Justice Bibek Chaudhuri sets aside judgment of conviction by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Sasaram, Rohtas in a murder case of 2001

In Janardan Singh @ Janardan Singh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 20-page long judgement dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"64. ....the points for determination are answered in following words:(i) The prosecution has not been able to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. (ii) The identity and participation of the appellants have not been established by reliable and cogent evidence. (iii) The conviction of the appellants with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable. (iv) The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 65. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. 66. The judgment of conviction, dated 06.07.2018 and the order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 80 of 2003 are set aside. 67. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 68. The appellants are on bail. They are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds." Justices Chaudhuri authored the judgement. 

These appeals arose out of the judgment of conviction, dated July 6, 2018 and the order of sentence, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Sasaram, Rohtas, in a Sessions Trial of 2003, which arose out of Karakat P.S. Case of 2001. The Criminal Appeal by Janardan Singh @ Janardan Singh Yadav also arose out of the same judgment.

The prosecution case, as disclosed in the fardbeyan of the informant Keshav Singh, is that on 18.11.2001, the informant along with several other persons was travelling in a jeep. When the vehicle reached near Belwai, it was allegedly intercepted by a group of about fifteen persons, who were said to be armed with firearms. 5. It is alleged that the said persons surrounded the jeep and, upon identifying the occupants, opened indiscriminate fire. As a result of the firing, the driver of the jeep, Raju Pandey, along with other occupants, sustained fatal injuries. Some persons also received injuries. 6. In the fardbeyan, several accused persons, including the appellants, were named as participants in the occurrence. The allegation against them is that they acted in concert and took part in the firing upon the occupants of the jeep. On the basis of the fardbeyan, Karakat P.S. Case was instituted under Sections 302, 307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After registration of the case, investigation was taken up and, upon completion thereof, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and was registered as a Sessions Trial of 2003. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The accused persons denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 11. In course of trial, the prosecution examined a number of witnesses in support of its case. The prosecution relied mainly upon the testimony of the informant and other alleged eye-witnesses, including those who claimed to have sustained injuries in the occurrence. 12. It appears from the record that some of the witnesses did not support the prosecution case in its entirety and were declared hostile. The statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they denied the allegations and asserted that they have been falsely implicated.

The judgement recorded that "certain witnesses connected with the investigation and medical examination
were not examined during the course of trial." The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had succeeded in proving the occurrence and the participation of the accused persons therein. The Trial Court placed reliance upon the evidence of the eye-witnesses and held that the accused persons had acted in furtherance of their common intention. Accordingly, the accused persons were convicted under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Upon conviction, they were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, along with other sentences. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "55. Mere presence in a group, without clear evidence of participation and shared intention, is not sufficient to attract liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the absence of clear and cogent evidence establishing common intention, the application of Section 34 IPC becomes unsustainable. 56. Upon a cumulative assessment of the evidence on record, this Court finds that while the occurrence of firing resulting in death and injuries stands established, the participation of the appellants has not been proved with the degree of certainty required in criminal law. 57. The evidence against the appellants is general in nature, lacks specific attribution of roles, and suffers from inconsistencies and deficiencies. The presence of hostile witnesses and the non-examination of material witnesses further weaken the prosecution case. 58. In such circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellants. 59. It is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and if two views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted, as held in paragraph no. 25 of Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgement in case of Kali Ram v. State of  Himachal Pradesh, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808...." 

It reads; 25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm
conclusion or so timid that is is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us  recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 227 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886] a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures." 

The judgement reads:"60. The prosecution has succeeded in proving the occurrence, but has failed to prove the role of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. 61. On perusal of the evidence on record, we find that during the trail only 09 witnesses were examined. Out of them, two injured witnesses supported the prosecution case in course of their evidence. PW-1, Vinod Singh only identified Jaj Yadav; PW-2, Rajendra Singh identified accused Vinod Yadav and Bali Yadav. Thus, all the assailants were not identified by the witnesses. Informant was not examined during trial. The Medical Officer, who conducted postmortem of the deceased was also not examined. Therefore, the cause of death of the deceased has not been established. The I.O. of this case was also not examined. 62. In the absence of their evidence, it would be highly risky to affirm conviction of the accused persons on the basis of evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, specially because it is established that there was political and caste related rivalry between the accused persons and the witnesses and the deceased. 63. No explanation has been furnished by the prosecution for withholding such a material witness. The non-examination of such a material witness assumes significance and casts a serious doubt on the prosecution case, particularly when the case rests primarily on ocular evidence.

