Supreme Court sets aside regular bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in Devnath Rai murder case from Maner

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 5-page long order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"The order passed by the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 8. The appellant shall be released on bail....".  The High Court's order was passed by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra. Supreme Court recorded:" 4. In this case, it appears that Vinay was an injured witness. His statement was not recorded at the time when the petition was filed and therefore, hearing on this petition was deferred to enable the Trial Court to record the statement of Vinay. 5. We have been informed that the statement of Vinay has been recorded in the trial and he has not identified the appellant as one of the participants in the incident....7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed." Notably, Shiv Kumari Devi, the informant, the wife of Late Devnath Rai, the victim who has allegedly been killed has not been made a party. She has not been able to rope any advocate to represent her in the Supreme Court. 

Earlier, in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated July 7, 2025, wherein, he had refused to grant bail in a murder case. He had concluded:"6 Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the nature and gravity of the offence as alleged against the petitioner as also taking into account the materials available in the case diary, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the prayer for bail of the petitioner, above named, is rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously." The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 from Maner  instituted for the offences under Sections 140(1), 109, 61(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Shiv Kumari Devi was not made a party in the case in the High Court. She was not able to rope any advocate to represent her in the High Court to represent her.

As per prosecution case, the accusation against the accused persons including the petitioner is to have killed the Informant’s husband and disappeared his dead body. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and had committed no offence as alleged against him and has falsely been implicated in the present case merely on the basis of suspicion. The petitioner has not committed any offence as alleged in the F.I.R. The informant is not the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that there was delay of one day in lodging the F.I.R. that too without there being any plausible explanation for the same, which created doubt in the veracity of the prosecution case. It was submitted that nothing incriminating was recovered from the conscious/physical possession of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no direct or specific allegation of any overt act against the petitioner rather the same is general and omnibus in nature. The petitioner had two criminal antecedents and is languishing in judicial custody since December 3, 2024 without any rhymes or reason.The A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioner. He had stated that the in this case, the injured Vinay Kumar was the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence who have supported the prosecution case. The petitioner, in his confessional statement, had also confessed his guilt. The petitioner  was named in the F.I.R. and, hence, he did not deserve bail. 

Shivkumari Devi is a permanent resident of Lodipur Jeevarakhand Tola, Vyapur Police Station, Maner, Patna. She informed the Maner Police that the incident occurred when her husband Devnath Rai and his friend Vinay Kumar, s/o Murari Rai of Lodipur had gone to Om Sai brick kiln to smoke at around 10 pm on August 5, 2024. At that time, a notorious criminal who is currently lodged in Beur Jail—1. Sagar Rai (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Lodipur Ganga Tola) and 2. Umashankar Yadav alias Shankar Kumar (son of the late Chandeshwar Rai; resident of Lodipur, currently residing at R.P.S. Mor, Bailey Road, Rupaspur Police Station)—conspired to recruit other notorious criminals into their fold. These recruits are: 3. Dharmendra Kumar (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Ganga Tola, Lodipur Bagicha), 4. Lalu Kumar (Dharmendra’s nephew; son of Buddhadev Rai; resident of Chakiya Tola, Chhitnava), and 5. Daroga Rai (son of the late Manik Rai; resident of Lodipur Buddha Tola). 6. Dhora Rai (son of Phudi Rai, alias Pahalban Singh; resident of Vyapur, Purvi Gali) and 7. Munna Rai (son of an unknown person; resident of Bhaggu Tola, Vyapur)—all belonging to the Maner Police Station area, District Patna—suddenly arrived by boat at the Om Sai Brick Kiln, where my husband and his friend, Vinay Kumar, were already present. All the assailants began firing with various weapons they were carrying, with the intent to kill. As a result, her husband and his friend, Vinay, were shot in the leg; Vinay Kumar then ran into the bushes to save his life. After being shot, her husband fled and hid inside the office of the Om Sai Brick Kiln. Inside the office, my husband and a staff member of the kiln—Mohan Rai (son of Shri Sukan Rai, resident of Lodipur, Maner Police Station, Patna)—locked the door from within. Then, all the named perpetrators approached the office while firing indiscriminately and began shooting at the door. Some of the perpetrators climbed onto the roof of the office and started removing the roof tiles. Mohan Rai, one of the named accused, was ordered to open the door; he complied, and then—acting in concert with the other accused—he joined them in murdering my husband. Subsequently, all these perpetrators disposed of my husband's body. Her husband's friend, Vinay Kumar, witnessed the entire incident while hiding in the bushes. Therefore, she request the SHO, Maner P.S. to please take necessary legal action against all the named eight accused persons. Manoj Kumar is the I.O.  of the case. 

