Justice Purnedu Singh partly affirms judgment of conviction by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in a Sessions Trial

In Luta Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnedu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 14-page long judgment dated April 22, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances and the medical evidence indicating only simple injuries do not establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 IPC. Rather, the materials on record demonstrate that the act of the appellant falls within the ambit of voluntarily causing hurt by a dangerous weapon. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellant under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and also keeping in mind that the injury reports of both the injured persons are found to be simple incised injuries, caused by a sharp cutting weapon."

Justice Singh added:" 24. Accordingly, this Court finds that the impugned judgment of conviction dated 30.03.2012 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in Sessions Trial No. 377 of 2007 (arising out of Sono P.S. Case No. 93 of 2006, G.R. No. 1311/2006 dated 05.10.2006, whereby, the appellant has been convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, does not warrant interference so far as the finding of conviction is concerned." 

The judgment reads:....so far as the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellant, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. To that extent, the appeal stands allowed. It is directed that if the appellant has already undergone the modified sentence, he shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellant is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds, if any. 26. Accordingly, the present appeal stands partly allowed."

The appeal was filed under Section 374(2) and 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated March 30, 2012 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in a Sessions Trial of 2007 (arising out of Sono P.S. Case of 2006, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years.

Sections 307 of IPC is as under:-

“ 307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.—[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death].

Section 324 of IPC reads:"Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

In absence of any corroboration of oral evidence of the other prosecution interested and injured witness, whose evidence itself reflects the existence of a land dispute between the parties, suggesting possibility of exaggeration. The medical evidence shows that the injuries are simple in nature, not supporting the allegation of intention to commit murder, moreover, the informant has not been examined, there is no independent witness, and there is unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, all of which cumulatively cast serious doubt on the prosecution version and clearly demonstrate absence of intention to cause death, rendering the charge under Section 307 IPC unsustainable.

Justice Singh relief on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case of Sivamani (Supra). 

The background of the occurrence was that the calf of the appellant was found grazing the crop of the informant which was objected by the informant and the on account of a trivial issue it escalated into a sudden quarrel between the parties without any premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the appellant. 

Mukhiya from West Champaran cannot approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent stand about his caste identity: Justices Sudhir Singh, Shailendra Singh

In Manoj Prasad vs. The State Election Commission (Panchayat), Patna through the State Election Commissioner & Ors (2026). Justices Sudhir Singh and Shailendra Singh delivered a 14-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"18....this Court is of the considered view that the appellant, having taken inconsistent stand regarding his caste status, cannot be permitted to derive benefit therefrom. The claim advanced by the appellant is therefore, wholly unsustainable in the eyes of law. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge call for no interference. 20. The present intra court appeal is, accordingly, dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. 

The intra court appeal was preferred against the 47-page long judgment dated August 9, 2023 passed in Manoj Prasad vs. The State Election Commission (Panchayat), Patna through the State Election Commissioner & Ors (2026), whereby Justice Rajiv Roy, the Single judge had dismissed the writ petition.  The appellant, Manoj Prasad was Mukhiya, Gram Panchayat Raj, Bagahi Baghambarpur,  Bairiya, West Champaran at Bettiah. 

The limited issue which arose for consideration was as to whether the judgment and order dated August 9, 2023 passed by Justice Roy, the Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, warrants interference by the Division Bench of the High Court in exercise of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction. 

The appellant was elected as a Mukhiya in the year 2021 on the seat which was reserved for extremely backward class candidates. Thereafter Respondent No. 4 lodged a complaint under Section 136(2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 seeking his disqualification on the ground that he does not belong to the Extremely Backward Class. The said complaint was registered as Case No. 72 of 2021, and upon notice, the appellant appeared and filed his written statement disputing the allegations and asserting that the documents relied upon by the complainant were fabricated. Upon consideration, the State Election Commission referred the issue of caste status to the Caste Scrutiny Committee vide order dated July 15, 2022. Being aggrieved by the order of reference dated July 15, 2022, the appellant preferred the writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 14258 of 2022 before the High Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the State Election Commission to make such reference. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Caste Scrutiny Committee proceeded with the matter and, upon enquiry, returned a finding vide order dated January 12, 2023 declaring the appellant to be of Koeri (Kushwaha) caste. The appellant, thereafter, also challenged the said order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee in the pending writ proceedings; however, the writ petition ultimately came to be dismissed by the Single Judge vide judgment and order dated August 9, 2023, giving rise to the present intra-court appeal. 

The Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, made the following observations: "75. This Court has gone through the facts of the case as also the submissions put forward by the rival parties and finds force in the averments made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 4, the State as also the Election Commission. As per the documents on record, the ‘Dangi’ caste was incorporated as a separate caste in the year 1995 and has not been carved out from Kushwaha/Koeri as pointed out by Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 4 and is also reflected from the Gazette notification.  As per the letter no. 673 dated March 8, 2011 issued by ‘the GAD’, the land revenue record is the foremost document for the issuance of caste certificate and only in its absence, the other documents have to be relied upon."

