Sunday, October 25, 2026

Paper entitled “Employment and Dignity Under Beneficial Owners of Information, Automatic Identification and Surveillance Technology” to be presented at Nalanda University

A paper entitled “Employment and Dignity Under Beneficial Owners of Information, Automatic Identification and Surveillance Technology” to be presented at Nalanda University during 25th Annual Conference of Indian Association of Social Science Institutions which commences on October 25.

The paper entitled “Employment and Dignity Under Beneficial Owners of Information, Automatic Identification and Surveillance Technology” will be presented at the 25th Annual Conference of the Indian Association of Social Science Institutions (IASSI) to be held at Nalanda University, Rajgir, during 25-28 October 2026. The abstract of the paper has been published in the book of abstracts published at the university by IASSI. The paper authored by Dr. Gopal Krishna, Advocate, Patna High Court captures the six epoch making phases of the Information Technology (IT), automatic identification and surveillance industry in India and their ramifications for the employment and dignity. It will be presented during the technical session on Digital Futures: Technology, Society and Well-Being in a Changing World. 

The paper maps these phases and the emergence of the IT-era in India. Amid resistance from the trade unions who were worried about the adverse impact of IT industry on employment in the mid 1960s, the first began during 1955-1970, with the establishment of the Department of Electronics was established and the Electronics Corporation of India Limited. Today, there is a full fledged Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology which functioning with an objective to rewrite the India’s landscape with e-government, e-industry, e-innovation, e-learning, e-security, e-inclusion, e-diplomacy and internet governance. It is promoting internet, IT, IT enabled services, electronic-biometric identification and semiconductor devices and laboratories.

In the second phase, during 1970-1984, the government set up a committee in 1969 to examine the impact of automation on employment ahead of the establishment of the first software export zone, Santacruz Electronics Export Processing Zone in Mumbai in the 1970s. 

In the third phase, during 1984-1991, the New Computer Policy, Software Policy and Electronic Policy was adopted and Centre for Development of Telematics laid the foundations for the growth of IT industry in the country. Indian Railways adopted computerized ticket reservation system while studying concerns regarding possible negative impact of the IT policy on the structure of employment.

In the fourth phase, during 1991-1998, the Department of Electronics established Software Technology Parks (STPs) in 1991 with satellite communication links which enabled Indian software companies to develop software applications on their international clients’ computers from India.

In the fifth phase, during 1998-2005, the National Task Force on Information Technology and Software Development was constituted, Software Technology Parks of India established in different cities and the Information Technology Act, 2000, the first e-commerce law was enacted in pursuance of the resolution on United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce by UN General Assembly in January 1997 for electronic transactions, e-commerce and e-governance. In this phase, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) replaced ballot papers for elections since the general elections of 2004. 

In the sixth phase, during 2005-2024, administrative approval was provided for Unique Identification of all the residents of India, which is based on biometric “technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as 'fingerprints', 'eye retinas and irises', 'voice patterns', "facial patterns', 'hand measurements' and 'DNA' for authentication and automation purposes in the face of concerns regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI) replacing human workers with robot workers. The legitimate uses of computers in education, science, research, statistics and defence as also in commercial and industrial establishments has been normalized and naturalized in this phase.

The paper underlines that responding to the need for legal protection of workers, the four labour codes- Code on Wages, Social Security Code, Industrial Relations Code and the Occupational Safety Code-have been enacted in this very phase. Among other aspects, the paper infers that recognition of gig workers and platform workers as a separate class of workers by Social Security Code of 2022 paves the way for ensuring labour rights, social security, and welfare programmes for platform workers.It can shift towards citizens, workers and employee and make beneficial owners of technologies subservient to the democratic consent of the citizens.

The opening address will be by Professor Sachin Chaturvedi, Chairperson, IASSI and Vice-Chancellor, Nalanda University. Prof. Dhananjay Singh, Member-Secretary, Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi. Prof. S. Mahendra Dev Chairman, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM) will deliver the inaugural lecture. Shivkumar Kalyanaraman, Chief Executive Officer, Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF), Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India will deliver the keynote address on Digital Futures: Technology, Society and Well-Being in a Changing World. S. Gurumurthy, Chairman, Vivekananda International Foundation and Editor, Thuglak will address the Special Panel on Indian Methodologies for Issues Before Social Sciences. 


Saturday, October 24, 2026

Justice Subramonium Prasad of Delhi High Court's attention drawn towards Supreme Court's verdict in Madhu Limaye vs. Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) in Neha Bora case

In Neha vs. The State NCT of Delhi 2026 DHC 9436, Justice Subramonium Prasad of Delhi High Court delivered a 46-page long judgement dated October 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"50. In the opinion of this Court, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye (Supra) have not been violated at this stage. The SEM shall ensure that the principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court and the provisions of Chapter IX of the BNSS are not given a go by at later stages of the proceedings against the Petitioner also. 51. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the Impugned Notice meets the requirements of a show cause notice under Chapter IX of the BNSS. However, it is always open to the Petitioner to raise a challenge at an appropriate stage. 52. This Court, however, deems it fit to state that the SEM must necessarily keep in mind the import of Section 135 of the BNSS and leaves it open for the SEM to decide on the insistence of a bond at the first instance, as the provision provides for furnishing a bond only if there is an apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance after the commencement and before the completion of the enquiry. Needless to state, at the time of passing an order under Section 135(3) of the BNSS, the SEM will take into account the safeguards given by the five Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye (Supra), followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Aldanish Rein (Supra). 53. It is further needless to state that there will be several opportunities to the Petitioner to take recourse to the remedies under law at different stages of enquiry, including after passing of the final order upon conclusion of the enquiry. 54. It is made clear that all the observations in this Judgment are only limited to the purport of interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the stage of issuance of a show cause notice. Undoubtedly, the SEM would apply his own mind to the material/information placed before him and only then, arrive at a conclusion regarding furnishing of a personal bond or bail bond. 55. With these observations, the Writ Petition is dismissed, along with pending Application(s), if any."

