Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Harish Kumar sets aside judgement by Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy

"Labour law is not merely an adjunct of the law of contract; it is a charter of human rights at the workplace. The Government cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with its own employees. To deny a workman his lawful dues by juggling with procedural niceties is to negate the very rule of law."

-Judgement dated May 7, 2026 in Siya Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Labour,  Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026) by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar 

In Siya Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Labour, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 23-page long judgement dated May 7, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy. It concluded:"28.....we are of the humble view that when the foundational award has not been challenged before the learned Single Judge, the impugned order disturbing the effect of such award, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, the impugned order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, is hereby set aside. The writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 17753 of 2018 filed by the appellant Siya Singh is allowed and the writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 filed by the Corporation stands dismissed. 29. Both the Letters Patent Appeals stand allowed." 

The six other respondents were: 2.District Magistrate-Cum-Collector, Patna, 3. Certificate Officer-Cum-District, Panchayati Raj Officer, Patna, 4. Bihar State Road Transport Corporation through its Administrator, Patna, 5. Administrator, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, 6. Chief Accounts Officer, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna and 7. Divisional Manager, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna Division, Bankipur, Patna. 

 Both the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the appellant Siya Singh challenging the common order dated June 23, 2025 passed by Justice Chakravarthy, the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 and C.W.J.C. No. 17753 of 2018, whereby the writ petition filed by the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation vide C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 was allowed and the writ petition filed by the appellant Siya Singh vide C.W.J.C. No. 17753 of 2018 was dismissed. 

C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 was filed by the Corporation through the Chief of Administration with a prayer for quashing the judgment dated June 19, 2013, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in Misc. Case No. 02 of 2008 which had directed payment of back wages to the tune of Rs. 11,70,990/- (Rupees Eleven Lakh Seventy Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety only) after computation under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947as per the award dated November 14, 2006 passed by the said Court in Reference Case No. 24 of 1995 under section 10(1)(c) of I.D. Act, 1947. 

It was the case of the Corporation in C.W.J.C. No. 2592 of 2014 that the appellant was working as a Conductor in the Corporation, in Bankipur Depot, Patna and on January 24, 1978, while he was on duty in vehicle no. BHT-8015 (Rupauli – Patna service), during checking, it was found that the appellant had realized fare from ten unbooked passengers illegally without giving them any tickets, and there were seventeen unbooked passengers in the bus, and he had committed misconduct with the checking party and, as such, the charge was framed against him and after proper departmental enquiry, it was proved that he collected illegal money from the unbooked passengers and ultimately he was dismissed from service on September 19, 1978.. The dispute was referred by the Govt. of Bihar to the Labour Court and Reference Case No. 24 of 1995 was initiated under Section 10(1)(c) of I.D. Act, 1947 and the terms of reference were as follows: “Whether the termination of services of Siya Singh, Conductor, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Bankipur Depot is proper and justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?”

The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna before whom oral and documentary evidence was adduced by both the sides, after hearing the parties, passed the award on November 14, 2006 in favour of the appellant. The Labour Court set aside the dismissal order of the appellant dated September 19, 1978 and held that the appellant would be deemed to be an employee on the date of dismissal and the management was directed to reinstate him with full back wages and other consequential benefits.

It was the case of the Corporation that the appellant submitted the award before the Corporation and since the Corporation was running under acute financial crisis, the Administrator of the Corporation suggested to the appellant for reinstatement, after forgoing the back wages and consequential benefits, as provided in the award, which was accepted by the appellant. Accordingly, the reinstatement order was passed on December 28, 2007 with a specific direction that the appellant shall not be entitled to any benefits for the non-working period.

The case of the Corporation was that the appellant willfully accepted the order dated December 28, 2007, without any objection and joined the duty and after one year, he filed Misc. Case No. 02 of 2008 before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947, claiming the back wages to the tune of Rs. 16,90,238/- (Rupees Sixteen Lakh Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Eight only), wherein the Corporation appeared on being noticed and filed the show-cause. However, the Labour Court without proper finding and without assigning any cogent reason passed the order dated June 19, 2013, holding that the appellant was entitled to get a sum of Rs. 11,70,990/- only instead of his total back wages and other consequential benefits. The Labour Court also directed the Corporation to pay the said amount to the appellant within three months from the date of the order, failing which the Corporation would be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum, on the said amount. 

The Corporation contended that the Labour Court had granted the relief without proper application of judicial mind and without considering the principle of “No Work, No Pay”, as well as the fact that the appellant had been engaged in other employment during the idle period.

