Patna High Court's bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, S.D. Mishra holds DM, Banka guilty of illegal act, Girdhari Yadav awarded compensation of Rs 1 lakh be realised from erring officials

In Girdhari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Home (Police), Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 25-page long judgement dated September 11, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"30. In result, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order of externment of the petitioner in the manner ordered by the District Magistrate, Nalanda would not sustain the test of law. It is hereby set aside. 31. We find that the fundamental right of the petitioner embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution has been infringed without following the established procedure of law. Therefore, we award a compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) to the petitioner together with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) which will be payable by the State within a period of one month from today. The cost and compensation shall be realised from the erring officials in the light of the judgment of this court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad & Other reported in (2019) 1 PLJR 1051 wherein it has been held that whenever the State is saddled with cost and compensation for the misuse of power by an executive of the State, it is required to be recovered from the erring officials. 32. This Court, therefore, directs the State Government to realise the cost and compensation amount payable to the petitioner from the erring officials within a period of six months in accordance with law. 33. In result, this criminal writ application succeeds. The impugned order dated 08.09.2025 (Annexure ‘3’) passed by the District Magistrate, Banka, is hereby set aside. 34. The criminal writ application, thus, stands allowed."  

The hearing in this case was concluded on July 13, 2026 and the judgment was reserved.

Earlier, the High Court's Division Bench of Justice Prasad and Sourendra Pandey had passed an order dated  November 11, 2025, wherein, it had concluded: 2. We have perused the order as contained in Memo
No. 1532 dated 08.09.2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Banka. Prima-facie, it appears to have been passed in haste and the condition imposed is not commensurate to the requirement of the provisions of the Act. 3. We, therefore, stay the operation of the order dated 08.09.2025 as contained in Memo No. 1532 forthwith. 4. It is stated that the petitioner has been kept confined in the police station from the morning even though he is required to cast his vote today itself which is going on. 5. We direct that the petitioner shall be set at free and will be allowed to go to the polling booth for casting his vote....6. The order be communicated also through FAX to the office of the District Magistrate, Banka."  

In his judgment dated September 11, 2026, Justice Prasad observed:"22. On a bare reading of the Sanha Diary entry, it would appear that the police officer, Arvind Kumar Rai, has lodged two Sanhas at an interval of only four minutes, and both the Sanhas are recorded in similar words. The Sanha entry is said to be made based on the information received from some reliable sources, but who are those reliable sources are not known. Who are the persons of suspicious characters with whom the petitioner was holding meeting is not mentioned and on what basis the police officer has an apprehension that in the coming festival or the election, the petitioner may commit any occurrence which may cause disturbance to the public order. In the Sanha entry, it is stated that all the officers were directed to keep vigil over such people and collect information, but no information has been collected in respect of the petitioner. No mobile call details showing that the petitioner was talking to person of suspicious character was produced before the S.P. or D.M. No particular place where meeting, if any, was held by the petitioner has been mentioned. In the present digital/mobile era, the police could have at least shown the tower location. No verifiable material has been collected by police from which it may be even prima-facie found that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the public peace and order as defined under Clause (a) of Section 2 of the BCC Act. 'Sanha' alone has no 'probative value'. 23. While it is true that a police officer is given the responsibility to ensure that there should not be any breach of the public peace and order in the hand of the miscreants, they are expected to proceed against a person under the BCC Act only after collecting reliable materials after due verification which may have some probative value. A mere suspicion without any reference to the name of any person who is of suspicious character, without referring to a single meeting with date and venue at which such meeting was held, a mere bald statement and suspicion expressed by a police officer in the Sanha that a person is likely to commit an occurrence and breach the public peace and order cannot form basis of forming an opinion that the movement of such person is likely to cause breach of peace and public order. This kind of unbridled and uncanalised power cannot be exercised by police."  

Justice Prasad observed: "An executive order interfering with the fundamental right of a person cannot be exercised in such unbridled and uncanalized form of discretion on the part of the police officer. It is required to be noticed that the petitioner was granted bail by this Court on 26.03.2025. For a period of almost five months, no act or omission on the part of the petitioner has been noticed by the police officer. The police officer did not file any application for cancellation of bail of the petitioner on any ground whatsoever. 25. In such circumstance, this Court is of the considered opinion that the condition under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 read with Section 5 of the BCC Act are not satisfied in this case. The District Magistrate, Banka could not have exercised his power under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the BCC Act. 26. Having said so, this Court further finds that under Rule '6' of the BCC Rules, the District Magistrate could have directed the petitioner at best to mark his attendance once in a day in the nearest police station from his residence, but he did not follow the rules. He directed the petitioner to not only mark his attendance in a police station at a distance of 40 kilometers from his house, but also to remain present in the police station from 10:00 AM to 5:00 PM every day. This action of the District Magistrate is
in breach of the rules, which has further resulted in causing hardship to the petitioner. He was rendered unemployed during this period."

