An order of debarment/blacklisting passed for an indefinite period is legally unsustainable, Justice Mohit Kumar Shah refers to Supreme Court's decision

In Sindhuja Engineer and Contractor having its Principal Place of Business at village Mow, P.S. Tekari, District Gaya, Bihar through its Authorized Signatory, Sushil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Public Health and Engineering Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench  Patna of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Raj Kumar allowed the writ petition. The 7-page long judgement dated July 9, 206 was authored by Justice Shah. He concluded:"...we deem it fit and proper to quash the impugned Office Order dated 09.01.2026 and remand the matter back to the respondent No. 3 who shall issue fresh show cause notice to the petitioner and after inviting his objections shall pass a reasoned and a speaking order, in accordance with law and the agreement entered into between the parties." 

The judgement was delivered upon hearing a writ petition filed for quashing of an Office Order dated January 9, 2026, whereby and whereunder the Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, Banka, i.e. the respondent No.4 had debarred the petitioner firm. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the letter dated January 14, 2026, issued by the respondent No.4 whereby the petitioner had been directed to make payment of the electricity bills within 24 hours, failing which process shall be initiated for debarment/rescindment of the contract. 

The case was that the petitioner was a registered Class I contractor under the provisions of the Bihar Contractors Registration Rules, 2007. The petitioner was granted certificate of registration dated August 26, 2020, as a Contractor of Public Health Engineering Department by the Chief Engineer (Urban), Public Health Engineering Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, i.e. the respondent No.3 for a period of five years. The petitioner participated in a tender process relating to Mukhya Mantri Peyjal Nischay Yojana for the District of Banka relating to the work of management of safe and pure drinking water for the areas which were affected by High Floride content in the water by establishing/construction of Floride Removal / Treatment Unit along with five years operation and maintenance. The tender was awarded to the petitioner, leading to execution of an Agreement in between the petitioner and the respondent No.4 as also issuance of work order. The petitioner completed the work. It was also the case of the petitioner that subsequently the respondent No. 4, by Office Order dated December 29, 2025 had directed the petitioner to pay the up to date electricity bills by means of receipt failing which it was contemplated that the bills would be paid from the amount payable to the petitioner from the concerned work division and further action for debarment/blacklisting/ rescindment of agreement etc. shall be taken in terms of the agreement and in accordance with law. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 had issued the impugned Office Order dated January 9, 2026, debarring the petitioner indefinitely. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the debarment cannot be for an indefinite period in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Khulja Industries Limited vs. Chief General Manager, Western
Telecom Project Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Others, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731. The paragraph No.25 of the judgement reads: “25. Suffice it to say that “debarment” is recognised and often used as an effective method for disciplining deviant suppliers/contractors who may have committed acts of omission and commission or frauds including misrepresentations, falsification of records and other breaches of the regulations under which such contracts were allotted. What is notable is that the “debarment” is never permanent and the period of debarment would invariably depend upon the nature of the offence committed by the erring contractor.”

It was submitted that the impugned order dated January 9, 2026 had been issued by an incompetent authority inasmuch as the respondent No.4 was not the authority who had registered the firm of the petitioner. It was thus submitted that only the respondent No.3 could have either issued the show cause notice to the petitioner or the order of debarment/ blacklisting qua the petitioner. In this regard, reference was made to Rule 11 (d) of the Rules, 2007. Rule 11 (d) reads: "The order of blacklisting/suspension shall be passed by the officer who is competent to register the contractor or by the officer under whom the registering officer works.” Thus, it was submitted that since the respondent No.3 i.e. the Chief Engineer (Urban)-cum-Registering Authority, Public Health and Engineering Department, Government of Bihar, Patna was the registering authority of the firm of the petitioner, he was only authorized to either issue show cause notice to the petitioner or pass any order of debarment/blacklisting.

The counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the respondent No.4 had issued show cause notices dated November 5, 2025, November 6, 2025 and November 19, 2025, apart from other notices before passing the impugned order dated January 9, 2026, hence the principles of natural justice had been complied with before passing of the impugned order dated January 9, 2026. 

In his judgement, Justice Shah recorded that the counsel for the respondent-State could not show from the records or from the Rules, 2007 that the respondent No.4 was the competent authority to either issue show cause notice to the petitioner, prior to passing of the order for debarment/ blacklisting or pass an order of debarment/ blacklisting itself.

The judgement reads: "We find from the records that the show cause notices as also the order of debarment of the petitioner firm have been issued by the respondent No.4, who is not the registering authority in the present case inasmuch as a bare perusal of the certificate of registration,....would show that the registering authority is the respondent No.3, i.e. the Chief Engineer (Urban)-cum-Registering Authority, Public Health and Engineering Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, hence it is only the respondent No.3 who is/was authorized to issue show cause notice for debarment/ blacklisting as also pass an order of debarment/ blacklisting. Thus, a debarment or blacklisting order passed without a valid show cause notice is not only invalid but also violates the principles of natural justice, hence is liable to be quashed on this ground alone."

Justice Shah observed: "8. We further find that it is a well settled law that an order of debarment/blacklisting passed for an indefinite period is legally unsustainable, as it violates the principles of natural justice, the doctrine of proportionality, and the fundamental right to carry on trade. In the present case, by the impugned order dated 09.01.2026, the petitioner firm has been debarred for an indefinite period. The law in this regard is no longer res integra inasmuch as the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Khulja Industries Limited (supra) has held that debarment can never be permanent. Thus, on this score as well the impugned order dated 09..01.2026 is unsustainable in the eyes of law."

