Supreme Court orders "Metro trains and railway facilities shall function normally, free movement of people in the city shall be ensured, Internet facilities should function unhindered, There shall be no illegal detention, Lawyers, journalists and other professionals shall not be hindered in discharge of their professional duties"

In Shailendra Mani Tripathi vs. Govind Mohan (2026), upon hearing a Contempt Petition (Civil) Diary, a case arising out of 4-page long Supreme Court’s impugned judgment and order dated October 9, 2026 in M.A. Baby vs. Union of India, Commissioner of Police, Joint Commissioner of Police & Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Joymalya Bagchi and  V. Mohana passed a 11-page long order on SUNDAY October 11, 2026, wherein, it concluded: 16. Taking note of such submissions, we direct as follows:

(a) Metro trains and railway facilities shall function normally until and unless they need to be regulated keeping in mind reasonable restrictions envisaged under Article 19(2).

(b) Similarly, free movement of people in the city shall be ensured subject to law and order situation and/or traffic regulations. Imposition of barricades on roads shall be reviewed forthwith to ensure free movement subject to law and order and traffic requirements.

(c) Internet facilities should function unhindered.

(d) There shall be no illegal detention, particularly in cases of peaceful unarmed assemblage of people beyond the area where Section 163 BNSS is in operation.

(e) We have been informed that a notice board stating Section 163 BNSS has been invoked in and around the precincts of the Supreme Court has been put up in the Court premises. We direct the authorities concerned to forthwith take down the said board, if not already done, so that there is no apprehension with regard to ingress and egress to the Supreme Court or any other court of law.

(f) Lawyers, journalists and other professionals shall not be hindered in discharge of their professional duties in any manner whatsoever. 17. List on 13.10.2026 for further consideration along with Diary No. 63952/2026, Diary No. 63943/2026, Diary No. 63944/2026 and application(s) for intervention/impleadment.

The order reads: “1. Application for permission to file contempt petition is allowed. 2. In view of the urgent applications alleging violation of our earlier order dated 09.10.2026 and also alleging illegal detention of large number of individuals at Delhi on 10.10.2026, this Court has assembled for an urgent hearing. 3. During hearing, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. N. Hariharan, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Mr. Shadan Farasat, Dr. Monika Gusain, Mr. Shoeb Alam, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel and Mr. Devvrat, learned AOR along with other learned senior counsel/counsel submitted that there were flagrant violations of directions given in our order dated 09.10.2026; metro railway was not functioning; New Delhi railway station and Nizamuddin railway station remained closed; no traffic advisories were issued and large number of persons were subjected to undue harassment and illegal detention even beyond the area which was covered by the prohibitory order passed under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). It was also contended that there was a complete shutdown of the internet and that the city bore a curfew like look with suspension of transport and free movement of people and goods.”

The order further reads: “4. In addition to such submissions, oral mentionings were made in respect of Diary No. 63952/2026, Diary No. 63943/2026 and Diary No. 63944/2026 wherein similar prayers had been made. 5. Dr. Menaka Guruswamy in support of the listed matters being Diary No.63801/2026 (in Diary No.63560/2026) and Diary No.63858/2026 took us through the pleadings, wherein it has been averred that the metro railway stations namely GTB Nagar Metro Station and Viswavidyalaya Metro Station among other metro stations were completely shut out to public and there has been a deliberate and wilful violation of our order as aforesaid. 6. Addressing us on the Habeas Corpus petition (Diary No.63858/2026), Dr. Guruswamy forcibly contended that the prayer re: illegal detention is not merely restricted to the personalities referred to therein but is a plea against widespread illegal detention of about 7,000 individuals in the city. 7. In rebuttal, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India & Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India contend that the petitions which were orally mentioned have not been served on the Union and accordingly they are unable to assist the Court on the issues pleaded therein.”

The order states: “8. With regard to the allegations made in the Diary No. 63801/2026, Mr. Tushar Mehta orally denies and disputes the allegations of violation of order dated 09.10.2026 and contends that the Delhi Metro was functioning normally, however, 45 out of 303 stations had been closed to maintain law and order. In response to the Habeas Corpus petition, he denied any one had been illegally detained and otherwise the petition is infructuous as the detenues referred to have since been released. 9. With regard to the submission that the essential services still remain suspended, he assured this Court that all metro stations are open since 10 p.m. yesterday, trains are functioning normally and internet connection has been restored. With regard to a serious insinuation that Section 163 of the BNSS had been clamped in and around the Supreme Court premises, Mr. Mehta sought time to seek instructions. 10. Other counsel have made prayers for intervention in these proceedings and contend that the fundamental freedoms must be exercised in a reasonable manner and must be subjected to reasonable restrictions.”