Her compliant was registered on August 6, 2024. It reads:"सेवा में थानाध्यक्ष महोदय, मनेर थाना पटना। विषयः. मेरे पति देवनाथ राय के हत्या कर लाश गायब करने के संबंध में आवेदन। महाशय, विनम्रपुर्वक निवेदन के साथ कहना है कि मैं शिवकुमारी देवी पति देवनाथ राय सा० लोदीपुर जीवराखंड टोला पा० व्यापुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना कि स्थायी निवासी हूँ। मेरे पति देवनाथ राय एवं मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार पिता श्री मुरारी राय सा० लोदीपुर दोनो मिलकर दिनांक 05.08.024 को समय लगभग 10:00 बजे रात्रि में ओम साई ईंट भट्ठा पर धुमने गये हुए थे। उसी समय एक कुख्यात जो वेउर जेल में बंद है 1. सागर राय पिता काशी राय सा० लोदीपुर गंगा टोला एवं 2. उमाशंकर यादव उर्फ शंकर कुमार पिता स्व० चंदेश्वर राय सा० लोदीपुर वर्तमान पता R.P.S मोड़ बेली रोड थाना रूपसपुर इन दोनो साजिश करके कुछ कुख्यात अपराधियो को अपने मेल मे लाकर अपराधि का नाम 3. धर्मेन्द्र कुमार पिता काशी राय सा० गंगा टोला लोदीपुर बगीचा 4. लालु कुमार (धर्मेन्द्र के भगिना) पिता बुद्वदेव राय सा० चकिया टोला छितनावा 5. दरोगा राय पिता स्व0 मानिक राय सा० लोदीपुर बुद्वाटोला 6.ढोरा राय पिता फुदी राय उर्फ पहलबान सिंह सा० व्यापुर पुर्वी गली 7. मुन्ना राय पिता नामालुम सा० भग्गु टोला व्यापुर सभी थाना मनेर जिला पटना ने नाव से एकाएक ओम साई ईट भट्ठा पर पहुँचा जहा पहले से मेरे पति एवं उनके दोस्त विनय कुमार बैठे हुए थें। सभी अपराधी अपने अपने हाथ मे लिये कई तरह के हथियार से जान मारने कि नियत से फायरिंग करना शुरू कर दिया । जिससे मेरे पति एंव पति के दोस्त विनय को पैर में गोली लगी तब मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार जान बचाने के लिए झाड़ी में जाकर छिप गया। और मेरे पति गोली लगने के बाद ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के ऑफिस मे भागकर छिप गया। ऑफिस के अंदर मेरे पति के साथ ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के स्टॉफ 8. मोहन राय पिता श्री सुकन राय सा० लोदीपुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना दोनो ईंट भटठा के ऑफिस के अंदर दरवाज बंद कर लिया। तब सभी नामित अपराधी अंधाधुंध फायरिंग करते हुए ऑफिस के पास आकर दरवाजा पर गोली चलाने लगा। ओर कुछ अपराधी ऑफिस उपर चढ़कर खपड़ा हटाने लगा।नामित अभियुक्त मोहन राय को दरवाजा खोलने को कहा गया। जिसपर मोहन राय ने दरवाज खोल दिया जिसपर सभी उक्त अभियुक्त के साथ मोहन राय भी मिलकर मेरे पति कि हत्या कर दिया। और उक्त सभी अपराधी मिलकर मेरे पति के शव को ठिकाने लगा दिया। जिस घटना को घटित होते मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार ने झाड़ी से छुपकर देखा। अतः श्रीमान् से प्रार्थना है कि सभी नामजद 08 अभियुक्तो के विरूद्ध आवाश्यक कानुनी करवाई करने कि कृपा कि जाय। इसके लिए में श्रीमान् कि सदा आभारी रहूंगी। आपकी विश्वासी (शिवकुमारी देवी)". 

Will Shiv Kumar Devi, wife of Devnath Rai get justice? Isn't it a case where a habeas corpus petition should be filed in the High Court? 

Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Supreme Court directs Bar Council of India (BCI) to file counter affidavit in NALSAR convocation row case within two weeks, BCI chairman issues apology

In Mihira Sood & Anr. vs. Bar Council of India & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant, Justice Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana passed an order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it directed:"no punitive action shall be taken against the students or Faculty of NALSAR University of Law at the instance of Bar Council of India or any State Bar Council in respect of the incidents mentioned in the subject letters." The petitioner was represented by senior advocate K. Parameshwar and advocate-on-record Rupali Francesca Samuel. Upon hearing the counsel, the Court took the matter on board and issued notice, returnable on September 3, 2026. Radhika Gautam, the counsel appearing on behalf of Bar Council of India (BCI) accepted the notice. Gautam informed the Court that "the offending Circulars have since been withdrawn." The court's order reads:"4. Be that as it may, let the counter affidavit be filed within two weeks." 

 

It all began with the way CJI dismissively responded when the matter of police brutality at Jantar Mantar, New Delhi on July 20, 2026 was mentioned before his bench. This brutality took place during the Sansad Chalo march organized by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) and student and youth groups demanding the resignation of the Education Minister for national examination leak scam. The NALSAR students have expressed their strong disapproval of CJI's insensitive approach by protesting against the participation of CJI as the chief guest for their convocation. They wrote, “We feel that receiving our degrees from a dignitary whose recent public conduct, as reported, appears dismissive of serious allegations of police brutality against protesting citizens sits uncomfortably with what we have been taught to value during our time at NALSAR.” Their statement of condemnation stated that Section 7(1)(b), 7(1)(g), 7(1)(h), 7(1)(i) of the Advocates Act of 1961, establishes the functions of the BCI. "These provisions, the ones applicable to the University are only regarding the BCI's function to set standards for professional conduct and promotion of legal education. Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 restricts disqualifications from enrolment strictly to convictions for criminal offences, which did not take place in the present case. To then direct State Bar Councils to restrict the enrolment of students from the Batch of 2026 does not align with the BCI's statutory functions." 

 

Subsequent to the Court's order, nation-wide condemnation, and apprehending protest from students and youth, Manan Kumar Mishra, chairman, BCI issued an apology to law students in a letter issued on Independence Day amidst bitter criticism from students of NALSAR and National Law School of India University (NLSIU), Bangalore regarding BCI's arbitrary and unauthorised order in the backdrop of the row surrounding CJI's participation in NALSAR's 2026 convocation. Mishra's statement reads:"If anything connected with the present controversy, any of my words, or letter, has hurt the feelings of our law students, I sincerely regret and apologise for the same. There should be no hesitation in saying so. An expression of regret is not a matter of prestige or ego. It is simply an acknowledgment that the feelings and concerns of our students matter". 

BCI chairman had issued an order dated stop the enrolment for NALSAR's graduating batch of 2026 after they objected to the participation of CJI Surya Kant as the chief guest for their convocation. NALSAR's Student Bar Council had demanded a public apology from Mishra. NLSIU's graduating students, current students and alumni had also issued a joint statement in this regard. NLSIU, Bengaluru students have also rejected the presence of the BCI chairperson and the CJI at their own convocation. Mishra's statement reads:"No student should be compelled to attend, and no student should feel compelled to abstain. My only appeal is that the decision should be taken independently, after considering the matter in its entirety and according to their own judgment".

Notably, on July 23, 2026, as chairman of BCI, Mishra had issued a public appeal to the country's legal fraternity, academicians, professionals and intellectuals, urging them to counter what he described as "anti-social and anti-national forces" who are attempting to exploit ongoing student protests to destabilise the country". The press release titled "An Appeal to the Intellectuals of the Country" reads:"Experts in stone pelting have been brought from Jammu and Kashmir and other states into Delhi... These miscreants are reportedly paid substantial sums to create disorder, assault police personnel, and damage public vehicles and property."

 

The case was mentioned on August 14.  When the matter was mentioned, the CJI-led bench observed:"This is absolutely uncalled for..It a dialogue between me and students."The bench added: “I myself, during student days, was involved in student activities. Peacefully they are raising voice, they should be allowed. Even if they are wrong, assuming, they have the right to protest. Who can stop them?. Why Bar Council or any other body should interfere?”.  

