Condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant the State, delay is owing to administrative difficulties would be impermissible: Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Kumar Mainsh

In The Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railway, Hazipur Bihar & Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Pvt. Ltd. through its Authorized representative Sri Arjun Rajput (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Kumar Manish delivered a 13-page long judgement, dated June 25, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered opinion that the learned District Judge is correct in taking a view that the miscellaneous arbitration application preferred by the present appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. In view of the clear mandate of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the learned Court could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of three months. Thus, no illegality or infirmity may be found in the impugned order. 16. This appeal fails." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing a commercial appeal which had been preferred seeking setting aside of the order dated August 17, 2023 passed by the District Judge, Patna in a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case  (Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railways, Hazipur, Bihar and Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Private Limited) whereby and whereunder the District Judge had dismissed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the Act of 1996’ as amended upto date) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed on behalf of the petitioners-respondents for setting aside the arbitral award dated December 14, 2021 passed by a sole Arbitrator in a Arbitration Case of 2019 which arose out of Request Case of 2019. 

The application was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the arbitral award was rejected on the ground of the same being hopelessly barred by limitation. The Sheristedar’s report was that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the application. 

An application seeking condonation of delay was filed. It was pointed out to the trail court that due to the COVID period delay was caused in preparation of the draft and its approval. It was submitted that after taking approval and sanction from the competent authority of the Railways, the matter was sent to Railway Lawyers for drafting the challenge petition in May, 2022 and the department was waiting for the final drafting of the petition. It was also stated that the counsel for the East Central Railways was delisted from its panel by the order of Ministry of Law and Justice and thereafter the deponent assigned the work to one of the learned Standing Government Counsel after approval of the same from the competent authority. It was finally submitted that the Supreme Court had also given a direction to condone the delay, if any, and after March 1, 2022, there was a delay of only 89 days in filing of the present application.

The District Judge had taken note of report of Sheristedar which showed that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the present case. The Court had also taken note of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and held that the delay of 222 days in filing of the case cannot be condoned. 

The counsel for the appellants argued before the High Court that the District Judge, Patna had not considered the order passed by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court during the COVID period in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 in which the period between March 15, 2020 and February 28, 2022 had been excluded in reckoning of the period of limitation. It was submitted that the trail court had merely considered the Sheristedar’s report and based on that the impugned order was passed. The impugned order suffers from non-consideration of the materials, therefore, it was liable to be set aside.

The counsel for the respondent submitted that on a bare perusal of the impugned order it was evident that the District Judge had duly considered the scope and ambit of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. So far as Sheristedar’s report is concerned, there was no contest that the appeal was filed on October 22, 2022 for setting aside of the arbitral award delivered on December 14, 2021. It was submitted that if the overall period is computed, the Sheristedar’s report was correct. So far as the COVID period was concerned, no doubt the District Judge had not specifically taken note of the said report in the impugned order but that would not make any change in the opinion of the court and the same would be totally irrelevant so far as the present case is concerned. Even if the period between December 14, 2021 and February 28, 2022 was excluded in reckoning the period of limitation, the fact remains that the application under Section 34(1) was preferred after eight months. The District Judge could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the period of limitation i.e. three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award by the party making the application.

Justice Prasad observed:"The facts are not in dispute. The arbitral award has been delivered on 14.12.2021. It is not the case of the appellant that the Award was served on the appellant on any other date. Thus, the period of limitation of three months for filing of an application under Section 34(1) of the Act of 1996 would have expired on 14th March, 2022. By virtue of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 were liable to be excluded. In this case, the last date for filing of the application under subsection (1) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was due to expire on 14th March, 2022. The period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are liable to be excluded for the purpose of filing of the application.  10. The application was not filed within a period of three months even if the period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are excluded, still on showing sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the prescribed period of limitation, the appellant would have got a condonation of another thirty days. Unfortunately, the appellant being such a big organisation having battery of lawyers, law officers and the senior officers dealing with the matter did not take care of the period of limitation and the mandatory nature of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. They have to blame themselves for this gross negligence on their part in not attending their matter within time. 

This is not the solitary case in which such inordinate delay has taken place. It is for the Railways to set their house in order and the means and ways by which it is to be taken care of or the responsibilities are to be fixed are in the domain of Railways." 

Sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 reads: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).(2) …...(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

Justice Prasad relied on the two judgments of theSupreme Court on this issue. In Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, the Supreme Court has held that condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant is the State and delay is owing to the administrative difficulties would be impermissible and in such cases, there would be no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It reads: “11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the extension of the prescribed period for any appeal or application subject to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to an application challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This has been settled by this Court in its decision in  Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein it held as follows : (SCC pp. 474-75, paras 12 &14) “12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of of interpretation would justify such a result. 

The history and scheme of the 1996 Act supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with the “exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide” in a court without jurisdiction, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions. The question whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been answered by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169. 

Supreme Court observed:“23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the 1996 Act, this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 ofthe 1996 Act, more particularly where no provision is to be found in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the 1996 Act would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside an arbitral award.”

Justice Prasad observed: "14. The position of law is well settled with respect to the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. By applying the facts of the present case to the well-settled position of law, we need to assess whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in condoning the delay for filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.”

In Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470, the Supreme Court has held that the application challenging the award filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would not be an application “in accordance with” subsection (3) as required under Section 34(1).

Justice Prasad concluded: 13. This Court has discussed both the judgments with the learned counsel for the appellant. Even as we have noticed that in its application under Section ‘5’ of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed before the learned District Judge, the appellant took a plea that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed for condonation of delay, if any, we are of the view that the blanket plea taken by the appellant before the learned District Judge has no basis to stand."

Justice Arun Kumar Jha grants bail to a child in conflict with law, sets aside order Appellate Court, Saran and Juvenile Justice Board in a gang-rape case

Name of the offender juvenile anonymized, but the name of the victim of gang rape disclosed in the judgement, ignoring Supreme Court's repeated directions

In X vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated June 29, 2026 concluded:"15. Let the petitioner, a child in conflict with law, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra/concerned Court in connection with JJB Case No. 51 of 2025, arising out of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the parents of the petitioner and the other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent and shall give undertaking that he / she shall keep proper care and upkeep of the petitioner. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board. (iii) If the petitioner is found involved in similar nature of offence in future, the learned J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra will be at liberty to move for cancellation of his bail bond. 16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is allowed." 

The respondent no. 2 is Tannu Kumari is the daughter of Rajendra Kumar Yadav, resident of village near Sadha Dhala, Bazar Samiti, Mufassil, Saran was impleaded as a opposite party no. 2 on the directions of Justice Jha by his order dated February 23, 2026. The order reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner is was directed to be implead the informant of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025 as opposite party no. 2 in course of the day."

Justice set aside the order by the Appellate Court dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra in Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2025. Subsequently, the order of the Juvenile Justice Board in a JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 was also set aside. 

The judgement records that in the revision petition, the identity details of the petitioner /child in conflict with law was disclosed, which is against the statutory provisions prescribed under Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which mandates protection of disclosure of identity of the child in conflict with law.  Therefore, the identity of the child in conflict with law is being referred to in the cause title as X. 3. Registry while uploading the order on the website shall also ensure that the cause title is reflected in similar manner. 

Notably, the petitioner is a son of Jitendra Ray, resident of village- New Basti Brahmpur, Bhagwan Bazar, Saran. His mother is Rinku Devi.  

The criminal revision petition was directed against the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra, in a Criminal (Juvenile) Appeal of 2025, whereby and whereunder the appeal was dismissed and the order of Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra dated September 8, 2025 passed in JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 70(1) and 3(5) of the B.N.S., 2023, was affirmed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 

As per prosecution case, the petitioner and other co-accused persons committed gang-rape with the informant. The petitioner was apprehended and was in custody since January 19, 2025 of the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. The petitioner was declared a child in conflict with law vide order dated August 11, 2025 passed by the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. 

Being aggrieved by the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the Appellate Court, the petitioner moved the revision petition before the High Court. 

The counsel for the petitioner/child in conflict with law submitted that the child in conflict with law was falsely implicated in this case and he was innocent. The prosecution story was not believable. The FIR was registered after a delay of more than twenty-four hours without any plausible explanation. Though the child in conflict with law was named as an accused in the written report on which the FIR was instituted, the informant did not name this child in conflict with law in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the B.N.S.S., 2023. He also submitted that the medical report did not support the allegation of gang-rape. The main accused against whom there was specific allegation of kidnapping the informant and taking her to a secluded place and committing rape with her, was been granted bail by First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra. The counsel further submitted that the Courts below failed to appreciate the mandate of law as under Section 12 as well as Sections 3(i), 3(IV), 3(V) and 3(XIV) of the Act of 2015. The counsel also submitted that the Courts below failed to consider that prolonged detention of a child in conflict with law defeats the very objective of the J.J. Act which is reformative and rehabilitative in nature. It was submitted that mother of the child in conflict with law undertakes to take full care of her son and further undertakes that she would not allow the child in conflict with law to come in contact with bad elements. The child in conflict with law was having antecedent of five cases and  he was on bail in all these cases. 

APP for the State and the counsel for the OP No. 2 vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner/child in conflict with law. The counsel for the OP No. 2 submitted that the Courts below has correctly passed the orders considering the antecedent of the child in conflict with law. The child in conflict with law was having altogether five criminal cases and he committed all these offences while on bail in two such cases. There was every likelihood that the child in conflict with law would again commit some serious offence if he was enlarged on bail. He also submitted that thus there was apparent mental, physical and psychological danger to the child in conflict with law (CICL) and it was also very likely that the CICL would again come in contact with his associates who appear to be inveterate criminals.

Justice Jha observed: "10. Section 12 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that a CICL could be denied bail only on the ground that on release, the said child would come in contact with criminal elements or there was danger to the moral, physical and psychological well being of the CICL or the release would defeat the ends of justice. If these grounds are not present, the bail could not be denied to a CICL. 11. Further, the Act of 2015 is, in fact, child friendly. The central theme is that the interest of child is supreme. Section 3 of the Act of 2015 incorporates the general principles to be followed in the administration of the Act. According to which, “all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. In fact, Section 3(iv) of the Act of 2015 provides for the principle of best interest and for all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. Section 3(xii) of the Act of 2015 makes it abundantly clear that a child shall be placed in institutional care as a step of last resort after making a reasonable inquiry. Further, Section 3(xiii) of the Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for Principle of repatriation and restoration stating that a CICL shall have the right to re-unite with his family and be restored to the social, cultural and the economic background that he came from unless such restoration and repartition is not in the CICL’s best interest." 

