Supreme Court stays interim order by Justice Arun Kumar Jha who had directed compliance with Supreme Court's judgements in Arnesh Kumar and Asfak Alam

In Rakesh Kumar & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manmohan and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated June 8, 2026 staying interim order dated March 30, 2026 by Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High High Court. The Supreme Court's order reads:"4. Till further orders, there shall be stay of impugned judgment and order as well as further proceedings in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No.256 of 2022" referring to Kumar Dushyant vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026).  Rakesh Kumar, the respondent no 11 is in S.D.P.O., Jamui P.S., Jamui before the High Court. The petitioner no. 2 is Pramod Kumar Mandal who is the respondent no.12 in the case which is pending in the High Court. 

The relevant paragraph in the High Court's order reads:"25. So far as other respondents, namely the Sub-Divisional Police Officer and the Superintendent of Police, Jamui are concerned, being not directly involved in the arrest of the petitioner or being liable for ensuring service of notice, it could not be said that they are in contempt of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, being the superiors of respondent no. 10, the then IO and also the then SHO, not taking appropriate action in accordance with law against him renders these two respondents liable for departmental action. 26. Therefore, in the light of discussion made hereinbefore, finding disobedience of the mandate of law as well as the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Director General of Police, Bihar/competent authority is directed to initiate departmental proceeding against the respondent no. 10, 11 and 12, the then SHO, SDPO, Superintendent of Police, Jamui, respectively. Till completion of departmental proceeding, no investigation work would be assigned to respondent no. 10." 

Supreme Court's order records that "the counsel for the petitioners states that despite recording that the petitioners were neither directly involved in the alleged act nor in violation of the directions issued by this Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 1SCC 273, the High Court has proceeded to issue adverse strictures and direct initiation of departmental proceedings. 2. Issue notice by all modes, returnable on 20.07.2026. 3.Mr. Manish Kumar, learned AOR, accepts notice on behalf of Respondent Nos.1 to 8."

It is intriguing as to why the Supreme Court stayed the "further proceedings in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No.256 of 2022" when only respondent no. 11 and 12, two out of the 12 respondents had approached it for relief.   

Does it not imply that Supreme Court has put a stay on completion of departmental proceeding against respondent no. 10. Chandan Kumar, the then IO/ SHO who violated the directions of the  Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar case and Asfak Alam case in not issuing the notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of the CrPC to the petitioner and making the arrest in violation of the said guidelines, hence, is liable for the breach of law and non-compliance of direction of the Supreme Court and its willful disobedience? Does it imply that now investigation work would be assigned to Chandan Kumar although he ha sbeen found guilty? 

Justice Jha came to a finding that against the respondent no. 10, Chandan Kumar, a case of Civil Contempt under the provision of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is made out and he is directed to furnish a show cause as to why contempt proceeding be not initiated against him for wilful disobedience of the directions of the orders of the Supreme Court. As a consequence of the Supreme Court's order, has the contempt proceeding been stayed? 

The case was filed in the Supreme Court on May 24, 2026, registered May 29, 2026 and verified on June 3, 2026.  The other ten respondents are: Principal Secretary, Director General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, District Magistrate, Suprintendent of Police, Sub-Divisional Police, Kumari Anchala, Chandan Kumar and Kumar Dushyant. 

It is clear that Kumar Dushyant's counsel will have to approach the Supreme Court to seek clarification with regard to the action initiated by High Court against Chandan Kumar.   

In Kumar Dushyant vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Jha of the High Court has passed a 28-page long order dated March 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded that CJM did not fulfill the requirement of the Supreme Court's decision in Arnesh Kumar because CJM's order dated November 25, 2020 authorizing the detention merely records that the offence is non-bailable and there were sufficient material available for remanding him from case diary. Such mechanical order by a judicial officer needs to be deprecated in strongest terms. Authorizing detention without recording reasons regarding satisfaction of the Court and, the same being non-speaking would be in violation of the guidelines of the Supreme Court and would make such judicial officer liable for departmental action. However, considering that it is a judicial order, this Court would not like to interfere with such order under its writ jurisdiction and leave it to the disciplinary authority to take appropriate action on administrative side. The right of the petitioner to personal liberty was curtailed not by a procedure established by law but in an arbitrary manner by the IO who also happened to be the SHO. Hence, Chandan Kumar, the SHO, the respondent no.10 defied the directions of the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar case and Asfak Alam case wherein, the Court held that for the event of non-service of notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC and for arrest without recording the reasons necessitating the arrest, contempt proceeding would be initiated, against the erring official and has, thus, made himself liable for initiation of contempt proceeding." The case is pending in the High Court. 

As far as Sub-Divisional Police Officer and the Superintendent of Police, Jamui are concerned, being the superiors of respondent no. 10, the then IO and also the then SHO, not taking appropriate action in accordance with law against him renders these two respondents liable for departmental action  for disobedience of the mandate of law as well as the directions of the Supreme Court, the Director General of Police, Bihar/competent authority is directed to initiate departmental proceeding against the respondent no. 10, Dr. Rakesh Kumar, the respondent no. 11 and Pramod Mandal, the respondent no. 12, the then SHO, SDPO, Superintendent of Police, Jamui, respectively. Till completion of departmental proceeding, no investigation work would be assigned to respondent no. 10. Chandan Kumar, the then IO/ SHO has violated the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar case and Asfak Alam case in not issuing the notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of the CrPC to the petitioner and making the arrest in violation of the said guidelines, hence, for the breach of law and non-compliance of direction of the Supreme Court and its willful disobedience, Justice Jha came to a finding that against the respondent no. 10, Chandan Kumar, a case of Civil Contempt under the provision of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is made out and he is directed to furnish a show cause as to why contempt proceeding be not initiated against him for wilful disobedience of the directions of the orders of the Supreme Court. 

The show cause must be filed within eight weeks. The case is listed for hearing on June 19, 2026. The High Court's order dated March 30, 2026 records that Chandan Kumar is presently posted as Barhiya S.H.O., P.S. and District- Lakhisarai.

The other 11 respondents are:the respondent no. 2 Principal Secretary, Home Police, Bihar, Patna, the respondent no.3, the respondent no.4, Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna, the respondent no. 5, Deputy Inspector general of Police, Central Bihar, Patna, the respondent no.6, District Magistrate, Jamui, Superintendent of Police, Jamui, the respondent no.7, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Jamui, the respondent no. 8, Chandan Kumar, Officer-in-Charge-cum-Investigation Officer, Jamui Town Police, Station, Jamui, respondent no. 9. Kumari Anchala D/O Parsuram Mishra, the respondent no. 10, Chandan Kumar, SHO., Dr. Rakesh Kumar, and the respondent no. 11, Pramod Mandal. 

The petition was filed for issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents authority to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the erring Officer-in-Charge Jamui Town Police Station and Investigating Officer Jamui Town PS Case No. 379 / 2020 in connivance with Superintendent of Police and SDPO, Jamui who have illegally arrested the petitioner. The petitioner prayed to hold the officers involved in the case guilty of contempt of court as they have willfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions of the Supreme Court rendered in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar and the mandate of Article 144 of the Constitution of India. The petition sought direction to award exemplary damages to the petitioner as he suffered injury of mental and prestige due to negligent/arbitrarily/malafide act of the officers involved in the case.

