As part of Division Bench Justice Partha Sarthy concludes:"Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are held to be constitutionally valid"

In Sudhakar Jha & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 2024 (3) PLJR 403 (DB), the Division Bench of the Patna High Court of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 174-page long judgement dated October13, 2023 upon hearing  the applications which challenged the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 as also that of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Surplus Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019. The operative part is from page no. 128 on wards. It was heard with numerous anlogous cases.  The petitioners had also challenged the orders passed in their respective case by different authorities including the Additional Collector, the Commissioner of the Division and the Bihar Land Tribunal, all of which arose out of applications for pre-emption filed under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 

The applications contended that the amendments are against the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution as also against the principles of natural justice. It was ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution, against the legal rights and also takes away the vested right of an individual. Section 16(3) of the Act was repealed in an arbitrary manner without assigning any cogent reasons and the amendment was arbitrary, unconstitutional, unreasonable and ultra vires the parent Act. It should not be made applicable with retrospective affect. The amendment effected was not only in excess of the power granted under the Constitution; assent of the President; without which it was otiose, was not taken before its promulgation. The parties were harassed on account of pendency of the cases for decades and now the petitioners’ peremptory rights have been ordered to have abated. It was also contended that the amendment affected was beyond the competence of the State legislature and on account of repeal of section 45B of the Act, the statutory remedy of appeal/revision as was earlier available has been taken away without providing for any forum for adjudication of the disputes. The contention was that the amendments be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the same be set aside.

Kamal Nayan Choubey, senior counsel submitted that pursuant to Article 38 of the Constitution which provides a mandate for the State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people and Article 39, which lays down six Directive Principles, some of which are to ensure means of equal livelihood to men and women, ownership and control of resources be distributed to serve the best interest of the people, avoid concentration of wealth, ensure equal pay for equal work of men and women etc; legislative steps were taken in all the States as also in the State of Bihar. The same led to the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation
Act, 1956 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. It was further contended that the Act which provided for fixation of ceiling area of land which a person could hold and the object of which was equitable distribution of land, after receiving the assent of the President was published in the gazette on April 19, 1962. At the time of all important amendments in the Act, whenever the State Government felt that major provisions are being deleted, the assent of the President was obtained. As the Presidential assent has not been obtained in the instant case, in absence thereof, the amendment is unconstitutional. He submitted that the Act was promulgated by the Government of Bihar pursuant to the subjects enumerated at item no.18 of the State List and item no.42 of the Concurrent List, of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. Further, the Act having been enacted after obtaining the assent of the President, the same cannot be taken away in this manner. Even if it is held to be a curable defect, unless the defect is cured the same cannot be implemented. 

Referring to the principles of law laid down in Taylor vs. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all, Choubey, the senior counsel had contended that the Presidential assent was a mandatory requirement and even now assent could be obtained; without which the amendments would have no effect.  It was next contended that the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution will not be available to the Amendment Acts, impugned herein, in absence of the President’s assent in view of the first proviso to Article 31A.

Choubey placed reliance on the judgments in Mahant Shankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami vs. State of
Orissa & Anr., AIR 1967 SC 59; Sriram Narayan Medhi vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 199; State of Haryana vs. Jai Singh & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 418; Pt. Rishikesh & Anr. vs. Salma Begum, (1995) 4 SCC 718 and Anita Kushwaha vs. Pushap Sudan, AIR 2016 SC 3506.

Jitendra Kishore Verma, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the right to pre-emption is a very old
right, history of which could be traced to the period of Mughals. The question to be asked is as to why section 16(3) of the Act was brought and has the constitutional goal or it’s purpose been achieved. For the purpose behind the ceiling law as also the law of pre-emption, placed reliance on judgments in Bhau Ram vs. Baij Nath Singh & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1476 and Kedar Mishra vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 2110. He relied on judgment in Ram Sagar Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2017 (1) PLJR 2019 to submit that section 16(3) of the Act was a beneficial legislation enacted to prevent fragmentation of holding and to facilitate consolidation. A statute is best interpreted when we know as to why it was enacted; reference may be made to the case of Gaurav Aseem Avtej vs. U.P. State Sugar Corporation. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 518. In Atam Prakash vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 859 the right of pre-emption was held to be reasonable as also constitutionally valid. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Suresh Prasad Singh vs. Dulhin Phulkumari Devi & Ors., 2010 (2) PLJR 167 (SC), wherein, it was held that the right has been recognised by the statute. 