Notably, on October 19, 2026, the Neha Bora, the petitioner had prayed for exemption from personal appearance on health grounds. The petitioner was called on October 24, 2026 at 02:00 P.M to appear before the SEM. 

Neha appeared before the special executive magistrate (SEM) at Mandir Marg Police Station on October 24. In compliance with the High court's directions, her counsel was provided the documents that formed the basis of the police allegation that there was a likelihood of breach of peace and gave her time to reply by October 29. 

Earlier, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, senior counsel for the petitioner appaered before the High Court and placed reliance on Paragraph 42 and 43 of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court's 5-Judge Constitution Bench in Madhu Limaye vs. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746. It reads:"“42. In our opinion the words of the section are quite clear. As said by Straight J. in Emperor v. Babua, [ILR 6 All 132] the order under Section 112 is on hearsay but the inquiry under Section 117 is to ascertain the truth of the necessary information. Sub-section (1) contemplates an immediate inquiry into the truth of the information. It is pending the completion of the inquiry that an interim bond can be asked for if immediate measures are necessary, and in default it is necessary to put the person in custody. Therefore, as the liberty of a person is involved, and that person is being proceeded against on information and suspicion, it is necessary to put a strict construction upon the powers of Magistrate. The facts must be of definite character. In Nafar Chandra Pal v. King Emperor [28 CWR 23] there was only a petition and a report and these were not found sufficient material. In some of the cases before us no effort was made by the Magistrate to inquire the truth of the allegations. The Magistrate adjourned the case from day to day and yet asked for an interim bond. This makes the proceedings entirely one-sided. It cannot be described as an inquiry within an inquiry as has been said in some cases. Some inquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered. We, therefore, approve of those cases in which it has been laid down that some inquiry should be made before action is taken to ask for an interim bond or placing the person in custody in default. In an old case reported in A.D. Dunne v. Hemchandra, [(1869) 12 WR (Cr) 60] a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court went into the matter. The case arose before the present Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, there was no provision for an interim bond. But what Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J., said applies to the changed law also not only with regard to the ultimate order but also to the interim order for a bond. The section even as it is drafted today is hedged in with proper safeguards and it would be moving too far away from the guarantee of freedom, if the view were allowed to prevail that without any inquiry into the truth of the information sufficient to make out a prima facie case a person is to be put in jeopardy of detention. A definite finding is required that immediate steps are necessary. The order must be one which can be made into a final order unless something to the contrary is established. Therefore it is not open to a Magistrate to adjourn the case and in the interval to send a person to jail if he fails to furnish a bond. If this were the law a bond could always be insisted upon before even the inquiry began and that is neither the sense of the law nor the wording or arrangement of the sections already noticed. 
43. The power which is conferred under this Chapter is distinguished from the power of  detention by executive action under Article 22 of the Constitution. Although the order to execute a bond, issued before an offence is committed, has the appearance of an administrative order, in reality it is judicial in character. Primarily the provision enables the Magistrate to require the execution of a bond and not to detain the person. Detention results only on default of execution of such bond. It is, therefore, not apposite to characterise the provision as a law for detention contemplated by Article 22. The safeguards are therefore different. The person sought to he bound over has rights which the trial of summons case confers on an accused. The order is also capable of being questioned in superior courts. For this reason, at every step the law requires the Magistrate to state his reasons in writing. It would make his action purely administrative if he were to pass the order for an interim bond without entering upon the inquiry and at least prima facie inquiring into the truth of the information on which the order calling upon the person to show cause is based. Neither the scheme of the chapter nor the scheme of Section 117 can bear such an interpretation. We accordingly, hold in the case of Madhu Limaye (Writ Petition 307 of 1970 — Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti that as the case was simply adjourned from time to time and there was no inquiry before remanding him to custody his detention was illegal. We may now briefly notice the remaining sections of the Chapter.”

The senior counsel also relied on the judgments passed by Delhi High Court in Aldanish Rein vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12207, Asha Pant vs. State, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 367, Vivek Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 417 and Ramavtar vs. State, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8027, the judgment passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Medha Patkar vs. State of M.P., 2007 SCC OnLine MP 591. 

