Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment of 2013 by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Ara in a case of kidnapping for marriage

In Harendra Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 16-page long judgement dated June 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"24. The impugned judgment dated 18.04.2013 and order of sentence dated 20.04.2013 passed in Sessions Trial No. 149 of 2005 arising out of Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 by the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge II, Ara is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the above-named appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, as such, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him. 25. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 26. There shall be no order as to cost. 27. Office is directed to send back the lower court records along with a copy of the judgment to the learned District Court forthwith."

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the criminal appeal which was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2005. The case arose out of a Ara Nawada P.S.Case of 2003, by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge IInd, Ara, whereby the trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence committed under Section 366 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000.

The prosecution case was that the informant, Yogendra Yadav, while working in a Cotton Mill at Sapar, Rajkot (Gujarat), became acquainted with accused Nagendra Yadav, who was employed in the same establishment. On February 17, 2003, when the informant, along with his wife and minor son, was returning to his native village, Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and allegedly persuaded them to visit his residence at Ara Town. It was alleged that after reaching Ara on February 19, 2003 and staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, the informant found the very next morning that his wife, son and a box containing Rs.90,000/- were missing. Upon inquiry from the co-accused Ram Ayodhaya, he was informed that his wife and son had gone to the River Ganga and would return later, however, allegedly co-accused Ram Ayodhaya had allegedly served him food containing intoxicant and after consuming the same he remained unconscious for several days. The day he regained consciousness he found that his wife, son and the cash box were missing. Subsequently, on February 26,.2003, when the informant, along with witnesses had again approached the accused persons to know about the whereabouts of his son and wife, allegedly the accused demanded Rs.1,00,000/- to release his wife and son and in case of failure of fulfillment of the 
demand he had threatened that they would be killed, which led to institution of the complaint before the Chief Judicial  Magistrate.

The Magistrate directed the local police for investigation in exercise of power under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., pursuant to which Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 was registered for the commission of offences under Sections 364, 379, 328 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) against four accused persons, including the appellant. 

The police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 366, 364, 379 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code on November 26, 2023. Cognizance was taken on February 7, 2004, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on March 18, 2005. Charges were framed against the appellant on January 7, 2006 leading the conviction of the appellant upon completion of trial. 

The counsel of the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the main allegation is against co-accused Nagendra Yadav and the appellant were implicated solely because he is the brother of the co-accused, in spite of the fact, no material came against the appellant that he had participated in the alleged abduction of the informant’s wife or son and he had shared any common intention with the main accused, so as, to attract the provisions
of 120-B of the IPC. 

He referred to the testimony of Om Prakash Yadav, the P.W.1, the son of the informant. He in his examination-in-chief, gave varying versions regarding the circumstances in which his mother allegedly went away on her own, which creates serious doubt about the veracity of his testimony and the prosecution case as a whole. 

The counsel submitted that neither any witness nor any material was brought on record in course of trial to suggest that the victim was kidnapped by the appellant as would also appear from the deposition of the victim Meera Devi, the P.W.5, who is the victim and she also has not supported the prosecution story. 

P.W.5 in her statement in police custody that she on her own had accompanied the co-accused which demolishes the accusation of kidnapping and, as such, the prosecution having miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, renders the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence to be set aside.

APP appeared for the State. While opposing the appeal, he submitted that the District Court, after considering all the evidences on record and exhibits submitted on behalf of the parties during the course of trial, has erred no mistake in passing the order conviction against the appellant.

The conviction of the appellant is under Section 366 and Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. Section 366 reads: “Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.

Section 120B reads: "Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.  (2)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."

Justice Singh observed: "12. To constitute the offence of abduction, it must be shown that a person was unlawfully taken away or induced to move from one place to another either by the use of force or through deceitful means. The essence of the offence lies in the intention with which the accused acts. It is the accused's conduct, volition and underlying purpose that are determinative of whether the offence is made out. The crucial issue in every case is the intention accompanying the act of taking or inducing the woman to leave a particular place. Once the requisite criminal intent on the part of the accused is established, the offence stands complete irrespective of whether the intended object was ultimately achieved and regardless of whether the woman subsequently consented to marriage or sexual relations. 13. It is a well-settled principle that, for bringing home a charge under Section 366 IPC, the prosecution must establish not merely that the woman was taken or induced to move from one place to another, but also that such inducement was effected by force or deceitful means and was accompanied by the requisite criminal intent contemplated under the provision. The prosecution is further required to prove that the abduction was committed with the intention that the woman may be compelled to marry any person against her will, or that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or with the knowledge that such consequences were likely to follow. Mere proof of abduction, by itself, is insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 366 IPC. The gravamen of the offence lies not only in the act of taking away the woman but also in the specific purpose and intention behind such act. Therefore, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving that the abduction was for one of the purposes enumerated under Section 366 IPC, a conviction under the said provision cannot be legally sustained.

