Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgement by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi

In Yogendra Sah vs.The State Of Biha (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 17-page long judgement dated April 20, 2026 wherein, he concluded: "The prosecution case thus rests predominantly on the testimony of official witnesses without any credible independent corroboration, and the non-production of the alleged seized contraband as a material exhibit further creates a serious lacuna in the chain of evidence. In such circumstances, the mere availability of the F.S.L. Report cannot be treated as conclusive proof either of the recovery or of the nature of the substance allegedly seized, and in the absence of reliable evidence establishing the factum of recovery, its evidentiary value stands considerably diminished, thereby creating a serious doubt in the prosecution case, as a result of which this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. 21. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 22. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 12-09-2013 and order of sentence dated 16-09-2013 passed by the learned 1st. Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi in GR No. 3297 of 2009 / TR No. 07 of 2013, arising out of Sonbarsa P.S. Case No. 136 of 2009 is hereby set aside."

The judgement reads:"...the appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him."

The appeal was filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated September 12, 2013 and order of sentence dated September 16, 2013 passed by the 1st. Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi in GR No. 3297 of 2009 / TR No. 07 of 2013, arising out of Sonbarsa P.S. Case No. 136 of 2009, whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 4 (four) years along with a fine of Rs.20,000/. 

Justice Singh relied upon para nos. 6 and 7 of Supreme Court's judgment in Gorakh Nath Prasad vs. State of Bihar reported in (2018) 2 SCC 305, to observe that "the non-production of the seized material is therefore considered fatal to the prosecution case." He added:"17. It is well settled law that although the NDPS Act envisages a reverse burden of proof, it is well settled that the prosecution must, in the first instance, establish the foundational facts by leading cogent and reliable evidence in strict compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions governing search, seizure and recovery. It is only upon such initial burden being duly discharged that the onus shifts upon the accused. Mere registration of a case under the Act does not ipso facto operate to shift the burden at the threshold. Having regard to the stringent nature of the statute, the evidence on record warrants strict scrutiny, and where the prosecution fails to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of such doubt must enure to the accused/appellant." 

Justice Singh observed:"18. It appears that, all the prosecution witnesses examined in the present case are official witnesses belonging to the S.S.B., and there is a complete absence of reliable independent evidence with regard to the alleged recovery. It would, therefore, be unsafe to base a conviction solely on their testimony, especially in the absence of corroboration. Significantly, the alleged contraband (ganja) was neither produced before the Trial Court nor marked as a material exhibit, and no plausible explanation has been furnished for such non-production. Consequently, there is no cogent material on record to establish a nexus between the substance allegedly seized and the samples sent for forensic examination. In such circumstances, question arises whether the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. 

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava set aside verdict by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Vaishali in POCSO case

In Md. Alam vs.The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 21-page long judgement dated April 20, 2026 wherein, it conclude that "....the presumption contained under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act would not be attracted." The informant/ victim boy (PW-1) "cannot be put in the category of a sterling witness for the obvious reasons showing huge contradiction in his statement. In a case under the POCSO Act, the presumption of innocence is not lost." For these reasons, the Court set aside the  judgment of conviction dated April 25, 2023 and order of sentence dated May 15, 2023 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Vaishali at Hajipur in POCSO case of 2021 which arose out of Mahua P.S. case of 2021. The appellant was acquitted of the charges giving him benefit of doubt. The appellant was said to be in custody. Justice Parsad authored the judgement. The Court directed to be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case .The appeal was allowed. 

Justice Prasad observed:"The prosecution has not disclosed the date of birth of the victim boy recorded in his first school admission register. No ossification and dental test of the victim has been conducted to assess his age. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the victim would come within the definition of the word “child” as envisaged under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act." 

The appeal was preferred for setting aside the judgment of conviction. The appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 377/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. By the order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty (20) years with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten (10) years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- under Section 377/34 IPC, he was to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.

