for infrastructure projects: excluding private hospitals, private educational institutions and private hotels.

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (ii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for projects related to agriculture and allied activities set up or owned by the appropriate Government or by a farmers' cooperative or by an institution set up under a statute. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (iii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones. 

Under Section 2 (1) b (iv-vii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for water conservation structures sanitation, Government aided educational and research schemes or institutions, sports, healthcare, tourism, transportation or space programme or any infrastructure facility as may be notified in this regard by the Central Government and after tabling of such notification in Parliament. 

Under Section 2 (1) (f) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken project for project affected families, for housing for such income groups, as may be specified from time to time by the appropriate Government, for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by the Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State. 

Under Section 2 (2) (a) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for public private  partnership projects, where the ownership of  the land continues to vest with the Government, for public purpose. 

Under Section 2 (2) (b) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for private companies for public purpose. 

In this backdrop, the division bench of the Patna High Court opined that "there is no gainsaying that establishment of Metro line in the city of Patna is in public interest. No further ink is required to be wasted in deciding whether it is in public interest or not. Relieving the city dwellers of traffic congestion, providing fast moving traffic and the income generated from the property development area are by no means opposed to public interest."

It is apparent that the division bench of the High Court did not pay heed to the decision of Supreme Court in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar and Others reported in 2011(12) SCC 375 held that “Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power—sometimes called colorable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions, and satisfaction—is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for the promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colorable exercise and is undeceived by illusion”, a veil of public purpose was employed to acquire land from the people who were misled in the name of planned industrial development

Supreme Court stays order of Lokpal of India to bring High Court's judges within ambit of Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act

In the matter of IN RE : ORDER DATED 27/01/2025 PASSED BY LOKPAL OF INDIA AND ANCILLIARY ISSUES, a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court issued notice to the Union of India, Registrar, Lokpal of India and the complainant, returnable on March 18, 2025 at 10.30 a.m. The Registrar, Lokpal has been directed to mask the identity of the complainant and serve notice upon the complainant through the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court, where the complainant resides. The Court's order reads: "In the meantime there shall be stay of the order dated 27.01.2025 passed by the Lokpal of India in Complaint No.05/2025. We injunct the complainant from disclosing the name of the Hon'ble Judge against whom he has filed the complaint. The complainant is further directed to keep the complaint strictly confidential. Shri Kapil Sibal and Shri B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel, have graciously offered to assist the Court, since the matter is of a great significance concerning the independence of the judiciary....Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, waives notice for the Union of India. Written submission, if any, may be filed in the meantime."

The Lokpal of India had passed an order on January 27, 2025 after examining two complaints filed by the same complainant against a sitting Additional Judge of a High Court. The complainant alleged that the named judge had influenced the concerned Additional District Judge of a particular State and a Judge of the same High Court who had to deal with the suit filed against the complainant by a private company, to favour that company. It is alleged that the private company was earlier client of the named High Court Judge, while he was practicing as an advocate at the Bar. 

The order of the Lokpal reads:"Recently, we had an occasion to examine a complaint against the previous Chief Justice of India. After examining the relevant provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act. 2013 (for short, the Act of 2013), it was concluded vide order dated 03.01.2025 in Complaint No 255/2024 that the judges of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice of India even though public servants in terms of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, Act of 1988), are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Lokpal. Because, they do not come within the sweep of the expression public servant predicated in Section 2(1)(o) read with Section 14 of the Act of 2013. In that, the Supreme Court is a body or adjudicatory authority established in terms of Article 124 of the Constitution of India; and not under an Act of Parliament as such. It was clarified in that decision that the issue of applicability of the stated principle to other courts established by an Act of Parliament was not being discussed."

It observed: "unlike the Supreme Court of India, the High Courts for the concerned State during the pre-constitution period or so to say British India, had been established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 enacted by the British Parliament. This Act authorised creation of High Courts in British India, especially in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay through Letters Patent issued by the British Monarch. The Government of India Act. 1935, also passed by the British Parliament, restructured the High Courts which were already functioning in British India regime; and recognized that the High Courts were established by virtue of various Letters Patents and Regulating Act issued by the British Monarch. Pertinently, the Constitution of India. vide Article 214, intrinsically recognises the existence of all the High Courts established under the Act of 1861, the Act of 1935 and the Letters Patents issued by the British Monarch; and restates that there shall be a High Court for each State. In contrast. Article 124 is for "Establishment" and Constitution of the Supreme Court of India, as it was not in existence hitherto. After the Constitution of India came into being, the High Courts established during the British India period, under the Act of 1861 or the Act of 1935 and Letters Patent issued by the British Monarch, continued to function as the High Court of the concerned State enlisted in the First Schedule of the Constitution. Notably, the Act of the Dominion Legislature has been regarded as a Central Act. means an Act of Parliament in terms of Section 3 (7) of the General Clauses Act. 1897. 5. In due course of time, however, the States so formed and specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution. had to be reorganized. Because of reorganization of the States... "

Taking note of the legislative history, the Lokpal of India inferred that the High Court of being an "authority" empowered by law to discharge adjudicatory functions, has been established by an Act of Parliament as a "body" of Judges for that State. Thus. the High Court would qualify the description of at least two juristic entities 'by whatever name called''. out of the eight mentioned in Section 14(1)(f) of the Act of 2013 established by an Act of Parliament. which are mutually exclusive descriptions owing to use of expression "or" in that provision. It will be too naive to argue that a Judge of a High Court will not come within the ambit of expression "any person" in clause (f) of Section 14(1) of the Act of 2013. The expression "Judge" has always been understood as not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person. The definition of Judge in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as also the enactment of Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act. 1964 (Act 40 of 1964) and re-enacted Section 21 with the third category of public servant, including sub-clause (iv) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act of 1988 — defining expression public servant to mean any Judge. 