In the case of the petitioner, the admitted fact is that his ancestor, Bhagelu Mahato has been shown in the ‘Khatiyan’ as ‘Koeri’ (Khushwaha). Even the petitioner purchased the land in 2018 showing himself to be of ‘Koeri’ caste. As per the findings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee; one Santosh Kumar, son of Nandlal Prasad of village Baghambarpur, P.O. Patjirwa, Shree Nagar, West Champaran who was a Government Teacher in Bhagambarpur Panchayat and own cousin of petitioner was having a ‘Koeri’ caste certificate. In view of such unimpeachable evidences before the Caste Scrutiny Committee which included the report submitted by ‘the CID’ showing the petitioner to be a ‘Koeri’ (Khushwaha) caste; it rightly came to the finding communicated on January 12, 2023 which cannot be faulted upon.

Justice Singh observed that the petitioner cannot be allowed to change colours like the Chameleons inasmuch as he cannot become a ‘Koeri’ (under OBC category) to purchase a land in 2018 and immediately thereafter turn into a ‘Dangi’ (under EBC category) to contest 2021 election from an Extremely Backward Class seat.”  

Justice Singh noted that the Single Judge undertook a detailed examination of the documentary evidence and has rightly recorded that the foundational records, particularly the land revenue record (khatiyan), reflect the caste of the appellant’s ancestor as Koeri (Kushwaha). Such revenue records, being contemporaneous and maintained in the ordinary course of official business, carry a presumption of correctness and constitute primary evidence for determination of caste status. This Court, upon independent scrutiny, finds no reason to discard the evidentiary value of such records. It was an admitted position that the appellant himself, in the year 2018, while entering into a land transaction, declared his caste as Koeri. This conduct of the appellant, reflected in an official and  voluntary declaration, assumes considerable significance. The appellant was unable to provide a justification as to how he declared his caste as Koeri in the document, and later declared his caste as Dangi for purposes of election. The Division Bench underlined that the Single Judge rightly took note of this aspect and drew an adverse inference with regard to the consistency and credibility of the appellant’s claim. A person cannot be allowed to oscillate between two caste identities claiming to be Koeri for one purpose and Dangi for another depending upon the benefit sought to be derived. Such conduct not only undermines the sanctity of the system of reservation but also strikes at the root of fairness in public administration. 

Justice Singh observed that "the Caste Scrutiny Committee has taken into account all relevant materials, including the revenue records, the appellant’s own declarations, and the enquiry report submitted by the competent authority, and has thereafter arrived at a categorical finding that the appellant belongs to Koeri (Kushwaha) caste. Therefore, the plea taken by the appellant that the State Election Commission cannot adjudicate the issue relating to caste in view of the observations made by Full Bench decision rendered in case of Rajini Kumari (supra) is misconceived, because here the State Election Commission has not determined the caste of the appellant, rather it has forwarded the matter before the competent Caste Scrutiny Committee. 

He relied on the decision of the Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105, wherein, it was held that a person who secures benefits on the basis of a false or doubtful caste claim cannot be permitted to retain such benefits. The relevant part of the order reads: "15. This apart, the appellant obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. When it was found by the Scrutiny Committee that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste community, then the very basis of his appointment was taken away. His appointment was no appointment in the eye of the law. He cannot claim a right to the post as he had usurped the post meant for a reserved candidate by playing a fraud and producing a false caste certificate. Unless the appellant can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under Article 311 of the Constitution. As he had obtained the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate he cannot be considered to be a person who holds a post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee that the appellant got the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate has become final. The position, therefore, is that the appellant has usurped the post which should have gone to a member of the Scheduled Castes. In view of the finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee and upheld up to this Court, he has disqualified himself to hold the post. The appointment was void from its inception. It cannot be said that the said void appointment would enable the appellant to claim that he was holding a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. As the appellant had obtained the appointment by playing a fraud, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was holder of the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or the Rules framed thereunder. Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit, such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all."

The judgement of the Division Bench referred to the decision of the High Court's Division Bench in Ishwar Dayal Sah v. State of Bihar [1987 Lab IC 390 : 1987 BBCJ 48 (Pat)], wherein, it examined the point as to whether a person who obtained the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. In the case the employee had obtained appointment by producing a caste certificate that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community which later on was found to be false. His appointment was cancelled. It was contended by the employee that the cancellation of his appointment amounted to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution and was therefore void. It was contended that he could not be terminated from service without holding departmental inquiry as provided under the Rules. Dealing with the above contention, the High Court held that if the very appointment to the civil post is vitiated by fraud, forgery or crime or illegality, it would necessarily follow that no constitutional rights under Article 311 of the Constitution can possibly flow. It was held:(Lab IC pp. 394-95, para 12) If the very appointment to civil post is vitiated by fraud, forgery or crime or illegality, it would necessarily follow that no constitutional rights under Article 311 can possibly flow from such a tainted force. In such a situation, the question is whether the person concerned is at all a civil servant of the Union or the State and if he is not validly so, then the issue remains outside the purview of Article 311. If the very entry or the crossing of the threshold into the arena of the civil service of the State or the Union is put in issue and the door is barred against him, the cloak of protection under Article 311 is not attracted.”  