On a written report by Kumari Anchala to the police, Jamui P.S. Case No. 379 of 2020 on July 26, 2020 under Section 420 of the IPC and Section 66(c)(d) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was instituted. The allegation in the written report was about hacking of Facebook account of the informant and posting of obnoxious messages on the said account. The investigation was handed over to one Dinesh Ram, Sub-Inspector of Police who made a call to the petitioner on September 3, 2020 telling him that the petitioner was wanted in the case. The petitioner, thereafter, approached the said police official through a lawyer and when the lawyer had a meeting with the police official, he told the petitioner to go and meet the Investigating Officer as allegation was not serious and appeared to be trivial in nature. The petitioner went and met with the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer told him about pressure from his senior officials for making out the arrest of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted that, thereafter, the father of the petitioner along with his advocate approached Chandan Kumar, the concerned Station House Officer, Jamui Town, the respondent no. 10 and prayed for a fair investigation in the case. He also pleaded that the notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC be served upon the petitioner or alternatively he might be enlarged on bail since the offence as alleged in the FIR was bailable in nature and Section 420 of the IPC was wrongly inserted without any allegation for commission of the said offence. The respondent no. 10 disclosed that Section 420 of the IPC was inserted in the list of offences to make the case non-bailable and he was so instructed by the Superintendent of Police. Thereafter, the father of the petitioner approached the Sub-Divisional Police Officer again pleading for a fair supervision. Although the Sub-Divisional Police Officer showed his surprise about inclusion of Section 420 of the IPC in the light of allegation made in the FIR, he mechanically put a supervision note finding the case true under Section 420 of the IPC as well. The petitioner submitted that on November 24, 2020, the petitioner was sent by the Principal of the School to attend a Seminar at the District Education Office, Jamui which was just adjacent to the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Jamui. After the end of the seminar, while the petitioner was returning to his village on Scooty, he was waylaid by some unknown persons in plain dress riding two motorcycles who snatched his mobile and one of them identified himself as the Station House Officer of Jamui Police Station. These persons forcibly brought the petitioner to the police station and in the police station, the Station House Officer used abusive language against the petitioner. When the petitioner was apprehended, the country was under the grip of COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioner was kept in the police station till late night of the next day and he was not allowed to meet any of his family members, who were not even informed about the arrest of the petitioner. Getting the news of abduction of the petitioner, his father came to the police station where he found that the petitioner was in police custody. When the father of the petitioner tried to meet him, he was shooed away by the police officials with threat that he would also be falsely implicated in some case and was told that petitioner would be sent to jail. The petitioner was sent to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamui in handcuffs. The petitioner brought to the notice of the Chief Judicial Magistrate the mala fide act of the Investigating Officer and Station House Officer and submitted that the Investigating Officer had no power to arrest in the said case under the provisions of Section 41 of the CrPC. Thus, against the act of the police officials claiming it to be illegal, the petitioner has approached the High Court. 

Satya Prakash Parasar, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the action of respondent-authorities violates the right of the petitioner provided under Article 14, 19 and 21 and also violates Article 144 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner all along cooperated with the police authorities and there was no apprehension of petitioner fleeing away and hampering the investigation in the matter. The counsel also submitted that the mala fide of the police officials is writ large on the face of the record. Though from the written report it is clear that the only allegation was against some unknown person that he hacked the Facebook account of the Kumari Anchala, the respondent no. 9 still offence under Section 420 of the IPC was inserted in the FIR. Therefore, inclusion of Section 420 of the IPC is completely arbitrary and it appears the same has been inserted to make the case serious and non-bailable. As it is apparent from the record that no prima facie case under Section 420 of the IPC is made out in the given facts and circumstances.  Moreover, offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000 are of special category. It was a self contained legislation and a separate kind of procedure has been prescribed for investigation/inquiry/trial. Section 72 of the Information Technology Act provides that only the officers who are not below the rank of the Inspector can investigate the offences alleged to have been conducted under the provisions of IT Act. But for the reasons best known to the SHO and the Superintendent of Police, Jamui, a Sub-Inspector was appointed as the Investigating Officer of the case and the investigation got vitiated by this very fact. There is complete violation of the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar and Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273 wherein, the Supreme Court deprecated the tendency of the police officials arresting the accused unnecessarily and the Magistrate authorizing such detention casually and mechanically. These guidelines were issued while considering a case under Section 498A IPC but subsequently in the case of Md. Asfak Alam vs. The State of Jharkhand, 2023 INSC 660 the Supreme Court clarified that these guidelines would be equally applicable to the cases registered for other offences wherein the punishment extends up to seven years. Although no offences under Section 420 of the IPC could have been inferred from the allegation made in the written report of respondent no. 9 still, considering the guidelines issued in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam (supra) the police authorities could not have arrested the petitioner. The police officials acted beyond the mandate of law and did not follow the provisions of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. No reasons in writing were given necessitating the arrest of the petitioner. Therefore, the liberty of the petitioner was curtailed without any sanction of law and hence, the police officials are in contempt of the orders of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam (supra). The petitioner is a teacher and he has all along been performing his duty and never absconded, still, he had been wrongly arrested by the police officials.T he police officials were predetermined to put the petitioner behind the bar and issued press note and got the news published in local newspaper that a serious and heinous kind of crime has been committed by the petitioner. This news was circulated on Whatsapp through the mobile number 9386382267 by Chandan Kumar, the then S.H.O. Jamui Town and the respondent no. 10 and it shows his personal bias in the case. 

While the petitioner was taken to the Court of the CJM, he was put under handcuffs and was taken to the Court on foot through a busy market to malign his image. Even the application for remand before the CJM is full of wrong facts. The remand was sought on the ground that release of the petitioner would create law and order problem but the fact was ignored that the petitioner being a teacher was on his duty even on the date when he was arrested. Therefore, allowing of remand by the CJM, Jamui was also illegal. The counsel submitted that undue haste was shown by the Investigating Officer in effecting the arrest of the petitioner and the police authorities acted in most mala fide and arbitrary manner against the petitioner. The counsel also submitted that the fact was not considered that life and liberty of a citizen is sacrosanct and making arrest in such trivial matter without any material runs contrary to the fair play in action and goes against the mandate of law and judicial pronouncements made from time to time by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, learned counsel referred to the case of D.K. Basu vs. State of W. Bengal, (1997)1 SCC 416 wherein certain guidelines were issued to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention. The counsel submitted that none of the family members of the petitioner were informed about his arrest and this fact is clear from the arrest memo dated November 24, 2020 wherein in the column of persons who have been informed about the arrest, it has only been mentioned that information was given to family member (parijan) without specifying the name or relationship of the family member. The counsel reiterated that the arrest of the petitioner violates the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Arensh Kumar(supra), Asfak Alam (supra) and D.K. Basu (supra) and hence makes the respondent-authorities liable for contempt.  

The counsel also referred to the case of Joginder Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1349 wherein, the Supreme Court issued certain guidelines with regard to right of an arrested person flowing from Article 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The counsel submitted that for illegal detention of the petitioner, the authorities should be heavily penalized and departmental proceedings be initiated against them and they should be proceeded for committing Contempt of Court and petitioner should be adequately compensated. 

