"Trust the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar can to create a dispute when there exists none":Patna High Court

 "The other problem is that the State's capacity to litigate can outmatch even the richest conglomerate. If the state loses a case, at any level, it will appeal, and keep doing that till the Supreme Court. It could be an increment of 100 Rs given to a mali in a government department or a pension of 300 Rs to a widow of the deceased government servant. Everything has to be appealed. And if the private individual succeeds there is no guarantee that the government will accept and comply with the court order."

-Dr S Muralidhar, Senior Advocate and former High Court Chief Justice in his 28th DS Borker Memorial Lecture on the Vision of India 2047

"Trust the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar to create a dispute when there exists none. The situation in hand is a classic example of the State in its Finance Department litigating at its lowest level. The response of the Finance Department, Government of Bihar to the issues raised herein, in fact, borders on contempt for the Finance Department thinks that it is above law and has a right to maintain an opinion which is in conflict with the judicial verdicts."

-Justice Jyoti Saran in Binit Kumar & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2017) in August 21, 2017, Patna High Court  

The State of Bihar is not amenable to any settlement in this matter and the learned counsel for the State prays to list the matter before regular Court. 2. Let the matter be listed before regular Court on the date already fixed i.e., 18.09.2026.

-Supreme Court's order dated August 23, 2026 in The State of Bihar vs. Biresh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2026) which is tagged with SLP No. 4912/2024 before Supreme Court' Special Lok Adalat [Samadhan Samaroh)

Principal Secretary, Finance Department, Bihar "has the audacity to term the judgment of the Division Bench" of Patna High Court in The State of Bihar vs. Ram Janam Jha & Ors L.P.A. No. 206 of 2014, as "per incuriam" 

In The State of Bihar vs. Biresh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanatha and Arun Palli passed an order dated August 3, 2026, which reads: "5. Till further orders, status quo as on 09.03.2026 shall be maintained insofar as the pay and emoluments received by the respondents are concerned. 6. In the absence of the stay of the impugned judgment by this Court, the State cannot reduce the pay. 7. We are told that pursuant to the judgment, the parity in pay was granted to the correspondence clerks along with the accounts clerks in terms of pay. Only by order/letter of 10.03.2026 issued by petitioners, the State has reduced the pay. 8. We direct that the State will restore the status quo as it obtained on 09.03.2026. 9. Needless to say that these directions are subject to final outcome of the matter."Navaniti Prasad Singh, is the senior counsel for the applicants, who are respondents in the main matter. The State of Bihar has challenged the final judgment dated September 19, 2023 in LPA No.766/2019 (Biresh Kumar Singh case) and LPA No.762/2019 (Sanjay Kumar's case) passed by the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court issued notice on June 27, 2024. 

By its 2-page long order dated February 16, 2024, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal stayed the proceedings of the Contempt Petition MJC No.2663 of 2019 Bihar State Road And Building Construction Employees Union Gope Group & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. pending before the Patna High Court. 

In Bihar State Road And Building Construction Employees Union Gope Group & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. MJC No.2663 of 2019, Justice Mohit Kumar Shah of the High Court passed a 2-page long order dated January 25, 2024, wherein, the order reads:"1. Though the learned counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that the order of this Court dated 27.02.2019, passed in CWJC No.13644 of 2016 and other analogous cases has been challenged by filing an appeal bearing LPA No.764 of 2019 and other analogous cases, however, the learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the same has stood dismissed by a judgment dated 19.09.2023, passed by a learned Division Bench of this Court. 2. In such view of the matter, the learned counsel for the opposite parties seeks and is granted four weeks’ time for complying with the aforesaid order dated 27.02.2019, failing which it is submitted that the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna shall be present in the Court so that contempt proceeding can be initiated against him for creating hindrance in the administration of justice. 3. List this case on 29th February, 2024." On March 20, 2024, the contempt case was listed before Justice Rajiv Roy. Upon hearing  I.A. No. 01 of 2024, Justice Roy passed a 4-page long order March 20, 2024. The order reads:"2. Pursuant to the last order passed by the co-ordinate bench, an Interlocutory Application No. 01 of 2024 has been preferred by the Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna with a prayer which read as follows:-“(i) exemption of his personal appearance in the Court as directed by the Hon’ble in the present contempt petition in the order dated 25.01.2024; (ii) for adjourning the present contempt application for consideration after disposal of SLP (C) No. 3335 of 2024 (The State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Biresh Kumar Singh and Ors.) and analogous matters by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” It added: "3. Learned State Counsel has taken this Court to paragraph- 6 which read as follows:- “ That it is respectfully stated and submitted that the State Government thereafter filed special leave petition in the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Diary No. 4071/2024 in L.P.A. No. 764 of 2019. The said S.L.P. was taken up for adjudication on 16.02.2024 by Hon’ble Supreme Court along with SLP (C ) No. 3335 of 2024 (filed in L.P.A. No. 766 of 2019) and analogous cases and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to issue notice to the respondents and has been pleased to stay the further proceedings of the M.J.C. No. 2663 of 2019 pending before this Hon’ble Court.” 4. In view of the aforesaid facts, both the prayers of I.A. No. 01 of 2024 stands allowed. 5. I.A. No. 01 of 2024 stands disposed of. M.J.C. No. 2663 of 2019 Let the matter come up after the disposal of SLP (C) No. 3335 of 2024."   

In The State Of Bihar vs. Lachhaman Kumar & Ors. (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 25-page long judgement dated September 19, 2023, wherein, it concluded:"....we are surprised that an appeal is filed for the purpose of denying pay parity to persons identically situated.....13. We hence reject the appeals leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs." Referring to the Letter No. 3A-2-V.P.-09/2016-5838/V of the Finance Department of Government of Bihar dated June 22, 2022, the High Court stated that it "indicates a complete, absolute and wholesome identity between the Accounts Clerks and the Correspondence Clerks." 