The principle that a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent stands, has been reiterated in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25, the relevant part of the said order reads: “Approbate and reprobate 26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.”  Justice Singh applied this settled principle in order to dismiss it and endorsed the judgement by Justice Roy. 

The other four respondents were: State Election Commissioner, Secretary, State Election Commission (Panchayat ), Patna, Santosh Kumar, West Champaran at Bettiah and State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar.

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside order by Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar for violating Rule 17, CCA Rules

In Anand Swarup vs. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 15-page long judgment dated April 21, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... in the opinion of the Court, this is a case of no evidence against the petitioner as also in categorical violation of the provisions as contained in Rule 17 of the CCA Rules. 34. Thus in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, neither the order of dismissal contained in memo no.4295 dated 18.3.2016 issued under the signature of the Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar nor the order rejecting the review contained in memo no.10532 dated 1.8.2016 issued under the signature of the Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar are sustainable and are both quashed and set aside. 35. The petitioner is held entitled for all consequential benefits including the arrears of salary for the period of suspension as also for the period of dismissal. 66. The writ application is allowed.". 

Rule 17 of Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005 is as follows: "17. Procedure for imposing major penalties.
(1)No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007] of Rule 14 shall be made without holding an inquiry, as far as may be, in the manner provided in these Rules.
(2)Wherever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring about the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a government servant, he may himself inquire into it, or appoint under these Rules an authority to inquire about the truth thereof.Explanation. - Where the disciplinary authority himself holds the inquiry, any reference in sub-rule (7) to sub-rule (20) and in sub-rule (22) of this Rule to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a reference to the disciplinary authority.
(3)Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under this Rule, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-
(i)the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite and distinct article of charge;
(ii)a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-
(a)a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government Servant;
(b)a list of such document by which, and a list of such witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.
(4)The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the articles of charge, such statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government Servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.
(5) (a)On receipt of the written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may himself inquire into such of the articles of charge which are not admitted, or, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under sub-rule (2) of this Rule, an inquiry authority for the purpose he may do so and where all the articles of charges have been admitted by the Government Servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record his findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall take action in the manner laid down in Rule 18.
(b)If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government Servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into the articles of charge or may, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under sub-rule (2) of this Rule an inquiry authority for the purpose, it may do so.
(c)Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry about such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a government servant or a legal practitioner to be known as the "Presenting officer' to present on his behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.
(6)The disciplinary authority shall, where it is not the inquiring authority, forward the following records to the inquiring authority-
(i)a copy of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(ii)a copy of the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the government servant:
(iii)a copy of the statement of witnesses, if any, specified in sub-rule (3) of this Rule.
(iv)evidence proving the delivery of the documents specified to in sub-Rule (3) to the Government Servant; and
(v) a copy of the order appointing the "Presenting officer".
(7)The Government Servant shall appear in person before the inquiring authority on such day and at such time within ten working days from the date of receipt by him of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, as the inquiring authority may, by a notice in writing, specify in this behalf or within such further time, not exceeding ten days, as may be specified by the inquiring authority.
(8) (a)The Government Servant may take the assistance of other Government Servant posted in any office, either at his headquarter or at the place where the inquiry is to be held, to present the case on his behalf:
Provided that he may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits:Provided also that the Government Servant may take the assistance of any other Government Servant posted at any other station, if the inquiring authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing so permits:Provided further that the Government Servant shall not take the assistance of any such other Government Servant who has three pending disciplinary cases on hand in which he has to give assistance.
(b)The Government Servant may take the assistance of a retired government servant to present the case on his behalf, subject to such conditions as may be specified by the Government from time to time by general or special order in this behalf.
(9)If the Government Servant, who has not admitted any of the articles of charge in his written statement of defence or has not submitted any written statement of defence, appears before the inquiring authority, such authority shall ask him whether he is guilty or has to say anything for his defence and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of charge, the inquiring authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the Government Servant thereon.
(10)The inquiring authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the Government Servant pleads guilty.
(11)The inquiring authority shall, if the Government Servant fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty days, after recording an order that the Government Servant may, for the purpose of preparing his defence,-
(i)inspect within five days of the order or within such further time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may allow, the documents specified in the list in sub-rule (3);
(ii)submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf;
Note:-If the Government Servant applies in writing for the supply of copies of the statements of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (3), the inquiring authority shall furnish him with such copies as early as possible.
(iii)give a notice within ten days of the order or within such further time as the inquiring authority may allow for the discovery or production of any documents which are in the possession of Government but not mentioned in the list specified in sub-rule (3) of this Rule:
Provided that the Government Servant shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Government.
(12)The inquiring authority shall, on receipt of the notice for the discovery or production of documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept, with a requisition for the production of the document by such date as may be specified in such requisition:Provided that the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, refuse to requisition such of the documents as are, in its opinion, not relevant to the case.