J. S. Arora, learned senior advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment in Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. S.B. Kamble & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1193 to submit that for the State to claim immunity of Article 31B of the Constitution, although, the original Act was in the 9th Schedule, it was required that the amending Act also be in the 9th Schedule and for the same, assent of the President is required to be obtained. It was further submitted that the amendment creates ambiguity in so far as it does not provide as to how the landlord gets his land back. Even if a person was entitled to get the land as pre-emptor, the proceedings having abated, the person gets back his amount which included the consideration amount with 10% thus causing great hardship. The Court should examine it’s rationality, which in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861, could be done even if the law was granted protection by including the same in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. With regard to the Amendment Act, 2016, Arora submitted that in case land of some person was sold without his knowledge and later he comes to know about it being subject matter of a ceiling proceeding, on deletion of section 45B of the Act, he becomes remedy-less. This type of amendment cannot be upheld.

Nagendra Rai, the counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that section 45B of the Act was introduced by way of amendment in the year 1978. There are three categories of transfers. One of the period prior to 1959 for which there was no embargo, the second for the period from 1959 to 1970 when permission of the Collector was to be sought and lastly for the period after the cut-off date of September 9, 1970. Section 9 of the Act deals with exercise of option and how land transferred is to be adjusted. The judgment in Bisheshwar Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1999 (3) PLJR 117 provides that land transferred in contravention of section 5 of the Act, to the extent not exceeding ceiling area be deemed to have been selected by him within the ceiling area. Reliance was also placed on the judgement in Mohammad Kajimuddin vs. State of Bihar, 2005 (4) PLJR 718 where it was held that transfers made in contravention of section 5(i) and (ii) of the Act will go in share of the land holder and shall not form part of surplus to be acquired by the State. It was lastly submitted that in Sunil Kumar vs. State of Bihar, 2004 (2) PLJR 820 the scope of application of section 45B of the Act has been dealt with. By deletion of section 45B, large number of persons will be left remedy-less.

P. K. Shahi, Advocate General appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that there was no argument by the petitioners on the legislative competence of the State to legislate. The grounds that an Act can be held to be not constitutionally valid, are mainly the same being in violation of Part III of the Constitution, the State lacking legislative competence or the same being violative of some other provision of the Constitution. The power to legislate was solely with the State, which would be evident form perusal of Item no.18 of the State List under the Seventh Schedule. It was submitted that only in the case of a law falling under the scope of Article 31A of the Constitution that the assent of the President was required. So far as the principal Act as originally enacted in the year 1961 is concerned, the same deals with the acquisition and vesting of land. The Act received the President’s assent on March 8, 1962 and was published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19.4.1962. Section 16(3) or section 45B of the Act not being in violation of any provision of the Constitution, no presidential assent was required. It was submitted that the right of pre-emptor was not a fundamental right but a statutory right which flowed from the Act. No law can be invalidated only on account of some person facing difficulty. The ground on which an Act could be declared unconstitutional are that it contravenes any fundamental right, legislating on a subject which is not assigned to the relevant legislature, contravenes a mandatory provision of the Constitution or in case of a State law it seeks to operate beyond its boundaries and impinges upon the legislative power of the Union Parliament. The Advocate General submitted that it was not that section 45D of the Amending Act, 2016 was challenged but the entire Amendment Act was under challenge. The newly added section 45D provides that after repeal of section 45B of the Act, the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceedings reopened earlier under the now deleted section 45B of the Act and pending before the Collector shall also stand abated. This amendment was introduced to give a quietus to the issues. It was lastly submitted that whole of the principal Act could also be repealed and in so repealing, neither any Presidential assent was required nor any other provision of the Constitution would come in the way of such repeal.

Basant Kumar Choudhary, senior advocate appearing for the respondents, submitted that the original Ceiling Act is a progressive legislation. So far as section 16(3) of the Act which dealt with the right of pre-
emption is concerned, the same was a supplementary right and not main purpose of the Act. The High Court in Banarsi Yadav vs. Krishna Chandra Das, 1971 BJR 1077 held that the Act being a protective legislation cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19, section 16(3) of the Act was held to be valid and the reference made held to be incompetent. It was also submitted that section 16 of the Act did not help in consolidation and section 16(3) is not protected by the 9th Schedule. The informed wisdom of the State Legislature cannot be questioned nor are the amendments ultra vires. A Full Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated March 12, 1951 declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as ultra vires on the ground of it infringing Article 14 of the Constitution, which led to the first Constitutional amendment and such laws were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 was enacted, it received the assent of the President on 8.3.1962 and was published in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19.4.1962. It was an Act to provide for fixation of ceiling, restriction on subletting and resumption by certain raiyats for personal cultivation of land, acquisition of status of raiyat by certain under-raiyats and acquisition of surplus land by the State, the object being equitable distribution of land. 