The appeals filed by the State of Bihar challenged the 14-page long judgement dated February 27, 2019 by Justice Madhuresh Prasad, the Single Judge, which has allowed the writ petitions granting parity of pay to Correspondence Clerks as is available to the Accounts Clerks; both appointed on compassionate grounds. The Single Judge had relied on a 50-page long judgment by Justice Jyoti Saran dated August 21, 2017 of a Co-ordinate Bench in Binit Kumar & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2017) and analogous cases. The Single Judge, in the cited decision, had relied on a Patna High Court's Division Bench's 3-page long judgment dated August 24, 2016 in The State of Bihar vs. Ram Janam Jha & Ors L.P.A. No. 206 of 2014, which was authored by Justice Hemant Gupta. Justice Gupta led Division bench had concluded:"We find that once the distinction between the Junior and Senior Accounts Clerk has been done away with and that all Accounts Clerks have been granted pay scale as that of Senior Accounts Clerk, therefore, all accounts clerks, whether appointed on compassionate ground or otherwise are entitled to same pay scale i.e., pay scale meant for the Senior Accounts Clerk."

The Government Advocate Sarvesh Kumar Singh (AAG-13) had argued that the Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks are persons existing in different cadres for which different pay-scales are applicable. It was also contended that the qualifications for appointment in the two posts are different; the Correspondence Clerks were required to possess Matriculation with typing while the Accounts Clerks are required to possess Matriculation with Mathematics. He specifically referred to an extract of the recommendation of the Pay Fixation Committee to point out that the pay fixation was made specifically reckoning the fact that originally Mathematics was not an essential subject in Matriculation. He also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in S.C. Chandra & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 279 to contend that there is no complete and wholesale identity between the two posts and even if they are doing identical work, they cannot be granted equal pay unless there is such complete and wholesale identity established. 

Senior Counsel Sanjay Singh and Chitranjan Sinha and counsel Shri Subodh Kumar Jha and Abhinav Srivastava argued for the respondents who were the writ-petitioners. It was pointed out that there could have been no Matriculation without Mathematics as is presently understood and as would be applicable to the Matriculation qualification obtained by all the respondents. The decision in Binit Kumar's case squarely applies. There was severe criticism of the Finance Department by the Single Judge in the aforesaid judgment for having taken a skewed view of the binding precedent in Ram Janam Jha. It was also pointed out that discrimination was meted out only on account of the source of appointment being from families of employees who died in harness; which identity gets effaced as soon as they get appointed to the post. Reliance was also placed on the decision taken by the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar dated June 22, 2022.

In Binit Kumar & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2017), Justice Jyoti Saran observed:"In what could have been disposed of by the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar as well as the Controlling Authorities of the petitioners herein, in the light of the issues settled by the Division Bench of this Court rendered in LPA No.206 of 2014 (The State of Bihar Vs. Ram Janam Jha and others) and despite the fact that the State has lost its challenge up to the Supreme Court to the issue so settled by the Division Bench yet the arrogance of the State in its Finance Department is reflective from the response where the deponent Under Secretary, Finance Department on the authorization of the Principal Secretary, Finance Department, has the audacity to term the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Ram Janam Jha (supra), per incuriam, without having the least of the knowledge what the term means and whether he has the jurisdiction and authority to opine as such. It is this brazen response of the State in its Finance Department which has necessitated a discussion on the issue which otherwise could have been well disposed of by two line order in the light of the opinion already expressed by the Division Bench in the case of Ram Janam Jha (supra) inasmuch as the relief so prayed stands covered by the said opinion." It is recorded in the 50-page long judgement dated August 21, 2017 by Justice Saran that Siya Ram Shahi had led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners and Ashok Kumar Dubey, Assisting Counsel to Additional Advocate General No.11 had led the argument for the State in reference to the counter affidavit filed in CWJC No.9921 of 2017. Ravi Mittal was the principal secretary, finance, Bihar during May 2015-2018. 

Chief Justice Vinod Chandran headed Division bench looked at the history of the litigation, to observe that "The admitted facts are that the respondents herein were appointed on compassionate ground and were continuing as Correspondence Clerks. The petitioners in Binit Kumar were also persons who were appointed on compassionate ground, but as Accounts Clerks. There is absolutely nothing to substantiate the contention now raised by the State that there were different qualifications prescribed for Accounts Clerks and Correspondence Clerks." The Bench underlined that "Annexure-1, pointed out from the Interlocutory Application of the respondent State, supports the claim raised by the writ-petitioners, the respondents herein." 

The petitioners, as was the case of Accounts Clerks, were appointed in the pay-scale of Rs. 3050-4590/-, which scale was upgraded by a resolution of the Finance Department dated March 25, 2015; which stood cancelled in the light of a subsequent Advisory dated July 11, 2016 issued by the Finance Department. The reasoning in the Advisory cancelling the grant of higher scale of pay was in so far as the upgradation in scale not being applicable to those appointed on compassionate grounds. The Single Judge in the cited judgment of Binit Kumar referred to the unification of posts and merger of cadre made in the clerical cadre of the Government employees. The Junior Accounts Clerk and the Senior Accounts Clerk posts were unified and the post was designated as an Accounts Clerk. Likewise, the Lower Division Clerk and the Upper Division Clerk were also unified to be designated as Clerk in the year 1980-81. When such unification was made, the Senior Accounts Clerk had a pay-scale of Rs. 260-408/- while the unified post of Clerk had a pay-scale of Rs. 284-372/-. Again, a decision was taken to unify the accounts clerical cadre as well as normal clerical cadre which was later, in the year 2000, de-merged. It is this process of merger and de-merger that led to a chain of litigations on the anomaly arising in the fixation of pay. 

