Justice Nani Tagia sets aside termination order by District Magistrate, Buxar based on a photograph published in Dainik Bhaskar, show cause by District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar

Can a photograph in Dainik Bhaskar or any newspaper reveal whether or not someone is drunk?  

In Rajesh Kumar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Nani Tagia delivered a 19-page long judgement wherein, he drew on two decision of the Supreme Court to conclude:"....it appears to be the law that when an employee, even if such an employee is temporary one, is sought to be terminated on a charge of bribery-which is punitive-it becomes necessary to hold an enquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law. Even in the case of minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say in the matter and if the charges are factual and are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be held. That is for the reason that adherence to the principle of natural justice cannot be dispensed with in such circumstances. 34. In view of the legal position and the finding recorded hereinabove, the impugned order dated 13.07.2019, terminating the petitioner’s contractual service from the post of Executive Assistant, Mid-Day Meal Scheme Office, Buxar, without holding an enquiry with regard to the allegations made against the petitioner, cannot be sustained in law. 35. Accordingly, the impugned Office Order No. 40/2019-20, dated 13.07.2019 (Annexure-9), issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, terminating the petitioner’s contractual service from the post of Executive Assistant, Mid-Day Meal Scheme Officer, Buxar and the show cause notice dated 01.07.2019 (Annexure –6) issued to the petitioner by the District Programme Office, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar are hereby set aside and quashed. 36. The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner in service forthwith with all the consequential benefits."  

The writ application was filed by the petitioner challenging the Office Order issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, whereby the petitioner’s contractual service on the post of Executive Assistant, Mid-Day Meal Scheme Office, Buxar was terminated. The show cause notice issued to the petitioner by the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar was also challenged. The petitioner, vide a order dated October 30, 2012 was appointed on the post of Executive Assistant in the District Mid-Day Meal Scheme Office, Buxar on contract basis by the District Magistrate, Buxar. While the petitioner was working as such, a show cause notice dated July 1, 2019 was issued to him along with two other persons, namely, Manoj Kumar Singh and Sudehi Rai (both contractors), by the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar, wherein, it was stated that on June 30, 2019, Buxar edition of Dainik Bhaskar featured a photograph of the petitioner consuming alcohol in a vehicle along with two contractors and some unidentified persons. The following day, i.e. on July 1, 2019, the same newspaper published the petitioner’s name regarding the alleged alcohol consumption. In the show cause notice, it was also stated that the District Magistrate, Buxar, had taken cognizance of the matter, noting that the Bihar Government has strictly prohibited the sale and consumption of alcohol and consuming alcohol in the State is an offence. As such, the petitioner was directed to submit a clarification within 24 hours of receiving the notice. Subsequently, an FIR being Muffasil P.S. Case No. 181 of 2019 was also lodged under Section 37(C) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2018 against the petitioner and others. Pursuant to the show cause notice issued by the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar, the petitioner submitted his reply on July 6, 2019, to the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, Buxar. In his response, the petitioner denied the allegation of consumption of alcohol stating that the allegation levelled against him is false and the news item was published in the newspaper due to the prevailing rural politics. 

The District Magistrate, Buxar, finding the reply submitted by the petitioner unsatisfactory, terminated the contractual service of the petitioner vide the impugned order dated July 13, 2019 with immediate effect by holding that as the consumption of alcohol is prohibited and is considered an offence in the State of Bihar, consumption of alcohol by the petitioner signifies his indiscipline. 

The petitioner, thereafter, submitted an application dated December 18, 2019 before the District Magistrate, Buxar with a prayer to allow him to rejoin the service contending that in the FIR being Muffasil P.S. Case No. 181 of 2019 registered against him under Section 37(C) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2018, the Investigating Officer has submitted a final report stating that there is no evidence against the petitioner suggesting commission of the alleged offence. 

Did Dainik Bhaskar report about the Investigating Officer's final report when its report turned to be fake? Did the editor of the newspaper seek an explanation from its Buxar based reporter? High Court ought to have sought an explanation from the newspaper in question?

The application of the petitioner was forwarded by the Deputy Collector, Establishment, Buxar to the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar, seeking a report for further action to be taken in the matter. In response to the Deputy Collector’s letter dated March 14, 2020, the District Programme Officer, vide letter dated June 10, 2020, confirmed the final report submitted by the police in Muffasil P.S. Case No. 181 of 2019 and also apprised that no other person has been appointed to the post previously held by the petitioner. Since the petitioner did not receive any favorable response regarding his reinstatement despite the submission of the aforementioned application and the ensuing inter-departmental communications, he filed the writ petition challenging the impugned termination order dated July 13, 2019, issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned termination order was issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, solely on the basis of a photograph published in the Dainik Bhaskar newspaper dated June 30, 2019, allegedly showing the petitioner consuming alcohol. It is further submitted that the respondent authorities summarily terminated the petitioner’s contractual services without conducting any departmental enquiry, despite the petitioner’s categorical denial of the allegations in his show-cause reply. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the respondent authorities acted in a most unfair manner, violating the principles of natural justice and denying the petitioner an opportunity of a hearing to defend himself. Therefore, the impugned order of termination issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, cannot withstand the legal scrutiny of this Court and is liable to be set aside and quashed. 

The counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of the High Court, which is as follows:-
(i) Sur Enamel And Stamping Works Ltd. Versus Workmen reported in 1963 SCC Online SC 97.
(ii) O.K. Bhardwaj Versus Union of India & Ors. reported in (2001) 9 Supreme Court Cases 180.
(iii) Hari Ram Maurya Versus Union of India & Ors. reported in (2006) 9 Supreme Court Cases 167.
(iv) Amit Kumar versus The State of Bihar & Ors. (CWJC No.5537 of 2020).

Dainik Bhaskar fails Breath Analyser Test reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025, I.O. of the case passes the test 

The District Programme Officer, Mid Day Meal Scheme, Buxar issued a letter dated July 1, 2019 asking the petitioner along with two others to clarify within 24 hours of the receipt of the letter regarding the photograph featured in the Dainik Bhaskar newspaper dated June 30, 2019 of the petitioner and others consuming alcohol. It also stated that the name of the petitioner was again published in the same newspaper on July 1, 2019 alleging consumption of alcohol by the petitioner  to exploit the petitioner due to the prevailing rural politics. 

Justice Tagia recorded: "The impugned order of termination has been passed thereafter on the basis of aforenoted two letters. It, thus, is evident from the impugned order of termination itself that no enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and the petitioner’s service has been terminated only on the basis of aforenoted two letters dated 01.07.2019 and 08.07.2019, respectively. 27. Since the petitioner was a contractual employee, no specific service rules regulating the disciplinary proceeding against him appears to be in vogue. What, therefore, arises for determination by this Court is whether, in the absence of any specific service rules prescribing the enquiry to be conducted against the petitioner (a contractual employee), a formal enquiry should have been held before the impugned termination order was issued?"

Justice Tagia referred to two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court which was cited by counsel for the
petitioner in this regard and, 

In paragraph 3 of the Supreme Court's decision in Hari Ram Maurya vs Union of India & Ors. reported in (2006) 9 SCC 167, it has been held: “3. From the order of termination Annexure P-7, it appears that the same refers to the show-cause notice dated 20-8-2002 which is to be found at Annexure P-5. It is stated therein that the appellant demanded kickback with a view to help the complainant to get a favourable order in the pension matter. That being so, there was a clear charge of bribery levelled against the appellant. No doubt, the appellant was a temporary employee, but if he is sought to be removed on the ground that he was guilty of the charge of bribery, it becomes necessary for the respondent Union of India to hold an inquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law. In this case, admittedly, no inquiry was conducted, and that is obvious even from Annexure P-7, the letter described as disengagement of casual labour. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as also the order of termination Annexure P-7 dated 30-09-2002. This, however, will not prevent the respondents from taking action in accordance with law.” 

In the case of Hari Ram Maurya, where the appellant, who was a temporary employee, was terminated on a charge of bribery without holding an inquiry, it has been held that if the employee is sought to be removed on the ground that he was guilty of the charge of bribery, it becomes necessary to hold an inquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law, even if the employee was a “temporary employee”.

In paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of the decision in the Supreme Court in O.K. Bhardwaj vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2001) 9 SCC 180, it has been held: “2. The High Court has recorded its opinion on two questions: (i) that the punishment imposing stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect is not a major penalty but a minor penalty; (ii) in the case of minor penalties, “it is not necessary to give opportunity to the employee to give explanation and it is also not necessary to hear him before awarding the penalty”: a detailed departmental enquiry is also not contemplating in a case in which minor penalty is to be awarded. 3. While we agree with the first proposition of the High Court having regard to the rule position which expressly says that “withholding increments of pay with or without cumulative effect” is a minor penalty, we find it not possible to agree with the second proposition. Even in the case of a minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the charges against him. Moreover, if the charges are factual and if they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for. This is the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot be dispensed with.” 

In O.K. Bhardwaj's case, the Court has held that even in the case of a minor penalty, an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the charges against him and if the charges are factual and if they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for, which is the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot be dispensed with.

Although no Breath Analyser Test, Blood and Urine Test done on the petitioner to ascertain the veracity of the fake news published by Dainik Bhaskar and although the I.O. found no evidence of alleged offence, Justice Tagia added: "37. The respondents, however, shall be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner by strictly following the due process of law, if so advised. 38. The writ petition is allowed in above terms and the same stands disposed of."  

Dainik Bhaskar was one of the newspapers which had published a similar news about an advocate of the Patna High Court, the advocate has filed a case against it and others who reported without ascertaining the results of the Breath Analyser Test, Blood and Urine Test? 

Also read: Legal reporting in Bihar fails Breath analyser test, reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025

Patna High Court's Division Bench upholds judgement of 2023 by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, petitioner's counsels disregarded Full Bench judgment based on Supreme Court's judgement

In Rajeev Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 6-page long judgement dated September 22, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....The conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted. 8. We are of the view that the appeal apart from being without merit is also barred by delay of 771 days. The appeal is dismissed both on merits and on delay." The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Rao. This is his 9th judgement as Chief Justice Patna High Court. The Division Bench recorded that he writ petition before the learned Single Judge was second round of litigation by the petitioner. He had earlier approached the High Court in CWJC No. 4156 of 2019, which was disposed on August 8, 2019. 

