Supreme Court's Justice Vinod Chandran led Division Bench upholds judgement by Justices Vipul Pancholi, Ramesh Chand Malviya

In Sanjay Kumar Sharma vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and Sanjay Kumar delivered a 34-page long judgement dated March 11, 2026 wherein it upheld the 49-page long judgement dated August 13, 2024 by Justices Vipul Pancholi and Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court in Saurav Sharma @ Saurav Kumar Sharma @ Saurabha Kumar Sharma @ Mukul Sharma & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2024). Soni Devi @ Swarnlata devi was the respondent no. 2. 

Justice Pancholi who had authored the judgement of the High Court concluded:"....the impugned judgment of conviction dated 16.08.2017 and order of sentence dated 22.08.2017 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Purnea in Sessions Trial No. 16 of 2017, C.I.S. No. 16 of 2017 (arising out of Banmankhi P.S. Case No. 188 of 2016) are quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them by the learned Trial Court." He observed:"we are of the view that we cannot simply rely upon the dying declarations given by the deceased Kamala Devi to the police as well as to the Executive Magistrate. 46. Thus, from the aforesaid deposition of the prosecution-witnesses, we are of the view that there are major contradictions, inconsistencies and improvements in the deposition of the prosecution-witnesses. 47. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, despite which the Trial Court has recorded the judgment of conviction and order of sentence which require to be quashed and set aside."

Supreme Court concluded:" 31. We have found that the investigation carried out is grossly deficient. The scene mahazar was not drawn up, no forensic examination was carried out at the scene of crime and no independent witnesses were arrayed. The causation of fire not investigated, the presence of the accused in the vicinity of the crime scene not established. The delay in registration of FIR despite the information having been received at the police station earlier, and the police personnel including the I.O having visited the scene of occurrence where a number of villagers were present was a serious lapse. The delay caused and the manner in which the FIS was recorded in the present case throws suspicion on the very conduct of the I.O. The dying declarations should have been recorded with more caution and when taken inside the hospital it should have ideally been recorded in the presence of a Doctor, whose certification also ought to have been obtained. The incriminating circumstances that come out in a trial are to be put to the accused in its entirety, a solemn duty enjoined both on the Court and the Prosecutor equally, failing which the entire prosecution may fail for that sole reason. We reiterate these aspects only to point out the lapses in investigation, which could have been avoided, to provide some guidance at least in the future." 

The Court added: "32. A couple, at the fag end of their lives were burnt to death and the cause, whether it’s a homicide or accidental death, eludes civil society and throws a pall of suspicion on their own son and his family, who will always carry the yoke of dishonour. The son and daughter-in-law were accused of parricide and were convicted by the trial court, later acquitted by the High Court, which acquittal is now affirmed by us. The trauma of arrest, incarceration and trial will always scar the couple and more so their children who were left orphaned, during the time when their parents were imprisoned. We cannot but caution the investigators and the Courts to strive to do better and follow accepted practises and procedural rules to the hilt, when lives are lost or taken and there is a possibility of false accusations being made, putting to peril the reputations of the living. 33. The appeal is dismissed."

Justice Chandran who authored the judgement observed: "2. Overzealous investigation is as fatal to prosecution as are the lethargic and the tardy. Framing a case on public perceptions and personal predilections ends up in a mess, often putting to peril an innocent and always letting free the perpetrator. Here, we have a case of gruesome death of a couple when their house was gutted in a fire, with the son and daughter-in-law accused of murder. The entire case is founded on motive; the ill-will the son harbored against the father for not having given him his due share in the ancestral property. The entire village was against the son and the mishap ended in an investigation where truth was sacrificed at the altar of perceived vengeance, ably assisted by the Investigating Officer’s selective but careless pursuits, derailing the entire prosecution."

In this case, on the early hours of November 23, 2016, a shanty in which a lawyer and his wife were residing was gutted in a fire, killing the old man immediately and his wife after two days in a hospital at Patna. It was alleged that the younger son and daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous enmity arising from land disputes, torched the hut with the intention to murder the parents. In defense, as is permissible, inconsistent stances were taken; of the neighbour, who was managing the properties of the deceased, and the elder son having colluded to murder the couple and an accidental fire, by reason of the cooking gas cylinder bursting. The Trial Court convicted the accused, while the High Court acquitted him. 