The judgement relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Arjun vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 2024 INSC 968, wherein the appellant before the Supreme Court was sought to be proceeded under Section 3(2) of the The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black-Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981. The appellant was detained for a period of twelve months so as to prevent him from indulging in the activities of bootlegging thereby preventing the maintenance of peace. For this purpose, the detaining authority had basically relied on the six cases registered against the said appellant by the State Excise Department. The Supreme Court took note of the six cases pending against the appellant alleging illicit manufacture of handmade liquor, these cases were registered during the period January 29 2023 to October 18, 2023, but in none of these cases, the authorities had found it necessary to arrest the appellant. The Supreme Court relied upon the observations of Hon’ble Justice Hidayatullah in Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar and Another reported in (1966) 1 SCR 709 and also in Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587.
Paragraph ‘12’, ‘13’ and ‘14’, of the judgment rendered in the case of Arjun (supra) was cited. 

The writ application was preferred for setting aside the show cause notice dated August 26, 2025, passed by the District Magistrate, Banka in Bihar Crime Control Case No. 14/2025-26. The petitioner had also prayed for setting aside the order dated September 8, 2025 (Annexure 3) passed by the District Magistrate, Banka. By the impugned order, the District Magistrate, Banka had in exercise of his power under Section 3 (3) of the Bihar Crime Control Act, 2024 (BCC Act) rejected the show-cause/explanation submitted by the petitioner and directed him to mark his attendance every day from 10:00 AM to 5:00 PM in Barahat Police Station.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the District Magistrate, Banka recorded at the end of the order by pen that the order shall be applicable till completion of the election. The submission was that since the assembly election in the State of Bihar was over on November 14, 2025, the petitioner had to mark his attendance till such time but by virtue of the order dated November 11, 2025, as the impugned order was stayed by the High Court, the petitioner suffered the hardship for a period of two months from the date of passing of the impugned order.  He submitted that on a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that without there being any material to show that the petitioner was indulging in, or was likely to indulge in, any act to disturb public peace and order, simply on a mere asking by the police authorities, the impugned order had been passed.  It was submitted that the petitioner was accused in two cases. The first case, Katoria P.S. Case No. 178 of 2024, was registered by one Ranjan Kumar due to village politics, and in this case, the petitioner was granted bail by the High Court on March 19, 2025 in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 187 of 2025. The another case being Katoria P.S. Case No. 165 of 2024 was registered under Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). In the said case, the name of the petitioner transpired in the confessional statement of a co-accused. The petitioner had been granted bail in the said case by the High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 9778 of 2025 on March 26, 2025. The counsel submitted that on a bare perusal of the definition of the cluster of words “anti-social element” as it is provided under Section 2 (b) of the BCC Act read with Clause (f) and (g) of Section 2, it would appear that the petitioner would not fall in the category of an anti-social element. It was also submitted that Section 3 (3) of the BCC Act confers drastic power on the District Magistrate, therefore, such power is to be exercised sparingly with all circumspection and care. In order to exercise the power under Section 3 (3), the District Magistrate has to form a subjective satisfaction/opinion that the twin conditions mentioned under Section 3(1)(a) and (b) are duly satisfied. In this case, neither of the two conditions was satisfied.

It was pointed out that in a very casual manner, the District Magistrate, Banka, declared the petitioner an anti-social element, causing damage to the reputation of the petitioner and thereafter directed him to mark his attendance in Barahat Police Station, where he was required to stay right from morning 1 AM to evening 5 PM every day. Thus, for a period of two months, the petitioner was not left in a position to work for his livelihood as he was required to go at least 40 kilometers from one side from his house to attend the police station. It was submitted that as per the Bihar Crime Control Rules, 1978 (BCC Rules), the District Magistrate, while exercising his power under Section 3 (3), would be obliged to direct a person to mark his attendance once in a day in the nearest police station but in this case, the District Magistrate ordered that the petitioner shall remain in the Police Station, Barahat, from 10 AM to 5 PM every day. The petitioner is a resident of Katoria Police Station, but he was ordered to go to Barahat Police Station covering a distance of 40 kilometers from one side, thus leaving his house in the early morning and returning home after sunset. This was in complete violation of law and result of an arbitrary exercise of power. The counsel submission was that for such misuse of power by the District Magistrate, which interfered with the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, besides setting aside the impugned order, expunging the tag of 'anti-social element', the petitioner be awarded appropriate cost and compensation.

The counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India reported in (2016) 7 SCC 221 and the State of Bihar vs. Lal Krishna Advani reported in (2003) 8 SCC 361, to submit that right to reputation is an integral part of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that for infringement of such rights of the petitioner, the State is liable to compensate the petitioner. 

Justice Prasad observed:"28. On a bare perusal of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would be evident that for an act to qualify as a disturbance to public order, the specific activity must have an impact on a broader community or general public, invoking feelings of fear, panic or insecurity. No such act or deed of the petitioner has been pointed out in the show cause notice. 29. The views of the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court that every breach of peace does not lead to public disorder is to be understood in its terms and spirit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that when a person can be dealt in exercise of power to maintain the law and order, unless the acts of the proposed detainees are the ones which have the tendency of disturbing the public order, a resort to preventive detention, which is a hardship measure, would not be permissible. The same reasoning and rationale is to be applied while exercising the power under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the BCC Act. Drastic powers are to be exercised with circumspection and care." The judgment referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kuso Sah vs. The State of Bihar reported in (1974) 1 SCC 195. 

The judgement recorded that Section 8 of the BCC Act states that for purpose of satisfying himself as to whether the condition necessary for the making or confirmation of an order under Section 3 or 5 exists or not take into consideration any evidence which he considers to have probative value but the provisions of the Evidence Act shall not apply thereto. The judgement reads: "It is evident that Section 8 of the BCC Act casts a duty upon the District Magistrate to satisfy himself with some tangible material having probative value....19. By virtue of Section 27 of the Bihar and Orrisa General Clauses Act, 1917, the Rules of 1978 shall still survive. No rule has been framed so far under BCC Act 2024, as informed to this Court." 

 

Supreme Court reverses Patna High Court's order, "the material against the petitioner falls short of the threshold required for refusal of anticipatory bail"

In Santosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Vinod Chandran passed a 3-page long order dated September 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:" 2. The petitioner is accused of unlawfully dealing in illicit foreign liquor, which was seized from a motorcycle bearing registration No.BR/31/AU/6305, registered in his name. The said motorcycle was being ridden by two boys, who has been arrayed as co-accused. Upon searching the motorcycle, one bottle containing 750 ml of illicit foreign liquor was recovered. 3. The petitioner was denied anticipatory bail by the High Court considering the fact that he is the owner of the aforementioned motorcycle from which recovery was effected. 4. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the material against the petitioner falls short of the threshold required for refusal of anticipatory bail. 5. Therefore, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner in connection with the offence enumerated above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose. He is also required to cooperate and submit the evidentiary materials as required by the I.O. 6. Once the petitioner is released on bail by the IO, on directions issued by the IO or summons issued by the jurisdictional court, the petitioner shall appear before the jurisdictional court and furnish fresh bail bonds and ensure due appearance in the trial. 7. With the aforesaid, this petition stands disposed of."

The petitioner was denied anticipatory bail by page 1-page long order dated August 10, 2026 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court in connection with FIR being No.5104015260260/2026 dated April 14, 2026 registered with Vaishali Thana (Police Station, Vaishali) District Vaishali, Bihar, for the offence punishable under Section 30(a) Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. Justice Singh had concluded:" 4. Considering the fact that petitioner is registered owner of the motorcycle, from which, aforesaid recovery has been effected, the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioner is rejected."

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in a case registered for offence under Section 30(a) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act.

Section 147A of Income Tax Act is unconstitutional: Punjab & Haryana High Court

In Jyoti Sareen vs. Union of India & Ors. (2026), Punjab & Haryana High Court's Division Bench of Justics Deepak Sibal and Rupinderjit Chahal delivered a 97-page long judgement dated September 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded that the newly inserted Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional. The judgment is reserved on September 8, 2026. The judgement was authored by Justice Sibal. 

A large number of f petitioners approached the High Court seeking therein to declare Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961to be ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 265 of the Indian Constitution. After the grant of declaration as above, the petitioners pray for quashing the notices issued to them under Section 148 of the Act by their respective jurisdictional Assessing Officers (AOs). The petitioners submitted that even if Section 147A of the Act is held to have been legally promulgated by the legislature, the impugned notices, issued under Section 148 of the Act, were liable to be set aside because the petitioners’ respective jurisdictional AOs, who issued the impugned notices, were not chosen randomly through automated allocation which violates Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme dated March 29, 2022 framed thereunder. 

