Supreme Court reverses judgement of remand passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya in a case from Munger

In Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K Vinod Chandran delivered a 30-page long judgement dated May 12, 2026, wherein, it reversed 9-page long judgement of remand dated July 4, 2025 passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. 

Justice Chandran observed: "35. The prosecution has failed to establish the constant demands of dowry, a bitter matrimony or any other circumstance which could lead to a conclusion that the family of the husband or the husband alone had instigated or perpetrated the crime of dowry death or subjected her to cruelty leading to the death. Sadly, the prosecution has completely failed to bring forth the nature of the burn injuries suffered by the victim, which could have, on analysis by a forensic expert, garnered an expert opinion as to whether it was a homicide, a case of fatal self-harm or as argued by the defence, purely accidental. We have to emphasise in this context the absence of the postmortem and unsatisfactory explanation offered on that count. 36. The case set up by the defence of the husband having declined the entreaties of the family of the wife to marry her sister assumes relevance, especially in the context of the delayed FIR registered at the home town of the deceased while her marital home, where the incident occurred was at Mirzapur and she succumbed at a hospital in Allahabad. The defence evidence led, also indicate a happy marriage and a caring husband; which has not been controverted effectively by the prosecution in cross examination. In the circumstances of the valid defence evidence, we could also rely on the dying declaration, exculpating the accused, as a corroborative piece of evidence, making believable the version of accidental burn injuries. 37. The defence evidence was given a complete go by without any valid reasons, despite the substantive testimonies and credible documents produced, remaining uncontroverted. The prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the attendant circumstances coupled with the defence evidence brings forth a probable hypothesis of innocence. The trial courts would do well to bestow equal attention to the defence evidence as that bestowed on the prosecution evidence. There is no cause to approach the defence evidence with distrust, suspicion or even scepticism."

He pointed out that "The accused is not obliged to prove his/her innocence and if a reasonable doubt is raised either from the unsatisfactory evidence led by the prosecution or from the evidence led by the defence its benefit should inure to the accused; which is the reasonable hypothesis of innocence as laid down" in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116. 

Justice Chandran observed: "A valid defence plea, substantiated through testimonies of independent witnesses and documents, as in this case, tested alongside the sketchy evidence led on behalf of the prosecution ought to have raised the judicial antenna of caution especially when the standard of proof is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt." It has been held in Swaran Singh vs. State of Punjab (1957) 1 SCR 953 in travelling from ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’ the whole of the distance should be paved with ‘legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence’.

In the penultimate paragraph, the judgement reads: "38. Before leaving the matter, we are constrained to notice the clear travesty of justice which has occurred in the above case, putting on the dock seventeen persons for reason only of having marital ties with the victim who, in all probability, sustained burn injuries in an accidental fire at her matrimonial home. The High Court also should have bestowed better care in disposing of a criminal appeal from a conviction for an offence alleged to have been committed a quarter century back. The casual approach is evident from the remand order made for reason only of lack of opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses, which testimonies were inconsequential and the impugned order of the Sessions Court having considered only those witnesses led in the trial of the accused, appellant herein." It concluded: "39. We allow the appeal and acquit the appellant/accused reversing the order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court and the order of remand passed by the High Court. We had released the accused on bail, which if carried out, the bail bonds shall stand cancelled. It goes without saying that if the accused is still in custody, he shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case." 

Granting leave, the Justice Chandran observed:" Leave granted. 2. A serious procedural deviation, resulting in a graver travesty of justice is alleged; of two trials, from two final reports on the same First Information Report, having been proceeded with against seventeen persons leading to conviction of only one of them in the second trial, despite the further investigation having unearthed no evidence against the fifteen accused. The appellant, the hapless husband of a woman who succumbed to burn injuries in her matrimonial home, has been in the dock for a quarter of a century on the accusation of marital cruelty and dowry death. The prosecution is also blamed of having failed to bring in material evidence; adduced by the defense, which the investigators ought to have detected before the charge sheet was filed. 3. The two cases were clubbed together after considerable evidence was led in both separately. Later, after further evidence was adduced jointly, they were de-tagged and adjudicated individually. In the first case the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, the two accused arrayed, were acquitted. Fourteen family members of the husband were acquitted in the second case wherein the husband alone stood convicted. The impugned order remanded the matter to the trial court on the premise of the convicted accused not being present when the witnesses were examined in the other case, before clubbing. The appeal is filed by the sole accused who stood convicted." 

Justice Malviya's order indicated that before clubbing, in the instant case PW1 to PW6 were examined and after clubbing, PW13 to PW15 and DW1 to DW5 were examined. The trial court had also recorded that the oral testimonies of only those witnesses examined in the presence of the accused in this case would be evaluated to come to a just decision; scrupulously done avoiding any prejudice to the accused. PW1 to PW6 examined herein are respectively PWs 1, 11, 3, 2, 12 & 4 in the first case; the first two, associates of the family, then a cousin, two brothers and the father of the deceased. PW13 proved the sanction order and PW14 &15 testifying in the joint trial were another brother of the deceased and the Investigating Officer (I.O) respectively. PW5 to PW10 examined in the first case were not even cross-examined by the two accused and their testimonies were completely eschewed even in the first case, the order of acquittal in which was produced. 

In his order, Justice Malviya had concluded:"10. It is settled principle of law that all evidence taken in a trial or other proceedings is recorded in the presence of the accused. This principle is fundamental to fair trial as it allows that accused to hear the evidence, observe the demeanor of witnesses, and instruct their legal counsel accordingly. Essentially it guarantee accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and to ensure transparency and to allow the accused to understand the case against him and present their defence effectively. Legally, both the cases cannot be disposed off together, so, separate trial is required to be concluded after examining the remaining witnesses within six months in accordance with law. 11. The learned trial court, before clubbing both the sessions trial vide order dated 05.03.2009, should have considered the aforesaid exigency and that being so, the amalgamation happens to be contrary to the spirit of law. Consequent thereupon, the judgment impugned has been passed on the basis of illegal procedure so followed by the learned Trial court and ultimately, leading to illegality which is being found incurable and consequently, it leads to a failure of justice. Hence, the same happens to be against the spirit of law, whereupon, is set aside judgment accordingly conviction and sentence is set aside. 12. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court to proceed with the trial independently right from the stage after examination of PW-6. Learned trial court is directed to complete the trial within six months but, with a caution that there should be proper presence of the witnesses. The appellant is on bail, hence he is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within ten days of the receipt of copy of this judgment by the Trial Court and their bail bonds stand cancelled. Further, Superintendent of Police, Munger is directed to procure attendance of all the witnesses so that, the trial be concluded at an earliest. Learned Trial Court is directed to grant bail to the current appellant after surrendering before the Trial Court within stipulated time. If the appellant did not surrender within stipulated time then the Trial Court is directed to take coercive steps against him." Now the Supreme Court has reversed the judgement of remand by Justice Malviya.  

The case in question arose from an incident of the year 2000. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a remand at this stage would only prolong the matter. The counsel for the accused agreed to a  consideration on merits by the Court at the expense of losing one appellate forum, i.e., the High Court, to which the State Counsel also did not object. Therefore, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the matter on its merits. 