A juvenile can be denied bail only on three grounds recorded in writing: Supreme Court

In Re-Exploitation of Children in Orphanages in the State of Tamil Nadu vs. Union of Indian & Ors. as reported in (2020) 14 SCC 327, the Supreme Court has held that bail to a juvenile can be denied only on three grounds as provided in the Proviso to Section 12(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: "7. Sub-section (1) makes it absolutely clear that a child alleged to be in conflict with law should be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person. The only embargo created is that in case the release of the child is likely to bring him into association with known criminals or expose the child to moral, physical or psychological danger or where the release of the child would defeat the ends of justice, then bail can be denied for reasons to be recorded in writing. Even if bail is not granted, the child cannot be kept in jail or police lock-up and has to be kept in an observation home or place of safety."

The ends of justice in the context of any Act is ascertained on the basis of the purpose and object of that Act and the objective of the J.J. Act is to reform and rehabilitate the juveniles and not to punish them, as emerges from the preamble to the J.J. Act, which reads: “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection by catering to their basic needs through proper care, protection, development, treatment, social reintegration, by adopting a child-friendly approach in the adjudication and disposal of matters in the best interest of children and for their rehabilitation through processes provided, and institutions and bodies established, hereinunder and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

Section 12 of the J.J. Act is equally applicable to all juveniles in conflict with law without any discrimination of any nature. Even a juvenile, aged between 16 to 18 years and being accused of heinous offence and being tried by Children Court, is entitled to get bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act. The nature and seriousness of the alleged offence is not relevant for consideration of bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act. “The ends of justice” as used in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act is drastically different to one as used in general criminal jurisprudence. If the detention of the juvenile at Observation Home or other institutions as contemplated under the J.J. Act is helpful in protection, development and rehabilitation of the juvenile, only then it can be said that release of the child would defeat the ends of justice. The family of the child in conflict with law is the best and first desirable institution to achieve the object of the J.J.Act. Institutionalization of a juvenile in conflict with law is the last resort and every child in conflict with law has right to be reunited with his family at the earliest. Under Section 12 of the J.J. Act, 2015, bail to a juvenile is a rule and the refusal of the same is an exception and it can be denied only on the grounds as provided in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act, 2015. 26(6). The denial of bail must be reasoned and the grounds of denial must be based on relevant facts and circumstances, as emerging from the material on record. The Social Investigation Report (SIR) is one of the most significant such material. The perusal of SIR report is mandatory as per Section 15 (2) of the J.J. Act, 2015. The Board/Court is required to know not only about the offence committed by the juvenile but even about the socio-economic conditions/circumstances under which the offence was committed, in order to ensure that appropriate order in regard to the juvenile in conflict with law could be passed with intent to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile and reintegrate him with the mainstream of the society. All resources have to be mobilised including those of the family and the community for reforming and rehabilitating the juvenile in conflict with law to make him productive member of the society. 

Justice Vikas Kumar sets aside order by Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna in a Guardianship case, remanded back for fresh consideration

In Sana Azim & Ors. vs. Md. Fashi-Ul-Haque (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Nani Tagia and Vikas Kumar delivered a 12-page long judgement dated July 9, 2026, wherein, it set aside  the impugned order dated April 16, 2025, passed in a Guardianship Case of 2021, by Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna is set aside, and the matter was remanded back for fresh consideration by  Court below from the stage of framing of issues. The judgement was authored by Justice Vikas Kumar. 

The appeal, under Section 47 of Guardians and Wards Acts 1890 was preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order dated April 16, 2025, whereby the respondent’s application under Section 25 of the Act was allowed and custody of the minor child, Master Daniyal Azimul Haque, was granted in favour of the respondent. In this appeal, appellant no. 1 was the mother, appellant no. 2 was the maternal grandfather and appellant no. 3 was maternal grandmother and respondent no. 1 was the father of the
minor male child, namely Master Daniyal Azimul Haque.

The brief facts as per the pleadings of the respective parties state that the appellant no. 1 was lawfully married to the respondent on April 14, 2018, in accordance with Sunni Muslim rites through a Nikah Ceremony held at Ali Nagar, Anisabad, Patna and out of the wedlock, a male child, namely Master Daniyal Azimul Haque, was born on February 7, 2019. After sometime, bitterness arose between the parties and since June 5, 2020, appellant no. 1 with her son, are living separately from the respondent. And as per respondent Father, the minor child, namely Master Daniyal Azimul Haque was residing with appellant no. 2 and 3 and was denied with the visitation right. Thereafter, for the custody of minor son, the
respondent Father on November 2, 2021 had filed Guardianship Case no.-54 of 2021 before the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna. From perusal of order-sheet of the proceeding of Guardianship Case, it was apparent that on April 7, 2022, the appellants had filed their appearance and on November 14, 2022, had filed their written submission. Thereafter, there was no appearance by the appellants before the trial court in the proceeding of Guardianship Case. On account of non-appearance of appellant Mother, even the two witnesses who were examined were discharged without cross-examination. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna, vide impugned order dated April 16, 2025, allowed the application and appointed respondent father as guardian of minor boy child and as a consequence, was given the physical custody of the minor child to the father, but in the interest of justice, directed both parties to be present along with the minor boy child on July 15, 2025 at 2 P.M. so that final result of the case may be disclosed in presence of both parties. 

Being aggrieved by the judgment/order dated April 16, 2025, the mother and maternal grand parents of the minor male boy preferred the appeal under the provisions of Section 47 of the Act and contended that the trial court had erred in law and fact as well by not passing an order to the extent that the suit be heard ex-parte in circumstances of non-appearance of appellants on subsequent dates in terms of Order IX Rule 6 (a) of the Civil Procedure Code. It had erred by not framing the issues after ascertainment of variance of parties on proposition of fact and law in terms of Order XIV Rule (1)(5) of the Civil Procedure Code. To substantiate their submission, the relevant part of the order-sheet of the proceeding was referred. It erred by not adhering to the mandatory requirement of Section 17 of the Act by appointing respondent father as “Guardian”. 