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2018) 6 SCC 664, wherein, it observed that to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case which is reproduced hereinafter:“16. In order to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case. Once the necessary intent of the accused is established, the offence is complete, whether or not the accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.

The judgement reads: ".....to constitute an  offence under Section 366 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge under Section 366 IPC is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 IPC, the court cannot hold the accused guilty and punish him under Section 366 IPC.” This proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yousuff vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2021) 16 SCC 461. 

Justice Singh explored as to whether the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 366 and 120-B of the IPC was justified. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether four witnesses. P.W.1 – Om Prakash Yadav: P.W.1 is the son of the informant and one of the alleged victims. In his deposition, he stated that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) along with his parents, accused Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and persuaded them to visit Ara. According to him, after staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, he and his mother were taken away by accused Nagendra Yadav and were kept at different places, including Kudhwa Tola and Mumbai. He also stated that when they later came to Buxar Railway Station, he met his father, whereupon the accused persons fled away with his mother. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was a student of Class V at the relevant time and supported the fact that he had stayed with his mother at Kudhwa Mohalla and Mumbai. The trial court found his testimony corroborative of the evidence of P.W.2, Yogendra Yadav, the Informant. 

P.W.2 identified his signature on the complaint petition. He substantially reiterated the allegations made in the complaint petition. He deposed that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) on February 17, 2003 along with his wife and son, accused Nagendra Yadav persuaded them to visit Ara Town. After reaching the khatal of the accused persons and taking meals, he went to sleep and on waking found his wife and son missing. He stated that accused Ram Ayodhaya informed him that they had gone to the Ganga for bathing and worship. He further alleged that after consuming food provided by the accused persons, he became unconscious for several days and, upon regaining consciousness, found that his wife and son were still missing. He also deposed that the accused persons later demanded Rs.1,00,000/- for their release. In cross-
examination, he stated that Meera Devi was his second wife and that he had married her in the year 1995 after separating from his first wife. The trial court found that his evidence regarding the stay at the khatal and subsequent disappearance of his wife and son remained substantially unshaken.

P.W.3–SurendraYadav, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He denied having any knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been interrogated by the police in connection with the case. Nothing material supporting the prosecution case could be elicited from his evidence.

P.W.4–Vindhyachal Yadav was also declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the
alleged occurrence and did not support the prosecution version. His evidence did not advance the prosecution case in any manner.

P.W.5 – Meera Devi, the alleged victim and the second wife of the informant according to the prosecution case did not support the prosecution version and was declared hostile. She stated that she had never married the informant and also alleged that her statement recorded before the Magistrate had been made under pressure from the police. She specifically denied the prosecution allegation that accused Nagendra Yadav had forcibly abducted her after administering poison to the informant. Her evidence was completely contrary to the prosecution case and substantially weakened the allegation of kidnapping.

P.W.6 – Daya Ram Singh @ Dayanand Yadav was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been questioned by the police regarding the incident. No material supporting the prosecution case emerged from his testimony.

P.W.7 – Singhasan Yadav was also declared hostile. He denied knowledge of the occurrence and did not support the prosecution case. His evidence was of no assistance to the prosecution.

P.W.8 – Paras Nath Yadav, (referred to as P.W.9 in portions of the trial court judgment) was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied having any knowledge of the alleged incident and did not support the prosecution version. Nothing favourable to the prosecution could be elicited from his evidence.

Justice Singh recorded that on the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellants/accused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against them, which they denied and show their complete innocence. 

Justice Singh observed:"....I find that the learned trial Court has erred in concluding that the present appellant, Harendra Yadav, shared the common intention or was a party to any conspiracy with the co-accused, Nagendra Yadav, so as, to attract the allegations under Sections 366 and 120B IPC. 22. From the evidence available on record, it transpires that the main allegation of taking away the victim is directed against co-accused Nagendra Yadav. Significantly, the alleged victim, P.W.5 (Meera Devi), has herself not supported the prosecution case and has categorically denied that she was forcibly abducted by the accused persons. She has further denied material aspects of the prosecution story and has not attributed any overt act whatsoever to the present appellant. Mere relationship of being brother of the co-accused and his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be established that there was prior meeting of mind for establishing offence under Section 366 and 120(B) of I.P.C without any independent corroboration."

The judgement reads: "23. The record further reveals that P.Ws.3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution to rest substantially upon the testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2. Even their evidence does not disclose any specific act on the part of the appellant indicating that he had induced, compelled, or deceived the victim into going from one place to another, nor is there any material to establish that he possessed the requisite intention contemplated under Section 366 IPC. Likewise, there is no cogent evidence demonstrating any agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the co-accused so as to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. From the records of the case and the testimony of the victim herself, it is evident that no specific allegation has been levelled against the appellant so as to attract the ingredients of the aforesaid offences. In such circumstances, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial Court is not borne out of the evidence on record."