The judgement recorded that the Finance Department of State Government came out with a resolution dated March 25, 2015 referring to another letter dated September 28, 1999 from the very same department which classified the appointments in the Accounts Clerical Cadre in two categories; those appointed between May 1, 1980 to September 27, 1999 and the other after September 28, 1999. Admittedly, the Accounts Clerks who had challenged the cancellation of the upgradation was appointed after September 28, 1999 and so are the respondents herein who are the Correspondence Clerks. Referring to the resolution of 2015, it was held that the persons appointed to the Accounts Clerical Cadre, whether they be appointed initially as a Junior Accounts Clerk, Lower Division Accounts Clerk or a Lower Division Clerk (Accounts), would be entitled to the same scale of pay i.e. Rs. 4000-6000/- with effect from December 31, 2005 and to the scale in Pay Band-1 with Grade Pay of Rs. 2400/- with effect from January 1, 2006. It was categorically found by the Single Judge in Binit Kumar that when earlier an attempt was made by the State Government in its Finance Department to deny the scale admissible to similarly placed Clerks in the Accounts Cadre; the litigation initiated, resulted in the decision of the Division Bench in Ram Janam Jha. It was categorically held by the Division Bench that: “Once the distinction between the Junior and Senior Accounts Clerk has been done away with and all Accounts Clerks have been granted pay scale as that of Senior Accounts Clerk, then all Accounts Clerks, whether appointed on compassionate ground or otherwise, are entitled to the same pay-scale i.e., pay-sale meant for the Senior Accounts Clerks’(sic). It is the very same proposition which is urged by the respondents herein to enable identical pay-scales to be granted to them, thus ensuring pay parity between the Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks.

Chief Justice Chandran observed that the decision in S.C. Chandra's case "was in the context of parity in salary claimed by School Teachers with Clerks working under the Government of Jharkhand or BCCL; in which context it was found that there is no complete and wholesale identity between the two groups. It was declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that merely because the nature of work is the same, irrespective of educational qualification, mode of appointment, experience and other relevant factors, the principle of ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ cannot apply. We do not find any application of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the present case." Government counsel cited an irrelevant judgement. He added: "9. Admittedly, the Correspondence Clerks, the writ-petitioners in the present case and the Accounts Clerks who were the petitioners in Binit Kumar, were appointed on compassionate grounds. The State has not produced anything to establish that in granting appointment on compassionate ground the dependents were classified on the basis of their qualification and thus given appointments to the posts of Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks, based on their different qualifications. We would, for argument’s sake, reckon the submission of the learned AAG-13 that as far as Accounts Clerks are concerned, there was an insistence for Matriculation with Mathematics. As was rightly pointed out by the respondents, Matriculation without Mathematics, at least for the past few decades, is not known to have existed. Even Annexure-1 speaks of ‘originally’, Mathematics being not an essential subject in Matriculation; but does not refer to the period when such Matriculation was in vogue. Having thus said, it has to be emphasized that there is nothing produced to substantiate that there were different qualifications applicable to Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks. It has also to be pertinently noticed that when appointments are made on compassionate grounds, especially to a cadre, there cannot be any discrimination by appointing certain persons to a post with lower scale of pay and others to a post with higher scale of pay; which would have been possible only if there is a requirement of a higher qualification for the post which carries a higher pay-scale."  

The judgement reads: "We are conscious of the fact that as of now the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that appointments on compassionate grounds can only be to the lowest cadre; but the practice was otherwise, earlier. The contention of the State of two different essential qualifications being applicable, is not established and hence fails. 10. We have to emphasize and reiterate that once the dependents are appointed on compassionate grounds in a post where there is also regular recruitment; there can be no discrimination in so far as pay-scale applicable, from those regularly appointed."

 

Two poems: “Decline” by T.B.P. Owen, and “Wake Up, Comrades” by Gautam Chattopadhyaya

Two poems: “Decline” by T.B.P. Owen, and “Wake Up, Comrades” by Gautam Chattopadhyaya published in No Pasaran: They Shall Not Pass, an anti-Fascist bulletin, Volume I, edited by Manoranjan Majumdar and Prodyat Mukherjee,  July 25, 1942. The poems reflect the period’s strong anti-Fascist sentiment and call for collective resistance against oppression. 

Source: Home, Political, I, 1943, Fn. No. 12/I/ KW II/ 1943.

Bombay Bar Association disapproves of the conduct of Manan Kumar Mishra as Chairman, BCI, seeks his resignation

In a statement dated August 18, 2020, Bombay Bar Association has strongly disapproved the conduct of Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman, Bar Council of India.  The text of statement is as under: 

STATEMENT TO CONDEMN ACTIONS OF MR. MANAN KUMAR MISHRA, CHAIRMAN, BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA [Approved at the Meeting of the "Standing Committee of the Bombay Bar Association" (Bombay Bar Association) held on 17 and 18 August 2026 through video conferencing] 

The Bombay Bar Association has taken note of the unilateral action of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman, Bar Council of India, regarding issuance of letter dated 13 August 2026 bearing no. BCI:D:5449/2026. By this letter, Vice-Chancellor, NALSAR was directed to submit a report and the State Bar Councils were directed not to enroll students of NALSAR, who are passing out in the batch of 2026. This communication was modified by another communication bearing no. BCI:D:5450/2026, also dated 13 August 2026 whereby the action proposed against the students of the said law college was dropped but the direction to NALSAR to carry out inquiry was retained. The communication bearing no. BCI:D:5450/2026 records that it is issued with approval of the Council. In a tweet by Mr. Mishra issued at 00:37 hrs on 14 August 2026, it was stated by Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra that "Bar Council of India has decided to close the proceedings altogether. No further action is required @NALSAR_Official."

The Bombay Bar Association notes that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is seized of the matter arising from the unfortunate events, which have arisen on account of actions of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra and the matter is now sub-judice. Meanwhile, Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra has issued a letter dated 15 August 2026 which is in the nature of an apology.

The Bombay Bar Association stands by the decision of the Bar Council of India, to close the proceedings altogether, as a step in the right direction and a step which restores the faith in the institution of the Bar Council of India, in whom we continue to repose our faith.

The Standing Committee has at its meetings held on 17 and 18 August 2026 deliberated the aforesaid developments which have taken place from 13 August 2026 to 15 August 2026 and it is expedient to record the following: 

A) The office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, is undoubtedly an important position. Higher the position, greater the responsibility. The contents of the communication dated 13 August 2026 (BCI:D:5449/2026) issued by Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman of Bar Council of India, were a direct attempt by the Learned Chairman to cause grave prejudice to the professional careers of students of NALSAR (Passing out batch of 2026). Such communication was uncalled for and reflects that the Learned Chairman took an extreme step against the students, without regard to the principles governing the right to protest and freedom of speech and expression. A large section of the students were condemned unheard. The issuance of the said communication by Mr. Mishra, is an abuse by him of the office of the Chairman, Bar Council of India. 