By the Amendment Act, 2019, sub-section (3) of section 16 of the Act, which gave the right of pre-emption was repealed and sub-section (4) was added to section 16 which provided that all cases or proceedings pending before any of the authorities/tribunals/Court shall be deemed to have abated and the purchase money together with the sum equal to 10% shall be refunded to the depositor without any interest. By the Amendment Act, 2019, amendments were carried out in section 16 of the Act. Section 16(3) which gave the Right of Pre-emption was repealed and newly added section 16(4) provided that all cases of proceedings after repeal of section 16(3) shall abate and the purchase money together with 10% thereof, without any interest, shall be refunded to the depositor.

By the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016, besides adding new sub-sections (3) and (4) to section 30 and sub-section (4) to section 32, section 45B of the Act was repealed. Further, a new section 45D was added which provided that the proceedings pending before the State Government or the Bihar Land Tribunal or those reopened under the deleted section 45B and pending before the Collector shall all stand abated. 

The judgement was authored by Justice Partha Sarthy. In the penultimate paragraph, it reads: "....the Court finds no merit in the challenge by the petitioners in these batch of cases to the Constitutional validity of the two Amendment Acts. Both, the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are held to be constitutionally valid. 49. Both the amendment Acts of 2016 and 2019 having been held to be Constitutionally valid, the question which would arise is as to how would the individual cases, arising out of an application of right to pre-emption under section 16(3) of the Act and which are pending adjudication at different stages are to be decided. The right of preemption which arose from section 16(3) of the Act having been repealed by the Amendment Act, 2019, it may be stated that clause 2(2) of the Amendment Act, 2019 provides that after repeal of section 16(3) of the Act, all cases or proceedings pending before the State Government, Board of Revenue, the Bihar Land Tribunal, the Divisional Commissioner, the Collector, the Additional Collector, the Deputy Collector Land Reforms or in any other Court shall be deemed to be abated and pursuant to the repeal any purchase money together with the sum equal to 10% thereof shall be refunded to the depositor, without any interest."

The judgement concluded: "52. The applications stand disposed of in the following terms:-(i) The applications so far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2016 as also that of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Surplus Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 are concerned, stand dismissed.... Both Section 45D and 16(4) provide for the consequence upon repeal of Section 45B and Section 16(3) of the Act. The language of Section 45D is different from that of Section 16(4). While Section 16(4) provides that all cases of proceedings pending before the Tribunal or the Authorities mentioned therein 'or in any other Court' shall abate, the words 'or in any other Court' does not find mention in Section 45D. Thus, in this view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that those matters arising out of an application under Section 45B of the Act having been decided by the Authorities or the Tribunal and applications preferred against the said orders being pending in this Court, though the Constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, 2016 has been upheld, these cases will have to be listed before the appropriate bench having roster, for it to be decided on it's own merits.....”

 

Justice Rajiv Roy disposes of cases related illegal private hospitals in Bihar

In Rohit Kumar Singh @ Rohit Kumar Rocky vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Rajiv Roy of Patna High Court disposed the case along with Bindeshwar Sah vs. State of Bihar (2025) on May 1, 2026. Earlier, Justice Roy had passed a 10-page long order dated January 15, 2026 wherein, it was recorded that the petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in connection with Jandaha P.S. Case No. 121 of 2025 instituted under Sections 319(2), 318(1), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 125(a), 125 of the Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023 lodged on March 21, 2025 by the informant, Dr. Rabindra Kumar. As per the prosecution story, during surprise inspection relating to illegal running of Clinic/Hospital that: (i) research child care unit;  (ii) new jiwan health care; (iii) maa shobha hospital; (iv) leafty life emergency hospital in Jandaha Block were running without any proper approval of the State Government, were sealed and the officials named as accused. The case was filed on December 10, 2025 and registered on December 22, 2025.

 

Prior to this in his order dated April, 3, 2026 had recorded that the counsel for the petitioners and GP-2 Prashant Pratap, Jitendra Kumar Singh prayed for and were allowed four weeks’ time to file affidavit on behalf of the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer and had ordered that this case be listed on May 1, 2026.