(13)On receipt of the requisition specified in sub-rule (12) of this Rule, every authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents shall produce the same before the inquiring authority:Provided that if the authority, having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents, is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the production of all or any of such documents will be against public interest or security of the State, he shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly and the inquiring authority shall, on being so informed, communicate the information to the Government Servant and withdraw the requisition made by it for the production or discovery of such documents.
(14)On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the Government Servant. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses, as it thinks fit.
(15)If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the inquiring authority may, in his discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the list given to the Government Servant or may itself call for new evidence or recall and re-examine any witness and in such case the Government Servant shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the inquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence, exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day to which the inquiry is adjourned. The inquiring authority shall give the Government Servant an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The inquiring authority may also allow the Government Servant to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interests of justice:Provided that new evidence shall not be permitted or called for or any witness shall not be recalled to supplement the evidence. Such evidence may be called for if there is any inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence, produced originally.
(16)When the case for the disciplinary authority is closed, the Government Servant shall be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the Government Servant shall be required to sign the record. In either case a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed.
(17)The evidence on behalf of the Government Servant shall then be produced. The Government Servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the Government Servant shall then be examined and they shall be liable to examination, cross-examination and, re-examination by the inquiring authority according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the disciplinary authority.
(18)The inquiring authority may, after the Government Servant closes his case, and shall, if the Government Servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government Servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.
(19)The inquiring authority may, after the completion of the production of evidence, hear the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed and the Government Servant, or permit them to file written briefs of their respective case, if they so desire.
(20)If the Government Servant to whom a copy of the articles of charge has been delivered, does not submit the written statement of defence on or before the date specified for the purpose or does not appear in person before the inquiring authority or otherwise fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Rule, the inquiring authority may hold the inquiry ex-parte.
(21) (a)Where a disciplinary authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (v) of Rule 14 [but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007.] of Rule 14], has himself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the article of any charge and that authority having regard to his own findings or having regard to its decision on any of the findings of any inquiring authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007.] of Rule 14 should be imposed on the government servant, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such disciplinary authority as is competent to impose the penalties mentioned in clause [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007.] of Rule 14.
(b)The disciplinary authority to which the records are so forwarded may act on the evidence on the records or may, if he is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interests of justice, recall the witnesses and examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witnesses and may impose on the Government Servant such penalties as it may deem fit in accordance with these Rules.
(22) Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another inquiring authority which has and which exercises, such jurisdiction the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the basis of evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself:Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and reexamine any such witnesses as hereinbefore provided.
(23) (i)After the conclusion of the inquiry, a record shall be prepared and it shall contain:-
(a)the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(b)the defence of the Government Servant in respect of each article of charge.
(c)an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge,
(d)the findings on each article of charge and the reasons thereof.
Explanation. - If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the proceedings of the inquiry may establish any article of charge different from the original articles of the charge, he may record his findings on such article of charge:Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the Government Servant has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge.
(ii)The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority, shall forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry which shall include-
(a)the report prepared by it under clause (i) of this sub rule;
(b)the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Government Servant;
(c)the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry;
(d)written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer or the Government Servant or both during the course of the inquiry; and
(e)the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry."

The respondents in the Anand Swarup case had come out with the order of punishment dated March 18, 2016 under the signature of the Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar dismissing the petitioner from service.

10. The review preferred by the petitioner was rejected by order dated 1.8.2016 passed by the Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar.

11. It is against the order of dismissal dated 18.3.2016 and the order rejecting the review application on 1.8.2016 that the petitioner has preferred the instant writ application. The petitioner has also prayed for setting aside the enquiry report dated 16.7.2015 and reinstating him in service with all back wages.

It was submitted by Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner being an Officer of the Bihar Administrative Service was appointed by the

Governor of Bihar. The memo of charge as came to be issued by the Under Secretary of the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Bihar. 

The other four respondents were: Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Government. of Bihar,Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Govt. of Bihar and Commissioner of Departmental Enquiry, Bihar. 

The petitioner had prayed for quashing of the resolution contained in memo no. 4295 dated 18.3.2016 whereby and where under the disciplinary authority inflicted punishment of dismissal from service and no payment during the period of suspension except subsistence. 

Justice Sarthy relied on Supreme Court's judgement in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank; (2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein, it held :-“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.”

The petitioner, was a Block Development Officer, had no role to play in the appointment of a Panchayat Shikshak and was acquitted in the criminal case in the trial Court.