Section 17 of the Act reads:“17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian (1)In appointing or declaring the guardian of a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor. (2)In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his property. (3)If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference. (4) Sub-Section (4) omitted by Act 3 of 1951, Section 3 and Sch. (5)The Court shall not appoint or declare any person to be a guardian against his will.”

The appellants contended that since the minor male boy is Muslim by religion and therefore, as per provision of Section 17(1) of the Act, in his case the provisions of Mohammedan Law will have an application and accordingly, as per provision of Section 352 of the Mohammedan Law, the mother is entitled to the custody (hizamat) of her male child until he has completed the age of seven years. As per Subsection (4) and (5) of Section 17 of the Act, the trial court ought to have called the minor male child, who is old enough to form an intelligent preference, and have asked about his will before appointing respondent Father as Guardian vide impugned order dated April 16, 2025.  The impugned judgment/order is ambiguous. 

The trial court had appointed respondent father as guardian but had also directed the appellants alongwith minor son to remain present so that final decision may be taken. In support of their contention, the appellants relied upon judgments passed by the Supreme Court in Athar Hussain vs. Syed Siraj Ahmed, reported in Manu/SC/0014/2010, Neetu vs. Rajesh Kumar, reported in Manu/SC/0920/2025, Asma Latif and others vs. Sabbir Ahmed and others, reported in Manu/SC/0034/2024, Neel Ratan Kundu and others vs. Abhijeet Kundu, reported in Manu/SC/7935/2008, Rosy Jacob vs. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, reported in Manu/SC/0260/1973 and Swarn Lata Ghosh vs. H.K. Banerjee and others, reported in Manu/SC/0023/1969.

The appeal was contested by the respondent father..The counsel on behalf of the respondent father opposed the contention made by the appellants and submitted that they had no regard towards the order passed by the court of law. The respondent was given the visitation right to meet his son twice a month vide order dated December 5, 2022, but the appellants did not allow him to meet his son. He had last met his son on October 8, 2023 and since October 2023, the appellants did not file any application before the trial court. The appellants did not turn up for cross- examination of the two witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent. As such they were discharged. It was also submitted that under the Muslim Law, the father is recognised as the sole natural guardian. The right of the mother to custody is not absolute. In provision of Section 354 of the Mohammedan Law, outlines the condition in which the female, including the mother looses custody rights. The counsel relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court on April 5, 1973, reported in (1973) 1 SCC 840 ( Rosy Jacob vs. Jacob A. Chakramakkal) which was also relied by the appellants.

Justice Kumar noted that the issue for consideration by the High Court was that whether the trial court, while passing the impugned order, had complied with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act or not.

Justice Kumar observed: " 9.1. as far as contention of the appellant as regard non-adherence of procedure under Order IX Rule 6 (a) of Civil Procedure Code, it is clear from perusal of the order-sheet of the Guardianship Case no- 54 of 2021, which forms as Annexure -P/3 to rejoinder affidavit, that the appellants upon issuance of notices vide order dated 08.03.2022, have entered their appearances through Vakalatnama and have filed their Written Statement (W.S.) on 14.11.2022, and subsequent thereto voluntarily abstained from the proceeding. In the circumstances of valid service of notice, Court below to make an order that the suit be heard ex-parte and appearance and filing of Written Statement by defendant, it is held that the learned Court below is not required to pass an order that the Guardianship Case be heard ex-parte for act of voluntary absentism by defendant/appellant. Accordingly, the contention of the appellant is rejected. 9.2. so far as contention of the appellants as regard non-compliance of Order XIV Rule 1(5), this Court finds that the learned Court below has committed the procedural infirmity by not ascertaining upon what material proposition of fact and law the parties are at variance and thereupon ought to have proceeded to frame and record the issues. This exercise is penultimate to passing of Judgment/Order. The learned Court below has failed to frame issues in terms of Order XIV Rule 1(5) of the Civil Procedure Code and contention of the appellants in this regard is accepted. 9.3. so far as contention of the appellants as regard non-adherence of provision of Section 17 of the Act, this Court finds that the learned Court below has failed to comply with the requirement of Sub-section 5 of Section 17 of the Act, which mandates that the Court shall not appoint or declare any person to be a guardian against his will. From bare perusal of the order-sheet of Guardianship Case no- 54 of 2021, which forms as Annexure-P/3 to the rejoinder filed by appellants, it is clear that no steps have been taken by the learned Court below to ascertain the will of minor male child before appointment of respondent Father as guardian vide impugned order dated 16.04.2025. Since the minor male child was born on 07.02.2019, the Guardianship Case no- 54 of 2021 was filed on 02.11.2021, and the impugned order has been passed on 16.04.2025. Therefore, this Court has reason to believe that the minor child boy is old enough to form an intelligent preference on the relevant date of impugned Judgment. The Judgments referred by appellants and respondent are relevant which in irrevocable terms mandates that the will of the minor child is paramount in consideration by the Court in appointing guardian. Further, there is no consideration as regard applicability of Mohammedan Law by the learned Court below. Therefore, it is held that the learned Court below has failed to adhere to the requirement of Section 17(5) of the Act. 9.4. Lastly, the contention of the appellants as regard ambiguity in order dated 16.04.2025, this Court find that the impugned order is ambiguous. The learned Court below at one hand has appointed respondent Father as guardian and on the other hand, has directed the appellant Mother to appear alongwith her minor son on 15.07.2025, so that final result of the case shall be disclosed, depicts it to be ambiguous. The submission made on behalf of the respondent Father that later part of impugned order is related with handing over and taking over of custody of minor child is rejected more or less to the fact that the learned Court below has even failed to frame and adjudicate the issue that with whom the minor child is residing? As per respondent, he is residing with appellant no. 2 and 3 whereas the appellants in their written statement have stated that the minor child is residing with appellant no. 1."