The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned notice does not meet the essential requirements prescribed by law under Section 126 of the BNSS. He stated that the Impugned Notice is nothing but a mere mechanical reproduction of the ingredients of the said provision. While issuing a notice under Section 126 of the BNSS, it was imperative on the part of the SEM to enquire into the material and satisfy himself that the information received by him would lead to an apprehension of breach of peace and disturb public tranquillity. He stated that without arriving at an independent opinion by conducting an enquiry on his own, the impugned notice could not have been issued by the SEM. Therefore, he submitted that without arriving at an independent opinion, neither an order under Section 130 no can a notice under Section 126 of the BNSS be issued. He drew the attention of this Court to the kalandara dated October 17, 2026, which according to him is the basis of the impugned notice, to submit that a notice under Section 126/130 of the BNSS cannot be issued only on the basis of a kalandara. He also stated that the kalandara indicates that the impugned notice was issued on the directions of “senior officers,” meaning thereby, that the impugned notice was issued as a performance of a command and not on the basis of an independent opinion arrived at by the SEM. He contended that the Order dated October 17, 2026 passed by the SEM also indicated that only the kalandara was submitted by SI Vaishali Tushir, the Investigating Officer (SI Vaishali Tushir) and on the inspection of the kalandara, the impugned notice was issued, which also was an indicator that without there being any enquiry as mandated at every stage of the proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS, the impugned notice was issued. The senior counsel drew the High Court's attention to the order dated August 23, 2026 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division, Parliament Street, New Delhi, to contend that Mandi House, where the protest was being called for by the Petitioner, did not fall in the area in which prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS had been passed, meaning thereby, that there was no restriction on any kind of protest to be carried out in that area.  The senior counsel submitted that a reading of the impugned notice indicated that the "information" on which basis the same was issued by the SEM was only hearsay material, which was not sufficient to initiate proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS. He also stated that Neha, the petitioner had never urged people to protest in the Central Park, Connaught Place, where the protest was called for by another group. He also states that staging a peaceful protest cannot lead to breach of peace and therefore, the entire basis of the proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS initiated by the SEM was unsustainable. He submitted that the impugned notice did not conform to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and other Courts. 

The High Court recorded that the petitioner had sought quashing of the Notice dated October 17, 2026 (the impugned notice) issued by the Special Executive Magistrate (SEM), New Delhi District, New Delhi, under Sections 126 and 130 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 to show cause as to why the Petitioner be not required to execute a personal bond in the sum of Rs.10,000/- each with one surety in the like amount of Rs.10,000/- under Section 135(3) of the BNSS for keeping peace for a period of enquiry. 

The impugned notice reads:-“NOTICE UNDER SECTION 126/130 BNSS Whereas it has been made to appear to me by a credible information received from SHO/B.K. Road, New Delhi through SI Vaishali Tushir that you, Neha Bora D/o Hoshiyar Singh R/o H. No. 25, Meena Bagh, Maulana Azad Road, Delhi, created nuisance by shouting loudly in protest at round about Mandi House and you have already been involved in repeated protest related activity in and around Jantar Mantra, New Delhi, despite prohibitory orders 163 BNSS. You instigated people to participate in unauthorized demonstration at Central Park, Connaught Place which is not a designated protest site and also hoist the national flag without obtaining valid permission. There is every likelihood of apprehension of breach of public peace and tranquility within the jurisdiction of this court. That you are likely to commit a breach of peace or to do a wrongful act which may probably converted in a breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility within the local limits and jurisdiction of this court. You may take law in your hands and likely to do a wrongful act which may cause breach of peace and public tranquility in the area. I am satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings against you u/s 126/169 BNSS. I, MAHESH KUMAR MEENA, Special Executive Magistrate, New Delhi, Distt. New Delhi hereby requires you to attend in person (or with a duly authorized agent) in my court on 19.10.2026 at 2.00 P.M to show cause as to why you may not be required to execute a Personal Bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- each with one surety in the like amount of Rs. 10,000/- U/S 135 (3) BNSS for keeping peace for a period of enquiry.” 

"It is a truism that the penal law of a country will tend to change according to the view of the wielders of its politica' power. Accordingly change of governments or change in the views of the self-same Government will be reflected both in the recognition of an act as an offence and in the severity of the punishment for the same offence." This relationship is noted by Abul Hasanat, Crime and Criminal Justice (1939), pp. 323-4. The relative conception of crime has been dealt with in S.S. Glueck's Crime and Justice (1936). When the views held by one Government and its successor differ fundamentally a corresponding change can be expected in the law of crimes and in the administration of criminal laws. Such a fundamental change took place between 1773 and 1861 in India. For the first few years of its administration the East India Company did not interfere with the criminal law of the country and although in 1772, during the administration of Warren Hastings, the Company for the first time interfered, and although henceforth till 1861, from time to time, the British Government altered the law, yet up to 1862, when the Indian Penal Code came into operation, the previous law was in force. 

With regard to "Good Behaviour Bond", it may recalled that in 1818, the power of the Court of Circuit to require security for good behaviour, and in default, to detain in jail, was restricted to persons who might have been acquitted on a "specific charge", but who would appear to be of notoriously bad or dangerous character from the evidence on the proceedings. In this respect, the power of the Magistrate and that of the courts of circuit was normally limited to one year and three years respectively, although in the case of a prisoner being found to be a robber, or of dangerous character, the Court of Circuit was declared competent to order confinement 'indefinitely', in default of security. In the latter case, however, the court was to examine the position again after 3 years, and was to release the prisoner, if considered safe. Next year, this provision was extended to other notorious robbers, of whatever denomination, being of desperate or dangerous character, whom it would be unsafe to set at liberty without substantial security for their future good behaviour, 

Revision application before Additional Collector against order in appeal passed by DCLR, order passed by Additional Collector in revision can be challenged before Bihar Land Tribunal