The petitioner is an Advocate practicing in the High Court. She is an Income Tax Assessee and her PAN number is APRPS8105E. The petitioner being a professional is earning income under the head “Business and Profession”. For the Assessment Year 2020-21, the petitioner filed her Income Tax Return on September 30, 2020. The petitioner’s return was processed. Thereafter, an intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act was received by her. On March 28, 2024, the petitioner received a message on her registered mobile number informing her that some proceedings had been initiated against her by the Income Tax Authorities and in this regard she was advised to go on to the Income Tax Business Application Portal. On doing so, the petitioner found that a notice dated March 15, 2024, under Section 148 of the Act, had been issued to her by her jurisdiction AO. As per the said notice the petitioner’s jurisdictional AO had received information that on March 14, 2022 a search had been conducted under Section 132 of the Act in the case of the petitioner or in the case of a person in respect of which the petitioner was assessable. To reassess her income, for the assessment year 2020-21, the petitioner was asked to file a return in the prescribed form. As per the said notice, the same had been issued after obtaining prior approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Chandigarh-I but the petitioner claims that no such approval was provided to her. Through the notice dated March 15, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Act, the petitioner was not informed the reasons as to why such proceedings had been initiated against her. According to the petitioner, since no proceedings under Section 132 of the Act had been conducted on any of her premises, she was also ignorant as to who was the person on whose premises search proceedings under Section 132 of the Act had been conducted leading to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act to her. On June 28, 2024 the petitioner received an intimation informing her that proceedings against her shall be conducted in a faceless manner. The petitioner challenged the notice dated March 15, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Act, through filing of a petition before this Court being CWP-15791-2024 which petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court through judgment dated July 19, 2024 primarily for the reason that the impugned notice issued by the petitioner’s jurisdictional AO violated Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022. The reliance placed upon by the respondent authorities on an office memorandum and other internal communications to justify issuance of the impugned notice by the petitioner’s jurisdictional AO was rejected in the light of the clear mandate under Section 151A read with Section 144B of the Act. To arrive at its afore conclusion, the High Court Court agreed with and relied upon the law laid down, in similar facts, by the Telangana High Court in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy vs. Income-tax Officer and others, 2023 SCC OnLine TS 4476, the Bombay High Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax & others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1249 and the Gauhati High Court in Ram Narayan Sah vs. Union of India and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Gau 1424. 

The judgment of the High Court dated July 19, 2024 was challenged by the respondents before the Supreme Court through filing of Special Leave Petition (C) No.000950-2025. However, while the afore Special Leave Petition, along with other Special Leave Petitions, was pending before the Supreme Court, through the Finance Bill, 2026, Section 147A of the Act was promulgated w.e.f. April 1, 2021. Section 147A started with a non-obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court or in Section 151A or in any scheme framed under Section 151A, for the removal of doubts, it was clarified through Section 147A that the Assessing Officer, for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A, shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the
National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in sub- section (3) of section 144B.

In the light of the introduction of Section 147A of the Act, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment(s) impugned before it and remitted the matters to the respective jurisdictional High Courts for fresh consideration. The assessees were granted liberty to amend their writ petitions, if so advised, within four weeks from the date of uploading of the order of the Supreme Court dated April 10, 2026 so as to enable them to lay challenge to Section 147A of the Act. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy, including the validity, scope, effect, retrospectivity or applicability of the amended provision and that all such questions were left open to be decided by the respective jurisdictional High Courts. The High Courts were requested to decide the matters preferably by September 30, 2026 and in the meanwhile interim stay of further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the notice impugned by the assessees was granted. However, such grant of interim stay was subject to further terms and conditions, if any, to be imposed by the respective jurisdictional High Courts. Operative part of the order of the Supreme Court dated April 10, 2026 reads as follows: -
“21. It appears to us that the assessees would be entitled to challenge the amending provisions as elaborated upon heretofore, for which it would only be appropriate to relegate them to the jurisdictional High Courts. All contentions raised before us, as well as any other grounds available to them to question the impugned notices, may be urged before the High Courts instead.
22. Since the High Courts have primarily quashed the reassessment notices on the ground that the JAOs lacked competence to initiate such proceedings, and the very foundation of that view now stands altered by the amending legislation, the impugned judgments in favour of the assessees are set aside on this limited ground. The matters areaaccordingly remitted to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration. Ordered accordingly. 
23. The assessees are granted liberty to amend their writ petitions, if so advised, within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of uploading of this order, so as to enable them to lay challenge to Section 147A of the IT Act, as introduced by Act No. 4 of 2026, or to any other connected or consequential provision.
24. Similarly, the Appellant-Revenue shall be at liberty to file their written submissions and affidavits before the jurisdictional High Courts within a period of three (3) weeks thereafter.
25. No additional time shall be granted to the parties beyond what has been granted above.
26. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy, including the validity, scope, effect, retrospectively or applicability of the amended provisions, and all such questions are left open to be decided by the High Courts.
27. Finally, during the pendency of the writ petitions before the High Courts, there shall be an interim stay of further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the High Courts.
28. The High Courts are requested to decide the matters preferably by 30.09.2026. Learned counsel for the parties undertake to extend full cooperation to the High Courts in this regard. No adjournments may be
granted by the High Courts on mere asking of the parties.
29. The Registry shall forthwith transmit a copy of this order to the Registrars General of the concerned High Courts.
30. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.”