Supreme Court was faced with the divergent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court; that of the High Court by its order of acquittal having fortified the presumption of innocence available to the accused.
The judgement reads: "26. In the totality of the circumstances as coming out from the evidence, we are convinced that the High Court was perfectly correct in acquitting the accused. Rather than providing a complete chain of circumstances, with the connecting links establishing the guilt of the accused and bringing forth no hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, here the circumstances bring out a conscious effort to nail the accused with the crime of arson and pre- meditated murder.....30. We cannot but notice that none of the incriminating circumstances including that of the motive, the complaints filed by the deceased against A1, the various dying declarations and the medical evidence were put to the accused. We had, in the very same context in Criminal Appeal No.860 of 2026, Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Ors. dated 12.02.2026 (authored by one of us, Sanjay Kumar, J.) with respect to the scanty questioning under Section 313, Cr. PC without putting all the incriminating circumstances to the accused, held as under:-
“Needless to state, the afore stated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again. We may refer to the recent judgment of this Court on this point in “Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” (2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused."

Justice Chandran relied upon Court's decision in Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637. In the High Court, Ajay Kumar Thakur appearing for the appellants submits that none of the prosecution-witnesses are eye-witness to the incident in question and the case of the prosecution rests on so-called two
dying declarations given by the deceased. It is submitted that the informant. However, there is no endorsement of the doctor that the patient was conscious and was in a fit state of mind to give her statement. Similarly, though the 2nd dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, on the said dying declaration also no endorsement of the doctor was obtained. Learned counsel has referred to the deposition given by the prosecution-witnesses and thereafter contended that almost all the prosecution-witnesses, i.e. P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, have each put forward a different story with regard to the manner in which the incident in question took place. Learned counsel also submitted that though it is the case of the prosecution that the Executive Magistrate has also recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, there is no endorsement of the doctor even in the said dying declaration that patient was conscious and was in a fit state of mind to give her declaration. It is further submitted that there are two versions with regard to recording of the dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate. P.W. 8, Executive Magistrate stated in his deposition that the dying declaration was written by the Investigating Officer and thereafter he has signed the same, whereas P.W. 7 the Investigating Officer, has stated that the dying declaration was written by the Executive Magistrate himself in his own handwriting. submitted that both the dying declarations are verbatim the same and in both the dying declarations the injured has given the entire history of disputes with regard to the property between her two sons and how one son is keeping them well. Minute details are given in the dying declarations, which is unusual.

He also submitted that what was the medical condition of the injured/deceased at the time of giving the dying declaration before the concerned witnesses is not coming out from the record and which type of treatment has been given by the doctor is also not produced before the Court. The dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is also not in the question-answer form. At this stage, it is also pointed out from the record that, admittedly, the fardbeyan as well as the dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate were recorded in presence of the relatives. Thus, there are all chances of tutoring. The counsel, therefore, urged that this Court may not rely upon the so-called dying declaration given by the deceased. Hesubmitted that one of the prosecution-witnesses has stated that it was a foggy cold night and there was no source of identification of the accused outside or inside the house and therefore also it is difficult to believe the story put forward by the deceased in the so-called dying declarations that she had seen the accused setting the house on fire. Even otherwise, admittedly, none of the prosecution- witnesses have seen the accused at the place of occurrence or fleeing away from the place of occurrence around 1-1:30 in the night. He urged that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, they may be acquitted and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed against them may be quashed and set aside.

Ajay Thakur was assisted by Advocates, namely Ritwik Thakur, Vaishnavi Singh and Kiran Kumari, Advocate.  

The counsels for the parties had placed reliance upon the following decisions:
(i) Abhishek Sharma vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in AIR 2023 SC 5271;
(ii) Uttam vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 576;
(iii) Naresh Kumar vs. State of Delhi, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1641;
(iv) Sardar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (1954) 2 SCC 214;
(v) Jan Mohammad and Another vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1953) 1 SCC 5;
(vi) Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710;
(vii) Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 562;
(viii) P.V. Radhakrishna Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 443.
 