 In his 5-page long impeccable judgement dated May 3, 2023, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad had concluded:"This writ application has no merit. It is dismissed accordingly." 

Justice Prasad had recorded that the "counsel for the petitioner is aware of the Hon’ble Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Niraj Kumar Mallick & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar and Anr. reported in 2018 (2) PLJR 951 wherein this Court has considered the government circular/guidelines with regard to the appointment on compassionate ground in a case where the other sibling of the applicant is gainfully employed." This is because drawing on Supreme Court's judgement, he noted that the writ Court has to be conscious of the judicial pronouncements of the Court wherein it has been repeatedly held that a Court has no power to ignore a provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. In Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar 1994 AIR 2148 has held:“the Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law, however hard the case may be, it should never be done”

Upholding Justice Prasad's judgement, Chief Justice Rao observed:"5. A perusal of the conclusion drawn by the Full Bench, it is clear that pursuant to a public policy inasmuch as where any of the dependents of the deceased Government servant is gainfully employed, no other dependent would be entitled to get the benefit of the compassionate appointment. 6. A reference is also made that the Government has come out with a policy that the dependent who is gainfully employed and living separately from other dependents cannot be a reason to provide appointment. That is, irrespective of that whether employed one lives together or separately, the other dependents would not get the benefit of compassion. 7. If the above being the position and there is no denial to the fact that the eldest son of the deceased employee i.e., the sibling of the petitioner is employed in Andhra Bank, the said policy will come into play. The conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted."  

Bihar Government complies with Supreme Court's directions, Principal District and Sessions Judge made head of Board of Visitors of jails in place of DM

All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.

-Article 13(1), The Constitution of India 

The word untouchable is an epitome of their ills and sufferings. Not only has untouchability arrested the growth of their personality but also it comes in the way of their material well-being. It has also deprived them of certain civil rights….The untouchable is not even a citizen. 

-Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, “Evidence Before the Southborough Committee”, in Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 256

 Caste System is not merely division of labour. It is also a division of labourers. Civilized society undoubtedly needs division of labour. But in no civilized society is division of labour accompanied by this unnatural division of labourers into water-tight compartments. Caste System is not merely a division of labourers which is quite different from division of labour—it is an hierarchy in which the divisions of labourers are graded one above the other.

-“Annihilation of Caste” in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 47 

Ahead of the upcoming hearing of the Supreme Court on November 3, 2026, on September 23, 2026, the Bihar Cabinet approved amendments to Rule 743 of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012, in compliance with the Supreme Court''s orders of July 30 and September 10, 2026, in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s).-10/2024, Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons In India. 

The Supreme Court's 6-page long order dated September 10, 2026 reads: "3. We give one last opportunity to place on record a comprehensive report explaining in what manner our order dated 30.07.2026 has been complied with. We make it clear that by the next date of hearing, we want a report indicating that all the States/Union Territories district-wise have constituted the Board of Visitors headed by the Principal District Judge."  

In compliance with a Supreme Court's order regarding the appointment of official and non-official visitors for all prisons, the State Government has amended the rules of the Bihar Prison Manual. The term "District Magistrate," which previously appeared in the regulations concerning the prison system and visitor arrangements, has been replaced with "District and Sessions Judge." A Board of Visitors will now be constituted, and under the new rules, it will be headed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge.

The unamended Rule 743 of Bihar Prison Manual reads: "Rule 743 Board of visitors.—The official and non-official visitors to all the prisons in the district shall constitute a Board of Visitors, of which the District Magistrate shall be the ex-officio chairperson. Official and non-official visitors shall jointly visit the prisons in the district atleast once in each quarter."  

The head of the Board of Visitors of jails will now be the Principal District Judge. A major change has been made in the administration of Bihar’s jails. The inspection by Board of Visitors’ team has been made mandatory to inspect the district jails at least once every three months. Now, it will be compulsory to visit and inspect the jails in the districts. During the inspection, the Board of Visitors of the jail will assess the arrangements on the jail campus, cleanliness, food, security, and the inmates. The command will not remain with the DM. The legal and basic facilities available to the inmates will be reviewed directly at the level of the judicial Principal District and Sessions Judge. 

This is being done in compliance with Supreme Court's directions in para 225-227 of the judgement dated October 3, 204 in Sukanya Shantha vs. Union of India & Ors. (2024) which reads:"225 Apart from this, a Board of Visitors is constituted, as per the Model Prison Manual 2016, at a district level. The Board comprises of: “29.03 The Board of Visitors shall comprise the following official members:
a) The District Judge at the District level, or the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate exercising Jurisdiction, at Sub-Division level
b) The District Magistrate, at the District level or Sub-Divisional officer at Sub- Divisional level
c) District Superintendent of Police
d) The Chief Medical Officer of the Health Department, at the District level or the Sub-Divisional Medical Officer at Sub-Division level
e) The Executive Engineer, PWD at the District level, or Assistant Engineer PWD at Sub-Divisional level
f) The District Education Officer dealing with literacy programmes.
g) District Social Welfare Officer
h) District Employment Officer
i) District Agricultural Officer
j) District Industrial Officer

The Board shall make at least one visit per quarter and for this purpose, presence of three members and the chairman shall constitute quorum.  

29.04 The Board of Visitors shall also comprise the following Non-Official Members:-
a) Three Members of the Legislative Assembly of the state of which one should be a woman.
b) A nominee of the State Human Rights Commission
c) Two social workers of the District/Sub-Division; one of them shall be a woman having an interest in the administration of prisons and welfare of prisoners.
29.05 The District Judge shall be the Chairman of the Board of visitors at District level and the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate shall be the Chairman at Sub-Division level. The Non-official visitors after their appointment must be sensitised and trained about their duties, roles and responsibilities.”
226 The duties of the Board have been provided as follows:
“29.22 All Visitors, official and non-official, at every visit shall:
(a) examine the cooked food;
(b) inspect the barracks, wards, work-sheds and other buildings of the prison generally;
(c) ascertain whether considerations of health, cleanliness and security are attended to, whether proper management and discipline is maintained in every respect and whether any prisoner is illegally detained, or is detained for undue length of time while awaiting trial;
(d) examine prison registers and records, except secret records and records pertaining to accounts;
(e) hear and attend to all representation and petitions made by or on behalf of the prisoners;
(f) direct, if deemed advisable, that any such representation or petition be forwarded to the Government;
(g) suggest new avenues for improvement in correctional work.”
The comments of the Board of Visitors are recorded in the visitors’ book of the prison and are forwarded to the Inspector General (IG) of Prisons. Any action on the comments is at the discretion of the IG Prisons. 
227 The Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 also envisages inspection of prisons, including by a Board of Visitors headed by the district judge/additional district judge/sub-divisional judicial magistrate.311 It also includes the provision for “free legal aid to the prisoners in accordance with the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987” and the relevant standard operating procedure."

In its order dated July 30, 2026, the Court had directed all the State Governments/Union Territories to ensure that Board of Visitors is constituted district – wise headed by the Principal District Judge of that particular District, within a period of four weeks from today. Board of Visitors shall be constituted accordingly without fail. Any laxity in this regard will be viewed strictly. 

Supreme Court's 7-page long order dated July 30, 2026 reads: "1. Dr. S. Muralidhar, the learned Amicus has placed on record a detailed Status Report. 2. In the Status Report, the learned Amicus has provided the background of the entire litigation, more particularly the various directions issued by this Court in its decision titled “Sukanya Shantha vs. Union of India and Others”, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 535. 3. The report talks about compliance of various directions issued by this Court in the Judgment, referred to above, including the clarificatory Order passed by this Court dated 7th November, 2024. 4. We have looked into the entire report. One copy of the Status Report has been provided to all other learned Counsel appearing in this litigation. 5. However, in the course of today's hearing, learned Amicus laid much stress on para 25 of his status report." Para 25 is titled 'Information Awaited Para 25 reads:The Amicus is awaiting further written responses from several States/UTs in respect of:-
"a. The method of collection and transmission of caste-data to NCRB;
b. Deletion of caste columns in all the registers and forms in prisons;
c. Outsourcing of cleaning work;
d. Status of compliance with the guidelines in the judgments in Arnesh Kumar and Amanatullah Khan;
e. Notifications constituting BoVs district wise;
f. Status of new Acts/Rules/Manuals that are proposed by several States/UTs;
g. Status of amendments to offending provisions in the Acts/Rules/Manuals.”

Dr. Muralidhar, the Amicus informed the Court that the State of Assam, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Meghalaya, and the Union Territory of Chandigarh have evolved a methodology insofar as collection and transmission of caste data is concerned. According to him, the same methodology may be adopted by other States/UTs for the purpose of procuring the necessary information. According to him, as on date, none of the States/Union Territories have constituted Board of Visitors District-wise. According to him, it is very much important and necessary for each State/UT to constitute Board of Visitors in each of the Districts where are sub-jails. This has to be done under the Model Prison Manual, 2016, more particularly, Clause 29.01 read with 29.03 respectively including the State Prison Manual respectively. 

The Court's order reads: "10. We direct all the State Governments/Union Territories to ensure that Board of Visitors is constituted district – wise headed by the Principal District Judge of that particular District, within a period of four weeks from today. Board of Visitors shall be constituted accordingly without fail. Any laxity in this regard will be viewed strictly....We also direct all the States/Union Territories to provide us the status of amendments to the offending provisions in the Acts/Rules/Manuals as pointed out by the learned Amicus in his Status Report within a period of four weeks from today. 13. Registry shall forward one copy each of this Order to the Principal Secretary (Home) of all the States/Lieutenant Governors of Union Territories. The necessary Report as regards the aforesaid shall be forwarded by the respective States/Union Territories by 3-9-2026. Once all the necessary information is received, the Registry shall provide one copy each to the learned Amicus at the earliest."

In Sukanya Shantha vs. Union of India & Ors. (2024), the 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court  delivered a 148-page long judgement dated October 3, 2024, wherein, referring to the discriminatory provisions in the prison manuals in the States, it concluded:...the impugned provisions are declared unconstitutional for being violative of Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 of the Constitution. All States and Union Territories are directed to revise their Prison Manuals/Rules in accordance with this judgment within a period of three months; (ii) The Union government is directed to make necessary changes, as highlighted in this judgment, to address caste-based discrimination in the Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023 within a period of three months; (iii) References to “habitual offenders” in the prison manuals/Model Prison Manual shall be in accordance with the definition provided in the habitual offender legislation enacted by the respective State legislatures, subject to any constitutional challenge against such legislation in the future. All other references or definitions of “habitual offenders” in the impugned prison manuals/rules are declared unconstitutional. In case, there is no habitual offender legislation in the State, the Union and the State governments are directed to make necessary changes in the manuals/rules in line with this judgment, within a period of three months; (iv) The “caste” column and any references to caste in undertrial and/or convicts’ prisoners’ registers inside the prisons shall be deleted; (v) The Police is directed to follow the guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) and Amanatullah Khan v. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi (2024) to ensure that members of Denotified Tribes are not subjected to arbitrary arrest;(vi) This Court takes suo motu cognizance of the discrimination inside prisons on any ground such as caste, gender, disability, and shall list the case from now onwards as In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India." The Court will hearing In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India case on November 3, 2026. 

Also read: Supreme Court all set to end persisting caste based discrimination in the prisons 

Summons issued by a Court under Sections 63 or 71 of BNSS, 2023, and a notice issued by an Investigating Agency under Section 35 of BNSS are different: Supreme Court

In Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. 2025 INSC 909, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N. K. Singh delivered a 21-page long judgement dated July 16, 2025, wherein, it has held that summons under Section 71 of the BNSS, 2023, has no immediate bearing on the liberty of an individual in case of its non-compliance. However, a notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 could have an immediate bearing on the liberty of the individual in case of its non-compliance, as laid down under Section 35(6) of the BNSS, 2023.  A summons issued by a Court under Sections 63 or 71 of the BNSS, 2023, and a notice issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 travel on different footings and cannot be equated with each other. A summons issued by a Court is a judicial act, whereas a notice issued by the Investigating Agency is an executive act. Hence, the procedure prescribed for a judicial act cannot be read into the procedure prescribed for an executive act.

The judgement reads: "41.The usage of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency, has only been provided for effecting the procedure under Sections 94 and 193 of the BNSS, 2023. 42. Section 94 deals with issuance of summons, in an electronic form, to produce a document. Section 193 deals with the usage of electronic communication for forwarding the report to a Magistrate, upon completion of the investigation, or to inform the progress of the investigation to the informant or victim. None of these procedures have any bearing on the liberty of an individual. 43. Hence, when viewed from any lens, we are unable to convince ourselves that electronic communication is a valid mode of service of notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, since its conscious omission is a clear manifestation of the legislative intent. Introducing a procedure into Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, that has not been specifically provided for by the Legislature, would be violative of its intent."

Supreme Court concluded: "We further wish to take note of the fact that the BNSS, 2023 does not entirely preclude the use of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency. The Legislature has envisioned the use of electronic communication, during the course of investigation, and upon completion of investigation by the Investigating Agency, specifically provided for under Sections 94(1) and 193(3) of the BNSS, 2023 respectively. 

Section 94(1) of the BNSS, 2023 reads: “94. Summons to produce document or other thing-(1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document, electronic communication, including communication devices, which is likely to contain digital evidence or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Sanhita by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons or such officer may, by a written order, either in physical form or in electronic form, require the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order.” 

Section 193(3) of the BNSS, 2023 reads: “193. Report of a Police Officer on the completion of investigation-***(3)(i) As soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward, including through electronic communication to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form as the State Government may, by rules provide, stating—
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether the accused has been released on his bond or bail bond;
(g) whether the accused has been forwarded in custody under Section 190;
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under Sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70 or Section 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023;
(i) the sequence of custody in case of electronic device;
(ii) the police officer shall, within a period of ninety days, inform the progress of the investigation by any means including through electronic communication to the informant or the victim;
(iii) the officer shall also communicate, in such manner as the State Government may, by rules, provide, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.”
 

28 paragraphs out of 34 paragraphs of Judgement by Allahabad High Court granting relief to Akriti Chaudhary, a law graduate kept intact by Supreme Court, but why has High Court's verdict been removed from Court's website

In Medha Roopam vs. Akriti Chaudhary & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Satish Chandra Sharma and N. K. Singh passed a 8-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"8. After hearing learned Senior Counsels for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that till the matter is heard on merits, the operation of paras nos. 27 to 33 of the impugned judgment including award of costs and strictures against the petitioner shall remain stayed. 9. List the matter on 07.10.2026." The Supreme Court's order implies that out of 34 paragraphs of the judgement by Allahabad High Court's Division Bench of Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev except these 6 concluding paragraphs are intact. 

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi of Live Law who broke the story about how Medha Roopam's matter was allotted to the bench that doesn't have the roster for preventive detention matter has disclosed that Akriti Chaudhary had infact earlier approached the Supreme Court to quash his detention which was before Justice B. V. Nagarathna. 

But why has the judgement by the High Court in Akriti Chaudhary (Detenue) vs. Union Of India & 4 Ors. (2026) HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. 960 of 2026 removed from the website of the High Court? The same is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/17opqogrvX_T4L4K1S0zNAHTDbwaguWWK/view?usp=drive_link 

Earlier, in Akriti Chaudhary (Detenue) vs. Union Of India & 4 Ors. (2026) HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. 960 of 2026, Allahabad High Court's Division Bench delivered a 15-page long judgement dated September 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"31.In this case, the conduct of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar who passed the impugned order, is worthy of derision. In a case where the police report against the Petitioner were only allegations without there being any credible material against her, the District Magistrate was expected to be vigilant and examine the record threadbare to determine if there was any material in support of the allegations and even thereafter, assess whether the oppressive provisions of the NSA were warranted against the Petitioner and how the general law of the land was inadequate against a female student activist without any previous criminal record, agitating for the rights of labourers and where the material on record did not disclose that she had in any way incited violence, reveals that the District Magistrate desired to set an example out of the Petitioner and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of the labourers. The District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar is guilty of violating her oath of allegiance, making this a fit case for the imposition of compensation to the petitioner.” It allowed the petition. Justice Sreedharan authored the judgement. In 2021, the High Court, quashed 94 out of 120 NSA detention orders it reviewed, citing procedural lapses and arbitrariness. It is apparently an unjust law. Notably, it seems the judgement has vanished from the website of the Allahabad High Court.  NSA refers to National Security Act (NSA), 1980. 

Justice Sreedharan observed:"The continued incarceration of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA is violative of her rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The order of detention along with the grounds of detention, being devoid of any material warranting the incarceration of the Petitioner under the NSA and the impugned order having been passed without application of mind, are quashed. The Petitioner shall be forthwith set at liberty, if not wanted in any other case. 26. The petitioner has prayed for a compensation of Rs. 50 lacs." 

He added:"27. As regards the compensation, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that her detention and continued incarceration under the NSA, was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and the State has acted in excess of its authority. To this, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the petitioner has not suffered any extra detention other than that of one single day on 12.04.2026, as she was arrested in Case Crime No. 163 of 2026, and is in judicial custody in that case in which the bail application has been rejected. Therefore, learned counsel for the State has submitted that even if this order of NSA is struck down and set aside, the petitioner would continue to remain incarcerated till she secures bail in the criminal matters."

The judgement recorded:"32. The contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the illegal detention of the Petitioner if any, was only for a day (11.04.2026) as she was arrested in Crime No. 163/2026 on 12.04.2026 and has remained in judicial custody ever since and she would continue to remain incarcerated even after the quash of her detention by this Court till she receives bail in all the cases registered against her. In other words, the Ld. Counsel for the State has submitted that the incarceration of the Petitioner under the NSA has merged with her period of detention in judicial custody. This Court finds force in the submission put forth by the learned counsel for the State. 33. Undoubtedly, even if the order in this particular case is quashed, the petitioner would still remain in jail as an under trial till she secures bail in all the criminal cases registered against her. As the period of detention merges with the period of judicial custody, the amount as prayed for by the petitioner, need not be considered in its entirety. However, on account of the casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the State through the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, which has violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner, this Court considers it sufficient to grant ₹5 lakhs as compensation to the petitioner. This Court also directs that the said amount must be recovered from the salary of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, who has passed this order of detention without application of mind and from all such other officers who may have been responsible, right down to the SHO of the Police Station, who had prepared the initial report warranting the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA. The displeasure of this Court against the conduct of the District Magistrate concerned and all such other officers of the police who were involved in preparing the dossier against the petition, be noted in their service records."

The petitioner is Akriti Chaudhary, who was arrested in Case Crime No. 163 of 2026, on April 12, 2026, where she was named as an accused, inter alia, of having committed offence under Sections 191(1), 191(2), 115(2), 121(1), 125(a), 351(3) and 352 of BNSS and Section 7 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932. Subsequently, she was detained under the National Security Act (NSA).

The genesis of the case commences from April 11, 2026, when during the month of April this year, there was widespread agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh by labourers, who were aggrieved by the payment of low salary, without any increase for several years, working for twelve hours at a stretch, and salaries being anything between ₹10-15,000 which was inadequate to lead a dignified and wholesome life on account of rising prices. Workers, numbering in thousands, came out into the streets near the industrial establishment and allegedly indulged in acts of vandalism and arson, destroyed the facades and glass panes of the factories and also set ablaze vehicles, including police vehicles. In the entire incident, the petitioner is alleged to be the agent provocateur, on account of whose actions and dissemination of information, the riots commenced from April 13, 2026. 

The petitioner's counsel submitted that the entire proceedings against the petitioner was an attempt to stifle freedom of speech and expression and even if the entire allegations against her is accepted without exception, there was no ground, much less sufficient grounds for having proceeded against the petitioner under the provisions of NSA. It was the case of the Petitioner that she was arrested at 5.30 pm on April 11, 2026 from Botanical Garden Metro Station which is situated in NOIDA, and locked up first in Sector-39 Police Station at 7.30 pm, and then she was locked up in various police stations during the night without any information being given by the police to petitioner's friends or family. On April 12, 2026, at around 1.00 pm, one of the petitioner's friends received a call from Sector-142 Police Station, informing her that the petitioner would be produced before Executive Magistrate at Sector 14A Police Station, where a lawyer representing the petitioner was informed that the petitioner was already produced and sent to jail under the orders of the Executive Magistrate under Section 126/135/170 of BNSS. Thus, it was the case of the Petitioner that she was never given an opportunity to sign a bond for good conduct.

The State submitted that the petitioner and her associates, between 6th, 7th and 8th of April, 2026 commenced the agitation and incitement to violence by the labourers from Manesar in Haryana, and thereafter, she and her associates shifted their focus towards NOIDA and hatched a conspiracy, allegedly in a library on how the violence against the State and its entities should be executed. It was also the undisputed case of the State that she was taken into custody on April 12, 2026, as much it was undisputed by the State that the violence commenced only from 13.04.2026. Therefore, the only inescapable inference that can be drawn is that the petitioner was in custody of the Law Enforcement Agencies from April 12, 2026, while the violence erupted from April 13, 2026. 

The counsel for the State has read out from the relevant portion of the order of the District Magistrate, which is elaborate and runs into several pages, wherein at page-40 of the counter affidavit  filed by the State, the main charge against the petitioner is reproduced herein as "पुलिस इतनी बड़ी संख्या में गिरफ़्तारी शांतिपूर्ण बैठे लोगों को शांति से बैठे लोगों को डरा रही है ये पुलिस है जो गैर कानूनी कायर्वाही कर रही है इसिलए जो लोग इस वीिडयो को देख सुन रहे है वो पुलिस  गैर कानूनी गैर वाजिब हरकतों को रोकने के लिए मजदूरों के दमन को रोकने के लिए बड़ी संख्या में पहुंचे।" (The police are arresting people who are sitting peacefully and are intimidating them; it is the police who are engaging in illegal actions. Therefore, those watching and listening to this video should arrive in large numbers to put a stop to the police's unlawful and unjust conduct and to halt the suppression of the workers.)

The judgement reads:" Even if these lines are taken to be the gospel truth, there is no incitement for violence, at the most and at its worst, it is only calling for people to gather to protect the rights of the labourers and stand with them in solidarity against the unlawful and excessive use of the authority by the police. This conversation had allegedly taken place between the petitioner and another co-accused." It was also submitted by the State that the WhatsApp chats between the petitioner and her associates, revealed that the petitioner allegedly told her associates that the police has gathered in large numbers in order to arrest those who are agitating peacefully and are scaring them by misusing their authority and therefore, anyone who can see and read this message should come in large numbers to prevent the unlawful actions of the police and to stand in support of the labourers who are being exploited. 

The judgement recorded that "10. There were several FIR's after Crime No. 163 of 2026, in which the Petitioner, though not initially named in the FIR as an accused, has also been inserted as an accused subsequently. In Case Crime No. 163 of 2026, the chargesheet has been filed against the Petitioner before the appropriate court, in which cognizance has been taken and the bail application of the petitioner has also been dismissed. The grounds of detention are given in page nos. 39 to 47 of the counter affidavit, which this Court has gone through. The introductory paragraph of the grounds of detention has already been stated hereinabove as to how the petitioner is stated to have entered into a conspiracy on 6th, 7th and 8th of April, 2026 in order to foment violence by the labourers in Manesar, Haryana and how in the library of one Yogesh Swamy, the Petitioner along with her other associates had hatched the conspiracy for both Manesar and NOIDA under the guise of the labour unrest.

The first ground related to April 12, 2026 on which date the Petitioner was arrested and produced before the Magistrate for remand and how at her indication, her mobile phone was recovered on April 25, 2026 (thirteen days after her arrest) from which the WhatsApp chats have allegedly been extracted.

The second ground, related to April 10, 2026, where the allegation against the petitioner was that in order to make the impending agitation by the labourers violent, she met her associates and created groups over WhatsApp and thereafter, the violence erupted from April 13, 2026 on account of the conspiracy hatched by the petitioner and her associates. Paragraph-3 relates to the commencement of violence on April 13, 2026 and how on April 11, 2026, the petitioner along with her co-conspirators at about 9.00 am in the morning gathered at Hosiery Complex, N.S.E.Z., Phase-2, Gautam Buddha Nagar along with 300-400 workers, tried to prevent labourers going for their work. The date on which this is supposed to have happened is April 13, 2026 pursuant to the alleged conspiracy which was stated to have been hatched on April 11, 2026. After which she was arrested on April 12, 2026, though it is the consistent case of the Petitioner that she was arrested by the police on April 11, 2026.

The judgment summarized the grounds of detention against the Petitioner, all the acts of violence commenced from April 13, 2026 onwards which led to widespread loss of public and private property and had taken place after the petitioner was in custody. The crux of the State's case for keeping the petitioner under detention is that all the violence that had taken place during the agitation, though had taken place after the arrest of the petitioner, are attributable to her on account of conspiracy that was hatched by her before her arrest on April 12, 2026 and if not for the same, the violence would never had taken place.

The petitioner is about 24 years old, a graduate in History from Daulat Ram College, who went on to do her M.A. in History from Delhi University and is currently a student of First Year Law at the Law Faculty at Delhi University and has no previous criminal antecedents at all (this has been admitted to by the State also).

The counsel for the respondent State submitted the WhatsApp chats that had taken place between the petitioner and her associates to justify the grounds of detention and the order of detention. It was also mentioned that it was trite law that to place a person in detention under the NSA, it was not required that the person must be arraigned as an accused in a catena of criminal cases and that the same may be given effect to on the mere apprehension of disturbance of public order by such person or a singular act which is harmful for the security of the State.

The counsel for the State placed before the High Court the notice that had allegedly been issued under Section 130 of the BNSS before Akriti Chaudhary, the law student of Delhi University was taken into custody. The notice was issued on April 12, 2026, whereby bond for good behaviour was fixed at Rs. 50,000/- and thereafter, allegedly on the grounds of the petitioner refusing to furnish the bail bond to keep good behaviour for six months, was taken into custody on the basis of the General Diary Entry No. 37 dated April 12, 2026 at 10.56 am by the District Unit (Commissionerate Gautam Buddha Nagar). The arrest is said to have been made at 10.20 am on April 12, 2026. The notice under Section 130 was also given to the petitioner on April 12, 2026. It purportedly bears the signatures of the Petitioner along with two others, showing that it was received by them. However, no time has been mentioned in the said notice under Section 130. It is also necessary to mention here that the G.D. number 37 on the basis of which she was arrested finds its mention in the notice under section 130 of the BNSS. The same is not written by hand but is printed.

In his judgement, Justice Sreedharan recorded that "17. My learned brother on the bench Justice Achal Sachdev, pointed out that the General Diary Entry No. 37 was generated at 10.20 am on 12.04.2026 and the mention of the G.D number in the notice under Section 130 goes to reveal that the notice was prepared after the arrest of the petitioner for, had the same been prepared before the arrest of the Petitioner, the G.D. number would not have been mentioned on the notice u/s. 130 BNSS. Mentioning the G.D. number in the notice under Section 130 of the BNSS reveals that the Petitioner was already arrested and the procedure of giving a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS was ex post facto the arrest and nothing more than a sham. I agree with the view of brother Justice Achal Sachdev that the notice u/s. 130 of the BNSS was prepared after the arrest of the Petitioner and that is the reason why the time of issuance is not mentioned in the notice and its omission is deliberate. Answer was sought from the Ld. Counsel for the state with regard to visible fabrication in the record for which no answer is forthcoming from the Ld. Counsel for the State.

With regard to the arrest of the Petitioner, the judgement recorded, "the contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the petitioner was arrested on 12.04.2026, while the Petitioner's side insists that she was taken into custody on 11.04.2026 from 5.30 pm onwards, which is denied by learned counsel for the State." 

Justice Sreedharan observed: "In order to assess which of the two versions is correct, this Court examined the extracts from the WhatsApp conversation between the petitioner and one of her associates produced and relied upon by the State. On page no. 1, is the conversation between one Priyambada, an associate of the Petitioner, messaging the petitioner. The date of the message is 11.04.2026 at 17:56 hrs, to which there is no reply from the petitioner. Then, there were two messages at 17:57 hrs, one at 17.58 hrs, next at 18:14 hrs, 18:35 hrs, 18:56 hrs, 19:11 hrs and a missed call at 19.31 hrs. None of these messages and the call have been answered by the petitioner."

The counsel for the State drew the attention of the High Court to page no. 2 of the WhatsApp chats, which shows again the messaging between the petitioner and Priyambada, which shows a video clip of the gathering sent by the petitioner to Priyambada at 13:41 hrs of 11.04.2026, which was replied with an emoji by Priyambada at 13:50 hrs, and thereafter, Priyambada messaged at 13:56 hrs, which is replied by the petitioner at 14:03 hrs.  

Taking note of the submission by the State, the High Court inferred: "Thus, the messages at page-1 which is of 11th April, 2026 from 17:56 hrs onwards sent to the petitioner- Akriti Chaudhary by her associate Priyambada have not been answered by the petitioner. The only probable reason was that the mobile was not with the Petitioner or that she was in a situation that she could not reply to the messages from Priyambada which probabilise as true, the version put forth by the Petitioner that she was in the custody of the State from 5.30 pm of 11.04.2026 while her formal arrest was shown from 12.04.2026 and concomitantly, falsifies the contention of the State that the Petitioner was in the custody of the State only from 12.04.2026.

The High Court repeatedly asked the counsel for the State to point out from the WhatsApp chats and the video recordings as to which one of them incited people or disclosed a conspiracy inciting people to indulge in acts of rioting, arson and destruction of public and private property? It observed: "The counsel for the State could not show a single message from the WhatsApp chats between the Petitioner and her associates or any video clip which would reveal any incitement from the Petitioner, either evidently or by necessary implication, which would disclose that it was the involvement of the Petitioner and the conspiracy hatched by her that resulted in the violence which erupted from April 13, 2026, much after the Petitioner was taken into custody by the State on 11.04.2026 (as held by this Court). Even otherwise, the undisputed case of the State is also that the violence erupted after the Petitioner was taken to custody by the police."

The judgement observed: "21. The video images relied upon by the State show a large number of people having gathered, which include men and women in traditional rural clothing, all standing near a lamp posts and one video image of a person who seems to be addressing the public. None of these videos disclose that the crowd is agitated or armed with lathi, stones or any such articles, which may be used in an act of violence, but appear to be exercising their constitutional right and freedom of speech and agitating their demands for higher pay and humane working hours."

The High Court observed:"22. Any detention under the NSA is an exception. It is not a substitute to ensure that a person who may receive bail on account of merits of his case, is still detained in custody under a concocted reasoning by the State. The elaborate grounds of detention of the District Magistrate are repetitive, speculative and are only opinion based without referring to a shred of evidence/material in support of sustaining those opinions. The grounds of detention must traverse beyond mere allegations and opinion. Allegations which raise a subjective opinion in the mind of the District Magistrate must be supported with reference to material for the formation of such opinion, else the same would be arbitrary. It must be understood that the exercise of such a discretion which directly violates a person's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be exercised lightly on the basis of surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions. It is the exercise of an extraordinary authority which results in the summary incarceration of a citizen merely on the opinion of the detaining authority which must be such that where a constitution court examining the grounds of detention is also satisfied that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate, crosses the threshold of mere surmises and conjectures and was justly based upon the material on record and not detaining the detenue under the stringent provisions of the NSA would in all probability than not, result in the public order being disturbed or would result in an act by the detenue which is deleterious to national security. The absence of such material would render the grounds of detention and the order of detention unjustified, deserving to be set aside."

The judgment pointed out that the material on record showed that at the petitioner, the law student had called for citizens in support of the labourers and to agitate for their rights. "There is no material to reflect that such agitation will have to be violent or challenging the authority of the State. The freedom of speech and expression extends to coming out on the streets and agitating a cause, and gathering peacefully without arms or without threat to the public order. However, the State must also realize that a peaceful agitation where people collect without arms or ammunitions, can still be scuttled by mischievous elements, who may be sent by parties, who are interested in ensuring that such an agitation is broken and also where such elements may indulge in acts of violence, which thereafter gets attributed to the entire group which is patently unjust. Preventing people from gathering in public spaces or agitating their rights on the grounds of assumed breach of peace, would be throwing the baby out of the bath water. If such a view is taken by the State and approved of by the Courts, it would lead to a cessation of the collective expression of opinion in public spaces. The Constitution protects such a right and the same cannot be trifled with merely on the subjective opinion of the State. The State must also realize that it has a strong and powerful police force, which must be trained in ensuring public order in such large gatherings and also resort to videography of the gathering and the manner in which it is conducted, so that accountability may be affixed, in the event of an outbreak of violence."

Justice Sreedharan recorded that the relationship between the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) on the one hand and the citizens of Uttar Pradesh whom they serve on the other, define the existence of the rule of law or its absence, as the case may be. There must also be a realisation that with great powers come great responsibility and an expected introspection on the part of the bureaucracy as to whether such powers be resorted to, and to what extent. "Else, in the words coined by Rudyard Kipling (spoken publicly by Stanley Baldwin) that 'power without responsibility – the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages, will ring true whenever the power is exercised by the bureaucracy in a cavalier manner, devoid of human sensitivity resulting in deleterious consequences for the citizen."

Justice Sreedharan observed that the IAS and IPS should realise that their loyalty is towards the Constitution and not the political executive, and the honesty and impartiality are towards the people whom they serve while bearing in mind at all times that they are the servants who serve the people, the masters in a democracy. In the bureaucracy and the police, when they act in a manner which is harmonious with their oath of allegiance, the citizens are thankful but "every time they ignore that solemn oath and act contrary to it, the people of the State of Uttar Pradesh would view them as an oppressive vestige of the British Empire arousing angst and hatred towards them creating an environment of civil unrest and this Court, while correcting their excesses and/or illegalities, especially those that impinge upon the civil liberties of the citizens without adequate cause or due process (inhering in the procedure established by law), may pass harsh orders to compensate the citizen so wronged, besides recording their despotic conduct. Else, it shan't be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia."

The 17-page long order sheet is available here. It records the genesis of the case which commenced from April 11, 2026, when during the month of April 2026 year. There was widespread agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar by labourers, who were aggrieved by the payment of low salary, without any increase for several years, working for twelve hours at a stretch, and salaries being anything between ₹10-15,000 which was inadequate to lead a dignified and wholesome life on account of rising prices. Workers, numbering in thousands, came out into the streets near the industrial establishment and allegedly indulged in acts of vandalism and arson, destroyed the facades and glass panes of the factories and also set ablaze vehicles, including police vehicles. In the entire incident, the petitioner was/is alleged to be the agent provocateur, on account of whose actions and dissemination of information, the riots commenced from April 13, 2026. The facts recorded in the judgment indicate that the entire proceedings against the petitioner was an attempt to stifle freedom of speech and expression. There was no ground, much less sufficient grounds for having proceeded against the petitioner under the provisions of NSA. 

The National Security Act (NSA) 1980, one of three counter -terror laws was enacted on December 27, 1980 after the notoriety of Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971 came to light during 21 months of the Emergency (1975-1977), which was deployed to silence opposition parties. Entry 9 of List I (the Union List) and Entry 3 of List III (the Concurrent List) empower the Central Government and State Governments, respectively, to frame laws concerning preventive detention. This preventive detention provision which has survived under Article 22 (3) of the Constitution of India, is a colonial residue of special laws introduced by the British monarch's East India Company in 1784 under which numerous freedom fighters were incarcerated. Post independence, it remained alive through the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 till 1969. It was replaced by MISA Act, 1971, which was repealed in 1978.  The successor of MISA is no better. The constitutionality of the NSA was challenged in the case of A.K. Roy vs. Union of India 1982 SCR (2) 272 on the ground that it is a draconian law that places arbitrary and excessive powers in the hands of the executive and was violative of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. But Section 3 (1) and Section 3(2) of the NSA was not struck down on grounds of uncertainty and vagueness by the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. It majority judgment reads: "We must therefore, held, regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board." 

The specter of colonial law which impacted the judicial outcome in A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 that upheld preventive detention within a compartmentalised reading of fundamental rights loomed large over the decision in the A.K. Roy's case. It ought o have factored in the decision in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 because certain provisions of the NSA are not just, reasonable and fair.

Under Section 3 of NSA, the Central Government or the State Governments can order the detention of a person in order to prevent him from adversely affecting the security of India, defence of India, India’s relations with foreign nations, the maintenance of public order, or the supply of essential supplies. NSA permits central and state governments, and in specified circumstances, the DMs and Commissioners of Police, to detain a person for up to 12 months if the DM is satisfied that the person's activities are prejudicial to national security, public order, or the maintenance of essential services. Section 4 provides that the detention order can be executed at any place throughout the territory of India. Under Section 8, the grounds of detention have to be communicated to the detained person as soon as possible. Such communication must preferably be made within a maximum period of 5 days and, in exceptional cases, within a maximum period of 15 days.  

Also read: Protest against economic injustice by workers in UP: Mentioning General Diary Entry Number in notice under Section 130 of BNSS ex post facto arrest of Akriti Chaudhary, the law student, turns procedure into a sham

 

Patna High Court's Division Bench upholds verdict by 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna City, records its deep appreciation for research assistance rendered by Aditya Shekhar, Ribhava Raj, the Legal Researchers in a murder case from 2017

In Ravi Kumar @ Singhrwa @ Singhara vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 40-page long judgement dated September 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"9. Conclusion and Operative Order (i) We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, examined the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, and applied the settled legal principles discussed above. (ii) The medical evidence of PW-1 Dr. Mukesh Kumar, supported by the post-mortem report (Ext. 1), conclusively establishes that the deceased Krishna Prasad @ Pahalwan died a homicidal death as a result of a firearm injury sustained on the back of the chest. The occurrence of a fatal shooting is, therefore, not in doubt. (iii) The principal question for determination is whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who fired the fatal shot. (iv) On a comprehensive and independent appraisal of the evidence, we find that PW-2 Prem Kumar is a natural witness whose presence at the shop of the deceased is fully explained. He has given a consistent account of having seen the appellant armed with a pistol, the deceased attempting to flee, the appellant opening fire, and the bullet hitting the deceased on the back. His evidence finds material corroboration from the testimony of PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti, who reached the place of occurrence immediately on hearing the sound of firing. PW-5 has specifically deposed that he saw the appellant running away from the spot within a few minutes of the incident. This circumstance is proximate in time and lends assurance to the version of PW-2. (v) The oral dying declarations attributed to the deceased and deposed to by PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 are consistent in material particulars in naming the appellant as the assailant. Although these witnesses are related or closely associated with the deceased, their evidence on this aspect has withstood cross-examination and finds support from the overall circumstances of the case. The medical evidence corroborates the nature and location of the injury. The motive suggested by the prosecution, namely the outstanding loan and the prior threat, provides an additional link in the chain. (vi) The discrepancies regarding the exact date and time of the occurrence, the non-recovery of the weapon and the projectile, and certain omissions in the investigation, though pointed out with some force, do not go to the root of the prosecution case. They are not sufficient to discard the reliable ocular account and the consistent oral dying declarations. The confessional statement recorded by the Investigating Officer has been kept out of consideration in view of the bar contained in Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. (vii) Having regard to the cumulative effect of the evidence of PW-2, the corroborative circumstances spoken to by PW-3 and PW-5, the consistent oral dying declarations, and the medical evidence, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial court do not warrant interference by this Court. (viii) In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. (ix) The judgment of conviction, dated 29.06.2018 and the order of sentence, dated 05.07.2018 passed by the learned 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna City, in Sessions Trial No. 40 of 2018 arising out of Agamkuan P.S. Case No. 396 of 2017 are affirmed. The appellant Ravi Kumar @ Singharwa shall serve the sentence awarded by the trial court...."

It concluded: "(xi) Before parting with the judgment, this court places on record its deep appreciation for the research and assistance rendered by Mr. Aditya Shekhar and Mr. Ribhava Raj, Legal Researchers attached with this court." S. K. Lal was the senior counsel on behalf of the appellants who was assisted by advocates Madhaw Prasad Yadav, Arvind Kumar and Pramod Kumar. Anil Kumar was the counsel for the informant and Shashi Bala Verma was the APP. 

The criminal appeal was preferred by the sole appellant Ravi Kumar @ Singharwa against the judgment of conviction dated June 29, 2018 and the order of sentence dated July 5, 2018 passed by the 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna City, in Sessions Trial of 2018 arising out of Agamkuan P.S. Case of 2017, whereby and whereunder the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

By the impugned order of sentence, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of 20,000 for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of 2,000 for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. The appellant was arrested during investigation and has remained in custody since then. After commitment of the case to the Court of Session, charge under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act was framed against him on March 5, 2018. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Upon conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted and sentenced him. The appeal had challenged the judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 

The case of the prosecution emerged from the fardbeyan of the informant Annu Gupta (PW-6), wife
of the deceased, is that the deceased Krishna Prasad @ Pahalwan was running a snack shop under the name and style of “Maa Sheetla Sweet” in front of Sheetla Temple since the year 1996. The brother of the informant, namely Prem Kumar (PW-2), was also associated with the said shop. The appellant Ravi
Kumar @ Singharwa had worked in the said shop as a maker of singhara and litti for about ten years but had left the job a few days prior to the occurrence. On 25.08.2017 at about 7:00 p.m., the
deceased, after closing his work for the day, went to Tulsi
Mandi adjacent to the railway line near Sheetla Mandir for
getting himself shaved. While returning, he met the appellant.
On noticing something in the pocket of the appellant, the
deceased searched the same and found a pistol. The deceased
questioned the appellant as to why he was carrying a pistol
and stated that he would inform the appellant’s mother. The
appellant became enraged.
(iv) Thereafter, the deceased returned to his shop,
consumed bhunja, and after some time started proceeding
towards his house. When he had barely covered a short
distance of about fifty yards from the shop, the appellant, who
was sitting there armed with a pistol, pointed the same
towards the head of the deceased and opened fire. The
deceased pushed the appellant and attempted to flee; however,
the bullet hit him on the back and he fell down at the spot. The
appellant managed to escape from the place of occurrence.
(v) On hearing the sound of the gunshot, several
persons including the staff of the shop assembled there. The
injured was shifted to Rajeshwar Hospital for treatment. The
informant and her son were informed and they reached the
hospital. According to the prosecution, the deceased, while
undergoing treatment and while still conscious, disclosed that
it was the appellant who had shot him. It is further the case of
the prosecution that the appellant and his father had taken a
substantial amount by way of loan from the deceased and,
whenever the deceased demanded repayment, the appellant
used to threaten to kill him. The occurrence is alleged to have
been committed at the behest of the father of the appellant.
(vi) On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant
recorded at the hospital, Agamkuan P.S. Case No. 396 of 2017
was registered under Sections 341, 324, 307, 504/34 of the
Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. During the
course of treatment, the injured succumbed to his injuries after
about two days. Upon completion of investigation, the
Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act
only against the present appellant. Cognizance was taken and
the case was committed to the Court of Session, culminating
in the trial that has given rise to the present appeal.
3. Trial Court Findings
(i) The learned trial court, upon appreciation of the
evidence adduced during the trial, recorded the following
material findings:
(a) The prosecution examined seven witnesses in
all. PW-1 Dr. Mukesh Kumar is the Autopsy Surgeon who
conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of
the deceased on 27.08.2017 and proved the post-mortem
report (Ext. 1). PW-2 Prem Kumar (brother of the informant
and associated with the shop of the deceased), PW-3 Dilip
Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti were examined as
witnesses to the occurrence. PW-4 Anchit Raj is the son of the
deceased and PW-6 Annu Gupta is the informant and wife of
the deceased. PW-7 Suchit Kumar is the Investigating Officer
of the case.
(b) On behalf of the defence, one witness (DW-1
Kashi Nath Chandravansi) was examined and certain
documents relating to a prior criminal case against the
deceased were marked as exhibits.
(c) The learned trial court held that PW-2 Prem
Kumar is an eye-witness to the occurrence. According to the
trial court, this witness had seen the appellant threatening the
deceased with a pistol, the deceased attempting to flee, the
appellant opening fire, the bullet hitting the deceased on the
back, and the deceased falling down. The trial court further
held that PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti
reached the place of occurrence immediately on hearing the
sound of firing; PW-5 specifically claimed to have seen the
appellant running away from the spot. The evidence of these
witnesses was found to be consistent and reliable.
(d) The learned trial court placed significant
reliance on the oral dying declarations alleged to have been
made by the deceased. It held that the deceased, while still
conscious, had disclosed to PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 that
it was the appellant Ravi Kumar @ Singharwa who had shot
him. These statements were held to be relevant and admissible
under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and
were found to be consistent and free from doubt.
(e) The medical evidence of PW-1 was held to
corroborate the prosecution version. The post-mortem report
disclosed an ante-mortem firearm entry wound on the left side
of the back of the chest with blackening and tattooing, and the
cause of death was opined to be haemorrhage and shock due
to the chest injury caused by a firearm.
(f) The trial court accepted the motive suggested by
the prosecution, namely that the appellant and his father had
taken a substantial loan from the deceased and that the
appellant had earlier threatened the deceased with death when
repayment was demanded.
(g) As regards the discrepancy in the date of
occurrence (some witnesses having stated the month as
October instead of August), the learned trial court observed
that witnesses cannot be expected to possess a photographic
memory and that the said discrepancy stood clarified by the
fardbeyan and the endorsement thereon, both of which clearly
mentioned the date as 25/26.08.2017. The discrepancy was
therefore held to be minor and immaterial.
(h) The trial court further referred to the
confessional statement of the appellant (Ext. 6) recorded by
the Investigating Officer. The defence evidence seeking to
establish the criminal antecedents of the deceased was held to
be irrelevant to the determination of the guilt of the appellant
in the present case.
(i) On the basis of the above findings, the learned
trial court concluded that the prosecution had successfully
proved the charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, and accordingly convicted and
sentenced him as noted earlier.
4. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
(i) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence on several grounds.
(ii) It was firstly submitted that the learned trial
court committed a serious error in recording a finding of guilt
against the appellant when none of the prosecution witnesses
can be said to be reliable eye-witnesses to the actual
occurrence. Learned counsel contended that a careful reading
of the evidence of PW-2 Prem Kumar, PW-3 Dilip Kumar
Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti would show that their presence
at the precise moment of firing is either unnatural or not free
from doubt. It was argued that the evidence of these witnesses,
even if accepted at face value, is largely in the nature of post-
occurrence testimony and that the trial court erred in treating
PW-2 as a wholly reliable eye-witness.
(iii) It was next submitted that the evidence of PW-4
Anchit Raj and PW-6 Annu Gupta (the informant) is purely
hearsay in character insofar as the actual act of firing is
concerned. Learned counsel urged that these witnesses were
admittedly not present at the place of occurrence and reached
the hospital only after receiving information. Their testimony,
therefore, could not have been used to establish the identity of
the assailant except to the limited extent of the alleged oral
dying declarations.
(iv) Strong reliance was placed on the contention
that the alleged oral dying declarations do not satisfy the
requirements of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. It was argued that the statements attributed to the
deceased were made only to highly interested witnesses (wife,
son, brother-in-law and a close associate), that there is no
contemporaneous record of such statements, and that the
prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased was in a
fit state of mind and body at the time of making the alleged
declarations. Learned counsel submitted that the trial court
mechanically applied Section 32(1) without subjecting the
alleged dying declarations to the close scrutiny required by
law.
(v) It was further contended that the medical
evidence of PW-1, while establishing a homicidal death by
firearm, does not corroborate the precise manner and genesis
of the occurrence as projected by the prosecution witnesses.
The non-recovery of the weapon of offence and the bullet was
also highlighted as a significant lacuna.
(vi) Learned counsel pointed out material
discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, particularly with
regard to the date of the occurrence (some witnesses having
deposed the month as October instead of August), the exact
time, the sequence of events, and the presence of various
persons at the spot. It was submitted that these discrepancies,
when viewed cumulatively, go to the root of the matter and
render the prosecution version unreliable.
(vii) Attention was also invited to the fact that the
confessional statement of the appellant (Ext. 6) recorded by
the Investigating Officer is hit by Section 25 of the Indian
Evidence Act and could not have been relied upon even for
limited purposes. The investigation was described as defective
on account of non-examination of independent witnesses,
delayed recording of statements, and failure to collect material
scientific evidence.
(viii) It was lastly submitted that the appellant is a
first offender, that the evidence on record does not establish
the charges beyond reasonable doubt, and that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence are liable to be
set aside. In the alternative, a prayer was made for suspension
of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of the
appeal.

5. Submissions on behalf of the State
(i) Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing
on behalf of the State supported the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence and submitted that the appeal
is devoid of merit.
(ii) It was contended that the learned trial court has
correctly appreciated the evidence on record and has recorded
concurrent findings of fact which do not warrant interference
in appellate jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that PW-2
Prem Kumar is a natural and reliable eye-witness to the
occurrence. His presence at the shop of the deceased, with
whom he was associated in business, is fully explained.
According to the State, this witness has given a consistent
account of having seen the appellant armed with a pistol, the
deceased attempting to flee, the appellant opening fire, and the
bullet hitting the deceased on the back.
(iii) It was further submitted that the evidence of
PW-2 finds material corroboration from the testimony of PW-
3 Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti. Both these
witnesses reached the place of occurrence immediately on
hearing the sound of firing. PW-5 has specifically deposed
that he saw the appellant running away from the spot. Their
presence is natural as they were associated with the shop of
the deceased, and their evidence lends assurance to the
version of the eye-witness.
(iv) Strong reliance was placed on the multiple oral
dying declarations made by the deceased. Learned Additional
Public Prosecutor submitted that the deceased, while still
conscious and soon after sustaining the injury, clearly named
the appellant as the assailant before PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and
PW-6. These statements, being consistent and made at the
earliest opportunity, fully satisfy the requirements of Section
32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and constitute
relevant and reliable evidence pointing to the guilt of the
appellant.
(v) The medical evidence of PW-1 was described as
fully corroborative of the ocular account. The post-mortem
report establishes an ante-mortem firearm entry wound on the
back of the chest with blackening and tattooing, which is
consistent with the prosecution version that the deceased was
shot from behind while trying to escape.
(vi) As regards the discrepancy in the month of the
occurrence (August/October), it was submitted that the same
is minor and stands clarified by the contemporaneous
documents, namely the fardbeyan and the endorsement
thereon. Such discrepancies are natural and do not go to the
root of the prosecution case.
(vii) Learned counsel for the State further submitted
that the motive of the occurrence, i.e., the outstanding loan
and the prior threat held out by the appellant, stands
established through the evidence of the informant and other
witnesses. The non-recovery of the weapon, though a lacuna,
is not fatal in the face of reliable ocular and dying-declaration
evidence. The confessional statement recorded by the
Investigating Officer was referred to only as a supporting
circumstance.
(viii) It was lastly contended that the prosecution
has proved the charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court has assigned
cogent reasons for convicting the appellant, and the impugned
judgment does not suffer from any perversity or infirmity
warranting interference by this Court. The appeal, it was
prayed, deserves to be dismissed. 

6. Points for Determination
On the basis of the rival submissions advanced on
behalf of the parties and upon perusal of the impugned
judgment and the evidence available on record, the following
points arise for determination in the present appeal:
(i) Whether the prosecution has been able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, Ravi Kumar @
Singharwa, intentionally caused the death of the deceased
Krishna Prasad @ Pahalwan by firing at him with a firearm on
25.08.2017?
(ii) Whether the oral statements attributed to the
deceased, alleged to have been made shortly after the
occurrence and naming the appellant as the assailant,
constitute reliable and admissible dying declarations under
Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and whether
they inspire confidence?
(iii) Whether the evidence of PW-2 Prem Kumar
(claimed to be an eye-witness) and the evidence of PW-3
Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti (immediate post-
occurrence witnesses) is natural, consistent, reliable and
sufficient to establish the complicity of the appellant?

7. Analysis of Evidence
(i) The prosecution has examined seven witnesses.
PW-1 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem; PW-2,
PW-3 and PW-5 are witnesses concerning the occurrence and
its immediate aftermath; PW-4 and PW-6 speak principally
about what was allegedly disclosed by the deceased; and PW-
7 is the Investigating Officer. The defence has examined one
witness, DW-1.
(ii) The evidence, therefore, has to be considered in
its proper compartments. The medical evidence establishes the
nature and cause of death; the question of identity of the
assailant rests upon the ocular and surrounding circumstances;
and the alleged statements made by the deceased require
separate consideration under Section 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.

A. Medical Evidence (PW-1)
(i) PW-1 Dr. Mukesh Kumar conducted the post-
mortem examination on the body of Krishna Prasad @
Pahalwan on 27.08.2017 and proved the post-mortem report
(Ext. 1). The external examination disclosed an ante-mortem
firearm entry wound measuring ¼" × ¼" over the left side of
the back of the chest, one inch away from the mid-line at the
level of the fifth thoracic vertebra, with inverted margins and
surrounded by blackening and tattooing over an area of 8" ×
7". There were also surgical stitched wounds. On dissection,
the chest cavity contained about 500 ml of blood and blood
clots. The projectile had pierced the fifth thoracic vertebra and
the apical area of the right lung. No metallic object was
recovered from the body. The doctor opined that the cause of
death was haemorrhage and shock due to the chest injury and
that Injury No. 1 was caused by a firearm. The time since
death was estimated at 6 to 18 hours.
(ii) The medical evidence thus establishes that the
deceased sustained a fatal firearm injury from behind and that
the death was homicidal in nature. It lends medical support to
the prosecution version that the deceased had been shot in the
back.
(iii) At the same time, the evidence of PW-1 has
definite limits. The doctor does not identify the assailant. The
non-recovery of the projectile is also part of the medical
record. Consequently, while PW-1 establishes the nature and
cause of death, the identity of the person who fired the shot
has to be determined from the remaining evidence.
PW-2 Prem Kumar
(i) PW-2 Prem Kumar is an important witness
because he claims to have been present at the time of the
occurrence. According to him, on 25.08.2017 at about 8:00
p.m., while he was at the shop, the deceased proceeded ahead
and, after covering about 50 steps, the appellant Ravi @
Singharwa took out a pistol, threatened him and fired. The
deceased sustained injury on the back, fell down, and was
thereafter taken for treatment. PW-2 has identified the accused in Court.
(ii) The importance of PW-2’s evidence lies in the
fact that, unlike PW-4 and PW-6, he does not derive his
knowledge of the identity of the assailant solely from a
statement allegedly made by the deceased at the hospital. His
account is presented as direct observation of the occurrence
itself. He has further stated that the deceased, while being
taken to the hospital, was still conscious and was naming the
person who had shot him. At the same time, he does not claim
personal knowledge of the alleged monetary transaction or of
the precise conversation which allegedly took place between
the deceased and the accused before the firing.
(iii) His evidence has to be tested for naturalness of
presence, consistency with the evidence of PW-3 and PW-5,
consistency with the medical evidence, and consistency with
the earliest version recorded during investigation. The
material question is whether his account of the actual firing
withstands scrutiny when read as a whole.
PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta
(i) PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta states that he was a
friend of the deceased and had accompanied him for shaving.
After returning to the shop, the deceased started for home.
PW-3 thereafter heard the sound of firing, went to the spot
along with others, and found the deceased lying on the ground
with a firearm injury on the back. He participated in taking the
injured to the hospital and has deposed that the deceased
disclosed the name of the appellant as the assailant.
(ii) PW-3 is not an eye-witness to the actual act of
firing. His direct observation begins from the point when he
heard the gunshot and reached the place of occurrence. The
portion of his testimony relating to the identity of the assailant
is based on the statement attributed to the deceased and must
therefore be evaluated under Section 32(1) of the Evidence
Act.
PW-4 Anchit Raj
PW-4 Anchit Raj, the son of the deceased, has
candidly admitted that he was not present at the place of
occurrence. He received information from PW-2, went to the
hospital, and has deposed that his father, while conscious, told
him that Ravi had shot him. His evidence is relevant only as a
recipient of the alleged oral dying declaration and cannot be
treated as ocular evidence of the firing.
PW-5 Sudhir Kamti
(i) PW-5 Sudhir Kamti states that he was at the shop
when he heard the sound of firing. He reached the spot within
about 2-3 minutes, saw the deceased lying injured, and saw
the appellant running away from the place. He also helped in
taking the injured to the hospital.
(ii) PW-5 does not claim to have seen the actual
firing. His evidence is circumstantial in nature: he heard the
shot, reached the spot almost immediately, found the deceased
injured, and saw the appellant fleeing. The circumstance of
the accused being seen running away shortly after the firing is
relevant and proximate in time, but it cannot by itself be
equated with proof of the act of firing. His evidence can
consequently provide corroborative circumstances, but the
fact of fleeing cannot by itself be equated with proof of the
actual firing.
PW-6 Annu Gupta (Informant)
(i) PW-6 Annu Gupta, the wife of the deceased and
the informant, has stated that on the night of the incident, she
received information from her brother (PW-2) and went to the
hospital with her son. According to her, the deceased was
conscious and told her that Ravi had shot him. She has,
however, clearly admitted in cross-examination that neither
she nor her son had witnessed the occurrence.
(ii) Her evidence regarding the identity of the
assailant is therefore dependent on the alleged oral dying
declaration. The trial court noticed that she had at one place
stated the date of occurrence as 25.10.2017 instead of
25.08.2017. While the contemporaneous documents such as
fardbeyan and endorsement consistently mention August
2017, the discrepancy remains a relevant factor to be weighed
while assessing the overall reliability of the prosecution
version.
PW-7 Investigating Officer
(i) PW-7 Suchit Kumar has proved the formal steps
of investigation, the fardbeyan, endorsements, charge-sheet
and other documents. His cross-examination, however, brings
out several omissions: non-recovery of the weapon and the
projectile, non-examination of independent public witnesses,
and certain deficiencies in the recording of statements.
(ii) These lapses assume significance because the
identity of the assailant is the central issue. An investigation is
not to be discarded for every omission, yet omissions that
could have provided objective corroboration or contradiction
cannot be ignored.
(iii) The confessional statement of the appellant
(Ext. 6) recorded by the Investigating Officer when the
appellant was apprehended in a different case is hit by Section
25 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be used as
substantive evidence against him.

Defence Evidence
DW-1 has proved documents (bail bond relating to
an earlier Alaganj Police Station case and connected
signatures/documents) relating to a prior criminal case against
the deceased. Even if the deceased had criminal antecedents,
that circumstance does not, by itself, constitute a defence to
the present charge or establish that the appellant was not the
assailant. The defence evidence does not point to any
alternative assailant or offer any substantive explanation for
the fatal firearm injury.
Statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
(i) The appellant was examined under Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All the material
incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution
evidence were put to him. The appellant denied the allegations
and the incriminating circumstances. He did not offer any
specific explanation or alternative version of the occurrence,
nor did he lead any substantive evidence in defence beyond
the formal evidence of DW-1 regarding the antecedents of the
deceased.
(ii) It is well settled that the statement of an accused
recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not substantive
evidence. It can be taken into consideration only to the limited
extent of explaining the circumstances appearing against him
or for the purpose of appreciating the truth or otherwise of the
prosecution version. The burden of proving the guilt of the
accused never shifts to the accused and remains always on the
prosecution.
(iii) In Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 13 SCC 289, the Supreme Court emphasised that the object of Section 313 is to afford the accused an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him, and that a false explanation or a false plea may, in appropriate cases, be
considered as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. However, the Court cautioned that the absence of a satisfactory explanation cannot by itself fill up the gaps in the prosecution evidence or relieve the prosecution of its primary burden.  

Alleged Oral Dying Declarations

(i) The prosecution relies upon oral statements
attributed to the deceased and made to PW-2, PW-3, PW-4
and PW-6, naming the appellant as the person who shot him.
There is no dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate. The
evidentiary value of these oral statements depends on whether
they are found to be voluntary, consistent, and made while the
deceased was in a fit condition.
(ii) It must also be kept in mind that PW-3, PW-4
and PW-6 (and to some extent PW-2) are recounting what
they claim the deceased told them. Their evidence on the point
of identity derives from the same source. While consistent oral
dying declarations can lend assurance, they cannot be treated
as multiple independent eye-witness accounts.
 

Date and Time Discrepancies
The documentary record and the majority of the
evidence place the occurrence on 25.08.2017. The reference to
25.10.2017 by the informant (and at places by PW-4 and the
IO) has been treated by the trial court as an error of
recollection. There is also a minor variation in the exact time
(approximately 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.). These discrepancies
have to be evaluated in the light of the overall consistency of
the prosecution case rather than in isolation.
Synthesis
(i) The medical evidence establishes that the
deceased died as a result of a firearm injury sustained on the
back. The occurrence of a fatal shooting is therefore not in
doubt.
(ii) The prosecution seeks to connect the appellant
with the act of firing primarily through:
(a) the direct account of PW-2;
(b) the immediate post-occurrence evidence of PW-
3 and PW-5 (including the circumstance of the appellant being
seen fleeing);
(c) the oral dying declarations alleged to have been
made to PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6; and
(d) the surrounding circumstances, including
motive.
(iii) The principal aspects that require careful
judicial scrutiny are: the reliability and naturalness of PW-2’s
presence and version; the weight to be attached to the oral
dying declarations made to interested witnesses; the
corroborative value of PW-5’s evidence of fleeing; the effect
of non-recovery of the weapon and projectile; the
investigative omissions; and the cumulative impact of the
discrepancies regarding date and time.
(iv) The trial court accepted the prosecution
evidence, treated the date discrepancy as immaterial, relied
upon the ocular account, the oral dying declarations and the
medical evidence, and held that the charges stood proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Whether that conclusion is
sustainable on a proper appraisal of the evidence is the
question that now falls for determination by this Court.

8. Legal Principles to be Applied

Before proceeding to the final evaluation of the evidence, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal
principles that govern the determination of the present appeal. 

Appreciation of evidence of related and interested witnesses

(i) It is well settled that the evidence of a related or
interested witness is not to be discarded merely on the ground
of relationship or interest. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki,
reported in (1981) 2 SCC 752, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that a related witness is not necessarily an interested
witness and that the evidence of such a witness cannot be
rejected on the mere ground of relationship. The real test is
whether the evidence is credible and trustworthy. The relevant
paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“7. As mentioned above the
High Court has declined to rely on the
evidence of PW 1 on two grounds: (1) she
was a “highly interested” witness
because she “is the wife of the deceased”,
and (2) there were discrepancies in her
evidence. With respect, in our opinion,
both the grounds are invalid. For, in the
circumstances of the case, she was the
only and most natural witness; she was
the only person present in the hut with the
deceased at the time of the occurrence,
and the only person who saw the
occurrence. True, it is, she is the wife of
the deceased; but she cannot be called an
“interested” witness. She is related to the
deceased. “Related” is not equivalent to
“interested”. A witness may be called
“interested” only when he or she derives
some benefit from the result of a
litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or
in seeing an accused person punished. A
witness who is a natural one and is the
only possible eyewitness in the
circumstances of a case cannot be said to
be “interested”. In the instant case PW 1
had no interest in protecting the real
culprit, and falsely implicating the
respondents.”
(ii) The evidence of a related witness should be
scrutinised with care, but if it is found reliable after such
scrutiny, it can form the basis of conviction. The same
principle has been consistently followed in later decisions,
including Raju v. State of T.N., (2012) 12 SCC 701.
 

Oral dying declarations
(i) A statement made by a person as to the cause of
his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction
which resulted in his death is relevant under Section 32(1) of
the Evidence Act.
(ii) In the classic decision of Khushal Rao v. State
of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958 SC 22, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can form the sole
basis of conviction if it is found to be voluntary and reliable.
No particular form is prescribed, and an oral dying declaration
is admissible.
(iii) The guiding principles were further elaborated
in Paniben v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 474.
The Court must be satisfied that:
(a) the declarant was in a fit state of mind;
(b) the statement was voluntary and not the result of
tutoring or prompting;
(c) it is consistent in material particulars; and
(d) it inspires confidence.
(iv) For the sake of elaboration, the relevant
paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“18. Though a dying
declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
worthwhile to note that the accused has
no power of cross-examination. Such a
power is essential for eliciting the truth as
an obligation of oath could be. This is the
reason the Court also insists that the
dying declaration should be of such a
nature as to inspire full confidence of the
Court in its correctness. The Court has to
be on guard that the statement of deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring,
prompting or a product of imagination.
The Court must be further satisfied that
the deceased was in a fit state of mind
after a clear opportunity to observe and
identify the assailants. Once the Court is
satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
conviction without any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as
an absolute rule of law that the dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The
rule requiring corroboration is merely a
rule of prudence. This Court has laid
down in several judgments the principles
governing dying declaration, which could
be summed up as under:
(i) There is neither rule of law
nor of prudence that dying declaration
cannot be acted upon without
corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376 : (1976) 2 SCR 764] )
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that
the dying declaration is true and
voluntary it can base conviction on it,
without corroboration. (State of U.P. v.Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552 :1985 SCC (Cri) 127 : AIR 1985 SC 416] ;Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169 : AIR 1983
SC 164] ).
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must
ensure that the declaration is not the 
result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination. The deceased had
opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make
the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473 : AIR 1976 SC 1994] ).
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon
without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264 :1974 SCC (Cri) 426] )
(v) Where the deceased was
unconscious and could never make any
dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 645 : AIR 1982 SC 1021] )
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the
basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981SCC (Cri) 581] )
(vii) Merely because a dying
declaration does not contain the details as
to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455 :1981 SCC (Cri) 364 : AIR 1981 SC 617])
(viii) Equally, merely because it
is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded. On the contrary, the shortness
of the statement itself guarantees truth.
(Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519 : AIR 1979 SC 1505] )
(ix) Normally the court in order
to satisfy itself whether the deceased was
in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration look up to the medical
opinion. But where the eyewitness has
said that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make this dying
declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. (Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp SCC 152 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 342 : AIR 1988 SC 912] )
(x) Where the prosecution
version differs from the version as given in
the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390 : 1989SCC (Cri) 585 : AIR 1989 SC 1519] )”
(v) In cases of oral dying declarations, greater caution is required. In State of M.P. v. Ramjan Khan, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3070, the Hon’ble Supreme Court flagging
case-specific infirmities, such as uncorroborated, omitted
from FIR/Section 161 CrPC statement, interested witness etc.
emphasised that when an oral dying declaration is made
before close relatives or interested persons and is not recorded
contemporaneously, the Court must examine it with closer
scrutiny. The relevant paragraph of the sid judgment is
reproduced below:
17. Through the evidence of
PW8, the mother of the deceased, who is
also the informant, the prosecution has
attempted to establish the existence of an
oral dying declaration. It is to be noted
that dying declaration itself is not a
strong piece of evidence and therefore,
when it is verbal and that too, allegedly
made to a close relative (in this case
allegedly to the mother), evidence of
mother about the oral dying declaration
was to be treated with care and caution.
To show that the trial Court dealt with the
same without due care and caution self-
evident from paragraph 32 of the
judgment of the Trial Court, which reads
thus:-
“32. During the arguments, ld.
Counsel for the accused argued that
complainant Sitara Bi has stated in her
court statement that when she reached at
well, at that time, her son Naseem Khan
told her that all the three accused Ramjan
Khan, Musab Khan and Habib Khan have
caused his murder after beating him with
sickle, axe and lathi. Though, this fact is
not written in the police statement Exh.
D-3 of Sitara Bi that when he reached, at
that time, accused Naseem had told her to
be beaten by accused persons, even
thereafter, I don't find it proper to give it's
benefit to the accused persons because I
don't find any reason to disbelieve the
statement, which has been given by her
before the court.”
(vi) Consistency among multiple witnesses
recounting the same oral declaration may lend assurance, but
such consistency cannot be treated as independent
corroboration of the same quality as that of an unrelated eye-
witness.

Non-recovery of the weapon of offence and the projectile

(i) It is equally well settled that non-recovery of the weapon of offence or the bullet is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case if the ocular evidence or the dying declaration is found to be reliable and receives corroboration from medical evidence. In Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2021) 7 SCC 188, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the absence of the weapon does not ipso facto demolish the prosecution version when the other evidence is trustworthy. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that
as per the ballistic report the bullet found
does not match with the firearm/gun
recovered and therefore the use of gun as
alleged is doubtful and therefore benefit
of doubt must be given to the accused is
concerned, the aforesaid cannot be
accepted. At the most, it can be said that
the gun recovered by the police from the
accused may not have been used for
killing and therefore the recovery of the
actual weapon used for killing can be
ignored and it is to be treated as if there
is no recovery at all. For convicting an
accused recovery of the weapon used in
commission of offence is not a sine qua
non. PW 1 and PW 2, as observed
hereinabove, are reliable and trustworthy
eyewitnesses to the incident and they have
specifically stated that A-1 Rakesh fired
from the gun and the deceased sustained
injury. The injury by the gun has been
established and proved from the medical
evidence and the deposition of Dr
Santosh Kumar, PW 5. Injury 1 is by
gunshot. Therefore, it is not possible to
reject the credible ocular evidence of PW
1 and PW 2 — eyewitnesses who
witnessed the shooting. It has no bearing
on credibility of deposition of PW 1 and
PW 2 that A-1 shot deceased with a gun,
particularly as it is corroborated by
bullet in the body and also stands
corroborated by the testimony of PW 2
and PW 5. Therefore, merely because the
ballistic report shows that the bullet
recovered does not match with the gun
recovered, it is not possible to reject the
credible and reliable deposition of PW 1
and PW 2.”
(ii) At the same time, the non-recovery remains a relevant circumstance, particularly when the identity of the assailant is seriously disputed and scientific evidence could have provided objective support.

Scope of interference in an appeal against conviction 

In an appeal against conviction, the appellate court exercises the same power as the trial court to review the evidence, subject to the well-known limitations attending the appreciation of oral evidence. It is under a duty to re-appreciate and re-examine the entire evidence on record, and is not confined to interfering only where the trial court's findings are perverse. Its jurisdiction to reverse a finding of conviction is co-extensive with the trial court’s original jurisdiction to render it. This principle has been reiterated in several decisions, including State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735, the relevant paragraph of which is reproduced below: 

“5.2. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it was dealing with the first appeal against the order of conviction passed by the learned trial court. Being the first appellate court, the High Court was required to reappreciate the entire evidence on record and also the reasoning given by the learned trial court while convicting the accused. Non-reappreciation of the evidence on record may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the accused. Being the first appellate court, the High Court ought to have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record without any limitation, which might be there while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court.”