In terms of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court through its order dated April 10, 2026, the petitioner amended her original petition to include therein the challenge to the newly introduced Section 147A of the Act.

The counsels who appeared on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the Bombay High Court through its judgments in Hexaware Technologies Ltd.’s case (supra) and Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd.vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2571, the Punjab and Haryan High Court through its judgments pronounced in Jatinder Singh Bhangu & another vs. Union of India & others, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 9337 and Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India and others, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 9677, the Telangana High Court in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy’s case (supra) and the Gauhati High Court in Ram Narayan Sah’s case (supra), after analyzing the provisions of the Act, categorically held that in the light of Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022, notices under Section 148 of the Act could only be issued by a Faceless Assessment Officer; without amending Section 151A of the Act and/or the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022 and thus without curing the defect pointed out by the constitutional courts through the afore referred judgments, through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A, the legislature could not nullify the effect of the judgments delivered by the constitutional courts; promulgation of Section 147A of the Act by the legislature, without amending Section 151A and Section 130 of the Act and/or the schemes framed thereunder is a glaring example of legislative outreach and breach of separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary which the Indian Constitution clearly seeks to maintain; simply because Section 147A of the Act begins with a non-obstante clause, it cannot nullify the effect of law laid down by the constitutional courts; Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022, which still exists in the Act, clearly provides that notices under Section 148 of the Act are required to be issued randomly through automated allocation and in a faceless manner and in the light of such clear mandate of law the “clarification” sought to be made through the introduction of Section 147A of the Act is in direct conflict with such substantive provisions within the same Act. 

It was submitted that Section 147A of the Act is also in conflict with Section 130 of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated 28.03.2022 as per which all the functions and duties by Income Tax authorities are required to be done through the faceless regime in terms of Section 144B of the Act; as per the memorandum attached to the Finance Bill, 2026 through which Section 147A of the Act was introduced, Section 147A was promulgated by the legislature to achieve certainty and clarity as also to avoid litigation but introduction of Section 147A of the Act has resulted in everything to the contrary.

It was also submitted that since there were divergent views expressed by different High Courts as to whether notices under Section 148 of the Act could be issued by the assessees’ jurisdictional AOs, there were cross Special Leave Petitions, filed by the respective aggrieved parties, pending before the Supreme Court at the time when Section 147A was introduced. In  the light of these facts, the revenue should have invited an opinion of the Supreme Court which would have granted a final closure to this issue rather than retrospective enactment of Section 147A which has resulted in breeding of litigation across the length and breadth of this country before different High Courts and which litigation is not likely to end with judgment(s) to be rendered by the jurisdictional High Court(s); partial implementation of the faceless regime at the assessment/ reassessment stage defeats the entire purpose behind introduction of the faceless regime; even the timing of introduction of Section 147A of the Act by the legislature when the issue as to whether an assessee’s jurisdictional AO could issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act was pending adjudication before the Supreme Court was not appropriate because by doing so the respondents have literally stalled an opinion by the Supreme Court which in the afore facts was highly desirable and that Section 147A of the Act is also arbitrary because it artificially bifurcates the different stages of assessment especially when proceedings under Sections 148 and 147 of the Act are statutorily required to be an integral part of the same process. 