Justice Chaudhary relied on paragraph no. 156 of Supreme Court's decision in Masalti vs. State of U.P. reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30, wherein, it cautioned that in cases involving a large number of accused, conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of general and omnibus allegations without specific evidence of individual participation. Paragraph 15 reads: “15. Then it is urged that the evidence given by the witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and since no specific part is assigned to all the assailants, that evidence should not have been accepted. This criticism again is not well-founded. Where a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of the assailants. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault."

Denied bail by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Arvind Srivastava in 2018 and 2023, appellants acquitted from murder charge by Justice Arun Kumar Jha

In Munna Yadav & Anr. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chandra Shekhar Jha and Bibek Chaudhuri delivered a 19-page long judgment dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"35. In view of aforesaid, we are of the considered view that testimony of PW-4 & PW-7 being interested witness not appears wholly reliable. They are immediate family members of the deceased. Their depositions are full of contradiction creating a doubt qua their presence near to the place of occurrence, and also their claim as an eye witness to the occurrence. 36. Accordingly, both above-named appellants are acquitted from the charges levelled against them, by giving benefit of doubt. 37. Hence, appeal stands allowed. 38. Accordingly, impugned judgment of conviction dated 4th June, 2018 and order of sentence dated 12.06.2018, passed by learned A.D.J., F.T.C.- 1st, Jamui in S. Tr. No. 278/2011 arising out of G.R. No. 169/2011 arising out of Khaira P.S. Case No. 17 of 2011 is hereby set aside. 39. Appellants namely, Munna Yadav and Dilip Yadav are in custody in connection with this case, they are directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Fine if any paid, be returned to appellants forthwith." 

The appeal was preferred under section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment of conviction dated June 4, 2018 and order of sentence dated June 12, 201, whereby and whereunder the two appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

The prosecution case as per Fard-e-beyan of Manju Devi (informant/PW-7) wife of Late Jageshwar Yadav of village – Mangobandar, P.S. - Khaira, District – Jamui, recorded by the S.I. of Khaira Police Station dated 08.02.2011, that on 07.02.2011 at about 7:00 P.M., the husband of informant (PW-7) had gone to supply the milk in the breakfast-cum-tea shop of one Vinod Rawat, which was situated in Mangobandar Bazar, but her husband did not return to his home. The informant alleged that when she went in search of her husband and was going on road at about 8:00 P.M., then, she saw that near to the house of one Prayag Thakur of village – Nai Tola, the accused persons, who belonged to the same family, namely, Dilip Yadav (appellant no.2) , Munna Yadav (appellant no.1) and Huro Yadav were assaulting her husband by means of
brick and stones and also dragging him by holding Gamchha in his neck. The informant further alleged that on seeing the such condition of her husband, she started raising alarm. Thereafter, all the accused persons fled away leaving the husband of the informant in injured condition at the place of occurrence. She further states that anyhow with the help of her Gotni (PW-3), she taken away the dead body of her husband to their house and informed the family members. The informant alleged that there was land dispute between the accused persons and the deceased husband of the informant and due to this reason her husband was murdered by the aforesaid accused persons/appellants. 

On the basis of said written information, Khaira P.S. Case was registered for the offences punishable under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. After concluding investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against the appellants. The jurisdictional Magistrate after perusal of materials and records took cognizance accordingly and after compliance of section 207 of the Cr.P.C. committed this case to the court of sessions under section 209 of the Cr.P.C. for its trial and disposal.