The revision before the Additional Collector against the order in appeal passed by the DCLR can be filed under Section 12 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Rules, 2012. Section 12 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Rules, 2012 reads:-"12. Revision.(1) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, may file an application for revision in the Court of Collector/ Additional Collector of the District concerned within thirty (30) days from the date of the order. (2) The Collector/ Additional Collector concerned may condone the delay in filing of the application for revision provided he is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons for the delay. (3) As soon as the application for revision is filed, the Collector/ Additional Collector shall call for the case-record from the Land Reforms Deputy Collector concerned. or the Circle Officer concerned in whose custody the case-record lies. (4) The Collector/Additional Collector shall issue notice to all parties concerned with the case, directing them to appear either in person or through their authorized representatives on the date, time and place fixed for the hearing of the case. (5) In case any of the parties does not appear even after a reasonable opportunity to appear and being heard has been given, the Collector/Additional Collector may dispose off the case ex-parte on the basis of the available records. (6) The time limit for the disposal of the mutation revision application shall be of thirty (30) working days from the date of the filing of such application. (7) After the disposal of the mutation revision application, the Collector/ Additional Collector shall return the case- record to the Circle Officer concerned for implementation of his order. (8) On receipt of the Case-record, the Circle Officer shall issue correction slip in the manner as provided in rule-9. (9) On receipt of the correction slip, the Karmachari shall alter the entries in the revenue records concerned in the manner as provided in rule-10." 

An appeal-Mutation Appeal-can be filed before the Collector against the order passed by the Additional Collector in Mutation Revision Case.  The appeal is filed before the Collector under Section 7 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Act, 2011 read with Rule 14 of the Bihar Land Mutation Rules, 2012. The Collector cannot exercise the power of appeal against an order of revision. The Collector does not have the power to entertain an appeal against the order of the Additional Collector passed in Revision under Section 12 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Rules, 2012. The order passed by the Additional Collector in revision can be challenged before the Bihar Land Tribunal (BLT) constituted under under Chapter XIII of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 

BLT is constituted to address the land related issues of raiyats of state. Disputes relating to land pending before different forums in the State of Bihar are huge in number and the present machinery including Civil Court is over burdened because of pendency of huge number of disputes relating to land. Right, title and possession over land is regulated under various land laws operating in the State of Bihar. The different forums under different land laws have been provided for adjudication of disputes. The State government is faced with complexities arising out of the multiplicity of adjudicating machinery and delay in the settlement of disputes. The State government strives to ensure speedy disposal of disputes under various land laws. In the absence of a common adjudicatory body, the people of the State are faced with undue hardship in getting their grievances redressed. 

The Constitution of India has conferred jurisdiction under Article 323B on appropriate legislature, to provide for adjudication or trial by Tribunals, by law, of any dispute, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws. In larger public interest and in the interest of the people of the State, it is deemed expedient to create a consolidated forum for adjudication of all disputes appertaining to land in the State of Bihar. With a view to provide a common and uniform forum for adjudication of disputes, it is necessary to create a Tribunal at the highest level in the hierarchy.

The Tribunal has the power to entertain any application against the final order passed by the Appropriate Authorities under the Acts/Manuals, mentioned below, within 90 days of such an order provided no other forum of appeal or revision against the order passed is provided in that Act/ Manuals:
The function of this department includes

    The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961
    The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950
    The Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885
    The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act,1956
    The Bihar Tenants' Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973
    The Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954
    The Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947
    The Bihar Government Estates Manual, 1953
    The Bihar Settlement Manual.
    Bihar Land Disputes Resolution Act,2009
    Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act ,2001
    Bihar Land Mutation Act,2011

 

Cases Involving Recovery Of Cough Syrup containing Codeine must be filed under Drugs & Cosmetics Act, not under NDPS Act:Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey

In Bharat Kumar vs. The State Of Bihar (Case No.: Criminal Miscellaneous No.60727 of 2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court observed:“Before parting, it is very strange that the cases where cough syrups containing codeine are recovered, the police is invariably filing cases under N.D.P.S. Act whereas in view of the notification of Central Government (supra) concentration of codeine being less than 2.5 %, the quantity does not come under the ambit of contraband. Cough syrup containing codeine is only a Schedule-H drug for which, the shopkeeper has to maintain register and he must be a licensed one. Such type of cases should be filed under Drugs and Cosmetic Act. It is only the violation of Drugs and Cosmetic Act whereas, police is invariably misusing the procedure.” The drug in question was not a narcotic drug and there was no jurisdictional basis for the case. The Court was considering a bail application of an accused booked in a case registered under Sections 21(c), 8(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.

Justice Pandey directed the petitioner to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs 10,000 with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the Special Judge, NDPS Act, Khagaria. He concluded tby observing that cases of cough syrup containing codeine should be filed under Drugs and Cosmetic Act.

Notably, uder Notification No. S.O. 826(E) dated November 14, 1985 under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and Rules, 1985 the preparations are exempted as manufactured drugs provided the preparations contained the narcotic drugs to the extent permitted in respect of codeine under Entry No. 35. The Cough Linctur RJT-SCEN Syrup containing codeine which wa recovered and the concentration of the codeine in this drug was less than 2.5% as provided in the notification. It was claimed to be in contravention of Drugs and Cosmetics Act.