The Court recorded: “11. Having heard the learned senior counsel as well as the learned Solicitor General of India and learned Additional Solicitor General of India, we note that our order dated 09.10.2026, inter alia, held as follows: “7. It appears that the notifications are overreaching, as they impose a complete ban upon essential public transportation. Upon our indication that a distinction exists between total ‘prohibition’ and the ‘regulation’ of Metro and other train movements, learned Solicitor General of India has fairly agreed to impress upon the authorities to reassess such prohibitions. Consequently, they will permit the operation of Metro trains and other rail services in such a regulated manner, that no inconvenience is caused to the residents and general public of Delhi, while adhering to the principles of proportionality. 8. Regarding that assurance, we clarify that although there shall be no outright prohibition on the movement of Metro trains, a prudent decision may be made to permit the operation of Metro trains and other rail services in a suitable and regulated manner. Such a decision should be widely publicised to prevent further inconvenience. 9. In this vein, a traffic advisory shall also be published in respect of smooth movement of vehicles in newspapers and on online platforms to ensure that no hardship or inconvenience is caused to the public in the course of traveling within the city. The order will be issued today to ensure that the decision receives publicity and that there is ample clarity on the prevailing circumstances. 10. During the course of hearing, it was suggested, and learned senior counsel and counsel for the parties were ad idem, that it is high time basic amenities were provided to those engaged in peaceful and lawful protest. To that end, suitable alternative sites capable of housing such infrastructure need to be identified and designated. Let the Competent Authority consider this suggestion and take an appropriate decision thereon. 11. Let a compliance report be filed by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, the requisite Railway authorities and Delhi Police (Traffic) in this regard within four days. 12. Ordered accordingly. 12. In summary, by the said order, firstly, the authorities concerned had been directed to revisit the earlier notification issued by Delhi Metro regarding closure of 57 metro stations keeping in mind the fact that the operation of metro train and other rail services may be regulated in appropriate situations but not prohibited outrightly. Secondly, the order had also directed the authorities to give wide publicity to the reconsidered decision to avoid further inconvenience to the public. Thirdly, the order had directed fresh traffic advisories in newspapers and online platforms in respect of free vehicle movement. The order has also called upon the authorities to submit a compliance report within four days i.e., 13.10.2026.” 

Supreme Court observed: “13. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the averments in the Contempt Petition, we are of the opinion that the petitioners have made out a prima facie case. Accordingly, we issue notice upon the alleged contemnors. They are directed to file counter affidavit to the said petition including a compliance report in terms of our order as aforesaid by 13.10.2026. Their personal presence is dispensed with in the meanwhile. Similarly, notice is issued in Habeas Corpus Petition (Diary No.63858/2026). 14. The other unlisted mentioned petitions shall be served upon the office of the Solicitor General during the course of the day and shall be tagged with the present matters. Intervention/impleadment application(s) shall also be tagged with these matters. 15. Learned counsel have strongly urged for ad-interim reliefs with regard to smooth operation of metro rail, traffic, internet services and free movement of people, especially lawyers, journalists and other professionals. Mr. Mehta has, on instructions, submitted that internet facilities have since been restored and all metro railway stations are fully functional. He also assures the Court that lawyers, journalists and other professionals shall not be impeded in discharge of their professional duties.”

 

 

 

Senior Advocate Basant Kumar Chaudhary appearing for Adhivakta Kalyan Samiti against Bar Council of India, Bihar State Bar Council, Ministry of Law and Justice, Advocate General, Bihar, case listed for hearing on October 29

In a related development, in Adhivakta Kalyan Samiti vs. The Bar Council of India & Ors. (2026), the Patna High Court's order dated October 8, 2026 on the sixth date of listing by Justice Ajit Kumar recorded that senior advocate Basant Kumar Chaudhary appeared for the petitioner and  Bipin Kumar, advocate appeared for the Bihar State Bar Council. The additional solicitor general appeared for the respondent. The latter sought seeks three weeks’ time to comply. The High Court's website for case status reveals that as per scrutiny dated January 27, 2025, "All Objections are Complied." In such a backdrop, the High Court's order dated October 8, 2026 reads: "Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. To show compliance of Annexure-P/1/1 and Annexure-P-3, Shri Bipin Kumar, Advocate who appears for the Bihar State Bar Council, Patna seeks three weeks’ time. 3. Post this case on 29.10.2026, under the same heading." The fact is that the list of objections do not show any objection, therefore, the prayer for time to undertake "compliance of Annexure-P/1/1 and Annexure-P-3" appears strange. 

The order on the first date of listing on July 6, 2026 by Justice Vikash Kumar reads: "On call, a prayer has been made by Mr. Bipin Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Bihar State Bar Council, Patna for adjournment of the matter so that a Senior Counsel may be engaged to put the side of respondent counsel.Prayer is allowed. 3. List the matter on 27.07.2026." The order dated August 13, 2026 by Justice Ajit Kumar passed on the second day of listing reads: "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Shri Bipin Kumar, who appears for the Bihar State Bar Council, submits that there is some development and proposes to place the same on record. 3. Let appropriate supplementary counter-affidavit be placed for consideration within a period of two weeks. 4. List this case on 27.08.2026, retaining its position under 25 cases." The order dated September 3, 2026, on the third date of listing records: "As jointly prayed for by the parties, list this case on 11.09.2026 at 3:45p.m." The order dated September 11, 2026 on the fourth date of listing reads: "As requested by the learned counsel for the petitioner, let this case be listed on 18.09.2026 to enable him to go through the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition(s) (Civil) No. 1049 of 2026 (M. Varadhan Vs. Union of India & Ors.)." The order dated September 24, 2026 on the fifth date of listing reads: "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. 2. Learned counsel representing the Bihar State Bar Council, Patna seeks two weeks’ time to file response to the second interlocutory application filed on behalf of the petitioner, by which amendment in the prayer portion of the main writ petition, has been sought. 3. Post this case on 08.10.2026, under the same heading, retaining its position."

The 3 other respondents are: Bihar State Bar Council, through its Secretary, Union of India, through its Secretary to Ministry of Law and Justice and Advocate General Bihar-cum-ex-officio Member, Bihar State Bar Council, High Court, Patna. Ram Jiban Prasad Singh, Pooja Arya, Sudhir Kumar, Arun Kumar Sinha, Sunil Kumar, Pankaj Kumar, Surendra Kumar Singh, Arun Kumar No. 1 and Kumar Rupesh are also listed as advocates of the petitioner. This case was filed in the High Court on January 21, 2025 and registered on January 31, 2025.  

