Wednesday, May 13, 2026

Supreme Court urges High Courts to constitute grievance redressal committees across courts in India to foster better relations between lawyers and judges

In Bar Council of India vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Supreme Court Bar Association vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi reminded the judiciary of its "institutional obligation" to treat young entrants with compassion and dignity, stressing that judges must act as mentors to ensure the integrity and growth of the legal profession. It observed: "We are thus of the view that the incident in question does not warrant any further action at our end. At the same time, we consider it appropriate to observe that members of the judiciary at all levels ought to exhibit patience, compassion, and a spirit of encouragement, particularly towards young entrants to the legal profession...The present juncture necessitates that young law graduates emerging from a wide variety of institutions are encouraged to join the Bar, especially at the level of trial and district courts, where they have to imbibe the foundational principles of legal practice."

The Court directed that such Grievance Redressal Committees should also be constituted at the district and taluka level with a fair representation from the members of the Bar. In such an institutionalized mechanism, it will ensure that the issues that may arise between the members of the Bar or the judiciary are amicably, effectively, and timely resolved in a congenial atmosphere.

The Court recorded: "The communication reveals that the incident originated from a disagreement between the learned judge and the young counsel regarding a judicial precedent applicable to the matter under consideration. The situation escalated when the learned judge formed an impression that the young counsel, in a state of frustration, had deliberately struck his file against the podium, whereas the young counsel kept on explaining that the file had inadvertently slipped from his hands. The report of the learned Chief Justice further revealed that the verbal exchange that ensued was recorded by an unidentified individual who then circulated it on social media."

The Court took note of a detailed report submitted by the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and heard submissions from the Senior Counsel appearing for the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA).

The controversy originated from a disagreement over a judicial precedent, during which a case file inadvertently fell from the hands of a young advocate. The Judge initially felt that the incident as a deliberate act of impropriety and made certain oral observations regarding police custody. The Bench noted that these remarks were never translated into a formal judicial order. 

The order reads: "The report records that the Hon'ble Chief Justice interacted with the young counsel, who affirmed that the misunderstanding had been amicably resolved and no complaint was lodged before the Bar Council or any other forum. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates’ Association also addressed the Chief Justice of their High Court, informing that the matter stood amicably settled with their intervention".

The Court ordered, "From the material placed before us, it appears that the learned judge, in the course of proceedings, sought to draw the attention of the young counsel to a reported decision which was supporting his case, whereas the young counsel insisted on placing reliance on another precedent which the learned judge thought was inapplicable to the facts of the case in hand. It further appears that in the course of exchange, the case file of the young counsel fell to the ground, which was not attended by any deliberate intent. The learned judge, however, appears to have construed the same as an act of impropriety, leading to certain strong oral observations, which were eventually not incorporated in the judicial order; consequently, no occasion arose to issue any executable direction. The matter thus stood concluded at that stage."

Following the unprecedented rift within the legal fraternity over the conduct of Justice Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao, the Bar Council of India (BCI) and the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) moved to the Supreme Court seeking urgent judicial intervention to address what they describe as a "grave assault on the dignity of the legal profession" and the "erosion of judicial temperament."

On May 6, 2026, an incident had occurred in the courtroom of Justice Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao at the Andhra Pradesh High Court during a hearing regarding a Look Out Circular. 

Justice Rao had orally directed that the young lawyer be taken into police custody for 24 hours. Despite the advocate apologizing with folded hands and begging for mercy, the judge remained firm in his rebuke. 

Notably, the Bar Council of India wrote a letter on May 6, 2026, to the Chief Justice of India. It expressed that such actions raise grave questions about judicial temperament, fairness, and proportionality. While a judge may correct or caution an advocate, sending a young member of the profession to custody for a procedural lapse is viewed as grossly inappropriate and damaging to the Bar's confidence in the judiciary. The BCI emphasized that advocates are officers of the court who should be entitled to correction without humiliation, as the relationship between the Bench and the Bar must be founded on mutual respect and institutional grace.

Responding to the incident, the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA)  expressed "deep concern and shock" regarding the incident and emphasized that the relationship between the Bench and the Bar must be built on mutual respect, dignity, and institutional balance. The SCBA warned that actions leading to the "fear, humiliation, or intimidation" of junior advocates could severely undermine the independence of the Bar. 