The allegation arose from an incident where the wife of the appellant was first taken to the District Hospital, Mirzapur from her marital home on April 13, 2000 allegedly with 40% burns sustained and then re-admitted to a private nursing home, at Allahabad, where the poor lady succumbed a few days later. The Court wondered as to whether the it was accidental, as contended by the husband and the in-laws or whether it was self-inflicted or induced, the causation being the cruelty which arose from incessant dowry demands, is the moot question arising. The victim died on May 2, 2000 and an FIR was registered at the Kotwali Police Station, Munger, which is situated the parental home of the deceased, on June 1, 2000. It arrayed the husband and his brother; the other family members was the father-in-law and the mother-in-law. 

The Court perused the FIR and also the charge sheets in both the cases received from the trial court. The FIR was registered on a complaint dated May 15, 2000 by the father, filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Munger, one under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. FIR No.272 of 2000 dated June 1, 2000 resulted first, in Final Report No.625 of 2000 dated October 31, 2000 leading to Sessions Case No.592 of 2001 and then, Final Report No.215 of 2005 dated May 31, 2005 which led to the instant case numbered as Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006.

The complaint spoke of the marriage and the continued demand of dowry of Rs.50,000/- despite sufficient gifts having been given by the bride’s family and the frequent complaints made by the deceased when she came to her parental home. Even during the pregnancy of the victim, she is said to have been harassed which resulted in the childbirth occurring in the parental home of the mother. The misdeeds continued even after the son was born and there was also an allegation of forced abortion, eventually leading to the death at the marital home. It was also alleged that since the marital family was very influential the entire incident was hushed up. In addition to the husband, his relatives, including immediate in-laws, were arrayed only for reason of the marital home having housed a joint family.

In the Final Report of October 31, 2000 after a brief narration of the complaint of constant demands of dowry pursuant to the marriage of the daughter of the complainant with Brijesh Kumar, it was categorically stated that on investigation, the allegation of offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 appeared to be true. It was noticed that the father-in-law and mother-in-law were in judicial custody and that the Superintendent of Police (S.P) had directed charge-sheet to be filed against the said accused considering the investigation against them as completed and directed investigation against the other 15 persons in the FIR to be continued. The charge-sheet first filed against the two accused gave rise to Sessions Case No.592/2001, which ended in acquittal of both the accused by judgment dated 17.12.2012. On the very same day, judgment dated December 17, 2012 was passed in Sessions Case No.504/2006 wherein the first accused alone was convicted, and the other 14 accused acquitted. Sessions Case No.504 of 2006 arose from a final report filed by a different I.O after further investigation finding no further evidence against the 15 accused remaining.

Issue arose of the trial court having taken cognizance based on a closure report filed by the I.O finding no evidence against the 15 persons who were not charged at the first instance; urged, placing reliance on Mariam Fasihuddin vs. State by Adugodi Police Station 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 and two trials having been proceeded with on the very same allegation of dowry death of the wife of the appellant. The first charge sheet filed; despite finding the offences made out against all the 17, charged only the two who were in judicial custody on the directions of the S.P who also directed further investigation against the others; such directions being clearly impermissible. The second final report stated that no evidence was found available on the record against all the others and there was no cause to raise a supplementary charge against the 15 accused, by another officer who was not examined before the trial court.

Justice Chandran observed: " 10. We are quite conscious of Section 158 of the CrPC which provides that a report be sent to the Magistrate through a superior officer of police, if the State Government by general or special order so directs. Apposite would be reference to Section 173 (3) which provides in such circumstances that the report should be submitted through that superior officer to the Magistrate and pending orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of the police station to make further investigation. Pertinently, the facts of the present case reveal that the report itself was filed by the officer-in-charge of the police station which makes it clear that there was no special or general order passed by the State Government under Section 158. Further, pertinent is the fact that the FIR was registered on the complaint forwarded under Section 156(3) on the directions of the CJM. The order of the S.P hence was clearly without any authority." 

He noted that the decision in Mariam Fasihuddin case frowned upon a supplementary charge sheet filed without any new material unearthed by the investigating agency; wherein the further investigation directed
was with respect to the dropping of two offences under the IPC. However, here the first charge sheet finds material against the other accused also which makes it imperative that we dwell upon the primacy of the Court which takes cognizance.

In H.N. Rishbud vs. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934, the Court was concerned with an investigation carried out under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, which could have been carried out only with the order of a Magistrate. It was held that investigation is the first step, followed by cognizance and then the trial itself. But an invalid investigation does not nullify the cognizance or the trial based thereon, since a defect or illegality in investigation has no bearing on the cognizance taken or the trial. Though a police report under Section 190 of the CrPC is the material on which cognizance is taken, a valid or legal police report is not the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken on a police report vitiated by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the trial cannot be set aside merely on that ground, unless the illegality in the investigation is shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice as provided under Section 537 of the CrPC of 1898 (Section 465 of CrPC of 1973). Finding also that the invalidity of an investigation is not to be completely ignored by the court during trial, it was held that if the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the court at a sufficiently early stage, the court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.

In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107, the Court emphasized the prerogative of the I.O while carrying out an investigation into an offence reported, as juxtaposed with the powers of the jurisdictional court in taking cognizance. The Judges dealt with Sections 154 to 176 of the CrPC of 1898 under the heading ‘Information to the Police and their powers to investigate’ together with Section 190, relating to the jurisdiction of the criminal court in inquiries and trials; which are almost in pari materia with CrPC of 1973. Finding very elaborate provisions made for securing an investigation into a reported offence, without causing any harassment to the accused and at the same time completion without unnecessary or undue delay, it was held that the manner and method of conducting the investigation are left entirely to the police and the Magistrate has no power to interfere with the same. After investigation, if the officer finds no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying forwarding the accused to the Magistrate, Section 169 provides that the accused shall be released on his executing a bond to appear before the Magistrate. 

On the other hand, if sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds are found to make out an offence, then the accused has to be forwarded to the Magistrate under Section 170 if the offence is bailable or otherwise released on bond requiring his appearance before the Magistrate. However, be it invocation of Section 169 or Section 170 the police officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under Section 173, either a closure report; finding no offence made out or a charge sheet; with material allegations based on valid evidence leading to the offence. It was categorically held relying on King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 71 IA 203, 212 that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping, leaving each to exercise its own functions, subject only to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case. When the jurisdictional court has no right to interfere less said the better about the interference made by a superior officer, herein the S.P, especially when the I.O forms an opinion that a case for trial is made out.

It was categorically held that the formation of opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is exclusively with the officer in charge of the investigation. If a closure report is filed; finding no case made out, it is not open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge sheet. It was also clarified that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless since the Magistrate is competent to proceed to take cognizance of the offence, on the materials revealed in the investigation, under Section 190 which imports a judicial discretion on the Magistrate to receive such report under Section 173. The Magistrate, hence, is not bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is no case to place the accused on trial as it is always open to take a contrary view on the facts disclosed in the report.