B) It is a matter of deepest anguish that Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, Senior Advocate, has while occupying the post as Chairman of the Bar Council of India, indulged in issuing Orders and directions against the law students of NALSAR (Passing out batch of 2026), which do not fall within the purview of the Bar Council of India. Such actions of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, are strongly condemned. We remain thankful to the Bar Council of India, for having reversed the order dated 13 August 2026, passed by Mr. Mishra against the law students. 

C) The issuance of an apology by Mr. Mishra on 15 August 2026 is clearly belated and nothing but an attempt to merely assuage the situation, when by his conduct, Mr. Mishra has failed to uphold the dignity of the legal profession, constitutional freedoms and the principles of fairness and natural justice, while occupying the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India. The apology sought to be tendered by Mr. Mishra, however, cannot be considered as an expression of true remorse, since he continues to hold the position as Chairman despite his conduct, when in the fitness of things, he ought to have already resigned.

Venkatesh Dhond Vice-President 

Nitin Thakker President

Naushad Engineer Honorary Secretary 

Bar Council of India (BCI) Chairman has appointed family members and relatives in the BCI without any advertisement: Y.R. Sada­s­iva Reddy, co-chairman, BCI

In a six-page let­ter dated August 22 by senior advoc­ate Y.R. Sada­s­iva Reddy, co-chairman, BCI has made sev­eral alleg­a­tions con­cern­ing the cre­ation of BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST, the trans­fer of around ₹150 crore from BCI funds to the trust has been made. He made allegation regarding demands for con­tri­bu­tions from law col­leges as “con­tri­bu­tions” to the PEARL-FIRST trust, and the hand­ling of funds gen­er­ated through the All-India Bar Exam­in­a­tion (AIBE). The insti­tu­tional con­tro­versy sur­round­ing the cre­ation of BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST and alleg­a­tions that the ori­ginal BCI Trust was rendered defunct. He alleged that the audit reports of the PEARL-FIRST trust has never been placed before a meet­ing of the BCI since the trust’s incep­tion in 2020. The ori­ginal BCI Trust wan cre­ated in 1974. It was allowed to fall into dis­use dur­ing his ten­ure and was replaced by BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST, whose trust­ees, he alleged, were chosen by him.

The text of the letter is as under: 

To,

Shri Manan Kumar Mishra,
Senior Advocate,
Chairman, Bar Council of India,
21, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area,
Near Bal Bhavan, New Delhi 110 002.

Sub: Demand for your immediate resignation from the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, and for an independent enquiry into the matters set out herein - regarding.

Sir,

I address this communication to you not as an adversary, but as an elected Member of the Bar Council of India, presently holding the office of Co- Chairman, and as a member of this profession for over three decades. I do so with considerable anguish, and only after long reflection, having satisfied myself that silence on my part would amount to a dereliction of the trust reposed in me by the advocates of this country.

The Bar Council of India is not the personal estate of any individual. It is a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, holding funds contributed by lakhs of advocates and exercising regulatory power over the entry of every young person into this profession. Every rupee it holds is held in trust. Every power it exercises is a power conferred by Parliament for the benefit of the Bar, and not for the benefit of the person who happens to occupy the Chair. 

It is my considered view, formed on the basis of what I have myself witnessed in the meetings of this Council, that under your Chairmanship the Council has drifted very far from that standard. I therefore call upon you, in the plainest terms, to tender your resignation from the office of Chairman of the Bar Council of India forthwith. My reasons are set out below.

GROUNDS ON WHICH YOUR RESIGNATION IS DEMANDED

I. Appointments to the establishment of the Council made without any transparent process of recruitment
Through the whole of my tenure as a Member of this Council, I proceeded on the assumption that appointments to the establishment of the Bar Council of India were made after due advertisement, due scrutiny of qualifications, and due observance of the norms binding upon a statutory body. I never had occasion to question it, because I never imagined it could be otherwise. On examining the list of persons presently employed by the Council, together with their particulars, I find a pattern that no responsible Member can overlook. A striking proportion of the staff are persons connected to you personally, several of them being members of, or related to, your own family. I am unable to find, in any record placed before this Council, a single advertisement, a single selection committee proceeding, or a single comparative merit list justifying these appointments.

II. The rendering defunct of the Bar Council of India Trust and the diversion of Council funds to a newly created trust
The Bar Council of India Trust was an institution of standing. It was the body through which this Council discharged its historic contribution to legal education in this country, including the founding of the National Law School of India at Bengaluru. That Trust was, over a period, allowed to fall into disuse. It did not become defunct by accident.
In its place, a new trust styled "BCI Trust PEARL First" came to be registered on 17.09.2020, with trustees of your choosing. Thereafter, a resolution was moved in this Council for the transfer of a sum of the order of Rs. 150 crores of the funds of the Bar Council of India to that newly created trust. I placed my opposition to that resolution on record at the time, as did certain other Members. Our objection was overridden. The transfer went through. Distinguished persons, including sitting and former Judges, were thereafter associated with the trust, lending it a respectability that the manner of its creation does not deserve.

The funds of the Bar Council of India are the contributions of ordinary advocates, most of them in the district courts, most of them struggling. I know of no provision of the Advocates Act, 1961 which permits the corpus of a statutory regulator to be transferred to a private trust registered by its own Chairman. None of the members of the Bar Council have ever seen a copy of the Trust Deed.

III. Contributions demanded from law colleges seeking approval or renewal of approval
Persistent and credible complaints have reached me, from more than one State, that managements of new law colleges approaching the Bar Council of India for approval, and managements of existing colleges approaching it for renewal, are being required to make "contributions" to the said trust, in amounts ranging from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore. If this is correct and I have received nothing from your office to indicate that it is not it is a matter of the utmost gravity. The power of approval and renewal under the Advocates Act and the Rules of Legal Education is a regulatory power. It is not a licence to raise funds. A regulator that receives money from the entity it regulates, in temporal proximity to the decision it must take on that entity, has destroyed the very foundation of its own authority. The consequence is visible in the state of legal education in this country: colleges that ought never to have been approved continue year after year, and thousands of young persons are sold a degree that equips them for nothing.