The association had urged the Chief Justice of India to take institutional cognizance of the matter, review the records, and implement corrective measures to preserve public confidence and maintain cordial Bar-Bench relations.


Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Union government notifies ‘rules’ under four labour codes, code on wages repeals Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, Equal Remuneration Act, 1976-Part 1

With 33 gazette notifications issued on May 8, 2026) and May 9, 2026, the union government fully operationalised the four Labour Codes. The rules have been published with “minor amendments” to the draft rules pre-published in December 2025. With this the union government has notified following ‘rules’ under the four new labour codes:

1. Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2026 (69 pages) Hindi version 30 pages and English version 39 pages

2. Social Security (Central) Rules, 2026 (259 pages) Hindi version 133 pages and English version 126 pages

3. Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2026 (92 pages) Hindi version 50 pages and English version 42 pages

4. Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (Central) Rules, 2026. (318 pages) Hindi version [138 pages] and English version (180 page)

Earlier, 32-page long The Code on Wages, 2019, 56-page long The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, 113-page long The Code on Social Security, 2020 and The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 has been operationalised with effect from November 21,  2025. These code have repealed pre-existing 29 labour laws. The notification dated May 08, 2026, the Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India has notified the Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2026, which are finalised after public consultation on the draft Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2025, published in December 2025. The Wage Rules are framed under Section 67 of the Code on Wages, 2019, which came into force on November 21, 2025.

The Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2026 provides a framework for fixation and revision of minimum wages and floor wage, prescribes formats and timelines for issuance of wage slips and maintenance of registers, provides procedural safeguards governing permissible deductions and recovery of advances, standardises of working hours, weekly rest days and treatment of night shifts and provides for principal employer accountability in contractor-based employment arrangements. 

Minimum wages and Floor wages: Under the Rules, the Minimum wages are to be fixed by the union government on a day basis, based on criteria separately notified through special or general orders under the Wage Code. The hourly wage rate is to be calculated by dividing the daily wage by eight (8), while the monthly wage rate is to be calculated by multiplying the daily wage by twenty-six (26), with rounding off rules prescribed for fractions. For establishments having less than six (6) working days in a week, the hourly minimum wage rate is to be used for deriving daily wages.  The union government may fix and revise Floor wages after consultation with the Central Advisory Board and State Governments, taking into account minimum living standards including food, clothing, housing and other relevant factors, with revision ordinarily at intervals not exceeding five (5) years. 

Working Hours of Work, Rest Days and Night Shift: The normal working day for employees whose wage period is fixed on a daily basis shall be eight (8) hours, while weekly working hours for other employees shall not exceed forty-eight (48) hours. Employees are entitled to one (1) weekly rest day, ordinarily Sunday in a six (6) day working week, while in establishments with less than six (6) working days, the rest period must include Saturday and Sunday unless another day is fixed by the employer. An employee cannot ordinarily work for more than ten (10) consecutive days without a rest day, and where work is performed on the rest day, a substituted rest day must be provided immediately before or after the original rest day. Employees working on a rest day are generally entitled to overtime wages for the rest day worked and wages for the substituted rest day, subject to specific exceptions such as for a six  (6) day working week, if daily wages are derived by dividing by twenty-six (26) and the same is not less than the notified minimum wage rate, then no wages shall be paid for the day. For night shifts extending beyond midnight, the twenty-four (24) hour rest period and calculation of the succeeding day are to be reckoned from the time the shift ends, and hours worked after midnight are treated as part of the previous day. 

Payment of Wages and Deductions: In the case of employees engaged through contractors, the principal employer is required to pay the contractor amounts payable towards wages in accordance with the Wage Code. Employees engaged on a part-time basis are not entitled to wages for a full normal working day where such arrangement is agreed under the terms of employmen. The total deductions from wages in any wage period cannot exceed fifty per cent (50%) of wages, and any excess must be carried forward to succeeding wage periods in instalments. Before imposing fines, deductions for absence from duty, or deductions for damage or loss, the employer must provide the employee an opportunity to explain within seven (7) days, and intimations must be issued electronically or in writing. Recovery of advances must be made in instalments, ensuring that deductions in any wage period do not exceed the prescribed ceiling of fifty per cent (50%) of wages. 

