Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside proceedings of Caste Scrutiny Committee and order by State Election Commission, Bihar

In Md. Isa vs.The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 31-page long judgement dated August 14, 026, wherein, he concluded:"51. In view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, taking into consideration the report dated 31.12.2024 of the three member Committee constituted on the directions of the Criminal Investigation Department (Weaker Section) finding the petitioner to be belonging to Teli (Muslim) caste on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence discussed in detail therein and the contents of the report dated 4.3.2025 of the Committee, this Court is of the opinion that both the Caste Scrutiny Committee in its report dated 4.3.2025 as also the State Election Commission in its order dated 25.6.2025 passed in Case no.56 of 2023 committed an error in applying Act of 1991 as also Amending Act 15 of 2003 in the case of reservation to the post of Mukhiya. 52. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the proceedings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee dated  28.3.2025 contained in memo no.6574 dated 11.4.2025 as also the order contained in memo no.2876 dated 25.6.2025 passed in Case no.56 of 2023 (Subhash Kumar vs. Md. Isa) by the State Election Commission, Bihar both being unsustainable are hereby set aside. 53. The writ application is allowed."

It was against the Caste Scrutiny Committee proceeding dated March 28, 2025 contained in memo dated April 11, 2025 and the order dated June 25, 2025 passed in Case of 2023 of the State Election Commission that the petitioner had filed the writ application. The case of the petitioner was that in the election held in the year 2021, he was elected on the post of Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj Sahuria. A complaint was filed by respondent no.9 before the State Election Commission praying for disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the seat on which the petitioner had been elected was reserved for Extremely Backward Class (EBC) while the petitioner who belonged to Sheikh community had fraudulently obtained a caste certificate of EBC wrongly showing himself to belong to the caste of Teli (Muslim). Upon the direction of the Criminal Investigation Department (Weaker Section), a three member Enquiry Committee enquired into the caste of the petitioner and submitted its report dated December 31, 2024 according to which it confirmed that the petitioner belonged to Teli (Muslim) caste. The petitioner received a show cause dated February 7, 2025 asking him to respond to the report dated December 31, 2024. The petitioner had submitted his reply on March 4, 2025. Another report dated March 28, 2025 contained in memo dated April 11, 2025 came to be submitted by the three member Caste Scrutiny Committee wherein the claim of the petitioner for reservation in the EBC category on account of belonging to Teli (Muslim) caste was rejected. 

The Commission had proceeded with the Case of 2023 registered on the complaint filed by Subhash Kumar, the respondent no.9 and passed order contained in memo dated June 25, 2025 under the signature of the State Election Commissioner, Bihar holding that the petitioner was not a permanent resident of the State of Bihar and thus was not entitled for reservation on the ground of the illegal caste certificate. Thus his election as a Mukhiya was not proper and as a result he is removed from the said post. It was further ordered to recommend action against the concerned State employee who had issued the incorrect caste certificate to the petitioner. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail rejection order by Justice Partha Sarthy in a rape case from Mohaniya, Kaimur, Bhabua

In Jokhan @ Jokhan Sant @ Dharmkant Sant vs. The State of Bihar Justice & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated August 13, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order of Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court. The order reads:"...we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail at this stage. 9. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 10. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case." 

The appeal arose from the order dated January 21, 2026 rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant in connection with P.S. Mohaniya, Kaimur, Bhabua. According to the prosecution case, the victim was found on the terrace of Ramakant’s house. Ramakant is the father of the appellant. The victim complained to her mother that she became unconscious because some scented handkerchief was put on her face by the appellant and, thereafter, she does not remember as to what happened. 

The order records: "5. It is not in dispute that her medical examination was conducted promptly and the medical report found no injury and no signs of recent sexual intercourse. Even to the Doctor, she had not reported any incident of sexual intercourse or sexual assault on her. 6. The submission on behalf of the appellant is that he has been falsely implicated; there is no medical report to corroborate the allegations which were leveled as an afterthought; and they never appeared in the First Information Report or in the statement of the victim made to the Doctor. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the appellant, who has no previous criminal antecedents and has suffered incarceration for a period exceeding one year, is entitled to be released on bail at this stage." The counsel for the State-respondent opposed the prayer for bail but could not dispute that there was no specific allegation of sexual assault in the First Information Report and there is no corroboration of the aforesaid allegation in the medical examination report. 

