Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Justice Bibek Chaudhuri's order

In Devendra Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal ad Manmohan passed a q-page long order dated August 14, 2025, wherein it observed:'we do not find any case is made out for interference with the impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.' In Sadhana Bharti vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri pf Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated June 26, 2025. The petitioner was the wife of Tushar Bharti, the Opposite Party. No. 2. 3. Devendra Prasad Singh, Chandana Devi, Kumari Shruti Bharti and Rinki Devi the O.P. Nos. 3 to 6 were matrimonial relations of the petitioner and closely associated and connected with O.P. No. 2. The marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the O.P. No. 2 on May 1,  2023. At the time of her marriage, her father spent a huge amount of money towards the dowry of  the opposite parties. However, the opposite parties were not satisfied, and the petitioner was treated with cruelty by the opposite parties. This prompted the petitioner to file a complaint at Purnea Mahila P.S., on the basis of which FIR Case No. 40 of 2023 under Section 341/323/342/498A/504/506/34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were instituted. 

The case is pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Purnea. The case of the petitioner was that the petitioner got employment at the National Inland Navigation Institute as an assistant librarian and was posted at Patna. Since, the petitioner was residing in Patna for her job. It was difficult for her to attend Purnea court on each and every date when the case is fixed for hearing. It was also contended by the petitioner that the sister-in-law of the petitioner was a practicing advocate at Purnea court; therefore, she was not getting proper help and advice from any advocate at Purnea. Further, the case of the petitioner was that when she was staying at Patna, her husband came to her house and abused and molested her and snatched away her mangalsutra and earrings. Over the said incident, she lodged a complaint at Alamganj P.S., which gave rise to a FIR case of 2023. In the said case, a charge sheet was filed, and the case is pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Patna. She had filed an application under Section 125 of the CrPC before the Principal Judge, Family Court at Patna. The said proceeding is also pending against her husband. The petitioner contended that one case is pending at Purnea and the other two cases are pending at Patna. Under such circumstances, the case pending at Purnea may be transferred to the court of competent jurisdiction at Patna under the provision of Section 407 of the CrPC.

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "It is needless to say that while deciding a transfer petition, the convenience of the woman litigant is given preference. The petitioner has been working in Patna; the said job is her only source of sustenance. If, at this stage, when two other cases are pending at Patna, the petitioner is directed to go to Purnea to represent another case, she will suffer financially and materially. Therefore, I am inclined to allow the instant petition under Section 407 of the CrPC. The Purnea P.S. Case No. 10/2023, therefore, the G.R. Case No. 2540 of 2024 arising out of Punrea Mahila P.S. Case No. 40 of 2023 pending before the Court of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Purnea, Bihar, is transferred to the
Court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Patna City. 8. Let a copy of this order be sent to the courts of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Purnea, as well as the court of the learned ACJM, Patna City, for information and compliance. 9. The instant criminal miscellaneous case is thus disposed of." The order recorded that the O.P.s entered appearance in the instant proceeding by filing vakalatnama on May 29, 2025, but on the date if hearing the opposite parties were not represented by their advocate. 

 

Supreme Court dismisses appeal of ED, sets aside orders of Special Court taking cognizance against accused

In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, ED had filed complaints against the respondents and others under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The complaint is for an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act. Both private respondents, namely, Bibhu Prasad Acharya and Adityanath Das. The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued summons to the respondents and other accused persons. Both of them had filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the cognizance taken by the Trial Court and prayed for quashing the complaints on the ground that both of them were public servants and, therefore, it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). By the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the respondents' contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents. The ED approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih observed: "17. Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words ‘All other proceedings’ include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. We have carefully perused the provisions of the PMLA. We do not find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC. Considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us. Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA."

The judgement was authored by Justice Oka. It reads: "18. Section 71 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the PMLA notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 65 is a prior section which specifically makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to PMLA, subject to the condition that only those provisions of the CrPC will apply which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA. Therefore, when a particular provision of CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 71 (1) cannot override the provision of CrPC which applies to the PMLA. Once we hold that in view of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 197(1) will apply to the provisions of the PMLA, Section 71 cannot be invoked to say that the provision of Section 197(1) of CrPC will not apply to the PMLA."

It also notes "A provision of Cr. P.C made applicable to the PMLA by Section 65, will not be overridden by Section 71. Those provisions of CrPC which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 will continue to apply to the PMLA, notwithstanding Section 71. If Section 71 is held applicable to such provisions of the CrPC, which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65, such interpretation will render Section 65 otiose. No law can been interpreted in a manner which will render any of its provisions redundant."

It concluded: "In this case, the cognizance of the offence under Section 3, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, has been taken against the respondents accused without obtaining previous sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC.Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct. We must clarify that the effect of the impugned judgment is that the orders of the Special Court taking cognizance only as against the accused B.P.Acharya and Adityanath Das stand set aside. The order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected." The Court endorsed the verdict of Justice B. Siva Sankara Rao of Telangana High Court. 

It is not clear from the judgement as to why the order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected. The judgement was delivered on November 6, 2024.

Supreme Court sets aside judgment of Jharkhand High Court that denied regular bail

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Enforcement Directorate (2024), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan set aside judgment of Jharkhand High Court which had dismissed the regular bail application of the appellant. The regular bail was sought in connection with a case registered for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 pending before the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi.  The bail application was under Section 45 of PMLA. 

The Court relied on  the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India (2022) wherein the Court categorically held that while Section 45 of PMLA restricts the right of the accused to grant of bail, it could not be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. It also relied on Court's decision in Manish Sisodia (II) vs. Directorate of Enforcement, wherein it was made amply clear that even under PMLA the governing principle is that “Bail is the Rule and Jail is the Exception”. 

The Court observed: "All that Section 45 of PMLA mentions is that certain conditions are to be satisfied. The principle that, “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is only a paraphrasing of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Liberty of the individual is always a Rule and deprivation is the exception. Deprivation can only be by the procedure established by law, which has to be a valid and reasonable procedure. Section 45 of PMLA by imposing twin conditions does not re-write this principle to mean that deprivation is the norm and liberty is the exception. As set out earlier, all that is required is that in cases where bail is subject to the satisfaction of twin conditions, those conditions must be satisfied."

The judgement reads: we hold that the appellant has satisfied the twin conditions under Section 45. Inasmuch as from the material on record, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant is not guilty of the offence of Money Laundering as alleged under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA and the Court is further satisfied that the appellant is not likely to commit any offence, if enlarged on bail.

It has recorded that the Court does not think that "the appellant can be denied bail based on the pendency of the other matter. We say so in the facts and circumstances of the present case as we do not find any justification for his continued detention. The appellant has already been in custody for over one year. The Trial is yet to commence."