In Ram Naresh Prasad vs. State of Jharkhand (2009) 11 SCC 299 held that when the police file a report, colloquially termed a ‘closure report’; finding no sustainable case made out, the Court cannot direct a charge sheet to be filed, but could always take cognizance on the basis of the material in the report or direct further investigation. H.S. Bains v. State (U.T. of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631 & Ramswaroop Soni vs.State of M.P. (2020) 18 SCC 327 reiterated that when a closure report is filed finding no offence made out, the Court has three options; (i) to accept the same and close the proceedings or (ii) take cognizance of the matter on the materials in the report or (iii) direct further investigation. It is thus open to the Magistrate on submission of a closure report to look into the material facts disclosed in the report and form an opinion as to whether it constitutes an offence and take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b). To buttress this position, Abhinandan Jha3 made reference to Section 169 of the Code which provides that even if the police officer finds on investigation that there is no reasonable ground or sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial, the officer while releasing the accused has to take a bond for appearance before the Magistrate, if required. The primacy of the Court to take cognizance or deny it is the law discernible from the very provisions of the CrPC. 

 In the instant case the first charge sheet was filed only against the two accused and investigation was continued against the other 15 accused arrayed in the FIR, on instructions of the S.P, which should have been left to the Court taking cognizance, especially when the charge sheet found a trial enabled against all the accused. On submission of the first charge sheet and if there is felt a need for further investigation, ideally it should have been done with the orders of the Court and the commencement of trial ought to have awaited the completion of such investigation. But the cognizance taken by the Court against the fifteen accused, on the basis of the subsequent final report cannot be faulted since though the report on further investigation found no fresh material, the first report found the offence made out against all the accused, which was also before Court when the closure report was considered.

There could be claimed an irregularity but there is no illegality, miscarriage of justice or prejudice caused to the accused since split trials, in the same offence is not unheard of, which we will now deal with. Useful reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Banwari v. State of U.P.1962 SCC OnLine SC 98, wherein the two accused were convicted under charges of Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Magistrate committed three cases to the Sessions Court two with respect to the two murders and the other for attempt to murder, all by gunshot injuries. The Sessions Court modified the charges and consolidated the three cases, permitting evidence to be adduced in the first case and relied on that evidence in the other two cases. The incidents occurred in quick succession and this Court held that though Section 235 is not applicable, joint trial was justified under Sections 234 & 239 of the Code. When separate commitments are made of distinct offences not coming within the exception to Section 233, they cannot be tried at one trial. But, if there are separate commitment orders; (i) of persons who could be tried together or (ii) of the same person for offences which could be tried together, the accused could still be tried at one trial. Persons accused of committing a particular offence or offences jointly or in the course of the same transaction are not put up for trial at the same time, oftener than ever for reason of some being not available. When they are later made available and subsequently committed, the Sessions Judge is not bound to have two separate trials, one with respect to each commitment, if the trial in the first instance has not commenced.

A committal order just gives the Sessions Court cognizance over the trial of the persons committed and is not the basis of the cognizance taken for trial. If there is no prejudice to the accused, multiple committal orders can be consolidated to try the accused at one trial, provided it is justified under Sections 233 to 239 of the CrPC of 1898 (Sections 218 to 223 of the CrPC of 1973). It was held that ‘…the validity of a joint trial before the Sessions Judge is dependent on the fact whether the provisions of the Code justify one joint trial or not’ (para 25). The above discussion makes it crystal clear that the opinion in the final report filed is not decisive of the cognizance and the committal order/s is/are not determinative of whether the trial is single/separate/joint; which is at the exclusive discretion of the Court.

Herein, though triable together, before the report of further investigation was filed, the first trial commenced. Despite the futile exercise of a joint trial in between, the cases were separated before final adjudication. The relevant witnesses led on behalf of the prosecution and the defence were identical and no prejudice is caused to the accused, which persuades us to consider the matter on its merits.

Supreme Court observed: "21. It is distressing that no postmortem was conducted of the deceased who died in the hospital at Allahabad nor is any wound certificate produced. A person who sustained serious burn injuries having been admitted to the hospital, intimation would have gone to the jurisdictional police station; both at Mirzapur and Allahabad but not produced or even enquired into. It is also pertinent that the witnesses examined to prove the allegations are the friend of the father of the deceased (PW1), the father-in-law of one of the brothers of the deceased (PW2), her brothers (PWs 3 to 5 & 14) and her father (PW6). The testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses indicate that though the incident occurred on 13.04.2000 they were informed only on 21.04.2000; effectively controverted in the defense evidence.

PW1 says that the information was passed on to PW6 on April 22, 2000 and he along with PW6 went to see the victim at the hospital on April 22, 2000. PW2 deposed that his son-in-law i.e. PW14, the brother of the deceased went to the hospital at Allahabad on 26.04.2000 and met the victim. PW14 however deposed that on April 22, 2000 he saw his sister, completely burned, at Allahabad and on April 30, 2000 his father returned to Munger for arranging money for the treatment of his sister. It is also the testimony of the brothers and the father of the deceased that on May 2, 2000 when the victim died, a hasty cremation was conducted, to avoid a postmortem. It is very unlikely that having reached the hospital long before the death, the family members of the victim would have abandoned the victim in the company of her in-laws against whom allegations are raised of dowry demands. What is more disturbing is that the I.O has not attempted to bring out what transpired after the victim sustained the burns especially since the incident occurred at Mirzapur, where she was first admitted to the District Hospital and then later taken to a hospital at Allahabad where she succumbed after a few days’ hospitalization. The explanation of the relatives of the deceased is only that the accused are very influential in Allahabad which however does not
prevent an I.O from inquiring in the neighboring State while carrying out an investigation, bringing to light the facts as they existed.

All the witnesses confined themselves with a bland refrain about the demand of a dowry of Rs.50,000/- commenced from the date of marriage till her death. Admittedly, a son was born to the couple in the meanwhile, and the son was kept with the father after the death of the mother. 

PW15 was the I.O who does not speak anything worthwhile as to the investigation carried out. His deposition, as found from the impugned order marks the FIR and describes the marital home of the deceased and records that there is no incident reported at the  police station at Mirzapur where the marital home is situated. The statement of the doctor at the hospital at Allahabad in which the victim was treated is said to have been recorded but the said person was not summoned as a witness for the prosecution. It was also stated that on enquiries made at the police station having jurisdiction over the location in which the hospital is located, he was informed that a statement of the victim was recorded before the Magistrate. It is further deposed that it was not produced since it was not provided; clearly a lackadaisical approach. What assumes significance is that the I.O. categorically deposes that but for the family members of the complainant, none in the neighborhood came forward to speak of an acrimonious marriage, quite relevant in the context of the defense set up by the accused.

Supreme Court's judgement reads:" 28. We would, for the moment, not reckon the dying declaration which absolves the accused in toto. It is trite that a dying declaration though delicate, is a crucial piece of evidence if found to be trustworthy from the overall circumstances, enabling a conviction on that basis alone. However, when the dying declaration is exculpatory in nature, then necessarily the entire evidence would have to be analysed and if the other circumstances form a complete chain, the exculpatory statement of the deceased will have to be treated with some circumspection or at times eschewed completely.' 