On the point of compensation, counsel referred to the case of Dr. Rini Johar & Anr. vs. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 2679, wherein, the Supreme Court finding that the conditions precedent of procedure of arrest were not followed and liberty of the petitioners was curtailed, a compensation of Rs. 5 lacs was awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State. The counsel also referred to the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. passed in CrWJC No. 2761 of 2025 dated November 13, 2025 and the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Rakesh Kumar vs. Vijayanta Arya (DCP) and Ors. in Cont. Case No. 480/2020 wherein, the petitioner was adequately compensated for his unauthorized detention. 

The counsel also referred to the decision in S. Rajarethinam(deceased) & Ors. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. in WMP No. 37619 of 2017 and Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs. Mr. A.R. Srinivas, DCP, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1190 wherein, the Single Judge of Telangana High Court finding that notice was not served in terms of guidelines of Arnesh Kumar (supra) held the respondents to be contemnors having willfully disobeyd the judgment of the Supreme Court and ordered them to be punished for Contempt of Court.

Justice Jha noted that from the record, it also transpires that initially one Sub-Inspector Dinesh Ram was made the Investigating Officer but subsequently, Chandan Kumar, the  respondent no. 10, the then SHO was handed over the charge of investigation by the order dated November 17, 2020 by the Superintendent of Police, Jamui. Therefore, for all purposes Chanadan Kumar,  the Officer-in-Charge-cum-Investigation Officer, Jamui Town Police Station, Jamui, the respondent no. 8 and Chanadan Kumar, the respondent no. 10 are the same person.  

The petitioner has alleged non-compliance of Section 41(1) and Section 41-A of the CrPC as well as the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar (supra) and Asfak Alam(supra). On the other hand, the answering respondents have denied any non-compliance of mandatory provisions of law or the guidelines of the Supreme Court. 

Section 41(1) and Section 41-A of the CrPC reads: “41. When police may arrest without warrant. (1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person - (a)[ who commits, in the presence of a police office, a cognisable offence; (b)against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognisable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely: (i)the police has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary- (a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or (b)for proper investigation of the offence; or (c)to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or (d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer;or (e)as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reason in writing; [Provided that a police officer shall, in all the cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provision of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.]
[41A. Notice of appearance before police officer. (1) [The police officer shall], in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. (2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. [(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.]” 

Therefore it is only under certain conditions that a police officer may arrest a person without an order from a Magistrate or without any warrant. 

In Arnesh Kumar's case, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 11 gave the following directions:-“11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically.
In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following direction:
11.1 All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;
11.2 All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub- clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii); 
11.3 The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention; 
11.4 The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
11.5 The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.6 Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of Cr.PC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.7 Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11.8 Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.” 

In Asfak Alam's case, the Supreme court in para 12 held that the directions of Arensh Kumar(supra) shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but also to such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine. 

Justice Jha observed that it is in this background that the arrest of the petitioner is to be tested. From the facts of the case and averment made in the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is evident that no notice was served upon the petitioner following the mandate of Section 41-A of the CrPC directing him to appear before the Investigation Officer considering the fact that the maximum sentence prescribed for offences mentioned in the FIR was seven years with fine. There has been no submission before this Court or any averment in the counter affidavit of any of the respondents that a notice under Section 41-A was served upon the petitioner. Though general averments have been made about compliance of Section 41(1), Section 41-A of CrPC and guidelines of Supreme Court regarding arrest and detention of an accused, no specific averment has been made about the satisfaction being recorded by the police officer for arrest of the petitioner, no documents have been brought on record by any of the respondents showing such satisfaction in terms of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of CrPC. Perusal of the remand application, shows even while seeking detention for a fortnight, only averment which has been made for keeping the petitioner in custody is that there was sufficient evidence against him and his release on bond would give rise to law and order situation but details are completely lacking. The Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar has made it very much clear that non-compliance of the guidelines would render the erring police officials liable for departmental action as well as for Contempt of Court. 

Justice Jha observed that from the order of the CJM dated November 25, 2020, "it appears petitioner was produced before the Court with Memo of arrest, seizure list without seized articles, checklist, photocopy of subscriber details, photocopy of medical prescription and photocopy of case diary. None of the respondents produced the checklist or any document to bring forth the fact before this court why arrest of the petitioner was necessary though maximum sentence prescribed for the offences mentioned in the FIR was imprisonment for seven years and fine. Therefore, there is non-compliance of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC as no material has been brought on record to show that the arrest of the petitioner was necessary at the first instance. Mere bland assertion about release of the petitioner giving rise to law and order situation would not suffice to meet the obligation under Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. It also runs counter to the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam(supra)."

Justice Jha observed: "22. The liberty of a person is precious and the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam(supra) are only to ensure that police officers do not unnecessarily arrest any person and the Magistrate do not mechanically remand any person. Once the Investigating Officer/respondent-authorities came to know about the involvement of the petitioner in the case in hand, they were supposed to furnish him a notice within two weeks under Section 41-A of the CrPC but no such steps were taken. Rather the petitioner was arrested on 24.11.2020 and brought before the learned CJM, Jamui on 25.11.2020." He added: "23. Even the remand of the petitioner by the learned CJM does not fulfil the requirement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar (supra) because the order dated 25.11.2020 authorizing the detention merely records that the offence is non-bailable and there were sufficient material available for remanding him from case diary. Such mechanical order by a judicial officer needs to be deprecated in strongest terms. Authorizing detention without recording reasons regarding satisfaction of the Court and, the same being non-speaking would be in violation of the guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and would make such judicial officer liable for departmental action. However, considering that it is a judicial order, this Court would not like to interfere with such order under its writ jurisdiction and leave it to the disciplinary authority to take appropriate action on administrative side. However, the contention made on behalf of the respondents that the order of the learned CJM dated 25.11.2020 remanding the petitioner into custody and subsequently cognizance being taken have put a cloak of legality over the previous action of the IO/SHO, Jamui in arresting the petitioner without notice, is without any substance. If the initial act is bad, then all subsequent proceedings become tainted and would suffer from illegality." 

Justice Jha drew on the decision of the Supreme court in State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 to state that "the orders of the CJM could not undone the previous act of the police authorities, if the same has been against the law of the land as the authorities must be reminded that under Article 144 of the Constitution of India, all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India are under a bounden duty to act in the aid of the Supreme Court and any guidelines issued by the Supreme Court is to be obeyed without demur by the authorities." 

The order concluded: "24. The right of the petitioner to personal liberty has been curtailed not by a procedure established by law but in an arbitrary manner by the IO who also happened to be the SHO. Hence, the respondent no.10 (the then SHO), has defied the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) & Asfak Alam(supra) wherein it has been held that for the event of non-service of notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC and for arrest without recording the reasons necessitating the arrest, contempt proceeding would be initiated, against the erring official and has, thus, made himself liable for initiation of contempt proceeding."

Justice Aravind Kumar, Prasanna V. Parale bench seeks clarification on the position of law laid down in K.A. Najeeb’s case by Justice Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose, N.V. Ramana

In Tasleem Ahmad vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026), Supreme Court's 2-judge bench passed an unreasoned order dated May 22, 2026, a 2-judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred to a larger Bench the question of how Article 21 is to be applied against the statutory bar on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, (UAPA) 1967. The provision states that no person shall be granted bail for an offence under the UAPA if a court is of the opinion that “there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true”.

Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna V. Parale passed a 28-page long order dated May 22, 2026, which reads:"5. The issue, as projected before us, is not a narrow one concerning the bail prayer of the present appellants alone. It concerns the proper constitutional approach to be adopted where prolonged incarceration and delay in conclusion of trial are pressed as grounds for bail notwithstanding the statutory restraint contained in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. 6. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to record that K.A. Najeeb (supra) is an authoritative pronouncement of a three-Judge Bench of this Court. It preserves the constitutional force of Article 21, while at the same time recognising the legislative policy underlying special statutes such as the UAPA.  7. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), this Court held that the presence of statutory restrictions such as Section 43D(5) of the UAPA does not per se oust the power of constitutional courts to grant bail where continued detention violates Part III of the Constitution. At the same time, the three-Judge Bench expressly recognised that at the commencement of proceedings courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail; and that the rigour of such provision may melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. 8. The ratio of K.A. Najeeb (supra), therefore, is neither a charter for indefinite incarceration under the cover of Section 43D(5), nor a mathematical command that the mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding circumstances, must automatically result in bail. 9. It is in this background that the decision in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [hereinafter referred to as “Gulfisha Fatima”] requires to be understood. The said judgment proceeded on the very premise that K.A. Najeeb binds all Benches of lesser strength. It expressly recognised that Article 21 occupies acentral place in the constitutional scheme; that the right to speedy trial is a facet of personal liberty; and that pre-trial incarceration cannot, by mere passage of time, assume the character of punishment. It further recognised K.A. Najeeb as a constitutional safeguard against unconscionable detention and recorded that there can be no second opinion on the proposition that statutory restrictions must yield in an appropriate case. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to reproduce certain portions of Gulfisha Fatima below:

“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of

personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts

retain the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.”

“52. The consequence of the above is that Najeeb(supra) must be understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable detention. Prolonged incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional concern and carries great

weight. It is not, however, the sole determinant. The Court must consider, in totality, whether continued detention has become constitutionally unjustifiable, having regard to the role attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the availability of intermediate remedies.

53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured content in a field where the Constitution itself recognises competing interests.Nor does it render Section 43D(5) absolute. It recognises that statutory restraint must yield in an appropriate case where detention becomes punitive by reason of unreasonable and unjustified delay. What it excludes is a mechanical override based on time alone, divorced from legal context.” 

The order reads: "10. What Gulfisha Fatima (supra) declined to accept was a mechanical or solitary application of delay. The judgment held that the inquiry into delay is contextual and must take into account the nature of allegations, the statutory field, the stage of proceedings, the realistic trajectory of trial, the causes contributing to delay, the role attributed to the accused, the prima facie material, the availability of intermediate safeguards and the risks attendant upon release. 11. The said approach, in our considered view, does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured content in a field where the Constitution requires the Court to accommodate personal liberty, fair trial, societal security and the legislative judgment underlying a special statute. The judgment in Gulfisha Fatima understood the findings and ratio in K.A. Najeeb as a principled safeguard against unconscionable detention, and not as a mathematical formula of universal application. 12. In Gulfisha Fatima, bail was granted to five of the seven appellants before the Court. Bail was declined to two appellants not because Article 21 was treated as subordinate to Section 43D(5), but because, upon an accused-specific evaluation, the Court found that their role, the prima facie material attributed to them, and the attendant concerns of trial integrity did not, at that stage, justify overriding the statutory embargo. Even in respect of those two appellants, liberty was reserved to renew the prayer for bail upon completion of examination of protected witnesses or upon expiry of one year, whichever was earlier. That course itself shows that the judgment treated Article 21 as a continuing constitutional check and not as a spent or excluded consideration. 13. One circumstance in the present batch deserves particular notice. The present appellants themselves have placed reliance upon Gulfisha Fatima in support of their prayer for bail. This circumstance is not without significance. If Gulfisha Fatima had proceeded on the basis that Section 43D(5) eclipses Article 21, or that prolonged incarceration has no constitutional bearing in UAPA prosecutions, it could hardly have been invoked by accused persons seeking enlargement on bail. The very reliance placed upon it demonstrates that the said decision cannot be placed in a rigid or one-sided frame. 14. In a later decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu  another coordinate Bench has expressed serious reservations on certain aspects of Gulfisha Fatima, including the manner in which K.A. Najeeb was applied. The later decision has observed, inter alia, that Gulfisha Fatima adopts a narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb and that such reasoning amounts to a hollowing out of the constitutional force of the three-Judge Bench decision. 15. We do not propose to enter into any adjudication on the correctness of observations made by a coordinate Bench. Judgments of this Court are not to be answered by counter-observations from another Bench of equal strength. The discipline of precedent demands a higher institutional method. 16. However, where a coordinate Bench entertains reservations about the reasoning of an earlier coordinate Bench, particularly on the application of a binding three- Judge Bench decision, the proper course is well settled. The matter must ordinarily be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench. A coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations, effectively unsettle the ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench while continuing to sit in equal strength. 17. We deem it necessary to observe that disagreement between coordinate Benches, by itself, is neither unusual nor undesirable. The law has often grown through reasoned difference. What the discipline of precedent does not countenance, however, is a course by which an earlier coordinate Bench is subjected to reservations of a fundamental character, particularly on the alleged misapplication of a larger Bench decision, without the matter being placed before a Bench competent in strength to resolve the perceived conflict. A coordinate Bench may distinguish an earlier decision, may explain its own understanding of the law, and may, in an appropriate case, express doubt. But where the doubt goes to the root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the

stage of criticism. A doubt expressed in emphatic terms is still a doubt; it is not a declaration of law. Unless resolved by a Bench of appropriate strength, it only introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice. 18. The obligation of judicial discipline is, therefore, not discharged by merely stating it. It lies in adopting the course which the institution requires. A Bench of equal strength cannot achieve, by language of reservation, what it cannot achieve by declaration of law. If the earlier view is thought to be inconsistent with a larger Bench decision,the proper course is reference. That course protects not merely the judgment doubted, but the authority of this Court itself. In matters touching personal liberty, national security, statutory restrictions on bail and prolonged incarceration, uncertainty in the law is itself an institutional cost. We, therefore, consider it our duty not to add another competing formulation to the field, but to place the perceived conflict before a Bench of appropriate strength so that the law may speak with the clarity and authority expected of this Court. 19. It is possible for Benches of this Court to differ in emphasis. It is equally possible that two decisions may proceed on the same constitutional foundation but apply it differently to distinct factual settings. But where the difference is projected as one concerning the binding force of a three-Judge Bench decision, and where such difference is likely to affect pending trials under special statutes across the country, the matter cannot be left to uncertain application by courts. 20. We are also conscious that an unqualified reading of the proposition that lapse of time by itself must compel bail in every case under the UAPA may have serious consequences. Such an approach may leave little room for courts to examine the nature of allegations, centrality of role, protected witnesses, risk of intimidation, possibility of reactivation of networks, nature of delay and whether such delay is attributable to the accused himself/herself, public order concerns and national security implications.On the other hand, an equally unqualified insistence on Section 43D(5) without regard to prolonged incarceration would imperil Article 21. The Constitution does not command either extreme. It is this precise issue that may warrant attention of the appropriate bench dealing with the issues.  21. The question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 survives Section 43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true question is how Article 21 is to be applied in a statutory field where Parliament has consciously imposed restrictions on bail in respect of offences alleged to affect the security of the State and the stability of civic life.  22. We clarify that nothing in this order is intended to whittle down, dilute, read narrowly, or detract from the authority of K.A. Najeeb. On the contrary, the present reference is necessitated because K.A. Najeeb deserves application with the clarity, consistency and institutional fidelity which a binding three-Judge Bench decision commands. If a coordinate Bench has expressed reservations on the manner in which another coordinate Bench has applied K.A. Najeeb, the proper answer is not further reservation. The proper answer is authoritative resolution. 23. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the issue requires consideration by Bench to be constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India. This is necessary not merely for the present batch of matters, but to settle the correct approach to bail under special statutes where Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutoryrestrictions intersect.24. Having regard to the importance of the issue, we are of the view that the questions requiring consideration need not be confined to the correctness of any one decision. The controversy raises a broader question concerning the manner in which constitutional courts are to approach bail where prolonged incarceration is asserted in prosecutions governed by special statutes imposing restrictive bail conditions. In this background it would be imperative or in other words necessary for the appropriate bench that may be constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, to clarify or expound the position of law laid down in K.A. Najeeb’s case, particularly in the backdrop of the rigour of 43D (5) which imposes restriction consciously and has received the assent of the Parliament, which obviously was brought in keeping in mind the valuable right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 25. Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench to resolve the aforesaid issues. 26. We clarify that the present reference shall not be understood as an expression of final opinion on the merits of the prosecution case or on the guilt or innocence of the appellants. Nor shall the present order be read as affirming or disapproving any factual finding recorded in any earlier bail order. The reference is confined to the legal questions noticed above." 