The prosecution case is based on the written information dated February 26, 2021 submitted by the informant/ victim boy (PW-1). In his written information, he stated that on  February 24, 2021 at about 06:30 AM in the morning, when he was sitting at the shop of Sunny Kumar and Golu Patel situated near Sahara India Office at Mahua Bazar, Samastipur Road, two persons came there and enquired from Sunny Kumar about the victim boy. On which Sunny Kumar told them that he was a good-mannered boy and was in search of some work due to his poor financial condition. Thereafter, these two persons told the victim to accompany them, they will provide him money, food and good clothes. They also said that he has to discharge their household work and assured him that he will be given opportunity for further study. Thereafter, Golu Patel told the victim boy to accompany them as they were known to Golu Patel. Those two accused persons were Ranjeet Patel and Md. Alam (this appellant). The victim boy along with two accused persons came at the house of Md. Alam on their motorcycle. Both of them told him to have food and go to sleep. He was trying to sleep, however, was not able to sleep. In the meantime, he saw that both of them started sipping alcohol from a bottle after pouring in glass and thereafter, he fell asleep. In the late night, he felt that somebody has opened his pants and trying to insert something through his anus which was painful. Thereafter, he woke up and saw that both the accused persons were naked and were doing unnatural sexual offence with him. He tried to prevent them but they threatened him to kill if he raised the alarm. These two accused persons committed unnatural sexual offence with the victim boy one by one by pressing his mouth. Thereafter, they put their clothes on and also told him to wear his clothes and threatened him not to disclose this to anyone, otherwise he will be killed. 

Thereafter, in the morning of  February 25, 2021 at about 09:30AM, both the accused persons left him on their motorcycle at the shop of Golu Patel. He felt the pain for the whole day but in the evening when he could not bear the pain, he disclosed about the said incident to his nearby neighbours and members of his family. He was taken to Mahua Sub-Divisional Hospital for treatment. Later on, he was referred to Sadar Hospital, Hajipur for better treatment. He was told to inform the concerned police station. On the basis of this written information, FIR being Mahua P.S. Case No. 162 of 2021 dated March 5, 2021 was registered
under Section 377 IPC amd Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act against (1) Sunny Kumar, (2) Golu Patel, (3) Ranjeet Patel and (4) Md. Alam (this appellant). After investigation, police submitted chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 817 of 2021 dated December 10, 2021 against Md. Alam for the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. 

The trial court by its order dated December 16, 2021 took cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act against Md. Alam. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant in Hindi to which he denied the charges and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges were framed vide order dated January 24, 2022 for the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.. In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses and got exhibited certain documents.  Thereafter, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. In this 313 CrPC statement, he pleaded innocence and stated that Prem Shankar and Uday Shankar had already registered case against him and they again implicated him in the this case. The Defence produced three witnesses and exhibited some documentary evidences. 

The trial court having examined the entire prosecution evidences found that the emphasis of defence regarding false implication due to previous enmity cannot be a ground to discard the witnesses' evidence if such evidence is found to be reliable while upholding conviction of an accused.

On the point of alibi taken by the defence, trial court took note of the argument of the defence counsel that at the time of occurrence, the accused being an Advocate was busy in court for preparing the filing of the bail bond and on the other hand, the learned counsel submitted that the accused was at the High Court, Patna at Mazar to join the tajposhi from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm. The trial court observed that it was highly
unbelievable that a person who is an Advocate was present at three places of surroundings of 20-30 kms at the same time. 

The High Court observed that the trial court negated the submission of defence counsel regarding contradiction on the point of age of the victim boy by referring the fact that no documentary evidence was brought on record regarding the education of the victim boy as the victim boy is from very poor family and is not a school going student and his mother is rustic. The trial court took note of injury report of the victim which suggested that the victim boy was minor and concerned medical expert being PW-2 found
the case of sexual assault. The trial court found that since the accused facing trial was accused in another case also, there was no reason of false implication of the accused by another person of poor and from a Scheduled Caste family of the vicinity.