 

The order dated May 1, 2026 by Justice Roy recorded that "8. In similar situate case, Cr. Misc. no. 90533 of 2025 (Bindeshwar Sah vs. State), response of Health Department, Bihar as also the Civil Surgeon, Vaishali have been sought. 9. Call for legible xerox/carbon copy of the case diary, the criminal antecedent report of the petitioner and the supervision report, if any, in the present case from the court of learned A.C.J.M., Vaishali at Hajipur, in connection with Jandaha P.S. Case No. 121 of 2025.List this case on 13.03.2026 as "Tied Up Matter" alongwith Cr. Misc. No. 90533 of 2025 (Bindeshwar Sah vs. the State of Bihar)  11. In the meanwhile, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner in connection Jandaha P.S. Case No. 121 of 2025 pending in the court of learned A.C.J.M., Vaishali at Hajipur." According to the affidavit of the Civil Surgeon, the clinic operated in Rajapakar, Vaishali was neither registered nor were qualified doctors present there. The administration has registered a case number imposing a fine of Rs 1 lakh. The High Court directed the Health Department to file the progress report.

 

Justice Roy recollected that in the Dr. Dilip Kumar @ Hari Shankar Pandit & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 43257 of 2025) wherein a lady had died at a private clinic in Piro (Bhojpur), reports were called for from the Civil Surgeon, Bhojpur as also the Health Department, Bihar, Patna. In his order dated November 24, 2025 referred to his order dated November 7, 2025. The latter recorded paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the counter affidavit which read as follows: “6. That a total of 123 private hospitals operating within the district of Bhojpur were inspected by the duly constituted investigation team. During the said inspection, it was found that 81 hospitals were not functioning as per prescribed medical and statutory standards and accordingly, were declared as illegal hospital with immediate effect. 7. That the aforesaid details of the inspection, including the list of illegal hospitals, have been uploaded on the official website Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Bhojpur in strict compliance of the order of this Hon’ble Court. A copy of Letter No. 2883 dated 31.07.2025 & Letter No. 2889 dated 01.08.2025 along with the enclosed list of such hospitals has also been placed on record. 8. That in furtherance of paragraph
18(i) of the order dated 25.07.2025, the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Bhojpur vide Letter No. 3118 dated 17.08.2025, addressed to the District Information and Public Relations Officer, Bhojpur, Arrah, requested the uploading of the list of illegal private hospitals, nursing homes, Bhojpur district on the official NIC website of the district.” 

 

Notably, the High Court was of the opinion that the Health Department of Bihar has taken strenuous job and expects that they will take the matter to its logical conclusion.The case was filed on June 16, 2025 and registered on June 26, 2025. 

 

Pursuant thereto, on August 22, 2025, the High  Court in the Dr. Dilip Kumar (supra) case, recorded: "Pursuant to the last order, the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Bhojpur is present in the Court and a supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on his behalf. The report is an eye opener for the District Administration as also the Health Department, Bihar as during the inspection, 81 Nursing Homes were found to be functioning illegally." He observed:"4. Clearly, the innocent citizen of Bhojpur district have been left to suffer at the hands of the illegal Nursing Homes with the office of the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Bhojpur as also the different other wings of the said district having the solemn duty to inspect and take necessary steps clearly looking the other way. The Health Department, Bihar also has to answer as to why reports are not sought for from the Districts randomly in this regard so that appropriate steps are taken in the matter. 5. Time has come for them to constitute a State level team under the leadership of a Senior Officer to be  deputed by the Departmental head who shall be visiting one of the district every fortnight alongwith a  dedicated team who shall have the power to inspect such Nursing Homes and directly report to the Department. 6. They shall also be inspecting the different Hospitals and Primary Health Centres situated in the particular district to get first hand knowledge about its functioning and suggest remedial measure so that they are strengthened accordingly to cater to the medical needs of the citizen. If the Hospitals/Primary Health Centres are fully equipped, the patients will certainly not like to go to the Nursing Homes....11. So far as the pathological labs are concerned, the concluding annexure clearly show that formality has been done by providing chart of 46 such labs but whether they are functioning legally/illegally and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the State government or not and if not, the steps that has been taken has not been brought on record by the Civil Surgeon, Bhojpur. 12. Regarding the guidelines sought for by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Bhojpur from the Health Department, Bihar, Patna is concerned, Mr. Prashant Pratap, learned GP-2 submits that steps are being taken to see to it that the said menace is controlled in the entire State of Bihar and for this, a request letter has been received for granting three week's time to file the reply of the Health Department, Bihar. The submission is that they shall soon be taking a policy decision....17. The Health Department, Bihar must realize that Bhojpur district is not an exception and if reports are called for, each and every district may give the same picture and as this Court has taken note of the fact that regular deaths are taking place everywhere in ordinary medical cases specially when a healthy pregnant lady enters such Nursing Home for the delivery of the child but the family members come out with her dead body. Each and every life is precious and the State has the solemn duty to protect them at any cost." 