The order reads: "27. Having said so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present appellants have undergone substantial incarceration; that the trial is not likely to conclude immediately; that the appellants themselves have invoked the principle of calibrated constitutional discretion

recognised in Gulfisha Fatima; and that the determination of the issues may consume further time. The appellants cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement. Without expressing any opinion on merits, and subject to stringent safeguards, we are inclined to grant interim bail to the appellants pending further orders."

It added:"List the matters after orders are passed by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side."

 

In Union of India vs. K A Najeeb (2021), a 3-Judge bench arrived at a decision by Division Bench of the Supreme Court which s binding on the 2-judge benches of the Supreme Court, High Courts, all the courts and law enforcement agencies in the country. On the issue of bail in UAPA cases, the law is settled by a binding precedent created by the 3-judge bench of Justices Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose and N.V. Ramana. It was authored by Justice Surya Kant. In his judgement dated February 1, 202, he concluded: "keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected. 20. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent on bail is that Section 43­D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such pre­condition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43­D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well­settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.... 

21. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order."

In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi vs. National Investigation Agency, Jammu (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed, "We have further discussed the judgment in Gulfisha Fatima. We harbor serious reservations on various aspects of that judgment, including its directive foreclosing the right of the appellants to seek bail for a period of one year. The judgment in Gulfisha Fatima would have us believe that Najeeb is merely a narrow and exceptional departure from Section 43-D(5), justified only in extreme factual situations...It is precisely this hollowing out of the import of the observations in Najeeb that concerns us. No reading of Najeeb suggests that the mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding circumstances, mechanically entitles an accused to release. The real concern addressed in Najeeb lay elsewhere." It ruled on bail applications in a  Unlawful Activities [Prevention] Act (UAPA) case.  The judgement dated May 18, 2026 was authored by Justices Ujjal Bhuyan with invaluable inputs of Justice B.V. Nagarathna, wherein, it clarified and reiterated the legal position following K.A. Najeeb case. 

It stated that it had reservations about a recent decision dated January 5, 2026 in Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026) by Supreme Court's 2-Judge Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N. V. Anjaria. It was authored by Justice Kumar. It  denied bail in a similar UAPA case. Justice Kumar concluded:"430. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material, taken at face value as required at this stage, discloses a prima facie attribution of a central and formative role by the appellants in appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 i.e., Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged conspiracy. The material suggests involvement at the level of planning, mobilisation, and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised acts. The statutory threshold under Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, therefore stands attracted qua these appellants. 431. While the period of incarceration undergone by these appellants is substantial and has been duly considered, the Court is not persuaded that, on the present record, continued detention has crossed the threshold of constitutional impermissibility so as to override the statutory embargo. The complexity of the prosecution, the nature of evidence relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings do not justify their enlargement on bail at this juncture as noticed in detail in the discussion made hereinabove. Hence, the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 stands rejected. 432. We reiterate that courts are under a constitutional obligation to ensure that criminal proceedings, particularly those involving prolonged pre-trial incarceration, should progress with utmost expedition and the accused are not left to languish in jail. At the same time, the Court is mindful that pre-trial detention, even when justified by statute, cannot be permitted to continue without regard to the progress of the trial. The restraint on liberty contemplated by law must proceed alongside a meaningful advancement of the prosecution. In the present case, having regard to the reliance placed upon protected witnesses, this Court considers it appropriate to provide a defined point for consideration of their prayer for grant of bail. We are of the opinion that on the completion of the examination of the protected witnesses relied upon by the prosecution, or upon the expiry of a period of one year from the date of this order, whichever is earlier, these two appellants would be at liberty to renew their prayer for grant of bail before the jurisdictional Court. In the event of such prayer being made it shall be considered on its own merits, having regard to the stage then reached in the proceedings before the Trial Court, and without being influenced by the impugned orders or the present order. This course gives effect to the statutory discipline embodied in Section 43D(5) of UAPA while ensuring that the constitutional guarantee under Article 21 operates as a continuing check against continued incarceration without there being any substantial progress of the trial."

The judgement reads:"433. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of 2025 (Gulfisha Fatima), SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of 2025 (Meeran Haider), SLP (Crl.) No. 14859 of 2025 (Shifa-ur-Rehman), SLP (Crl.) No. 15335 of 2025 (Mohd. Saleem Khan), and SLP (Crl.) No. 17055 of 2025 (Shadab Ahmed) are allowed as the Court is of the view that, having regard to the role attributed, the nature of the material relied upon, and the present stage of the proceedings, continued incarceration is not shown to be indispensable to the conduct of a fair trial, provided strict safeguards are imposed. The grant of bail in their favour does not reflect any dilution of the seriousness of the allegations, nor does it amount to a finding on guilt. It represents a calibrated exercise of constitutional discretion, structured to preserve both liberty of the individual and security of the nation....v. Each of the appellants, namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, shall personally appear twice a week, that is on Monday and  Thursday between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, before the Station House Officer, Police Station Crime Branch, Delhi Police, Office of the Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, Jai Singh Marg, New Delhi – 110001 and mark their attendance....vi. The abovenamed appellants shall not directly or indirectly contact, influence, intimidate or attempt to contact any witness or any person connected with the proceedings, nor shall they associate with or participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/ final report. vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate any information, statement, article or post whether in print, electronic or social media concerning the present case or its participants till conclusion of the trial. viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or address or attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether physically or virtually till conclusion of the trial. ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic form or physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters, banners, etc in any form whatsoever. x. The appellants shall fully cooperate with the trial and shall appear on every date of hearing unless exempted for reasons to be recorded by the Trial Court to its satisfaction and they shall not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of delaying the proceedings. xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour throughout and in the event of any offence committed during the pendency of the trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek for revocation of the bail granted by filing such application before the Trial Court and in the event of such application being filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own merits. 435. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed or in the event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it shall be open to the Trial Court to cancel the bail which would be necessarily after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants.... 436. Before we conclude, it bears reiteration that a principle lies at the heart of constitutional adjudication in matters of this nature. The Constitution guarantees personal liberty, but it does not conceive liberty as an isolated or absolute entitlement, detached from the security of the society in which it operates. The sovereignty, integrity, and security of the nation, as well as the preservation of public order, are not abstract concerns rather they are constitutional values which Parliament is entitled to protect through law. Where a special statutory framework has been enacted to address offences perceived to strike at these foundations, courts are duty-bound to give effect to that framework, subject always to constitutional discipline. 437. In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity, ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the statutory threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction. Criminal law does not mandate identical outcomes merely because allegations arise from the same transaction. Those alleged to have conceived, directed, or steered unlawful activity or terrorist activity stand on a different legal footing from those whose alleged involvement is confined to facilitation or participation at a different level. To disregard such distinctions would itself result in arbitrariness. 438. The present decision reflects this constitutional method. It neither endorses the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any accused. It applies the law as it stands, recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that it must also withstand the legitimate demands of national security and collective safety. This balance is not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional duty. 439. Before parting, it is necessary to reiterate the limited nature of the present determination. The Court has not examined the merits of the prosecution case beyond the confines mandated at the stage of consideration of an application seeking bail, nor has it expressed any opinion on the ultimate culpability of any of the accused. All observations are confined to the material presently on record and to the statutory and constitutional standards governing pre-trial liberty under a special enactment."