The trial court observed that on the ground of minor contradictions, the evidences of prosecution witnesses cannot be ignored, the version of the occurrence as alleged and the medical examination with the opinion of suspected case of sexual assault cannot be put outside on the ground of minor contradictions or on the ground of previous enmity. Accordingly, the trial court found that the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused under Sections 377/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The High Court noted that there is a delay of 9 days in lodging of the FIR. The application gave rise to the present FIR was signed by the victim boy, but it is his admission that the application was written by a person who met him in the Sadar Hospital at Hajipur and to whom he had explained the whole occurrence. According to the victim boy, the person was a general person and he could not give the name of the person who wrote the application. A perusal of the deposition of the victim boy (PW-1) showed that he claimed to have posted the application in the post office, but in paragraph ‘26’ of his deposition, PW-1 claimed that he had complained in the police station on 26th. In paragraph ‘21’, he claimed that he had alone gone to the police station. This statement of PW-1 created doubt as to who wrote the written application. The doubt goes deeper when the High Court found that his mother (PW-3) claimed that she had taken her victim boy to the police station at Mahua and she also said that the application was written by Darogaji. She also stated that Darogaji had recorded her statement 8 days after lodgment of the case. If the statement of PW-3 is examined, it was found that she claims to have come to know about the occurrence from her son on the next day of the occurrence in the morning, but the victim (PW-1) stated that on February 25, 2021, he had alone gone to Mahua hospital. PW-2 recorded the time of examination of PW-1 as 7.25 pm. His parents were not with him, therefore, the statement of PW-3 that she had come to know about the occurrence on the next day in the morning was not a reliable statement. PW-3 stated that she had taken the victim boy to Government Hospital, Manjhaul, whereas the victim boy says that he had alone gone to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Mahua. 

The High Court's judgement reads: "In our opinion, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 are not only contradicting each other, they are contradicting themselves also on various aspects. 25. This Court further finds that the learned trial court has itself recorded in its finding that “if the submissions of learned defence counsel is evaluated, the evidences on the point of age of the victim boy is contradictory….” Despite this, the learned trial court did not think it just and proper to determine the age of the victim in accordance with the scheme of Section 94 of the Act of 2015. 26. We have noticed hereinabove in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that how the age of the victim boy has not been disclosed by the prosecution in course of trial and the I.O. (PW-5) himself stated that he had not conducted
any verification on the age of the victim. In section 164 CrPC Statement, the victim is said to be studying in Class VIII but in course of trial, he has stated that he has studied up to Class IV....27. This Court further finds that the victim had gone to Mahua Hospital with 6-7 persons. PW-2 has stated so but the victim claims that he had gone alone. It is, thus, evident that the victim has been tutored not to disclose names of those 6-7 persons who were with him in the Mahua Hospital. Those 6-7 persons had said to PW-2 that they were from the neighbourhood of the victim and they cannot give consent. This makes the whole case
suspicious.  28. PW-2 has stated that he had not examined the source of the blood stain. He had referred the victim boy to Sadar Hospital, Hajipur but the victim had not received treatment in Sadar Hospital, Hajipur. The age of injury has been mentioned as within 6 hours and the doctor has noticed fresh blood but in course of his cross-examination, PW-2 has clearly stated that the blood would clot if the injury is on the upper part, within 3-4 minutes, he had not found any bruise around the anus. PW-2 has clearly stated that he had not made any statement before police. He had not examined the source of the blood stain, therefore, in our opinion,'

The judgement  recorded: "30. We have further noticed that in this case, the police officer Krishnanand Jha, who had drawn the formal FIR, has not been examined." 

Justice Prasad observed:"The prosecution has not disclosed the date of birth of the victim boy recorded in his first school admission register. No ossification and dental test of the victim has been conducted to assess his age. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the victim would come within the definition of the word “child” as envisaged under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act." 

Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section challenges orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas, directing attachment of Office of the Collector, Rohtas

Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section has challenged the order by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas, directing attachment of Office of the Collector, Rohtas in the Patna High Court and other orders. The case Shashi Shankar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Anr. is listed for April 21, 2026. The Respondents no. 2 is Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. 

 

The petition raises following question of law and facts as to i) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can impose personal liability upon a government officer who is not a party to the proceedings?; ii) Whether recovery of an award can be directed to Collector without issuance of certificate by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas to Collector under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act?; ii) Whether a  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can direct salary deduction and service-book entry against a government officer who is not party to proceeding?; iv) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can order salary deduction and service-book entry of officer who is not party to proceeding?; v) Whether adverse remarks can be recorded against a person without giving him an opportunity of hearing; vi) Whether adverse remarks can be recorded without hearing the affected officer?; vii) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has any supervisory or disciplinary jurisdiction over a District Collector or petitioner?; viii) Whether recovery under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be initiated without issuance of a statutory recovery certificate?; ix) Whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas can impose fine or penalty on an executive authority in absence of express statutory power?; x) Whether such action violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers?; xi) Whether order passed by respondent is arbitrary, illegal, ultra vires,void ab initio and unconstitutional?; xii) Whether collector can be compelled to recover award amount even though details of assets of decree debtor has not been provided to collector?; and xiii) Whether collector can be coerced to deposit  fine/penalty/cost from her salary?