Payment of Bonus: Where employees are engaged through contractors and the contractor fails to pay statutory bonus, the principal employer/establishment is required to pay the minimum bonus upon receiving written information and confirming such failure. Separate methods are prescribed for computation of gross profits for banking companies and for establishments other than banking companies through Appendices B and C respectively. Certain specified prior charges are required to be deducted from gross profits before computation of allocable surplus, as detailed in Appendix D of the Wage Rules depending upon the type of establishment. Excess allocable surplus beyond the maximum bonus payable may be carried forward for up to four (4) accounting years, while deficiencies in allocable surplus for payment of minimum bonus shall similarly be carried forward as set off amounts. 

Registers, Forms and Wage Slip: Employers are required to maintain electronically or physically an Employee Register in Form I, Register of Wages, Overtime, Advances, Fines and Deductions in Form IV, and an Attendance Register-cum-Muster Roll in Form IX. Registers maintained under the Wage Rules are required to be preserved for a period of five (5) years from the date of the last entry.  Every employer must issue wage slips in Form V to employees electronically or physically on or before payment of wages. Claims relating to wages and discrimination may be filed in Form II, while appeals against orders of the authority are to be filed in Form III electronically or through speed post. Employees are required to make nominations in Form VII for payment of dues in the event of death, and employers must deposit undisbursed dues with the jurisdictional Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) after the expiry of six (6) months from the date the amount become payable. 

Offences and Penalties: Complaints relating to offences under the Wage Code may be filed by an authorised officer, aggrieved employee, registered trade union or Inspector-cum-Facilitator. Upon receiving a complaint and being satisfied that an offence has been committed, the concerned officer may issue summons to the alleged offender and conduct proceedings including recording of evidence and cross-examination. The officer is empowered to impose penalties where the accused pleads guilty or where offences are established after considering oral and documentary evidence. Compoundable offences may be settled through an application in Form VI, upon payment of fifty per cent (50%) of the maximum fine prescribed under the Code within thirty days. Where the composition amount is not deposited within the prescribed timeline, prosecution may be instituted before the competent court for the concerned offence. 

Notably, Section 69 of The Code on Wages reads:"Repeal and savings.—(1) The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (21 of 1965) and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (25 of 1976) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the enactments so repealed including any notification, nomination, appointment, order or direction made there under or any amount of wages provided in any provision of such enactments for any purpose shall be deemed to have been done or taken or provided for such purpose under the corresponding provisions of this Code and shall be in force to the extent they are not contrary to the provisions of this Code till they are repealed under the corresponding provisions of this Code or by the notification to that effect by the Central Government. (3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2), the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) shall apply to the repeal of such enactments." 

The fact remains there is continued ambiguity regarding the precise inclusion of variable remuneration, sales commissions, and bonuses in the code. By mandating that basic wages must be 50% or more of total CTC (cost to company), employee take-home pay might decrease, while contributions to PF and gratuity increase. The code allows the central government to set a "floor wage," but does not mandate a specific, objective methodology to calculate it. It leaves room open for arbitrariness. Section 56 of the code replaces criminal penalties (imprisonment) with civil penalties (fines) for several offences, with provisions for compounding. The "Inspector-cum-Facilitator" system in the code is intended to be transparent, but gives birth to concerns about reducing strict inspections.

Dr. Gopal Krishna  

The author is a practicing advocate and a law, mass communication and philosophy researcher. He is a member, Drafting Committee, Kisan Majdoor Commission. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislation. He is an ex-Fellow, Germany based International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC)-University of Potsdam. He has been a Guest Fellow of Ex-Guest Fellow, Faculty of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin. He is also the editor of www.toxicswatch.org. He is a columnist with  https://www.livelaw.in, https://www.moneylife.in and https://followupstories.com and Mainstream Weekly.