The decision in Gulfisha Fatima case appears to be per incuriam because it did not follow the doctrine of precedent and judicial discipline. The os whether the situation in Gulfisha Fatima was “ordinary” or not, and whether the circumstances’ ‘extraordinariness’ was significant enough to outweigh long incarceration and trial delays when deciding to grant bail. The decision in Gulfisha also referred to the 3-judge decision but it inferred that it was not applicable because it was not dealing with an ordinary situation. 

Supreme Court issues notice to Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food Safety Standards Authority of India, CAG

In Dr. Aniruddha Narayan Malpani vs. Union of India & Ors., Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta has passed an order dated May 27 2026, whereby, it issued notice to Union of India and the Food Safety Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India and Union Ministry of Consumer Affairs, returnable within four weeks. The case was filed on May 13 registered on May 21 and verfied on May 25, 2026. 

The petition alleges that the existing penal provisions under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 is ineffective in deterring large food business operators from violating food safety standards, because the prescribed monetary fines are not proportionate to the commercial turnover of such entities. The petition seeks judicial directions for a revised enforcement architecture that incorporates turnover‑based penalties and other systemic improvements.

Notably, Section 97 of the Act has repealed the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Fruit Products Order, 1955, the Meat Food Products Order, 1973, the Vegetable Oil Products (Control) Order, 1947, the Edible Oils Packaging (Regulation) Order, 1998, the Solvent Extracted Oil, De oiled Meal, and Edible Flour (Control) Order, 1967, the Milk and Milk Products Order, 1992 and any other order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 relating to food.

The key issue raised by the writ petition is about the inadequacy of the penal provisions in Chapter IX of the 2006 Act, specifically Sections 49, 51 and 52. 

The petitioner has submitted that the statutory ceiling of Rs 5 lakh for sub‑standard food (Section 51) and Rs 3 lakh for misbranding (Section 52) is grossly insufficient to serve as a deterrent for large corporations whose annual turnovers may run into billions of rupees. It has been submitted that the fixed caps creates a “cost of doing business” rather than a punitive measure, thereby undermining the deterrent purpose envisioned by the legislature. It relies on the Court’s  decision in Centre for Public Interest Litigation vs. Union of India 2013 (16) SCC 279, wherein, it was held that consumption of hazardous food directly threatens Article 21 of the Constitution of India and directed the establishment of an effective food‑safety surveillance system. 

On October 22, 2013, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K. S. Radhakrishnan and Dpak Misra had concluded:"23. Enjoyment of life and its attainment, including right to life and human dignity encompasses, within its ambit availability of articles of food, without insecticides or pesticides residues, veterinary drugs residues, antibiotic residues, solvent residues, etc. But the fact remains, many of the food articles like rice, vegetables, meat, fish, milk, fruits available in the market contain insecticides or pesticides residues, beyond the tolerable limits, causing serious health hazards. We notice, fruit based soft drinks available in various fruit stalls, contain such pesticides residues in alarming proportion, but no attention is made to examine its contents. Children and infants are uniquely susceptible to the effects of pesticides because of their physiological immaturity and greater exposure to soft drinks, fruit based or otherwise. 24. We, therefore, direct the Food and Safety Standards Authority of India, to gear up their resources with their counterparts in all the States and Union Territories and conduct periodical inspections and monitoring of major fruits and vegetable markets, so as to ascertain whether they conform to such standards set by the Act and the Rules." The judgement was authored by Justice Radhakrishnan. 

The current petition points out systemic failures within the FSSAI. It cites CAG's performance audit report of 2017 which reported a 47 percent recovery rate for imposed penalties and chronic pendency of adjudication proceedings. It refers to data presented to the Rajya Sabha on March 13, 2026, indicating that only 2,997 Food Safety Officers were in post against a sanctioned strength of 4,208. It draws attention towards paucity of laboratory capacity. Many state‑level labs lack the infrastructure to test for pesticides, heavy metals, and microbiological contaminants, leading to incomplete testing of food samples.

It seeks introduction of turnover‑linked penalties that scale with the financial capacity of the offending entity; enhancement of the regulatory monitoring framework; augmentation of laboratory infrastructure; recruitment of additional Food Safety Officers; and greater public disclosure of violations. 

The petition also seeks direction from the Court for framing of rules that provide a rational connection between the severity of the violation, the economic gain and the penalty imposed.

31-member Joint Parliamentary Committee examining Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhisthan Bill

On June 5, 2026, Joint Parliamentary Committee on Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhisthan Bill, 2025 visited University of Kashmir and reviewed the functioning of the university. 

Critics of the Bill hold that it is an exercise in constitutional overreach disregarding the fact that Entry 66 of Union List of the Constitution of India which provides limited and specific legislative power to Parliament only for coordination and determination of standards in higher education institutions. Education is a subject under the Concurrent List of the Constitution. 

The bill concentrates regulatory, accreditation, and standard-setting functions under bodies appointed directly by the Union government, sparking concerns over executive overreach and political interference.

Several state governments have pointed out that it diminishes the authority of states over their own universities.

It promotes a market-driven, "hyper-globalized" approach focused on global rankings. It fails to address social justice, public-funded education, and domestic innovation.

The Bill covers Union and State-funded universities as well as private universities. It takes away the autonomy of the governing bodies of Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and Inter-University Centres (IUCs). 

Union Minister for Education had introduced the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan Bill, 2025 in Lok Sabha on December 15, 2025. The purpose of the Bill is to empower Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) of India.

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020calls for a fundamental transformation of the higher education regulatory system. Dr. K. Kasturirangan was the Chairperson, NEP Drafting Committee, former Chairperson, ISRO.

On December 12, 2025, the Union Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister had approved the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan Bill for it's introduction in the Parliament.

The Bill was introduced under the provisions of Entry 66 of the Union List in the seventh schedule of the Constitution of India which provides for “Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions”.

It provides for the establishment of the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan as an supreme body, along with three Councils: the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Viniyaman Parishad (Regulatory Council), the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Gunvatta Parishad (Accreditation Council), and the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Manak Parishad (Standards Council). 

The Bill also provides for repealing the University Grants Commission Act (UGC), 1956, the All India Council for Technical Education Act (AICTE), 1987 and the National Council for Teacher Education Act (NCTE), 1993. All higher educational institutions under the purview of the Ministry of Education, UGC, AICTE, and NCTE will be under the purview of the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan for determination of standards.  The Council of Architecture (CoA) shall function as a Professional Standard Setting Body (PSSB) as envisioned in the NEP, 2020. The Bill ensures upholding the current level of autonomy accorded to the Institutions of National Importance.

The Adhishthan will provide strategic direction for the holistic growth of higher education and ensuring coordination among the Councils. The Standards Council will be responsible for synchronization and specifying minimum academic standards in HEIs; the Regulatory Council will ensure coordination and maintenance of these standards; and the Accreditation Council will function as an independent accrediting authority overseeing a robust and credible accreditation ecosystem.

The Regulatory Council’s public portal, which mandates disclosure of governance, financial, academic, and institutional performance data by HEIs, will also serve as the foundational basis for accreditation. This integrated approach will ensure transparency, accountability, and efficiency, while reinforcing the Government’s commitment to simplification of systems for the stakeholders in Higher Education.

The membership of the Adhishthan and various Councils primarily comprises eminent academicians, domain experts, and representatives from States/UTs, State HEIs, and Institutions of National Importance, ensuring balanced representation and informed decision-making.

The entire regulatory framework will operate through technology-driven, faceless, Single Window Interactive Systems, based on principles of public self-disclosure and trust-based regulation.

The Regulatory Council will maintain a comprehensive public digital portal, where HEIs will be required to disclose information relating to financial probity, governance practices, finances, audits, procedures, infrastructure, faculty and staff, academic programmes, and educational outcomes. 

The data submitted on this public portal will also serve as the primary basis for accreditation, thereby ensuring transparency, accountability, and consistency across the higher education ecosystem. 

Delhi High Court declines interim relief for restoration of suspended social media account of Cockroach Janta Party on X, case to be heard on July 6

In Save India Foundation (Regd.) vs. Union of India & Ors. (2026), Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav of Delhi High Court declined to grant immediate interim relief for the restoration of the suspended social media account of the satirical political outfit Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) on the platform X. Justice Kaurav issued notice to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) and X Corp, observing that the challenges raised concerning freedom of speech on digital platforms. The case is listed for further arguments on July 6, 2026. 

The administrative blocking was issued under Section 69(A) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read alongside the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. 

Justice Kaurav observed: "The issues presented before this court carry structural complexities that affect public order and state scrutiny. Preliminary evaluations of the administrative background reveal that the overarching digital operations in question cannot be summarily classified as benign humor. Because the state records indicate a potential threat to institutional equilibrium, no mandatory ad-interim directions can be safely structured without analyzing the counter-affidavits of the respondents." 

 The High Court directed the statutory Review Committee—mandated under Rule 14 of the 2009 IT Blocking Rules—to re-examine the validity of MeitY's blocking order. 

The Union of India was granted four weeks to file its detailed counter-affidavit providing the confidential intelligence inputs that necessitated the digital restriction. 

Rajesh Exports Limited, the story so far

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has issued a 109-page interim order dated June 3, 2026 based on its investigation and forensic review which uncovered prima facie evidence suggesting that about 97-99% of the company's revenue may have been inflated. SEBI's interim order in the matter of Rajesh Exports Limited is available at https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/jun-2026/interim-order-in-the-matter-of-rajesh-exports-limited_101820.html

At page no. 94, the interim order reads:*It becomes all the more important for the regulator to step in at the right time and pass  interim  directions  because  if  the  same  is  not done,  huge  losses  may  be faced by gullible investors.Having regard to the prima facie findings recorded in this order, I am of the considered view that urgent ex parte interim directions are necessary for the following reasons:I.The  violations prima  facie established  in  this  matter  are  not  isolated  or inadvertent but constitute a systematic and multi-year scheme of financial misrepresentation.   The   inflated   consolidated   revenues,   the   fictitious standalone transactions, incorrect consolidation, the misutilization of funds through  personal  accounts,  and  the  opaque  receivable  adjustments  are interlinked elements of a broader pattern of conduct designed to present a false financial picture to the market. "

SEBI, the market regulator has restrained promoter Mehta from buying, selling or dealing in securities of Rajesh Exports until further orders. It has also directed the firm to cooperate fully with investigators and make true and fair disclosures in its financial statements and related-party transactions. The regulator has instructed both Rajesh Exports and Mehta to fully cooperate with investigators and submit all requested documents and explanations within 30 days.

Notably, Rajesh Exports' shares saw a sharp 5% decline following the announcement. The shares of Life Insurance Corporation of India have fallen over 1%. LIC holds a 10.80% stake in the company. In it, Sebi whole-time member Kamlesh Chandra Varshney noted "approximately 97% to 99% of the revenues of the company are inflated, are egregious and unheard of."

This 97%-99% of Rajesh Exports' consolidated revenue came from overseas subsidiaries, particularly Switzerland-based Valcambi ​SA, a firm which disclosed negligible ​standalone revenues in its audited financial statements. Rajesh Exports has routinely avoided disclosure of its subsidiaries' financials in the public domain.

It is also noteworthy that Rajesh Exports Ltd also recorded Rs 114.87 billion in sales and Rs 114.88 billion in purchases with Affluence Shares and Stocks Private Limited. This company has denied participating in any such sales.

SEBI, the regulatory body for securities and commodity market in India is under the administrative domain of Ministry of Finance. It was established on April 12, 1988 as an executive body. It was given statutory powers on January 30, 1992 through the SEBI Act, 1992. The Act has been amended on 14 occasions. Out of these eight amendments have been carried out during 2014-2021. 

SEBI Act was enacted "to provide for the establishment of a Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."

The term “securities” has the meaning assigned to it in section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. "Securities" include (i) shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other mark securities of a like nature in or of any incorporated company or other corporate;(ia) derivative;(ib) units or any other instrument issued by any collective investment sche the investors in such schemes;(ic) security receipt as defined in clause (zg) of section 2 of the Securitisation Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interes 2002;(id) units or any other such instrument issued to the investors unde mutual fund scheme;(ii) Government securities;(iia) such other instruments as may be declared by the Central Government securities; and(iii) rights or interest in securities".

The issue regarding Rajesh Exports Ltd. came to light from a shareholder's  complaint filed in March 2024, pointing out concerns over substantial trade receivables reflected in the company's accounts. In response, SEBI launched a probe into the complaint. It appointed BDO India Services as the forensic auditor. 

The SEBI is constituted under section 3 of the Act. It was originally constituted under the Resolution of the Government of India in the Department of Economic Affairs dated the April 12, 1988.

By an amendment in the SEBI Act which came into effect from January 25, 1995. inserted bar on jurisdiction of courts under Section 20A. It reads: "No order passed by the Board or the adjudicating officer under this Act shall be appealable except as provided in section 15T or section 20] and no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Board or the adjudicating officer] is empowered by, or under, this Act to pass any order and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any order passed by the Board or the adjudicating officer by, or under this Act. 