 

The petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders dated 22.01.2026 and 17.02.2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas in Execution Case No. 01/2014, expunging all adverse remarks recorded against the petitioner in the orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. The petition prays for setting aside of the direction imposing ₹10,000 penalty, salary deduction, entry in service book and registration of criminal miscellaneous case. It prays for removal of the observations contained in the orders which may affect the service career of the petitioner and for declaring that the  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to issue show-cause notice or impose penalty upon the petitioner. It seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the show-cause notice issued by  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. 

 

The petitioner prays for quashing the order dated February 17, 2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas imposing fine of ₹10,000/- as adjournment cost upon the petitioner and directing deduction of fine from salary, directing entry in service book and directing registration of criminal miscellaneous case;  It prays for quashing the order dated December 23, 2025 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas  imposing fine of ₹10,000/- upon the Collector, Rohtas. It seeks quashing the order dated January 22, 2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas passing adverse remarks against the petitioner. The petitioner declares that the  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to issue show-cause notice or impose penalty upon the petitioner.  

 

The petition seeks a declaration that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to attach office of the Collector and direct department proceeding and disciplinary action against Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas and seeks imposition of cost on Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. The petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas from taking any coercive action against the petitioner and the Collector. The petition seeks interim stay of the orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas during pendency of the writ petition. 

 

The writ petition was filed by Dr. Gopal Krishna, the advocate for the petitioner in the High Court on March 31, 2026. It was registered on April 20, 2026.  

Justice S. B. Pd. Singh reverses impleadment rejection order by 1st Additional District Judge, Gopalganj, grants limited impleadment

In Lal Babu Giri & Ors. vs. Matuki Giri @ Dharam Nath Giri & Ors. (2026), Justice S. B. Pd. Singh delivered a  5-page long judgement dated April 9, 2026, wherein he concluded that considering the facts of the case "it seems essential that intervenor be impleaded in the appeal to protect his interest with respect to his purchased property but he will be confined to the pleadings and evidence of the vendor only during the course of his argument. 7. Accordingly, the present application stands allowed." The judgement by Justice Singh was uploaded on April 17, 2026.  The judgment was reserved on March 13, 2026.

This civil miscellaneous application was filed for setting aside the order dated May 15, 2019 passed in T.A. No. 35 pf 2000 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Gopalganj whereby and whereunder the application filed by the petitioner under Order I Rule 10(2) of C.P.C. for adding the petitioner as respondent in the instant title appeal, was rejected without assigning any reason. The case was filed in the High Court on August 29, 2019 and registered on December 9, 2019.

Respondent-Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari had filed Title Suit No. 473 of 1993 against Matuki Giri @ Dharam Nath Giri which was decreed by the Court of Sub-Judge Gopalganj. Against the judgment and decree, the defendant/appellant Matku Giri preferred an appeal i.e. Title Appeal No. 35 of 2000. During the pendency of this appeal petitioner/proposed intervenor purchased the same suit land from the respondent-Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari on May 7, 2015, then he filed a petition for his impleadment in the appeal which was rejected by the impugned order that was under challenge in the present civil miscellaneous application.

The petitioner's counsel submitted that petitioner was a bona fide purchaser of the suit plot and without the knowledge of this litigation and he had apprehension that respondent namely, Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari may leave the pairwi and may gained over by the appellant in future. Therefore, in order to protect his right and interest, it was essential for him to be impleaded in the appeal. 

The counsel for the petitioner relied on Supreme Court's  the case of Yogesh Goyanka vs. Govind and Ors. reported in (2024) 7 Supreme Court Cases 524 in which it held: “20. In the particular facts and circumstances of this case, Mr. Sundaram has been able to satisfy this Court on the possibility of collusion between the Respondents. It is a fact that the Plaintiffs and Defendants are relatives. More importantly, Plaintiffs approached the court in the Underlying Suit after a substantial delay of 11 years whereas admittedly, the revenue records were mutated to reflect the name of Respondent No. 21 since 2007. It is also curious that the claim of non-payment of consideration by the Appellant was made for the first time before this Court. 21. On the other hand, the Appellant has a registered sale deed in his favor and has therefore seemingly acquired an interest in the Subject Land. Whether or not the consideration was paid, is a disputed question of fact that shall be determined by the Trial Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, including the fact that the trial has not progressed significantly, the Appellant herein, in the interest of justice, is entitled to impleadment in the Underlying Suit in order to protect his interests, if any, in the Subject Land. 22. In light of the aforesaid, the appeal stands allowed. The Impugned Order and the order of the ADJ dated 10.10.2019 are set aside and the Appellant is directed to be added as a party defendant in the Underlying Suit.”