In the present case, from the evidence at least it is clear that when the dying declaration was recorded, the deceased was admitted to the hospital and looked after by her husband and in-laws. The statements made in the above circumstances, presumably when the injured victim was looked after entirely by the accused will have to be treated with some circumspection and hence, we do not place any reliance on the same, at this point. 

The Court noted that it cannot but opine that the testimonies were in the nature of a soulless reiteration of a demand of Rs.50,000/-, having been made right from the inception of the marital life till the death occurred. The defense produced certificates of investments made in the joint names of the husband and the wife; far exceeding the demand alleged. DW1, the accused himself mounted the box to speak of an idyllic marriage and narrated the incident, the medical certificate indicating that his left hand was also scorched in the episode, while trying to save his wife. The accused also testified of informing his father-in-law on April 14, .2000 at 9:18 am through telephone, the call receipt evidencing the same. He had also sent telegrams on the same day at 08:35 am. The Kisan Vikas Patra and National Saving Certificates taken out in the joint name of himself and his wife, as also the LIC policy in his name, with his wife as the nominee were produced. The documents relating to the treatment of the deceased and the receipts with respect to the expenses incurred. The prescriptions during the treatment were also exhibited, belying the very contention of PW6 having returned to his village to arrange finance for his daughter’s treatment. 

The Court recorded that the trial court found that the entire documents from the hospital were not produced and it is not clear as to what medicines were administered to the patient, which in fact ought to have been procured and produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was rejected on the ground that the same was not forwarded through the jurisdictional CJM, the same having been received at the trial court, as directly forwarded from the office of the ADM. The efficacy of the dying declaration was further doubted since DW5 had not recorded it in the question-and-answer form. As to the demand of dowry, the trial court relied on the testimony of the witnesses regarding the demand made of Rs.50,000/- from 1995 till 1999. It was found that the time when the victim was taken to the hospital is 1:00 am on 14.04.2000 and there is discrepancy between the time of incident and the time claimed by the defense.

It also noted that the enquiries carried out at the police station having jurisdiction over the hospital, where the death occurred, clearly indicates a dying declaration having been made which was not produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and the doctor of the hospital, in which the victim was admitted, certified her fitness to make such a declaration. There is no hard and fast rule that a dying declaration should be in the question-and-answer form. The dying declaration, even if not reckoned to absolve the husband and the family members, at least raises a reasonable doubt regarding their culpability coupled with the other circumstances. The family of the victim reached the hospital long before her death and it is very unlikely that they left their child alone when they were arranging money for her treatment. 

The Court noted:" 34. Neither was a postmortem conducted nor was there an immediate FIR registered, at least in the hometown of the victim. The exact time when the fire occurred is discernible only from the statement in the dying declaration that it was around 10:45 pm. The time stated could only be an approximation and there would have been some time taken in arranging a transport and taking her to the hospital, first to the District Hospital at Mirzapur where the Doctor deposes, the victim was brought at 1 am. There was no attempt by the prosecution to bring forth the distance between the marital house of the deceased and the hospital. The victim was transferred to a higher medical center at Allahabad on the very same day for better treatment; all of which was carried out by the husband, as is indicated from the documents produced. The oral evidence led by the prosecution fails to prove the case set up of a demand of dowry or the animosity the husband is alleged to have been harboring against the wife. The hollow statement made of demand of dowry echoed listlessly by the witnesses; all relatives of the victim, raise not a grain of doubt but a sea of suspicion regarding the entire story set up.

Condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant the State, delay is owing to administrative difficulties would be impermissible: Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Kumar Mainsh

In The Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railway, Hazipur Bihar & Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Pvt. Ltd. through its Authorized representative Sri Arjun Rajput (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Kumar Manish delivered a 13-page long judgement, dated June 25, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered opinion that the learned District Judge is correct in taking a view that the miscellaneous arbitration application preferred by the present appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. In view of the clear mandate of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the learned Court could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of three months. Thus, no illegality or infirmity may be found in the impugned order. 16. This appeal fails." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing a commercial appeal which had been preferred seeking setting aside of the order dated August 17, 2023 passed by the District Judge, Patna in a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case  (Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railways, Hazipur, Bihar and Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Private Limited) whereby and whereunder the District Judge had dismissed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the Act of 1996’ as amended upto date) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed on behalf of the petitioners-respondents for setting aside the arbitral award dated December 14, 2021 passed by a sole Arbitrator in a Arbitration Case of 2019 which arose out of Request Case of 2019. 

The application was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the arbitral award was rejected on the ground of the same being hopelessly barred by limitation. The Sheristedar’s report was that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the application. 

An application seeking condonation of delay was filed. It was pointed out to the trail court that due to the COVID period delay was caused in preparation of the draft and its approval. It was submitted that after taking approval and sanction from the competent authority of the Railways, the matter was sent to Railway Lawyers for drafting the challenge petition in May, 2022 and the department was waiting for the final drafting of the petition. It was also stated that the counsel for the East Central Railways was delisted from its panel by the order of Ministry of Law and Justice and thereafter the deponent assigned the work to one of the learned Standing Government Counsel after approval of the same from the competent authority. It was finally submitted that the Supreme Court had also given a direction to condone the delay, if any, and after March 1, 2022, there was a delay of only 89 days in filing of the present application.

The District Judge had taken note of report of Sheristedar which showed that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the present case. The Court had also taken note of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and held that the delay of 222 days in filing of the case cannot be condoned. 

The counsel for the appellants argued before the High Court that the District Judge, Patna had not considered the order passed by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court during the COVID period in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 in which the period between March 15, 2020 and February 28, 2022 had been excluded in reckoning of the period of limitation. It was submitted that the trail court had merely considered the Sheristedar’s report and based on that the impugned order was passed. The impugned order suffers from non-consideration of the materials, therefore, it was liable to be set aside.

The counsel for the respondent submitted that on a bare perusal of the impugned order it was evident that the District Judge had duly considered the scope and ambit of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. So far as Sheristedar’s report is concerned, there was no contest that the appeal was filed on October 22, 2022 for setting aside of the arbitral award delivered on December 14, 2021. It was submitted that if the overall period is computed, the Sheristedar’s report was correct. So far as the COVID period was concerned, no doubt the District Judge had not specifically taken note of the said report in the impugned order but that would not make any change in the opinion of the court and the same would be totally irrelevant so far as the present case is concerned. Even if the period between December 14, 2021 and February 28, 2022 was excluded in reckoning the period of limitation, the fact remains that the application under Section 34(1) was preferred after eight months. The District Judge could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the period of limitation i.e. three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award by the party making the application.