The judgement reads: "12. Cumulative reading of aforesaid provisions show the CICL should be released on bail unless the fact comes on record that there was chance of such child coming in contact with a known criminal or enlarging such child on bail might expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger. Further, the Courts being parens patriae are supposed to look into for protection of best interest of the child. All such steps are to be taken by the Courts for reformation and rehabilitation of a CICL." 

Justice Jha recorded: "It is true that the CICL is having antecedent of five cases and it also appears that he has been named in this case after release on bail in two such cases, but the intent and purpose of the J.J. Act is to reform a child delinquent and if the Court refused to release the child and bring him to his family would defeat the purpose if prayer for bail is rejected on the ground of criminal antecedent, though it becomes relevant factor for considering whether the case of the CICL falls in any of the exceptions under Section 12 of the Act of 2015. Since the bail of the CICL is refused solely on the ground of criminal antecedent, I think the CICL can be given an opportunity to reform himself and for reformation and rehabilitation of the CICL, the best place is his family and as his mother has undertaken to take care of him, I think considering all these facts and circumstances and the mandate of law, the prayer for bail of the CICL could be sympathetically considered." 

While the removal of the name of the a child in conflict with law has rightly been protected from disclosure, the disclosure of the name of the informant does appear to be appropriate.  

In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Hukum Chand @ Monu 2026 INSC 290, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh concluded:"we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to all the Registrars General of the High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated prior to the passing of this Court’s judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (((2019) 2 SCC 703)) which has mandated the non-disclosure of the victim’s identity, and still pending, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is followed strictly. This has been the long-standing position in law but, it has not been followed. The primary reason thereamongst, one supposes, is the general indifference of the Courts below and possibly even the lack of awareness of the deep stigma that follows such offences." The Bench drew attention towards the Court's decisions in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh 1996) 2 SCC 384 which touched upon this issue in connection with Section 327 CrPC, and also towards Bhupinder Sharma vs. State of HP (2003) 8 SCC 551.

Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment of 2013 by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Ara in a case of kidnapping for marriage

In Harendra Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 16-page long judgement dated June 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"24. The impugned judgment dated 18.04.2013 and order of sentence dated 20.04.2013 passed in Sessions Trial No. 149 of 2005 arising out of Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 by the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge II, Ara is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the above-named appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, as such, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him. 25. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 26. There shall be no order as to cost. 27. Office is directed to send back the lower court records along with a copy of the judgment to the learned District Court forthwith."

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the criminal appeal which was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2005. The case arose out of a Ara Nawada P.S.Case of 2003, by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge IInd, Ara, whereby the trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence committed under Section 366 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000.

The prosecution case was that the informant, Yogendra Yadav, while working in a Cotton Mill at Sapar, Rajkot (Gujarat), became acquainted with accused Nagendra Yadav, who was employed in the same establishment. On February 17, 2003, when the informant, along with his wife and minor son, was returning to his native village, Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and allegedly persuaded them to visit his residence at Ara Town. It was alleged that after reaching Ara on February 19, 2003 and staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, the informant found the very next morning that his wife, son and a box containing Rs.90,000/- were missing. Upon inquiry from the co-accused Ram Ayodhaya, he was informed that his wife and son had gone to the River Ganga and would return later, however, allegedly co-accused Ram Ayodhaya had allegedly served him food containing intoxicant and after consuming the same he remained unconscious for several days. The day he regained consciousness he found that his wife, son and the cash box were missing. Subsequently, on February 26,.2003, when the informant, along with witnesses had again approached the accused persons to know about the whereabouts of his son and wife, allegedly the accused demanded Rs.1,00,000/- to release his wife and son and in case of failure of fulfillment of the 
demand he had threatened that they would be killed, which led to institution of the complaint before the Chief Judicial  Magistrate.

The Magistrate directed the local police for investigation in exercise of power under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., pursuant to which Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 was registered for the commission of offences under Sections 364, 379, 328 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) against four accused persons, including the appellant. 

The police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 366, 364, 379 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code on November 26, 2023. Cognizance was taken on February 7, 2004, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on March 18, 2005. Charges were framed against the appellant on January 7, 2006 leading the conviction of the appellant upon completion of trial. 

The counsel of the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the main allegation is against co-accused Nagendra Yadav and the appellant were implicated solely because he is the brother of the co-accused, in spite of the fact, no material came against the appellant that he had participated in the alleged abduction of the informant’s wife or son and he had shared any common intention with the main accused, so as, to attract the provisions
of 120-B of the IPC. 

He referred to the testimony of Om Prakash Yadav, the P.W.1, the son of the informant. He in his examination-in-chief, gave varying versions regarding the circumstances in which his mother allegedly went away on her own, which creates serious doubt about the veracity of his testimony and the prosecution case as a whole. 