Justice Ansul' s order is not in favour of "media gag", does not prevent fair, accurate, objective reporting of pending court proceedings or publication of facts in alleged tender scam case

In Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar through Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul passed a 7-page long order dated June 24, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"19. Having seen both sides of the coin, this court is clearly not in a view of media gag over the issue. However, the court would certainly direct for control over irresponsible reporting and imputation of guilt upon the petitioner without any initiation trial at all. 20. In that view of the matter the court issues following directions: Pending consideration of the present petition all print, electronic, digital and social media platforms shall be at liberty to report the factual developments concerning the case and proceedings before competent courts. However, none of the above would: (a) Describe the petitioner as guilty of the offences alleged. (b) Portray the petitioner as having committed the offences alleged. (c) Publish or broadcast material pertaining to determine criminal liability. (d) Use expressions imputing guilt like mastermind, scamster, kingpin or equivalent description conveying criminal responsibility. (e) Conduct media trials based upon alleged confessions, investigation material, unproved document whose evidentiary value is yet to be determined. (f) However, nothing in this order shall prevent fair, accurate and objective reporting of the proceedings pending before the court or publication of the facts. 21. The above restraint shall extend to digital publications, online portals, video streaming services, podcast, social media accounts, channels and other internet based platforms." The case is listed for further hearing on July 10, 2026.  

The order was passed upon hearing an application filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings pertaining to Special Vigilance Unit Case No. 05 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025. The counsel for the ED stated that in the round of litigation in connection with same FIR, the petitioner had filed Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 in which they were added as a party but in the application filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings they have not been added as a party. Notably, Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar through Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 was filed on May 8, 2025 and registered on May 14, 2025 for quashing the FIR. On the earlier occasion, by Justice Sandeep Kumar's order dated July 8, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement was ordered to be made party. Notably, this writ petition was withdrawn on April 18, 026.

The counsel for the petitioner was directed by Justice Ansul to add Enforcement Directorate as party respondent. 

The counsel for the ED sought time to file counter affidavit to bring the materials available on record. The counsel for the Special Vigilance Unit, Bihar also sought time to file counter affidavit. Justice Ansul directed that the counter affidavit must explain the reasons for delay of one year in conducting the raid after registration of FIR.

The counsel for the petitioner stated that an FIR was registered and after more than a year of registration of FIR raid was conducted in the residential premises on May 27, 2026 and he was arrested on the same date. In the raid nothing incriminating was found against him still after arrest various television channels,
newspapers, online news portal and social media handles commenced extensive and lurid coverage of the case, broadcasting one sided narratives, unverified allegations and prejudicial content that portrays the petitioner as guilty even before commencement of trial. Several prime time news debates were conducted by prominent TV anchors wherein the petitioner was condemned, vilified and subjected to public humiliation without any opportunity to present his side. Such coverage has direct effect of influencing public opinion against the petitioner, prejudicing the minds of potential witnesses and creating an atmosphere inimical to fair trial. The counsel stated that in State of Maharashtra vs. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 386, it is stated that “A trial by press, electronic media or public agitation is the very antithesis of rule of law.”The decision in M.P. Lohia vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2005) 2 SCC 686 was referred, wherein, the Supreme Court held that it is not proper for the press or the electronic media to project a one-sided picture of events before the public in matters which are sub-judice. The Supreme Court's decision in Sahara India real Estate Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr. Reported in (2012) 10 SCC 603 was also relied upon, wherein, the Court held that the courts have the power to impose prior restraints on publications in exceptional cases where there exists a real and substantial risk.  

Justice Ansul observed: "13. It is to be seen that these news items are not only in the mainline press or Television channels but the social media platforms are flooded with news declaring the petitioner a guilty person without even initiation of the trial. 14. The petitioner may be accused of a serious case his rights to get a fair trial would not be ousted by the magnitude of the allegation i.e. levelled against him there are freedom of the press guaranteed under Article 19(1)(A) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) in the interest state security, public order, decency, morality, defamation and incitement to an offence. 15. Maligning the image of a person who is yet to be held guilty may come within the ambit of defamatory act, immoral act or even an indecent act. This is pre-judging the issue when the matter is sub judice. 16. In the case of Mahua Moitra decided on 23.02.2024 in W.P. (c) 2676/2024 an Office Memorandum dated 01.04.2010 issued by Government of India which is an advisory on Media Policy of Police. It stated while sharing information to the public through the media appropriate information as is professionally necessary is shared without hampering the process of investigation or issues of legal/privacy rights of the accused/victims and matters of strategic and national interest. 17. Apart from that Senior Counsel for the petitioner, counsel for the ED also expressed his ex-pleasure over the type of reporting that is going on with regard to the case and with regard to the recent trend of media trial. 18. This Court is clearly aware of the judgments passed in the case of Indian Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1985) 1 SCC 641 which established the idea of free press. In LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah (Prof.) reported in (1992) SCC 637 where the court held that in any set-up more so in a democratic set-up like ours dissemination of news and views for popular consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned upon." 