Justice Prasad observed:"The facts are not in dispute. The arbitral award has been delivered on 14.12.2021. It is not the case of the appellant that the Award was served on the appellant on any other date. Thus, the period of limitation of three months for filing of an application under Section 34(1) of the Act of 1996 would have expired on 14th March, 2022. By virtue of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 were liable to be excluded. In this case, the last date for filing of the application under subsection (1) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was due to expire on 14th March, 2022. The period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are liable to be excluded for the purpose of filing of the application.  10. The application was not filed within a period of three months even if the period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are excluded, still on showing sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the prescribed period of limitation, the appellant would have got a condonation of another thirty days. Unfortunately, the appellant being such a big organisation having battery of lawyers, law officers and the senior officers dealing with the matter did not take care of the period of limitation and the mandatory nature of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. They have to blame themselves for this gross negligence on their part in not attending their matter within time. 

This is not the solitary case in which such inordinate delay has taken place. It is for the Railways to set their house in order and the means and ways by which it is to be taken care of or the responsibilities are to be fixed are in the domain of Railways." 

Sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 reads: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).(2) …...(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

Justice Prasad relied on the two judgments of theSupreme Court on this issue. In Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, the Supreme Court has held that condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant is the State and delay is owing to the administrative difficulties would be impermissible and in such cases, there would be no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It reads: “11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the extension of the prescribed period for any appeal or application subject to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to an application challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This has been settled by this Court in its decision in  Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein it held as follows : (SCC pp. 474-75, paras 12 &14) “12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of of interpretation would justify such a result. 

The history and scheme of the 1996 Act supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with the “exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide” in a court without jurisdiction, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions. The question whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been answered by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169. 

Supreme Court observed:“23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the 1996 Act, this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 ofthe 1996 Act, more particularly where no provision is to be found in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the 1996 Act would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside an arbitral award.”

Justice Prasad observed: "14. The position of law is well settled with respect to the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. By applying the facts of the present case to the well-settled position of law, we need to assess whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in condoning the delay for filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.”

In Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470, the Supreme Court has held that the application challenging the award filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would not be an application “in accordance with” subsection (3) as required under Section 34(1).

Justice Prasad concluded: 13. This Court has discussed both the judgments with the learned counsel for the appellant. Even as we have noticed that in its application under Section ‘5’ of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed before the learned District Judge, the appellant took a plea that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed for condonation of delay, if any, we are of the view that the blanket plea taken by the appellant before the learned District Judge has no basis to stand."

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes criminal proceedings under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, holds prosecution to be a “counterblast”

In Ankit Kumar Sharma vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated May 16, 2026, wherein, he quashed criminal proceedings under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and IPC provisions, holding that the prosecution appeared to be a “counterblast” to an earlier dowry harassment complaint filed by one of the accused against her husband and in-laws. 

Justice Sinha concluded:"24. It is well settled principle that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment and private vendetta. The High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.... The learned Special Court has taken cognizance without appreciating the attending circumstances, and in mechanical manner. 27. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion and the attending circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that a vexatious, frivolous and malicious complaint has been instituted against the appellants with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance which is a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the wife/appellant no. 4 against her husband at Jaipur. The FIR was lodged by the domestic help/caretaker of the husband of appellant no. 4 and the same is in abuse of the process of Court to harass the appellants and the learned Special Court has taken cognizance without due application of judicial mind. Allowing the prosecution to continue will result in miscarriage of justice to the appellants. 28. In the result, the order taking cognizance dated 27.09.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Saran at Chapra and the entire prosecution arising out of Garhka P.S.Case No. 298 of 2020 against the appellants is hereby quashed."

Justice Sinha drew on the analytical framework laid down by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of UP (2025) SCC Online SC 1947, becomes highly relevant. The court delineated four steps to determine the veracity of a prayer gor quashing under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which are as follows:-

Step 1. Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

Step 2. Whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges leveled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

Step 3. Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant, and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

Step 4. Whether proceedings with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court and would not serve the ends of justice?

Justice Sinha observed: "If the answer to all the steps is in affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.22. In the present matter, it appears that respondent no. 2 has been set up by the husband and mother-in-law of appellant no. 4 to lodge the present FIR in order to take revenge for lodging FIR at Jaipur by appellant no. 4 against her husband and his family members. The informant has admitted in the FIR that she is domestic help/caretaker of the house of Late father of the husband of appellant no. 4. 23. The motive for instituting the FIR against the appellants appears to be at the behest of landlords/masters of the respondent no. 2, i.e., Manish Kumar and Meera Devi, in whose house the respondent no. 2 resides and work for profit. If attending circumstances, emerging from the record of the case, is taken into account and the FIR is read with due care and circumspection, this Court comes to the conclusion that the criminal prosecution has been lodged in order to wreck vengeance on appellant no. 4 and her entire family for instituting a case under Section 498A of the I.P.C against the masters/landlord of respondent no. 2, including the husband of appellant no. 4. The FIR is a counterblast and tool to harass the appellants by way of launching false and malicious prosecution."

The prosecution case, as per the FIR lodged by the informant, namely Kalawati Devi, was that she resides in the house of late Ramji Singh and she was a caretaker of his garmland and house. In June 2019, Manish Kumar, son of late Ramji Singh, was married with Shalini Sharma/appellant no. 4.

Ankit Sharma and Abhinesh Sharma appellant nos. 1 and 3, who are brothers of Shalini Sharma/appellant no.4, visited the house of late Ramji Singh and abused her, addressing her with her caste name and threatened to throw her belongings out of the house. It was alleged that on June 29, 2020, appellants, along with two unknown persons, arrived in a car from their village Baikuntpur, Vaishali. Upon arrival, Shailendra Sharma and Abhinesh Sharma started hurling caste-based abuses and threatened the informant to vacate the house. The informant requested for some time to make alternative arrangements and upon hearing this, appellant nos. 1 to 3 dragged the informant by her hair out on to the road, assaulted her and tore her saree in order to outrage her modesty. When the informant's husband intervened to save her, he was also assaulted by the appellants. The local people gathered at the spot after hearing noise. In the meanwhile, appellant no. 1 took out pistol, pointed it at the informant’s forehead and threatened her to vacate the house failing which she would face dire consequences.

Supreme Court stays proceedings before Trial Court, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refused to quash FIR in a private dispute under corporate law

In Sarita Bajaj & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated July 18, 2025 staying further proceedings before the Trial Court. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court had passed a 20-page long judgement dated May 9, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....I have no other alternative but to hold that in the instant case, the F.I.R. being Kotwali P. S. Case No. 45 of 2024, dated 18th August, 2023, cannot be quashed. 32. The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. 33. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest."

Drawing on the judgement passed by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, Justice Chaudhari was "convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."  He observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

Sarita Bajaj, the Petitioner had invoked Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 at Kotwali Police Station in 2024 for the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Ajay Kumar Bajaj, Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to the Station House Officer of Kotwali Police Station, alleging inter alia, that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He also alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, along with other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. The parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. 

The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicated that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. It was confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, Petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. On February 27, 2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. 

On February 27, 2021, on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated August 30, 2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so. On February 27, 2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on February 28, 2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a resolution, dated August 31, 2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On April 3, 2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting.

The informant had already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in 2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated February 27, 2021 were forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs. Notably, certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition were not complied with or honoured by the informant. In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which has been registered as a Title Suit of 2023. Among other allegations, the informant alleged that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant also claimed that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. 