Contraband not recovered from appellant, "no useful purpose served in carrying out a prosecution against the appellant": Supreme Court

In Sanjana Bhaskaran vs. State of Telangana & Anr. (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 5-page long order dated October 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"6. Trite is the principle that no confession can be relied on. The contraband also having not been recovered from the appellant, we are of the opinion that there would be no useful purpose served in carrying out a prosecution against the appellant. We are of the opinion that the Police should be more sensitive in such matters, especially since the appellant, in one way, is a victim being last in the chain of supply. Prosecuting such victims can have a spiralling effect and incarceration pending trial, can lead to more disastrous consequences of the victim joining the supply chain, by reason only of associations developed in prisons. Curbing availability and breaking the supply chain shall be the focus and not merely punishing the user, who is actually the victim....8. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, her arraignment in the Sessions Case stands quashed. We are not persuaded to subject the appellant to a de-addiction process, especially since we find no complicity insofar as the appellant is concerned with respect to the allegations raised of conscious possession of narcotics. 9. The appeal stands allowed."

The appellant was the 4th accused in a case registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the allegation was that she had received a packet from the co-accused; two of whom were apprehended along with her, and the packet contained dried leaves and buds with strong odour, which was later identified as marijuana. The appellant was subjected to a medical test, wherein she was detected to have used marijuana. The alleged sellers of marijuana near the educational institution were apprehended with much more quantity of marijuana, which was kept in the Scooty on which they came to the spot, from where they were apprehended. The co-accused disclosed the names of their supplier, who was also arrayed in the case.

The order records:"3. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, even according to the statements of the officers of the police team, there was no recovery made from her or from the bag which she carried. In fact, the specific case is that the Sub-Inspector of Police, Nandigama Police Station, received a credible information that two persons were coming to sell marijuana near a college. The same was intimated to the superior officers and deputation of two government employees were sought from the Tahsildar to act as panch witnesses. The police team along with independent witnesses reached the spot at about 02:30 pm. At 03:00 pm, two persons arrived on a Scooty and halted at a distance of 100 meters from where the police team was carrying out surveillance. The appellant is said to have emerged from the college, approached the two persons who were standing near the Scooty, who handed over a cover to the girl, which was kept in her bag.  4. The police immediately pounced on the three and the allegation is that the appellant produced the cover from her bag; voluntarily. In fact, when the police saw the appellant putting the cover in the bag, they should have informed her about her right to be examined before a Magistrate and then they should have carried out the search, if she consents to that. The version that the girl produced the cover voluntarily, raises a suspicion also with respect to the knowledge of the appellant, that there was a contraband in the cover. In fact, the entire case set up against the appellant was based on the confession, said to have been made by the co-accused; the two persons who had commercial quantity of marijuana with them and the confession of the appellant herself."

The Court clarified that it had not looked at the case of the other accused who were arrayed in S.C. NDPS No. 91/2025 pending before the Special Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Rangareddy District, LB Nagar.  

Friday, October 23, 2026

Patna High Court uploads Supreme Court's directions dated September 12, 2025 for expeditious disposal of bail applications

In the aftermath of the joining of Chief Justice V. Kameswar Rao, as the 49th Chief Justice of Patna High Court, the High Court has uploaded a 4-page long statement entitled "Directions for expeditious disposal of bail applications in compliance of the judgment dated 12.09.2025 passed by the hon'ble supreme court of india in criminal appeal no. 4004/2025 titled 'Anna Waman Bhalerao vs. State of Maharashtra'" on the home page of its website.  

In Anna Waman Bhalerao vs. State of Maharashtra 2025 INSC 1114, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan had delivered a 28-page long judgement dated September 12, 2025, wherein, it drew on clear principles which emerged from Court's previous judgements. It concluded: "Applications concerning personal liberty cannot be kept pending for years while the applicants remain under a cloud of uncertainty. The consistent line of authority of this Court makes it abundantly clear that bail and anticipatory applications must be decided expeditiously on their own merits, without relegating the parties to a state of indefinite pendency. Prolonged delay in disposal not only frustrates the object of Code of Criminal Procedure, but also amounts to a denial of justice, contrary to the constitutional ethos reflected in Articles 14 and 21. 18. We accordingly issue the following directions:
a) High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before the subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months from the date of filing, except in cases where delay is attributable to the parties themselves.
b) High Courts shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts to prioritise matters involving personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments.
c) Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations in long-pending cases with promptitude so that neither the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of undue delay.
d) Being the highest constitutional fora in the States, High Courts must devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid accumulation of pending bail / anticipatory bail applications and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. In particular, bail and anticipatory bail applications shall not be kept pending for long durations without passing orders either way, as such pendency directly impinges upon the fundamental right to liberty. 18.1. The Registrar (Judicial) of this Court shall circulate a copy of this judgment  to all High Courts for immediate compliance and prompt administrative action."

Patna High Court's 4-page long statement is as under: 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Directions for expeditious disposal of bail applications in compliance of the judgment dated 12.09.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No. 4004/2025 titled 'Anna Waman Bhalerao V s. State of Maharashtra'. 

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India vide judgment dated 12.09.2025 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 4004/2025 titled 'Anna Waman Bhalerao Vs. State of Maharashtra' has directed all the High Courts to ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before the subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months from the date of filing, except in cases where delay is attributable to the parties themselves. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also directed for prioritizing the matters involving personal liberty and to avoid unnecessary adjournments.