In Abhishek Sharma vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in AIR 2023 SC 5271, Supreme Court has laid down certain principles which the Court has to consider when dealing with a case involving multiple dying declarations. Para-9 of the judgment reads as under:-
“9. Having considered various pronouncements of this Court, the following principles emerge, for a Court to consider when dealing with a case involving multiple dying declarations;
9.1. The primary requirement for all dying declarations is that they should be voluntary and reliable and that such statements should be in a fit state of mind;
9.2. All dying declarations should be consistent. In other words, inconsistencies between such statements should be ‘material’ for its credibility to be shaken;
9.3. When inconsistencies are found between various dying declarations, other evidence available on record may be considered for the purposes of corroboration of the contents of dying declarations.
9.4. The statement treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in light of surrounding facts and circumstances.
9.5. Each declaration must be scrutinized on its own merits. The court has to examine upon which of the statement reliance can be placed in order for the case to proceed further.
9.6. When there are inconsistencies, the statement that has been recorded by a Magistrate or like higher officer can be relied on, subject to the indispensable qualities of truthfulness and being free of suspicion.
9.7. In the presence of inconsistencies, the medical fitness of the person making such declaration, at the
relevant time, assumes importance along with other factors such as the possibility of tutoring by relatives, etc.”

In Uttam vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 576, Supreme Court held:"14. In Paniben v. State of Gujarat [Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 403] , on examining the entire conspectus of the law on the principles governing dying declaration, this Court had
concluded thus : (SCC pp. 480-81, para 18)
“18. … (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376] )
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127] ; Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169] .)
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is
not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473] .)
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
(Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 264 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 426] )
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with
regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [Kake Singh v. State of M.P., 1981 Supp SCC 25 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 645] )
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 581] )
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 364] .)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar [Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar, 1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519] .)
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P., 1988 Supp SCC 152 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 342] )
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390 :1989 SCC (Cri) 585] .)”

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court

In Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 9-page long judgement dated March 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in applying different standards to persons who stand on an identical footing insofar as the nature of the allegations against them is concerned. Since the allegations against the present appellants and the sister-in-law are, in substance, the same, the reasoning that led the High Court to quash the proceedings against the sister-in-law ought equally to have led to the quashing of proceedings against the present appellants. The impugned order, to the extent that it declined to extend such relief to the appellants, cannot be sustained."

Supreme Court set aside the 3-page long order dated 8th August 2023 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court "to the extent that it refused to quash the criminal proceedings against the present appellants. Consequently, all proceedings arising out of L.N.M.U. P.S. Case No. 81 of 2022, registered under Sections 341, 323, 498A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, are hereby quashed insofar as the present appellants are concerned. 12. In the result, the present criminal appeal is allowed in the above terms."

"Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14":Supreme Court

In Anurag Krishna Sinha vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 37-page long judgement dated March 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"The impugned Act authorises the State to take over the Institute & Library in its entirety, dissolving existing legal arrangements and divesting long-standing rights, without any demonstrated necessity, objective criteria, or prior inquiry. The manner in which this power is exercised is excessive, unreasoned and disproportionate to the stated object of 'better management and development'. We are therefore satisfied that the Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India." 

Justice Vikram Nath authored the judgement. The judgement reads:"....the scheme of the Act permits deprivation of property without adherence to basic requirements of fairness and due process. The absence of any principled or meaningful framework for compensation underscores the arbitrary character of the legislative measure. While Article 300A permits deprivation of property by authority of law, such law must be fair, reasonable and non-confiscatory. The impugned Act fails to meet this standard. 52. In view of the above, the judgment and order dated 29th February 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.7940 of 2015 is set aside. The Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is declared unconstitutional and is accordingly struck down. 53. Accordingly, the Trust governing the Institute & Library, together with its rights of management and administration, shall stand restored to its pre-existing legal position prior to the enactment of the impugned Act. This shall not preclude the State Government from providing financial assistance, administrative support or regulatory oversight in accordance with law. 54. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

The Court appeal arose on i. Whether the Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ii. Whether the impugned Act effects compulsory acquisition and extinguishment of rights in a confiscatory manner, thereby offending Article 300A read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

The Court heard the appeal which challenged 37-page long judgment dated February 29, 2024 passed by Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court in Anurag Krishna Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2024), whereby the appellant’s writ petition was dismissed by the High Court while upholding the validity of the Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015. The respondent no. 2 was the Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar. The High Court's judgment was authored by Justice Chandran. 