The counsel submitted that neither any witness nor any material was brought on record in course of trial to suggest that the victim was kidnapped by the appellant as would also appear from the deposition of the victim Meera Devi, the P.W.5, who is the victim and she also has not supported the prosecution story. 

P.W.5 in her statement in police custody that she on her own had accompanied the co-accused which demolishes the accusation of kidnapping and, as such, the prosecution having miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, renders the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence to be set aside.

APP appeared for the State. While opposing the appeal, he submitted that the District Court, after considering all the evidences on record and exhibits submitted on behalf of the parties during the course of trial, has erred no mistake in passing the order conviction against the appellant.

The conviction of the appellant is under Section 366 and Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. Section 366 reads: “Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.

Section 120B reads: "Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.  (2)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."

Justice Singh observed: "12. To constitute the offence of abduction, it must be shown that a person was unlawfully taken away or induced to move from one place to another either by the use of force or through deceitful means. The essence of the offence lies in the intention with which the accused acts. It is the accused's conduct, volition and underlying purpose that are determinative of whether the offence is made out. The crucial issue in every case is the intention accompanying the act of taking or inducing the woman to leave a particular place. Once the requisite criminal intent on the part of the accused is established, the offence stands complete irrespective of whether the intended object was ultimately achieved and regardless of whether the woman subsequently consented to marriage or sexual relations. 13. It is a well-settled principle that, for bringing home a charge under Section 366 IPC, the prosecution must establish not merely that the woman was taken or induced to move from one place to another, but also that such inducement was effected by force or deceitful means and was accompanied by the requisite criminal intent contemplated under the provision. The prosecution is further required to prove that the abduction was committed with the intention that the woman may be compelled to marry any person against her will, or that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or with the knowledge that such consequences were likely to follow. Mere proof of abduction, by itself, is insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 366 IPC. The gravamen of the offence lies not only in the act of taking away the woman but also in the specific purpose and intention behind such act. Therefore, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving that the abduction was for one of the purposes enumerated under Section 366 IPC, a conviction under the said provision cannot be legally sustained.

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2018) 6 SCC 664, wherein, it observed that to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case which is reproduced hereinafter:“16. In order to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case. Once the necessary intent of the accused is established, the offence is complete, whether or not the accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.

The judgement reads: ".....to constitute an  offence under Section 366 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge under Section 366 IPC is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 IPC, the court cannot hold the accused guilty and punish him under Section 366 IPC.” This proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yousuff vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2021) 16 SCC 461. 

Justice Singh explored as to whether the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 366 and 120-B of the IPC was justified. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether four witnesses. P.W.1 – Om Prakash Yadav: P.W.1 is the son of the informant and one of the alleged victims. In his deposition, he stated that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) along with his parents, accused Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and persuaded them to visit Ara. According to him, after staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, he and his mother were taken away by accused Nagendra Yadav and were kept at different places, including Kudhwa Tola and Mumbai. He also stated that when they later came to Buxar Railway Station, he met his father, whereupon the accused persons fled away with his mother. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was a student of Class V at the relevant time and supported the fact that he had stayed with his mother at Kudhwa Mohalla and Mumbai. The trial court found his testimony corroborative of the evidence of P.W.2, Yogendra Yadav, the Informant. 

P.W.2 identified his signature on the complaint petition. He substantially reiterated the allegations made in the complaint petition. He deposed that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) on February 17, 2003 along with his wife and son, accused Nagendra Yadav persuaded them to visit Ara Town. After reaching the khatal of the accused persons and taking meals, he went to sleep and on waking found his wife and son missing. He stated that accused Ram Ayodhaya informed him that they had gone to the Ganga for bathing and worship. He further alleged that after consuming food provided by the accused persons, he became unconscious for several days and, upon regaining consciousness, found that his wife and son were still missing. He also deposed that the accused persons later demanded Rs.1,00,000/- for their release. In cross-
examination, he stated that Meera Devi was his second wife and that he had married her in the year 1995 after separating from his first wife. The trial court found that his evidence regarding the stay at the khatal and subsequent disappearance of his wife and son remained substantially unshaken.

P.W.3–SurendraYadav, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He denied having any knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been interrogated by the police in connection with the case. Nothing material supporting the prosecution case could be elicited from his evidence.

P.W.4–Vindhyachal Yadav was also declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the
alleged occurrence and did not support the prosecution version. His evidence did not advance the prosecution case in any manner.

P.W.5 – Meera Devi, the alleged victim and the second wife of the informant according to the prosecution case did not support the prosecution version and was declared hostile. She stated that she had never married the informant and also alleged that her statement recorded before the Magistrate had been made under pressure from the police. She specifically denied the prosecution allegation that accused Nagendra Yadav had forcibly abducted her after administering poison to the informant. Her evidence was completely contrary to the prosecution case and substantially weakened the allegation of kidnapping.

P.W.6 – Daya Ram Singh @ Dayanand Yadav was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been questioned by the police regarding the incident. No material supporting the prosecution case emerged from his testimony.

P.W.7 – Singhasan Yadav was also declared hostile. He denied knowledge of the occurrence and did not support the prosecution case. His evidence was of no assistance to the prosecution.