A perusal of the order dated March 18, 2016 inflicting the punishment of dismissal from service of the petitioner showed that additional charges were levelled against him that instead of acting on the request for guidelines received from the panchayat office, in conspiracy with the staff of the panchayat, he got the matter with respect to appointment of the complainant sent to the Block and kept it pending there.

The disciplinary authority stated that when the petitioner did not take any positive action in getting the matter sent back to the panchayat and left it pending in the Block Office, by remaining a silent spectator, even though he did not take any bribe himself, he was in league with them.  The conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority in the order of punishment reveals that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved against him but the petitioner was punished for his inaction which was not part of the charge. 

The order passed in review on August 1, 2016 did not deal with nor answers the submissions raised by counsel for the petitioner. The authority considering the review filed by the petitioner was of the opinion that the petitioner should have acted on his junior officers i.e., the Block Education Extension Officer who was demanding bribe from the complainant. Justice Sarthy recorded that "It may be reiterated that this was not the charge in the memo of charge in the instant departmental proceeding."

Justice Sarthy referred to the judgment of High Court's Division Bench in Devendra Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (judgment dated October 19, 2023 passed in LPA no.1302 of 2017). He observed:"...none of the charges against the petitioner were proved as required in law and the Conducting Officer erred in coming to the conclusion that charge no.2 was proved."

Supreme Court re-affirms interim relief to petitioners in a case from Benibad, Muzaffarpur

In Jitendra Kumar Rai & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B.Pardiwala and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated April 20, 2026, wherein, it allowed the exemption applications. The Court observed:"8. It is very unfortunate that the FIR of 2024 is still under investigation. 9. Post this matter after two weeks. 10. On the next date of hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the State shall inform us how well the petitioners have cooperated in the investigation. 11. Interim order earlier granted to continue." 

On February 10, 2026, the Court had passed the following order: “Delay condoned. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there was some dispute between the neighbours in which both sides sustained injuries. Issue notice to the respondents returnable on 20.04.2026. Mr. Manish Kumar, learned Advocate-on-Record accepts notice on behalf of the respondent/State. In the meantime, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer in connection with FIR bearing Case No. 66 of 2024 dated 23.09.2024 registered at Police Station Benibad, District Muzaffarpur. Needless to add that the petitioners shall cooperate with the investigation.”

The counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that they were not called by the investigating officer. She submitted that they are ready and willing to appear before the investigating officer on any day as may be directed for the purpose of recording of their statements and interrogation.

The Court's order reads: "6. We direct the petitioners to appear before the investigating officer on 23rd April, 2026 without fail. 7. On that date, the investigating officer shall record the statements and interrogate the petitioners."The counsel appearing for the State had submitted that "the petitioners have not appeared before the investigating officer for the purpose of their interrogation."   

The case arose out of a 4-page long order dated September 1, 2025 in Phulo Devi & Ors.vs. The State of Bihar (2025) passed by Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court. The other petitioners were: Jitendra Rai and Kamod Kumar. In the High Court, the counsel for the petitioners were: Late Vaishnavi Singh and Late Ritwik Thakur. 

As per the prosecution story, the informant on September 9, 2024, when the sister-in-law, Shama Devi was out to attend nature’s call, the accused persons intercepted and made comments. As she raised alarm, subsequently informed the family members, allegation is that the accused persons armed variously came and after abuse, the assault. Jitendra Rai and Kamod Kumar assaulted with farsa and rod causing injury on the head and the right hand. Phulo Rai and Ranjeet Kumar assaulted Mithilesh Rai with iron rod on the head while Phulo Devi assaulted the mother of the informant causing injury on the back. Phulo Devi also assaulted his mother. Besides this, there was allegation of taking away the amount, they resorted to dial 112 whereafter they were shifted to SKMCH, Muzaffarpur for treatment. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was case and counter case, both being side by side, the accused side had also suffered and subsequent statement before the police during the investigation was of omnibus in nature save and except Jitendra Rai. The petitioners had no criminal antecedent.

Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgement by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi

In Yogendra Sah vs.The State Of Biha (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 17-page long judgement dated April 20, 2026 wherein, he concluded: "The prosecution case thus rests predominantly on the testimony of official witnesses without any credible independent corroboration, and the non-production of the alleged seized contraband as a material exhibit further creates a serious lacuna in the chain of evidence. In such circumstances, the mere availability of the F.S.L. Report cannot be treated as conclusive proof either of the recovery or of the nature of the substance allegedly seized, and in the absence of reliable evidence establishing the factum of recovery, its evidentiary value stands considerably diminished, thereby creating a serious doubt in the prosecution case, as a result of which this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. 21. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 22. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 12-09-2013 and order of sentence dated 16-09-2013 passed by the learned 1st. Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi in GR No. 3297 of 2009 / TR No. 07 of 2013, arising out of Sonbarsa P.S. Case No. 136 of 2009 is hereby set aside."