Earlier, in Jokhan @ Jokhan Sant @ Dharmkant Sant vs. The State of Bihar & Anr (2025), Justice Partha Sarthy had passed a 2-page long order dated January 21, 2026, wherein, he had concluded:"6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the material that has transpired in course of investigation specially the contents of the statement of the victim recorded under section 183 B.N.S.S., the Court is not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail and the application is rejected. 7. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to renew his prayer for bail after six months or on framing of charge, whichever is later."

The petitioner had approached the High Court for grant of regular bail in connection with Mohaniya P.S. Case no. 676 of 2025 registered under sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 64 and 62 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner was accused of having assaulting and outraging the modesty of the minor daughter of the informant as a result of which she fell unconscious and regained consciousness after three to four hours in the hospital. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the case as a result of differences between the parties who are next door neighbours. The petitioner has no criminal antecedent and he is in custody since August 5, 2025. Referring to the order of the trial Court, it was submitted that even as per the medical report, there is no finding of rape. The application for bail is opposed by APP for the State who submitted that the petitioner was named in the FIR and there is direct allegation against him. Even in her statement under section 183 B.N.S.S., the victim had given a detailed description of the assault etc by the petitioner.

Section 126 of the BNS defines and penalizes the offense of wrongful restraint, which occurs when someone voluntarily stops a person from moving in a direction they have a legal right to go. It replaces Section 341 of the IPC. 

Section 115 of BNS deals with voluntarily causing hurt. It replaces the old Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

 Section 76 of the BNS deals with the offense of assaulting or using criminal force against a woman with the intent to disrobe her or force her to be naked.

Section 64 of BNS has replaced Section 376 of the IPC to define the punishment for rape, mandating at least 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, potentially extending to life imprisonment, and a fine. Section 62 of BNS provides for punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.

Supreme Court Bar Association condemns BCI's arbitrary decision to withhold enrolment of NALSAR University Law Graduates, BCI modifies, withdraws its order

In a letter dated August 13, 2026 addressed to Chairman, Bar Council of India (BCI), President, Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has expressed its strongest condemnation regarding the decision taken by the BCI directing that, "Till further orders, no student of NALSAR University of Law, who has obtained the Law Degree in the year 2026, shall be enrolled by any State Bar Council as an Advocate." Subsequent to SCBA's letter, BCI modified its order dated August 13, 2026. All the three letters were issued on August 13, 2026. Now the Chairman, BCI has issued a statement dated August 14, 2026 stating that he has withdrawn the order unconditionally. 

 

It all began with a campaign started by around 450 out of NALSAR’s 1,400 students against invitation to Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant to their convocation. The campaign followed oral remarks made by the CJI last month while hearing a petition alleging police excesses during the national examination leak scam related protests, wherein, he reportedly remarked, “Please don’t waste our time. We don’t have time to watch these videos” of students and youth being beaten by Delhi Police, Rapid Action Force (RAF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and unidentified ununiformed persons during the seven-week long successful protest at at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi. 

Meanwhile, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), the party behind the resignation of education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan in wake of national examination leak scam, issued a detailed statement. It said, BCI's interim directive against NALSAR University of Law graduates "grossly disproportionate, deeply troubling, and prima facie indefensible". Responding to BCI's circular, Saurav Das of CJP said: "Alarming! Mr. Manan Mishra, HANDS OFF our students! How dare you pass such a grossly illegal order? Reveal your law degree to the world now because a lawyer can’t get the law this wrong! Students of NALSAR have displayed democratic dissent against a person they in their own wisdom thought was unfit to give them their hard-earned degrees. Who are you to intervene? Your accountability needs to be talked about too. Tell us why as the statutory regulator (BCI) responsible for supervising State Bar Councils you permitted elected bodies to continue BEYOND their terms until the Supreme Court intervened? Who were these people that were favoured as a result of this? Tell us now.  And why and how have you been holding the post of Chairman since 2012 to now till 2030? Do tell us about your track record. Tell us why did you illegally intervene in the 2026 Chhattisgarh State Bar Council, as stated by the High Court there? Law students and advocates in Delhi and across the country will rise up in protest against you and in support of the students of NALSAR if you don’t WITHDRAW this disgusting notification IMMEDIATELY and apologise for your conduct. Your conduct and tenure as the BCI Chairman (while being BJP RS MP) needs to be accounted for." 

Abhijeet Dipke of CJP observed: "What if all legal cockroaches come together?" Das added: "Much needed. The Bar Council of India needs to be looked into. Manan Mishra has been its Chairman since 2012. What has he done? Needs to be accounted for. All legal cockroaches, your task is cut out. Let’s fix BCI’s accountability. Let’s fix Mishra’s accountability." 

CJP's statement reads:"The Bar Council of India’s decision to halt the enrolment of NALSAR’s 2026 graduating students as advocates, reportedly because they opposed Chief Justice of India Surya Kant being invited as Chief Guest, is grossly disproportionate, deeply troubling, and prima facie indefensible. Students cannot be collectively penalised for expressing dissent over a ceremonial invitation. The Cockroach Janta Party condemns this order. If Chairman Manan Kumar Mishra does not withdraw this order immediately, then all law students, advocates, senior lawyers, and well-meaning young cockroaches will protest outside Bar Council’s office and Mishra’s official residence, and their respective states. @MishraManan01’s accountability will be fixed." Mishra responded: "Council has already withdrawn that letter." Das reacted:"Mr. Mishra, the order has NOT been fully withdrawn. The part which seeks names of the students and orders for an “inquiry” against them for their peaceful dissent still stands, as per your own new letter. IMMEDIATELY withdraw that entire letter. No student at NALSAR should face any inquiry or witch hunt for their democratic dissent against the Chief Justice of India. You are no one to threaten this. Stay within the four corners of your official duties and stop threatening the students with “inquiry”. Withdraw the letter in full and guarantee NO ACTION against our brilliant law students of NALSAR. The call for protest outside the BCI and Mr. Mishra’s official residence STANDS until this demand is fulfilled." After CJP's threat of protest against him, BCI chairman communicated to CJP that he has modified the order  

CJP was not satisfied with the modification of the BCI's order, it demanded complete withdrawal of BCI's order. Responding to CJP's demand on August 14, 2026, Mishra wrote:"After considering the representations and reactions of Senior Advocates, learned members of the Bar, law students and public spirited citizens, and being satisfied that the 2026 batch of NALSAR, Hyderabad, had no role in any disturbance or movement, the Bar Council of India has decided to close the proceedings altogether. No further action is required @NALSAR_Official. I wish the students the very best for their careers. A word of wisdom: we take immense pride in our legal institutions, and the day you enrol, you become vanguards. Voice your opinions freely, but with respect and institutional decorum. The highest judicial office is our collective pride. Dissent is welcome in a democracy; public ridicule of constitutional institutions is often counterproductive.  Official communication to follow." Das reacted: "It’s done, bro. Another major victory for the youth! But the quest for accountability will continue."

In a letter addressed to the chairman, BCI, Advocate N. Manoj Kumar, a member of both the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Kerala, has objected to the blanket prohibition against the entire 2026 batch which is, "manifestly arbitrary".  

Former Advocate-General of Telangana and senior advocate K Ramakrishna Reddy stated that the BCI had no jurisdiction to direct State Bar Councils against enrolling NALSAR graduates who completed their courses in 2026. Describing the original direction as “manifestly arbitrary” and “without jurisdiction”, he said the BCI’s powers under the Advocates Act primarily concerned professional standards, ethics and conduct.

SCBA's letter stated:"This unprecedented and wholly arbitrary direction is, in my view, illegal, disproportionate and fundamentally unsustainable. It amounts to an attempt to intimidate law students for exercising their fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Universities are meant to be campuses of free thought and fearless debate. Students cannot be threatened with denial of their right to enter the legal profession merely because they have expressed disagreement with a constitutional authority. Such an approach is fundamentally antithetical to the very values that a law university is expected to nurture....The directive also seriously affects the graduates' fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to practise a profession of their choice. A blanket and indefinite restriction of this nature cannot meet the requirements of legality, reasonableness or proportionality. The BCI, as the apex regulatory body of the legal profession, has a greater responsibility to uphold the rule of law and constitutional values. It cannot itself resort to collective punishment or use the professional future of young graduates as a means of institutional discipline. As members of the legal fraternity, it is our collective duty to nurture, support, and welcome the next generation of lawyers, rather than creating arbitrary institutional barriers that stall their careers before they even begin." The letter of SCBA's President concluded:"I therefore urge the Bar Council of India to immediately withdraw this wholly unjustified directive and permit the 2026 NALSAR graduates to seek enrolment without any hindrance and in accordance with law."

The Bar Council of India held its elections on April 15, 2012. BCI had unanimously elected Manan Kumar Mishra as the Chairman of BCI on April 17, 2012. In 2014, after his term expired, BCI Member from Rajasthan Biri Singh Sinsinwar was elected the Chairman. But Sinsinwar resigned from the post after few months. Mishra was again re-elected as Chairman. At present, he is serving his seventh term.

Mohua Moita, the parliamentarian wrote: "BCI has NO women imagine." BCI is a highly unrepresentative body but the plea for SC/ST representation in state bar councils was not entertained last year by a bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh. 

Earlier, in an animated exchange of words between Advocate on Record Kumud Lata Dass and Mishra in the Court of Chief Justice of India, she had stated that to the BCI Chairman "You're virtually a permanent Chairman...."

Saurav Das wrote:" Manan Mishra needs to go. Enough of him since 2012. All kinds of illegalities have been committed under his chairmanship. Our lawyers deserve better. Time’s up for Manan bro." Nagendra Sharma, a writer-advocate wrote:"It is also a case of huge conflict of interest. He runs a law university  in Goa through a trust set up by BCI and is setting up one more such university in Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh.  It is a clear attempt to undermine and diminish highly reputed and public funded NALSAR and to create space in South for his universities that charge over rs 10 lakh per annum per student." Das asked Mishra:"Very, very serious questions raised. @MishraManan01, is this true? Is this not misuse of the powers of your office? You’ve been the Chairman since 2012. Is this what you have been doing? Do no other lawyers exist? Legal Cockroaches, find out more about this and fix accountability!" He added:"The kind of horror stories that are coming out about Manan Kumar Mishra should lead to his resignation with immediate effect. This is what would’ve happened in a functional democracy. Cockroaches are here to make a functional democracy. Mr. Mishra, time’s up!" Das pointed out:"Friends, Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra’s Bar Council of India spent 14 CRORES on meetings and conferences in just one year. Today, he had to withdraw a portion of his outrageous order on NALSAR students within 1 hour. So where and how is this 14 crores being spent? 12 crores was also spent on travel and accommodation. But what has been the result? If Mr. Mishra is capable of issuing such a draconian order against young students, then what welfare has he been doing for young lawyers and law schools? He’s been in the position since 2012 and will be till 2030. Time’s up, Mr. Mishra! #LegalCockroachesUnite and hold him accountable." 

Gazette notification states that BCI spent Rs 180.25 crore on legal education in 2024-25 in its audited financial statement. It shows an increase from Rs 46 crore spent on legal education in the previous financial year. The total income of the BCI for 2024-25 stands at Rs 234.49 crore, compared to Rs 250.32 crore in the previous year. Inspection fees remain the primary source of revenue. It contributed over Rs 130 crore. The collection from examination fees from the All India Bar Examination (AIBE) amounted to Rs 36.96 crore, lower than Rs 50.19 crore collected from two editions in the previous year. The BCI's expenditure, apart from legal education, includes Rs 14.22 crore on its activities and meetings, Rs 10.27 crore on employee benefits, and Rs 3.41 crore on establishment and other expenses. The statement reveals that examination-related expenses are recorded at Rs 2.52 crore. The financial statement shows that the surplus for the year declined to Rs 23.42 crore from RS 173.50 crore in 2023-24. It attributes this change to higher expenditure during the year. The BCI’s total assets increased to Rs 815.83 crore from Rs 752.55 crore in the previous year. Notably, investments accounts for a substantial portion, with over RS 733 crore held primarily in fixed deposits with scheduled banks. The receipts from law colleges under legal education regularisation fees rose to Rs 9.08 crore, compared to Rs 3.16 crore in the previous year. The enrolment and other fees contributed Rs 18.81 crore, while interest income amounted to Rs 44.55 crore. 

Similar audited financial statements of State Bar Councils including Bihar State Bar Council should be notified in the Gazette at the earliest.   

The BCI draws its mandate from the Advocates Act, 1961 to lay down “standards of professional conduct and etiquette,” safeguarding “the rights, privileges and interests of advocates,” and specifying standards for legal education “in consultation with the universities in India imparting such education” to the state bar councils. It is responsible for recognising universities “whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an advocate.” But BCI has proposed to empower itself to conduct nationwide entrance examinations for law degree admissions under the Draft Advocates (Amendment) Bill, 2026. This draft bill also suggests raising the advocate's enrolment fee from ₹750 to ₹22,500, a massive 30%  increase. The Draft Bill gives the BCI authority to conduct entrance tests and define minimum eligibility qualifications for entry into law degree courses. The proposed Bill does not have provision for it's audit by Comptroller Auditor General. It's provision to legitimize it's election tribunal structure to deal with disputes concerning elections under the Advocates Act, 1961 is highly questionable because the election tribunal is structurally, a subordinate body under the chairman of BCI. BCI does not trust Election Commission of India like independent body to deal with election petitions under the law. 

On September 29, 2018, BCI publicly urged CJI Dipak Misra not to accept any post-retirement assignment from the govt, saying it was necessary to protect the “independence & integrity of the judiciary.” 

It's press release reads: "There is a public perception that independence of judges falls under stress and strain during the last part of the tenure of most of our Judges when the possibility of post retirement assignments and jobs by the Governments becomes a living possibility. When a Judge accepts any assignment after his retirement, fingers are raised about the bona fides of such assignment. The case of Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam, former Chief Justice of India who was appointed as a Governor of Kerala after retirement as CJI, had generated much reaction. Such post- retirement assignments, for good or no reason, put a question mark on the fair discharge of judicial functions by the Judge in question during the concluding part of his tenure. This is a very grey area in which Bar expects that retiring Judges should not accept any appointments after retirement, at least for a cooling period of two years from the date of their retirement. Recently, a Joint Meeting of Bar Council of India with the representatives of State Bar Councils and High Court Bar Associations, the Co-ordination Committee of Bar Associations of Delhi, NCR has passed the most emphatic resolution in this regard.The Indian Bar has requested the High Court and Supreme Court Judges not to accept any assignment after their retirement at least for two years. In that meeting, the representatives also expressed their anguish over the role of a Judge of Supreme Court, who passed some orders with sole intent to shut the mouth of the Bar. The Hon'ble Judge had gone to the extent of issuing directions to the Law Commission to suggest amendments in Advocates' Act for demolishing the democratic structure of Bar bodies. And the Law Commission, as expected, made its suggestions destroying the independence of the Bar. (Though due to strong protest by the Lawyers, the Government did not accept the recommendations). The same Judge passed another impractical order restraining the Lawyers from giving a call of abstention, boycott or strikes even for a single day (in any eventuality). This order is in violation of a constitution Bench Judgment of apex court."

But when former CJI Ranjan Gogoi was nominated to the Rajya Sabha, the BCI issued a release dated March 18, 2020 welcoming it as a “bridge between the Legislature & Judiciary” and called the criticism of the appointment “unwarranted & premature.” Isn't this a case where someone is guilty of applying double standards in his speech? Aren't such people commonly called a hypocrite, two-faced, or equivocator because they use different rules, values, or judgments for different people or situations? 

Earlier,  on March 3, 2017, the Supreme Court had stayed the operation of a circular issued in September 2016 by the BCI, that imposed age limits on people enrolling for law degree programmes in the country. The circular barred anyone above the age of 20 from entering five-year programmes, and anyone above 30 from entering three-year programmes (with relaxations for students from communities entitled to reservations). The court’s decision came as a relief to those who had been affected by the rule, which has a tumultuous history.

 

Also read: Legal reporting in Bihar fails Breath analyser test, reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025 

 

Patna High Court Advocates join the nation to express solidarity with students and youth protesting at Jantar Mantar, condemn police assault 

 

Chairman, Bar Council of India "requested and directed" Chairman, Co-ordination Committee of three advocate associations of Patna High Court to recall call for boycott of court's work 

 

Bihar Bar Council Journal removes names of members of Bihar State Bar Council due to pending dispute before Central Election Tribunal  

 

Patna High Court sets aside Bihar State Bar Council, Bar Council of India (BCI) orders, restores Advocate Shahnaz Fatma on the roll of BCI

 

Did Chhattisgarh High Court question the order by Bar Council of India?

In Chandra Prakash Jangade vs. Bar Council of India & Ors. (2026) WPC No. 103 of 2026, the Chhattisgarh High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Arvind Kumar Verma had questioned an order signed off by Bar Council of India (BCI) Chairman Manan Kumar Mishra to defer the election of office bearers to the Chhattisgarh State Bar Council and asked the BCI to explain the basis of such a decision. The petitioner had sought quashing of the impugned order dated January 6, 2026 issued by the Chairman, Bar Council of India. of The present writ petition was listed urgently on the ground that the election of the office bearers of the Chhattisgarh State Bar Council as well as the Member to the Bar Council of India was scheduled to be held on January 9, 2026 but the same was deferred by the Chairman of the Bar Council of India by the order dated January 6, 2026. 

The grievance of the petitioners arose out of an order dated January 6, 2026  passed by Chairman, Bar Council of India, wherein it is stated that the Bar Council of India had received certain inputs/information from multiple sources, described as rumours, suggesting that a few members were allegedly involved in corrupt practices, including horse-trading, and that there was an apprehension that such persons may get elected as office bearers by adopting corrupt, illegal and unethical means, thereby undermining the fairness and purity of the electoral process. BCI had decided to constitute an Inquiry Committee headed by a former Judge of a High Court with two Senior Advocates as its members, directing the Committee to submit its report to the Bar Council of India within a period of ten days.

The petitioner had submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Chairman, Bar Council of India to further delay the election process. 

The High Court at Bilaspur had pointed out that State Bar Councils are statutory bodies and cannot function indefinitely without elected office-bearers. 

In it's 5-page long order dated January 9, 2026, the Court had observed:"4 At this stage, a bare perusal of the impugned order prima facie reveals that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. No specific instance, material, or identifiable act of malpractice has been referred to in the order so as to justify the extreme step of deferring a duly notified election process. While the objective of maintaining purity of elections is undoubtedly laudable, any interference with an ongoing or scheduled electoral process must rest on cogent material and demonstrable necessity. Elections to statutory bodies form the backbone of democratic governance and cannot be lightly deferred, particularly when such elections are already overdue. Any decision to postpone elections must therefore be informed by transparency, fairness, and proportionality, and must be supported by tangible material rather than mere apprehensions or unverified information."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a case from Gamhariya, Madhepura, reason was not recorded for refusing anticipatory bail

In Buchiya Devi & Ors The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi passed a 5-page long order dated August 10, 2026 found that order by Justice Prabhat Kuamr Singh of Patna High Court refusing anticipatory bail lacked reason. 

Supreme Court concluded:"6. Perusal of the impugned order would indicate that it lacks reasons. In fact, this Court in the case of Mahipal v Rajesh Kumar alias Polia, 2020 2 SCC 118, has clearly held that judicial orders must record the reasons and the factora that weighed with the Court either in granting or refusing bail, the said element is conspicuously absent in the instant case namely in the impugned order. Only on the ground of nature of offence, the prayer for bail has been rejected. In fact, appellants claim to be residing separately from that of their son. The said issue is not being examined by this Court and it is for the jurisdictional trial Court to examine the same after full-fledged trial. In fact, this Court while issuing notice in the present petition had granted an interim protection from any coercive steps being taken against the appellants subject to their cooperation with the investigation and no material is placed to demonstrate that appellants have refused to cooperate with the investigation. 7. In the circumstances, we are of the considered view that appeal deserves to be allowed. Hence, the appeal is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. Appellants are ordered to be released on anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional Investigating Officer (IO) may deem fit to impose and also on the condition that appellant would appear before the IO for investigation as and when called and they shall also appear before the trial court on all dates of hearing except when exempted for any specific reason."

In Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 and Ms. Y vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr 2022 SCC OnLine SC 458, the Supreme Court laid down that it is a fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that factors which have weighed in the mind of the Judge in the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty of judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this commitment.

Earlier, in Buchiya Devi & Ors The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated November 15, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"6. Considering the nature of accusation and the fact that victim is still traceless, prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is refused." The petitioners had approached teh High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 365 of the Indian Penal Code. It was alleged that on March 22, 2023, when daughter of the informant went out of the house to depose in connection with Gamhariya P. S. Case No. 57 of 2017, all the F.I.R. named accused persons, including these petitioners, kidnapped her. The counsel for the informant vehemently opposed the bail application and submitted that there was specific accusation against these petitioners of kidnapping the daughter of informant, who was still traceless. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted petitioners are innocent and have falsely been implicated in this case.  

The appellants were arraigned as accused in FIR No.35 of 2023 for the offence punishable under Sections 363 and 365 IPC. They were before the Supreme Court seeking anticipatory bail after their prayer has been rejected by Justice Singh of the High Court and the trial court. 

The Supreme Court noticed that omnibus allegations is made against the appellants viz., they have abducted the victim-Rakhi Kumari who was married to accused no.2 (Subhash Mandal), namely, the son of Appellant Nos.1 and 3 and husband of Appellant No.2 and it is also alleged that during the subsistence of the marriage with the victim-Rakhi Kumari, Appellant Nos.1 and 3 in connivance with Appellant No.2 had performed the marriage with accused No.1 and as such the victim had lodged several cases and while she was proceeding to depose in the said cases, she had been abducted and her whereabouts are not known till date. 5. The role attributed to the appellants seems that Rakhi Kumari (victim) who was married to Subhash Mandal was subjected to cruelty by her husband and in-laws and from February 20, 2023 she went missing and complainant suspected that her husband Subhash Mandal and his family members including the other co-accused had abducted her with intent to eliminate her.

Besides Supreme Court's decision in Mahipal's case, the Supreme Court's judgement in Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Neeru Yadav vs. State of U.P. (2016) 15 SCC 422 has categorically opined that the power to grant bail under Section 439 of CrPC, is of wide amplitude. The court is bestowed with considerable but not unfettered discretion, which calls for exercise in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course and not in whimsical manner.

In Gurcharan Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118, it was held by the Supreme Court that the considerations in granting bail are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.

In State of U.P. vs. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21, it was opined by the Supreme Court that there is no strait jacket formula which can ever be prescribed as to what the relevant factors couldbe. However, certain important factors that are always considered, inter-alia, relate to prima facie involvement of the accused, nature and gravity of the charge, severity of the punishment, and the character, position and standing of the accused.

In Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi and Ors (2001) 4 SCC 280, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it has to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.

In Manno Lal Jaiswal vs. The State of U.P. & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 89, the Supreme Court has observed "when the Accused were charged for the offences punishable under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code also and when their presence has been established and it is stated that they were part of the unlawful assembly, the individual role and/or overt act by the individual Accused is not significant and/or relevant."

In Manoj Kumar Khokhar vs. State of Rajasthan, (2022) 3 SCC 501, it was made clear that the Court deciding a bail application cannot completely divorce its decision from material aspects of the case such as the allegations made against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced by the accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge against the
accused. 

The same view has been taken in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee and Anr (2010)14 SCC 496; Ishwarji Mali vs. State of Gujarat and another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 55; Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118; Manno Lal Jaiswal vs. The State of U.P. and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 89; Ms. Y vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr 2022 SCC OnLine SC 458 and Deepak Yadav vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2022)8 SCC 559.

  

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Rana Vikram Singh set aside judgement by trial court Bhojpur, acquits the convicts

In Balmiki Rai vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 9-page long judgement dated August 12, 2026, wherein, concluded:"...12....there is absolutely no evidence against the accused persons and they were wrongly convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court. 13. Thus, the judgement of conviction and order of sentence, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VII Court, Bhojpur at Arrah, in Sessions Trial No. 264 of 2013, arising out of Sahar P.S. Case No. 102 of 2011, is set aside. 14. The instant appeal is allowed on contest. 15. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 16. The appellant, namely, Balmiki Rai, in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 949 of 2019, be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 17. The appellants, namely, Ram Bhusuan Ray @Ram Bhushan Rai, in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 597 of 2019 and Dinesh Rai, in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 806 of 2019, are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. Since they are on bail, they are discharged from their bail bonds. The sureties are also discharged from their liabilities under the bail bonds." The judgement was authored by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri. The case arose out of a Sahar PS. Case of 2011 from Bhojpur

The trial judge had placed reliance on the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh, reported in (2003) 11 SCC 271. It is held in the said judgement that if an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it would be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence is insisted upon by the Court. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. He also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. 10. Even if an offence is committed within the four corners of a house and such offence is an offence of murder, the neighbouring people must have the opportunity to know about the incident. The Investigating Officer (I.O.) did not think it necessary to even examine any neighbouring people to ascertain the factual circumstances that allegedly took place in the night of December 8, 2011.

The case of the prosecution that the daughter of P.W. 2 was physically and mentally tortured as she failed to give birth to a child. Such incident of torture went on for a long period of five years. During this period, neither the victim nor his father or other family members took any legal step against her husband and other matrimonial relations but remain silent till her disappearance. It is also the case of the prosecution that the informant and the relatives of the victim came to know that the body of the victim was taken to some unknown place by the accused persons. None of the said villagers come to depose in support of the prosecution case. 

Against a common judgement and order of conviction passed in Sessions Trial No. 264 of 2013, arising out of Sahar P.S. Case No. 102 of 2011, whereby and whereunder, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-VII Court, Bhojpur at Arrah, convicted the appellants, Balmiki Rai and Dinesh Rai for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life as well as rigorous imprisonment for four year with fine and in the same trial, the appellant Ram Bhushan Ray @ Ram Bhushan Rai was convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years with fine, the appellants filed separate appeals. Since the appeals assailed the common judgement and order of conviction and sentence, the High Court heard and disposed the appeals by passing the judgement.

The judgement recorded that December 8, 2011, i.e., after about 9 years of her marriage, the informant got a news that his daughter was murdered by her husband and father-in-law. It observed: "There is absolutely no evidence how the victim was allegedly murdered. None of the witnesses are the eye-witness of the occurrence. Not a single villager of the matrimonial home of the deceased was made a witness to ascertain as to how the victim had met with an unnatural death. The body of the victim was missing. It is stated by the witnesses that accused Balmiki Rai, Dinesh Rai and Ram Bhushan Rai concealed the dead-body of the deceased to cause any evidence of the commission of the offence of murder to disappear with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment in the absence of any such evidence. The learned Trial Judge held the appellants guilty on the strength of special knowledge of the accused persons under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is needless to say that Section 106 comes into play only when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person. It has not been proved as to whether the daughter of the informant was murdered or she committed suicide at her matrimonial home or she disappeared. Only because she was not found, the Court cannot presume by placing burden upon the husband, father-in-law and a co-villager that the deceased was murdered and her dead-body was concealed to cause disappearance of evidence."