The counsel for the respondent/appellant submitted that petitioner had purchased the suit property during the pendency of the appeal which was hit by the rule of lis pendens and petitioner had derived his right title from the vendor-Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari who was still contesting the appeal.

The provision of order XXII Rule 10 of C.P.C. reads: “10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.–(1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. (2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).”

Justice Singh observed that in the light of these facts it is essential that intervenor be impleaded in the appeal to protect his interest with respect to his purchased property but he will be confined to the pleadings and evidence of the vendor only during the course of his argument.

Earlier, Justice Arun Kumar Jha had stayed the judicial proceeding of Title Appeal No. 35 of 2000 pending before the court of 1st Additional District Judge, Gopalganj by his 2-page long order dated April 30, 2024 in Bindeshwari Giri (now deceased) vs. Matuki Giri @ Dharam Nath Giri & Anr. (2024) till the  next date hearing. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted  that the petitioner has purchased the land after the title appeal was dismissed in default though it was subsequently restored. The appellate court had rejected the application on the ground of lis pendens and it was also the fact that petitioner was not the party in the original suit or in the appeal but there was no lis pendens. This was the second order in the case which was filed in August 2019. 

Notably, in subsequent order, the respondent no.2, namely Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari, who died on September 19, 2020, during the pendency of this petition, from the records, he was substituted with his legal heirs/representatives. The petitioner was permitted to take necessary steps for substituted service of notice through paper publication in two local daily newspapers, namely ‘Times of India’ and ‘Hindustan’, having its circulation in the area of residence of the respondents within four weeks. After publication, the petitioner will file a supplementary affidavit bringing on record copies of newspaper cuttings.

Justice Jha's order dated July 3, 2025 heard the interlocutory application filed on behalf of the petitioner for substitution of heirs/legal representatives of sole petitioner, Bindeshwari Giri. The counsel appearing on behalf of heirs/legal representatives submits that the sole petitioner died on May 13, 2025 leaving behind his heirs/legal representatives. The interlocutory application as well as submission made on behalf of heirs/legal representatives of the sole petitioner was allowed. The order reads:"4. Let the name of sole petitioner be deleted from the record and be substituted with his heirs/legal representatives..."

The first order was passed by Justice Vikash Jain December 16, 2019, wherein none had appeared on behalf of the petitioner when the matter was called. 

Dr. Gopal Krishna, a practicing advocate pointed out that Supreme Court's decision in Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 wherein, it held that in a suit relating to property in order that a third party may be impleaded, he/she should have a direct or legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation as distinguished from a commercial interest. Legal interest so interpreted means that the result of the suit would affect the third party legally. In a decision of the Federal Court in United Provinces vs. Mt. Atiqu Begum and others reported in AIR 1941 FC 16 wherein, it was held that a person would be a necessary party if a person ought to have been joined, that is to say, in whose absence no effective decree can be passed at all. The person would be a proper party to be impleaded if his/her presence is necessary for an effectual or complete adjudication and in the given facts and circumstances of the present case, the intervener petitioner is necessary party because no effective decree can be passed at all as the intervener petitioner is having right, title and possession over the suit land. The Supreme Court in P.C. Varghese vs. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and others reported in (2005) 8 SCC 486 stressed the point that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the plaintiff is allowed to claim a decree for possession and/or partition in a suit for specific performance. The High Court in Smt.Baby Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors reported in 2024 (2) BLJ 763 had allowed the application of the petitioner filed under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) read with Section 151 of the Code and in the case, the petitioner was only claiming her right, title and interest over a portion of the suit land. 
 