The judgement reads:"...the appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him."

The appeal was filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated September 12, 2013 and order of sentence dated September 16, 2013 passed by the 1st. Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi in GR No. 3297 of 2009 / TR No. 07 of 2013, arising out of Sonbarsa P.S. Case No. 136 of 2009, whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 4 (four) years along with a fine of Rs.20,000/. 

Justice Singh relied upon para nos. 6 and 7 of Supreme Court's judgment in Gorakh Nath Prasad vs. State of Bihar reported in (2018) 2 SCC 305, to observe that "the non-production of the seized material is therefore considered fatal to the prosecution case." He added:"17. It is well settled law that although the NDPS Act envisages a reverse burden of proof, it is well settled that the prosecution must, in the first instance, establish the foundational facts by leading cogent and reliable evidence in strict compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions governing search, seizure and recovery. It is only upon such initial burden being duly discharged that the onus shifts upon the accused. Mere registration of a case under the Act does not ipso facto operate to shift the burden at the threshold. Having regard to the stringent nature of the statute, the evidence on record warrants strict scrutiny, and where the prosecution fails to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of such doubt must enure to the accused/appellant." 

Justice Singh observed:"18. It appears that, all the prosecution witnesses examined in the present case are official witnesses belonging to the S.S.B., and there is a complete absence of reliable independent evidence with regard to the alleged recovery. It would, therefore, be unsafe to base a conviction solely on their testimony, especially in the absence of corroboration. Significantly, the alleged contraband (ganja) was neither produced before the Trial Court nor marked as a material exhibit, and no plausible explanation has been furnished for such non-production. Consequently, there is no cogent material on record to establish a nexus between the substance allegedly seized and the samples sent for forensic examination. In such circumstances, question arises whether the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. 

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava set aside verdict by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Vaishali in POCSO case

In Md. Alam vs.The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 21-page long judgement dated April 20, 2026 wherein, it conclude that "....the presumption contained under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act would not be attracted." The informant/ victim boy (PW-1) "cannot be put in the category of a sterling witness for the obvious reasons showing huge contradiction in his statement. In a case under the POCSO Act, the presumption of innocence is not lost." For these reasons, the Court set aside the  judgment of conviction dated April 25, 2023 and order of sentence dated May 15, 2023 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Vaishali at Hajipur in POCSO case of 2021 which arose out of Mahua P.S. case of 2021. The appellant was acquitted of the charges giving him benefit of doubt. The appellant was said to be in custody. Justice Parsad authored the judgement. The Court directed to be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case .The appeal was allowed. 

Justice Prasad observed:"The prosecution has not disclosed the date of birth of the victim boy recorded in his first school admission register. No ossification and dental test of the victim has been conducted to assess his age. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the victim would come within the definition of the word “child” as envisaged under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act." 

The appeal was preferred for setting aside the judgment of conviction. The appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 377/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. By the order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty (20) years with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten (10) years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- under Section 377/34 IPC, he was to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.

The prosecution case is based on the written information dated February 26, 2021 submitted by the informant/ victim boy (PW-1). In his written information, he stated that on  February 24, 2021 at about 06:30 AM in the morning, when he was sitting at the shop of Sunny Kumar and Golu Patel situated near Sahara India Office at Mahua Bazar, Samastipur Road, two persons came there and enquired from Sunny Kumar about the victim boy. On which Sunny Kumar told them that he was a good-mannered boy and was in search of some work due to his poor financial condition. Thereafter, these two persons told the victim to accompany them, they will provide him money, food and good clothes. They also said that he has to discharge their household work and assured him that he will be given opportunity for further study. Thereafter, Golu Patel told the victim boy to accompany them as they were known to Golu Patel. Those two accused persons were Ranjeet Patel and Md. Alam (this appellant). The victim boy along with two accused persons came at the house of Md. Alam on their motorcycle. Both of them told him to have food and go to sleep. He was trying to sleep, however, was not able to sleep. In the meantime, he saw that both of them started sipping alcohol from a bottle after pouring in glass and thereafter, he fell asleep. In the late night, he felt that somebody has opened his pants and trying to insert something through his anus which was painful. Thereafter, he woke up and saw that both the accused persons were naked and were doing unnatural sexual offence with him. He tried to prevent them but they threatened him to kill if he raised the alarm. These two accused persons committed unnatural sexual offence with the victim boy one by one by pressing his mouth. Thereafter, they put their clothes on and also told him to wear his clothes and threatened him not to disclose this to anyone, otherwise he will be killed. 