IV. Key positions in institutions run by the Council held by persons of your own family

The same pattern extends to the educational institution or institutions established and run under the aegis of the Council and the said trust. Persons occupying key administrative positions there are, once again, drawn from your family. The purpose for which such an institution was established was never explained to this Council in any meaningful terms, nor was any feasibility study, budget or governance structure ever placed before us for deliberation.

I may add that the very propriety of the Bar Council of India simultaneously regulating law colleges and operating one of its own has now been questioned before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. That such a question should arise at all is a measure of how far institutional propriety has been allowed to erode.

V. The direction issued against the graduating batch of NALSAR University of Law, without any material being placed before the Council 

On 13.08.2026, a communication was issued from your office directing the State Bar Councils not to enrol, until further orders, the graduating batch. of 2026 of the NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. It was accompanied by observations questioning the fitness of those students to enter this. profession. The occasion was a representation by some students of that University concerning the invitation extended to a distinguished guest for their convocation that is to say, the expression of an opinion.

That direction was issued without the material being placed before the Bar Council of India, without the Council deliberating upon it, and without any resolution of this Council authorising it. I was not consulted. To the best of my knowledge, the Council as a body was not consulted. The direction was withdrawn within hours in the face of nationwide condemnation. It was described by the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association as illegal and disproportionate. It drew the disapproval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself. On 15.08.2026 you issued a letter expressing regret. The expression of regret, though belated, is not the point. The point is that the office of Chairman was used to threaten an entire graduating batch of law students - young men and women with no power and no voice - with exclusion from the profession, as a reprisal for having held an opinion. The right of a citizen to express a view is not forfeited on admission to a law school. A body that exists to defend the independence of the Bar cannot itself punish independence of thought. That single act, in my respectful but firm view, has done more damage to the standing of this Council than anything else in its history, and it is by itself sufficient ground for you to demit office.

VI. Encouragement of factionalism within the State Bar Councils 

It has been a consistent feature of your tenure that factions are created and sustained within the State Bar Councils, that one group is favoured over another, and that orders are thereafter caused to be passed from the Bar Council of India in aid of the favoured group. Orders of this nature. have issued from time to time, frequently without notice to the affected side and without the matter being placed before the Council for deliberation.

The State Bar Councils are autonomous statutory bodies. They are not to be governed through patronage. Many of them have been paralysed by disputes that would never have survived a week had they not been sustained from Delhi.
 

VII. Continuance in the office of Chairman for more than a decade 

The office of Chairman of the Bar Council of India is an elected office with a term of two years. That term reflects a deliberate legislative and institutional choice: that the office should rotate, that no individual should become identified with the institution, and that the Council should be periodically renewed. 

You have held that office continuously since 2012, and were returned for a further consecutive term in 2025. This is without precedent. When elections to the office fall due, the arrangements are so managed that the outcome is a foregone conclusion. An elected office that has one occupant for fourteen years has ceased, in any real sense, to be an elected office.

VIII. The confidence of the Bar has been lost

The matter is no longer confined to this Council. Advocates have assembled in protest outside the office of the Bar Council of India itself, demanding your resignation and pointing to the absence of the most elementary welfare measures for the Bar an Advocates Protection Act, insurance cover, transparent inspection of law colleges. Young advocates, who have the most to gain from a functioning Council and the most to lose from a captured one, have led those protests. Members of the Bar in your own State and your own district have joined in seeking your departure. The Student Bar Councils of the National Law Universities have publicly declined to share a platform with the Chairman of the Bar Council of India. When the regulator of a profession is publicly repudiated by the profession it regulates, by the students it is meant to nurture, and by the courts before which it appears, the question of its Chairman's continuance is no longer a matter of personal preference. It is a question of institutional survival.

DEMAND

In the premises aforesaid, I call upon you:
(a) to tender your resignation from the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, forthwith, and in any event within fifteen (15) days of receipt of this letter;
(b) to convene, in the meanwhile, a Special Meeting of the Bar Council of India for consideration of each of the matters set out above, with the relevant records placed before every Member in advance;
(c) to cause a special audit of the accounts of the Bar Council of India and of BCI Trust PEARL - First, from the date of its registration to date, to be conducted by an independent firm empanelled with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, and to cause the report to be circulated to every Member and published;
(d) to direct that, with immediate effect, no contribution, donation or payment of any description shall be received from any law college, university or management by the Council or by any trust or body connected with it; and
(e) to place on the website of the Council the complete staff position referred to in Ground I above.

I hold no personal animosity towards you. I have served alongside you on this Council for a decade. It is precisely because I have watched this institution from within for that period that I am able to say, with a clear conscience, that it will not recover while you remain in the Chair. There are able persons in this Council capable of restoring it. Standing down now, of your own accord, is the one course still open to you that would be to your credit. 

The Bar of this country deserves better than what it is presently receiving from its own Council. I ask you to allow it that opportunity.

Yours faithfully,
(Y. R. SADASIVA REDDY), 
Senior Advocate, Member and Co-Chairman Bar Council of India 

 

Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms(CJAR) questions Manan Kumar Mishra's self appointment as a lifetime trustee of BCI Trust Pearl-First Trust

The Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms (CJAR) has issued a statement dated August 22, 2026 has questioned the role of Manan Kumar Mishra as Chairman of the Bar Council of India (BCI). CJAR statement reads: "It is also known that Mr. Mishra has set up a Trust under the BCI (BCI Trust Pearl-First Trust) of which he has made himself a lifetime trustee by name. This Trust took over the funds of an earlier trust set up by the BCI (Bar Council of India Trust). This taking over of the funds as well as their utilization is being enquired into by the CBI." 