The Lokpal of India drew on what is stated on paragraph 35 of the majority view exposited by Justice Shetty in the case of K.Veeraswamy vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655. it is plainly expounded that a Judge of the superior court cannot therefore be excluded from the definition of public servant and would squarely fall within the purview of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1947 (analogous to Act of 1988). Applying the underlying principle and the logic as given in this reported decision, the expression 'any person in Section 14(1)(f) of the Act of 2013 must include a Judge of the High Court established by an Act of Parliament as well. 

It observed that a fortiori, the judges of the High Court would come within the sweep of Section 14 of the Act of 2013 read with Section 2(1)(o) thereof. "We say so also because. the definition of public servant in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act of 2013 explicitly excepts only one category of officials or public servants from the jurisdiction of the Lokpal from amongst the species mentioned in Section 14 of the Act of 2013, in respect of whom the jurisdiction is exercisable by any Court or other authority under the Army Act, 1950, the Airforce Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Coast Guard Act,1978. Concededly; the Act of 2013 does not provide for such explicit exception for the judges of the Court established by an Act of Parliament, including Judges of the Constitutional and other Courts established by an Act of Parliament — who must come within the expanse sweep of sub-clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the stated Act." 

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in K. Veeraswamy case through its majority opinion ordains that to adequately protect a judge from frivolous prosecution and unnecessary harassment the President of India will consult the Chief Justice of India, who will consider all the material placed before him, tender his advice for giving sanction to launch prosecution or for filing FIR against the judge concerned after being satisfied in the matter, as opined by Justice B.C. Ray in paragraph 12 of the reported decision, while agreeing with the opinion of Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty for himself and Justice M.N.Venkatachaliah (as His Lordship then was). The two Judges, in paragraph 60 of the same reported Judgement, had observed as follows: 

"We therefore, direct that no criminal case shall be registered under Section 154 CrPC against a judge of the High Court, Chief Justice of a High Court or the judge of the Supreme Court unless the Chief Justice of India is consulted in the matter."

The thrust of the exposition of the majority view, is that no criminal case shall be "registered" against a judge of the High Court, Chief Justice of High Court or judge of the Supreme Court, unless the Chief Justice of India is consulted in the matter. 

The Lokpal's order reads: "We are conscious of the fact that a complaint before the Lokpal cannot be stricto sensu equated with a criminal case being registered under Section 154 of CrPC or the corresponding provision in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (for short. BNSS). However, considering the scheme of Section 20 of the Act of 2013 on receipt of a complaint and before the Lokpal decides to proceed further by ordering a preliminary inquiry by its inquiry wing or any nominated agency or investigation, it is required to examine whether there exists a prima facie case to proceed further. Such process inevitably involves a probe into the allegations against a Judge of the High Court. For effectuating preliminary inquiry, assistance of specified agency has to be taken who in turn is bestowed with an authority under Section 20 read with Section 27 of the Act of 2013, to obtain comments of the public servant and of the Competent Authority including do questioning of third persons and of official records of the courts, if the allegation against the public servant is concerning any judicial process. Further, this inquiry is and would be a prelude to issue of direction to the investigating agency to register a criminal case against the named public servant and to investigate the same under supervision of Lokpal. Having regard to the consequences emanating from the directions to be issued by the Lokpal under Section 20 of the Act coupled with the dictum in K. Veeraswami's case adverted hitherto, the appropriate course, Ex abundanti cautela, is to abide by the direction given by the majority view of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court and to approach the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India as a pre-condition or quintessence to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act of 2013."

It was conscious of the fact that "the allegation in this complaint also involves the named Additional District Judge. who is working in a court or body of judges which may have been established by an Act of the State Legislature.  He may be a public servant within the meaning of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, but not directly amenable to the jurisdiction of the Lokpal-as not being public servant within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) read with Section 14 of the Act of 2013. However, eventually if an inquiry is to be ordered against the judge of the High Court. and in that inquiry any incriminatory material emerges against the named Additional District Judge. he can be prosecuted in this very action as being involved in an act of abetting. bribe giving or bribe taking or conspiracy of any allegation of corruption under the 1988 Act, by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act of 2013.  A priori. we deem it appropriate to forward the subject complaints and relevant materials received in the Registry in these two matters. to the office of the Hon.ble Chief Justice of India for his kind consideration. Awaiting the guidance of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, consideration of these complaints, for the time being, is deferred until four weeks from today, keeping in mind the statutory time frame to dispose of the complaint in terms of Section 20 (4) of the Act of 2013."

The order concludes: "We make it amply clear that by this order we have decided a singular issue finally - as to whether the Judges of the High Court established by an Act of Parliament come within the ambit of Section 14 of the Act of 2013, in the affirmative. No more and no less. In that, we have not looked into or examined the merits of the allegations at all. The Registry is directed to issue/upload copy of this order by redacting the name of the High Court and of the State including revelation of any description suggestive of giving identity of the person involved, where-ever it occurs in this order, to maintain confidentiality as mandated by the Act of 2013 and the Rules framed thereunder. 

The order was passed Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Chairperson, Lokpal and Members of Lokpal Justices L Narayana Swamy, Sanjay Yadav, Ritu Raj Awasthi and Sushil Chandra, Pankaj Kumar and Ajay Tirkey.