The Dr. Dilip Kumar (supra) case was again taken up on November 7, 2025 and November 24, 2025 and on the last date, while modifying the order dated November 7, 2025, in para-3 of the order, the counter affidavit of the Health Department was incorporated as follows:  "5. That it is stated and submitted that the Health Department, Government of Bihar has taken note of the matter as per the direction of this Hon'ble Court issued by order dated 22.08.2025 and in that course, two State Level Committee for Saran, Tirhut, Darbhanga, Koshi and Purnia Division headed by Director-in-Chief (Administration), Health Services, Bihar, Patna and Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.90504 of 2025(2) dt.15-01-2026 another committee for Patna, Magadh Munger and Bhagalpur Division headed by Director-in-Chief (Nursing), Health Services, Bihar, Patna have been constituted by the Health Department, Bihar by order issued vide Memo No. 1875(18) dated 08.09.2025 for inspection of all Government and Private Hospitals/Nursing Homes/Pathology Centre and submitting a report to the Department with specific instructions to inspect the hospitals/Nursing homes in at least one district every fortnight and provide the inspection report to the department. 6. That it is relevant to state here that by departmental letter no. 1845 (18) dated 28.11.2013, Bihar Clinical Establishment (Registration and Regulation) Rules, 2013 has been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 54 of the Clinical Establishment (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010.  

 

Justice Roy's order reads: "7. That it is further relevant to state here that by departmental notification No. 480 (18) dated 04.03.2025, Bihar Clinical Establishment (Registration and Regulation) Rules, 2013 has been amended and hospitals with 01-40 beds have been exempted from the said rules. Thereafter, guidelines have been sought by various Civil Surgeons of Bihar regarding the control and renewal of hospitals having 01-40 beds and other facts. In this background and in view of the order of this Hon'ble Court passed in this case, a six-member committee headed by Dr. Pramod Kumar Singh, Director-in-Chief, Health Services, Bihar, Patna has been constituted by the Health Department by office order Memo No. 1853(18) dated 02.09.2025 to issue guidelines at departmental level for controlling Hospitals/Nursing Homes with  01-40 beds running in the surgeries. 8. That although the constituted committee was directed to provide the necessary guidelines to regulate 1-40 bedded hospitals/nursing homes within two days in the light of the guidelines sought by various Civil Surgeons. But due to the committee reviewing the matter in depth, the report could not be provided on time. 9. That the Health Department, Government of Bihar is actively pursuing the matter as per the direction of this Hon'ble Court." 

 

It has been submitted that the policy for regulation of small hospitals is in the final stages. Under the notification dated March 4, 2025, temporary relaxation was given to hospitals with 1–40 beds. After this, the committee constituted under the chairmanship of Dr. Rekha Jha submitted its report on February 20, 2026. The draft has received the approval of the Law Department and is currently under consideration with the Finance Department. 

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Frick India Limited's SLP dismissed as infructuous: Supreme Court

The petition filed under under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable if the same relief is prayed in Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The petition was filed by the M/s Frick India Limited to restrain Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA) from terminating the contract awarded to the company and from forfeiting the Performance and Additional Performance Bank Guarantees and to stay the implementation of letter dated August 10, 2024 to the extent it relates to debarment of the company from participating in any further tender for next five years in connection. The company was blacklisted by BIADA for five years and respondent was debarred from future tender process.

In Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA) & Ors. vs. M/s Frick India Limited (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Arun Kumar Jha passed an order dated May 16, 2025, wherein, it recorded that the petitioners submitted that the petitioners had challenged the order dated April 22, 2025 passed by Principal District Judge, Patna in Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No. 65 of 2024, whereby and whereunder the Principal District Judge allowed the respondent to participate in e-retender. The respondent was blacklisted by the petitioners for five years and respondent is debarred from future tender process. counsel further submits that the respondent has filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The other petitioners were: Chairman, BIADA and DGM (Technical), BIADA.

On April 30, 2026, Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhete passed an order in M/s Frick India Limited vs. Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA) & Ors. (2026), which reads:"The present Special Leave Petition has rendered infructuous and is dismissed as having become infructuous." 