CJAR has drawn public’s attention towards the fact that "Mr Mishra’s continuing as Chairman, BCI is irregular and raises serious questions. The Advocates Act, 1961 provides for a two-year term for the BCI Chairman. A proviso to Section 4(3) permits a sitting member to continue in office “until his successor is elected” — a provision that has, in practice, been used to entrench Mr. Mishra in office indefinitely rather than facilitate periodic rotation, as Parliament intended. This has enabled the concentration of power in a single office-bearer for over a decade and is an indictment of the BCI’s failure to reform itself from within." The statement reads: "CJAR reiterates that when an office-bearer who exercises regulatory power, threatens the careers of law graduates for exercising their right to protest and free expression, he has clearly demonstrated unfitness to continue holding that office, irrespective of a subsequent withdrawal of his statement." CJAR's statement has pointed out that BCI's chairman is known for issuing unilateral orders "misusing the letter head of the BCI without even calling a meeting of the Bar Council as he did in this NALSAR case. The latest letter only confirms that Mr Mishra is unfit to hold this office. CJAR notes that the BCI exists to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and legal education — not to serve as a permanent political perch. An independent legal profession, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted, is one of the best guarantees of constitutional rights. The continuing presence of Mr Mishra as the BCI Chairman has seriously damaged the independence of the Bar. In light of all the above, CJAR calls upon the legal fraternity, State Bar Councils, and the Supreme Court to ensure that accountability, rotation, and due process are restored to the BCI without further delay by first removing Mr. Mishra from the position of Chairman and ensuring that there is a free and fair selection of the next Chairperson." 

CJAR’s Demands
1. Immediate resignation of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra as Chairman, BCI.
2. An inquiry into Mr. Mishra's questionable actions during his tenure including the formation and misuse of the Trust, opaque and non-transparent decision making and orders, etc.
3. Enactment of a binding two-term (or time-bound) limit on the office of BCI Chairman and Vice-Chairman.
4. A transparent, rotational mechanism for BCI leadership across States.
5. Full public disclosure of BCI’s finances and disciplinary record during Mr. Mishra’s tenure.
6. Institutional safeguards to prevent any future office-bearer from unilaterally penalising students or advocates without due process.

Patna High Court quashes order by Bihar State Information Commission, Circle Officer, Siwan, Sadar, directs DM, Siwan to search or reconstruct required document under RTI Act

In Md. Rizwan vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026),  Justice Raj Kumar delivered a 15-page long judgement dated August 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"19. Taking into consideration, that the application was made by the petitioner in 2009 for obtaining this document and till 2026 this small issue is yet to be resolved, matter must be set at rest and steps should be taken up by the authorities to comply with the directions of this Court within a period of eight weeks. 20. In view of discussions made above the writ petition stands allowed, orders passed by the appellate authority dated 06.01.2012 in Case No. 37744/2010-11 of State Information Commission and the letter dated 28.06.2011 issued by respondent no. 3/P.I.O.-cum-Circle Officer, Siwan, Sadar, are hereby quashed. 21. Respondents are thus directed to ensure compliance in view of the directions given in Paragraph-17 of this order. The entire exercise should be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of this order. 22. The writ petition stands/allowed/disposed of in view of observations made aforesaid." The other five respondents are:2. The District Magistrate, Siwan, 3. The Circle Officer, Circle Office Siwan Sadar, Siwan, 4. The Circle Inspector cum Kanoongo, Circle Office Siwan Sadar, Siwan, 5. The Halka Karamchari, Circle Office Siwan Sadar, Siwan and 6. The State Information Commissioner, Bihar State Information Commission, Patna.

Paragraph 17 of the judgement reads:"In this background, the writ petition is allowed with following directions:-(i) The District Magistrate, Siwan, Sadar/Circle Officer (respondent no. 3), Siwan Sadar are thus directed to conduct a physical search of the barwarda register from the Circle Office or the office of the D.C.L.R. or District records, Siwan within four weeks and if the same is not traceable, then the authorities should reconstruct the record on the basis of the entries in the revenue records.
(ii) Secondly, if the document is found torn or not legible, then it could be digitized or enlarged or typed by the expert and it could be given to the petitioner after being certified by the concerned Circle Officer. This exercise should be carried out by the respondent authorities expeditiously.
(iii) At this juncture, if the document is traced out by the authorities, a communication to that effect be made to the petitioner to inspect the document in question along with his counsel so that petitioner is also made aware of the actual status of the document in question. If the petitioner finds that the document is torn or document is not legible and as such it will be difficult on part of the authorities to reconstruct or get it typed, petitioner can duly inform the authorities about his decision to either receive or not receive this document. It is expected that authorities will take proper steps in complying with the order and petitioner shall lend full cooperation to the authorities. However, if the parties’ fail to arrive at a definitive
conclusion and are at an impasse, regarding the receipt or non-receipt of the documents or as to the status or condition of the documents in question, the concerned authorities shall be obligated to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law, providing cogent reasons to the effect that the information could not be given despite making best efforts to furnish/reconstruct the same to the petitioner and despite ensuring full compliance to the directions issued in the light of this judgment."

The judgement was passed upon hearing the counsel for the petitioner, the counsel for the State as well as counsel for the State Information Commission. 

The writ application was filed seeking the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the final order dated January 6, 2012 passed in Case No. 37744/2010-11, by the State Information Commission, Patna, Bihar, issued under memo no. 11206 dated 11.01.2012, whereby and whereunder, the Respondent No. 6 has deemed it fit to drop the entire proceedings, while admitting the justification provided by PIO-cum-Circle Officer, Siwan, Sadar (Respondent No. 3), under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and as such refused to furnish the certified copy of the barwarda and Register- II to the petitioner. The petitioner also prayed for the quashing of the memo No. 605 ii dated 28.06.2011, issued by the Respondent No. 3, whereby the Respondent No. 3 refused to furnish the aforesaid documents to the petitioner, stating that since the requisitioned documents are not available in original and whatever is available is in an unreadable condition, therefore, a certified true copy of the same cannot be supplied. The writ petitioner had prayed for the issuance of a direction to the Respondent Authorities for the consideration of the petitioner’s objection dated July 30, 2011, preferred before Respondent No. 6. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated January 6, 2012 passed by the Respondent No. 6 is cryptic, unreasoned and non-speaking. He submitted that the impugned order was passed without considering the information supplied by the petitioner in the objection filed by him. It was submitted that it was the obligatory duty on part of the quasi-judicial authority, to pass a reasoned order with respect to the issues raised, for ensuring lawful adjudication. Hence, he submitted that the impugned order dated January 6, 2012 been passed against the mandate of the RTI Act, 2005. The counsel submitted that once request for information was sought under the terms prescribed under Section 6(1) of the RTI Act, the Public Information Officer is obligated to dispose of such request within a period of thirty days as envisaged under Section 7 of the RTI Act.It was also submitted the information which was sought by the petitioner did not fall within the purview of ‘exempted information’ within the meaning of Section 8 of the RTI Act. Based on the combined reading of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the RTI Act, it was contended that the respondents could not deny the furnishing of the information sought by the petitioner. On the factual aspect, learned counsel has pointed out the contradictory stand that unfolds on a bare perusal of the letter issued by Respondent No. 3 dated June 28, 2011, to the petitioner wherein, the P.I.O.-cum-Circle Officer/Respondent No. 3, Siwan Sadar refused the furnishing of the required document on the ground that it was not available in original and at the same time stated that the document in question was not legible/unreadable and therefore, a certified true copy of the same could not be supplied. Furthermore, this contradictory stand was reflected and would be apparent upon a plain reading of the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent No. 6, at paragraph-11, which showed that the respondents have acted in a contradictory and capricious manner. 