Under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. 

Besides this, an application was filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench in 2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400. 

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On November 8, 2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated December 4, 2023.

Notably, in the counter affidavit, filed by Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the Respondent No. 5, dated February 4, 2025, the High Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties falsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.. In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid.

However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. Later, Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Court, claiming that, as a Director of Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as August 2, 2021. In the application under Section 7 of IBC, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated September 20, 2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by NCLT, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to NCLAT New Delhi.

 

Suit for negative declaration that defendant is not legally married to plaintiff is maintainable: Bombay High Court

In Haridas Mahadev Sasne vs. Tejasvini Krushna Bhosale (2025), Bombay High Court's Justice N.  J. Jamadar held that "a suit for a negative declaration that the defendant is not legally married to the plaintiff is maintainable Consequently, the civil Judge can not be said to have committed any error in rejecting the application for rejection of the plaint" and rejected the civil revision application in its order dated March 6, 2025. The case was filed on February, 6, 2024. 

It is a case wherein the plaintiff, the complainant sought a declaration that no marriage occurred between her and the defendant, who falsely claimed marital status. 

The Court observed: the submission that a suit for mere declaration without any consequential relief, is not maintainable also does not carry much conviction. In a case of the present nature, the declaration about the marital status itself assumes the character of a substantive relief. The plaintiff in such a case is not required to seek any further relief. The declaration of marital status bears upon the rights and obligations of the parties and also serves the purpose of vindication of legal character."

A pivotal question of law which arose for consideration, in the revision application, was “whether a suit for declaration simpliciter that there is no marital relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, is maintainable” ? 

The plaintiff and the defendant were residents of the same village. They were acquainted with each other. The defendant took undue advantage of the proximity, and falsely claimed that defendant’s marriage was solemnized with the plaintiff on September 21, 2018 at Janjagruti Matrimonial Alliance Center, Chiplun. Asserting that no valid marriage was ever solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant and the latter was falsely claiming that the plaintiff is the wife of the defendant, the plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration that no marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant on September 21, 2018 or on any other day, at Janjagruit Matrimonail Alliace Center, Chiplun or at any other place. The defendant appeared and resisted the suit. The defendant also filed an application for rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code asserting that the plaintiff was seeking a negative declaration that no marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant. Such a negative declaration cannot be granted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963. Thus, there was a bar to the Suit seeking negative declaration. Resultantly, the Plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

The plaintiff resisted the application for rejection of the Plaint contending that if the averments in the plaint are read as a whole, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is seeking a negative declaration. Moreover, the Suit cannot be said to have been instituted under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 only. The plaintiff was entitled to seek declaratory relief under Section 9 and Order VII Rule 7 of the Code de hors the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1963. At any rate, the plaintiff was seeking a declaration as to her status, and, therefore, the purported bar under Section 34 of the Act of 1963 was inapplicable. 

The civil judge was persuaded to reject the application observing that a suit of the present nature for negative declaration was maintainable. The relief sought by the plaintiff was of a substantive nature. Thus, there was no substance in the application. Being aggrieved, the defendant has invoked the revisional jurisdiction.

The counsel for the respondent took the Court through the Plaint, averments in the application for rejection of the Plaint and the reply. He urged

that a person is not entitled to seek a negative declaration under Section 34 of the Act of 1963. It was submitted that the text of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 warrants that the person seeking a declaration must claim to be entitled to any legal character, status or right. A declaration that the plaintiff is not married to the defendant does not

fall within the ambit of the main part of Section 

In the case at hand, the plaintiff is seeking a mere declaration without any consequential relief. Therefore, the proviso to Section 34 of the Act, 1963 precludes the Court from granting a mere declaration. In these circumstances, according to counsel for the respondent a declaratory suit of the present nature is clearly barred. He urged that though there is a conflict of views of the different High Courts on the aspect of maintainability of such a suit, a Division Bench Judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Bhuvaneshwari vs . Revappa Alias Rani Siddaramappa Kolli (Since Deceased) by L.Rs 2009 SCC OnLine Kar 738 has categorically ruled that a relief seeking negative declaration as to marriage is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1963. The decision to the contrary by Calcutta High Court in the case of Joyita Saha vs. Rajesh Kumar Pande, AIR 2000 Calcutta 109 does not adequately deal with this aspect. Therefore, the decision in the case of Bhuvaneshwari case commands more persuasive value.

The counsel for the respondent, submitted that the declaration sought in the instant case cannot be said to be negative in character. Section 34 of the Act of 1963 is not the sole source of a declaratory relief. Section 9 of the Code is expansive enough to include a Suit for declaration that the defendant, who falsely claims to be married to the plaintiff, is not the husband of the plaintiff. Therefore, the very premise of the application for the rejection of the Plaint on the count that Section 34 of the Act of 1963 bars a Suit of the present nature, is flawed. He also submitted that the judgment of the Karnataka High Court can not be construed to lay down the ratio that a Suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is not married to the defendant cannot be instituted. The controversy in the case before the Karnataka High Court was regarding the maintainability of a Suit seeking a declaration that the defendant was not the wife of the plaintiff, before the Family Court. Adverting to the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 the Karnataka High Court ruled that a relief in the nature of a negative declaration in respect of a marriage does not fall within the ambit of the provisions contained in the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. 

He further submitted that the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court has made a passing observation that the relief of the instant nature is beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The Court has not considered the issue elaborately. The provisions and precedents which govern the field have not been considered. Thus, the said decision can be said to be a precedent sub silentio. To this end, reliance was placed on a Supreme Court judgment in the case of A-One Granites vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 537.

According to him, as a matter of principle, it cannot be said that a suit for negative declaration is not at all maintainable. The Court essentially deals with the legal character, right or status. The form of declaration is not material. He placed reliance on a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Narhar Raj (died) by L.Rs and Ors. vs. Tirupathybibi and Anr. 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1032. wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a suit for a relief of negative declaration is maintainable.

The Court took note of the nature and contours of a declaratory decree. A declaratory decree, in effect, cements and strengthens the legal character, right or status a person asserts, and denied by another. A declaration as to legal character or status protects from adverse attacks on title to such right, character or status and obviates further litigation by putting a judicial imprimatur over such right, character or status. Ordinarily a declaratory relief is accompanied by the consequential relief. However, it is not inconceivable that, in a given case, declaration itself assumes the character of a substantive relief. Undoubtedly, in a vast majority of cases, declaratory relief is sought under section 34 of the Act, 1963. However, that is not the sole repository of the power to grant a declaration. A civil Court in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction, referable to section 9 of the Code, may grant a declaration dehors the provisions contained in section 34 of the Act, 1963.

In order to appreciate the submissions of the  counsel for the applicant, the provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was cited. It reads: "Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its

discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

A bare perusal of the provision indicates that any person entitled to any legal character or any right in relation to any property, may sue for declaration. The words “character” and “property” are of expansive nature. To illustrate,

“character” may include the status and relation qua another person. The character may encompass within its scope an office, privilege and position with regard to a given entity. All attributes which the law vests in a person on account of an office, position, status or relation may fall within the ambit of the term “legal character”.