  

Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's order denying regular bail because charge sheet filed, co-accused already granted bail in a cyber crime case

In Raja Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it granted bail in a cyber crime case. It reversed the 2-page long order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court. 

The petitioner is implicated in a case pursuant to Cyber P.S. Case No. 11 of 2025 registered with Lakhisarai Cyber Thana under Sections 318(4), 319(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Sections 66(C) and 66(D) of the Information Technology  Act, 2000. Section 318 (1) (2) (3) of BNS deals with the offence of  cheating. Its corresponding Section in IPC Section 415. 

Section 318 (1) BNS reads:"Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section." It cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Magistrate of the First Class.

Section 318 (4) of BNS deals with punishment for cheating. It reads:"Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." 

Section 319 (1) of BNS defines cheating by personation. It reads:"A person is said to cheat by personation if he cheats by pretending to be some other person, or by knowingly substituting one person for or another, or representing that he or any other person is a person other than he or such other person really is. Explanation.—The offence is committed whether the individual personated is a real or imaginary person."

Section 319 (2) of BNS has provision for punishment for cheating. It reads:"Whoever cheats by personation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both." The offence is cognizable, bailable and triable by any Magistrate. 

Section 66 C of the Information Technology Act deals with identity theft. It reads:"Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly makes use of the electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment up to three years and a fine up to one lakh rupees.”

To establish guilt under Section 66C, the prosecution must prove fraudulent or dishonest intention while using another person’s credentials, use of electronic identity, such as password, signature, or biometric and absence of lawful authorization to use the said digital identity.

The offence attracts imprisonment up to 3 years and fine up to ₹1 lakh. Section 66D reads: "Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource.–Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource cheats by personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees." The offence is cognizable, bailable, and compoundable. 

Notably, Ritu Kohli case (Delhi Cyber Cell, 2001) is a landmark case of cyberstalking and identity theft. The accused misused the victim’s identity on a chat platform, leading to harassment. It directly established the applicability of Section 66C for digital impersonation. 

Supreme Court noted that the Investigating Officer has completed the investigation and has filed the charge sheet on March 31, 2025. The petitioner was arrested on March 1, 2025 and is in jail since then. One of the co-accused ‘Deepak Kumar’ has already been granted bail in the matter. The trial has not commenced and there are five listed witnesses. The counsel for the respondent submitted that the Trial Court will take at least one year to complete the examination. 

Supreme Court concluded: "5. In the facts and circumstances, we consider it appropriate to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 6. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail on such terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Trial Court commensurating with the charges, if any, framed against him including surrendering of his passport, if any, with the Trial Court itself."

In the High Court, the order dated January 9, 2026 by Justice Kumar heard the second attempt on behalf of the petitioner for grant of bail. Earlier the bail application of the petitioner was rejected by order dated May 6, 2025. The order noted that the petitioner, was in custody since March 1, 2025. He had sought regular bail in connection with the Cyber P.S. Case. As per the prosecution case, the Cyber Police Station on getting complaint of cyber fraud raided the place of occurrence from where the petitioner and others were apprehended. The Police had raided the place after tracing Mob.No. 9007683902. One mobile phone with dual sim has been recovered and from a bag in the room, three mobile were recovered from the petitioner, . From the place of occurrence, one Laptop and one copy was recovered and in the copy, many mobile numbers were written and cyber criminals were making calls on those mobile numbers.

Justice Kumar had concluded:"5. Considering the fact that the petitioner is a cyber fraud who was caught by the Cyber Police who committed raid at the place of occurrence and recovered a number of incriminating articles, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 6. Accordingly, this application for regular bail is hereby rejected.” 5. This Court finds no new ground to review its earlier order dated 06.05.2025. 6. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." But Supreme Court felt persuaded to grat bail to the petitioner. 

Supreme Court reverses bail rejection order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a gold chain snatching case

In Mukesh Tiwari @ Mukesh Pandey vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V Viswanathan and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it reversed the 2-page long order dated February 23, 2026 by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. Supreme Court concluded: "6. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, especially the fact that the petitioner is in custody for 10 months in a case where the maximum sentence is 3 years, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 7. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to be enlarged on bail, if not required in any other case, subject to terms and conditions that the Trial Court may think fit to impose. 8. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms."

The Special Leave Petition questioned the correctness of the order of the High Court. The petitioner is facing trial for offence under Section 304 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 202. Snatching is a cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable offence.

Section 304 (1) of BNS 2023 defines snatching as a distinct form of theft. For an act to qualify as “Snatching,” it must encompass all elements of theft, including dishonest intention, lack of consent, and the movement of the property. Section 304 (2) provides that “whoever commits snatching, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine”.