Marriage between Manish Kumar and Ruchi Sinha stands dissolved: Supreme Court

In Manish Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 11-page long order dated April 8, 2026, wherein it recorded that the terms of the settlement have been acknowledged . The complainant-wife (Ruchi Sinha) submitted that she does not want to continue with any of the cases filed, either civil  or criminal, and want divorce by mutual consent since the amount as referred to in the settlement agreement has been received by her. The appellant-Manish Kumar also agreed to by the terms of the settlement and submitted that in view of those terms, all criminal and civil cases pending between the parties may be quashed/disposed of and decree of divorce by mutual consent may be ordered.

The judgement reads: "In view of the above, we are inclined to accept the settlement agreement and to dispose of this criminal appeal and I. A. No. 94649 of 2026 with the following directions: (a) As submitted, the appellant-husband has paid Rs.4,00,000/-(Rupees Four Lakhs) as agreed to in the settlement agreement, the receipt whereof is acknowledged by the complainant/respondent No.2- wife towards full and final settlement of all her claims including alimony, stridhan, dowry articles, maintenance
(past, present, future). (b) All criminal and civil cases as mentioned in the settlement agreement be treated as quashed/ disposed of and be consigned to the record. (c) Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed, the bail bonds of the appellant shall stand discharged. (d) Accepting the terms of the settlement and as consented to by the parties, on their request, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we grant decree of divorce by mutual consent. Consequently, the marriage between the appellant-husband(Manish Kumar) and respondent No.2-wife (Ruchi Sinha) shall stand dissolved. By an outcome of the dissolution of marriage, the parties are set free to lead their lives separately as per their own will. 8) The settlement agreement be treated as part of this Order."

The appellant had assailed the order dated October 16, 2023 passed by the High Court rejecting his application for grant of anticipatory bail. The appellant had preferred the appeal seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 106 of 2022 dated August 25, 2022 for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, registered at Police Station Mahila, Sub-Division Sadar, District Patna, Bihar. Vide order dated August 28, 2025, at the request made by the counsel for the parties, the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre. In mediation, the parties have settled their differences and disputes amicably and settlement agreement dated February 27, 2026 has been entered into which is received vide communication dated March 10, 2026 from the Mediation Centre. The parties had also filed Interlocutory Application No. 94649 of 2026 seeking dissolution of marriage in view of the said settlement.

The terms of the settlement as decided are as under:

“1. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: The Parties have mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage. They jointly pray before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent by exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, thereby dissolving the marriage solemnized between them.
ALIMONY / MAINTENANCE (FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT): The Second Party/Husband has agreed to pay a total sum of 4,00,000/-(Rupees four Lakhs Only) to the First Party/Wife as a full and final settlement against all the claims of First Party/Wife, including but not limited to past, present, and future maintenance, alimony, stridhan, dowry articles, and any other claims whatsoever arising out of the matrimonial relationship.

MODE AND TIME OF PAYMENT: The aforesaid amount of 4,00,000/- (Rupees four Lakhs Only) shall be paid by the Second Party/Husband to the First Party/Wife drawn in the name of " RUCHI SINHA" by way of account payee cheque bearing Cheque No. "000024" dated January 27, 2026. The said account payee cheque shall be handed over to the First Party/Wife after she will execute/sign the present agreement. The agreement shall be considered complete and binding upon the parties after the parties shall execute this agreement and the money shall be credited in the bank account of First party/Wife. If the cheque shall be dishonored then the agreement shall become null and void.

WITHDRAWAL/QUASHING OF PENDING LITIGATION: The Parties jointly pray before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to quash the followings things by mutual consent by exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, these are:- (1) to quash the FIR bearing FIR No. 106/2022 registered at Mahila P.S., District-Patna under section 498A /506/34 IPC and u/s 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, (2) to quash the chargesheet u/s 498A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the Second party/Husband and his three relatives who are named in the FIR namely Kamla Devi Verma (the mother of Second Party/Husband), Poonam Kumari(the elder sister of Second Party/Husband) and Mithlesh Kumar (the husband of elder sister of Second party/Husband), (3) to quash the cognizance order and entire case pending before the Court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patna who took cognizance u/s 498 A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition against the Second party/Husband and his above three stated relatives. 

