Monday, February 23, 2026

Patna High Court detects error in sentencing order by Birendra Kumar Choubey as Additional Sessions Judge, NDPS, asks trial court to rectify its defect within one week

In Nav Kumar Ojha vs. The Union of India through the Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, Patna (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Praveen Kumar passed an order dated February 18, 2026. The order reads: "Let the certified copy of the impugned judgment be sent down to the learned trial court pointing out the defect. On receipt of the same, the learned trial court shall look into the same and send a duly corrected copy of the impugned judgment to this Court within a period of one week from the date of receipt of the communication....3. List this case on 12.03.2026 under appropriate heading." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. Dr. Gopal Krishna is the counsel for the appellant. Out of the four accused persons in the N.C.B Case No. 01 of 2021, Nav Kumar Ojha, a resident of Bokaro, Jharkhand is the third person who was convicted by Birendra Kumar Choubey, 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara, in N.D.P.S. Case No.- 06 of 2021. The four named accused persons were: 1. Shankar Yadav, 2. Pritam Lakda, 3. Bijendra Kumar Rai and 4. Nav Kumar OjhaBijendra Kumar Rai, the third accused was acquitted by the trial court.  

Nav Kumar Ojha, the appellant in question was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 20 (B)(ii)(C) and section 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. The appellant has preferred the appeal against the judgment of conviction dated May 9, 2023 and order of sentence dated May 17, 2023 passed by 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara. 

The Registry of the High Court has pointed out that "Year of sentence at last page of I.O is not matching with 1st page (below chart)". The year of sentence on last page of the impugned order (I.O.), the trial court's sentencing order is 2023 but the year of sentencing order on the 1st page is 2022. 

Significantly, the decision of the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VIII, Ara, Bhojpur did not find sufficient evidence of criminal conspiracy against the three accused persons including Nav Kumar Ojha. Therefore, he exonerated them of offence under Section 29 of the NDPS Act.  

Section 29 of the Act deals with "Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy" It reads:—(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence. (2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which—(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or (b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India. 

It is evident from the joint reading of the trial court's judgement and Section 29 that Nav Kumar Ojha is not involved in any criminal conspiracy. It is also crystal clear that he is neither an abettor nor a party.   

Granting benefit of doubt with regard to accusations under Section 20 (B) (ii), (C) and Sections 25 and 29 of NDPS Act, he acquitted Bijendra Kumar Rai, the main accused and released him from judicial custody. 

In the concluding sentence of his 84 page long judgement dated May 9, 2023, Virendra Kumar Choubey, Additional District and Sessions Judge-VIII fixed May 17, 2023 for hearing on the point of sentencing, eight days after his date of posting-May 9, 2023-as Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Madhepura.  

In the sentencing order dated May 17, 2023, Virendra Kumar Choubey, Additional District and Sessions Judge-VIII sentenced Shankar Yadav, Pritam Lakra and Nav Kumar Ojha of 15 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1 lakh. In case the fine is not submitted, the convicts will have to remain in prison for another six months.      

Notably, as per High Court's website, the judge in question was posted as District and Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura on May 9, 2023, i.e. the date on which he delivered the judgment of conviction dated May 9, 2023 as 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara, in N.D.P.S. Case No.- 06 of 2021. He passed the order of sentence on May 17, 2023. 

It is apparent that there is another error which has escaped High Court's attention. Is it possible for a judge remain posted at Bhojpur and Madhepura at the same time?. Is it possible for a judge to pass an order of sentence as 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara and be posted at Madhepura District and Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura on May 17, 2023?

Also readCriminal appeal of Jharkhand residents in NDPS case related to 9 quintals of ganja is before the High Court  

Patna High Court seized with NDPS case of 2021, driver Shankar Yadav was to get Rs 15,000, Pritam Lakra worked pro bono 

 

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra

In Amarjit Yadav @ Amarjit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated February 20, 2026. The order reads: "....we do not find any good ground to deny the prayer sought for by the appellant. Hence, appeal is allowed and appellant is ordered to be enlarged on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer...." It reversed the 3-page long order dated June 27, 2025 by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of the Patna High Court. The appellant had approached the Supreme Court apprehending his arrest in the FIR registered on May 13, 2025 under Sections 30(a), 32(c) and 41(1)(2) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2022 after denial of anticipatory bail by the High Court. 

The gist of the prosecution case is that appellant was a prospective purchaser of 260.250 liters of Indian made Foreign Liquor, which was being transported in a truck from Haryana to Bihar and the driver of the truck Sunil Paswan in his statement had disclosed the name of appellant as the potential buyer.