Section 22 of the Act reads: "All members, officers and other employees of the Board shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code."

SEBI also directed the company to ensure accurate disclosures relating to financial statements, related-party transactions and other requirements under the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements (LODR) regulations. 

It took more than two years for the SEBI to issue it's interim order. So far no one knows as to why  LIC invested in Rajesh Exports Ltd. SEBI has noted that there has been a significant misrepresentation of revenues spanning a five-year period from 2020-21 to 2024-25 that amounts ro a staggering Rs 15 lakh crore. It seems SEBI is yet to seek assistance from the Enforcement Directorate (ED), Ministry of Finance, which enforces the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to investigate further  The ED and CBDT can initiate investigations if SEBI files a case under the PMLA, 2002.

Supreme Court directs Bihar, Jharkhand Govt.s to clear dues of defunct Corporation employees after 25 year delay, post self-immolation of Chandan Bhattacharya

In Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026 INSC 607), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 29-page long judgement dated May 29, 2026, wherein, it concluded:  “The material placed before this Court revealed that the prolonged non-payment of lawful dues resulted in grave humanitarian consequences affecting a large section of the workforce and their dependants. The proceedings disclosed allegations of severe deprivation, destitution and reported instances of suicides and starvation deaths amongst the affected employees and their family members owing to prolonged denial of salaries and retiral benefits. The dispute, therefore, ceased to remain a mere matter of financial adjustment between two successor States and assumed the character of a significant human rights and constitutional concern directly implicating the right to livelihood and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”.

The Court had dealt with a similar issue in Kapila Hingorani vs. State of Bihar (2003) 6 SCC 1, wherein, it directed Rs 125 crores as interim relief but it proved insufficient to clear arrears beyond February 1997. Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh filed the writ petition in 2022. By Court's order dated October 9, 2023, it directed Bihar, Jharkhand and union governments arrive at a joint solution. As no solution was found. The Court constituted a Committee under Justice Dinesh Maheshwari (Retd.). The Committee conducted 25 meetings and submitted its final report on April 30, 2026. 

The Court had given the points of reference for consideration and enquiry by the Committee:-
I. Fixation of the proportional liabilities of both the States i.e., State of Bihar and State of Jharkhand, towards the salaries and other emoluments including retiral benefits of the employees of the erstwhile corporations, whether dissolved or existing. 
II. Identification of the employees/family members of the deceased employees including a finding on the service tenure(s) of the employee(s) concerned and the duration for which they have been deprived of their lawful dues.
III. The entitlement of the erstwhile employees to receive salary and/or retiral benefits as per the extant statutes or rules.
IV. Any other matter relevant to the controversy. 

The Court received two interim reports dated August 6, 2025 and November 25, 2025 submitted by the Committee. 

The Court expressed its agreement with the findings, recommendations and suggestions made by the Committee, together with the consequential directions required to be issued for effective implementation. It enumerated them as under:-
i. The apportionment and fixation of the inter se liability of the respective States towards payment of salaries, retiral dues and other consequential emoluments payable to the employees of the erstwhile corporations shall stand resolved in terms of the allocation and computation determined by the Committee in paragraph No. 8.2 of the Final Report, namely, on the basis of the Affidavit dated 22nd26 December, 2023 furnished on behalf of the Union of India, which shall govern the respective liabilities of both the States. The concerned States shall remain bound to discharge their respective liabilities accordingly, if already not discharged.
ii. The determination of the applicable Pay Revision Commission shall stand confined to the Pay Revision Commission(s) duly adopted by the concerned Corporations prior to their becoming defunct, and consequently, no entitlement shall accrue in favour of the employees towards benefits arising from any subsequent Pay Revision Commissions which were never formally adopted by the competent authorities of the respective Corporations. 
iii. The determination, computation and disbursal of dues payable towards Employees’ Provident Fund contributions and allied statutory benefits shall be undertaken in accordance with the structured mechanism recommended by the Committee and noted hereinabove, and the concerned authorities shall ensure expeditious and effective disbursal of the admissible amounts to the eligible employees and/or their legal heirs in accordance therewith.

The judgement reads: "38. Notwithstanding the substantial resolution of the disputes in terms of the findings and recommendations accepted hereinabove, following residual issues still survive which, in our considered view, require independent judicial consideration and adjudication by this Court having regard to the nature of the claims involved and the legal consequences flowing therefrom:-
i. The identification and verification of the remaining employees/workmen and/or the legal heirs of deceased employees/workmen in cases where claims are yet to attain finality;
ii. The entitlement of the daily-wage workmen, as also the legal heirs of deceased employees/workmen, to lump-sum compensation and/or any other form of monetary, rehabilitative or welfare support including payment of due wages and other consequential admissible benefits; and iii. The entitlement to, and determination of, appropriate interest on delayed payment of salaries/wages, retiral dues, provident fund amounts and other consequential emoluments." 

The court directed that "an additional honorarium of Rs. 35,00,000/- (Thirty-Five Lakhs only) shall be paid to Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Judge (Retd.), Supreme Court of India." The amount shall be borne equally by the States of Bihar and Jharkhand and disbursed within a specified period.

Earlier, the Court had passed judgement dated May 9, 2003, judgement dated January 13, 2005 and  judgement dated July 8, 2008.  In its 2003 judgement in Kapila Hingorani case, it was recorded:"A newspaper report as regard non-payment of salary for a long time resulting in starvation highlighted the case of one Chandan Bhattacharya, son of an employee of the Bihar State Agro-Industries Development Corporation who tried to immolate himself. The incident was widely reported, inter alia, in ’The Hindustan Times’, Delhi Edition, on 19.9.2002 under the caption "Empty coffers drive staff to self-immolation bids". The said Chandan Bhattacharya later on succumbed to the burn injuries suffered by him. In this writ petition, the writ petitioner, a public spirited citizen and a Supreme Court lawyer, alleged that apart from plight of the employees of the public sector undertakings or the statutory authorities, even the teaching and non-teaching staff of Aided and Unaided Schools, Madrassas and Colleges have been facing a similar fate. We, however, as at present advised do not intend to deal with the same. According to the petitioner, from a newspaper report it would appear that about 250 employees died due to starvation or committed suicide owing to acute financial crisis resulting from non-payment of remunerations to them for a long time. The report further goes on to say that the leader of the opposition in the Bihar Assembly had alleged that over 1000 employees died "due to lack of salary for a period ranging from four months to 94 months". In its counter affidavit, the State of Bihar does not deny about the factual statement made in the said writ petition...."

Subsequently, a 3-Judge Bench of the Court had passed an order dated August 9, 2010, wherein, it had concluded:"The issues involved in these cases basically are legal issues. They will have to be gone into by the concerned High Courts. This Court has so far monitored the matter to its best possible ability. In the circumstances, we request the High Court to examine these matters in the PIL and pass appropriate orders in these PILs as expeditiously as possible. The Registry is directed to forward copy of this order to the Registrar General of the High Court. The attention of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court may be drawn to this Order. We request the High Court to consider the orders passed by this Court giving appropriate directions from time to time in these cases. We also direct the High Court to consider making interim payments to the affected persons including medical treatment. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. In view of the order passed in the writ petition, no orders are required to be passed on the interlocutory applications." It is not clear as to what was done by the High Court in this regard.