P.W.8 – Paras Nath Yadav, (referred to as P.W.9 in portions of the trial court judgment) was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied having any knowledge of the alleged incident and did not support the prosecution version. Nothing favourable to the prosecution could be elicited from his evidence.

Justice Singh recorded that on the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellants/accused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against them, which they denied and show their complete innocence. 

Justice Singh observed:"....I find that the learned trial Court has erred in concluding that the present appellant, Harendra Yadav, shared the common intention or was a party to any conspiracy with the co-accused, Nagendra Yadav, so as, to attract the allegations under Sections 366 and 120B IPC. 22. From the evidence available on record, it transpires that the main allegation of taking away the victim is directed against co-accused Nagendra Yadav. Significantly, the alleged victim, P.W.5 (Meera Devi), has herself not supported the prosecution case and has categorically denied that she was forcibly abducted by the accused persons. She has further denied material aspects of the prosecution story and has not attributed any overt act whatsoever to the present appellant. Mere relationship of being brother of the co-accused and his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be established that there was prior meeting of mind for establishing offence under Section 366 and 120(B) of I.P.C without any independent corroboration."

The judgement reads: "23. The record further reveals that P.Ws.3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution to rest substantially upon the testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2. Even their evidence does not disclose any specific act on the part of the appellant indicating that he had induced, compelled, or deceived the victim into going from one place to another, nor is there any material to establish that he possessed the requisite intention contemplated under Section 366 IPC. Likewise, there is no cogent evidence demonstrating any agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the co-accused so as to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. From the records of the case and the testimony of the victim herself, it is evident that no specific allegation has been levelled against the appellant so as to attract the ingredients of the aforesaid offences. In such circumstances, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial Court is not borne out of the evidence on record."

Justice Ansul' s order is not in favour of "media gag", does not prevent fair, accurate, objective reporting of pending court proceedings or publication of facts in alleged tender scam case

Did tender scam led to removal of Nitish Kumar as Chief Minister? 

In Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar through Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul passed a 7-page long order dated June 24, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"19. Having seen both sides of the coin, this court is clearly not in a view of media gag over the issue. However, the court would certainly direct for control over irresponsible reporting and imputation of guilt upon the petitioner without any initiation trial at all. 20. In that view of the matter the court issues following directions: Pending consideration of the present petition all print, electronic, digital and social media platforms shall be at liberty to report the factual developments concerning the case and proceedings before competent courts. However, none of the above would: (a) Describe the petitioner as guilty of the offences alleged. (b) Portray the petitioner as having committed the offences alleged. (c) Publish or broadcast material pertaining to determine criminal liability. (d) Use expressions imputing guilt like mastermind, scamster, kingpin or equivalent description conveying criminal responsibility. (e) Conduct media trials based upon alleged confessions, investigation material, unproved document whose evidentiary value is yet to be determined. (f) However, nothing in this order shall prevent fair, accurate and objective reporting of the proceedings pending before the court or publication of the facts. 21. The above restraint shall extend to digital publications, online portals, video streaming services, podcast, social media accounts, channels and other internet based platforms." The case is listed for further hearing on July 10, 2026.  

The order was passed upon hearing an application filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings pertaining to Special Vigilance Unit Case No. 05 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025. The counsel for the ED stated that in the round of litigation in connection with same FIR, the petitioner had filed Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 in which they were added as a party but in the application filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings they have not been added as a party. Notably, Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar through Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 was filed on May 8, 2025 and registered on May 14, 2025 for quashing the FIR. On the earlier occasion, by Justice Sandeep Kumar's order dated July 8, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement was ordered to be made party. Notably, this writ petition was withdrawn on April 18, 026.

The counsel for the petitioner was directed by Justice Ansul to add Enforcement Directorate as party respondent. 

The counsel for the ED sought time to file counter affidavit to bring the materials available on record. The counsel for the Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar also sought time to file counter affidavit. Justice Ansul directed that the counter affidavit must explain the reasons for delay of one year in conducting the raid after registration of FIR.

The counsel for the petitioner stated that an FIR was registered and after more than a year of registration of FIR raid was conducted in the residential premises on May 27, 2026 and he was arrested on the same date. In the raid nothing incriminating was found against him still after arrest various television channels,
newspapers, online news portal and social media handles commenced extensive and lurid coverage of the case, broadcasting one sided narratives, unverified allegations and prejudicial content that portrays the petitioner as guilty even before commencement of trial. Several prime time news debates were conducted by prominent TV anchors wherein the petitioner was condemned, vilified and subjected to public humiliation without any opportunity to present his side. Such coverage has direct effect of influencing public opinion against the petitioner, prejudicing the minds of potential witnesses and creating an atmosphere inimical to fair trial. The counsel stated that in State of Maharashtra vs. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 386, it is stated that “A trial by press, electronic media or public agitation is the very antithesis of rule of law.”The decision in M.P. Lohia vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2005) 2 SCC 686 was referred, wherein, the Supreme Court held that it is not proper for the press or the electronic media to project a one-sided picture of events before the public in matters which are sub-judice. The Supreme Court's decision in Sahara India real Estate Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr. Reported in (2012) 10 SCC 603 was also relied upon, wherein, the Court held that the courts have the power to impose prior restraints on publications in exceptional cases where there exists a real and substantial risk.  