The Court observed: "It is an admitted fact that the contraband has not been seized from the possession of appellant and it is based on the co-accused statement, the appellant has been roped in as an accused. The courts-below had rejected the prayer of the appellant on the ground of his criminal antecedents, however none of the offences alleged are under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2022. Be that as it may, pursuant to our interim order, appellant has appeared before the Investigating Officer and has cooperated with the investigation which is also fairly admitted by the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent."

Before the High Court, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. The petitioner had no concern with the alleged recovery of liquor. He also submitted that the petitioner was not present at the place of occurrence. It was submitted that the petitioner was neither owner nor driver of the truck in question. Name of the petitioner transpired in this case on the basis of confessional statement made by co-accused person as the petitioner was receiver of the seized items and the same has got no evidentiary value. He submitted that similarly situated co-accused was granted regular bail by this Court vide order dated April 2, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 19754 of 2025. There is no compliance of Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

In his order Justice Mishra had concluded: "6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and criminal antecedents of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. The prayer is rejected. However, the petitioner is directed to surrender in the Court below and pray for regular bail. If any such application is filed, the Court below shall consider and dispose of the same on its own merit without being prejudiced by this order." 

 

Denied opportunity to appear in CBSE's Xth Exam, Sameer Raj withdraws his appeal from Patna High Court

In Sameer Raj @ Sameer Raj & Anr. vs. Union of India through the Secretary (School of Education and Literacy), Ministry of Human Resource Department & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Rajesh Kumar Verma passed an order dated February 18, 2026. It reads: "Learned counsel for the appellants seeks permission to withdraw the present appeal. 2. Permission, as prayed for, is granted. 3. The appeal stands dismissed as withdrawn." This L.P.A was filed and registered on February 12, 2026. The counsels of the petitioner were: Dr. Gopal Krishna, Priyanka Singh,  Eashita Raj, Khalid Faizan Khurshid and Adarsh Singh.  

The present Letters Patent Appeal was preferred against the judgment and order dated January 27, 2026 passed by Justice Harish Kumar in C.W.J.C. No. 18381 of 2025, whereby the writ petition was dismissed. The reliefs prayed by the petitioner despite admitting in the ultimate and final paragraph of the Impugned Judgement and Order that the student had already appeared in the Practical Examination of Class 10 of CBSE and also without considering that even after the disposal of SLP, material changes in circumstances and new judicial developments have occurred. 

The facts of the case are that the appellant no. 1 was a minor student admitted in a CBSE-affiliated school in the year 2018 and had continuously progressed on the basis of merit up to Class-X. The appellant-student had consistently secured excellent grades in scholastic and co-scholastic areas and has already appeared in Internal, Pre-Board and Practical examinations of CBSE’s Class X examination. The difficulty arose when the CBSE online system blocked the registration of the appellant on account of an age-related software restriction, though no statutory provision prescribes such absolute bar. The appellants challenged the arbitrary denial by non-human software and sought permission to appear in AISSE 2026 by filing C.W.J.C. No. 18381 of 2025. Although the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned judgement, however in the ultimate and final paragraph-20 of the impugned judgment, the Court expressly recorded that “……….. the petitioner no. 1, who was admitted in Class IV at the age of 5 years and 3 months only and has also been allowed to appear in the Pre-Board Examination of 10th for the session 2024-25 ……….” 

While dismissing the writ petition, the single Judge himself acknowledged that the claim of the appellant remained open for reconsideration as it has been concluded that “ ….. the claim of the petitioner be considered a fresh ………”. The Single Judge failed to appreciate that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be curtailed merely on the ground that an administrative authority claims exclusive jurisdiction over a subject. Even in matters relating to education, courts are duty bound to examine whether the decision-making process is fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary and in conformity with constitutional principles. The Single Judge committed a serious error of law in holding that the respondent-CBSE is the "best judge" of considering the exceptional merit and CBSE’s decision is beyond judicial scrutiny. Such an approach is contrary to settled principles of administrative law, which mandate that no public authority can be permitted to exercise unfettered and unguided discretion immune from judicial review. He failed to consider that the respondent-CBSE has not prescribed any transparent, uniform or objective mechanism for assessing exceptional merit, nor constituted any expert   committee for such purpose. In absence of such safeguards, deference to CBSE's decision  amounts to approval of arbitrariness.

He also erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of finality of earlier litigation, without appreciating that the present case involved continuing violation of fundamental rights of a minor student and fresh circumstances relating to his academic progression and maturity. Having recorded in paragraph-20 of the impugned judgment that the appellant-student has outstanding performance and has suffered due to the fault of the CBSE controlled school, the Single Judge acted inconsistently and unreasonably in denying effective relief to the appellants, thereby defeating the very object of doing complete justice. The impugned judgment reflects excessive judicial restraint and misplaced deference to administrative authority, resulting in failure to balance regulatory discipline with constitutional protection of merit, equality and right to education, and is therefore bad in law and liable to be interfered with by the High Court.