Supreme Court issues notice to officer bearers of Bihar State Bar Council (BSBC), reply required to be filed by November 27

In Dharmnath Prasad Yadav & Anr. vs. The Honble Returning Officer, Bihar State Bar Council & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court passed a 1-page long order dated October 8, 2026, which reads:1. IA No.298929/2026 (application for deletion of respondent Nos.19 and 23) is allowed. Cause-title be amended accordingly. 2. Delay condoned. 3. Issue notice, returnable on 27.11.2026.” Amidst deafening silence of legal journalsists-advocates, the million dollar question which is occupying the mind of every concerned advocate is that: if Bihar State Bar Council had a total 47,528 voters, how did voting of 56,350 voters took place.   

The civil appeal was filed by Yadav on August 17, 2026 and verified on September 29,2026. The appeal arose out of impugned judgment and order dated July 22, 2026 in Election Petition No. 2 of 2024 passed by the 3-member Tribunal/Committee No. 3 comprising of Rajendra Menon, former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, M. Sathyanarayanan, former Judge, Madras High Court and Mridula Mishra, local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council. Notably, the order by Bar Council of India (BCI)'s Tribunal/Committee No. 3 is confined to the issue of limitation.   

Notably, the Supreme Court does not refer to order by  “Tribunal/Committee No. 3”, it refers to it as the “impugned judgment and order of the Bar Council of India”, not to the Tribunal/Committee No. 3. 

The petitioner no. 2 is Pankaj Kumar. Besides Respondent no.1, the Hon'ble Returning Officer, Bihar State Bar Council, the other 25 respondents are: 2. Bihar State Bar Council Secretary, 3. Manan Kumar Mishra, Member, Bihar State Bar Council, 4. Prem Nath Ojha, Member, Bihar State Bar Council, 5. Ramakant Sharma, President, Bihar State Bar Council and Members of Bihar State Bar Council-6. Sachidanand Singh, 7. Mahammad Saidullah, 8. Vindhya Keshri Kumar, 9. Murari Kumar Himanshu, 10. Rajiv Sharan 11. Yogesh Chandra Verma, 12 S.D. Yadav, 13. Sharma Chandreshwar Upadhyay, 14. Jitendra Narain Sinha, 15. Ramjee Mishra, 16. Ram Charitra Prasad, 17. Jai Praksah Singh, 18. Namrata Mishra, 19. Dina Nath Yadav, 20.  Prem Kumar Jha, 21. Rajeev Kumar Singh, 23. Neetu Jha, 24. Sanjeev Kumar, 25. Pannag Kumar Tripathi and 26 Madhusudan Sharma. 

Earlier,  on September 7, 2026, Bihar Gazette Extraordinary published a Notification No. 2224  Gazette No. 1093 on the subject of "List of 25 Elected as a member of Bihar State Bar Council". The Notification reads:"No. 2224— I, Nilu Agrawal, Returning Officer appointed under the Bihar State Bar  Council Election Rules as amended up to date, pursuant to the polling held for the Bihar State Bar Council on 20.12.2023, declare the following twenty five persons whose names are given below, as being elected as Members of the Bihar State Bar Council.
Sl. No. Name of Candidates
1 Manan Kumar Mishra
2 Prem Nath Ojha
3 Ramakant Sharma
4 Sachidanand Singh
5 Mahammad Saidullah
6 Vindhya Keshari Kumar
7 Murari Kumar Himanshu
8 Rajiv Sharan
9 Yogesh Chandra Verma
10 S.D. Yadav
11 Sharma Chandreshwar Upadhyay
12 Jitendra Narain Sinha
13 Ramjee Mishra                                                               

14 Ram Charitra Prasad
15 Jai Prakash Singh
16 Namrata Mishra
17 Ranjan Kumar Jha (Now elevated as Hon’ble Judge, Patna High Court)
18 Dina Nath Yadav
19 Prem Kumar Jha
20 Rajeev Kumar Singh
21 Sudama Roy (Now deceased)
22 Neetu Jha
23 Sanjeev Kumar
24 Pannag Kumar Tripathi
25 Madhusudan Sharma
The reason for the delay in publication and notification of results was the pendency of two Election Petitions and the order of Stay by the Central Election Tribunal on Gazette notification of results. The Tribunal had stayed the functionings of Bihar Bar Council, not even Committees were to be formed, only day to day (routine) works were being discharged. The Election Petitions have now been rejected vide orders dated 22.07.2026 therefore the results are being notified now. By Order, Justice Nilu Agrawal, Former Judge, Patna High Court, Returning Officer, Bihar State Bar Council, Patna." It implies that from now onwards among other things the Journal of Bihar State Bar Council can start republising the names of the members of the State Bar Council, which was discontinued.  

Prior to this in Ratan Kumar Singh vs. The Chairman, Bihar State Election Commission & Ors. (2024), the 44th Chief Justice of Patna High Court, K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy dismissed the petition with liberty to explore the alternative remedy. The 4-page long judgement dated September 4, 2024 observed:"There is an alternate remedy provided in the Rules itself which the petitioner would be entitled to pursue, if he so desires. We find no reason to interfere with the Rules, specifically the amendments brought in or the elections; which have been concluded and results declared. The intervenor application is also filed, which, in the circumstance of the main matter being rejected does not survive." The fact is that the Rules were framed in an exercise of subordinate legislation beyond the manadate of the parent Act, the Advocates Act. Singh, the petitioner had filed the case in the High Court on February 16, 2024. It was registered on March 14, 2024. A. Kumar, P.K. Paswan, R.S. Roy, Alka Pandey, P.K. Singh, F.A. Khan and RJP Singh were the counsels for the petitioner. The five other respondents were Chairman, Bar Council of India, Bihar State Bar Council, through its Chairman, Returning Officer, the Bihar State Bar Council Election- 2023, Chief Observer, Bihar State Bar Council Election- 2023 and all the Members of Bihar State Bar Council.  