 

It is quite likely that the CJI will assign the case to some other bench to comply with the Latin maxim nemo judex in causa sua i.e. no one should be a judge in his or her own case incorporated in The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct adopted in 2002, endorsed by UN resolution in 2006 and reiterated in Regulation 5 (2) of Draft Regulations for Use of Artificial Intelligence in Courts, 2026 and The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, the judicial standards and principles to be observed and followed by the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts which was unanimously adopted in Full Court Meeting of the Supreme Court of India held on May 7, 1997.    

Also read: Supreme Court Bar Association condemns BCI's arbitrary decision to withhold enrolment of NALSAR University Law Graduates, BCI modifies, withdraws its order

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside proceedings of Caste Scrutiny Committee and order by State Election Commission, Bihar

In Md. Isa vs.The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 31-page long judgement dated August 14, 026, wherein, he concluded:"51. In view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, taking into consideration the report dated 31.12.2024 of the three member Committee constituted on the directions of the Criminal Investigation Department (Weaker Section) finding the petitioner to be belonging to Teli (Muslim) caste on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence discussed in detail therein and the contents of the report dated 4.3.2025 of the Committee, this Court is of the opinion that both the Caste Scrutiny Committee in its report dated 4.3.2025 as also the State Election Commission in its order dated 25.6.2025 passed in Case no.56 of 2023 committed an error in applying Act of 1991 as also Amending Act 15 of 2003 in the case of reservation to the post of Mukhiya. 52. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the proceedings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee dated  28.3.2025 contained in memo no.6574 dated 11.4.2025 as also the order contained in memo no.2876 dated 25.6.2025 passed in Case no.56 of 2023 (Subhash Kumar vs. Md. Isa) by the State Election Commission, Bihar both being unsustainable are hereby set aside. 53. The writ application is allowed."

It was against the Caste Scrutiny Committee proceeding dated March 28, 2025 contained in memo dated April 11, 2025 and the order dated June 25, 2025 passed in Case of 2023 of the State Election Commission that the petitioner had filed the writ application. The case of the petitioner was that in the election held in the year 2021, he was elected on the post of Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj Sahuria. A complaint was filed by respondent no.9 before the State Election Commission praying for disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the seat on which the petitioner had been elected was reserved for Extremely Backward Class (EBC) while the petitioner who belonged to Sheikh community had fraudulently obtained a caste certificate of EBC wrongly showing himself to belong to the caste of Teli (Muslim). Upon the direction of the Criminal Investigation Department (Weaker Section), a three member Enquiry Committee enquired into the caste of the petitioner and submitted its report dated December 31, 2024 according to which it confirmed that the petitioner belonged to Teli (Muslim) caste. The petitioner received a show cause dated February 7, 2025 asking him to respond to the report dated December 31, 2024. The petitioner had submitted his reply on March 4, 2025. Another report dated March 28, 2025 contained in memo dated April 11, 2025 came to be submitted by the three member Caste Scrutiny Committee wherein the claim of the petitioner for reservation in the EBC category on account of belonging to Teli (Muslim) caste was rejected. 

The Commission had proceeded with the Case of 2023 registered on the complaint filed by Subhash Kumar, the respondent no.9 and passed order contained in memo dated June 25, 2025 under the signature of the State Election Commissioner, Bihar holding that the petitioner was not a permanent resident of the State of Bihar and thus was not entitled for reservation on the ground of the illegal caste certificate. Thus his election as a Mukhiya was not proper and as a result he is removed from the said post. It was further ordered to recommend action against the concerned State employee who had issued the incorrect caste certificate to the petitioner. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail rejection order by Justice Partha Sarthy in a rape case from Mohaniya, Kaimur, Bhabua

In Jokhan @ Jokhan Sant @ Dharmkant Sant vs. The State of Bihar Justice & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated August 13, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order of Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court. The order reads:"...we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail at this stage. 9. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 10. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case." 

The appeal arose from the order dated January 21, 2026 rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant in connection with P.S. Mohaniya, Kaimur, Bhabua. According to the prosecution case, the victim was found on the terrace of Ramakant’s house. Ramakant is the father of the appellant. The victim complained to her mother that she became unconscious because some scented handkerchief was put on her face by the appellant and, thereafter, she does not remember as to what happened. 

The order records: "5. It is not in dispute that her medical examination was conducted promptly and the medical report found no injury and no signs of recent sexual intercourse. Even to the Doctor, she had not reported any incident of sexual intercourse or sexual assault on her. 6. The submission on behalf of the appellant is that he has been falsely implicated; there is no medical report to corroborate the allegations which were leveled as an afterthought; and they never appeared in the First Information Report or in the statement of the victim made to the Doctor. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the appellant, who has no previous criminal antecedents and has suffered incarceration for a period exceeding one year, is entitled to be released on bail at this stage." The counsel for the State-respondent opposed the prayer for bail but could not dispute that there was no specific allegation of sexual assault in the First Information Report and there is no corroboration of the aforesaid allegation in the medical examination report. 

Earlier, in Jokhan @ Jokhan Sant @ Dharmkant Sant vs. The State of Bihar & Anr (2025), Justice Partha Sarthy had passed a 2-page long order dated January 21, 2026, wherein, he had concluded:"6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the material that has transpired in course of investigation specially the contents of the statement of the victim recorded under section 183 B.N.S.S., the Court is not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail and the application is rejected. 7. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to renew his prayer for bail after six months or on framing of charge, whichever is later."

The petitioner had approached the High Court for grant of regular bail in connection with Mohaniya P.S. Case no. 676 of 2025 registered under sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 64 and 62 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner was accused of having assaulting and outraging the modesty of the minor daughter of the informant as a result of which she fell unconscious and regained consciousness after three to four hours in the hospital. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the case as a result of differences between the parties who are next door neighbours. The petitioner has no criminal antecedent and he is in custody since August 5, 2025. Referring to the order of the trial Court, it was submitted that even as per the medical report, there is no finding of rape. The application for bail is opposed by APP for the State who submitted that the petitioner was named in the FIR and there is direct allegation against him. Even in her statement under section 183 B.N.S.S., the victim had given a detailed description of the assault etc by the petitioner.

Section 126 of the BNS defines and penalizes the offense of wrongful restraint, which occurs when someone voluntarily stops a person from moving in a direction they have a legal right to go. It replaces Section 341 of the IPC. 

Section 115 of BNS deals with voluntarily causing hurt. It replaces the old Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

 Section 76 of the BNS deals with the offense of assaulting or using criminal force against a woman with the intent to disrobe her or force her to be naked.

Section 64 of BNS has replaced Section 376 of the IPC to define the punishment for rape, mandating at least 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, potentially extending to life imprisonment, and a fine. Section 62 of BNS provides for punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.

Supreme Court Bar Association condemns BCI's arbitrary decision to withhold enrolment of NALSAR University Law Graduates, BCI modifies, withdraws its order

In a letter dated August 13, 2026 addressed to Chairman, Bar Council of India (BCI), President, Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has expressed its strongest condemnation regarding the decision taken by the BCI directing that, "Till further orders, no student of NALSAR University of Law, who has obtained the Law Degree in the year 2026, shall be enrolled by any State Bar Council as an Advocate." Subsequent to SCBA's letter, BCI modified its order dated August 13, 2026. All the three letters were issued on August 13, 2026. Now the Chairman, BCI has issued a statement dated August 14, 2026 stating that he has withdrawn the order unconditionally. 

 

It all began with a campaign started by around 450 out of NALSAR’s 1,400 students against invitation to Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant to their convocation. The campaign followed oral remarks made by the CJI last month while hearing a petition alleging police excesses during the national examination leak scam related protests, wherein, he reportedly remarked, “Please don’t waste our time. We don’t have time to watch these videos” of students and youth being beaten by Delhi Police, Rapid Action Force (RAF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and unidentified ununiformed persons during the seven-week long successful protest at at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi. 

Meanwhile, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), the party behind the resignation of education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan in wake of national examination leak scam, issued a detailed statement. It said, BCI's interim directive against NALSAR University of Law graduates "grossly disproportionate, deeply troubling, and prima facie indefensible". Responding to BCI's circular, Saurav Das of CJP said: "Alarming! Mr. Manan Mishra, HANDS OFF our students! How dare you pass such a grossly illegal order? Reveal your law degree to the world now because a lawyer can’t get the law this wrong! Students of NALSAR have displayed democratic dissent against a person they in their own wisdom thought was unfit to give them their hard-earned degrees. Who are you to intervene? Your accountability needs to be talked about too. Tell us why as the statutory regulator (BCI) responsible for supervising State Bar Councils you permitted elected bodies to continue BEYOND their terms until the Supreme Court intervened? Who were these people that were favoured as a result of this? Tell us now.  And why and how have you been holding the post of Chairman since 2012 to now till 2030? Do tell us about your track record. Tell us why did you illegally intervene in the 2026 Chhattisgarh State Bar Council, as stated by the High Court there? Law students and advocates in Delhi and across the country will rise up in protest against you and in support of the students of NALSAR if you don’t WITHDRAW this disgusting notification IMMEDIATELY and apologise for your conduct. Your conduct and tenure as the BCI Chairman (while being BJP RS MP) needs to be accounted for." 

Abhijeet Dipke of CJP observed: "What if all legal cockroaches come together?" Das added: "Much needed. The Bar Council of India needs to be looked into. Manan Mishra has been its Chairman since 2012. What has he done? Needs to be accounted for. All legal cockroaches, your task is cut out. Let’s fix BCI’s accountability. Let’s fix Mishra’s accountability." 

CJP's statement reads:"The Bar Council of India’s decision to halt the enrolment of NALSAR’s 2026 graduating students as advocates, reportedly because they opposed Chief Justice of India Surya Kant being invited as Chief Guest, is grossly disproportionate, deeply troubling, and prima facie indefensible. Students cannot be collectively penalised for expressing dissent over a ceremonial invitation. The Cockroach Janta Party condemns this order. If Chairman Manan Kumar Mishra does not withdraw this order immediately, then all law students, advocates, senior lawyers, and well-meaning young cockroaches will protest outside Bar Council’s office and Mishra’s official residence, and their respective states. @MishraManan01’s accountability will be fixed." Mishra responded: "Council has already withdrawn that letter." Das reacted:"Mr. Mishra, the order has NOT been fully withdrawn. The part which seeks names of the students and orders for an “inquiry” against them for their peaceful dissent still stands, as per your own new letter. IMMEDIATELY withdraw that entire letter. No student at NALSAR should face any inquiry or witch hunt for their democratic dissent against the Chief Justice of India. You are no one to threaten this. Stay within the four corners of your official duties and stop threatening the students with “inquiry”. Withdraw the letter in full and guarantee NO ACTION against our brilliant law students of NALSAR. The call for protest outside the BCI and Mr. Mishra’s official residence STANDS until this demand is fulfilled." After CJP's threat of protest against him, BCI chairman communicated to CJP that he has modified the order  

CJP was not satisfied with the modification of the BCI's order, it demanded complete withdrawal of BCI's order. Responding to CJP's demand on August 14, 2026, Mishra wrote:"After considering the representations and reactions of Senior Advocates, learned members of the Bar, law students and public spirited citizens, and being satisfied that the 2026 batch of NALSAR, Hyderabad, had no role in any disturbance or movement, the Bar Council of India has decided to close the proceedings altogether. No further action is required @NALSAR_Official. I wish the students the very best for their careers. A word of wisdom: we take immense pride in our legal institutions, and the day you enrol, you become vanguards. Voice your opinions freely, but with respect and institutional decorum. The highest judicial office is our collective pride. Dissent is welcome in a democracy; public ridicule of constitutional institutions is often counterproductive.  Official communication to follow." Das reacted: "It’s done, bro. Another major victory for the youth! But the quest for accountability will continue."

In a letter addressed to the chairman, BCI, Advocate N. Manoj Kumar, a member of both the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Kerala, has objected to the blanket prohibition against the entire 2026 batch which is, "manifestly arbitrary".  

Former Advocate-General of Telangana and senior advocate K Ramakrishna Reddy stated that the BCI had no jurisdiction to direct State Bar Councils against enrolling NALSAR graduates who completed their courses in 2026. Describing the original direction as “manifestly arbitrary” and “without jurisdiction”, he said the BCI’s powers under the Advocates Act primarily concerned professional standards, ethics and conduct.