The Parties mutually agree that the case pending before the Hon'ble FAMILY COURTS, Patna Bihar and other courts of India alongwith all cases, complaints, and proceedings (civil and criminal) filed by them against each other and/or their family members and relatives, if any, shall be withdrawn, compounded, or quashed. The Parties undertake to fully cooperate with each other and file necessary joint applications, petitions, and affidavits and make requisite statements before the concerned courts/authorities for the purpose of withdrawing/quashing all the cases.

NO FUTURE CLAIMS OR LITIGATION: The Parties solemnly undertake that upon the complete execution of the terms of this Agreement, they shall have no further claims or demands of any nature whatsoever against each other or their respective family members, relatives, heirs, and assigns, relating, to their marriage. They further undertake not to initiate any civil or criminal proceedings against each other or their family members in the future with respect to this matrimonial alliance.

6. RETURN OF BELONGINGS: The Parties confirm that there are no pending claims against each other regarding any movables. immovables, jewelry, stridhan, dowry articles, or personal belongings, and all such issues have been amicably resolved.

7. MUTUAL UNDERTAKING OF NON-INTERFERENCE: Both Parties undertake not to interfere in
the personal, social or professional life of the other Party in any manner whatsoever. They shall not communicate witheach other through any medium (electronic or otherwise) and shall not make any defamatory or derogatory statements against each other or their families.

8. MUTUAL RELEASE OF LEGAL CLAIMS, LIABILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER: Both the parties hereby agreed and acknowledged that they shall not, at any point and anywhere, initiate or pursue any legal claim, demand, or action against each other, and that neither shall hold any liability towards the other. Each party shall be free to submit, at their own discretion, the documents pertaining to their divorce or decree before the authority concerned, if any, in order to maintain proper record and to avoid any future complications or misunderstandings among them with respect to this matrimonial alliance.

9. VOLUNTARY AND BINDING AGREEMENT: The parties declare that they have entered into this Settlement Agreement after fully understanding its terms and implications. They confirm that this agreement is the result of then-own free will and consent and is not vitiated by any coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties, their legal heirs, executors, and assigns.

10. VOLUNTARILY CHANGE THE NAME OF MANISH KUMAR AS HER HUSBAND BY THE FIRST PARTY-The first party/Wife shall change all her documents where she has mentioned her husband name as Manish Kumar like Aadhar card, Voter Id, PAN card, Bank details, ration cards, passports, driving licence, etc.

11. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between the Parties and supersedes all prior discussions and agreements. No modification of this Agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by both Parties.

Can co-traveller of an escort to Ganja carrying truck be denied regular bail?

In Thakur Shanni Pratap Singh @ Shanni vs. The Union of India NCB New Delhi (2026), Dr. Gopal Krishna appeared on April 10, 2026 for the petitioner before Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra to submit that this is the second attempt for regular bail in a case related to recovery of 544 kg of Ganja from a truck. 

This is an application for regular bail in connection with NCB Case No. 14 of 2023 instituted for offence under Sections of the Penal Code and under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act.

Dr Krishna submitted that the petitioner is in custody since November 4, 2023. He has no role in the offence. There was no recovery from the petitioner. The car on which was traveling has been released. He was sitting in the back of the car. He is not the owner of Ganja or the truck. e is not related to the truck in any manner. Nothing incriminating recovered from him. He was arrested on a mere confession of the driver of the car to the police officer. 

Dr. Krishna also pointed out the Petitioner, in stark contrast to the other accused, does not have any identifiable role. There is absence of any independent evidence establishing his active role, and given that he was merely a back-seat passenger unnamed in the original intelligence, there are clearly reasonable grounds for believing that the Petitioner is not guilty of the offences charged. The Petitioner has absolutely no criminal antecedent. 

The matter is listed for April 17.

    

Justice Rajiv Roy directs State respondents to file affidavit in a case seeking return of land acquired for unambiguous public purpose as per Agreement between Bihar Government and Rohtas Industries Limited

In Kumar Mirtunjay vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Rajiv Roy heard a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents-to-act under the ambit of unambiguous public purpose of the land acquisition law and desist from selling public purpose land and unacquired land for private purpose by selling it to private purpose entities with specific reference to sale of Khesra/Plot no. 723, which was acquired for the unambiguous public purpose of building houses of the company's workers but it was not built contrary to the clause in the Agreement between Bihar Government and M/S Rohtas Industries Limited under the land acquisition law. Dr. Gopal Krishna, the petitioner's counsel has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents to fix appropriate rate commensurate with the rate fixed by the State Government known as Circle Rate and upon payment at the same rate the land be directed to be returned to the Khatiyani Raiyat or their legal heirs. The 4-page long order dated April 7, 2026 by Justice Roy reads: "3. Let the State respondents file affidavit in the matter." The matter will come up for listing on June 23, 2026.