Ratan Kumar Singh, a practicing Advocate had also filed the writ petition challenging the amendment made in 2023 to the Bar Council of Bihar Election Rules, 1968. He had also challenged the elections conducted in the year 2023 to the State Bar Council. The petitioner had submitted that the State of Bihar has less number of Voter-Advocates than more voters/Advocates voted in the election! 

Supreme Court upholds judgement by Single Judge Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, sets aside order by Justice P. B. Bajanthri led Division Bench in a Block Teacher termination case from Vaishali

In The State of Bihar & Ors vs. Nandeshwar Kumar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu delivered a 11-page long judgement dated October 7, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the considered opinion that the candidature of respondent could not have been considered as eligible under the 2006 Rules at the time of his appointment in 2007. Having held so, we feel that the impugned order of Division Bench rendered in LPA No.669 of 2022 by the High Court of Judicature at Patna deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. 5. Consequently, the present Civil Appeal No.13079 of 2026 filed by the State of Bihar stands allowed and the LPA No.669 of 2022 of respondent stands dismissed." The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Nagu. The judgement by the Division bench of the Patna High Court was authored by Justice P. B. Bajanthri.    

Earlier, in Nandeshwar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Director, Education Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bajanthri and S. B. Pd. Singh had delivered a 9-page long judgement dated July 8, 2025, wherein, it had concluded: "....appellant has made out a case so as to interfere with the order of learned Single Judge dated 10.11.2022 passed in CWJC No. 14676 and the impugned order dated 16.09.2022 before the learned Single Judge are set aside. 5. The concerned authority is hereby directed to reinstate the appellant within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order and extend all service and monetary benefits from the date of dispensing of services of the appellant and the same shall be calculated and disbursed in his favour within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 6. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of. In MJC No. 1693 of 2018 7. MJC No. 1693 of 2018 does not survive for consideration in view of later development insofar as disposal of CWJC No. 19322 of 2015." The High Court's Division Bench verdict was authored by Justice Bajanthri. 

The appellant was appointed to the post of Block Teacher by the Block Teacher Employment Unit, Manhar, Vaishali vide Niyozan Letter No. 75 dated 11.09.2007. Pursuant to the order of appointment, he had joined as Block Teacher in Government Middle School, Rupsipur on 13.09.2007. When things stood thus BDO-cum-Secretary, Block Teacher Employment Unit, Manhar issued a show cause notice to the appellant on 06.11.2015 as to why his selection and appointment to the post of Block Teacher shall not be cancelled in the light of the fact that teacher training certificate obtained by him is not from recognized institution. The appellant had submitted his explanation. The same was not satisfied, thereafter, the concerned authority proceeded to dispense the services of the appellant while dismissing him from service on 02.12.2015. It was the subject matter of CWJC No. 19322 of 2015 which was disposed of on 11.01.2016, directing the appellant to invoke remedy of appeal before the District Teacher Appellate Authority, Vaishali on 11.01.2016. On 20.02.2016, appellate authority set aside the order of dismissal with a direction to reinstate the appellant. The appellant filed a contempt of Court petition namely MJC No. 728 of 2017, it was disposed of in the light of the fact that appellant was reinstated on 20.02.2016. The appellate authority is stated to have issued a fresh order on 16.02.2022 which is the subject matter of CWJC No. 14676 of 2022 and the writ Court passed order while dismissing CWJC on 10.11.2022. Hence, the LPA was filed.

The core issue involved in the present lis is whether possession of teacher training certificate by the appellant issued by Dr. B.C. Roy College of Education, Calcutta, State of West Bengal affiliated and guided by AIES (All India Education Society) is Government registered or not and its validity. The appellant was issued with the senior teacher training certificate on 09.01.1995 pursuant to the date of examination as 28.08.1994. This is one of the eligibility for the purpose of Block Teacher selection and appointment. Thus, the appellant was appointed. After about eight years, official respondents have opened their eyes and proceeded to issue show cause notice as to why his selection and appointment to the post of Block Teacher shall not be cancelled. Further, there is no material information on behalf of the respondents to contend that State of West Bengal have de-recognized or cancelled the recognition and affiliation of Dr. B.C. Roy College of Education, Calcutta, State of West Bengal. In the absence of competent authority of the State of West Bengal cancelling the recognition or registration or affiliation of Dr. B.C. Roy College of Education, Calcutta, certificate is intact. 

The next question would be whether National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (NCTE Act) which is effective from 01.07.1995 could spring into action in respect of selection and appointment of the appellant or not ? It is undisputed that petitioner had obtained senior teacher training certificate on 09.01.1995 which is prior to introduction of the NCTE Act with effect from 01.07.1995, therefore, whatever the terms and conditions imposed in the NCTE Act has no application to the appellant’s case and NCTE norms would be applicable from the prospective date and it has no retrospective effect.

Notably, identical issues were subject matter of various litigation before different High Courts, whereas some of the matter were subject matter of Civil Appeal No. 3693 of 2020 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27694 of 2018 in the case of Bhagirathi Prasad Dey vs. State of Jharkhand and Others decided on 17.11.2020. It is relevant to take note of paragraph Nos. 5 and 8 of the aforementioned decision and it reads as under :
“5. Insofar as the first category of cases are concerned, some of the decisions rendered by the High Court were as under:-
A) While dealing with Writ Petition (S) No.5412 of 2005 vide order dated 18.05.2006 Single Judge of the High Court made following observations:
“1. … Further prayer has been made by the petitioner to declare that the provisions of National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (hereinafter to be referred as the ‘N.C.T.E. Act’) which came into effect since 1st July, 1995 are prospective and shall have no effect or abrogation to the accrued right of obtaining decree or diploma.
… … ...

9. It has been held by the Court that the NCTE Act 1993 came into force since 1st July 1995 and after six months thereafter i.e. after 1st January, 1996 nobody, offering a course or training in teachers education, can run the institute without prior recognition by the National Council for Teachers Education. The petitioner having passed the examination in the year 1992 itself, the question of recognition of Dr. B.C. Roy College of Education, Calcutta, by the National Council of Teachers Education at the relevant point of time does not arise. The Director, Primary Education, Jharkhand, Ranchi, has failed to appreciate the aforesaid facts and simply giving reference to the High Court’s decision, rendered in the case of Dilip Kumar Gupta and Ors (supra), cancelled the provisional approval, as was given by the District Superintendent of Education, Singhbhum West, Chaibasa.” 

The aforesaid decision was affirmed in LPA No.400 of 2006 by the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 24.11.2006, which made following observations: “Further, it is noticed, as correctly pointed out by Mrs. I. Sen Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, National Council for Teachers Education Act came to be introduced on 1st July, 1995. It is true, as strenuously contended by Mrs. Sen Choudhary, counsel for the appellants, that the Division Bench made an observation entertaining doubts with regard to the genuineness of the Institution granting teachers' training certificate. But, however, it is correctly pointed out by the learned counsel of the respondent that that portion has been expunged by the Supreme Court vide order dated 3.3.2006, holding that the Division Bench could not have entertained those doubts in the absence of anything to show that the other parties were heard on the relevant question. As such those observations cannot be made use of by the authorities for passing the order impugned in the writ petition. So, in our view, the direction given by the learned Single Judge, directing the authority to pay the salary of the petitioner/respondent, is perfectly valid and justified.”

The matter was carried further before this Court. However, Special Leave Petition (Civil) CC No.4396/2007 was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 14.05.2007.

B) Various orders passed by other Single Judges of the High Court took the similar view and by way of example, we may cite two such orders where following directions were issued:
i) Order dated 13.09.2010 in Writ Petition No.393 of 2010: “7. The Committee on its formation rejected the claim of the petitioner, as the petitioner had obtained degree in training from Sister Nivedita College, Kolkata, which was not a recognized college, but the Committee failed to consider that the N.C.T.E. Act came into force w.e.f. 1.7.1995, whereas the petitioner had obtained B.Ed. (training) degree from the said Institute in the year 1989 and under this situation, this Court in the case of Kalpana Lodhiya (supra) has been pleased to hold that the training degree obtained from Sister Nivedita College, Kolkata prior to 1995 must be recognized as valid training degree, as N.C.T.E. Act, which was promulgated in the year 1993, came into force w.e.f. 1.7.1985. Thus, the order, under which Three Members Committee did not find the petitioner to be eligible for regularization, is hereby set aside.” 

ii) Order dated 15.09.2011 in Writ Petition (S) No.5568 of 2009: “6. The reasons given by the Three Member Committee that the petitioner has not cleared his teachers training certificate examination is incorrect mainly for the reason that looking to Annexure-15 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner, this certificate was already given to the School authorities by the petitioner and they have to submit to the Committee. The supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner is dated 7th July, 2011. In view thereof or otherwise also, looking to the annexures annexed by the petitioner in this petition and subsequently affidavit before this Court in this matter, it appears that the petitioner has cleared his teachers training certificate examination on 16th March, 1994 and as this certificate examination has been cleared prior to enforcement of the Act of 1993, his case is alike to other writ petitions of the aforesaid decided cases. 7. As a cumulative effective of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, I hereby quash and set aside the report given by the Three-Member Committee which is at Annexure-B to the counter affidavit filed by respondent No.2 to the extent to which it affects the present petitioner and the reasons given in the said report for the present petitioner is dehors to law for the reasons stated herein above and I, hereby direct the respondents that services of the petitioner may be recognized and necessary order may be passed to that effect and the petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits including salary.” 8. The instant case comes in the ‘Ist Category’ of cases as stated above. Insofar as that category is concerned, the matter stands concluded by the decisions of the High Court, which were confirmed by dismissal of Special Leave Petition arising therefrom. In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not justified in taking a different view in the matter.” Reading of the paragraph Nos. 5 and 8 of the  aforementioned decision, it is squarely covered in favour of the appellant, the same has not been apprised by the learned Single Judge and so also not apprising the fact that appellant was in possession of senior teacher training certificate on 09.01.1995 and NCTE Act, 1993 which is in vogue with effect from 01.07.1995 has no application to the case in hand. Further, in order to ascertain whether Dr. B.C. Roy College of Education, Calcutta, State of West Bengal is recognized or not recognized, to that effect there is
no material information and that too from the competent authority of the State of West Bengal. The State has also not ascertained from the State of West Bengal whether Dr. B.C. Roy College of Education, Calcutta, State of West Bengal is a genuine institution and other correspondence so as to contend that the appellant is not in possession of valid teacher training certificate. 

Justice Bajanthri had observed that these issues have not been adjudicated by Justice Sharma, the Single Judge, therefore, appellant has made out a case so as to interfere with the order of Single Judge dated 10.11.2022 passed in CWJC No. 14676 and the impugned order dated 16.09.2022 before the Single Judge are set aside. 5. The concerned authority is hereby directed to reinstate the appellant within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order and extend all service and monetary benefits from the date of dispensing of services of the appellant and the same shall be calculated and disbursed in his favour within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 

Now that Justice Bajanthri has been set aside, Justice Sharma's order is upheld and restored.  

Chief Justice of India reminded the BRICS Chief Justice Forum about the legacy of Nalanda University, proposed BRICS Plus Judicial Fellowship and Nyay Setu of a shared jurisprudence repository

Justice Harish Kumar directed Government TIBBI College & Hospital, Kadamkuan, Patna to permit the petitioner to appear in 3rd Year Main Professional Examination of B.U.M.S.

In Khushboo Kumari @ Khusboo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page long judgement, wherein, he  directed Government TIBBI College and Hospital, Kadamkuan, Patna to permit the petitioner to appear in 3rd Year Main Professional Examination of B.U.M.S. 2. The Principal Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, The judgement concluded: "....the respondent-University and the Principal, Government TIBBI College and Hospital, Kadamkuan, Patna, are directed to permit the petitioner to appear in the 3rd Year Main Professional Examination of B.U.M.S. for the session 2021-2026, scheduled to commence from 03.10.2026, subject to completion of all requisite formalities. 18. It is made clear that the present order shall not come in the way of the respondent-University and the College in conducting the 2nd Supplementary Examination for the unsuccessful students of the 2nd Professional Examination within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with the applicable Regulations. 19. The concerned respondent(s) shall be at liberty to act upon the downloaded/printed copy of this order, which shall be made available on the official website of this Court, subject to verification of its authenticity. 20. The writ petition stands disposed off."  

The petitioner, a student of B.U.M.S. course was pursuing her studies at Government TIBBI College and Hospital, Kadamkuan, Patna had approached the High Court seeking a direction upon the respondent-University and the College to permit her to appear in the 3rd Year Main Professional Examination for the session 2021-2026, prior to holding of the 2nd Supplementary Examination of the 2nd Professional Examination and publication of the result thereof. The petitioner had also sought an ad-interim ex parte direction upon the respondent-University, particularly the Vice-Chancellor and the Controller of Examinations, to immediately open the online examination portal, accept her examination form and requisite fees, and issue a provisional admit card, thereby permitting her to appear in the ongoing 3rd Professional Bachelor of Unani Medicine and Surgery (B.U.M.S.)/BMS Main Examination, which was scheduled to commence from October 3, 2026. 

The petitioner's counsel submitted that the 2nd Year 1st Supplementary Examination of the B.U.M.S. Examination, 2025, was conducted by the respondent-University w.e.f. May 12, 2026 and the result thereof was published on August 20, 2026, i.e., only about one and a half months prior to the commencement of the 3rd Year Main Professional Examination. Referring to the applicable Regulations, it was submitted that a student required to appear in a supplementary examination is entitled to have such examination conducted within the prescribed academic and examination cycle. It was submitted that, notwithstanding the said position, the 2nd Supplementary Examination of the 2nd Professional B.U.M.S. Examination, 2024 (S), was neither conducted nor scheduled till date. According to the petitioner, the delay in holding the said supplementary examination resulted in serious and immediate academic consequences for her. The petitioner,'s counsel referred to Clause 11(b)(i) and (ii) of the applicable Regulations of the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine (NCISM), as contained in the Gazette Notification dated February 16, 2022, submitted that these provisions specifically prescribe the manner in which a student is to be dealt with in the 2nd Professional Examination. Clause 11(b)(i) provides that the 2nd Professional Examination shall ordinarily be held and completed by the end of the 2nd Professional session, whereas Clause 11(b)(ii) specifically provides that a student who has failed in one or two subjects of the 2nd Professional Examination shall be allowed to keep the term of the 3rd (Final) Professional session. It was submitted that the petitioner had failed in only two subjects in her 1st Supplementary Examination and was required to clear the same in the subsequent examination. However, the 2nd Supplementary Examination was neither conducted nor scheduled, and no date has been fixed for holding the same. In the meantime, the 3rd Professional Main Examination was scheduled to commence from October 3, 2026. It was, therefore, submitted that if the petitioner was not permitted to appear in the 3rd Professional Main Examination, she would suffer serious academic prejudice, apart from the likelihood of loss of an academic year, adversely affecting her professional progression and future career prospects. 

The petitioner's counsel placed reliance upon a Bench decision of the High Court in Ravi Ranjan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., passed in C.W.J.C. No. 13193 of 2026, wherein, while considering the aforesaid Clause 11(b)(i) and (ii) of the Notification dated February 16, 2022, the Court had directed the respondent-University and the concerned Colleges to permit the students who had failed in one or two subjects of the 2nd Professional Examination to participate in the next Professional Examination.

The judgement recorded that the Notification dated February 16, 2022, particularly Clause 11(b)(ii), specifically stipulates that a student who fails in one or two subjects of the 2nd Professional Examination
shall be allowed to keep the term of the 3rd (Final) Professional session. "15. Despite the aforesaid stipulation, the petitioner has not been permitted to appear in the 3rd Professional Examination. An identical issue came up for consideration before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 13193 of 2026, wherein this Court, taking note of the non-holding of the 2nd Supplementary Examination within the prescribed time, was pleased to permit the concerned students to participate in the next Professional Examination. 16. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the provisions contained in Clause 11(b)(i) and (ii) of the Notification dated 16.02.2022, and the order passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 13193 of 2026, this Court finds substance in the writ petition."

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sunil Dutta Mishra bench sets aside order by Special Judge, NIA, Patna after Supreme Court remittd the case back to the High Court

In Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani vs. The Union of India through National Investigation Agency, New Delhi (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 30-page long judgement dated October 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"38. In the present case, the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the ground(s) for arrest/detention have been furnished in writing. Even as time was granted to the respondent, no document showing service of grounds of arrest in writing has been placed before this Court. 39. We have further found from the transit remand order dated 13.09.2024 passed by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate, that before the learned magistrate Bihar police produced the Case- diary (C.D. File) and a remand petition but there is nothing to indicate that the copy of the C.D. File and the remand application was served on the appellant two hours before his production before the learned magistrate. Therefore, in this case the prejudice caused to the accused is evident. The learned Magistrate didn’t satisfy himself with the compliance of Article 22 of the constitution of India read with section 50 Cr.P.C. [Now section 47 & 48 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (In short ‘BNSS’)]. Perhaps, in absence of the service of grounds of arrest the accused- appellant couldn’t file an application for bail immediately before the learned CJM at Budgam, and before the learned special judge NIA at Patna. 40. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the appellant has made out a case for interference. His arrest cannot be sustained. 41. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment/order of the learned trial court and direct that the appellant shall be released from custody, giving him the benefit of the ratio in the case Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra). The appellant shall be released on bail forthwith, subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the learned trial court. The learned trial court may impose such other conditions as may deem fit and proper to secure the attendance of the appellant in course of trial. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside. 42. It will be open to the learned trial court to secure presence of the appellant in course of trial, if occasion so arises, by issuing coercive order(s) in accordance with law. 43. This appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated herein-above."

The Criminal Appeal was preferred under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.2. The appellant was aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated July 15, 2025 (in Proceeding No. III) passed by Special Judge, NIA, Patna rejecting his prayer for regular bail in Special Case No. 10 of 2024, which arose out of Banjariya P.S. Case No. 229 of 2024 dated 05.09.2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 317(5), 318(4), 61(2), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 111, 178, 179, 180, 181, 3/5 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The prosecution case is based on the self- statement of ASI Indrajeet Paswan recorded on September 5, 2024 at 18.15 hrs at NH-28A near Kharwa Pool, Banjaria, District-East Champaran, Motihari. In his self-statement, the informant has stated that on 05.09.2024 at about 5:30 hours in the evening, he along with other police personnel proceeded for patrolling and vehicle checking. When they reached near Shankar Dhaba, they got secret information that that from Jhakiya village three persons on one without number plate red coloured motorcycle are coming towards Khandwa Pool. One of the three persons have beard who was wearing blue colour T-shirt and black coloured pant and was carrying black coloured backpack in front of his stomach as also he is the person who was driving the motorcycle. Second person was wearing Khaki coloured Fullshirt and Blue coloured Jeans pant and third person was wearing white coloured T-shirt with lining and Black coloured Jeans Pant. All of them were carrying fake Indian notes. On this information, the informant has informed the senior officials and with the Shashtra Bal personnels, they proceeded towards Khandwa Pool where they found one red motorcycle with above description and three persons on it was coming. On seeing police personnel, they tried to flee away, but police personnel chased them and nabbed all three persons. Seeing this action of the police, nearby people gathered there. Thereafter, police asked their names. They told their names as (1) Md. Nazar Saddam, (2) Md. Waris and (3) Md. Jakir Hussain. The informant requested the people who have assembled there to become witness to the production-cum-seizure list to which all of them refused by saying that these accused persons are outsiders, if we become witness, anything bad can happen to us. Thereafter, two of the raiding team members, namely, Sukhram Bharti and Aditya Kumar were made witnesses to the production-cum-seizure list. Police asked for papers of the motorcycle from Md. Nazar Saddam but he could not produce any papers. The Engine number and chasis number of the motorcycle was worn out. It seems that the motorcycle was stolen one. On search of black coloured backpack, some clothes and hundred notes of 500 Rupees (total 50,000/-) two Aadhar Cards of Md. Nazar Saddam of different addresses was found. On search of his pant, hundred notes of 500 Rupees (total 50,000/-) was found. On search of Md. Waris, from his pant’s pocket, eighty notes of Rs. 500/- and from his shirt’s pocket twenty notes of Rs. 500/- (total Rs.50,000/-) was found. And on search of Md. Jakir Hussain, sixty notes or Rs.500/- from his pant’s pocket and thirty notes of Rs.500/- from his shirt’s pocket (total 45,000/-) was found. Altogether from all the three persons, three hundred ninety (390) fake notes total of Rs.1,95,000/- was found. On further interrogation, they disclosed that they used to carry these fake Indian currency from Pakistan via Nepal through one Rajesh Sahni. They used to transport these fake notes via Delhi to Sarfaraj @ Muzaffar Ahamd resident of Jammu Kashmir. They disclosed that they have done this many times earlier also. In the presence of two witnesses named above, seizure list was prepared, on these three accused persons have
put their signature. The informant alleged that from the above facts, it is clear that these three accused persons in conspiracy with other named accused persons were trying to use fake Indian notes in the market.

The investigation of the case was handed over to the NIA vide order dated December 10, 2024 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Before handing over the investigation to the NIA, the Bihar Police had already completed the investigation of the case and submitted a charge-sheet vide Charge-sheet No. 310 of 2024 dated October 24, 2024 against four accused persons, namely, Mohammad Waris, Mohammad Nazar Saddam, Mohammad Zakir Hussain and Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (the present appellant).

The appellant was arrayed accused number 4 in the charge-sheet. The seized mobile phone as allegedly revealed contained various PDF files of counterfeit currency notes, incriminating voice clips, photographs of suspected persons along with their contact details as well as incriminating chats related to the procurement and supply of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN). His connections with the co-accused have been highlighted in the charge-sheet filed by the NIA.

It was the case of the appellant that he was innocent, had not committed any offence and that the appellant was not arrested on the spot and nothing incriminating was recovered from his conscious possession. It was submitted that whatever counterfeit Indian currencies were recovered, were recovered from the possession of the persons arrested from the spot, one of whom is accused number 1. The appellant had interactions through Social media platform and by virtue of this interaction, they had developed a business relation. The appellant claimed that he was running a business of poultry farm at his local place and was exploring the idea of selling fruit through e-commerce platform, and in that process he came in contact with Nazar Saddam (A1) who was running an e-commerce business with the name of Zamad Online Shopping and Service Private Limited. In connection with the investment in the business in the e-commerce company of Zamad the appellant started investing his money from time to time. The story of transferring money for procuring ‘FICN’ was completely false and without any corroborative legal evidence. The appellant had taken a specific ground in paragraph ‘27’ of his memorandum of appeal that the appellant was arrested in complete violation of the law as the appellant was not served with the grounds of arrest, which would make his arrest completely illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law. It was lalso submitted that the charges under Sections 16, 18, and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act (UAPA) would not be attracted in the present case. The prerequisites for inviting applicability of these Sections is that there must be a terrorist act as defined under Section 15 of the UA(P) Act. It was submitted that in this case the appellant has neither produced, nor smuggled, or circulated the high quality counterfeit Indian currency or coin or any material. The counsel for the appellant submitted that in the present case although trial is going on, till date only 3 out of 91 witnesses had been examined. The trial was not likely to be concluded in near future within a stipulated period. 

It was submitted that earlier the High Court had occasion to consider the prayer of the appellant for bail. The High Court had refused to enlarge the appellant on vide order dated February 24, 2026. The Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1478 of 2025 preferred by theappellant was dismissed. 

Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, the appellant had preferred Criminal Appeal No. 3238 of 2026 (SLP (Crl) No. 8196 of 2026) before the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court, having gone through the order of the High Court, noticed that the issue pertaining to the non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest to the appellant, though raised, had not been considered by the High Court. For this reason, without going into the merit of the case, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remitted it to the High Court to consider the said issue while deciding the bail application of the appellant.

In this background, the appeal was once again taken up for consideration on September 17, 2026. On that date, the High Court passed the following order:-“Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Additional Solicitor General assisted by Mr. Arvind Kumar learned counsel for the N.I.A. 2. This appeal has been taken up for consideration in view of the remand made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 15.07.2026 in SLP (CRL.) No. 8196 of 2026. It is noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court having gone through the impugned order found that one of the submissions made on behalf of the accused-appellant was that the written ground of the arrest memo was not furnished to the accused-appellant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that this ground was not considered by the High Court.

In his submissions, Md. Tahir, counsel for the appellant has placed before the High Court, judgments of the Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 799, Ahmed Mansoor & Ors. vs. State Rep. By Assistant Commissioner of Police & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2650 and Dr. Rajinder Ranjan vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 802. It was submitted that all these recent judgments of the Supreme Court have taken note of the judgment rendered in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500 in which the Supreme Court has taken a view that the ground of arrest in writing, it should effectively serve the intended purpose as envisaged under the Constitution of India and the ground of arrest must be made available within two hours minimum interval before the production of the accused before the learned Magistrate. It is submitted that non-compliance with this direction would be in the teeth of the arrestee's constitutional right under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

The appellant's counsel had also submitted that in the remand requisition submitted before the Court seeking transition, there was no mention of furnishing of written grounds of arrest.

When the appeal was taken up for consideration, the ASG representing the NIA categorically stated that no written grounds of arrest seems to have been furnished to the appellant. 

Justice Prasad recorded that the counsel for the appellant solely focused on his submissions with regard to
non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest, therefore, the High Court is not going into any other aspect of the matter at this stage.

In the case of Vihaan Kumar, the Supreme Court concluded: “26. Therefore, we conclude: 26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1); 26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved; 26.3. When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the investigating officer/agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1); 26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge-sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of charge-sheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1); 26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and 26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.”

Justice Prsad observed:"...it turns out that mere communication of the grounds in a language not understood by the person arrested does not fulfil the constitutional mandate under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The failure to supply such grounds in a language understood by the arrestee renders the  constitutional safeguards illusory and infringes the personal liberty of the person as guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The objective of the constitutional mandate is to place the person in a position to comprehend the basis of the allegations levelled against him and it can only be realised when the grounds are furnished in a language understood by the person, thereby enabling him to exercise his rights effectively. 52. From the catena of decisions discussed above, the legal position which emerges is that the constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not a mere procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights. The intent and purpose of the constitutional mandate is to prepare the arrested person to defend himself. If the provisions of Article 22(1) are read in a restrictive manner, its intended purpose of securing personal liberty would not be achieved rather curtailed and put to disuse.”

In the penultimate paragraphs of the judgement, Justice Prasad concluded:" (i) The constitutional mandate and the statutory mandate as contained under Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of the CrPC leave no room for doubt that it would be necessary for the investigating agency/arresting authority, that a copy of the written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. This has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576:
(ii) If the arrest memo is simply a proforma indicating that the grounds of arrest has been conveyed, it would not be a compliance with the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) and Dr. Rajindra Rajan (supra): and
(iii) Templates of the arrest memo containing the statement to the effect that the arresting officer explained the grounds of arrest to the accused before the arrest, is no compliance with the mandate of Article 22 of the constitution of India read with section 50 and 50A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Now Sections 47 and 48 of the BNSS); and
(iv) The judgment in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with a clear finding that the arrest memos and remand orders reflected that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. In such circumstance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that no material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the present case, the facts are entirely different, therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) is to be read as explained in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) in paragraph ‘8’ of the judgment. 37. In terms of paragraph ‘66.3’ of the judgment in the case of Mihir Rajesh Sah (supra), the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case, at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee for remand before the Magistrate.