Accordingly, a SOP has been formulated with a view to ensure that bail applications are disposed of expeditiously, which shall be adhered to by all the courts while dealing with bail matters:-
1. In any judgeship, within the state of Bihar, whenever an application for regular or anticipatory bail is to be filed, an advance copy of bail or anticipatory bail application shall be served on the Public Prosecutor/ Additional Public Prosecutor/ District Prosecution Officer, as the case may be.

2. On receipt of the advance copy of the bail or anticipatory bail application, the concerned PP/ APP/ DPO, as the case may be, shall call for the case diary/status report without waiting for the order of the Court through the Court Officer/ Court Nayab (Nyayalaya), so as to effectively assist the Court during the course of hearing of the bail application. 

3. Court Nayab (Nyayalaya) has been deputed in every Court in compliance of Police Order No. 33112025 read with CID, Bihar Letter No. 121/Prosecution dated 13.02.2025, for ensuring compliance of the orders of the Court and seamless transfer of information and documents required by the Court. Thus, Court Nayab (Nyayalaya) shall be solely responsible to procure the case diary from the concerned Court Nayab (Police Thana) and for the said purpose he will coordinate with the PP/ APP/ DPO/ Court Officer/ Court Nayab (Police Thana) etc. on day-to-day basis regarding the pending bail applications. 

4. A whatsapp group of the PP/ APP/ DPO/ Court Officer/ SHO/Court Nayab (Nyayalaya)/Court Nayab (Police Thana)/ Nodal Officer may be created for the purpose of expediting the production of case diary. It will be preferable if the scanned copy of the case diary is transmitted by the Court Nayab (Police Thana) of the respective police station to the Learned PP/APP/DPO/ Court Nayab (Nyayalaya) by whatsapp or email. The APP shall produce the scanned copy of the case diary in digital form before the concerned Court. The Nodal Officer (Dy. S.P. Level) shall be responsible for ensuring proper coordination amongst the Court Officer/ Court Nayab (Nyayalaya)/ Court Nayab (Police Thana) and the SHO of the concerned Police Station. 

5. In such cases, where it is mandatorily required, as per the statute, to issue notice to the victim/ informant like in POCSO/ SC & ST cases at the time of hearing of bail application, the notice shall also be served upon the victim/informant through the concerned SHO of the Police Station and the service report shall be filed before the Court concerned within a period of 5 days. 

6. In such cases, where the Injury" Report/Post-Mortem Report is required, the PP/APP/ DPO shall provide the details of the case to the Court Nayab (Nyayalaya), who in turn will be responsible to obtain the same from the CMO/CS of the concerned district/ Primary Health Centre/ Medical College Hospital/ other hospitals within a period of 5 days and ensure production of the same before the concerned Court.

Similarly, in case of requirement of FSL Report by the Court concerned, the PP/APP/DPO shall provide the details of the case to the Court Nayab (Nyayalaya) who shall, in turn, be responsible to obtain the same within a period 5 days and ensure production before the Court concerned. 

In the case of failure to make available the Injury Report/Post-Mortem Report by the Court Nayab (Nyayalaya) within a period of 5 days from the date of requisition, the same shall be reported by the PP/APP/DPO to the Court concerned, who shall be free to take appropriate coercive action against the defaulter, for delay in production of the reports in time. The feasibility of appointing one Nodal Officer by the Health Department in each district for the purpose of coordinating procurement of Injury Report/Post-Mortem Report/FSL Report; may be explored. The Additional Chief Secretary, Health Department be requested to do the needful in this regard. 

7. No adjournment shall be granted on mere asking of Advocates and only in exceptional circumstances, adjournment may be granted in bail matters, after recording of specific reasons for such adjournment by the concerned Court.

8. Learned Principal District and Session Judge shall allocate bail and anticipatory bail application filed before him, amongst the Judicial Officers in an equitable manner (except Special Courts) taking into consideration, the existing workload of a particular Judge and also other factors deemed essential to be considered.

9. Every Court shall submit a monthly statement to the Principal District & Sessions Judge of the concerned judgeship furnishing the details of filing and disposal of bail applications in their Court, which shall be discussed in the monthly officers' · meeting and thereafter a consolidated report of the same shall be transmitted by the Learned Principal District & Sessions Judge to the Hon'ble Inspecting Judge of the concerned judgeship. In case of delay of more than 2 months in disposal of bail petition, the concerned presiding officer shall furnish the reasons thereof in the order itself highlighting the reasons for nondisposal within the time specified. 

10. The Principal District and Session Judge shall communicate the noncompliance of the orders to the D.M. and S.P. in the DLMC meeting and seek information regarding the action taken agaipst the erring Nayab Courts/I.O.s, who have failed to submit the case dairy/ Injury Report/ Post-Mortem Report/FSL Report, within the time prescribed. 

11. Copy of the SOP be shared with the DM (Head of the prosecution) and SP/SSP (Head of the investigation)/Nodal Officer of all the districts for information and ensuring necessary compliance.

Additionally, the following suggestions may be implemented for expeditious disposal of bail applications in the High Court and Civil courts:- 

1. Creation of a dedicated bail dashboard: A dashboard at the District Level as well as High Court level may be created for monitoring the pendency of Bail and Anticipation Bail Applications. The age of each application may be calculated from the date of filing, in conformity with the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The applications may be automatically categorized as: up to 30 days; 31-60 days; 61-90 days; and above 90 days. The bail matters which are more than 60 days old may be termed as 'aged bail matters' and those above 90 days as "Long Pending Bail Matters."