Secondly, the declaration can be sought against any person denying the first person’s title to such character or right, and also against any person interested to deny first person’s title to such legal

character or right.

Thirdly, the proviso to section 34, precludes the Court from granting a declaration simpliciter where the plaintiff though able to seek further consequential relief, than a mere declaration omits to do so. The proviso thus warrants a further inquiry whether in the facts of the case, the plaintiff is able to seek further consequential relief and yet omitted to do so. Obliviously the necessity and adequacy of consequential relief, in addition to declaration, would hinge upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

The declaration under section 34 of the Act, 1963 is, however, not exhaustive of the power of the civil Court to grant declaratory reliefs. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy and Ors. vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy and Ors. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 436 wherein the Supreme Court traced the development of the law with regard to declaratory action and enunciated that section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Old), was not exhaustive of cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the civil Courts have the power to grant such declaration independent

thereof. The observation in the paragraph 11 reads: "In our opinion, s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section. It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the

plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act."

The Supreme Court further expounded the law in the case of M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. vs. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and Ors. AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1810.  The Court enunciated that section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 merely gives statutory recognition to well recognized type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42.

The edifice of the submission of counsel for the applicant is that section 34 of the Act, 1963, bars the declaration, as sought in the instant case, and, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected stands dismantled. A civil Court is competent to grant a declaration regarding the marital status dehors the provisions contained in section 34 of the Act, 1963.

The Court examined as to whether a negative declaration as to marital status can be granted. First and foremost, from the phraseology of section 34 of the Act, 1963, an inexorable inference can not be drawn that such a negative declaration, cannot be made. The term legal character is of wide amplitude. The ‘marital status’ as a personal attribute and qua a particular person, squarely falls within the ambit of legal character. If a person can seek a declaration that he is legally weeded to the defendant, a fortiori , there does not seem any impediment in seeking a declaration that he is not married to the defendant. The negative form

of declaration is nothing but assertion of a particular positive marital status. If the defendant denies or is interested in denying such marital status asserted by the plaintiff, a declaration can be legitimately sought under the provisions of section 34 of the Act, 1963 itself.

The Court observed: "there seems to be a cleavage in the judicial opinion of the High Courts on the tenability of such a suit for negative declaration as to marital status." In the case of Bhuvaneshwari which constituted the sheet anchor of submission of counsel of the applicant, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court while deciding the question as to whether a suit seeking declaration that the defendant is not the wife of the plaintiff is maintainable before the Family Court, after considering the provisions contained in section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 which confers the jurisdiction upon a Family Court, held that the relief in the nature of negative declaration in respect of a marriage, is not tenable before the Family Court. After recording this view, the Division Bench ventured to add that the relief of such nature was even beyond the scope of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The observations in paragraph 22 of the judgment are relevant and hence extracted. It reads:-"In fact, we find a relief of this nature is even beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as a negative declaratory relief to declare that the marriage had never taken place, is not one that can come within scope of Section 34 of the Specific' Relief Act. Accordingly, when it is a relief that cannot be granted in law, there is no way the civil court can grant a declaratory relief."

A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, in the case of Joyita Saha case ruled that since the marriage itself was denied and the prayer was made in the suit for a declaration that there was no marriage between the parties, the suit as framed was quite maintainable in law. The controversy, however, seems to have been settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balram Yadav vs. Fulmaniya Yadav (2016) 13 SCC 308. In this case, the High Court of Chattisgarh had allowed an appeal against a decree passed by the Family Court to the effect that the respondent was not the legally married wife, on the ground that a negative declaration was outside the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Referring to the provisions contained in sections 7 and 8 of the Family Court Act, 1984 the Supreme Court held that in case there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative or negative relief. What is important is a declaration regarding marital status. 

The observations in paragraph 7 are material and hence it is extracted. It reads: "Under Section 7(1) Explanation (b), a Suit or a proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of both marriage and matrimonial status of a person is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, since under Section 8, all those jurisdictions covered under Section 7 are excluded from the purview of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. In case, there is a dispute on the matrimonial status of any person, a declaration in that regard has to be sought only before the Family Court. It makes no difference as to whether it is an affirmative relief or a negative relief. What is important is the declaration regarding the matrimonial status. Section 20 also endorses the view which we have taken, since the Family Courts Act, 1984, has an overriding effect on other laws."

The counsel of the applicant attempted to distinguish this judgment by canvassing a submission that the ratio in this decision is restricted to the Family Court, and that a civil Court would not be empowered to grant negative declaration as to marital status. 

Bombay High Court observed: "The submission simply does not merit countenance." The High Court underlined that "the civil Court has power to grant declaratory relief even independently of section 34 of the Act, 1963. The principle that the form of declaration does not matter and it is the status or legal character with regard to which the Court makes the declaration that is of substance, applies with even greater force to the proceedings before the civil Court which has inherent jurisdiction to decide all suits of civil nature unless their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."

 

Supreme Court reverses Trial Court's 1992 verdict, High Court's 2015 verdict in a abduction and murder case of 1985

In Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 26-page long judgement dated September 25, 2024, wherein, it set aside the judgement of the Patna High Court's Division Bench comprising Justices Dharnidhar Jha and Amaresh Kumar Lal in a case arising out of 1985 case from Munger's Sikandra Thana on September 25, 2024. The High Court's 38 page long judgement was delivered on March 26, 2015.  It was authored by Justice Jha. 

In its 26 page long judgement, the Court concluded: "the findings of conviction arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court are not sustainable. Moreover, the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Accordingly, the impugned judgment as well as the judgment rendered by the Trial Court (to the extent of conviction of A-1 to A-5) are set aside, and all seven accused persons (appellants) are hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled upon them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if lying in custody."

Neelam breathed her last in Simaltalla, Sikandra, Munger, Bihar on August 30, 1985 after her reported abduction by seven persons from the house which occurred on that day. The dead body of Neelam was not even discovered until the following morning. According to the post mortem report the death happened at 5 PM. But according to the informant the incident of abduction took place around 10:00 PM. Although, the post mortem report indicated that the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission of murder can-not be ruled out. But no direct evidence on record proved the commission of murder by the accused persons. The link of causation between the accused persons and the alleged offence was found conspicuously missing.

An FIR was lodged against seven accused persons, namely –Krishna Nandan Singh, Ram Nandan Singh, Raj Nandan Singh, Shyam Nandan Singh, Bhagwan Singh, Vijoy Singh/Sharma and Tanik Singh. After investigation a chargesheet was filed. The Trial Court delivered the judgement in June 1992. The High Court delivered the judgement in March 2015 and the Supreme Court in September 2024. 