Justice Ansul observed: "13. It is to be seen that these news items are not only in the mainline press or Television channels but the social media platforms are flooded with news declaring the petitioner a guilty person without even initiation of the trial. 14. The petitioner may be accused of a serious case his rights to get a fair trial would not be ousted by the magnitude of the allegation i.e. levelled against him there are freedom of the press guaranteed under Article 19(1)(A) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) in the interest state security, public order, decency, morality, defamation and incitement to an offence. 15. Maligning the image of a person who is yet to be held guilty may come within the ambit of defamatory act, immoral act or even an indecent act. This is pre-judging the issue when the matter is sub judice. 16. In the case of Mahua Moitra decided on 23.02.2024 in W.P. (c) 2676/2024 an Office Memorandum dated 01.04.2010 issued by Government of India which is an advisory on Media Policy of Police. It stated while sharing information to the public through the media appropriate information as is professionally necessary is shared without hampering the process of investigation or issues of legal/privacy rights of the accused/victims and matters of strategic and national interest. 17. Apart from that Senior Counsel for the petitioner, counsel for the ED also expressed his ex-pleasure over the type of reporting that is going on with regard to the case and with regard to the recent trend of media trial. 18. This Court is clearly aware of the judgments passed in the case of Indian Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1985) 1 SCC 641 which established the idea of free press. In LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah (Prof.) reported in (1992) SCC 637 where the court held that in any set-up more so in a democratic set-up like ours dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon." 

Earlier, Justice Alok Kumar Pandey had passed an order dated March 31, 2026, which recorded the relief sought by the writ petition. The petition sought quashing of the First Information Report bearing Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05/2025 dated 30.04.2025 registered for the offences under Section 7A read with Section 8, Section 9 read with 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Section 3(2) read with 6(2) read with Section 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 as well as under Section 61 read with 318(4) read with 338 read with 340(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Justice Pandey's order reads: "2. When the query is asked what are the circumstances which reflect that the no offence, as alleged in the F.I.R., is made out against the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner does not give any specific reply and he seeks an adjournment on the ground that the main counsel is not available."

Notably, Justice Pandey's order dated April 18, 2026 records that "the counsel for the petitioner seeks permission for withdrawal of the instant criminal writ petition with liberty to raise his grievance before appropriate forum, at appropriate stage. 2. Permission, as prayed for, is accorded. 3. With the aforesaid liberty, the instant criminal writ petition stands dismissed as withdrawn."

By an order dated August 1, 2025 issued by the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, Patna, the immovable property of Rishu Shree, the petitioner has been attached and a number of bank accounts has also been freezed.

Notably, ED's press release dated November 26, 2025 reads:"Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Patna Zonal Office has conducted search operations at 09 locations across Ahmedabad, Surat, Gurgaon and New Delhi on 25.11.2025, under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 in a case related to a Patna based contractor Rishu Shree. During the search operations, cash of approx. Rs. 33 Lakh, digital devices, diaries, and several incriminating documents have been found and seized. ED initiated investigation on the basis of FIR registered by Special Vigilance Unit (SVU), Bihar against Rishu Shree and others. Rishu Shree, who’s firms work as contractors/subcontractors in various Bihar Government departments, such as Water Resources, Health, Public Health Engineering, Urban Development, Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation (BUIDCO), Education, Building and Construction, and Rural Works Department, is alleged to have a nexus with various Government officials to facilitate tenders for illicit personal gains. Earlier in this case, search operations were carried out at several travel agents and also at the residential premises of several Government officials in Patna. These searches had led to the seizure of a total of Rs.11.64 Crore (approx.) in cash, along with various incriminating documents and digital evidences. Further, assets to the tune of Rs.68.09 Crore belonging to Rishu Shree, his family members and entities were put under Provisional Attachment on 01.08.2025. Further investigation is under progress."

 

Justice Partha Sarthy hears Saraug Mochi case pursuant to request by Supreme Court's Division Bench, lists it on July 2

In Sri Saryug Mochi @ Saraug Mochi vs. The State Election Commission Through State Election Commissioner (Municipality) & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court passed an order dated June 26, 2026, wherein he recorded that counsel the State of Bihar submitted that a copy of the counter affidavit on behalf of the State respondents has been served on counsel for the petitioner in Court on June 29, 2026 and "the same will be filed in course of the day. 3. Put up this case on 2.7.2026."

Prior to this, in Usha Kaushik vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Suryakant and V. Mohana passed an order dated June, 19, 2026, wherein, the Court had requested to Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to list CWJC No.15629/2025 before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on June 29, 2026. It had also requested Justice Partha Sarthy to take up the case "on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest." 

Sri Saryug Mochi @ Saraug Mochi vs. The State Election Commission Through State Election Commissioner(Municipality) CWJC No. 15629/2025 was filed September 15, 2025. It was registered on September 19, 2025. Initially, the case was before Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of the High Court. Subsequently, it was listed before Justice A. Abhishek Reddy. The Court's website shows it be pending before Justice Partha Sarthy.    