The counsel contended that the objection dated July 30, 201 filed by him with the writ application before Respondent No. 6, was not considered while passing the final order dated January 6, 2012 in Case No. 37744/2010-11, as the impugned order made no reference to the objection filed by the petitioner, and thus, it did not reflect any consideration on this issue. It was submitted that the impugned order suffered from the vice of illegality and unreasonableness. The counsel also pointed out that vide Annexure-9, he has specifically mentioned the details of the persons to whom the certified copy and copy of the barwarda and register-II pertaining to the same Halka and Tauzi have been issued from the Circle Office, Siwan, Sadar. This fact has not been denied by the respondents in their respective counter affidavits, as in response to the same they have only mentioned that the same was a matter of record. 

The counsel further submitted that the petitioner requires the required documents/information for submitting it before the concerned Court in Title Suit No. 106/1992 and thus, he required the documents in his support for the factual adjudication of the title suit, pending before the concerned court. He pointed out that there was no reason as to why the authorities could not grant him the requisite information or documents, when the same was a public document under Section 74 of Indian Evidence Act. The counsel also submitted that the plea of non-availability of records was unsubstantial and mala fide in as much as the State Information Commission has the power to conduct an inquiry, if it is satisfied that reasonable grounds warranting the same exist, before passing of a final order as enshrined under Section 18 (2) and (3) of the RTI Act. The counsel pointed out that the second appeal was filed by the appellant on May 18, 2010, but was disposed of only on July 30, 2011, i.e., almost after a year and it also in a way frustrated the mandate of Section 19(3) of the RTI Act. It was pointed out that in terms of Section 19(6) of the RTI Act, no time limit has been prescribed for the disposal of the second appeal and the same only stipulates that an appeal under sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 19 shall be disposed of within a period of 30 days or within such extended period not exceeding 45 days from the date of filing of such appeal. Thus, upon a combined reading of Section 19 and specifically sub-Section (6) it could be construed that the second appeal must also be disposed of within a period of thirty days or within such extended period not exceeding 45 days. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the judgment dated October 29, 2015 passed by the Karnataka High Court in Jayaprakash Reddy vs. Central Information Commission (In writ petition nos. 28310-28311 and 45540-45542 as well as the judgment dated July 7, 2010 by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Akhil Kumar Roy vs. The West Bengal Information Commission and Ors. in writ petition no. 11933 of 2010. In both the judgments, it has been categorically held that the second appeal should be decided within a period of 30 days or within such extended period not exceeding 45 days from the date of the filing of the appeal. 

The counsel for the State submitted that barwarda is not a public document, as stated in paragraph-4 of their counter affidavit. It was argued that barwarda means a partition of tauzi by the ex-landlord amongst their co-sharers themselves and is an unsurveyed land of which Khatiyan was not prepared and therefore, barwarda in original was not available in Circle Office and it was not possible to furnish the certified copy of the same. It was also argued by the State that no Jamabandi has been created in respect of the barwarda land and in that context the State Information Commission vide final order dated January 6, 2012, issued in memo no. 11206, dated January 11, 2012, rightly closed the proceedings. 

The counsel appearing on behalf of the State Information Commission was also filed an affidavit and defended the impugned orders and has contended that the document was not available in original, rather the photocopy of the same is available in a very unreadable and torn condition and thus, it is a settled principle of law that no certified copy of a photocopy can be issued. Since the barwarda in original was not present in the Circle Office, Siwan, Sadar, hence, a certified copy of the same cannot be granted by the respondent authorities. The counsel also contended that the information had already been furnished after due consideration and a proper compliance of the order dated March 10, 2011 was made. In this view, reference has been drawn to paragraph-11 of the counter affidavit filed by the Respondent No. 6. The counsel of the State Information Commission also submitted that while passing of the impugned order, the State Information Commission had gone through the objections raised by the petitioner and after due consideration of the same had issued directions to the Public Information Officer-cum-Circle Officer for providing due justification under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act, 2005, and after considering entire materials on record has rightly dropped the proceedings. The counsel argued that the petitioner had not appeared before the appellate authority on the date of passing of the impugned order. The counsel for the State Information Commission contended that the barwarda was not a public document and further, in view of the fact that the document in original was not available, hence the certified copy of the said barwarda could not be furnished to the petitioner.

Justice Kumar considered the issue as to whether the barwarda could be given to the petitioner when the same was untraceable or present in an unreadable form and observed: "Coming to the etymology of the document in question, it is defined as an year wise rent payment and it may not be registered but is used to determine the rent paid by the co-sharers, which is used as proof in partition suits as well as for Order 20 Rule 20 of the CPC. It contains the details of the co-sharers and further regarding the rent paid by them to the extent of their share of the Khesra or as per payment register to identify the co-sharers paying rent. This document is a public document as defined under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, which can be used as an exhibit in a suit and as evidence under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act as it is a Government record and can also be adduced as a secondary evidence." 