After commitment, learned trial court, upon perusal of records, framed charges against accused persons/appellants under section 302/34 of the IPC and explained the charges to the accused/appellants in their vernacular language, which they pleaded “not guilty” and claimed to be tried. To substantiate its case, prosecution altogether examined seven witnesses

Justice Jha observed: "The missing links could have been provided by the Investigating Officer who, again, did not enter the witness box. Whether or not non-examination of a witness has caused prejudice to the defence is essentially a question of fact and an inference is required to be drawn having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. The reason why the Investigating Officer could not depose as a witness, as told by PW-4, is that he had been sent for training. It was not shown that the Investigating Officer under no circumstances could have left the course for recording of his deposition in the trial court. It is worthy of being noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court considered the issue of non-examination of the Investigating Officer. In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the Investigating Officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case."

Notably, by its order dated July 26, 2023, the High Court's Division Bench of Justices Arvind Srivastava and Sunil Dutta Mishra had declined to grant the privilege of bail to the appellants. Their prayer for bail was rejected by Justice Srivastava who had authored the order. The appellants had prayed for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of appeal. Their prayer for bail was earlier rejected by the Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Arvind Srivastava by its order dated October 3, 2018. The order was authored by Justice Kumar. The appellants were languishing in custody since June 4, 2018.

The judgement reads:" In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the investigating officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.” 

Is it not noteworthy that both Justice Kumar and Justice Srivastava erred like Additional District Judge, Jamui in not considering the issue of non-examination of the Investigating Officer? Is it not because of S.K. Lal, the senior advocate that the Court could detect the issue of non-examination of the Investigating Officer?

Supreme Court set aside order by Justice Rajiv Roy, grants anticipatory bail

In  Maksud Alam & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh And Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh passed a 5-page long order dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....the impugned order stands set aside and the appellants are granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Trial Court. The appeal stands allowed, accordingly. The appellants shall appear before the Investigating Officer on 5th May, 2026 at 11.00 a.m. If they do not appear on the said day, anticipatory bail granted to the appellants by this Court shall stand cancelled automatically."

The impugned order refers to the 3-page long order dated January 15, 2026 by Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court.  

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with Amnour P.S. Case No. 220 of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 115(2), 126(2), 109(1), 303(2), 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, lodged by the informant Ankita Raj. The informant had alleged that after treatment of her child, as they were returning on their vehicle, the wedding procession of Siraj Ansari was going on. As they have blocked the road, request was made whereafter the accused side armed variously assaulted causing injuries. The husband and the informant was taken to the Primary Health Centre, Garkha, Saran at Chapra and the allegation is that thereafter Ehsan Ali threatened the informant and others with dire consequences after their release on bail. This led to the F.I.R.

The counsel for the petitioner had taken Justice Royto Court to an order passed by a coordinate Bench of the High Court in Najrul Miyan and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar disposed of on December 24, 2025 to show that similar situated persons were extended relief. 

Supreme Court observed: "The antecedent in which the appellants are allegedly involved, pertain to an occurrence in respect of which a complaint was also given on behalf of the appellants. The appellants have, in fact, joined the investigation and their custodial interrogation is not required." It has reversed the order by Justice Roy. 

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail rejection order by Justice Satyavrat Verma

In Uma Shankar Prasad vs The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B. V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhyan passed a 6-page long order dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 482 of the BNSS. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 04.11.2025. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only) with two like sureties. It is directed that the appellant shall extend complete cooperation in the ensuing investigation. The appellant shall not misuse his liberty and shall not in any way influence the witnesses or tamper with the material on record. With the aforesaid directions, the criminal appeal is allowed."

The criminal appeal had challenged the order dated November 4, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court of  in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 42978 of 2025. Apprehending arrest in connection with crime registered pursuant to F.I.R No.207 of 2024 lodged with Bhagwanganj Police Station, District Patna in respect of the offence punishable under Section 30(a) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2022, the appellant preferred an application before the High Court seeking anticipatory bail in terms of Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The application for anticipatory bail was rejected by the High Court.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that merely because the appellant was the owner of the motor cycle in which fifteen litres of liquor was recovered, he had been proceeded against though not named in the First Information Report; that the appellant was not involved in the offence alleged against him. More importantly, the rider of the motor vehicle was not apprehended or interrogated. In the circumstances, relief of anticipatory bail may be granted to the appellant. 