The submissions made by the counsels for the petitioner(s) was that even if the High Court does not find favour with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner(s) with regard to the challenge to the vires of Section 147A of the Act still the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the Act are liable to be set aside as they have not been issued by AOs chosen randomly by way of automated allocation in terms of Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022. In support of their submissions, reliance was placed by counsel of the petitioners on the following judgments: -

1. NHPC Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh Secretary and others, (2023) 17 SCC 1
2. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara Vs. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and another, (1970) 1 SCC 509
3. State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala and another, (2014) 12 SCC 696
4. S.R. Bhagwat and others Vs. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16 
5. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Private Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1
6. S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala and others, (2015) 4 SCC 400
7. Tata Motors Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2004) 5 SCC 783
8. State of Karnataka and others Vs. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association and others, (2018) 6 SCC 363
9. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (1986), 3 SCC 461
10.M/s Hiralal Rattanlal Vs. State of U.P. and another, (1973) 1 SCC 216

The judgement of the Punjab & Haryana High Court  reads:"....Through and even after the retrospective enactment of Section 147A, Section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder continue to exist on the statute book and without any amendment. Thus, the primary basis on which the constitutional courts had held that notices issued under Section 148 of the Act could not have been issued by the assessees’ jurisdictional AOs has not been removed through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A. Without amending Section 151A of the Act or the scheme framed thereunder, the “clarification” made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A that Assessing Officers for the purpose of issuance of notices under Section 148 of the Act mean and shall always deemed to have meant to be Assessing Officers other than the faceless AOs is in defiance of and in conflict with the law laid down by the constitutional courts. Through such “clarification”, the legislature visibly seeks to substitute its opinion over and above the findings returned by the constitutional courts which is legally impermissible. Section 147A is also clearly found to be in direct conflict with Section 151A, read with the scheme framed thereunder, all of which provisions simultaneously exist in the same statute. In the absence of any amendment to Section 151A and/or the scheme framed thereunder, simply because Section 147A begins with a non-obstante clause, would not make its retrospective enactment pass the test of a constitutionally enacted validation law. Rather, by the retrospective enactment of Section 147A, in the manner in which it has been done, the legislature has clearly trenched upon judicial power and through the introduction of Section 147A the legislature directly seeks to upset findings returned through judgments of several constitutional courts. The attempt by the legislature is clearly to circumvent unfavourable judicial decisions. Even today, if a matter is listed before the constitutional courts which rendered the afore verdicts as to who is the competent Assessing Officer to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act, there would be no change in the rendering of the above referred verdicts because such verdicts were primarily based on Section 151A and the scheme framed thereunder dated 29.03.2022 which provision and the scheme still continue to exist on the statute book as they existed at the time when the judgments of the constitutional courts were rendered. In the light of the considered and categoric findings returned by the constitutional courts after carefully analyzing Section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder that only a faceless AO can issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act, the “clarification” which is in clear defiance of and contrary to the afore findings, made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A of the Act would be of no help to the respondents." 

The judgement added:"The “clarification” made through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A was that an Assessing Officer, for the purpose of issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act, meant and was always deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the faceless AO. Such “clarification” was in conflict with the findings returned by as many as nine constitutional courts of this country to the effect that as per Section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder only a faceless AO could issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act. Section 151A and/or the scheme framed thereunder continue to exist on the statute book simultaneously with Section 147A. Therefore, introduction of Section 147A of the Act did not bring any clarity or certainty. It only added to the confusion. The other purpose behind enactment of Section 147A of the Act was to avoid litigation but such enactment became the breeding ground of litigation as thousands of petitions on the issue in question are pending in at least in eight different High Courts across the length and breadth of this country and that such litigation is also not likely to end before the respective High Courts because the parties aggrieved by the judgment of the respective jurisdictional High Courts would likely take up the matter before the Supreme Court. If it is a judgment of the Supreme Court which is ultimately going to give a quietus to the entire matter then rather than, for the afore “objects”, retrospectively enacting Section 147A, it was desirable for the respondents to
have invited an early opinion of the Supreme Court at the time when cross petitions were pending before the Supreme Court, filed by the respective parties aggrieved by the divergent views expressed by different jurisdictional High Courts as that would have finally put a lid on this issue. 63. In the light of the afore discussion, we have no hesitation to declare Section 147A of the Act to be unconstitutional. "

The High Court concluded: "79. In the light of the above discussion, after holding Section 147A of the Act to be unconstitutional and directing it to be struck down, we further order setting aside of the notices issued to the petitioner(s) under Section 148 of the Act because such notices have not been issued through the process of randomized allocation of assessing officers and in a faceless manner as is mandated under Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated 29.03.2022." 