The Single Judge decided the case of the Petitioners/ Appellants in a very mechanical manner without considering consequence of the last paragraph of his own judgement.  He is right in appreciating the admitted position that the appellant no.1 (student) was duly admitted in class-IV (i.e. in primary class) when he was at the age of 5 years 3 months and having allowed him to continue his studies up to Class-X, but erred in rectifying the error of the respondents, who hold that the appellant no.1  was not eligible for admission in that class. He failed to appreciate that subsequent to the disposal of SLP (C) no. 8849/ 2025 a fresh and highly material judicial development has occurred on 19.08.2025 in the case of Aarav Singh vs. Union of India & ors. Writ Petition no. 13186/ 2025 decided by the  High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in which Court, after considering expert material including IQ/ Psychometric assessment and noting the extraordinary academic performances of the student the Court adopted a just and reasonable approach to consider an exceptional case and has held that Clause 4.1 of the National Education Policy, 2020 is directory and not mandatory, and further observed that exceptionally meritorious students cannot be debarred on the basis of age-related norms; hence, the said judgment squarely supports the case of the Appellant no. 1 and constitutes a vital change in the circumstances after the dismissal of the said SLP. He failed to consider the subsequent and material development, that the appellant no. 1 was referred to IQ assessment at AIIMS, Patna (Dept. of Psychiatry/ Clinical Psychology) (one of the best institute of India) on 13.10.2025 and thereafter the scientific assessment was duly conducted and final result was recorded on 04.11.2025, wherein it has been conclusively opined that the appellant no. 1 possesses Superior Intellectual Functioning with recorded scores of IQ=127.

The Single Judge failed to consider direct the CBSE to permit the appellant no. 1 (student) to appear in AISSE 2026 on the basis of (i) his consistent outstanding academic record his IQ assessment of the level of Superior Intellectual Functioning having IQ=127, his outstanding performances in Co-Scholastic Areas, Co-Curricular and extra- Curricular activities -and he was permitted to appear and accordingly he appeared in Practical Examinations of class-X, which is part of CBSE examination.  

In compliance with the directions contained in the impugned judgement, the appellants submitted a detailed representation before the respondent CBSE and also personally approached the office of CBSE at New Delhi and requested for an opportunity of personal hearing, including via virtual mode for effective consideration of their case. Despite repeated requests, the respondent-CBSE did not grant any opportunity of hearing nor fixed any date for consideration of the appellant’s representations, instead the appellants were orally informed that since their earlier representation had already been rejected by order dated 20.05.2024, the CBSE authorities were not inclined to take different view left with no alternative remedy, the appellants have been constrained to prefer the present Letters Patent Appeal.

The earlier order dated 20.05.2024 was passed in very mechanical manner, without proper application of mind and without exercising jurisdiction in accordance with law, particularly because the CBSE examines the academic performances only and not extra co-curricular activities and the CBSE’s order was passed arbitrarily, unreasonably and contrary to harass the appellants. TSingle Judge failed to appreciate the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh vs Sanjay Gulati [AIR 1983 SC 580 = 1983 SCC (3) 517], wherein it has been categorically held that when authorities themselves commit an errors by ignoring the prescribed norms, the consequences of such lapses cannot not be imposed upon deserving students. The Supreme Court also held that:-“………Those who infringe the rules must pay for their lapse and the wrong done to the deserving students who ought to have been admitted has to be rectified.”   

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 27.01.2026, passed by Justice Harish Kumar in C.W.J.C. No. 18381 of 2025, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed, the appellants preferred the LPA on following grounds:(i) Because theSingle Judge erred in law in treating the previous litigation as an absolute bar, ignoring material changes occurred after disposal of SLP (C) no. 8849/ 2025 and also ignoring the continuing nature of violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.  (ii) Because the Single Judge failed to appreciate that principles of res-judicata are applied with flexibility in writ jurisdiction, particularly where the constitutional rights of a minor, exceptionally meritorious student are involved. (iii) Because the impugned judgement fails to examine whether CBSE has any objective, transparent and expert based mechanism and tool to assess the exceptional merit of the student. (iv) Because the impugned judgment is inconsistent and legally unsustainable in as much as failed to consider that the school is duly affiliated to the CBSE and for all workings of the school, related to the education, the CBSE is fully responsible. (v) Because the impugned judgement failed to consider that the  appellant no. 1 (student) was admitted in class IV at the age of 5 years 3 months, and continuously studied up to class X and was also allowed to appear in examinations of Pre-Board of Class X and Practical Examination of class X (which is a part of CBSE Board Examination) and as such he cannot be restrained from appearing other papers of CBSE Class X examination, in the light of Judgement/ Order passed in Tathagat Avtar Tulsi vs. Central Board of Secondary Education and another, Writ Petition (Civil) no. 4386 of 1996,. passed by High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. 