Earlier, Justice Alok Kumar Pandey had passed an order dated March 31, 2026, which recorded the relief sought by the writ petition. The petition sought quashing of the First Information Report bearing Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05/2025 dated 30.04.2025 registered for the offences under Section 7A read with Section 8, Section 9 read with 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Section 3(2) read with 6(2) read with Section 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 as well as under Section 61 read with 318(4) read with 338 read with 340(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Justice Pandey's order reads: "2. When the query is asked what are the circumstances which reflect that the no offence, as alleged in the F.I.R., is made out against the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner does not give any specific reply and he seeks an adjournment on the ground that the main counsel is not available."

Notably, Justice Pandey's order dated April 18, 2026 records that "the counsel for the petitioner seeks permission for withdrawal of the instant criminal writ petition with liberty to raise his grievance before appropriate forum, at appropriate stage. 2. Permission, as prayed for, is accorded. 3. With the aforesaid liberty, the instant criminal writ petition stands dismissed as withdrawn."

By an order dated August 1, 2025 issued by the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, Patna, the immovable property of Rishu Shree, the petitioner has been attached and a number of bank accounts has also been freezed.

 

Justice Partha Sarthy hears Saraug Mochi case pursuant to request by Supreme Court's Division Bench, lists it on July 2

In Sri Saryug Mochi @ Saraug Mochi vs. The State Election Commission Through State Election Commissioner (Municipality) & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court passed an order dated June 26, 2026, wherein he recorded that counsel the State of Bihar submitted that a copy of the counter affidavit on behalf of the State respondents has been served on counsel for the petitioner in Court on June 29, 2026 and "the same will be filed in course of the day. 3. Put up this case on 2.7.2026."

Prior to this, in Usha Kaushik vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Suryakant and V. Mohana passed an order dated June, 19, 2026, wherein, the Court had requested to Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to list CWJC No.15629/2025 before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on June 29, 2026. It had also requested Justice Partha Sarthy to take up the case "on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest." 

Sri Saryug Mochi @ Saraug Mochi vs. The State Election Commission Through State Election Commissioner(Municipality) CWJC No. 15629/2025 was filed September 15, 2025. It was registered on September 19, 2025. Initially, the case was before Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of the High Court. Subsequently, it was listed before Justice A. Abhishek Reddy. The Court's website shows it be pending before Justice Partha Sarthy.    

Also read: Supreme Court requests Chief Justice of Patna High Court to list Usha Kaushik case before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on June 29, assigned bench requested to take up the same on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest

Sword of Damocles hanging over Deepak Prakash, the minister in Bihar government

"A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the Legislature of the State shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister." 

-Article 164 (4), The Constitution of India  

In Rakesh Kumar Singh alias Rakesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice V. Mohana passed an order dated June 15, 2026 issuing notices to the State of Bihar, Cabinet Secretary, Deepak Prakash and the Election Commission Of India.  Disregarding the fact that executive power is tethered to electoral legitimacy, Deepak Prakash has been appointed as a minister in the Bihar government in breach of constitutional provisions under Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India. It feigns ignorance about Supreme Court's judgements in S.R Chaudhuri vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2001 INSC 373), Har Sharan Verma vs. Tribhuvan Narain Singh (1971), Har Sharan Verma vs. State of U.P (1985) and S.P Anand vs. H.D Deve Gowda (1996). The case is likely to listed on July 15, 2026. It was filed on June 23, 2026, registered on June 24, 2026 and verified on June 25, 2026. 

The PIL has sought an issuance of a writ of Quo Warranto calling upon Deepak Prakash to demonstrate the constitutional authority under which he continues to occupy and exercise powers attached to the office of Minister of Panchayati Raj, Bihar, along with consequential reliefs seeking declaration that the impugned reappointment is unconstitutional, void ab initio, illegal, contrary to Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India.

The PIL has challenged the reappointment of Deepak Prakash as Bihar's Panchayati Raj Minister. Article 164(4) of the Constitution allows non-legislators to be ministers, provided they are elected to the state legislature within six months. The petition questions whether the constitutional clock can be "restarted" through a fresh government appointment after the initial six-month limit expired without the minister securing a legislative seat. 

The PIL raises the issue of deliberate circumvention and structural subversion of the democratic and representative constitutional mandate embodied under Article 164 of the Constitution of India by artificially fragmenting and reutilizing the limited constitutional grace period available to a non-legislator Minister. 

Deepak Prakash was initially appointed and sworn in as Minister of Panchayati Raj, Government of Bihar, on November 20, 2025 under the Council of Ministers headed by Nitish Kumar unmindful of the fact that he was notan elected member of either the Bihar Vidhan Sabha or the Bihar Vidhan Parishad. 

Deepak Prakash is required to secure membership of either House of the State Legislature within a maximum period of six consecutive months from the date of his initial appointment, failing which he would constitutionally cease to hold ministerial office. The maximum constitutional period available to Prakash under Article 164(4), commenced from November 20, 2025, which expired on May 19, 2026. 

Following the resignation and dissolution of the earlier Council of Ministers headed by Nitish Kumar, the ruling alliance elected Samrat Choudhary as its legislative leader. He was sworn in as the 24th Chief Minister of Bihar on April 15, 2026. Deepak Prakash demitted ministerial office and ceased to be part of the council of ministers. 

The PIL has submitted that after a distinct intervening gap period of approximately 22 days consequently came into existence extending from April 15, 2026 till May 6, 2026, during which Deepak Prakash held no constitutional, ministerial, executive, statutory, or public office whatsoever as the newly constituted Government under the leadership of Samrat Choudhary initially functioned with a limited and truncated Council of Ministers, and all unallocated portfolios, including the Department of Panchayati Raj, remained under the direct supervision and charge of the Chief Minister himself.  

But thereafter, on May 7, 2026, upon expansion of the newly constituted council of ministers,Deepak Praksh, the respondent No. 3 was once again reappointed and sworn in as minister of Panchayati Raj in  Bihar, although he remained an unelected non-legislator and despite been a minister for about 4 months and 26 days out of the constitutionally permissible six-month period contemplated under Article 164(4) without being a member of the legislature. As a consequence, only a residual balance period of approximately 1 month and 4 days remained available before expiry of the original six-month constitutional limitation calculated from the initial appointment dated November 20, 2025. 

By artificially fragmenting, interrupting, suspending, and attempting to carry forward the unexpired balance portion of the original constitutional grace period through resignation and subsequent reappointment under a reconstituted Government during the tenure of the very same legislative assembly, the respondent authorities have engaged in a colourable exercise of constitutional power intended to indirectly achieve what is constitutionally impermissible directly. 

In S.R Chaudhuri vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2001 INSC 373), the Supreme Court of India interpreted Article 164(4) of the Indian Constitution to ascertain the constitutional validity of appointing a non-legislative member to the council of ministers and the limitations imposed on such appointments. The core issue was whether reappointment of a minister who failed to secure a legislative seat within the stipulated six months was permissible. The parties involved were Tej Parkash Singh, who appointed as a minister without being a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, and the State of Punjab.

The appellant had challenged the reappointment of Tej Parkash Singh as a minister, arguing that such reappointment violated constitutional provisions. The Court held that Article 164(4) does not permit the repeated reappointment of a non-legislative individual as a minister beyond the initial six-month grace period without securing an elected legislative position. The Court declared the reappointment unconstitutional, emphasizing the principles of representative and responsible government. The judgment referred to previous cases and constitutional provisions to elucidate the limits of Article 164(4). The main precedents included: Har Sharan Verma vs. Tribhuvan Narain Singh (1971), wherein, the Court affirmed that a non-legislative Minister must secure a legislative seat within six months. 

It also relied on the decision in Har Sharan Verma vs. State of U.P (1985), wherein, the Court reinforced the interpretation that non-legislative appointments are temporary and subject to electoral validation.

It recollected the decision in S.P Anand vs. H.D Deve Gowda (1996), wherein, it held that even the Prime Minister can be a non-member initially but he/she must secure a legislative position within six months.

The Court dwelt on the constitutional intent behind Article 164(4), tracing its lineage to the Government of India Act, 1935. It stressed that while the Constitution permits the appointment of non-legislative Ministers in extraordinary circumstances, such appointments are strictly time-bound. The term "six consecutive months" was interpreted literally, preventing any form of reappointment beyond the initial period without electoral endorsement. The Court rejected the notion that repeated appointments could circumvent the constitutional mandate. It underscored that such practices would undermine the democratic fabric by allowing individuals to hold executive power without legislative accountability.

This judgment reiterated the sanctity of the constitutional provisions governing ministerial appointments. It establishes a clear precedent that non-legislative Ministers cannot be reappointed beyond the six-month grace period. Any attempt to circumvent this through repetitive appointments is unconstitutional. The principles of representative and responsible government are paramount and cannot be overridden by political expediency.

Notably, responding to a question regarding appointment of "non-members in the council of ministers" from Kanti Singh and Dr. Raghuvansh Prasad Singh in the Lok Sabha, on August 23, 2001, the Union Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs and Shipping had informed that "The Supreme Court of India in its judgement of August 17, 2001, in S.R. Chaudhury Vs. State of Punjab and Others has clearly indicated that no one can be reappointed under Article 164(4) without getting elected to the Legislature. The Court has observed that it was not the intention of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution that a person should continue to be Minister without being duly elected, by repeated appointments, each time for a period of six consecutive months. Further, such an appointment would be unacceptable in any parliamentary system of Government. Article 75(5) being pari materia with Article 164(4) of the Constitution, the position would be the same in the case of Article 75(5) of the Constitution."

Significantly, all ministers at a time can be non-members of Parliament or state legislature for six months. 

Revision petition is partly allowed, conviction by Nalanda trial court upheld, sentence awarded reduced to the period already undergone: Justice Arun Kumar Jha

In Bipin Singh @ Bipin Kumar Singh vs.The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement date June 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"If the facts were appreciated in the light of the evidence and two subordinate courts recorded a concurrent finding, there is very little scope for this Court to interfere in the matter in revision. 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and considering the fact that the petitioner has already undergone seven months of incarceration in this case and further considering the fact that he has no criminal antecedent and he is facing this lis from the last 19 years, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if, while upholding the conviction of the petitioner, the sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 8. Consequently, the conviction of the petitioner under the aforesaid section is affirmed and he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The fine sentence is affirmed. 9. Accordingly, this revision petition is partly allowed. 10. The petitioner is already on bail. He is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds." 

This criminal revision was preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 10, 2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif in Criminal Appeal of 2016, which arose out of a Complaint Case of 2007 and trial of 2016. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated January 21, 2016 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Nalanda at Biharsharif was affirmed. The petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000.

Pushpa Devi, the opposite party no. 2 had filed a complaint case alleging therein that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner in the year 1987. At the time of marriage, her parents had given cash amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- and some ornaments. After her marriage, the petitioner and his family members demanded a motorcycle and due to non-fulfillment of their demand, they started harassing the opposite party no.2. Thereafter, Rs.40,000 was given by the parents of the opposite party no.2 for purchasing motorcycle. After birth of a female child, the accused persons became more violent and increased torture of the complainant. The accused persons including the petitioner also made an attempt to burn the complainant to death by pouring kerosene oil, but she anyhow escaped and returned to her paternal house. Thereafter, the present complaint case was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgments of conviction and orders of sentence was bad in law as well as on facts. The appellate court and the trial court had failed to appreciate that all the complainant witnesses are closely related to each other and, thus, they all are highly interested witnesses. Therefore, their testimonies are not trustworthy. Hence, the petitioner should have been acquitted from the charges levelled against him on this score alone. The counsel also submitted that there is no independent witness of alleged offence. The counsel submitted that the trial court did not examine the evidence of the witnesses minutely and came to an erroneous finding and hence, the judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed by the courts below were not sustainable. Moreover, the petitioner was continuously facing the ordeal and miseries of the prolonged criminal proceeding against him for the last more than 18 years, although he was been paying the amount of maintenance and also paid arrears amount of maintenance to the opposite party no.2 and no useful purpose would be served to put the petitioner behind the bar.  The counsel also submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties and the petitioner has fulfilled all the conditions put by the opposite party no.2 towards amicable settlement of the matter and the father of the petitioner has executed a sale deed for two bigha of land in favour of opposite party no.2 towards full and final settlement and mutation of the said land is also being done in the name of opposite party no.2. Therefore, it was prayed by the counsel that the judgments and orders of the courts below be set aside and the revision petition may be allowed. If the Court is not inclined, then in that case the sentence awarded to the petitioner may be reduced to the period already undergone by him.

Decoding custodial murders, encounters, half encounters-Part 1

Bharat Bhushan Tiwari case of June 17, 2026  

 

On Saturday, June 27, 2026, a 7-member fact finding team of Advocates from Patna High Court team visited the scene of the murder of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari in Bilauti, Shahpur, Bhojpur. The team learnt that after meeting all the concerned parties at the scene of the incident, it  learnt that attempts are underway to tamper with the evidence and intimidate the witnesses and to portray this custodial murder as an encounter. Chandan Tiwari, the brother of the (effectively) deceased Bharat Tiwari has been threatened that he too will be killed just as they had killed Bharat Tiwari who was murdered following his surrender. This incident stands as an unique case of police cruelty, barbarity, and oppression in the history of India. The brutal murder of a social worker with no criminal history, fighting for the welfare of the poor and the general public, is a blatant violation of constitutional fundamental rights and the guidelines given by the Supreme Court.  The team learnt that retired Patna High Court Judge Vinod Kumar Sinha, who is heading the judicial commission formed by the State government to investigate the alleged encounter of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari, reached the village Bilauti on June 25, 2026 and met the grieving family members of Tiwari. Bhojpur Superintendent of Police, along with othe policemen accompanied Justice Sinha to the village. The team was shocked to learn that the Chairman of the Judicial Inquiry Commission on the murder of Bharat Tiwari, had gone to his house to meet his family members accompanied by the accused officials. His visit with such officials sends a wrong message to the public about the impartiality of the Commission. It is essential for the Commission's impartiality that independent jurists be made part of the Commission. During an interaction with advocates of Bar Association, Ara, the team learnt that Bharat Bhushan Tiwari was not a criminal. It is a case of police atrocity. The bullets fired by Police hit the testicles of Bharat Tiwari. 

An FIR (Shahpur Case No. 178/26) was registered on June 22, 2026 by the Bhojpur police against the Jagdishpur Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), the then Shahpur Station House Officer (SHO), and other police personnel following the death of 28-year-old Bharat Bhushan Tiwari in an alleged police encounter on June 17, 2026. The FIR was filed based on a complaint lodged by Asha Devi, the deceased’s mother, who alleged that her son was shot dead after surrendering. Notably, it is intriguing as to why the portal of the State Crime Records Bureau, Department of Home, Bihar has not uploaded the FIR as yet. 

Meanwhile, Bhojpur district, Jagdishpur SDPO Rajesh Kumar Sharma, who led the police operation on the day of the encounter, has been attached to the police lines. The case has been registered under Sections 103(1) and 3(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), along with Section 27 of the Arms Act. The investigation has been assigned to Ara Circle Inspector Sanjeev Kumar.  The family has alleged that Bharat was shot at close range after surrendering. The police initially claimed that on June 17, 2026, they raided Bharat's home to arrest him. They alleged that he resisted by firing at them, prompting a retaliatory encounter. The police FIR (Shahpur Case No. 169/26) accuses Bharat’s father and brother of hiding his weapons and harboring him. Refuting the police claim, Asha Devi, Bharat's mother lodged an FIR (Shahpur Case No. 178/26) alleging that her son had already surrendered and was murdered in cold blood.An FIR has been registered at Shahpur police station (Case No. 178/26 dated 22.06.2026) based on a complaint filed by the mother of the deceased in connection with the police encounter incident. The case has been filed against the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Jagdishpur, the then Shahpur SHO, and other police personnel. The investigation is currently underway

But this FIR is not on the portal of the State Crime Records Bureau, Department of Home, Bihar. Following massive public outrage and a Mahapanchayat on June 24, 2026 in Belauti, a high-level judicial inquiry has been ordered. The incident has caused a massive political stir in Bihar, drawing visits from opposition leaders and resulting in the removal of the involved DSP from the investigation. The advertisement seeking testimonies from teh public is to be published. The office of the inquiry commission too is yet to be announced. 

The Supreme Court on June 22, 2026 refused to urgently hear a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking an independent probe into the alleged fake encounter killing of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari in Bhojpur and raising broader concerns over what it describes as a growing "encounter culture" and instances of extra-judicial killings across the country.

Justice BV Nagarathna led bench told petitioner Vishal Tiwari, "Mention before Registrar first".

The PIL was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the petition alleges that fake encounters and police brutality in States such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh pose a serious threat to the rule of law and democratic governance.

The plea was filed by Advocate Vishal Tiwari contends that encounter killings, also known as extra-judicial killings, represent a breakdown of the constitutional framework where police officials assume the role of judge, jury and executioner. It states that in a democracy, the power to punish lies exclusively with the judiciary and not with law enforcement agencies.

The petition centres around the killing of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari, who died in a police encounter in Bhojpur district on June 17, 2026. According to the plea, Tiwari had gone live on Facebook hours before the encounter and declared that he was willing to surrender and lay down his weapon if certain demands were met.

The petition had claimed that the encounter took place within 24 hours of the police stating that Tiwari was mentally unwell and that efforts were being made to take him into safe custody and arrange treatment at a mental health facility. Relying on statements made by Tiwari's father, Kashinath Tiwari, the plea alleges that the deceased had no criminal antecedents, no FIRs or chargesheets against him and was engaged in social work. It also claims that Bharat Bhushan Tiwari had thrown away his pistol and surrendered before the police but was nevertheless shot dead.

The encounter has triggered protests in Bilauti village under Shahpur police station limits, with residents demanding an impartial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the killing. According to the petition, while taking up arms against the police warranted legal action, the use of lethal force after an alleged surrender raises serious questions regarding adherence to established police protocols.

The PIL had contended that the incident must be examined in light of the Supreme Court's decision in People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635, in which detailed guidelines were laid down governing investigations into police encounters. 

Calling such incidents manifestations of "oppressive police brutality" and a drift towards a "police state", the petition sought registration of an FIR against the police personnel involved in the killing of Bharat Bhushan Tiwari and a court-monitored CBI investigation into the encounter. It had also sought the constitution of an independent expert committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge to inquire into the incident and a direction to the Union Government to issue advisories to all States to strictly comply with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the PUCL judgment governing police encounters and extra-judicial killings.

Law officer of government cannot appear in Courts against the State: Patna High Court

The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.

-Article 39A, The Constitution of India 

The office of the Advocate General, Bihar issued an office order dated March 16, 2026, wherein, it referred to a "significant" order dated February 18, 2026 by the Patna High Court in Pappu Kumar Manjhi  vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1142 of 2024 with Arvind Kumar Manjhi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr 1195 of 2024, citing the provision contained in Rule 7(1) of the Law officers Engagement Rules, 2023. The office order pointed out that "the said rule does not permit law officer to appear against the State." 

The office order reads: "In the light of the judicial order, all Addl. Public Prosecutors being a Law officer as per the Rule 3(1)(f) of the said engagement rule, 2023, are hereby directed to ensure strict observance of the above order accordingly. 2. Under Secretary/Section officer of the Criminal Section is hereby directed to bring into the notice of the undersigned if any non-observance in this regard comes to the knowledge forthwith. 3. This order shall come into effect immediately."

The copy of the order was sent to the Registrar General, Patna High Court, Patna, Secretary-cum-LR, Law Department, Government of Bihar, Under Secretary/Section officer, Office of the AG and all Additional Public Prosecutors, Patna High Court; for information and necessary action. The office order was issued by Navin Chandra, Joint Secretary, Secretary to Government of Bihar. 

In its order dated February 18, 202, the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Praveen Kumar recorded: " As soon as the matter was called out, Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur assisted by Mr. Manish Kumar No.2, Advocate appears to argue the matter. On finding that Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 is assisting Mr. Ajay Thakur, Advocate on behalf of the appellant even as he happens to be an Additional Public Prosecutor presently in the panel of the State, this Court raised a query as to whether he can appear on behalf of the private party against the State. 2. Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 was, in fact, asked this question earlier also by one of the Hon’ble Judges of this Court who was constituting the Bench in which the Criminal Appeal (DB) was being heard. He was put to caution, but despite lapse of substantial period, he has continued to do so."

It added: "3. This Court, therefore, sent a request to the learned Advocate General to appear and assist this Court in the matter as to whether Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 is permitted by the State to appear on behalf of the private party. The learned Advocate General has appeared and apprised this Court. It is informed that Rule 7(i) of the Law Officers Engagement Rules, 2023 published in the Gazette on the 4th of July, 2023 does not permit a law officer to appear against the State. A clear stand has been taken referring to the said rule that Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 cannot appear on behalf of the private party against the State." 

The order noted: "4. Having sensed the trouble, Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 offers an undertaking that he would henceforth either not accept any private brief in his chambers or he would immediately resign today itself as Additional Public Prosecutor. This Court is of the considered opinion that Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 being an experienced lawyer having spent about two decades at the Bar has been violating the rules which is bordering on the face of a breach of the professional ethics. 5. This Court invited the suggestions from the learned Advocate General and at the Bar and it has been the request of the learned Advocate General and the Bar that Mr. Manish Kumar No.2 may be allowed to resign today itself if he wants to continue with this private practice against the State and he may be left with an admonition only at this stage. 6. This Court accepts the suggestions at the Bar and is not directing initiation of any disciplinary action against Mr. Manish Kumar, No.2, however, the admonition will be there on the record. He may choose for himself the next course of action. 7. Let this matter be taken up tomorrow i.e. on 19.02.2026 for consideration on merit. 8. A copy of the order shall be made available to the learned Advocate General for his records." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. 

On the next date, the order dated February 20, 2026 was passed by Justice Prasad. The order did not mention Manish Kumar's name as the assisting counsel. It is clear that the matter ended with Court's admonition.    

Notably, Justice M.L. Jain of Delhi High Court too had an occasion to grapple with a similar situation in 1981. In Lt. Col. K.C. Sud, New Delhi vs. S.C. Gudimani. The Court had framed three questions: (1)Whether a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor or a panel lawyer for that matter, can appear against the State? (2)Whether it is permissible to the State or the Administration to permit a Public Prosecutor or an Addl. Public Prosecutor to appear against the State ? (3)Whether a Public Prosecutor can appear on behalf of the accused person in cases instituted on a complaint by a private party? 

Delhi High Court's answer to the three questions are as follows: "(1)The Public Prosecutor, the Additional Public Prosecutors cannot appear against the State in criminal matters. That is so even where the party has carefully avoided to implead the State as a party in a revision or an appeal, or any other criminal proceedings. This applies to panel lawyers as well, because no panel lawyer can appear without being appointed as an Addl. Public Prosecutor. (2)It is not permissible for the State or the Delhi Administration to allow the Public Prosecutor or the Addl. Public Prosecutor to appear against itself and it must provide so specifically in the terms of their appointment. (3) The Public Prosecutor cannot appear on behalf of the accused even in cases instituted on a complaint by a private party." Bihar too should adopt these answers in pursuit of comprehensive justice.