If the offence is penalized under Section 304(2) according to Section 283(2) of the BNSS, the magistrate may choose to hold a summary trial. The offence has been made triable by any magistrate. 

FIR registration under Sections 173 of BNSS, the procedure begins when the complainant goes to the police station to file an FIR under Section 173. Property seizure under Sections 106-107: During the investigation, the police may seize any property associated with the crime vide Section 106. It also requires the seized property to be presented to the Magistrate. Section 107 (7), (8) lays down the procedure for the attachment, forfeiture or restoration of such property to the victim. Investigation (Sections 173-196): A new provision in BNSS has been added vide Section 173(3) wherein on receipt of information relating to a cognizable offence, the officer-in-charge of the police station may with prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (i) Conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within 14 days, or (ii) proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case. The procedure for investigation is given under Section 176. 

There is provision for charge Sheet under Section 193. If there is adequate evidence following an inquiry, a charge sheet is submitted under Section 193. Framing of Charges under Section 251): Section 251 provides the framework for the start of the trial. BNSS states that charges must be framed within 60 days of the initial charge hearing. Trial under Sections 248-260: The witnesses are examined, cross-examined, and re-examined as the trial moves along. Under Section 248, the Public Prosecutor will lead the trial. 

Under Section 249, prosecution will begin. Under Section 250, there is provision for discharge. Under Section 251, there is a provision for framing of charges. Under Section 252,there is a provision for plea of guilty and conviction. Under Section 253, the date of the prosecution's evidence is fixed. Under Section 254, there is provision for prosecution-related evidence. Section 255 has provision for acquittal. Sections 258-260 has provisions for judgment. The court renders a decision based on the evidence that was put out in the trial. 

Snatching is one of the new offences that has been introduced in the BNS, one of the three new criminal laws. The rising incidents of chain snatching, and mobile phone snatching, which contain sensitive data, financial information, and passwords necessitated the addition of a section to punish the same. Theft is considered “snatching” if, with the intent to commit theft, the offender suddenly, quickly, or forcibly seizes, secures, grabs, or takes away any movable property from any person or their possession. Theft was formerly specified under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), however, snatching was not specifically listed as a distinct crime. 

In the High Court, Justice Kumar's order noted that it was the second attempt on behalf of the petitioner for grant of bail in connection with Doriganj P.S. Case of 2025 registered for the offence under Section 304 of the BNS. Earlier, the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected vide order dated September 17, 2025. The second bail application was preferred by the petitioner within six months of its earlier rejection. The High Court had observed:" 4. In the opinion of this Court, this application is premature as successive bail applications cannot be entertained by this Court within few months of earlier rejection. 5. Accordingly, this application is dismissed with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- which shall be deposited by the petitioner in the Patna High Court, Legal Services Authority within two weeks from today." 

On the earlier occasion, Justice Kumar's order had recorded that as per the prosecution case, unknown criminals were found involved in snatching the gold chain from the neck of the wife of the informant. The motorcycle of the snatchers was recovered from the place of the occurrence which belongs to the petitioner. The petitioner is in custody since June 12, 2025 and had two criminal antecedents. His earlier, order had concluded:"5. Considering the allegation levelled against the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. 6. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected."

Unlike Justice Kumar, Supreme Court's Division Bench was persuaded by the submission of the counsel for the petitioner to grant bail. It was submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 10 months imprisonment and that the maximum punishment is 3 years. The offence was also a Magistrate triable offence. 

Justice Purnendu Singh affirms judgement of conviction under Section 323 by Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur

In Sukhari Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026) which was heard along with Mahipat Ram vs, The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 19-page long judgement dated April 30, 026, wherein, he concluded:"25. I find that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the judgment passed by the Apex Court in case of Sivamani (supra) and in view of the aforesaid discussion of factual and legal aspects, it emerges that the alleged occurrence took place in a sudden manner on account of prior enmity between the parties and without any clear premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the accused persons. The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances, and the medical evidence, particularly the testimony of P.W.4 –Dr. Vinod Kumar Kashyap, indicate that although the informant sustained a head injury opined to be grievous in nature, the same has been attributed to a hard and blunt substance and the doctor has also admitted the possibility of such injury being caused by a fall on a hard surface, thereby creating doubt regarding the manner of assault. In the backdrop of inconsistent testimonies of the material witnesses, lack of reliable independent corroboration, and infirmities in investigation, tfhe evidence on record does not conclusively establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Rather, the materials on record, at best, indicate an act of causing hurt by use of a blunt object, and thus,....this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the conviction, if any, can be sustained only for a lesser offence in accordance with law. The learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellants under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly in view of the injury reports showing injuries caused by hard and blunt substance." 

To sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 9 of its judgement in Sivamani vs. State, reported in, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1581,  has held: “ 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.  Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.”

Before delivering the verdict, Justice Singh examined the case to find out whether the impugned judgment warrants interference by this Court on the charge levelled against the accused/appellants under Sections 307/34 and 323 of IPC. 

Justice Sing observed: "....taking an overall view, the Impugned judgment dated 17-01-2012 and order of sentence dated 21-01-2012 passed in S.T. No. 118/13 of 2003/07 (arising out of Durgawati P.S. Case No. 15/2003) is varied only to the extent that the conviction of the appellants stands modified to that under Sections 323 of the IPC. 27. However, so far as, the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellants, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. It is directed that if the appellants have already undergone the modified sentence, they shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellants are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds, if any." 

Section 323 reads:"Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

The appellants preferred the criminal appeals against the judgment dated January 17, 2012 and order of sentence dated January 21, 2012 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Durgawati P.S. Case 2003 by1st Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur at Bhabua, whereby, the trial court convicted the appellants under Section 307/34 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years (for section 307 of IPC) and further these three appellants were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 years (for section 323 of IPC). The appellants assailed the impugned judgment primarily on the ground that the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in its proper perspective and has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants.

Sections 307 reads:"Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

The case of the prosecution, was that on February 12, 2003 at about 21:30 hours, the informant, Chhabilal Ram, was returning to his house from Durgawati Bazaar. When he reached near a well situated close to the house of Khobhari Ram in village Khaminaura, the accused persons, namely Rajendra Ram, Dularchand Ram, Sukhari Ram and Mahipat Ram, allegedly surrounded him and, on account of previous enmity, formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted him. It was also alleged that during the course of the assault, accused Mahipat Ram dealt a lathi blow on the head of the informant, causing injury as a result of which he fell down and raised alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, nearby persons reached the place of occurrence, whereupon the accused persons fled away. Thereafter, the injured was taken for treatment by his nephew, Om Prakash Ram. 

During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether eight witnesses and relied upon documents exhibited during the course of trial. 

Justice Singh observed: "19. It is well settled that an attempt to commit murder must be clearly distinguished from a mere intention to commit the offence or from acts that amount only to preparation for its commission. The law recognizes that the existence of a guilty intention alone is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. There must be something more than planning or arranging the means to commit the crime. Therefore, in order to secure a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution must prove the presence of a definite intention or knowledge to cause death, accompanied by some overt act that directly moves towards the execution of that intention. In other words, the accused must not only possess the intention to commit murder but must also perform an act that clearly demonstrates the commencement of the offence."

The Supreme Court laid down the litmus test for determination of nature of offence in Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the Court needs to decide the pivotal question of existence of intention with care and caution. The following factors needs to be examined:
"(i) nature of the weapon used;
(ii)whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;
(iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;
(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;
(viii)whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation;
(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner;
(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows."

The Supreme Court grappled with a similar question in the case of Joseph vs. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 165. The relevant paragraph reads: “3. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the intention to cause the injury which was found sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of the nature was not established. In support of this submission he relied on the circumstances namely that the whole incident took place because of a trivial incident which resulted in a quarrel and that the weapon used was only a lathi and in the circumstances it cannot be said that the accused intended to cause the death by inflicting that particular injury which objectively was proved by the medical evidence to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In other words he submits that clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC is not attracted in this case. We find considerable force in the submission. The weapon used is not a deadly weapon as rightly contended by the learned counsel. The whole occurrence was a result of a trivial incident and in those circumstances the accused dealt two blows on the head with a lathi, therefore, it cannot be stated that he intended to cause the injury which is sufficient (sic). At the most it can be said that by inflicting such injuries he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to five years' RI.”

In the case of Jugatram vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 520, Supreme Court drew on its judgment in Joseph case. 

Drawing on these judgements, Justice Singh observed: "24. Admittedly, from the prosecution case itself, it transpires that the alleged occurrence arose out of previous enmity between the parties and is stated to have taken place suddenly at night, without any clear evidence of premeditation or prior meeting of minds, the incident having occurred in the course of a sudden confrontation. Further, the prosecution evidence suffers from material infirmities..."