(vi) Because the impugned judgement failed to consider that the Hon’ble Patna High Court has hold in Judgement/ Order dated 23.01.2009 in Monark Monalisa and ors. vs. The State of Bihar and others, Writ Petition no. 10357/ 2008 that “This Court finds the rule, as contained in Article 291 (presently Article: 259) of the Bihar Education Code restricting the age is not an absolute rule……..”  and also about letter dated 23.08.1989 of the Secretary, Dr. Brij Kishore Giri of the Bihar School Examination Board that “  …. The policy decision is in furtherance to Article 291 (presently Article: 259) of the Bihar Education Code because under no statute that has been brought in my notice, there any such mandatory restriction. The policy decision itself, thus, is discretionary, as noted above.” (vii) Because the impugned judgment fails to examine whether CBSE has any objective, transparent and expert-based mechanism to assess exceptional merit of the student as CBSE itself states that “there is no such established mechanism or scientific tool to assess and declare a candidate as prodigy or exceptionally meritorious in an academic matter” and in such situation the CBSE should rely upon the results of IQ assessment by AIIMS (one of the best institute of India) that the student possesses the “Superior Intellectual Functioning” beyond age i.e. the student is “exceptionally meritorious”, beyond age i.e. the student is child prodigy and has exceptional merit and  in such situation it was just and proper to direct the CBSE to allow the student to appear in AISSE examination. 

(viii) Because the Court wrongly declined to test the action of CBSE on the anvil of arbitrariness, proportionality, and reasonableness, particularly when the CBSE itself has duly accepted that “the result of the past academic performance of the petitioner perused and found that same is satisfactory”. (ix) Because denial of registration based on a non-human software-generated age restriction, without statutory backing, is per se arbitrary and unconstitutional. (x) Because the impugned order places excessive deference on administrative discretion and undermines judicial review. (xi) Because the impugned judgment is bad in fact and law and liable to be set aside.

Also read:Sameer Raj to file Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A.) against Justice Harish Kumar's dismissal of his writ seeking direction to appear in CBSE's 10th Board Exam 

CBSE fails to comply with Patna High Court's orders in Sameer Raj vs. Union of India 

Patna High Court dismisses PIL bribery of voters during recent Bihar Legislative Assembly Election

In Anil Kumar vs. The Election Commission of India Through the Chief Election Commissioner & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 4-page long judgement dated February 20, 2026, wherein, it concluded:" So far as violation of Model Code of Conduct is concerned, there is nothing in the petition that the petitioner has approached the Election Commission of India. There is no specific instances have been given that while the Model Code of Conduct was in force, there has been violation and the money has been disbursed to the beneficiaries under the Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojna. Therefore, in absence of specific averments taken in the writ petition, we do not feel it proper to entertain this Public Interest Litigation. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed." The other four respondents were: Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar, State of Bihar Through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Finance Department, Government of Bihar, Through the Principal Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Bihar and Department implementing the scheme Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojna, Through its Principal Secretary, Government of Bihar. The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Sahoo.  

The petitioner alleged that while the Model Code of Conduct during Bihar Legislative Assembly Election, 2025 was in force, at that point of time, some money was transferred in the accounts of the beneficiaries under Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojna, which according to the petitioner should not have been done as it amounted to bribing the voters in order to influence them to vote for the ruling parties.