The concluding paragraph of the judgement reads:"11. During the course of hearing, it was pointed out by the counsel for respondent Father that the appellants have no regard for judicial order, and this Court also finds from the order-sheet that the appellants have volunteered to abstain from proceeding. No one is above law. Since future of the minor child is involved in present matter, therefore, it is expected that the appellants herein will co-operate the learned Court below in adjudication and passing of proper and just order expeditiously within a period of six months from the appearance of respective parties on 20.07.2026 before the learned Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna." 

High Court of Judicature at Patna Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulation, 2026 adopted to comply with Supreme Court's order of July 2013

Subordinate courts are also required to draft and notify its rules for prevention of sexual harassment in court premises, as per Supreme Court's directions of 2013, but Regulation, 2026 does not cover them

In compliance of the directions of the 3-Judge Bench of Supreme Court, in the order dated July 17, 2013 passed in Ms. Binu Tamta vs. High Court of Delhi & Ors. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 162 of 2013, the Patna High Court has approved and adopted a 12-page long “High Court of Judicature at Patna Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulation, 2026”. It was published by the order of Dr. R. K. Singh-I, Registrar General I/c, Patna High Court in the Bihar Gazette on July 31, 2026. It has come into effect from August 1, 2026. 

The Regulation 4 of the Regulation, 2026 provides for constitution of High Court of Judicature at Patna Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaint Committee to address any complaints made with regard to sexual harassment at the Patna High Court. The Chief Justice of the High Court by an order in writing, shall constitute a committee to be known as the Patna High Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaint Committee (PHCGSICC) which shall consist of not less than 4 members and shall include one judge preferably senior most women judge of the High Court, who shall be the Chairperson of the Committee to be nominated by the Chief Justice of High Court. It shall have one female member of any of the Bar Association of the High Court with at least 10 years of membership of the Bar Association concerned to be nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court. Not less than 2 female members from amongst employees in the service of the High Courtto be nominated by the Chief Justice of High Court. Out of two female members one female member shall be an officer not below the rank of the District Judge and other female member shall be an officer not below the rank of Deputy Registrar and any other member that the Chief Justice of High Court of Judicature at Patna may deem fit to nominate. It shall be ensured that the majority of the members of the PHCGSICC shall be women members. The Chairperson/ Presiding Officer and every member of the Internal Complaint Committee shall hold office for such a period, not exceeding 3 years from the date of their nomination or as may be specified by the Chief Justice of the High Court.  

At present, the website of the Court states that Patna High Court's Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee comprises of the Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Soni Shrivastava.  It is apparent that the committee is yet to be constituted under Section 4 of the Regulation 2026, which came into force on August 1, 2026.  

The preamble of the Regulation, 2026 reads: "Whereas Gender Discrimination and Sexual Harassment results in violation of the fundamental rights of a woman to equality under Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and her right to life and live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business which includes a right to safe environment free from Sexual Harassment under Articles 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India; and Whereas sensitization against Discrimination on basis of gender and the protection against Sexual Harassment and the right to work and live with dignity are universally recognized human right by International Conventions and Instruments such as Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, which has been ratified on the 25th June, 1993 by the Government of India; and whereas it is expedient to make provisions for giving effect to the Convention for Protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at High Court of Judicature at Patna precincts;Whereas Now these Regulations are being published as a comprehensive code for prevention of sexual harassment of women within the precincts of the High Court of Judicature at Patna and for redressal of any complaints that may be lodged in the High Court of Patna." 

Besides the preamble, the Regulation, 2026 has five chapters and 15 Regulations. Chapter-I provides the title, extent and commencement and definitions. Chapter-II provides for the constitution of the Gender Sensitization & Internal Complaints Committee. Chapter-II provides for complaint of sexual harassment, conciliation, inquiry into complaint, inquiry report, punishment for false or malicious complaint and false evidence, orders on inquiry report, prohibition of publication or making known contents of complaints and inquiry proceedings, penalty for publication or making known contents of complaints and inquiry proceedings and appeal. Chapter-IV empowers Patna High Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaint Committee (PHCGSICC) and its duties. Chapter-V deals with confidentiality, protection of action taken in good faith and regulations not in derogation of any other law. The provisions of these Regulations shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The provisions of the present Regulations shall not bar any Court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under any other enactment or law.

Section 2 (a) states that “'aggrieved woman' means, in relation to the High Court of Judicature at Patna any female, of any age whether employed or not who claims to have been subjected to any act of Sexual Harassment by any person in the High Court of Judicature at Patna precincts". 

Section 2 (g) states that “'High Court of Judicature at Patna precincts' means the whole premises of the High Court of Judicature at Patna including the court block, open grounds, parking, chamber blocks, libraries, canteens, bar-rooms, health centers and/or any other part of the premises under control of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Patna."