Notably, Section 147 A provision was introduced retrospectively to clarify the role of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) in reassessment proceedings. Section 147A was inserted with retrospective effect from April 1, 2021. It provides that, for the purposes of reassessment provisions, the expression “Assessing Officer” would mean an Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the assessee.

The amendment in the Act was in reaction to the JAO-FAO controversy. It arose after the introduction of the faceless assessment framework in 2021. The dispute centred on whether reassessment notices and orders could be validly issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers or whether such proceedings were required to be undertaken through the National Faceless Assessment Centre. The adverse High Court order was appealed in the Supreme Court. While the batch of appeals was pending, Parliament had introduced Section 147A with retrospective effect, seeking to clarify the statutory position and validate reassessment action undertaken by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers.

Justice Alok Kumar sets aside order by Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna in an Arms Appeal

In Md. Yasin Khan vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Patna & Ors. (2026), Justice Alok Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page long judgment dated September 10, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"9. A perusal of the order dated 05.10.2023, makes it clear that the order was passed without giving an adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Hence, such order violates the fundamental principle of natural justice (Audi-alteram-partem) and is liable to be set aside or quashed. 10. As such, the order dated 05.10.2023 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna in Arms Appeal No. 17 of 2018 is accordingly set aside, and the said appeal is restored to its original number and file before the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna, who shall dispose of the same afresh, in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the Respondents, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

The other five respondents were: 2. The District Magistrate, Patna, 3. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, 4. The Additional District Magistrate (Arms), Patna, 5. The District Arms Magistrate, Patna and 6. The Officer-in-Charge-cum- S.H.O., Pirbahore Police Station, Patna.

The petitioner had prayed for the setting aside the Impugned Order dated October 5, 2023 passed by the Court of Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna passed in Arms Appeal No. 17 of 2018 whereby the Arms Appeal filed against the Order dated July 14, 2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Patna wherein the prayer of Petitioner for the grant the arms license was rejected in mechanical and arbitrary manner. He had also sought issuance of writ or writs in the nature of writ of Certiorari quashing the order dated July 14, 2017 passed under in a Arms Case by the District Magistrate, Patna whereby the prayer of grant of arms license was rejected without having any cogent reason on flimsy ground. The petitioner had also prayed for issuance of writ or writs in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondent District Magistrate to grant arms license to the Petitioner who is having no disqualification for grant of license and is entitled to the license as provided under law.

The case of the petitioner was that the petitioner, who is the Secretary of Millat Committee, Golakpur Kabristan (Waqf Estate No. 2153), Mahendru, Patna, and who was engaged in removal of encroachment over the said Waqf property, was allegedly attacked by criminals, giving rise to Pirbahore P.S. Case No. 291 of 2014 under Sections 341/323/307 I.P.C. On account of the resultant threat perception, the petitioner applied on November 21, 2014 before the District Magistrate, Patna for grant of an N.P. Bore Revolver/Pistol licence. When the application remained undecided, the petitioner approached the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 5922 of 2016, which was disposed of with a direction to the licensing authority to take a final decision within three months. On account of continued inaction, the petitioner was constrained to file Contempt Case (M.J.C. No. 358 of 2017), pursuant to which the District Magistrate, Patna passed the order dated July 14, 2017 rejecting the application. The said order, according to the petitioner, was never communicated to him and came to his knowledge only during the contempt proceeding. The petitioner thereafter had preferred Arms Appeal No. 17 of 2018 before the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna, which was dismissed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

The petitioner submitted that the order dated July 14, 2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Patna is wholly mechanical and unsustainable, inasmuch as it overlooks the recommendation of the Officer-in-Charge, Pirbahore P.S., certifying the petitioner's good moral character and favourably recommending grant of licence, and proceed merely on assumption and presumption without any cogent material, in violation of the mandate of Section 14 of the Arms Act, 1959, and further that the said order came to be passed only to shield the licensing authority from the pending contempt proceeding, and not upon an independent application of mind to the continuing threat perception disclosed by the two First Information Reports lodged by the petitioner.

The counsel for the State submitted that the licensing authority, in exercise of its statutory discretion under Sections 13(3)(b) and 14(1)(b)(i) & (ii) of the Arms Act, 1959 formed the opinion that grant of licence was more for projecting influence in the petitioner's land-dealing business than for protection of life, and was accordingly liable to affect public peace and safety.