Supreme Court reverses Justice Anil Kumar Sinha's order denying anticipatory bail

In Bablu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol  and Augustine George Masih passed a 3-page long order dated May 8, 2026, wherein, it reversed the 2-page long order dated March 19, 2026 passed by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court. The petitioner challenged the order by the High Court. The Supreme Court's order concluded: "8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.5804036250020 of 2025 of Korma Police Station, Sheikhpura District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. However, in the attending facts, one of the conditions shall necessarily be that if the petitioner possesses a passport, the same shall be deposited before the Competent Authority/Court, till the conclusion of the Trial or directed otherwise. The order recorded: "10. Needless to add, till the investigation is not complete in all respects, the petitioner(s) would fully cooperate, and if the challan/charge sheet is filed...."

The application, for grant of anticipatory bail, had arisen out of a Korma Police Station Case of 2025, disclosing offences under Sections 137(2), 96, 3(5) of the BNS, 2023. As per the prosecution case, on February 15, 2025 at about 7:00 PM, the informant’s 17-year-old daughter, Savita Kumari, went to the fields and was allegedly abducted by several accused persons who lured her with the intention of marriage. Despite efforts, she could not be traced and her mobile phone was found switched off. The informant fears that the accused may cause harm to his daughter. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and he had falsely been implicated in the case due to ulterior motives. He submitted that petitioner had no connection with the alleged occurrence and he was merely the brother of co-accused Deepak Kumar. The petitioner asserted that the informant’s daughter had voluntarily left her home owing to a consensual relationship with the co-accused Deepak Kumar. It was also submitted that the FIR disclosed only general and omnibus allegations against the petitioner without any specific role attributed to him. The petitioner had denied having any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the co-accused and the informant’s daughter. He submitted that the case was lodged maliciously with the intent to harass and exert pressure upon the petitioner. 

Justice Sinha had concluded; "Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and taking into consideration the fact that minor girl has been kidnapped, there is allegation against the petitioner that he along with Deepak Kumar and others kidnapped the minor daughter of the informant and the girl has not yet been recovered, I am not inclined to grant the petitioner privilege of anticipatory bail. 6. This application is, accordingly, rejected."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in a POCSO case

In Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Patna High Court's Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra dated March 11, 2026. The order concluded:"6. It is pertinent to note at this juncture itself and for the limited purpose of considering the prayer for bail, that the statements of the recused girls which have been recorded under Section 183 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and particularly two victims associated with the orchestra group where petitioner was working would disclose that there were no recent evidence of sexual
assault and three co-accused Gena Sah, Rajat Sardar @Rajjat Kumar @ Rajat Kumar and Subhash Kumar have since then granted regular bail by the jurisdictional High Court. Hence, on the ground of parity, petitioner is also entitled for grant of bail. 7. The impugned order dated 11.03.2026 passed by the High Court is set aside and petitioner is ordered to be released on bail
on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional court deems fit to impose, including the condition of directing the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court on all dates of hearing."

The petitioner was arraigned as an accused No. 11 in the FIR No. 8 of 2025, registered at Police Station Women Police Station, District Betiah, for the offence punishable under Section 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 95, 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 6, 8 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 75 and 79 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956 and Section 16, 17, and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, was seeking regular bail. The record disclosed that investigation had been concluded and charge-sheet was filed and two witnesses were already examined. It was the case of the prosecution that minor girls were found in various orchestra groups who had been trafficked and they were sexually exploitated. Even according to the FIR, the petitioner was neither the owner or Manager of the orchestra group and he was only a employee (Announcer) in Chhoti New Musical Orchestra Dhamaka Group.

Earlier, in Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated March 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"...the prayer for bail of the petitioner is again rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from today. If the trial is not concluded within the period of six months, as stated above, the petitioner will be at liberty to renew his prayer before the court below." The name of respondent no. 2 has been kept anonymous. 

The petitioner sought bail in connection with Bettiah Mahila P.S. case of 2025 instituted for the offences under Sections 64, 65(1), 143(1), 145, 98 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 6, 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act and Sections 75 and 79 of the J.J. Act and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. This was the second attempt of the petitioner for bail. The petitioner had renewed his prayer for grant of regular bail which was earlier rejected on merit by Justice Mishra of the High Court vide 3-page long order dated August 13, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 31511 of 2025, taking into account the nature of accusation and the gravity of the offence and involvement of the petitioner in the offence.  

The order dated August 13, 2025 recorded that the informant filed a complaint before the ADJ, Champaran, based on an tip-off from National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) constituted under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015, which led to raids at seven locations by the police team. Sixteen girls were rescued. The victims gave statements under Section 180 BNSS alleging repeated sexual assaults, exploitation for dance, and being forced into sexual activities by various accused associated with different orchestra groups.

APP for the State and counsel for the informant had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioners. They submitted that on perusal of record it appeared that the several victims were minor girl. It was specifically submitted that petitioner, namely, Dhamu Sah used to inappropriately touch the body of victim, during dance on the stage, whereas petitioner, namely, Ravi Ranjan Choube @ Ravi Ranjan Choubey, had established illicit relation with one of the victims.

In compliance of the order dated January 17, 2026, a report dated February 12, 2026 with regard to the present stage of trial has been received. From perusal of the report, it appeared that two (2) out of nineteen (19) charge sheet witnesses had been examined in the case. It was also reported that trial was likely to be concluded within a period of nine months. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that the petitioner was languishing in judicial custody since February 23, 2025 without any rhymes or reason, having no criminal antecedent. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, hence, petitioner may be enlarged on bail. The APP for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail. The APP had further relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3539 (X. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.), wherein, in paragraph No.14, Supreme Court had observed as under: “14. Ordinarily inserious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court be it the Trial Court or the High Court should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the accused.”  

Justice Mishra observed: "7. There is no new ground to consider the bail petition of the petitioner. From the aforesaid report, it appears that the trial is going on." Supreme Court has reversed the order by the High Court. 

Monday, May 11, 2026

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Harish Kumar sets aside judgement by Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy

"Labour law is not merely an adjunct of the law of contract; it is a charter of human rights at the workplace. The Government cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with its own employees. To deny a workman his lawful dues by juggling with procedural niceties is to negate the very rule of law."

-Judgement dated May 7, 2026 in Siya Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Labour,  Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026) by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar 

In Siya Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 23-page long judgement dated May 7, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy. It concluded:"28.....we are of the humble view that when the foundational award has not been challenged before the learned Single Judge, the impugned order disturbing the effect of such award, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, the impugned order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, is hereby set aside. The writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 17753 of 2018 filed by the appellant Siya Singh is allowed and the writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 filed by the Corporation stands dismissed. 29. Both the Letters Patent Appeals stand allowed." 

The six other respondents were: 2.District Magistrate-Cum-Collector, Patna, 3. Certificate Officer-Cum-District, Panchayati Raj Officer, Patna, 4. Bihar State Road Transport Corporation through its Administrator, Patna, 5. Administrator, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, 6. Chief Accounts Officer, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna and 7. Divisional Manager, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna Division, Bankipur, Patna. 

 Both the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the appellant Siya Singh challenging the common order dated June 23, 2025 passed by Justice Chakravarthy, the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 and C.W.J.C. No. 17753 of 2018, whereby the writ petition filed by the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation vide C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 was allowed and the writ petition filed by the appellant Siya Singh vide C.W.J.C. No. 17753 of 2018 was dismissed. 

C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 was filed by the Corporation through the Chief of Administration with a prayer for quashing the judgment dated June 19, 2013, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in Misc. Case No. 02 of 2008 which had directed payment of back wages to the tune of Rs. 11,70,990/- (Rupees Eleven Lakh Seventy Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety only) after computation under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947as per the award dated November 14, 2006 passed by the said Court in Reference Case No. 24 of 1995 under section 10(1)(c) of I.D. Act, 1947. 

It was the case of the Corporation in C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 that the appellant was working as a Conductor in the Corporation, in Bankipur Depot, Patna and on January 24, 1978, while he was on duty in vehicle no. BHT-8015 (Rupauli – Patna service), during checking, it was found that the appellant had realized fare from ten unbooked passengers illegally without giving them any tickets, and there were seventeen unbooked passengers in the bus, and he had committed misconduct with the checking party and, as such, the charge was framed against him and after proper departmental enquiry, it was proved that he collected illegal money from the unbooked passengers and ultimately he was dismissed from service on September 19, 1978.. The dispute was referred by the Govt. of Bihar to the Labour Court and Reference Case No. 24 of 1995 was initiated under Section 10(1)(c) of I.D. Act, 1947 and the terms of reference were as follows: “Whether the termination of services of Siya Singh, Conductor, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Bankipur Depot is proper and justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?”

The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna before whom oral and documentary evidence was adduced by both the sides, after hearing the parties, passed the award on November 14, 2006 in favour of the appellant. The Labour Court set aside the dismissal order of the appellant dated September 19, 1978 and held that the appellant would be deemed to be an employee on the date of dismissal and the management was directed to reinstate him with full back wages and other consequential benefits.

It was the case of the Corporation that the appellant submitted the award before the Corporation and since the Corporation was running under acute financial crisis, the Administrator of the Corporation suggested to the appellant for reinstatement, after forgoing the back wages and consequential benefits, as provided in the award, which was accepted by the appellant. Accordingly, the reinstatement order was passed on December 28, 2007 with a specific direction that the appellant shall not be entitled to any benefits for the non-working period.

The case of the Corporation was that the appellant willfully accepted the order dated December 28, 2007, without any objection and joined the duty and after one year, he filed Misc. Case No. 02 of 2008 before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947, claiming the back wages to the tune of Rs. 16,90,238/- (Rupees Sixteen Lakh Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Eight only), wherein the Corporation appeared on being noticed and filed the show-cause. However, the Labour Court without proper finding and without assigning any cogent reason passed the order dated June 19, 2013, holding that the appellant was entitled to get a sum of Rs. 11,70,990/- only instead of his total back wages and other consequential benefits. The Labour Court also directed the Corporation to pay the said amount to the appellant within three months from the date of the order, failing which the Corporation would be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum, on the said amount. 

The Corporation contended that the Labour Court had granted the relief without proper application of judicial mind and without considering the principle of “No Work, No Pay”, as well as the fact that the appellant had been engaged in other employment during the idle period.

Chief Justice Sahoo who authored the judgement observed:"26. The liability of any employer towards its workmen arises from the very nature of the employment relationship and cannot be shaken off by the employer through make-believe arrangement, or claims of financial hardship. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in a landmark
decision in the case of Hussainbhai, Calicut Vrs.- The Alath Factory Thezhilali Union, Kozhikode & Ors., reported in (1978) 4 Supreme Court Cases 257 as follows:- “6. If the livelihood of the workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make-believe trappings of detachment from the Management cannot snap the real life-bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off.” Further in the case of Hombe Gowda Educational Trust & Anr. -Vrs.- State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 430, it was held as follows:- “30. This Court has come a long way from its earlier viewpoints. The recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between the earlier approach to the industrial relation wherein only the interest of the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court, it has been noticed how discipline at the workplace/industrial undertakings received a setback. In view of the change in economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity. Our country is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore, must be taken in
accordance with law……”
27. Therefore, in our humble view, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from perversity and patent illegality and this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal has got ample jurisdiction to interfere with such an order, therefore, we feel it necessary to correct the errors committed by
the learned Single Judge
."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Satyavrat Verma in an Excise case

In Kumar Viplav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Courts Division Bench of Justices  B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated January 30, 2026 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of the Patna High Court. 

The appeal had challenged Justuce Verma's order. The criminal appeal arose out of crime registered pursuant to FIR No. 19 of 2022 dated February 22, 2022 lodged with PS Maranchi (Pach Mohalla O.P.), District Patna, registered under Section 30(a) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016. Anticipating arrest in connection with the offence in question, the appellant had preferred an application for anticipatory bail before the High Court. By order dated December 4, 2025, the High Court had granted  provisional anticipatory bail subject to verification that the appellant had no criminal antecedents. Thereafter, the appellant filed a modification application before the High Court to disclose a criminal antecedent under Sections 323, 341, 379, 387 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, all relatable to a single incident. Subsequently, by impugned order dated January 30, 2026, the High Court did not confirm the provisional order, thereby denying the relief of anticipatory bail. Hence, the appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court's order reads:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail claimed. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 30.01.2026."  

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed an order, which reads:"2. The Court is taking a consistent view of not modifying the order by which petitioner was granted anticipatory bail, in the event, if the same was obtained by concealing the criminal antecedent of the petitioner. 3. Accordingly, the instant modification application is dismissed." Supreme Cort has reversed this order by the High Court.