In Uma Shankar Prasad vs The State of Bihar (2025), in his 3-page long order Justice Verma had concluded:"....the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the instant anticipatory bail application stands rejected."The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Section 30(a) of the Bihar Excise Act. 

Justice Verma observed: "3. The case was taken case up on 18.07.2025 when a report was called for from the DTO, Patna, but the same till date has not been received, as such, the Court will not wait endlessly for the report." He had recorded that the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner was not in a position to rebut the submission of the APP and who submitted that legally petitioner was the owner of the vehicle. When a report was called for from the DTO, it was submitted that petitioner was the legal owner of the vehicle in question. 

Patna High Court Advocates demand immediate implementation of Women's Reservation Act

The advocates of Patna High Court organized a talk on the subject of "In Defense of Women's Reservation Act" on April 23, 2026. The subject was introduced by Y. C. Verma, senior advocate. He underlined that the woman's reservation act was guided by the quest for political justice. While concluding the subject, advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna pointed out that they who do not have sense of beauty cannot have sense of justice. The supporters of immediate implementation of Women's Reservation Act have a sense beauty which inspires their sense of justice. The advocates who spoke on the occasion included Ayushi Chaudhary, Nupur, Isha Ann, Kumari Akanksha Rai. Chaudhary underlined that Bihar’s experience of electing more than 50 per cent of women to Panchayats in the state is creating a strong base of women leaders over multiple election cycles. These advocates argued that what is being promised in the name of woman's reservation was akin to promising 33 % share in mangoes once there are 85 mangoes on the tree. Women are demanding share in the existing mangoes. 

महिलाओं की मांग हैं कि वर्तमान 543 सीटों के आधार पर महिलाओं के लिए 33 प्रतिशत आरक्षण तत्काल लागू किया जाय. 16 से 18 अप्रैल को बुलाए गए संसद के विशेष सत्र में  किया तीन विधेयक पेश किए गये:-केंद्र शासित प्रदेश क़ानून (संशोधन) विधेयक 2026, संविधान (131वां संशोधन) विधेयक 2026, परिसीमन विधेयक 2026 (डीलिमिटेशन बिल 2026). 

नारी शक्ति वंदन अधिनियम (128वां संविधान संशोधन विधेयक, 2023), जो अब 106वां संविधान संशोधन अधिनियम, 2023 है, संसद और राज्य विधानसभाओं में महिलाओं के लिए 33% (एक-तिहाई) सीटें आरक्षित करता है। सितंबर 2023 में पारित यह कानून लोकसभा, राज्य विधानसभाओं और दिल्ली विधानसभा में लागू होगा, जिसे 16 अप्रैल 2026 से प्रभावी किया गया है. 19 सितंबर 2023 को सरकार ने नए संसद भवन में लोकसभा में संसद के विशेष सत्र के दौरान इस विधेयक को 128वें संवैधानिक संशोधन विधेयक, 2023 के रूप में पेश किया गया था.

Noted journalists like Arvind Ujjwal and Mukesh Kumar Singh and advocates like Ram Jiban Prasad Singh, Dr. S,S.P. Yadav, Manju Sharma, Jnana Chandra Bhardwaj, Rajaram Rai, Neeraj Kumar and Priya Kumari graced the occasion. 

 

The speakers noted that on April 17, 2026, the Lok Sabha rejected the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026. Consequently, the government withdrew the Delimitation Bill, 2026 and the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, which were dependent on the amendment. The failed amendment aimed to increase Lok Sabha seats to 850, linking 33% women's reservation to 2011 census-based delimitation. Notably, the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026 failed to pass after receiving only 278 votes in favor (failing to secure the required two-thirds majority). Delimitation Bill, 2026 was withdrawn following the failure of the 131st Amendment Bill. The Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 too was withdrawn following the failure of the 131st Amendment Bill. 

 

The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026 had proposed increasing the maximum total strength of the Lok Sabha to 850 members (815 from states, 35 from Union Territories), expanding it from the current 550. The bill aimed to facilitate delimitation based on the 2011 Census to implement 33% women's reservation, but failed to pass. 