Thereafter, in the morning of  February 25, 2021 at about 09:30AM, both the accused persons left him on their motorcycle at the shop of Golu Patel. He felt the pain for the whole day but in the evening when he could not bear the pain, he disclosed about the said incident to his nearby neighbours and members of his family. He was taken to Mahua Sub-Divisional Hospital for treatment. Later on, he was referred to Sadar Hospital, Hajipur for better treatment. He was told to inform the concerned police station. On the basis of this written information, FIR being Mahua P.S. Case No. 162 of 2021 dated March 5, 2021 was registered
under Section 377 IPC amd Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act against (1) Sunny Kumar, (2) Golu Patel, (3) Ranjeet Patel and (4) Md. Alam (this appellant). After investigation, police submitted chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 817 of 2021 dated December 10, 2021 against Md. Alam for the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. 

The trial court by its order dated December 16, 2021 took cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act against Md. Alam. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant in Hindi to which he denied the charges and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges were framed vide order dated January 24, 2022 for the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.. In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses and got exhibited certain documents.  Thereafter, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. In this 313 CrPC statement, he pleaded innocence and stated that Prem Shankar and Uday Shankar had already registered case against him and they again implicated him in the this case. The Defence produced three witnesses and exhibited some documentary evidences. 

The trial court having examined the entire prosecution evidences found that the emphasis of defence regarding false implication due to previous enmity cannot be a ground to discard the witnesses' evidence if such evidence is found to be reliable while upholding conviction of an accused.

On the point of alibi taken by the defence, trial court took note of the argument of the defence counsel that at the time of occurrence, the accused being an Advocate was busy in court for preparing the filing of the bail bond and on the other hand, the learned counsel submitted that the accused was at the High Court, Patna at Mazar to join the tajposhi from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm. The trial court observed that it was highly
unbelievable that a person who is an Advocate was present at three places of surroundings of 20-30 kms at the same time. 

The High Court observed that the trial court negated the submission of defence counsel regarding contradiction on the point of age of the victim boy by referring the fact that no documentary evidence was brought on record regarding the education of the victim boy as the victim boy is from very poor family and is not a school going student and his mother is rustic. The trial court took note of injury report of the victim which suggested that the victim boy was minor and concerned medical expert being PW-2 found
the case of sexual assault. The trial court found that since the accused facing trial was accused in another case also, there was no reason of false implication of the accused by another person of poor and from a Scheduled Caste family of the vicinity.

The trial court observed that on the ground of minor contradictions, the evidences of prosecution witnesses cannot be ignored, the version of the occurrence as alleged and the medical examination with the opinion of suspected case of sexual assault cannot be put outside on the ground of minor contradictions or on the ground of previous enmity. Accordingly, the trial court found that the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused under Sections 377/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The High Court noted that there is a delay of 9 days in lodging of the FIR. The application gave rise to the present FIR was signed by the victim boy, but it is his admission that the application was written by a person who met him in the Sadar Hospital at Hajipur and to whom he had explained the whole occurrence. According to the victim boy, the person was a general person and he could not give the name of the person who wrote the application. A perusal of the deposition of the victim boy (PW-1) showed that he claimed to have posted the application in the post office, but in paragraph ‘26’ of his deposition, PW-1 claimed that he had complained in the police station on 26th. In paragraph ‘21’, he claimed that he had alone gone to the police station. This statement of PW-1 created doubt as to who wrote the written application. The doubt goes deeper when the High Court found that his mother (PW-3) claimed that she had taken her victim boy to the police station at Mahua and she also said that the application was written by Darogaji. She also stated that Darogaji had recorded her statement 8 days after lodgment of the case. If the statement of PW-3 is examined, it was found that she claims to have come to know about the occurrence from her son on the next day of the occurrence in the morning, but the victim (PW-1) stated that on February 25, 2021, he had alone gone to Mahua hospital. PW-2 recorded the time of examination of PW-1 as 7.25 pm. His parents were not with him, therefore, the statement of PW-3 that she had come to know about the occurrence on the next day in the morning was not a reliable statement. PW-3 stated that she had taken the victim boy to Government Hospital, Manjhaul, whereas the victim boy says that he had alone gone to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Mahua. 

The High Court's judgement reads: "In our opinion, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 are not only contradicting each other, they are contradicting themselves also on various aspects. 25. This Court further finds that the learned trial court has itself recorded in its finding that “if the submissions of learned defence counsel is evaluated, the evidences on the point of age of the victim boy is contradictory….” Despite this, the learned trial court did not think it just and proper to determine the age of the victim in accordance with the scheme of Section 94 of the Act of 2015. 26. We have noticed hereinabove in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that how the age of the victim boy has not been disclosed by the prosecution in course of trial and the I.O. (PW-5) himself stated that he had not conducted
any verification on the age of the victim. In section 164 CrPC Statement, the victim is said to be studying in Class VIII but in course of trial, he has stated that he has studied up to Class IV....27. This Court further finds that the victim had gone to Mahua Hospital with 6-7 persons. PW-2 has stated so but the victim claims that he had gone alone. It is, thus, evident that the victim has been tutored not to disclose names of those 6-7 persons who were with him in the Mahua Hospital. Those 6-7 persons had said to PW-2 that they were from the neighbourhood of the victim and they cannot give consent. This makes the whole case
suspicious.  28. PW-2 has stated that he had not examined the source of the blood stain. He had referred the victim boy to Sadar Hospital, Hajipur but the victim had not received treatment in Sadar Hospital, Hajipur. The age of injury has been mentioned as within 6 hours and the doctor has noticed fresh blood but in course of his cross-examination, PW-2 has clearly stated that the blood would clot if the injury is on the upper part, within 3-4 minutes, he had not found any bruise around the anus. PW-2 has clearly stated that he had not made any statement before police. He had not examined the source of the blood stain, therefore, in our opinion,'