Notably, the Institute & Library were established in 1924 by Sachichidanand Sinha, a distinguished public figure of Bihar, who served as the first President of the Constituent Assembly for an interim period. The Institute & Library was founded in memory of his wife, Radhika Sinha. For this purpose, Sachichidanand Sinha had addressed a letter to the then Governor of Bihar and Orissa, offering a sum of ₹50,000 from the sale proceeds of ancestral property belonging to Radhika Sinha. The offer was accepted, and the foundation stone was laid on March 28, 1922. The construction of the buildings for the Institute and Library was completed using the money.

Justice Chandran had concluded:"46. The vesting occurs of ‘the Institute & Library’ on the State Government for the purpose of better management and development of ‘the Institute & Library’. The objects of the Trust cannot be digressed from by the State Government nor is it intended to be, as is disclosed from the impugned enactment. Whatever rights, powers and duties that remained with the Trustees, in the management of ‘the Institute & Library’ as was available after Annexure-2 agreement was entered into, would also vest completely in the State Government by the impugned enactment. 47. We find absolutely no reason to entertain the writ petition and dismiss the same but hasten to add that the vesting does not absolve the State Government from carrying on the objects of the Trust; which obligation attaches itself to the Trust taken over by the State Government, intention of the original settlor. 48. The writ petition stands dismissed without any order on costs." His conclusion has been set aside and the Supreme Court declared the Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 to be unconstitutional, and has been accordingly struck down. 

Also read: Constitutionality of Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 remains sub judice

Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 is constitutionally valid: Patna High Court 

Patna High Court Legal Services Committee issues notice for National Lok Adalat

Registrar-cum-Secretary, Patna High Court Legal Services Committee has issued notice for National Lok Adalat. National Lok Adalats will be held on March 12 2026, May 9, 2026, September 12, 2026 and 12th December 2026 in terms of Letter No. F.No. L/34/2018/NALSA December 4, 2025 of National Legal Services Authority. Schedule for National Lok Adalat to be held in the year 2026 is as under:- 
1st National Lok Adalat March 14, 2026,
2nd National Lok Adalat May 9, 2026
3rd National Lok Adalat September 12, 2026
4th National Lok Adalat December 12, 2026 

Following types of cases (pre-litigation and pending) may be taken up for settlement in the aforesaid National Lok Adalat:- 
a. Pre-litigation: All type of Civil and Compoundable Criminal cases, as may be permissible under the Act/Regulations may be taken up. The data and record of registration of cases be maintained by DLSA/HCLSC or TLSC under the directions of SLSA. The SLSA will make all endeavors to promote registration of pre-litigation cases and services of notices through digital platforms/online mode to ease pressure on conventional system. 

b. Pending in the Courts: All type of civil and compoundable criminal cases including following:
i. Criminal Compoundable Offences;
ii. Plea Bargaining Cases,
iii. NI Act cases under Section 138,
iv. Money Recovery cases;
v. Motor Accident Claim cases;
vi. Compoundable Traffic Challans,
vii. Labour dispute cases;
viii. Disputes related to Public Utility services such as Electricity & Water Bills cases etc. (excluding non-compoundable),
ix. Matrimonial disputes (except divorce)/Family disputes, 
x. Land Acquisition cases;
xi. Service matters including pension cases;
xii. Revenue and other ancillary matter, pending High Court, district Courts and state/district/taluka authorities.
xiii. IPR matter/Consumer matters/ also other matters pending before any other quasi-judicial authority
xiv. Other civil cases (rent, easmentary rights, injunction suits, specific performance suits etc.).

NALSA has been constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 to provide free Legal Services to the weaker sections of the society and to organize Lok Adalats for amicable settlement of disputes. Justice Surya Kant, The Chief Justice of India is the Patron-in-Chief, NALSA. Justice Vikram Nath, Judge of the Supreme Court of India is the Executive Chairman of NALSA. NALSA is housed at Supreme Court of India, Tilak Marg, New Delhi. The NALSA Centre for Citizen Services is set up at Jaisalmer House, Man Singh Road, New Delhi. It is working during office hours on all working days. 