2. Software for Priority identification in the listing process: The regular Bail/Anticipatory Bail Applications approaching or exceeding two months from the date of filing may be identified in the listing software system so that the concerned Hon'ble Bench is able to readily notice the age of such matters. A red flag may be put before such cases so that they can be listed on priority basis. 

3. Identification of the reason for pendency: In such bail applications, which have remained pending for more than 60 days, the Registry may identify the broad reasons for their pendency, such as: case diary awaited; service awaited; reply/counter of the State awaited; adjournment sought by the petitioner; adjournment sought by the State; matter part-heard; stay order by the higher courts; connected matter pending; order reserved; listing/administrative reason; or any other reason. This would enable the Hon'ble Court to ascertain whether the delay is attributable to the parties or arises from any procedural or administrative cause. 

4. Timeline: A timeline may be fixed by the Hon'ble Court for .conduct of stamp reporting/ notifying defects and curing the same. The entire process should preferably take not more than 72 hours.

5. Listing: As far as Hon'ble High Court is concerned, bail matter may be listed before all the Hon'ble Judges sitting singly in moderate numbers for example 5 or 10 cases before every Judge.

6. Categorization: The listing and consideration of bail matter can be classified according the nature and gravity of the crime, on the basis of general statutory classifications, on the basis of operational categories like anticipatory bail/regular bail/statutory bail etc. and on the basis of categorization under the Special Act.

S.D. Sanjay, Advocate General of Bihar informed Supreme Court about 16 cases pending under Section 11 of NIA Act and their trial by 2 Special Exclusive Courts

In Re: Creation Of Special Exclusive Courts (2026), Advocate General for the State of Bihar informed the Supreme Court that "there are sixteen cases pending under Section 11 of the NIA Act, and two Special Exclusive Courts have already been established to try the same." This submission is recorded in Court's 12-page long order dated September 7, 2026. On the previous occasion, Sanjay had appeared before the Court as the Additional Solicitor General of India, on behalf of the Union of India on March 24, 2026. Earlier, the Court's 15-page long order dated July 20, 2026 The status report with regard to Bihar stated that the Court of District & Additional Sessions Judge-XV, Patna has been designated as an Exclusive Court for trial of NIA cases vide Gazette Notification dated 8th January, 2026. The Central Government, vide letter dated 23.06.2026, has written to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar seeking their consent/comments on the Hon’ble High Court of Patna’s letter dated 22.05.2026 vide which the consent of Hon’ble High Court was conveyed to designate the Court of District & Additional Sessions Judge-XXVI, Patna as Special Court exclusively for trial of NIA cases. Subsequent to the submission of July 2026, one more Special Exclusive Court has been created. The matter is listed for hearing on November 16, 2026. 

The September 2026, order has recorded that with reference to the directions issued by the Court for the establishment of Exclusive Special Courts for trial of NDPS cases, "the Union of India has filed an affidavit, according to which a revised figure of 449 exclusive Courts have been identified to be established. The details of these Courts, State-wise and location-wise, have also been given in a tabulated form in the status report filed on behalf of the Union of India. That report and the said table are taken as part of this oral order. 4. The information given in the tabulated form further points out that 176 exclusive Courts are presently operational. 5. It seems to us that, owing to the current pendency of cases under the NDPS Act and an unfortunate alarming increase in offences under that Act on a pan-India basis, it is expedient and in the interest of justice that the requisite Courts, i.e., 449 exclusive NDPS Courts, are established at the earliest. We direct the Union of India and all the State Governments/Union Territory Administrations to take necessary steps for the purpose of providing/creating of infrastructure as well as appointment of necessary staff, so that such Courts shall be established as early as possible and preferably within six weeks." 

Supreme Court is dealing with the issue of the establishment of exclusive Special Courts for the trial of criminal cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) as also under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), whether prosecuted by central agencies, like the National Investigation Agency (NIA) or the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) or by the State Police/Agencies. The Special Courts are required to be designated under Section 11 of the National Investigation Agency Act (NIA), 2008. In its 9-page long order dated April 20, 2026, the Court observed:"15. In the interest of completeness, we clarify that wherever this 8Court has referred to ‘NIA’ cases or ‘UAPA/NIA’ cases, the intention has been to include all the cases being tried under the UAPA, irrespective of which agency is prosecuting the same. Similarly, cases under the NDPS Act would also refer to all the criminal cases concerning offences under that statute. The parties and authorities shall furnish the necessary information, keeping in mind the broader scope of these proceedings." 

The Court's subsequent 11-page long order dated May 8, 2026 observed: "The proceedings now stand focused on the creation/designation and operationalisation of exclusive Special Courts for expeditious trial of cases under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (in short, the 'NIA Act'), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (in short, 'UAPA') and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short, the 'NDPS Act'). 2. There are broadly two categories of trials under the NIA Act. The first category comprises trials before Courts of Session designated as Special Courts by the Central Government under Section 11 of the NIA Act, where the investigation/prosecution is principally conducted by the National Investigation Agency (in short, 'NIA'). The second category comprises trials before Courts of Session designated as Special Courts by the State Governments under Section 22 of the NIA Act, including scheduled offences/UAPA cases investigated and prosecuted by State agencies."