The judgement  recorded: "30. We have further noticed that in this case, the police officer Krishnanand Jha, who had drawn the formal FIR, has not been examined." 

Justice Prasad observed:"The prosecution has not disclosed the date of birth of the victim boy recorded in his first school admission register. No ossification and dental test of the victim has been conducted to assess his age. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the victim would come within the definition of the word “child” as envisaged under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act." 

Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section challenges orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas, directing attachment of Office of the Collector, Rohtas

Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section has challenged the order by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas, directing attachment of Office of the Collector, Rohtas in the Patna High Court and other orders. The case Shashi Shankar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Anr. is listed for April 21, 2026. The Respondents no. 2 is Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. 

 

The petition raises following question of law and facts as to i) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can impose personal liability upon a government officer who is not a party to the proceedings?; ii) Whether recovery of an award can be directed to Collector without issuance of certificate by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas to Collector under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act?; ii) Whether a  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can direct salary deduction and service-book entry against a government officer who is not party to proceeding?; iv) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can order salary deduction and service-book entry of officer who is not party to proceeding?; v) Whether adverse remarks can be recorded against a person without giving him an opportunity of hearing; vi) Whether adverse remarks can be recorded without hearing the affected officer?; vii) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has any supervisory or disciplinary jurisdiction over a District Collector or petitioner?; viii) Whether recovery under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be initiated without issuance of a statutory recovery certificate?; ix) Whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas can impose fine or penalty on an executive authority in absence of express statutory power?; x) Whether such action violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers?; xi) Whether order passed by respondent is arbitrary, illegal, ultra vires,void ab initio and unconstitutional?; xii) Whether collector can be compelled to recover award amount even though details of assets of decree debtor has not been provided to collector?; and xiii) Whether collector can be coerced to deposit  fine/penalty/cost from her salary?

 

The petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders dated 22.01.2026 and 17.02.2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas in Execution Case No. 01/2014, expunging all adverse remarks recorded against the petitioner in the orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. The petition prays for setting aside of the direction imposing ₹10,000 penalty, salary deduction, entry in service book and registration of criminal miscellaneous case. It prays for removal of the observations contained in the orders which may affect the service career of the petitioner and for declaring that the  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to issue show-cause notice or impose penalty upon the petitioner. It seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the show-cause notice issued by  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. 

 

The petitioner prays for quashing the order dated February 17, 2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas imposing fine of ₹10,000/- as adjournment cost upon the petitioner and directing deduction of fine from salary, directing entry in service book and directing registration of criminal miscellaneous case;  It prays for quashing the order dated December 23, 2025 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas  imposing fine of ₹10,000/- upon the Collector, Rohtas. It seeks quashing the order dated January 22, 2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas passing adverse remarks against the petitioner. The petitioner declares that the  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to issue show-cause notice or impose penalty upon the petitioner.  

 

The petition seeks a declaration that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to attach office of the Collector and direct department proceeding and disciplinary action against Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas and seeks imposition of cost on Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. The petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas from taking any coercive action against the petitioner and the Collector. The petition seeks interim stay of the orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas during pendency of the writ petition. 

 

The writ petition no. 6117 of 2026 filed by Dr. Gopal Krishna, the advocate for the petitioner in the High Court on March 31, 2026.  

In Branch Manager (The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.) vs. Sanjay Kumar Gupta (2026) Execution Case No. 01/2014, CIS No. - 03/2014, the Court of Anil Kumar, District and Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Rohtas at Sasaram passed an order dated April 21, 2026 which records that writ petition no. 6117 of 2026 is pending in the High Court. Notably, the judge is Respondent no. 2 in the writ petition. In the Court of Anil Kumar, District and Additional Sessions Judge-IV it was submitted that since the Court itself is a party in the writ petition in the High Court, further proceedings ought to await the decision of the High Court. 

It is apparent that the District and Additional Sessions Judge-IV-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas at Sasaram is acting without factoring in the pending proceedings in the High Court. Instead of waiting for the outcome of the writ petition in High Court, it has issued show cause notice to Collector, Rohtas asking her to explain as to why the trial Court should not recommend contempt proceedings to the High Court. The trial Court has fixed April 28, 2026 for further proceedings.