The counsel for the State also submitted that the appellate order dated October 5, 2023 does not suffer from any illegality, as the record discloses that the petitioner was afforded due notice and opportunity but remained absent on as many as three occasions, namely November 20, 2018, April 26, 2022 and August 1, 2023, before the Divisional Commissioner, and it was only after affording such repeated opportunities that Arms Appeal No. 17 of 2018 came to be dismissed and the order of the District Magistrate dated July 14, 2017 affirmed, and that the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

Justice Kumar observed:"....it is well settled that while citizens have no fundamental right to bear arms, and the grant, refusal or renewal of an arms licence remains a statutorily regulated privilege under the Arms Act, 1959, the exercise of that discretion by the licensing and appellate authorities is not unfettered. Orders under Sections 13 and 14 of the Act must reflect due application of mind to the material on record, including police verification and recommendation reports, and cannot rest on vague apprehension, assumption or presumption. Further, it is well settled that adherence to the principle of natural justice is the very soul of the administration of justice. The universal excuse that these proceedings are summary proceedings and repeated opportunities cannot be given renders the order bad in law; it violates natural justice, resulting in arbitrariness and the denial of a fair opportunity to be heard."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Patna High Court in a case Section 406, 420 of IPC from Buxar

In Dr. Keshar Naman Kumar Pandey @Keshar Naman Kumar Pandey@Kesh Nayan Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu passed a 5-page long order dated September 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "5. The allegation against the appellant is that he collected money in lieu of assurance to arrange a job for the complainant and, thereafter, has been absconding. 6. It is admitted by the respondent-State of Bihar that investigation has already been completed, whereafter the chargesheet has been filed on 25th December, 2025. Since the investigation stood completed prior to passing of our earlier order dated 13th April, 2026, the appellant was not called upon to join investigation. This is what appears from paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit. 7. In such view of the matter, we are, thus, of the opinion that custodial interrogation of the appellant is not necessary and that there is sufficient ground for the appellant to be admitted to an order for grant of bail in anticipation of arrest. 8. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order stands set aside." The opposite party no. 2 is Bir Bahadur Singh, a resident of Dhansoi, Buxar.

Earlier, in a 2-page long order dated March 10, 2026, Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had concluded:"6. Considering the allegations levelled against the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the application stands dismissed." Supreme Court has set aside the order by Justice Kumar. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in connection with Dhansoi P.S. Case No. 104 of 2024 instituted under Sections 420, 406 of the I.P.C. As per the prosecution case, petitioner is alleged to have cheated informant and six persons an amount of Rs. 13,18,500/- in the name of providing jobs. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner had not cheated anyone. He had clean
antecedent. APP for the State opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner. Justice Kumar had directed teh petitioner to surrender within four weeks from the date of the order and pray for regular bail, failing which the Superintendent of Police, Nalanda was directed to take all steps for arrest of the petitioner. 

Supreme Court observed that since the investigation is yet to conclude, "we direct that if the investigating officer calls upon the appellant to join the investigation, he shall do so by attending the police station. 13. We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case." 

Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh denied anticipatory bail in an excise case

In Anil Sah vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order dated June 24, 026, wherein, he concluded: ""Considering the fact that petitioner is owner of the poultry farm from which huge quantity of illicit liquor was recovered, prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner is refused." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under section 30(a) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Amendment Act 2022. As per prosecution case, 1987.815 liters of illicit liquor was recovered from the poultry farm of petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that no incriminating material was recovered from conscious possession of the petitioner. He was not concerned with the alleged recovery and he had been made accused in the case only on suspicion. A.P.P. for the State opposed the prayer for bail of the petitioner and submitted that huge quantity of liquor was recovered from poultry farm of this petitioner.

CS Datamation Research Services Pvt. Ltd. debarred for a period of 3 years:Patna High Court

CS Datamation Research Services Pvt. Ltd., a Gurgaon based company has been debarred for a period of three years by the Patna High Court. A letter dated August 18, 2026 has been issued under the signature of Rupesh Deo, Registrar General, the Patna High Court. 

The letter reads: "I am directed to inform you that your reply vide letter dated 06.06.2026 submitted in response to the show cause notice issued to you vide Court's Letter No. 51421/File No. VIII- 16-2024/R&A dated 26.05.2026 has been found unsatisfactory by the Hon'ble Court. It is to further inform you that upon a comprehensive review of the entire recruitment process for 'Regular Mazdoor Recruitment Examination, 2025' and your aforesaid reply submitted in response to the show cause notice issued to you, the Hon'ble Court have been pleased to debar your agency from participating in any tender, contract, or recruitment process conducted by or on behalf of this Court for a period of three years w.e.f. 18.08.2026. Moreover, the agreement with your agency stands terminated w.e.f. 18.08.2026."