It added: "7. No category of cases other than cases triable before a Court designated under Section 11 of the NIA Act, and offences connected with such trials, shall be assigned to these Courts. The High Courts shall also ensure posting of dedicated Court staff substantially in terms of the staffing pattern noticed in the earlier orders. 8. The broad norm shall be one exclusive Special Court for every block of 10 to 15 pending trials. Thus, where the pendency under Section 11 of the NIA Act within the jurisdiction of a High Court exceeds 15 trials, at least two such Courts shall be operationalised; where it exceeds 25 trials, at least three such Courts shall be operationalised; and one additional Court shall be considered for every further block of 10 to 15 trials. These are minimum working norms and may be suitably adjusted by the High Court, after consulting the NIA and the State Government/Union Territory, having regard to the complexity of the cases, number of accused, number of witnesses and availability of infrastructure. 9. The aforesaid exclusive Special Courts under Section 11 of the NIA Act shall be made functional within one month from today. The Presiding Officers shall regulate their boards in such manner as they deem appropriate, but shall ensure that the trials assigned to them are taken up on a day-to-day basis. As far as practicable, ripe trials shall be listed in continuous blocks so that at least one such trial is brought to a conclusion every month, without compromising the rights of the accused, victims or witnesses and without diluting the requirements of a fair trial. 10. As regards trials under Section 22 of the NIA Act, UAPA cases prosecuted by State agencies, and other related trials, we direct the States/Union Territories and the Registrars General of the High Courts to furnish, in consultation with each other, a consolidated statement indicating: (i) the number of pending trials; (ii) the District and Court where each trial is pending; (iii) the age and present stage of each trial; (iv) the number of accused in custody; (v) the number of prosecution witnesses already examined and remaining; (vi) the availability or non-availability of court rooms and allied infrastructure; (vii) the number of exclusive Courts required; and (viii) the availability of dedicated Public Prosecutors. The said information shall be filed within four weeks."

The Office Report dated March 24, 2026 stated that the Court had directed the registration of a Suo Moto Writ Petition based on Order dated February 10, 2026 passed in Md. Heydaitullah vs. National Investigation Agency SLP(Crl.) No. 8799/2025 in pursuance of paragraph 3 of the Court's order dated December 16, 2025. Accordingly, In Re: Creation Of Special Exclusive Courts Suo Moto Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1/2026 was registered.  

In its 11-page long order dated 24 March, 2026, the Court's Division Bench observed:"8. It is against this backdrop that this Court, after taking cognizance of the prevailing situation, decided that the NIA Courts should exclusively deal with UAPA or other related trials and that such Presiding Officers should not be entrusted with any other cases. This will ensure that the Presiding Officers are able to take up the UAPA trials on a day-to-day basis. 9. Keeping this in mind, let the Union of India release the necessary grant-in-aid/financial assistance in terms of the Office Memorandum dated 07.01.2026 to the 17 States mentioned in paragraph 4 of this order. The learned Advocate Generals shall meet the Hon’ble Chief Justices of their respective High Courts, along with a copy of this order, and shall request that a Presiding Officer be posted in the NIA Court to whom no other cases except UAPA or related trials shall be entrusted. 10. It goes without saying that such a recourse shall be required to be followed only in those States where such an initiative has not already been taken. The State Governments, in consultation with the High Courts, will meanwhile make additions to the existing cadre of the Higher Judicial Services to the extent that the State may require additional Courts to deal with NIA/UAPA matters. The recruitment to the newly created posts shall be made by the High Courts in the next immediate selection process. It is clarified that there shall not be a separate cadre of Presiding Officers of the NIA/UAPA Courts, and that the Judicial Officers, who have fair and reasonable experience of conducting criminal trials, shall be posted as the Presiding Officers of those Courts. Similarly, the High Courts will take necessary steps to appoint the Court Staff as per the pattern given in paragraph 2 of this order. 11. Knowing well the method of evaluation of the Annual Confidential Reports of the Judicial Officers, we clarify that a separate mechanism shall be prescribed in consultation with the High Courts for evaluation of the Confidential Reports of the Presiding Officers of the NIA/UAPA Courts, as they will not be able to earn units in the traditional manner. For this purpose, appropriate directions will be issued by a Three-Judge Bench in the matter pertaining to the judicial services.12. The State Governments shall, meanwhile, identify how many separate exclusive NIA/UAPA Courts are required to be established by them to conduct the trials in UAPA or related matters on a day- to-day basis, with a categorical commitment that each trial, in all circumstances, shall be completed within one year. After such evaluation, the viewpoint of the State Governments shall be placed on record within four weeks.  13. The National Investigating Agency/CBI/any other Central or State Agency will ensure that one dedicated Public Prosecutor for each Court is made available, and if there are insufficient prosecutors available in the regular cadre, the Union of India and the State Governments are directed to notify Special Public Prosecutors for this purpose in consultation with the respective High Courts."

Meanwhile, in a case related to special courts/special laws, Patna High Court's Full Bench comprising of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Jitendra Kumar and Dr. Anshuman have passed an order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, Amicus Curiae in the case has submitted his note on September 16, 2026 vide AO Number 967051/ 2026. The Court has asked the Advocate General to assist the Court. The order reads:"10. Considering the importance of the matter, in which the scope of reference itself has arisen for consideration apart from the questions which have been referred to, we would also request learned Advocate General to assist this Court."