Justice Kumar relied on para-8 of the decision rendered in Anil Kumar Shukla vs. Central Public Information Officer, Ministry of Human Resource and Development Department of Higher Education, Decision No. CIC/MOHRD/A/2018/129097/01715. It reads: “Prima facie, any public authority cannot deny the right of the appellant to get the information by putting forward an excuse of the file going missing. The defence of missing file cannot be accepted even under the RTI Act. If the file is really not traceable, it reflects on the inefficient management of files by the public authority. If the file could not be traced in spite of best efforts, it is the duty of the respondent authority to reconstruct the file or develop a mechanism to address the issue raised by the appellant.”

Patna High Court's judgement recorded that "Under Rule 80 of the Bihar Records Manual, 1960, it has been stipulated that the District Collector is responsible to account for all missing files. Section 4 (1) of the R.T.I. Act, 2005, also emphasises that Public Information Officers have a duty to maintain all records which facilitates furnishing of the information. In this regard, reference has been made to Rule 230 of the Bihar Records Manual, 1960 wherein it has been stipulated that when a document is found to be illegible, it may be destroyed only after the same has been personally inspected by the Collector/S.D.O. The authorities therefore are duty bound to assign the reason for the destruction of the document and accordingly a memorandum must be prepared stating the fact of destruction, the nature of document destroyed and the same must bear the signature of the Collector/S.D.O. Hence, there appears to be a complete violation of the Rule 230, of the Bihar Records Manual, 1960 on part of the respondent authorities.

Justice Kumar also concluded: "14. What comes out in this matter for adjudication is that the respondents have not denied that the document/barwarda was falling within the parameters or purview of an exempted information within the meaning of Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005. On the one hand, while the authorities have categorically mentioned that the document in the original was not present at the Circle Office, Siwan, Sadar, but at the same time they have mentioned that a photocopy of the same was available in an unreadable and torn condition. These two statements are contradictory to each other and strikes at the core of the object underlining the R.T.I. Act, 2005. It is also taken into consideration by this Court that the objection filed by the petitioner vide Annexure-9 to the writ petition in which it was mentioned that the other persons, who had made applications for the procuring this barwarda document had been handed over the documents in question. Although, no averments have been made by the concerned authorities denying the claim or the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 15. In the background of these facts, this Court is of the opinion that it is the statutory duty of the public authority to maintain all records which can facilitate the furnishing of information under the R.T.I. Act, 2005. It is also not in dispute that if original is damaged, then a secondary evidence can be created by a typed transcript prepared by Anchal Amin and attested by Circle Officer from the Lagan Rasheed as well as Khesra copy of the land pertaining to the said barwarda. 16. It is incumbent upon the authorities to maintain the records manual. The document being torn or not being legible or untraceable cannot be a ground to deny the furnishing of information which is a public record. The State cannot take advantage of its own failure to preserve records."

The counsel had further pointed out the provision of Section 19 of the R.T.I. Act, wherein, no time frame has been stipulated for disposing of the second appeal. The counsel referred to the judgments reported in Jayaprakash Reddy and Akhil Kumar Roy (supra) in which it has been held that the appeals should be decided within a period of 45 days as it would be travesty of justice if the appeals are kept pending and undecided for a long period. The judgement reads: "This Court is of the view that a second appeal must be decided within a period of 30 days or within such period not exceeding 45 days as decided through various judgments referred above so that, the person seeking information is not left remediless." 

 

Justice Soni Shrivastava quahes FIR bearing Pirbahor P.S. Case No.639 of 2024 by Madhuri Devi, resident of Gaya

In Ritambhara Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Soni Shrivastava delivered a 4-page long judgement dated August 21, 2026, wherein, she concluded:"this Court is of the considered view that no offence against the present petitioner is made out from the impugned FIR and continuance of any proceedings against a law professional made by some professional litigants would only amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and if such frivolous litigations are not quashed, the same would also set bad precedents. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion and also considering the fact that the present case falls within the ambit of category (1), (2), (3) and (5) of the State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, reported in (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, Pirbahor P.S. Case No.639 of 2024 and any prosecution therefrom, so far as it relates to the petitioner, stands quashed." 

Although notice was issued to Madhuri Devi, the opposite party no.2 who is a resident of South Lakhibag
near Gauri Kanya Vidyalaya Manpur thana- Muffasil, which was accepted as validly served, she chose not to appear in the proceedings before the High Court.By way of filing the application, the petitioner had prayed for quashing of the F.I.R. bearing Pirbahor P.S. Case No.639 of 2024 dated September 21, 2024 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 352, 351(2) and 3(5) of the B.N.S. In the First Information Report, it was alleged that are that the petitioner has abused, assaulted and pressurized the informant to withdraw the case (S.T.R. No.72 of 2020). It was also alleged that the petitioner was threatened to face dire consequences if the said case was not withdrawn.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted at the outset that the petitioner is an advocate by profession and the FIR is out and out a case of malicious prosecution on account of the fact that this petitioner happens to be the advocate of adversary of the informant. It was also submitted that the allegations made in the First Information Report itself, on the face of the record, do not make out any criminal case against the petitioner, much less the ones under which it has been alleged.  

The Court's attention was drawn to an FIR which was lodged by the petitioner on the same date, which was in the form of a complaint before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna Sadar, disclosing allegations against the present informant who intercepted her while she was going to her seat in the Civil Court and threatened her of dire consequences. It was contended that the informant is a professional litigant which manifests from a number of cases, eight of which have been enumerated therein which has been lodged against different accused persons. On account of such grounds as advanced and especially in view of the case and counter case, the counsel for the petitioner had prayed for quashing of the FIR and any prosecution arising therefrom as against the petitioner, who is an advocate by profession.

Justice Shrivastava observed: "8. I have perused the entire materials on record and especially impugned FIR, upon perusal of which, I find that the allegations are totally vague and do not make out any case against the present petitioner. The narration of facts in the FIR read in juxtaposition with the FIR lodged by the present petitioner is also reflective of the fact that the present case is a malicious prosecution filed against the present petitioner only on account of the fact that she happened to be the counsel of the adversary of the opposite party no.2."