Also read: Supreme Court requests Chief Justice of Patna High Court to list Usha Kaushik case before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on June 29, assigned bench requested to take up the same on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest

Sword of Damocles hanging over Deepak Prakash, the minister in Bihar government

"A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the Legislature of the State shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister." 

-Article 164 (4), The Constitution of India  

In Rakesh Kumar Singh alias Rakesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice V. Mohana passed an order dated June 15, 2026 issuing notices to the State of Bihar, Cabinet Secretary, Deepak Prakash and the Election Commission Of India.  Disregarding the fact that executive power is tethered to electoral legitimacy, Deepak Prakash has been appointed as a minister in the Bihar government in breach of constitutional provisions under Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India. It feigns ignorance about Supreme Court's judgements in S.R Chaudhuri vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2001 INSC 373), Har Sharan Verma vs. Tribhuvan Narain Singh (1971), Har Sharan Verma vs. State of U.P (1985) and S.P Anand vs. H.D Deve Gowda (1996). The case is likely to listed on July 15, 2026. It was filed on June 23, 2026, registered on June 24, 2026 and verified on June 25, 2026. 

The PIL has sought an issuance of a writ of Quo Warranto calling upon Deepak Prakash to demonstrate the constitutional authority under which he continues to occupy and exercise powers attached to the office of Minister of Panchayati Raj, Bihar, along with consequential reliefs seeking declaration that the impugned reappointment is unconstitutional, void ab initio, illegal, contrary to Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India.

The PIL has challenged the reappointment of Deepak Prakash as Bihar's Panchayati Raj Minister. Article 164(4) of the Constitution allows non-legislators to be ministers, provided they are elected to the state legislature within six months. The petition questions whether the constitutional clock can be "restarted" through a fresh government appointment after the initial six-month limit expired without the minister securing a legislative seat. 

The PIL raises the issue of deliberate circumvention and structural subversion of the democratic and representative constitutional mandate embodied under Article 164 of the Constitution of India by artificially fragmenting and reutilizing the limited constitutional grace period available to a non-legislator Minister. 

Deepak Prakash was initially appointed and sworn in as Minister of Panchayati Raj, Government of Bihar, on November 20, 2025 under the Council of Ministers headed by Nitish Kumar unmindful of the fact that he was notan elected member of either the Bihar Vidhan Sabha or the Bihar Vidhan Parishad. 

Deepak Prakash is required to secure membership of either House of the State Legislature within a maximum period of six consecutive months from the date of his initial appointment, failing which he would constitutionally cease to hold ministerial office. The maximum constitutional period available to Prakash under Article 164(4), commenced from November 20, 2025, which expired on May 19, 2026. 

Following the resignation and dissolution of the earlier Council of Ministers headed by Nitish Kumar, the ruling alliance elected Samrat Choudhary as its legislative leader. He was sworn in as the 24th Chief Minister of Bihar on April 15, 2026. Deepak Prakash demitted ministerial office and ceased to be part of the council of ministers. 

The PIL has submitted that after a distinct intervening gap period of approximately 22 days consequently came into existence extending from April 15, 2026 till May 6, 2026, during which Deepak Prakash held no constitutional, ministerial, executive, statutory, or public office whatsoever as the newly constituted Government under the leadership of Samrat Choudhary initially functioned with a limited and truncated Council of Ministers, and all unallocated portfolios, including the Department of Panchayati Raj, remained under the direct supervision and charge of the Chief Minister himself.  

But thereafter, on May 7, 2026, upon expansion of the newly constituted council of ministers,Deepak Praksh, the respondent No. 3 was once again reappointed and sworn in as minister of Panchayati Raj in  Bihar, although he remained an unelected non-legislator and despite been a minister for about 4 months and 26 days out of the constitutionally permissible six-month period contemplated under Article 164(4) without being a member of the legislature. As a consequence, only a residual balance period of approximately 1 month and 4 days remained available before expiry of the original six-month constitutional limitation calculated from the initial appointment dated November 20, 2025. 

By artificially fragmenting, interrupting, suspending, and attempting to carry forward the unexpired balance portion of the original constitutional grace period through resignation and subsequent reappointment under a reconstituted Government during the tenure of the very same legislative assembly, the respondent authorities have engaged in a colourable exercise of constitutional power intended to indirectly achieve what is constitutionally impermissible directly. 

In S.R Chaudhuri vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2001 INSC 373), the Supreme Court of India interpreted Article 164(4) of the Indian Constitution to ascertain the constitutional validity of appointing a non-legislative member to the council of ministers and the limitations imposed on such appointments. The core issue was whether reappointment of a minister who failed to secure a legislative seat within the stipulated six months was permissible. The parties involved were Tej Parkash Singh, who appointed as a minister without being a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, and the State of Punjab.

The appellant had challenged the reappointment of Tej Parkash Singh as a minister, arguing that such reappointment violated constitutional provisions. The Court held that Article 164(4) does not permit the repeated reappointment of a non-legislative individual as a minister beyond the initial six-month grace period without securing an elected legislative position. The Court declared the reappointment unconstitutional, emphasizing the principles of representative and responsible government. The judgment referred to previous cases and constitutional provisions to elucidate the limits of Article 164(4). The main precedents included: Har Sharan Verma vs. Tribhuvan Narain Singh (1971), wherein, the Court affirmed that a non-legislative Minister must secure a legislative seat within six months. 