SCBA's letter stated:"This unprecedented and wholly arbitrary direction is, in my view, illegal, disproportionate and fundamentally unsustainable. It amounts to an attempt to intimidate law students for exercising their fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Universities are meant to be campuses of free thought and fearless debate. Students cannot be threatened with denial of their right to enter the legal profession merely because they have expressed disagreement with a constitutional authority. Such an approach is fundamentally antithetical to the very values that a law university is expected to nurture....The directive also seriously affects the graduates' fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to practise a profession of their choice. A blanket and indefinite restriction of this nature cannot meet the requirements of legality, reasonableness or proportionality. The BCI, as the apex regulatory body of the legal profession, has a greater responsibility to uphold the rule of law and constitutional values. It cannot itself resort to collective punishment or use the professional future of young graduates as a means of institutional discipline. As members of the legal fraternity, it is our collective duty to nurture, support, and welcome the next generation of lawyers, rather than creating arbitrary institutional barriers that stall their careers before they even begin." The letter of SCBA's President concluded:"I therefore urge the Bar Council of India to immediately withdraw this wholly unjustified directive and permit the 2026 NALSAR graduates to seek enrolment without any hindrance and in accordance with law."

The Bar Council of India held its elections on April 15, 2012. BCI had unanimously elected Manan Kumar Mishra as the Chairman of BCI on April 17, 2012. In 2014, after his term expired, BCI Member from Rajasthan Biri Singh Sinsinwar was elected the Chairman. But Sinsinwar resigned from the post after few months. Mishra was again re-elected as Chairman. At present, he is serving his seventh term.

Mohua Moita, the parliamentarian wrote: "BCI has NO women imagine." BCI is a highly unrepresentative body but the plea for SC/ST representation in state bar councils was not entertained last year by a bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh. 

Earlier, in an animated exchange of words between Advocate on Record Kumud Lata Dass and Mishra in the Court of Chief Justice of India, she had stated that to the BCI Chairman "You're virtually a permanent Chairman...."

Saurav Das wrote:" Manan Mishra needs to go. Enough of him since 2012. All kinds of illegalities have been committed under his chairmanship. Our lawyers deserve better. Time’s up for Manan bro." Nagendra Sharma, a writer-advocate wrote:"It is also a case of huge conflict of interest. He runs a law university  in Goa through a trust set up by BCI and is setting up one more such university in Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh.  It is a clear attempt to undermine and diminish highly reputed and public funded NALSAR and to create space in South for his universities that charge over rs 10 lakh per annum per student." Das asked Mishra:"Very, very serious questions raised. @MishraManan01, is this true? Is this not misuse of the powers of your office? You’ve been the Chairman since 2012. Is this what you have been doing? Do no other lawyers exist? Legal Cockroaches, find out more about this and fix accountability!" He added:"The kind of horror stories that are coming out about Manan Kumar Mishra should lead to his resignation with immediate effect. This is what would’ve happened in a functional democracy. Cockroaches are here to make a functional democracy. Mr. Mishra, time’s up!" Das pointed out:"Friends, Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra’s Bar Council of India spent 14 CRORES on meetings and conferences in just one year. Today, he had to withdraw a portion of his outrageous order on NALSAR students within 1 hour. So where and how is this 14 crores being spent? 12 crores was also spent on travel and accommodation. But what has been the result? If Mr. Mishra is capable of issuing such a draconian order against young students, then what welfare has he been doing for young lawyers and law schools? He’s been in the position since 2012 and will be till 2030. Time’s up, Mr. Mishra! #LegalCockroachesUnite and hold him accountable." 

Gazette notification states that BCI spent Rs 180.25 crore on legal education in 2024-25 in its audited financial statement. It shows an increase from Rs 46 crore spent on legal education in the previous financial year. The total income of the BCI for 2024-25 stands at Rs 234.49 crore, compared to Rs 250.32 crore in the previous year. Inspection fees remain the primary source of revenue. It contributed over Rs 130 crore. The collection from examination fees from the All India Bar Examination (AIBE) amounted to Rs 36.96 crore, lower than Rs 50.19 crore collected from two editions in the previous year. The BCI's expenditure, apart from legal education, includes Rs 14.22 crore on its activities and meetings, Rs 10.27 crore on employee benefits, and Rs 3.41 crore on establishment and other expenses. The statement reveals that examination-related expenses are recorded at Rs 2.52 crore. The financial statement shows that the surplus for the year declined to Rs 23.42 crore from RS 173.50 crore in 2023-24. It attributes this change to higher expenditure during the year. The BCI’s total assets increased to Rs 815.83 crore from Rs 752.55 crore in the previous year. Notably, investments accounts for a substantial portion, with over RS 733 crore held primarily in fixed deposits with scheduled banks. The receipts from law colleges under legal education regularisation fees rose to Rs 9.08 crore, compared to Rs 3.16 crore in the previous year. The enrolment and other fees contributed Rs 18.81 crore, while interest income amounted to Rs 44.55 crore. 