The petitioner had prayed for for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents to stay the sale proceeding till the claims of the Petitioner is adjudicated by the High Court. The petition prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents to hand over the unutilized plots of land to the Khatiyani Raiyat or legal successor on circle rate since the unambiguous public purpose for which the land was acquired by the State, and given to the company in question for utilization remains unutilized and is being sold to private purpose entities, which creates a logical and legal compulsion for the Respondents to return the land in question to the legal heirs of the original owner.  

On an earlier occasion, it is apparent that a co-ordinate bench of the Court which was seized with a matter concerning Plot no. 723 was misled by the Official Liquidator citing an order dated September 6, 2012, stating that petitioner's father, namely, Keshwar Singh along with 27 other petitioners, had come before the High Court in Item No.4, I.A.No. 5326/2012 filed by Nihora Singh & Ors.for similar relief. It is not clear as to whether Keshwar Singh was among the 27 other petitioners.  

The fact remains the writ is not confined to Plot no. 723. It seeks relief  with regard to the unacquired land, acquired, used and unused land situated in Village Rattu Bigha, Mauja. Mathuri, Thana No. 159, Tauji No 5335, Anchal-Dehri, District-Rohtas, Bihar which was acquired by the Government of Bihar for the purpose of welfare of construction of quarters for staff and labour of Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar. Land Details: The details of the acquired land are as follows:Khata No. 148: Khesra/Plot Nos.  703, 704, 709, 723, 733, 788, 796, 798, 809, 892, 901, 902 and 903, total area in decimal “746”. Khata No. 149: Khesra/Plot No. 739, 743, 797 and 816 total area decimal “102”. Khata No. 150: Khesra/Plot No. 872 total area decimal “52”

Details of Land Survey (L.S.) Khata No. 148: (i)Plot No. 703: Total 55 decimal of land, out of which 52.75 decimal of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, but 1.25 decimal of the land was illegitimately sold for Uday Pratap Singh. Register 2 rent is fixed in the name of Rohtas Industries in account number 146, it is shown in my account number 148, which is my land. The remaining 2.25 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (ii)Plot No. 709: Total 55 decimal of land, out of which 38.5 decimal of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, the remaining 16.5 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (iii)Plot No 733: Total 49 decimal of land, out of which 29 decimal of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, but Register 2 rent is fixed in the name of Rohtas Industries in only 17 decimals. The remaining 32 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (iv)Plot No 798: Total 124 decimal of land, acquired for Rohtas Industries, but 11.72 decimal of the land was illegitimately sold for Satyendra Narayan Singh. (v)Plot No 809: Total 83 decimal of land, out of which 30 decimals of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, the remaining 53 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (vi)Plot No 892: Total 63 decimal of land, acquired for Rohtas Industries, but 18.77 decimal of the land was illegitimately sold for Model School, a private school. (vii)Plot No.s 704, 723, 788, 796, 901, 902, 903: My land in these plots-04 decimal in Plot no. 704, 34 decimal in Plot no. 723, 25 decimal in Plot no. 788, 17 decimal in Plot no. 796, 15 decimal in Plot no. 901, 2.15 decimal in Plot no. 902 and 7 decimal in Plot no. 903 was totally acquired for Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar. As to the acquired land in Plot no. 723, a notice has been published a “sale notice” on February 4, 2026 In Hindustan newspaper, Patna edition at page no. 3 fixing 20.02.2026 as a date for opening the sealed tender contrary to the clause in the Agreement between Bihar Government and M/S Rohtas Industries Limited. Details of L.S. Khata No. 149: Plot No 739, 743, 797 and 816: My land in these plots-16 decimal in Plot no. 739, 45 decimal in Plot no. 743, 12 decimal in Plot no. 797, and 29 decimal in Plot no. 816 was totally acquired for Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar. Details of L.S. Khata No. 150, Plot No 872: Total 52 decimal of my land was totally acquired for Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar.