Justice Soni Shrivastava as part of Division Bench sets aside judegment of Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur

In Md Quarban vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"42. All these inconsistencies and conflicting versions of the prosecution case which is apparent from the deposition of the prosecution witness render the prosecution case considerably doubtful. The failure of the prosecution to prove the foundational facts with regard to age and sexual assault makes the entire edifice of the prosecution crumble against the weight of evidence." The judgement was authored by Justice Soni Shrivastava. 

Justice Shrivastava added: "43. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and on account of all the foregoing reasons, including the consideration of several missing links and loopholes in the case of the prosecution, we come to a clear finding that the circumstances and evidence on which the conclusion of guilt has to be drawn, has not been fully established and the appellant is entitled to be extended benefit of doubt, inasmuch as, the prosecution hasmiserably failed to prove its case by adducing credible and trustworthy evidence. 44. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances and also taking into account the overall perspective and the entire conspectus, it would be extremely unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant, as such, the finding of conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable and requires interference. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 18.03.2023 and the order of sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No.35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No.361 of 2018, is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. 45. The appellant, who is said to be in custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case."  

The appeal was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated March 18, 2023 and the order of sentence dated March 22, 2023 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No. 35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No. 361 of 2018. 3. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted and was sentenced for the offences punishable under Section 363, IPC for rigorous Imprisonment for seven years along with fine of Rs. 50,000/, Section 341 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year or fine of Rs. 500/, Section 323 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1000/, Section 504 IPC for rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/ and Section 4 of POCSO Act for rigorous imprisonment for 20 years along with fine of Rs. 1 lakh.

The prosecution case based on the written report of the informant alleged that the minor daughter (aged about 14 years) of the informant had gone for her tuition classes 15 days back, but did not return. He frantically searched for his daughter but did not get to know of her whereabouts. When he could not find out anything even from his relatives, he gave the written application on December 28, 2018 before police.
Based on the written application, a Sabour P.S. Case was registered against unknown for the offences punishable under sections 363 and 365 of IPC. After investigation supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against the present appellant under sections 366A, 376, 341, 323, 504, 506, 427/34 of the IPC and section 6/8 of POCSO Act, whereafter cognizance was also taken under these provisions by the Special Court POCSO, Bhagalpur. 

The trial Court on August 10, 2021, framed the charges against the appellant under sections 341, 323, 376, 366 A, 427 of IPC and 4 and 8 of POCSO Act and the same were explained to him to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case examined as many as five witnesses and exhibited some documents on its behalf. The trial court decided the primary issue relating to the minority of the victim and recorded the fact that while the victim’s age was disclosed as 14 years in both the FIR and the statement of the victim under section 164 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate had assessed her age as 15 years. The medical report indicated her age to be between 16 to 18 years. The date of birth of the victim as per her Registration Card in the Bihar School Examination Board was recorded as January 25, 2004. It reached the conclusion that the victim was undoubtedly a minor on the basis of the document.

The trial court has thus concluded that the solitary evidence of the victim itself was sufficient for proving the guilt of the accused and since there are no apparent contradictions in the prosecution evidence to doubt the veracity of the same, the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts. However, while holding that the case was proved under sections 323, 341, 376, 504 of the IPC along with section 4 of the POCSO Act and additionally finding the case to be proved under section 363 IPC also (under which no charge was framed), the accused/appellant was acquitted of the charges under Section 427, 506, 366 A of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act as the same was held to be not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

Justice Shrivastava observed: "28. After having analysed the trend of evidence as disclosed by the victim (PW3), it would be difficult to place her in the category of ‘sterling witness’ whose evidence would be complete and sufficient in itself to base a conviction, as such, the evidence of victim (PW3) must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well-settled legal principles as established by law in a catena of decisions." 

She drew on Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, wherein, it said “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

This view was further reiterated by a 3-Judgebench of the Supreme Court in Nirmal Prem Kumar & Anr. vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2024 INSC 193) Cr. Appeal No. 1098 of 2024 disposed off on March 11, 2024.

The High Court's judgment took note of the inordinate delay of 15 days in lodging the FIR. 

Justice Shrivastava  observed: "This fact compels this court to take a view that there is something more in this case that meets the eye, as no father whose daughter went missing or was kidnapped would wait for fifteen days for lodging an FIR. Further, the medical examination of the victim conducted by the medical officer (PW4) reveals that there was no physical or chemical injury on her body including her private parts and upon pathological investigation no spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal swab, however the urine pregnancy test was found positive. 31. Her age was assessed between 16 to 18 years but no evidence of any recent sexual assault has been noted by the doctor, thereby making it abundantly clear that even the medical report (Ext. P1)does not stand in support of the contentions of the victim. Merely because the pregnancy test was found to be positive, it would not lead us to the irresistible conclusion that the entire prosecution story narrated against the appellant has an element of truth and there could be other reasons, including one of consensual sexual relation, leading to the pregnancy of the victim. 32. The issue of a consensual sexual relation brings us to the crucial question as to whether the victim was actually a minor and whether her age determination was done in consonance with the procedure laid down under Section 94 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. With regard to the minority of the victim, the only document which has been brought on record is the Registration Card (Exhibit- P4) issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 25.01.2004. This document has been proved and marked as Exhibit P4 by the victim herself and no other evidence has been adduced in support of the said document. Neither the school admission register has been produced nor the headmaster of the concerned school has been brought forward for examination in order to lend support to the case of the victim that she was a minor at the relevant period. Further, the fact that all the witnesses including the I.O., have maintained a curious and suspicious silence on the aspect of age of the alleged rape victim, is very intriguing and raises considerable doubt in the mind of this court with regard to the minority of the victim. None of the victim’s family members i.e. her sister or her father, have mentioned a word about the age of the victim in their deposition made in the Court. The victim too has remained effectively silent on the said aspect and only on recall for recording further examination-in-chief after about 10 months of her cross-examination, she produced the above-mentioned Registration Card which was marked as Exhibit-P4. Such evidence may be
admissible but its evidentiary value, in the entire scenario, gets lost, especially in absence of any supporting evidence and non-examination of the maker of the said document to vouchsafe of the contents thereof. Exhibit-4 did not form part of the charge-sheet and the police papers supplied to the accused."

She added, " Since the determination of age has not been done in accordance with law and there is no other evidence, much less clinching, to establish the minority of the victim, this court would go on to consider the medical evidence whereby the doctor has assessed her age to be between 16 and 18 year

In Ram Suresh Singh versus Prabhat Singh and Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 681 and Om Prakash versus the State of Rajasthan and Another, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 201, the Supreme Court took a view that radiological examination for purpose of age determination was not very reliable and there was always a possibility of an error of plus and minus two years. 

In Rajak Mohammad vs. H.P, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248, the court laid down that the age determination on the basis of radiological examination may not be accurate determination and thus sufficient margin on either side has to be allowed. The judgment reads: “9. While it is correct that the age determined on the basis of a radiological examination may not be an accurate determination and sufficient margin either way has to be allowed, yet the totality of the facts stated above read with the report of the radiological examination leaves room for ample doubt with regard to the correct age of the prosecutrix. The benefit of the aforesaid doubt, naturally, must go in favour of the accused.”

In Santosh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, the Court held that solitary version of prosecutrix in a case under Section 376 of the IPC, was not to be taken as gospel truth in absence of any other supporting or corroborative evidence. It had also considered the factum of delay in lodging of the First Information Report as also the fact that the medical report of the victim did not support the allegations made by her and considering all these facts cumulatively, the accused was acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt.

Justice Shrivastava observed: "40. Similarly, in the present case in view of the fact that the victim has been giving vacillating statements with regard to the manner of occurrence and these inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative significantly undermines the credibility of the prosecution version and takes away the veracity of the evidence of the victim. We also take into consideration the fact that there is total want of evidence on record to corroborate the case of the victim and it appears that for the reasons best known to the prosecution, material witnesses who could have shed some light on correct facts have also been withheld. 41. The cloud of doubt upon the entire prosecution case starts form the very inception as the informant (PW2) did not lodge an FIR upto fifteen days of her daughter being allegedly kidnapped which is not a normal phenomenon. Moving further, the factum of non-raising of alarm by victim while being forcibly taken away on a motorcycle points towards a probability of a consensual act with no resistance offered at the end of the victim. The age of the appellant at the relevant period being about 19 years i.e., of the same age group as the victim, further contributes to such a probability. The evidence of both the father and the sister of the victim during trial failed to lend support to the case of the prosecution. PW1, the sister of the victim, rather stands out as she has deposed no incident happened in her presence which is absolutely contradictory to the story as propounded by the victim." Consequently, the Division Bench allowed the appeal.

Show Cause Notice can be challenged directly in High Court in exceptional cases: Supreme Court

In J. Sri Nisha  vs. The Special Director, Adjudicating Authority, Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 1, 2026, wherein, it concluded:”....the Adjudicating Authority has undone the order of the Competent Authority even while the appeal against the said order is pending. Such a course of action, in the opinion of this Court, tantamounts to abdicating the powers of the Appellate Authority, even when the order of the Competent Authority was still under challenge in appeal at the instance of the department." The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta.

It added: "39. In wake of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 23rd July, 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court and so also the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 30th November, 2023, rejecting the writ petition preferred by the appellants and as a consequence, the final order dated 26th August, 2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority imposing penalty and ordering confiscation of the property held by appellants are declared to be arbitrary and contrary to law. The same are hereby set aside. The proceedings are revived from the stage of the SCN." 

The Division Bench concluded: "40. As an upshot, we provide that the Appellate Authority shall first decide the appeal preferred by the Department against the order of the Competent Authority under Section 37A(5) of FEMA after hearing the parties and by passing a reasoned order within a period of two months from today. Pursuant to the disposal of the appeal pending before the Appellate Authority, the proceedings arising out of the SCN may be commenced and shall be taken to their logical conclusion without being prejudiced by any of the observations made hereinabove or in the orders passed by the High Court. 41. The appeals are disposed of in these terms."

These appeals arose out of the common judgment and final order dated July 23, 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The appellants had approached the Single Judge of the High Court, assailing the order/show cause notice (SCN) dated December 22, 2021 issued by the Adjudicating Authority under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999, and the consequential corrigendum dated March 13, 2023. The writ petitions instituted by the appellants assailing the said SCN and corrigendum came to be dismissed by the Single Judge vide common final order dated 30th November, 2023. The intra-Court appeals preferred against the said order was also rejected by the impugned judgment dated July 23, 2024. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.  

The controversy in the present cases is more appropriately examined within the framework of sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 37A. A plain reading of Section 37A(1) indicates that the power of seizure was predicated upon the existence of a “reason to believe” that foreign exchange, foreign security or immovable property situated outside India was suspected to have been held in contravention of Section 4. Such satisfaction by the Authorised Officer at the stage of preliminary seizure under Sub-section (1) is only tentative and is expressly subject to scrutiny under Sub-sections (2) and (3), wherein the Competent Authority is required to independently examine whether the reasons recorded justify continuation of the seizure. The exercise undertaken by the Competent Authority was thus not an empty formality, but a substantive evaluation of whether the material on record was sufficient to sustain even a prima facie inference of contravention in relation to foreign exchange. In the present case, upon such evaluation, the Competent Authority declined to confirm the seizure by a well-reasoned order, thereby indicating that the material did not meet even this preliminary threshold. The refusal to confirm the seizure, therefore, reflects a considered finding that the foundational requirement of a “reason to believe” was not satisfied on the material available.

The Supreme Court observed: "....a prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the Competent Authority that there was no evidence of the appellants being involved in foreign security transactions having any value. Consequently, it has to be taken that there did not exist the “reasons to believe” referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 37A. These findings definitely support the cause of the appellants herein. It is not in dispute that the appeal preferred by the Department against the order dated 3rd February, 2021, is still pending consideration. The Division Bench of the High Court, while deciding the writ appeal, observed that the writ petition against the SCN is not entertainable. We feel that the said observation may not be correct in every situation. This Court has consistently held that although ordinarily a writ petition against an SCN may not be entertained, however, the said proposition is not an inviolable rule. Interference at the stage of SCN is permissible in exceptional circumstances, such as where the notice suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, is issued with a pre-determined or premeditated approach, amounts to an abuse of the process of law, or results in a violation of the principles of natural justice. In such situations, the High Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent manifest injustice." 

The Court relied to its earlier decision in Union of India vs. VICCO Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270 : 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1420. The relevant pragraph reads:"“31. Normally, the writ court should not interfere at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice by the authorities. In such a case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their contentions before the authorities concerned and to satisfy the authorities concerned about the absence of case for proceeding against the person against whom the show-cause notices have been issued. Abstinence from interference at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice in order to relegate the parties to the proceedings before the authorities concerned is the normal rule. However, the said rule is not without exceptions. Where a show-cause notice is issued either without jurisdiction or in an abuse of process of law, certainly in that case, the writ court would not hesitate to interfere even
at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice. The interference at the show-cause notice stage should be rare and not in a routine manner. Mere assertion by the writ petitioner that notice was without jurisdiction and/or abuse of process of law would not suffice. It should be prima facie established to be so. Where factual adjudication would be necessary, interference is ruled out.”

Justice Mehta observed: "33. Thus, the rejection of challenge laid by the appellants to the SCN on the ground of non-maintainability was not justified in the peculiar facts of the case at hand."

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri in DTDC Express Ltd Excise Act case

In The State of Bihar vs. DTDC Express Ltd. Courier Company (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, it sets aside the 7-page long judgement dated July 2, 2025 by Justices P. B. Bajanthri and S. B. Pd. Singh.  Supreme Court order reads: "1. This Court vide order dated 17.10.2025 had issued limited notice confined to imposition of costs. 2. We are informed that the confiscated material has already been released. In the facts and circumstances of the case, when the prohibited as well as normal goods were being transported together, the circumstances under which the State has taken action does not require imposition of costs. 3. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order to the extent of imposition of costs of Rs. 50,000/- is set aside. 4. With these observations, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of." 

In DTDC Express Ltd. (Courier Company) vs. The Principal Secretary, Excise Department, Government of Bihar, & Others (2025), the High Court had concluded:"It is a case for imposing cost, in view of the fact that petitioner has been unnecessarily harassed for about one year and he had filed multiple litigations before this Court and Criminal Jurisdictional Court. In this regard, we have taken note of principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Judgment, namely, UFLEX Ltd. Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in (2022) 1 SCC 165. Therefore, the respondents are hereby directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner towards litigations cost. The cost shall be paid by the respondents within eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 11. Accordingly, writ petition stands disposed of. 12. Copy of this order be communicated to the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar, DGP, State of Bihar and Commissioner of Excise Department, State of Bihar." 

The other four respondents were: District Magistrate-Cum-Collector, Buxar, Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM) Buxar, Excise Superintendent, Buxar, and SHO, Buxar Excise Police Station, Buxar.

The petitioner had prayed for the following reliefs: (A) A writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the goods seized in connection with Buxar Excise P.S. Case No. 240 / 24 dated June 29, 2024. The goods prayed to be released were mentioned in the list to the writ petition. The goods were not prohibited. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated December 6, 2024 and December 27, 2024 passed by the SDM Buxar P.S. Case No. 240 2024 whereby and whereunder the SDM (respondent no.4) declined to release the good items which are not forbidden/prohibited under the law. Also the two orders by the SDM Buxar Sadar was unreasonable and did not address the main issue. 

The petitioner – DTDC Express Ltd. who is in courier business had booked the truck-container bearing no. HR55A-H-7501 for the purpose of transportation of goods from Gurugram to Patna. During the transit, the vehicle was seized at New Ganga Bridge, Excise Checkpost, Buxar Industrial Area, Distt. Buxar on June 29, 2024. The driver of the truck was not only carrying the goods of the petitioner, he was carrying 360 litres of liquor. Thus, the Excise / Police officials proceeded to initiate action against the driver of the truck while seizing the subject matter of the vehicle along with the goods. For the release of goods other than liquor, the petitioner who is owner of the goods, had filed criminal petition before the jurisdictional court on July 3, 2024 and it was rejected on July 29, 2024. He had approached the Authorities on September 7, 2024 for release of the goods. It was not materialized resultantly, he had invoked remedy before the High Court in filing CWJC No. 15630 of 2024 and it was disposed of on October 8, 2024 while directing the official-respondents to consider the petitioner’s grievance within a period of three weeks. Thereafter, the Authorities rejected on two occasions namely, December 6, 2024 and December 27, 2024, which are the subject matter of the present litigation. Simultaneously, petitioner had filed one more criminal petition before the jurisdictional court and it was rejected on January 6, 2025. Therefore, the writ petition was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that he was only an agent and who was into courier business, he had booked the subject matter of truck container for the purpose of transporting goods other than the excise material. The container/truck should have been seized along with the liquor only, for the reasons that perusal of the FIR, offences for the seizure of the container/truck was only to the extent that possession of the vehicle had violated offences under the Excise Act. The seizure memo was not in respect  to excise material. Therefore, in all fairness, the seizure authority should not have seized. Assuming that it was seized, which should have been released in favour of the concerned person after due verification of the records. It was also submitted that unnecessarily petitioner was harassed. He was compelled to invoke number of remedies before the criminal jurisdictional court and before the High Court. Overall on four occasions, he invoked the remedy before court of law. Therefore, seizure ofcwas without authority of law. In  particular, those items do not fall under the offence of the Excise Act.

Undisputed fact was that on June 29, 2024, vehicle no. HR55A-H-7501 was seized along with the 360 litres of liquor and goods narrated in the Seizure Memo. It was also not disputed that the petitioner had invoked criminal jurisdictional court on two occasions and before the High Court, this was the second round litigation. Despite these multiple limitations, the petitioner was not extended the relief for which he is entitled to. In other words, seizure of the goods was not part and parcel of excise material so as to invoke offences under the Excise Act. It was to be noted that the concerned authority was not registered any offences under the Sales Tax etc. for illegally transporting under any specific provision of law. At the best, the seizing authority should have sought for certain documents relating to ownership of items and released the same within a reasonable period of time from the date of seizure, the same was not done. Thus, the petitioner was harassed unnecessarily for more than one year. Hence, the petitioner made out a case so as to grant relief. Accordingly, the impugned decision of the respondent dated December 6, 2024 and December 27, 2024 were set aside. Justices Bajanthri who authored the judgement of the High Court had observed: "9. The concerned authority is hereby directed to release the goods within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order after due verification of the fact that petitioner is connected with the seized goods at item no. 1 to 33. 10. The petitioner shall cooperate in producing necessary material to connect the goods, which are narrated in Annexure-1." This judgement has been set aside. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Navneet Kumar Pandey in fake Lakme products case

In Rohit Kumar @ Darpan vs. The State of Bihar Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustin George Masih passed a 4-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 2-page long order dated November 21, 2025 in Rohit Kumar @ Darpan vs. The State of Bihar Bihar (2025) passed by Justice Navneet Kumar Pandey of the Patna High Court. The appellant had challenged the judgment and order dated November 21, 2025 passed by Justice Pandey. The appellant had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Bodhgaya P.S. Case No. 228 of 2021, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420/34 of IPC and 63 of Copy Right Act. The specific allegation against the petitioner is that he, along with other co-accused, was manufacturing fake Lakme products, and selling them by affixing Hindustan Ltd.’s sticker on it.

Supreme Court observed: "6. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed. 7. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 27.02.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to take any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. and on subsequent dates as and when called upon, till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 8. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail." 

On February 27, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads:-“8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.228 of 2021 of Bodhgaya Police Station, Gaya District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer." 

Justice Pandey had concluded that "the petitioner doesn’t deserve the privileges for anticipatory bail. Accordingly, it is rejected. 7. The petitioner is directed to surrender before the court below and seek regular bail after framing of charge or after completion of six months in custody." Supreme Courthas reversed the High Court's order. 

Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act pending in Supreme Court, Justice Ajit Kumar points out "a very sorry state of affairs" in UIDAI, a failed entity as per CAG

In Prashant Rajak vs  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology & Ors. (2026), Justice Ajit Kumar of Patna High Court passed a 3-page long order dated March 16, 2023, wherein, he concluded:"4. It is a very sorry state of affairs, which this Court has witnessed today, that in so many cases, for correction Central Identities Data Repository" (CIDR) in the Aadhaar date of birth, the applicants are forced to knock the doors of this Court. It is expected that the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, would issue appropriate instruction to the persons who are dealing with such issues, so that this Court is unnecessary not burdened with such petitions where, for correction of date of birth, the statutory requirement of documents are already being fulfilled and the persons who are at the helm of affairs are to carry out the formalities, and accordingly, the necessary corrections are required to be made in the Aadhar database, which somewhere is not being addressed properly." 

The order refers to "Central Identities Data Repository" (CIDR) envisaged under the Aadhaar Act, 2016. As per Section 2 (h) of the Aadhaar Act, CIDR "means a centralised database in one or more locations containing all Aadhaar numbers issued to Aadhaar number holders along with the corresponding demographic information and biometric information of such individuals and other information related thereto. "

Justice Kumar added:"5. Considering the nature of relief sought, this Court finds it appropriate to direct this petitioner to approach the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, within a period of one week, and on his appearance it is expected that necessary corrections shall be made looking to the nature of the document, which is required for making such corrections. 6. With the above observations, the instant writ petition stands disposed of." One week deadline given to  Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI ended on March 21, 2026.  The respondents were: Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, UIDAI Through its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), CEO, UIDAI, Director, UIDAI Regional Office, 4th Floor, Lalit Bhawan, Bailey Road, Patna.

The petitioner had prayed for a direction upon the Respondent Authorities to make correction against Date of Birth, in his AADHAR card in accordance with his matriculation certificate. He has disclosed his Aadhaar Number which is refereed in the Court's order. The disclosure is contrary to the provisions of the Aadhaar Act. 

The petitioner committed the blunder of referring to 12-digit Aadhaar number as Aadhaar card, which has not been rectified by the Court. Under Section 2 (a) of the Aadhaar Act “Aadhaar number” means an identification number issued to an individual under sub-section (3) of section 3. 

Section 3 (3) reads:"On receipt of the demographic information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority shall, after verifying the information, in such manner as may be specified by regulations, issue an Aadhaar number to such individual." 

Such an individual refers to a resident of India. Section 2(v) states that “resident” means an individual who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment. 

Section 3 (1) reads: "Every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing the process of enrolment:Provided that the Central Government may, from time to time, notify such other category of individuals who may be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number."

Section 2 (k) states that “demographic information” includes information relating to the name, date of birth, address and other relevant information of an individual, as may be specified by regulations for the purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number, but shall not include race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical history. 

Section 2 (g) states that “biometric information” means photograph, finger print, Iris scan, or duch other biological attributes of an individual as may be specified by regulations. 

Supreme Court's 1448-page long judgment dated September 26, 2018 mentions " “demographic information" on 149 occasions, "biometric information” on 347 occasions, "core biometric information” on 72 occassions and "biological attributes" on 20 occasions. 

As per Section 2 (b) “Aadhaar number holder” means an individual who has been issued an Aadhaar number based on "biometric information” under this Act. The petitioner in question is such an individual. 

The counsel for the Union of India submitted that  that the petitioner with representation may appear before the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, on any working day, and the necessary correction in the Aadhar database shall be made by looking to the statutory documents, which are required for necessary corrections. It not clear whether UIDAI has complied with the deadline given by the High Court. 

Is it not strange that even before the adjudication of the Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act by the 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court vested interests like World Bank Group and NATO are making biometric profiling based Central Identities Data Repository CIDR of Aadhaar Numbers, the online database irreversible by making it's use a business as usual activity unmindful of its illegitimacy? 

Justices Mohit Kumar Shah, Alok Kumar Pandey bdench sets aside reinstatement order by Central Administrative Tribunal for Shreya, the Sanskrit student

In The Union of India & Ors. vs. Shreya through the Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Department of Post (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Alok Kumar Pandey delivered a 27-page long judgement dated April 3, 2026, wherein, it set aside reinstatement order by Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) for Shreya, the sole respondent in the original application. She  had filed the application before the CAT. The Department of Posts, Ministry of Communications, Government of India, New Delhi had issued an advertisement/notification dated July 12, 2024, inviting applications from the eligible candidates to fill the vacant posts of Gramin Dak Sevaks (GDSs) in different offices of the Department of Posts. 

The petitioner pointed out that Shreya had entered Hindi-A/Hindi-B in the uploaded application form while Sanskrit was depicted in the original mark sheet submitted by her during the document verification held on October 25, 2024, thus she violated the requirement of Rule 8(x) of the Selection Criteria mentioned in the notification dated July 12, 2024. There is mismatch of subject as per the application filed by the candidate online vis-à-vis the physical certificate submitted by her apart from the fact that she has not studied the local language of Bihar i.e. Hindi in Class 10th, hence her engagement was terminated as per Rule 8 (1) of the Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct & Engagement) Rules, 2020.

The Division Bench concluded:"....we find that the Ld. CAT has erred in passing the impugned judgment dated 19.8.2025 by misconstruing the basic issue involved in the present case, as has been discussed at length in the preceding paragraphs, hence we are of the view that the impugned judgment dated 19.8.2025 requires interference, thus the same is set aside and the order dated 6.2.2025, passed by the Petitioner No. 5, as contained in covering letter dated 7.2.2025 is restored." The judgement was authored by Justice Shah.  

Justice Sandeep Kumar sets aside order by District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad, directs him to pass reasoned speaking order

In Shailendra Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar through The Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Govt. of Bihar, Patna & Ors. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar passed a 20-page long judgement dated April 3, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "....this Court deems it appropriate that the violation of principle of natural justice in the present case, warrants remand of the present matter to the District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad for passing a reasoned and speaking order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in consonance with the principles of natural justice. 27. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 08.10.2025 issued by the District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the District Magistrate-cum-District Mining Officer, Aurangabad for passing a reasoned and speaking order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 28. The writ petition is allowed to the above extent." The other three respondents were:Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Aurangabad-cum-District Mining Officer, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, Aurangabad and Mines Development Officer, District Mining Office, Aurangabad. 

The petitioner had prayed for quashing the order bearing Memo No.1396 dated October 8, 2025 issued under the signature of Respondent No.3 whereby the Earnest Money Deposited by the Petitioner in the auction for settlement of Sandghat Aurangabad Son-14A was arbitrarily forfeited. The writ petition sought direction upon District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Aurangabad-cum-District Mining Officer, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, Aurangabad, the Respondent No. 3 to refund the amount of Rs. 2,34,22,500/- which was deposited by the petitioner as EMD in connection with Tender Notice for settlement of Sandghat Aurangabad Block 14-A (Aurangabad Son 14-A) or in alternative consider the said EMD submitted vide NEFT bearing UTR No. SBINR52025090597754809 as EMD for the fresh Tender Notice floated on October 20, 2025, including Aurangabad Son 14-A Sandghat at Serial 2. It had prayed for issuance of writ or order or a direction restraining the respondent from the proceeding with the fresh tender process pursuant to NIT dated October 20, 2025 in exclusion of the petitioner till adjudication and disposal of the writ petition. The petitioner had prayed for directing the Respondent No.3 to settle the Sandghat Aurangabad Son 14-A re-advertised vide short notice inviting Tender Notice dated October 20, 2025 in favour of the petitioner and for holding that the Respondent No. 3 admitting the existence of Technical glitch due to which the Petitioner could not participate in bidding process, could not have passed the impugned order forfeiting the EMD due to non-participation of the Petitioner in the bidding process on the date of bidding. He wanted the Court to hold that in the facts of the present case the Respondent No.3 could not have forfeited the EMD of the petitioner as due to admitted technical glitch, the petitioner could not have been alleged to have violated Clause 19(v) of the Tender Notice”. 

The respondent-Department of Mines & Geology, Government of Bihar, published a tender notice for settlement of ghats situated in the district of Aurangabad including Aurangabad Sone 14-A. Being eligible, the petitioner participated in the bid and paid EMD of Rs. 2,34,22,500/- along with bid security amount of Rs.5000/- and Rs.5900 along with other necessary documents. According to the tender notice, the date and time for financial bidding/auction was slated for 16.09.2025 between 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM. It was the case of the petitioner that on the day of financial bid, he attempted to participate, however, according to him, he was prevented from participating in the financial bidding process on account of some technical error/glitch on the portal. The technical glitch preventing him from participating in the financial bid process on the specified date and within stipulated time was beyond the control of the petitioner. It was
the case of the petitioner that the petitioner immediately contacted the office of BELTRON which was entrusted for operating the e-portal at proc2.bihar.gov.in and therefore boda fide attempted to participate in the financial bidding process. It was also the case of the petitioner that he had submitted a representation dated September 16, 2025 requesting the respondent authorities to conduct the process afresh but vide impugned order dated October 8, 2025, the earnest money deposit of an amount of Rs.2,34,22,500/- was forfeited in terms of Clause-19(v) of the tender notice on the ground that the petitioner deliberately did not participate in the bidding process.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) of the petitioner was wholly illegal since he had attempted to log-in into the portal for participating in the e-auction process, however, for the reasons beyond the control of the petitioner he was prevented from participating in the aforesaid process. Consequent upon the representation dated September 16, 2025, filed by the petitioner, the respondent authorities had called for a report from BELTRON regarding the technical glitch on the date and time when the process of e-auction was going on, to which, BELTRON had replied vide its e-mail dated September 24, 2025 wherein, according to the counsel for the petitioner, BELTRON had admitted that there was indeed certain technical error on the portal of e-auction which had
subsisted till 1:01 P.M. on September 16, 2025. According to the tender notice, the auction process was only till 1:00 P.M. and therefore, the petitioner could not participate in the e-auction process. Adverting to Clauses- 14 and 19(v) of the tender notice, the counsel for the petitioner argued that though the participant to the e-auction process was vigilant regarding I.T. resources and its functioning, however, the technical glitch or issue on the portal itself was beyond the control of the petitioner and therefore, cannot result into punishing the petitioner himself, more-so, when admittedly, the respondents admitted to the existence of technical glitch on the portal. The counsel for the petitioner submitted no show-cause notice seeking explanation from the petitioner was issued before forfeiture of the EMD of the petitioner, which is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and is bad in the eyes of law.

The petitioner's counsel submitted that for the settlement of sand ghat at Aurangabad Sone 14-A, altogether three participants including the petitioner had filed tender notice document and in the technical bid the petitioner and one M/s. Laxmi H.P. Gas Agency were found technically qualified for the bid. The counsel emphasized that M/S. Laxmi H.P. Gas Agency was automatically restrained from participating in the present bid process since one Sand Ghat i.e. Sand Ghat No.16-A had already been allotted to the aforesaid other participant and therefore, the said bidder being restrained from participating in the auction, therefore, the petitioner remained the sole bidder. Out of a total of three participants one was disqualified in the technical bid itself and out of remaining two bidders, one was restrained from participating in the bid process since he had already been allotted another sand ghat in the same district, and therefore, as a consequence, the petitioner remained the sole bidder and in such case, the provisions under Clause-19(vi) of the Tender Documents ought to have been applied whereunder the respondents were bound to issue a fresh auction and in case of no participation even in response to such fresh notice, the respondent no.3 would be required to make necessary recommendation to the respondent department for decision on the point of acceptance of the proposal of the single bidder. Therefore, once the co-bidder M/S. Laxmi H.P. Gas Agency was prevented from participating and the petitioner was left as the single bidder, the provisions of Clause-19(vi) ought to have been implemented and the respondent no.3 had to issue a notice instead of passing the impugned order forfeiting the E.M.D. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order forfeiting the E.M.D. of the petitioner was punitive, arbitrary and wholly illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 

Notably, during the pendency of the case, the respondents had come out with fresh tender notice for the settlement of the subject sand ghat and in these circumstance the High Court vide order dated November 4, 2025, had permitted the petitioner to participate in the fresh tender process without depositing fresh E.M.D. subject to the final outcome of this writ  petition. Thereafter, a supplementary affidavit was filed by the petitioner stating therein that pursuant to the order of the High Court he was allowed to participate in the fresh bidding process but the petitioner failed to succeed in the said fresh bidding process.

Justice Kumar observed: "It appears that the petitioner was neither issued notice nor was heard before forfeiting his E.M.D., which clearly violates the principles of nature justice." He relied on Supreme Court's decision in Krishnadatt Awasthy vs. State of M.P. & Ors., reported as (2025) 7 SCC 545 wherein it emphasized on the imperativeness of principles of natural justice, particularly, before an administrative authority acting as a quasi judicial function. It observed:“43. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545]. 44. It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice may not be necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such arguments to be “pernicious” and held that “[t]he non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”. The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an exception where “on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice” [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : (1981) 51 Comp Cas 210; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965]. 45. Professor I.P. Massey [I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edn., 2012).] has commented on this shift as under: “Before the decision of the highest Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379], the rule was that the principles of natural justice shall apply only when an administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby that he must have suffered some “civil consequences”. Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order to prove “prejudice” or civil consequences. This approach had stultified the growth of administrative law within an area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that in Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] , the
Court took a bold step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of natural justice need not be observed.” 46. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], the Supreme Court observed that where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe the principles of natural justice, the court/tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” or “no adequate opportunity”. In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice." 

Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), Justice Kumar pointed out that "it is clear that the principles of nature justice must be adhered to strictly. However, in the present case, the same has not been adhered to since the earnest money deposited by the petitioner has been forfeited without having been given an opportunity of hearing. In my opinion, the petitioner should have been issued a proper notice and should have been given an opportunity of hearing before forfeiture of the earnest money deposited by the petitioner."