The Supreme Court has recorded that the prosecution did not examine the three natural witnesses of the incident namely, Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Kumud Ranjan Singh. "There is no explanation for non-examination of the natural eye witnesses." It has raised doubt about the conduct of Ramanand Singh (P.W.18) the informant who was the brother-in-law of Neelam, the deceased. Neelam was married to Ashok Kumar Singh who happened to be the brother of Ramanand Singh. He did not try to prevent the accused persons from entering the premises or from abducting the deceased or from taking away the deceased on their shoulders in front of his eyes. The Court has detected inconsistency in the testimonies of three Prosecution Witnesses who has submitted that while coming from Lakhisarai to Sikandra Chowk, Ghogsha came first, followed by Lohanda and Simaltalla. In such circumstances, their presence at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM must be explained to the satisfaction of the Court. For, if they were going to their village, there was no occasion for them to come to Simaltalla as it did not fall on their way. But no such explanation is forthcoming from the material on record. It found it strange that the High Court too had detected it with regard to the testimony one of the Prosecution Witnesses but it failed to extend its finding to the other two Prosecution Witnesses who were similarly placed. It has inferred that "the so-called eye witnesses of the incident were actually accessories after the fact and not accessories to the fact." It renders the entire version of the prosecution as improbable and unreliable.

The Trial Court and High Court did not doubt the fact that Neelam was residing in her father’s house at Simaltalla but Supreme Court has reservations regarding its veracity. It noted that the investigating officer had inspected the house and no direct material, except some make-up articles, could be gathered so as to indicate that Neelam was actually residing there. The Court has recorded that Chando Devi, the sister of Ram Chabila Singh one of the tenants in the house was also residing in the same portion of the house but the High Court did take note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since Chando Devi was a widow, the make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no need for her to put on make-up being a widow. The judgement reads: "Mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly residing there. Furthermore, if Neelam was indeed residing there, her other belongings such as clothes etc. ought to have been found in the house and even if not so, the other residents of the same house could have come forward to depose in support of the said fact." Notably, the prosecution has not spotted any room in the entire house wherein the informant was residing. His own presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful.

The Court observed: "In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any evidence on record."

The Court disapproved of the approach of the High Court in reversing the acquittal of Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma (Accused No. 6) and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad (Accused No.7) "was not in line with the settled law pertaining to reversal of acquittals." It observed: "The Trial Court had acquitted the said two accused persons on the basis of a thorough appreciation of evidence and the High Court merely observed that their acquittal was based on the improbable statement of PW5 and since the evidence of PW5 stood excluded from the record, there was no reason left for the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Pertinently, the High Court did not arrive at any finding of illegality or perversity in the opinion of the Trial Court on that count. Furthermore, it did not arrive at any positive finding of involvement of the said two accused persons within the sphere of common intention with the remaining accused persons. Equally, the exclusion of the evidence of PW5, without explaining as to how the evidence of PW2 and PW4 was not liable to be excluded in the same manner, was in-correct and erroneous." This is with reference to the three eye witnesses whose testimony appear unreliable. 

The Court noted that the High Court was well within its powers to appreciate the evidence on record in its exercise of appellate powers but "in order to reverse a finding of acquittal, a higher threshold is required." It underles that "For, the presumption of innocence operating in favour of an accused through-out the trial gets concretized with a finding of acquittal by the Trial Court. Thus, such a finding could not be reversed merely because the possibility of an alternate view was alive. Rather, the view taken by the Trial Court must be held to be completely unsustainable and not a probable view. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, took a cursory view of the matter and reversed the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 without arriving at any finding of illegality or perversity or impossibility of the Trial Court’s view or non-appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court."

The Court relied on the exposition of law in Sanjeev v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022)., wherein the Supreme Court has summarized the position in this regard. It is well settled that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal. 

Justice Bela Trivedi led bench noted that "the case of the prosecution is full of glaring doubts as regards the offence of abduction", and "the offence of murder is entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence....The circumstantial evidence emanating from the facts sur-rounding the offence of abduction, such as the testimonies of eye witnesses, has failed to meet the test of proof and cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law. Therefore, the foundation of circumstantial evidence having fallen down, no inference could be drawn from it to infer the commission of the offence under Section 302 IPC by the accused persons. It is trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable conclusion of guilt. In the pre-sent case, the prosecution case is far from meeting that standard."

With regard to motive, the Court observed: "motive has a bearing only when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients of the offences under consideration."

The Court observed: "Without the proof of foundational facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of motive alone....The accused persons and the eyewitnesses belong to the same family and the presence of a property related dispute is evident. In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from implicating the other. In such circumstances, placing reliance upon motive alone could be a double-edged sword."

These seven accused persons were put on trial by the Sessions Judge who were charged under Sections 323, 302, 364, 449, 450, 380/34 and 120B of the IPC. The accused Vijoy Singh @ Vijoy Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh were charged under Sections 342/34 of the IPC. The judgment of the Sessions Judge had acquitted the two accused, namely, Vijoy Singh Sharma and Tanik Singh of all the charges. The five other accused persons were convicted of committing offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the IPC. They were also acquitted of charges under Sections 449, 450, 380, 323 and 120B of the IPC. The five appellants, who had been convicted under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the IPC were heard on sentence and each of them was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life under each of the two counts, the sentences being directed to run concurrently.

The High Court had set aside the judgment of acquittal delivered by 12th Additional Sessions Judge, Munger on June 5, 1992 in respect of respondents Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh by allowing the Government Appeal. It held the two guilty of committing offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and had directed each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment on each of the two counts each for life. 

In his judgement, the High Court noted that the respondents had submitted that they had not committed the offences under Sections 364 and 302 of the IPC. He observed: the charges had been framed under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code does not define any substantive sentence rather it lays down a rule of evidence that if from material evidence, it is shown that the accused persons had acted in furtherance of their common intention, then even if the main act had been committed by any of them all of them was equally liable for the offence as if the same had been committed by him. In order to bringing the case of an accused into the purview of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court has to find out as to whether there was any pre-meeting of mind or in other words had there been any consultations between the accused persons which could fall in the class of conspiracy hatched up by them to commit some unlawful act or an act which may not be unlawful if the means of committing it was unlawful. There could not be direct evidence in such matters and in most of the cases, the Court has to depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case so as to find out as to whether there had been pre-concert between the accused persons before they had embarked upon achieving their goal.

The High Court's judgement recorded that the respondents Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh had been shown from the evidence, to have put the informant under wrongful confinement when they had taken him into the corner of the house near a well. The purpose of this act of the two respondents was only to eliminate any chances of resistance coming into the further acts of the other accused persons of capturing Neelam from inside the house and taking her away. The other accused persons entered inside the house and dragged Neelam out and lifted her to take her away and subsequently her dead body was found in a paddy field. Thus, the sharing of the common intention by contributing into the commission of the offence in their own way by the two respondents of the Governmental Appeal is clearly established. 

The High Court's judgement had "set aside the judgment of acquittal in respect of respondents Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh by allowing the Government Appeal." The Court held "the two guilty of committing offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and direct each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment on each of the two counts each for life. In the result, the Government Appeal is allowed. The connected two criminal appeals appear of no merit and they are dismissed."

These five appellants had preferred the two criminal appeals against their conviction and sentence imposed upon them. The State of Bihar had preferred a separate appeal for challenging the acquittal of Vijoy Singh @ Vijoy Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh. These appeals arose out of the same judgment. The High Court had heard them together and had disposed of by a common judgment.