In every State, State Legal Services Authority has been constituted to give effect to the policies and directions of the NALSA and to give free legal services assistance to the people and conduct Lok Adalats in the State. The State Legal Services Authority is headed by the Chief Justice of the respective High Court who is the Patron-in-Chief of the State Legal Services Authority. The Seniormost Judge of the High Court is nominated as Executive Chairman, SLSA. In every District, District Legal Services Authority has been constituted to implement Legal Services Programmes in the District. The District Legal Services Authority is situated in the District Courts Complex in every District and chaired by the District Judge of the respective District. A Judicial Officer of Civil Judge Cadre is appointed as Secretary on full time basis.

Article 39A of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. Articles 14 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India also make it obligatory for the State to ensure equality before law and a legal system which promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity to all. Legal aid strives to ensure that constitutional pledge is fulfilled in its letter and spirit and equal justice is made available to the poor, downtrodden and weaker sections of the society.

The earliest Legal Aid movement appears to be of the year 1851 when some enactment was introduced in France for providing legal assistance to the indigent. In Britain, the history of the organised efforts on the part of the State to provide legal services to the poor and needy dates back to 1944, when Lord Chancellor, Viscount Simon appointed Rushcliffe Committee to enquire about the facilities existing in England and Wales for giving legal advice to the poor and to make recommendations as appear to be desirable for ensuring that persons in need of legal advice are provided the same by the State. Since 1952, the Govt. of India also started addressing to the question of legal aid for the poor in various conferences of Law Ministers and Law Commissions. In 1960, some guidelines were drawn by the Govt. for legal aid schemes. In different states legal aid schemes were floated through Legal Aid Boards, Societies and Law Departments. In 1980, a Committee at the National Level was constituted to oversee and supervise legal aid programmes throughout the country under the Chairmanship of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India. This Committee came to be known as CILAS (Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes) and started monitoring legal aid activities throughout the country. The introduction of Lok Adalats added a new chapter to the justice dispensation system of this country and succeeded in providing a supplementary forum to the litigants for conciliatory settlement of their disputes. In 1987, Legal Services Authorities Act was enacted to give a statutory base to legal aid programmes throughout the country on a uniform pattern and come into force on 9th November, 1995 after certain amendments were introduced therein by the Amendment Act of 1994. Justice R.N. Mishra the then Chief Justice of India played a key role in the enforcement of the Act.

With the enforcement of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 on November 9, 1995, the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) was constituted, and Justice K. Ramaswamy, Judge, Supreme Court of India was appointed as its first Executive Chairman. Upon assuming office, His Lordship promptly initiated steps to operationalize the Authority. R.C Chopra The first Member Secretary of NALSA was appointed in December 1997, followed by the induction of other officers and staff in January 1998. By February 1998, the office of the NALSA became fully functional. 

Criteria for giving legal services.– Every person who has to file or defend a case shall be entitled to legal services under this Act if that person is –

1. a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
2. a victim of trafficking in human beings or begar as referred to in Article 23 of the Constitution;
3. a woman or a child;
4. a mentally ill or otherwise disabled person;
5. a person under circumstances of undeserved want such as being a victim of a mass disaster, ethnic violence, caste atrocity, flood, drought, earthquake or industrial disaster; or
6. an industrial workman; or
7. in custody, including custody in a protective home within the meaning of clause (g) of section 2 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (104 of 1956); or in a juvenile home within the meaning of clause (j) of section 2 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (53 of 1986) or in a psychiatric hospital or psychiatric nursing home within the meaning of clause (g) of section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987); or
8. in receipt of annual income less than rupees nine thousand or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by the State Govt., if the case is before a court other than the Supreme Court, and less than rupees twelve thousand or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by the Central Govt., if the case is before the Supreme Court.”
   (Rules have already been amended to enhance this income ceiling)(Income wiling limits of various states is provided in Legal Aid heading further).