Similar audited financial statements of State Bar Councils including Bihar State Bar Council should be notified in the Gazette at the earliest.   

The BCI draws its mandate from the Advocates Act, 1961 to lay down “standards of professional conduct and etiquette,” safeguarding “the rights, privileges and interests of advocates,” and specifying standards for legal education “in consultation with the universities in India imparting such education” to the state bar councils. It is responsible for recognising universities “whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an advocate.” But BCI has proposed to empower itself to conduct nationwide entrance examinations for law degree admissions under the Draft Advocates (Amendment) Bill, 2026. This draft bill also suggests raising the advocate's enrolment fee from ₹750 to ₹22,500, a massive 30%  increase. The Draft Bill gives the BCI authority to conduct entrance tests and define minimum eligibility qualifications for entry into law degree courses. The proposed Bill does not have provision for it's audit by Comptroller Auditor General. It's provision to legitimize it's election tribunal structure to deal with disputes concerning elections under the Advocates Act, 1961 is highly questionable because the election tribunal is structurally, a subordinate body under the chairman of BCI. BCI does not trust Election Commission of India like independent body to deal with election petitions under the law. 

On September 29, 2018, BCI publicly urged CJI Dipak Misra not to accept any post-retirement assignment from the govt, saying it was necessary to protect the “independence & integrity of the judiciary.” 

It's press release reads: "There is a public perception that independence of judges falls under stress and strain during the last part of the tenure of most of our Judges when the possibility of post retirement assignments and jobs by the Governments becomes a living possibility. When a Judge accepts any assignment after his retirement, fingers are raised about the bona fides of such assignment. The case of Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam, former Chief Justice of India who was appointed as a Governor of Kerala after retirement as CJI, had generated much reaction. Such post- retirement assignments, for good or no reason, put a question mark on the fair discharge of judicial functions by the Judge in question during the concluding part of his tenure. This is a very grey area in which Bar expects that retiring Judges should not accept any appointments after retirement, at least for a cooling period of two years from the date of their retirement. Recently, a Joint Meeting of Bar Council of India with the representatives of State Bar Councils and High Court Bar Associations, the Co-ordination Committee of Bar Associations of Delhi, NCR has passed the most emphatic resolution in this regard.The Indian Bar has requested the High Court and Supreme Court Judges not to accept any assignment after their retirement at least for two years. In that meeting, the representatives also expressed their anguish over the role of a Judge of Supreme Court, who passed some orders with sole intent to shut the mouth of the Bar. The Hon'ble Judge had gone to the extent of issuing directions to the Law Commission to suggest amendments in Advocates' Act for demolishing the democratic structure of Bar bodies. And the Law Commission, as expected, made its suggestions destroying the independence of the Bar. (Though due to strong protest by the Lawyers, the Government did not accept the recommendations). The same Judge passed another impractical order restraining the Lawyers from giving a call of abstention, boycott or strikes even for a single day (in any eventuality). This order is in violation of a constitution Bench Judgment of apex court."

But when former CJI Ranjan Gogoi was nominated to the Rajya Sabha, the BCI issued a release dated March 18, 2020 welcoming it as a “bridge between the Legislature & Judiciary” and called the criticism of the appointment “unwarranted & premature.” Isn't this a case where someone is guilty of applying double standards in his speech? Aren't such people commonly called a hypocrite, two-faced, or equivocator because they use different rules, values, or judgments for different people or situations? 

Earlier,  on March 3, 2017, the Supreme Court had stayed the operation of a circular issued in September 2016 by the BCI, that imposed age limits on people enrolling for law degree programmes in the country. The circular barred anyone above the age of 20 from entering five-year programmes, and anyone above 30 from entering three-year programmes (with relaxations for students from communities entitled to reservations). The court’s decision came as a relief to those who had been affected by the rule, which has a tumultuous history.

 

Also read: Legal reporting in Bihar fails Breath analyser test, reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025 

 

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