In Sukhari Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026) which was heard along with Mahipat Ram vs, The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 19-page long judgement dated April 30, 026, wherein, he concluded:"25. I find that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the judgment passed by the Apex Court in case of Sivamani (supra) and in view of the aforesaid discussion of factual and legal aspects, it emerges that the alleged occurrence took place in a sudden manner on account of prior enmity between the parties and without any clear premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the accused persons. The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances, and the medical evidence, particularly the testimony of P.W.4 –Dr. Vinod Kumar Kashyap, indicate that although the informant sustained a head injury opined to be grievous in nature, the same has been attributed to a hard and blunt substance and the doctor has also admitted the possibility of such injury being caused by a fall on a hard surface, thereby creating doubt regarding the manner of assault. In the backdrop of inconsistent testimonies of the material witnesses, lack of reliable independent corroboration, and infirmities in investigation, tfhe evidence on record does not conclusively establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Rather, the materials on record, at best, indicate an act of causing hurt by use of a blunt object, and thus,....this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the conviction, if any, can be sustained only for a lesser offence in accordance with law. The learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellants under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly in view of the injury reports showing injuries caused by hard and blunt substance."
To sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 9 of its judgement in Sivamani vs. State, reported in, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1581,
has held: “ 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554,
the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it
was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death
should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307,
IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow
as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that
‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was
done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned
in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not
sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been
reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra)
and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or
life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under
Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from
the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances.
Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of
the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.”
Before delivering the verdict, Justice
Singh examined the case to find out whether the impugned judgment
warrants interference by this Court on the charge levelled against the
accused/appellants under Sections 307/34 and 323 of IPC.
Justice Sing observed: "....taking an overall view, the Impugned judgment dated 17-01-2012 and order of sentence dated 21-01-2012 passed in S.T. No. 118/13 of 2003/07 (arising out of Durgawati P.S. Case No. 15/2003) is varied only to the extent that the conviction of the appellants stands modified to that under Sections 323 of the IPC. 27. However, so far as, the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellants, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. It is directed that if the appellants have already undergone the modified sentence, they shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellants are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds, if any."
Section 323 reads:"Punishment for
voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by
section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with
both.”
The appellants preferred the criminal appeals against the judgment dated January 17, 2012 and order of sentence dated January 21, 2012 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Durgawati P.S. Case 2003 by1st Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur at Bhabua, whereby, the trial court convicted the appellants under Section 307/34 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years (for section 307 of IPC) and further these three appellants were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 years (for section 323 of IPC). The appellants assailed the impugned judgment primarily on the ground that the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in its proper perspective and has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants.
Sections 307 reads:"Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
The case of the prosecution, was that on February 12, 2003 at about 21:30 hours, the informant, Chhabilal Ram, was returning to his house from Durgawati Bazaar. When he reached near a well situated close to the house of Khobhari Ram in village Khaminaura, the accused persons, namely Rajendra Ram, Dularchand Ram, Sukhari Ram and Mahipat Ram, allegedly surrounded him and, on account of previous enmity, formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted him. It was also alleged that during the course of the assault, accused Mahipat Ram dealt a lathi blow on the head of the informant, causing injury as a result of which he fell down and raised alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, nearby persons reached the place of occurrence, whereupon the accused persons fled away. Thereafter, the injured was taken for treatment by his nephew, Om Prakash Ram.
During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether eight witnesses and relied upon documents exhibited during the course of trial.
Justice Singh observed: "19. It is well settled that an attempt to commit murder must be clearly distinguished from a mere intention to commit the offence or from acts that amount only to preparation for its commission. The law recognizes that the existence of a guilty intention alone is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. There must be something more than planning or arranging the means to commit the crime. Therefore, in order to secure a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution must prove the presence of a definite intention or knowledge to cause death, accompanied by some overt act that directly moves towards the execution of that intention. In other words, the accused must not only possess the intention to commit murder but must also perform an act that clearly demonstrates the commencement of the offence."
The Supreme Court laid down the litmus test for determination of nature of offence in Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the Court needs to decide the pivotal question of existence of intention with care and caution. The following factors needs to be examined:
"(i) nature of the weapon used;
(ii)whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;
(iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;
(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;
(viii)whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation;
(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner;
(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows."
The Supreme Court grappled with a similar question in the case of Joseph vs. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 165. The relevant paragraph reads: “3. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the intention to cause the injury which was found sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of the nature was not established. In support of this submission he relied on the circumstances namely that the whole incident took place because of a trivial incident which resulted in a quarrel and that the weapon used was only a lathi and in the circumstances it cannot be said that the accused intended to cause the death by inflicting that particular injury which objectively was proved by the medical evidence to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In other words he submits that clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC is not attracted in this case. We find considerable force in the submission. The weapon used is not a deadly weapon as rightly contended by the learned counsel. The whole occurrence was a result of a trivial incident and in those circumstances the accused dealt two blows on the head with a lathi, therefore, it cannot be stated that he intended to cause the injury which is sufficient (sic). At the most it can be said that by inflicting such injuries he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to five years' RI.”
In the case of Jugatram vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 520, Supreme Court drew on its judgment in Joseph case.
Drawing on these judgements, Justice Singh observed: "24. Admittedly, from the prosecution case itself, it transpires that the alleged occurrence arose out of previous enmity between the parties and is stated to have taken place suddenly at night, without any clear evidence of premeditation or prior meeting of minds, the incident having occurred in the course of a sudden confrontation. Further, the prosecution evidence suffers from material infirmities..."