According to section 2(1) (a) of the Act, legal aid can be provided to a person for a ‘case’ which includes a suit or any proceeding before a court. Section 2(1) (aaa) defines the ‘court’ as a civil, criminal or revenue court and includes any tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As per section 2(1)(c) ‘legal service’ includes the rendering of any service in the conduct of any case or other legal proceeding before any court or other authority or tribunal and the giving of advice on any legal matter. Legal Services Authorities after examining the eligibility criteria of an applicant and the existence of a prima facie case in his favour provide him counsel at State expense, pay the required Court Fee in the matter and bear all incidental expenses in connection with the case. The person to whom legal aid is provided is not called upon to spend anything on the litigation once it is supported by a Legal Services Authority.

Justice Partha Sarthy finds BIADA to be a wrongdoer as an employer, orders payment of full back wages for compulsorily retired period

In Mrityunjai Prasad Singh vs.The Chairman, Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority, Patna & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgement dated March 10, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "16....the Court holds that the petitioner is entitled for full back wages for the period that he remained compulsorily retired ie from October 2007 to 19.6.2009. 17. The respondents are directed to pay the difference of arrears of salary for the period from October 2007 to 19.6.2009 to the petitioner after deducting the subsistence allowance and/or any other amount already paid. The respondents shall pay the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 18. The writ application stands allowed." 

Justice Sarthy drew on Supreme Court's decision in Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others; (2013) 10 SCC 324. Justice Sarthy recorded:"13. In the opinion of the Court, the proceedings were in gross violation of the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice and thus the order of punishment was set aside by this Court. 14. In view of the facts and circumstances stated herein above, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) would be fully applicable to the case of the petitioner." 

In Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the Court's judgement reads:“38.5. The cases in which the competent court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages.”  

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the order dated February 18, 2013 passed by the Chairman, Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority, Patna in Appeal No. 03/2012, whereby he disposed of the appeal preferred by the Petitioner against the order of punishment of censure upon the Petitioner without any interference in the order of punishment, while admitting that the another employee should have been proceeded against for the charges levelled against the Petitioner, and the claim of the Petitioner for payment of back wages for the period he remained compulsorily retired in between October, 2007 to 19-06-2009 was rejected. He also prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the order contained in Memo No. 361 dated January 20, 2012 issued by under the signature of the Secretary, BIADA whereby it communicated that the review petition preferred by the appellant against the order of punishment contained in Memo No. 4092 dated July 28, 07-2011 has been decided to be rejected. He further prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the order contained in Memo No. 4092 dated July 28, 2011 passed by the Managing Director, BIADA whereby the appellant was held guilty of charge No. 11 in the memo of charge and he has been awarded a punishment of censure to be entered in his A.C.R. in the period of 2007-2009. Further, it was held that the appellant will not be entitled for anything except the subsistence allowance for the period he remained under suspension. He sought a direction to the respondent authorities to pay the back wages to the Petitioner for the period he remained under compulsory retirement from October, 2007 to June 19, 2009 and for payment of entire salary for the period the Petitioner remained under suspension. He also sought necessary direction to the respondent authorities to pay the back wages to the Petitioner along with arrears of Dearness Allowance as admissible to the Petitioner. 

The case was that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Development Officer (Chemical) on June 26, 1978 in the erstwhile Darbhanga Industrial Area Development Authority. With the merger of the three Industrial Area Development Authorities of Bihar in the year 2003, Bihar Industrial Area Development (BIADA) was formed and the petitioner became an employee of BIADA. The petitioner was proceeded against in a departmental proceeding and by order dated September 29, 2007, 5 out of the 13 charges levelled against him having been proved in the enquiry, an order of punishment was passed compulsorily retiring him w.e.f. September 30, 2007. The order of punishment of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was challenged by him by filing CWJC no.16950 of 2007. The case was heard along with the batch of applications and by order dated May 5, 2009 passed in CWJC no.11196 of 2007 (Ram Pravesh Singh vs. BIADA) and analogous cases, the impugned orders in each of the writ applications whether of termination or compulsory retirement were set aside and the petitioners directed to be reinstated. The writ applications was allowed, on the petitioners pressing for back wages, the Single Judge observed that if the petitioner prefers an application for back wages, the authorities were required to decide the same in accordance with the settled principles for grant of back wages, by a reasoned and speaking order after due opportunity to the petitioner within a maximum period of eight weeks. 

The petitioner filed an application for grant of back wages before the respondent authorities. The joining of the petitioner was accepted and the petitioner was once again placed under suspension on June 30, 2009. In the departmental proceeding that followed, by order dated July 28, 2011, an order of punishment of censure for the period 2007-2009 was given and it was also ordered that for the period of suspension, no other amount except for the subsistence allowance would be payable, however, the period of suspension shall be counted for the purpose of calculation of gratuity and other post retiral dues. The review preferred by the petitioner was rejected by order dated January 20, 2012 and also the appeal preferred by him was dismissed by order dated February 18, 2013 not interfering with the order of punishment. The petitioner superannuated on January 31, 2012. 

Notably, the first order of compulsory retirement was set aside by order dated May 5, 2009 on the ground that in the departmental proceeding neither a Presenting Officer was appointed nor any oral or documentary evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution nor was any opportunity to cross-examine given to the petitioner. 

The order of punishment of compulsory retirement w.e.f. September 30, 2007 was set aside by the High Court by its order dated May 5, 2009 passed in CWJC no.16950 of 2007 and consequent thereto, the petitioner was reinstated in service. There was a logical compulsion for the respondents to pay the petitioner the back wages for the period he remained compulsorily retired i.e. from October 2007 to June 19, 2009. 

The claim that “the Supreme Court, in a significant decision in Civil Writ Petition No. 2490 and Case No. 8222/2024, has directed that the recovery period for pension commutation for central government employees will now be 10 years and 8 months (128 months) instead of 15 years“ does not appear to be correct.  

The case numbers cited in the claim, i.e., CWP 2490/2024 and 8222/2024, refer to petitions filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, not the Supreme Court.  These cases involved requests for temporary (interim) stays (here, here) and were primarily filed by state government pensioners in Punjab and Haryana. They did not lead to any nationwide change in pension rules or reduce the commutation recovery period. From this, it can be noted that the Gazette notification graphic accompanying the fake post is unrelated to pension commutation.

Later, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in (CWP 9426/2023) Shila Devi & Others vs State of Punjab dismissed 807 petitions challenging the Punjab state pension rules. In several related matters, the courts either dismissed the petitions or upheld the existing 15-year commutation recovery rule.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Chandigarh, dismissed 106 cases challenging the pension commutation recovery rules reaffirmed the 15 years, citing decisions of the Supreme Court. The Telangana High Court has reaffirmed it in July 2025.   

There is no Supreme Court judgment directing that the pension commutation recovery or restoration period for Central Government employees be reduced to 10 years and 8 months (128 months). The cited cases CWP 2490/2024 and 8222/2024 relate to petitions filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, not the Supreme Court. 

The Gazette notification dated December 12, 2025 from the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) does not appear relevant. It pertains to the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (Exits and Withdrawals under the National Pension System) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025.

The Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 continue to apply, which provide for restoration of full pension only after 15 years from the date of commutation.

The Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, stipulates the restoration of full pension after 15 years. Official government portals (here, here) confirm restoration after 15 years. As per CCS Rules, 1981 “The commuted amount of pension shall be restored on completion of fifteen years from the date the reduction of pension on account of commutation becomes operative in accordance with rule 6: Provided that when the commutation amount was paid on more than one occasion on account of upward revision of pension, the respective commuted amount of pension shall be restored on completion of fifteen years from the respective date(s).”

Judgement by High Court's 3-Judge Bench challenged in Supreme Court

 

In Ravi Shankar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary (2025), Patna High Court's 3-Judge Bench of  Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Arun Kumar Jha delivered a 60-page judgement, wherein it concluded: "84. Since we have heard the writ petitions with the consent of the parties for final disposal, these writ applications being devoid of merit are being dismissed. The petitioners are not entitled for any relief. 85. The parties shall bear their respective costs." The case has reached Supreme Court and is titled as Arvind Kumar & Ors vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. It is before the Court's Division Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti. It was heard on February 27, 2026 and a 2-page long order was passed. It has been tagged with Vikash Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.  

The three other three respondents in the High Court were: Principal Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of Bihar, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar and District Magistrate, Nawadah. It was heard along with Sanjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar & Ors., Mateen Akhter vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Kishanganj & Ors. and Vijendra Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through its Principal Secretary of the Finance Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. and Nagendra Prasad Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar & Ors.