It also relied on the decision in Har Sharan Verma vs. State of U.P (1985), wherein, the Court reinforced the interpretation that non-legislative appointments are temporary and subject to electoral validation.

It recollected the decision in S.P Anand vs. H.D Deve Gowda (1996), wherein, it held that even the Prime Minister can be a non-member initially but he/she must secure a legislative position within six months.

The Court dwelt on the constitutional intent behind Article 164(4), tracing its lineage to the Government of India Act, 1935. It stressed that while the Constitution permits the appointment of non-legislative Ministers in extraordinary circumstances, such appointments are strictly time-bound. The term "six consecutive months" was interpreted literally, preventing any form of reappointment beyond the initial period without electoral endorsement. The Court rejected the notion that repeated appointments could circumvent the constitutional mandate. It underscored that such practices would undermine the democratic fabric by allowing individuals to hold executive power without legislative accountability.

This judgment reiterated the sanctity of the constitutional provisions governing ministerial appointments. It establishes a clear precedent that non-legislative Ministers cannot be reappointed beyond the six-month grace period. Any attempt to circumvent this through repetitive appointments is unconstitutional. The principles of representative and responsible government are paramount and cannot be overridden by political expediency.

Notably, responding to a question regarding appointment of "non-members in the council of ministers" from Kanti Singh and Dr. Raghuvansh Prasad Singh in the Lok Sabha, on August 23, 2001, the Union Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs and Shipping had informed that "The Supreme Court of India in its judgement of August 17, 2001, in S.R. Chaudhury Vs. State of Punjab and Others has clearly indicated that no one can be reappointed under Article 164(4) without getting elected to the Legislature. The Court has observed that it was not the intention of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution that a person should continue to be Minister without being duly elected, by repeated appointments, each time for a period of six consecutive months. Further, such an appointment would be unacceptable in any parliamentary system of Government. Article 75(5) being pari materia with Article 164(4) of the Constitution, the position would be the same in the case of Article 75(5) of the Constitution."

Significantly, all ministers at a time can be non-members of Parliament or state legislature for six months. 

Revision petition is partly allowed, conviction by Nalanda trial court upheld, sentence awarded reduced to the period already undergone: Justice Arun Kumar Jha

In Bipin Singh @ Bipin Kumar Singh vs.The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement date June 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"If the facts were appreciated in the light of the evidence and two subordinate courts recorded a concurrent finding, there is very little scope for this Court to interfere in the matter in revision. 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and considering the fact that the petitioner has already undergone seven months of incarceration in this case and further considering the fact that he has no criminal antecedent and he is facing this lis from the last 19 years, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if, while upholding the conviction of the petitioner, the sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 8. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner under the aforesaid section is affirmed and he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The fine sentence is affirmed. 9. Accordingly, this revision petition is partly allowed. 10. The petitioner is already on bail. He is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds." 

This criminal revision was preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 10, 2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif in Criminal Appeal of 2016, which arose out of a Complaint Case of 2007 and trial of 2016. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 21, 2016 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif was affirmed. The petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000.

Pushpa Devi, the opposite party no. 2 had filed a complaint case alleging therein that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner in the year 1987. At the time of marriage, her parents had given cash amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- and some ornaments. After her marriage, the petitioner and his family members demanded a motorcycle and due to non-fulfillment of their demand, they started harassing the opposite party no.2. Thereafter, Rs.40,000 was given by the parents of the opposite party no.2 for purchasing motorcycle. After birth of a female child, the accused persons became more violent and increased torture of the complainant. The accused persons including the petitioner also made an attempt to burn the complainant to death by pouring kerosene oil, but she anyhow escaped and returned to her paternal house. Thereafter, the present complaint case was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgments of conviction and orders of sentence was bad in law as well as on facts. The appellate court and the trial court had failed to appreciate that all the complainant witnesses are closely related to each other and, thus, they all are highly interested witnesses. Therefore, their testimonies are not trustworthy. Hence, the petitioner should have been acquitted from the charges levelled against him on this score alone. The counsel also submitted that there is no independent witness of alleged offence. The counsel submitted that the trial court did not examine the evidence of the witnesses minutely and came to an erroneous finding and hence, the judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed by the courts below were not sustainable. Moreover, the petitioner was continuously facing the ordeal and miseries of the prolonged criminal proceeding against him for the last more than 18 years, although he was been paying the amount of maintenance and also paid arrears amount of maintenance to the opposite party no.2 and no useful purpose would be served to put the petitioner behind the bar.  The counsel also submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties and the petitioner has fulfilled all the conditions put by the opposite party no.2 towards amicable settlement of the matter and the father of the petitioner has executed a sale deed for two bigha of land in favour of opposite party no.2 towards full and final settlement and mutation of the said land is also being done in the name of opposite party no.2. Therefore, it was prayed by the counsel that the judgments and orders of the courts below be set aside and the revision petition may be allowed. If the Court is not inclined, then in that case the sentence awarded to the petitioner may be reduced to the period already undergone by him.