Tracing the history of the demand for women's rights in the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft, Dr. Krishna drew the attention of the advocates towards what she wrote in her A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) after writing A Vindication of the Rights of Men, in a Letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, occaisioned by his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). She demanded equality based on natural reason because denying equality to women is indefensible. She wrote:"we shall not see women affectionate till more equality be established in society, till ranks are confounded and women freed, neither shall we see that dignified domestic happiness, the simple grandeur of which cannot be relished by ignorant or vitiated minds; nor will the important task of education ever be properly begun till the person of a woman is no longer preferred to her mind. For it would be as wise to expect corn from tares, or figs from thistles, as that a foolish ignorant woman should be a good mother." The enactment of the law was long due but its continued presence as a post dated cheque is indefensible. 

Expressing his support for the enactment of the Constitution (106th) Amendment Act, 2023, Dr. Krishna contended that Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam should be implemented in right earnest. In 2023, the Parliament had passed the law unanimously to foster equitable representation of women in public life. This landmark legislation rotationally reserves one-third of all seats for women in the Lok Sabha and in all State Legislative Assemblies, including the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam notification was issued to implement old laws that were not implemented earlier.

 

 

 

 

 

Supreme Court modifies the anticipatory bail order by Justice Satyavrat Verma

In Ritesh Anand & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 3-page long order dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it observed:  "We are of the view that there was no good reason for the High Court to restrict the operation of the order of anticipatory bail till the filing of the charge-sheet. 5. The order passed by the High Court releasing the petitioners on anticipatory bail shall operate till the conclusion of the trial. 6. With the aforesaid, this petition stands disposed of."

Earlier, in Ritesh Anand & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court had delivered a 4-page long order dated March 23, 2026, wherein, the petitioners were released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned trial court where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Minapur P.S. Case No.286/2024, "subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 482(2) of the B.N.S.S. 7. However, it is made clear that if charge sheet is submitted connecting the petitioners with the offence, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall come to an end." 

The petitioners apprehending their arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 105, 3(5) of the B.N.S. had approached the High Court for anticipatory bail. The petitioners were persons with clean antecedent. The informant alleged that land of petitioners was adjacent to his land and petitioners passed electric current through iron wire of the informant with which the informant had wired his pumpkin field, on account of which he along with both his sons got electric current and his elder son died.

 

 

Supremde Court upholds judgement of conviction by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi, Samarendra Pratap Singh in a murder case

In Adalat Yadav etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K Singh delivered a 18-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it dismissed the appeals. The appellant-convicts before the Court were the father and son, namely Adalat Yadav and Anirudh Yadav. This appeals of 2019 were filed by Adalat Yadav, and Anirudh Yadav. Both challenging the 56-page long common judgment by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Samarendra Pratap Singh dated February 4, 2017 passed in Girdhari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2017), whereby the Division Bench had confirmed finding of conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai1 in terms of judgment dated November 22, 2011 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2019 sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 149 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also a fine of Rs.10,000/. These convicts were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years under Sections 307, 149 of the I.P.C. read with Section 120B of the I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.5000/. Apart from this, they were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Trivedi. 

On December 4, 2008 while Sunil Yadav @ Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-5/complainant) was homebound from the Begusarai Court along with his brother Ram Sharan Yadav (deceased), certain persons including two appellants/convicts surrounded them upon reaching the grocery store run by one Suresh Mahto. A-1 hurled abuses at them and stated that despite repeated directions/clear warnings given to them by Girdhari Yadav (who was also an accused before the High Court), against giving depositions in the murder case on one Mahesh Paswan, the deceased had refused to heed. He then fired his pistol, hitting the deceased on his head, making him fall to his death, instantly. A-2 had fired upon the deceased and, thereafter, other members of the group also opened fired on the complainant as also one Ganesh and Baidyanath Yadav, who were walking alongside the deceased and the complainant. The bullet fired by one Shivji Yadav, hit the complainant on his leg. A written complaint was lodged about the incident on the same day, resulting in registration of FIR Number 222/08 at Police Station Balia. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheets were filed in March 2009. The Trial Court convicted a total of 4 persons including the appellant-convicts while acquitting one Ram Balak Yadav. A perusal of the Trial Court judgment reveals that such a finding was arrived at upon a cumulative assessment of the testimonies of all the witnesses.