The writ petition was filed with the following prayer(s): “1(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the complete records relating to the conception, approval, budgetary allocation, advertisements, beneficiary selection criteria and date-wise Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) details of the scheme titled "Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojna", particularly during the subsistence of the Model Code of Conduct.(ii) Direct the Respondent-State of Bihar to file a detailed affidavit disclosing; a.total amount disbursed under the scheme, b.number of beneficiaries, c. date-wise installments released, d. authority permitting continuation of DBT during election period, and e. correspondence exchanged with the Election Commission of India.
(iii) Constitute an Independent High-Level Inquiry Committee, preferably headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India or the High Court, assisted by financial, administrative and election-law experts, to inquire into: a. the legality, b. intent, c. timing, and d. electoral impact of implementation of the said scheme during the election period.
(iv) Direct that the aforesaid inquiry shall be conducted under the supervision and monitoring of the High Court, with liberty to the Committee to summon records, call officials, examine witnesses, and submit periodical status reports before the High Court.
(v) Direct the Inquiry Committee to specifically examine: (a) whether continuation of the scheme violated the Model Code of Conduct, (b) whether the scheme amounted to inducement or bribery of voters; (c) whether public funds were misused for electoral advantage; (d) whether there was selective or discriminatory non-enforcement of election norms by the Election Commission of India. (vi) Upon completion of the inquiry, direct initiation of appropriate civil, criminal and departmental proceedings against responsible officials and authorities, if any illegality, misconduct or abuse of power is found. (vii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the Election Commission of India to frame and strictly enforce uniform, binding and transparent guidelines governing Direct Benefit Transfer and welfare scheme disbursement during election periods, applicable uniformly across all States and Union Territories.”

 

Sunday, February 22, 2026

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Md. Kasim vs State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated February 19, 2026, wherein, it set aside order dated March 19, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. Patna High Court  has dismissed the appellant’s prayer for bail in anticipation of arrest. 

The appellant figured as an accused in Complaint Case of 2016 dated 22nd November, 2016 under Sections 504, 406, 420, 384, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120-B/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Supreme Court observed;"6. We are conscious that process has been initiated for declaring the appellant as a proclaimed offender owing to the fact that he was absconding for quite some time; however, we are of the considered opinion that interest of justice would be sufficiently served if the appellant is directed to appear before the trial magistrate on each and every date, unless exempted. Ordered accordingly. 7. In such view of the matter, the appeal is accepted and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. 8. It is directed that in the event of the appellant being arrested, he shall be released on bail on terms and conditions to be imposed by the trial court. 9. Needless to observe, the appellant shall not, directly or indirectly, by making inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing such facts to the court. Also, it is made clear that unless exempted, the appellant shall appear in person before the trial magistrate on each and every day. If there be any breach, the protection granted hereby shall cease to operate."

Justice Singh's order rejected the petition for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is dismissed as not maintainable. It had recorded the State's counsel that "petitioner has been declared absconder and process of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. has been initiated against him to ensure his appearance in the Court as such petitioner is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail (Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 730, State of MP v. Pradeep Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 17)

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Patna High Court delivered eight judgement on Feb. 20

 Patna High Court delivered eight judgement on February 20, 2026 in 

 207     LPA-140/2025        Binod Kumar Mishra Vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Regd. Office,     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
208     CWJC-1925/2022        Vijay Kumar Jha Vs. The State of Bihar     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
209     CWJC-6197/2025        Santosh Kumar Yadav @ Santosh Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
210     CWJC-8213/2011        ST. MARYS SCHOOL,SAMASTIPUR Vs. EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND ORGAN     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
211     CWJC-10134/2025        Chandra Kishor Parashar @ Acharya Chandra Kishore Parashar Vs. The Union of India     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
212     CWJC-15181/2025        Sayad Abid Hussain Vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Food and Consumer Protection Department     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
213     CWJC-24819/2013        Kapileshwar Choudhary Vs. The State Of Bihar and Ors     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
214     Cr. WJC-300/2025        Manoj Ray @ Manoj Kumar Ray Vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, Bihar.     20-Feb-2026    VIEW
215     Cr. WJC-1419/2024        Brij Kishor Prasad Vs. THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVT. OF BIHAR, PATNA, BIHAR     20-Feb-2026    VIEW

Patna High Court delivered 15 judgement on Feb. 19

Patna High Court delivered  15 judgement on February 19, 2026 in 

196     Cr.Misc.-49071/2025        Rakesh Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
197     CWJC-268/2025        Rajesh Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
198     CWJC-1051/2025        Pradip Kumar Pandit Vs. The State of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
199     CWJC-3723/2025        Bijay Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
200     CWJC-10487/2021        Md. Mujtaba Vs. The Union of India through the Secretary,     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
201     CWJC-17628/2014        Udeshwari Yadav Vs. The State Of Bihar and Ors     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
202     CWJC-21414/2019        Bablu Kumar Mahto Vs. The State of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
203     CWJC-24210/2013        Abhay Kumar Vs. The State Of Bihar and Ors     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
204     Cr. WJC-316/2024        MANOJ SAW Vs. The State of Bihar through the Director General of Police, Old Secretariat, Patna.     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
205     CR. APP (SJ)-312/2014        Shankar Harijan Vs. The State Of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW
206     CR. APP (SJ)-3711/2022        DR. GAUTAM CHOUDHRY @ GAUTAM KUMAR Vs. The State of Bihar     19-Feb-2026    VIEW