Section 2 (i) states "'Sexual Harassment' includes any one or more of the following unwelcome acts or behaviour (whether directly or by implication) namely:-(i) physical contact and advances; or (ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or (iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or (iv) showing or exhibiting pornography and / or sexually explicit material by any means. (v) sending undesirable sexually coloured oral or written messages, text messages, e-mail messages, or any such messages by electronic, manual or other means; (vi) stalking or consistently following aggrieved woman in the High Court of Judicature at Patna precincts and outside; (vii) voyeurism including overt or tacit observation by the respondent by any means of the aggrieved woman in her private moments; (viii) any conduct whereby the respondent takes advantage of his position and subjects the aggrieved woman to any form of sexual harassment and seeks sexual favor especially while holding out career advancements whether explicitly or implicitly, as an incentive or a natural result of submitting to the insinuations/ demands of the respondent; (ix) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-vernal conduct of sexual nature; (x) implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her legal career; (xi) implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her legal career; (xii) implied or explicit threat about her present or future legal career; (xiii) interferes with her work or creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her; or (xiv) any treatment having a sexual colour or content likely to affect her emotional and/or physical health or safety." 

The Regulation, 2026 was long due. The Regulation does not provide for publication of the annual report of the committee constituted under its provisions. The earlier committee could not publish its annual reports. 

The Regulation, 2026 does not provide for adoption of similar regulation for subordinate courts under the High Court's jurisdiction. These courts are also required to comply with the Supreme Court's directions. It is apparent that the Regulation, 2026 has drawn lessons from the Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Regulations, 2013 framed pursuant to Supreme Court's direction dated July 17, 2013. It is not framed under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013.

The filing of the writ petition by Ms. Tamta had led to the question of the formation of a Committee as suggested by the Supreme Court in Vishaka & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1997(6) SCC 241. This had led to the further suggestions regarding framing of proper Regulations in regard to gender sensitisation and to prevent sexual harassment of women at the Supreme Court of India and in other courts as well. 

By its order dated April 23, 2013, Supreme Court had constituted a sub-Committee with Fali S. Nariman, senior Advocate, as is Chairperson to look into the reports submitted by Ms. Asha Menon in her capacity as Member Secretary of the National Legal Services Committee and also to look into the draft rules prepared by Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija and, thereafter, to submit a comprehensive set of draft rules on the basis of which orders could be passed. Such a Report was submitted before the Court in its draft form and after thorough discussion, the Committee was requested to make certain additions and alterations. Subsequent to that the Regulations referred to as - The Gender Sensitisation & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013 was placed before the Court in its final form. The said Regulations were also considered by the Attorney General, as also Sidharth Luthra, the Additional Solicitor General. All the counsel were agreeable that the Regulations, in their present form, may be accepted and appropriate orders may be passed thereupon. 

The Supreme Court observed: "We too have gone through the Regulations and find them to be suitable to tackle the menace of sexual predation in the Court precincts for the present. The same may require changes, if necessary, based on future experience. We, accordingly, approve of and accept the aforesaid Regulations and direct the Supreme Court in its administrative jurisdiction to take note of the same and to arrange that the same are promulgated and given wide publicity. Copies of the same be sent to the different High Courts in the different States, so that they too may formulate their own Regulations in the same manner, in order to contain harassment of women in court premises. The High Courts may also ensure that the same are implemented at the District level as well."

Notably, one of the prayers in the writ petition was for issuance of a mandamus to Secretary General, Supreme Court of India and all the High Courts and subordinate courts to draft and notify its rules for prevention of sexual harassment in court premises, inter alia, providing for permanent internal committees with effective punishment powers of the delinquent, for providing safe working environment for women and matters ancillary thereto. The court directed that these prayers must be followed in its essence and spirit by all the courts concerned. 

Notably, the Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) too is yet to re-start the publication of its annual reports. 

Also read: Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) reconstituted with 12 members with Justice B.V. Nagarathna as its Chairperson

Supreme Court Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) reconstituted, reference to complaints omitted from GSICC Annual Report since 2022 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sunil Dutta Mishra sets asdie order by Special Judge, Special Court (NIA Cases), Patna, directs him to hear case of East Champaran residents afresh

In Reyaz Moarif @ Bablu & Ors. vs. The Union of India through Ministry of Home Affairs & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices delivered Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 10-page long judgement dated July 14, 2026, wherein, it set aside the impugned judgment/order passed by the Special Judge NIA and directed the Special Judge to consider the application of the appellants afresh and pass a reasoned order thereon within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy o this judgment."The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. The judgement recorded that the observations of the trial court that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition does not hold good. Additional Solicitor General had conceded that that part of the order may be set aside and the trial court may be directed to consider the application afresh in accordance with law. The other two respondents are: National Investigation Agency (NIA), through its Director General and Director General, NIA.

The appeal was filed in the High Court for setting aside the order dated August 23, 2025 passed by the Special Court (NIA Cases), Patna in Special Case No. 07/2022 whereby and whereunder the application filed by the appellants under Section 45 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) challenging the validity of sanction has been rejected by the Special Judge and the court had imposed a cost of Rs. 10,000/- on the appellants. These appellants, the accused nos. 4, 28, 29 and 30 are facing trial in Special Case No. 07/2022 and have been charged under Sections 17, 18 and 18A of the UAPA, 1967. The appellants are from Kuawan, Chakiya, East Champaran, Bihar.

The case arose out of R.C. No. 31 of 2022 originally registered with the Phulwarisharif P.S. in Crime No. 827 of 2022. In this case, the High Court was not required to go into the allegations against the appellants, therefore, for the brevity, Justice Prasad did not go into the charges against the appellants. The bone of contention in the case was the order of the Special Judge, NIA rejecting the application of the appellants to take up the challenge to the sanction order. The trial court had taken a view that the appellants had intentionally chosen to file the petition under Section 45 of the UAPA, 1967 during the ongoing trial to prolong the conclusion of trial. The court found that the appellants had not raised this issue at the earliest available two stages i.e. at the stage of the cognizance and the framing of charge. The court had taken a view that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the central government, by sanction order dated August 1, 2023 in respect of Md. Tanweer, Md. Aabid and Irshad, the appellant nos. 2 to 4 and by order dated March 14, 2024 in respect of Reyaz Moarif, the appellant no. 1, had granted sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA, 1967 read with Section 196 Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of NIA’s recommendation but according to him, this sanction order has been issued in a completely mechanical manner, based only on the agency’s report. The counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2610 and submitted that the validity of the sanction may be tested at the threshold. It was submitted that as on July 14, 2026, seventeen witnesses were examined, six separate chargesheets were filed and all the chargesheeted accused were being tried in the same and one trial, there are altogether 423 witnesses as per the chargesheets. The counsel submitted that in such circumstance, the trial court could have well appreciated the fact that examination of the large number of witnesses would take several years and the challenge to the sanction order at the stage of trial may be considered at the earliest opportunity. It was submitted that in the case of Fuleshwar Gope (supra), the Supreme Court held the right of an accused to avail all remedies available to him under law, in ordinary circumstances challenge to sanction under UAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to enable the trial court to determine the question, for its competence to proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on the appellate side would depend on the answer to this question. The Supreme Court having considered that in the said case out of 125, 113 witnesses had already been examined, refrained from returning any finding on the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the appellants and left it to be raised before the  trial court which was directed to decide it promptly. The counsel also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in National Investigation Agency, Bengaluru vs. Fairoz Pasha & Ors, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 4023. Referring to paragraph ‘19’ of the said judgment, learned counsel had contended that the  Division Bench of Karnataka High had summoned the sanctioning authority and examined the validity of sanction order. If the sanction order is found to be invalid, there is no need to hold further trial, and the accused can be discharged even at that stage. The High Court had further made it clear that the observations of the Court is made with a rider that the prosecution can obtain fresh sanction in that eventuality. 

ASG assisted by Manoj Kumar, Standing Counsel for the NIA opposed the appeal but having gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fuleshwar Gope (supra) and that of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Fairoz Pasha (supra), submitted that the observations of the trial court that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition may not hold good, therefore, that part of the order may be set aside and the trial court may be directed to consider the application afresh in accordance with law. 

Justice Prasad observed:"9....this Court finds that these appellants are facing trial in Special Case No. 07 of 2022. There is no denial of the assertions made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the huge number of prosecution witnesses are to be examined in this case and out of them only seventeen witnesses have been examined. The appellants have filed an application under Section 45 of the UAPA, 1967. Section 45 reads as under :-'45. Cognizance of offences. [(1)] No Court shall take cognizance of any offence--(i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf; (ii) under Chapters IV and VI without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government, and [if] such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country without the previous sanction of the Central Government. [(2) Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) shall be given within such time as may be prescribed only after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation within such time as may be prescribed to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government.]' 10. It is evident that Section 45(1) bars taking of cognizance of any offense under Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter VI without previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. In this case, the order taking cognizance is not under challenge and that stage is over. The appellants did not challenge the sanction order at the stage of cognizance or at the stage of framing of charge. The challenge is being made at the stage of trial. Sub-section (2) of Section 45 talks of grant of sanction for prosecution after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in course of investigation and make a recommendation, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government. It is the contention of the appellants that the sanction order has been issued in mechanical way without considering the case diary, the original statements of eye witnesses and other exculpatory evidence. 11. This Court would not examine this issue on merit in the present appeal, however, keeping in view the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and that of the Hon’ble Karnataka High  Court and the stand taken by the learned ASG, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court ought to have examined the challenge to the sanction order at the earliest opportunity as soon as it has been raised by the appellants.'

The relevant paragraph ‘18’ from the relevant judgment of the Supreme Court in Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2610 reads: “18. The UAPA does not provide for any such saving of the sanction. This implies that, in the wisdom of the legislature, the inbuilt mechanism of the Act of having two authorities apply their mind to the grant of a sanction, is sufficient. This emphasizes the role and sanctity of the operation to be carried out by both these authorities. In order to challenge the grant of sanction as invalid, the grounds that can be urged are that (1) all the relevant material was not placed before the authority; (2) the authority has not applied its mind to the said material; and (3) insufficiency of material. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. The common thread that runs through the three grounds of challenge above is that the party putting forward this challenge has to lead evidence to such effect. That, needless to say, can only be done before the Trial Court. In that view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that while we recognise the treasured right of an accused to avail all remedies available to him under law, in ordinary circumstances challenge to sanction under UAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to enable the Trial Court to determine the question, for its competence to proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on the appellate side would depend on the answer to this question.  In the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, keeping in view the submission made at the bar that the trial is underway and numerous witnesses (113 out of 125) already stand examined, we refrain from returning any finding on the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the present appellant and leave it to be raised before the Trial Judge, who shall, if such a question is raised decide, it promptly.” 

The relevant paragraph ‘19’ of Karnataka High Court's judgement in National Investigation Agency,  Bengaluru vs. Fairoz Pasha and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 4023 reads: :-“19. Another point raised by Sri. C.V. Nagesh is to be answered now. His argument is that the accused has to wait till the sanctioning authority is summoned, which is usually after other material witnesses are examined. To this answer is that, the practice has been to summon the sanctioning authority after other material witnesses, other than investigating officer, are examined. There is no mandate that the witnesses are to be examined in a particular order, but the investigators will be examined at the end. This procedure is adopted to duly prove contradictions if any, through the investigating officer as contemplated under Section 162 of Cr. P.C. So far as sanctioning authority is concerned, he can be examined in the beginning itself. If the accused is so sure that sanction order is invalid and for this reason there is no need to examine all the witnesses, he can request the court to examine the sanctioning authority in the beginning itself. After the charges are framed, the court can summon the sanctioning authority and examine the validity of sanction order. If the sanction is found to be invalid, there is no need to hold further trial, and the accused can be discharged even at that stage. This observation is of course made with a rider that the prosecution can obtain fresh sanction in that eventuality.” 

Now the special judge, of the trial court judge will have to  to consider the application of the appellants afresh and pass a reasoned order thereon within a period of two months because the observations of the special judge that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition was not correct and has been set aside and has been directed to consider the application afresh in accordance with law.  

PUCL condemns illegal handcuffing, detention and mistreatment of Advocate Akash Keshav, Patna High Court and Vrati Kumar, a law graduate, without any ground of arrest and FIR

People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) has strongly condemned of the conduct of the Bihar Police, in particular the SHO, Gandhi Maidan Police Station, in connection with the illegal detention and mistreatment of Akash Keshav, Advocate, Patna High Court and Vrati Kumar, law graduate from Calcutta University, social worker, and independent filmmaker/director, both members of PUCL, on the July 26-27, 2026. At times, advocate Akash Keshav has assisted the Patna High Court as Amicus Curiae in the past. 

In its meeting held on July 26, 2026, PUCL decided to extend legal support to students who had been detained or arrested by the police in connection with NEET student protests. Both Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar were part of PUCL’s legal support group. On the night of Sunday, July 26, 2026, when they reached the Gandhi Maidan Police Station to ascertain the status and welfare of the detained students, they were informed that the detainees were being produced before Ms. Arti Upadhyay, the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM) at Chhajju Bagh. Then they reached the Chhajju Bagh residence/court of the SDJM.

Inside SDJM’s residence/court at Chhajju Bagh

At the outset both the advocates observed the proceedings of the open court for a while. When they found that the students were being sent to judicial custody without following due process, they raised their objection with the court. None of the students was informed of the specific charges against them. They were not provided with copies of the First Information Report (FIR), which violated their basic legal rights. Advocate Akash Keshav, who was in his proper lawyer’s robes, asked for copies of the FIR to be furnished to the detainees, that their statements be duly recorded, and that the court proceedings be recorded. These objections and demands were met with hostility from police personnel and persons in plain clothes present in the courtroom. The SHO of Gandhi Maidan Police Station,  Akhilesh Kumar Mishra, declared, in a vindictive manner, that since he had been injured during the protest, all students produced before the Ms. Aarti Upadhyaya, SDJM must be sent to jail as a punishment. Advocate Akash pleaded that despite his sympathy with the SHO for having sustained injuries during the student protest, that could not become the basis for collective punishment of the students presented before the SDJM.

Police refuses to share copy of FIR based on flawed breath analyser test

Unmindful of the fact that provisions of Sections 37 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 deals with such accused who were caught drinking but were not involved in liquor trading/smuggling, not with advocates defending their clients, the police misused these provisions. The amended Section 37 provides that in case, a person only consuming the liquor he/she is liable to be arrested immediately and produced before the nearest Executive Magistrate and can be released on payment of penalty. Failure to pay the penalty would invite simple imprisonment for one month. 

PUCL has learnt that when advocate Akash Keshav, persisted in making submissions on behalf of the detained students, police officers reportedly turned aggressive and physically cornered advocate Akash Keshav, Vrati Kumar, and other advocates present. The SHO of Gandhi Maidan Police Station threatened to prosecute Akash Keshav unless he stopped raising objections on behalf of students. When they did not give in, he ordered the premises doors locked, and—without any direction or permission from the Magistrate — arranged for a breath analyser and compelled both Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar to undergo the test on the spot, without the device being calibrated or tested and, subsequently, without any blood or urine confirmatory test being conducted. On the strength of this breath analyser reading alone, both Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar were taken into custody by the SHO, Gandhi Maidan, while denying their production before the presiding Magistrate, and whisked them off to the Kotwali Police Station, where they were held overnight. 

The SHO, Gandhi Maidan, with the help of a staff member, himself prepared the arrest memo at Kotwali Police Station and asked Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar to sign it. When they demanded a copy of the FIR, the police refused to share a copy of FIR with the advocates. It clearly establishes that the police officers had adopted undue process and implicated the two members, of PUCL, a defender of human rights, in a false case.

Unprecedented illegitimate handcuffing of advocates

The next morning, on July 27, the advocates were taken to a nearby hospital in the lhandcuffs for examination and declared fit, and thereafter brought back into custody. Even at the hospital, their urine and blood samples were not taken. Despite repeated requests for removal of the handcuffs, they were paraded in handcuffs, first within the police station, then at the Hospital and later, at around 2 PM, through the premises of Patna Civil Court, in full public view — a practice contrary to established guidelines of the Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Court on the use of handcuffs, which permit their use only in exceptional circumstances and never routinely or to humiliate an accused. The handcuffs were removed only after members of the legal fraternity present at the court premises intervened and objected.

Both Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar were thereafter produced before the Special Judge (Excise). Upon hearing the arguments of the Public Prosecutor and advocates for Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar, the learned judge released them on Personal Recognisance (PR) Bond and reprimanded the Investigating Officer (IO) of the Kotwali Police Station for handcuffing them.

Reporters misled by unauthorised persons to malign advocates' reputation

PUCL has noted that after the release of the advocates, the police released the arrest-memo photographs of Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar to the media. The SHO, Kotwali Police Station, gave statements to the print, electronic and social media, resulting in newspaper reports and videos that portrayed them as having been intoxicated and having misbehaved with a lady judicial officer. The reporters were misled by unauthorised persons in order to malign advocates' reputation. The advocates were performing the legitimate duty of safeguarding the legal rights of young detainees, and to deflect attention from the violations of the due process of law by the police during the proceedings of the court.

It has pointed out that every detainee, including minors and students, is entitled under law to be informed of the charges against them and to be furnished a copy of the FIR without delay. No police officer has the authority to detain, coerce, or intimidate an advocate or a social worker for making legitimate submissions in open court on behalf of detained persons. In a travesty of justice, where section 132 of the BNS should have been imposed on the SHO, Gandhi Maidan, for obstructing an officer of the court (in this case, advocate Akash Keshav) from discharging his duty, it was advocate Akash Keshav and Vrati Kumar who were victimised by the police. The use of a breath analyser or any other test on a citizen, without the permission of the court within its premises and without following due procedure (including calibration and confirmatory testing), and the consequent detention on that sole basis, is wholly illegal.The parading of any person in handcuffs through public places, absent the specific circumstances recognised in law, is a violation of binding judicial guidelines and an affront to human dignity. The release of their photograph and a one-sided, unverified narrative to the media by the police was deliberately done to prejudice public opinion against them. It violates not only procedural propriety but also the person’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

There is a compelling reason for quashing the FIR filed against the advocates. An independent inquiry, preferably under the supervision of the Patna High Court, should be instituted to inquire into the conduct of the SHO, Gandhi Maidan Police Station, and other police personnel involved in the incident that occurred on the night of the July 26. There is a need for strict action against the erring officers for illegal detention, coercive testing without judicial sanction, unauthorised use of handcuffs, leaking photos, giving irresponsible statements to the media, and mental harassment of the advocates. 

As a consequence of of the misuse of the provisions under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, Patna High Court is crowded by bail applications to the extent that at some stage 16 judges of the High Court were hearing bail matters and prosecutions under the Excise Act. In Sudhir Kumar Yadav @ Sudhir Singh @ Sudhir Kumar vs. State of Bihar, Supreme Court observed:"What is of utmost concern to us is the legislative impact study which ought to have been undertaken before implementing the law as every law has an impact in terms of the litigation it generates and there has to be an analysis and arrangements made to tackle those consequences before a law is brought into force".

Also read:Legal reporting in Bihar fails Breath analyser test, reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025

Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra sets aside orders by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur, underlines criminal breach of trust and cheating have different ingredients

In Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 17-page long judgement dated July 31, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated March 5, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in G.R. No. 739 of 2016 which arose out of V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 and the subsequent order dated September 10, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in Trial No. 1019 of 2018/G.R. No. 739 of 2016. The judgement reads:"Consequently, the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom, stands quashed. 21. Both the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are, accordingly, allowed." Justice Mishra observed:"19. In the considered opinion of this Court, even if the allegations contained in the F.I.R are accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the petitioner. The dispute, at its core, is essentially contractual and civil in nature, which has been sought to be given the colour of a criminal prosecution."  

Justice Mishra relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Race Club (1940) & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690 wherein, it has distinguished between criminal breach of trust and cheating.  “36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients...."

The trial court had taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the petitioner, and the discharge application preferred by the petitioner was rejected. 

Justice Mishra recorded that in this case, neither entrustment of property nor dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction was discernible from the allegations made in the F.I.R. The dispute, arose out of an alleged breach of contractual obligations relating to sale of a motor vehicle and does not disclose the commission of either offence. A plain reading of the First Information Report did not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 503 and 504 Indian Penal Code. Except for a bald allegation of abuse and threat, there is no material to indicate intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace as required under Section 504 Indian Penal Code, nor are the allegations sufficient to constitute criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 503 Indian Penal Code punishable under Section 506 Indian Penal Code. The case fell squarely within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute any offence and where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or exerting pressure." 

Justice Mishra also concluded: "Continuation of the criminal proceeding, in the facts of the present case, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and would warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court."

The prosecution case was that Anil Kumar Chaudhary, the opposite party No.2 (informant), being the registered owner of a Bolero Pick-up Van bearing Registration No. BR-09M-4666, alleged that on August 1, 2016 the petitioner had approached him with a proposal to purchase the said vehicle. The sale consideration was settled at Rs.4,21,000/-, whereupon the petitioner allegedly issued a cheque of Rs.2,50,000/- towards part payment and agreed to pay the remaining Rs.1,71,000/- within two weeks, whereafter possession of the vehicle was delivered to him. It is further alleged that when the cheque was presented for encashment on September 30, 2016, the same was dishonoured. Thereafter, on October 5, 2016, when O.P. No.2 approached the petitioner demanding either payment of the amount or return of the vehicle, the petitioner allegedly abused and threatened him with dire consequences and refused either to return the vehicle or to make payment, further stating that he would dispose of the vehicle as scrap. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, a written report was submitted by O.P. No.2 before the SHO, Vidyapatinagar Police Station, Samastipur, pursuant to which F.I.R bearing V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 was registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In Lalan Kumar v. The State of Bihar (Cr.Misc No. 37503 of 2023), the High Court has held that prosecution under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act can only be initiated by filing complaint. It was also submitted that no statutory demand notice, as mandated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was ever issued and, therefore, the very institution of criminal proceedings under the said provision is legally unsustainable. He further submitted that the Magistrate  mechanically took cognizance without due application of judicial mind and that the subsequent rejection of the discharge application also suffers from the same infirmity. It is, thus, submitted that both the impugned orders dated 05.03.2018 and 10.09.2018 be quashed along with the entire criminal proceeding.