Chief Justice Sahoo who authored the judgement observed:"26. The liability of any employer towards its workmen arises from the very nature of the employment relationship and cannot be shaken off by the employer through make-believe arrangement, or claims of financial hardship. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in a landmark
decision in the case of Hussainbhai, Calicut Vrs.- The Alath Factory Thezhilali Union, Kozhikode & Ors., reported in (1978) 4 Supreme Court Cases 257 as follows:- “6. If the livelihood of the workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make-believe trappings of detachment from the Management cannot snap the real life-bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off.” Further in the case of Hombe Gowda Educational Trust & Anr. -Vrs.- State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 430, it was held as follows:- “30. This Court has come a long way from its earlier viewpoints. The recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between the earlier approach to the industrial relation wherein only the interest of the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court, it has been noticed how discipline at the workplace/industrial undertakings received a setback. In view of the change in economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity. Our country is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore, must be taken in
accordance with law……”
27. Therefore, in our humble view, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from perversity and patent illegality and this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal has got ample jurisdiction to interfere with such an order, therefore, we feel it necessary to correct the errors committed by
the learned Single Judge."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Satyavrat Verma in an Excise case

In Kumar Viplav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Courts Division Bench of Justices  B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 5-page long order dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated January 30, 2026 passed by Justice Satyavrat Verma of the Patna High Court. 

The appeal had challenged Justuce Verma's order. The criminal appeal arose out of crime registered pursuant to FIR No. 19 of 2022 dated February 22, 2022 lodged with PS Maranchi (Pach Mohalla O.P.), District Patna, registered under Section 30(a) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2016. Anticipating arrest in connection with the offence in question, the appellant had preferred an application for anticipatory bail before the High Court. By order dated December 4, 2025, the High Court had granted  provisional anticipatory bail subject to verification that the appellant had no criminal antecedents. Thereafter, the appellant filed a modification application before the High Court to disclose a criminal antecedent under Sections 323, 341, 379, 387 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, all relatable to a single incident. Subsequently, by impugned order dated January 30, 2026, the High Court did not confirm the provisional order, thereby denying the relief of anticipatory bail. Hence, the appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court's order reads:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail claimed. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 30.01.2026."  

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed an order, which reads:"2. The Court is taking a consistent view of not modifying the order by which petitioner was granted anticipatory bail, in the event, if the same was obtained by concealing the criminal antecedent of the petitioner. 3. Accordingly, the instant modification application is dismissed." Supreme Cort has reversed this order by the High Court. 

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Dr. Anshuman sets aside judgemengt by Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS Court No. II, East Champaran

In Manoj Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 39-page long judgement dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"89. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt.....this Court deems it appropriate to observe that cases arising under the NDPS Act require strict adherence to the statutory safeguards prescribed under the Act. The investigating agency is expected to ensure scrupulous compliance of the mandatory procedural requirements relating to search, seizure, sampling and preservation of seized narcotic substances so as to maintain the sanctity and credibility of the prosecution case." It was heard along with Sheikh Amrullah vs. The State of Bihar (2026). The judgement also concluded:"91. The judgment of conviction, dated 14.05.2025 and the order of sentence, dated 19.05.2025, passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS Court No. II, East Champaran, Motihari in NDPS Case No. 10 of 2024, arising out of Ramgarhwa P.S. Case No. 277 of 2023, so far as it relates to the present appellant Sheikh Amirullah, are hereby set aside." The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhury. 

The criminal appeal was preferred by the appellant against the judgment of conviction dated May 14, 2025 and the order of sentence dated May 19, 2025 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS Court No. II, East Champaran, Motihari in NDPS Case No. 10 of 2024, arising out of Ramgarhwa P.S. Case No. 277 of 2023. By the impugned judgment, the Trial Court held the appellant along with co-accused persons guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c), 23 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/ each. 

The appellant, namely Sheikh Amirullah, who was arrayed as accused no. 2 before the Trial Court, had assailed the judgment on the ground that the conviction was recorded without proper appreciation of the evidence on record and in complete disregard of the mandatory safeguards provided under the NDPS Act. The prosecution case arose out of an alleged recovery of charas of commercial quantity was said to have been made from the possession of the accused persons on July 5, 2023, leading to institution of the police case and subsequent trial culminating in conviction. Being aggrieved by the recorded findings of the Trial Court and the sentence imposed, the appeal was filed seeking interference of the High Court.

The prosecution case emerged from the written report of the informant and the evidence adduced during trial, was that on July 5, 2023 at about 19:30 hours, the informant, namely Indrajeet Paswan, who was then posted as Officer-in-Charge of Ramgarhwa Police Station, along with other police personnel, proceeded on patrolling duty from the police station. It was stated that while the police party was engaged in routine checking of vehicles near Bela Canal Chowk, two motorcycles were seen approaching from the side of Ramgarhwa market. One motorcycle was being driven by a single person, while on the other motorcycle, two persons were riding. On noticing the police party, the accused persons allegedly turned their motorcycles and attempted to flee towards the market side, which aroused suspicion. The police party immediately chased the motorcycles and succeeded in intercepting them near Semar Chowk. 

Upon interception, the persons riding the motorcycles were apprehended and their identities were ascertained. The person on the first motorcycle disclosed his name as Manoj Yadav, whereas the two persons on the second motorcycle disclosed their names as Suresh Prasad Kushwaha and Sheikh Amirullah, the appellant. Upon questioning regarding the articles carried by them, the accused persons allegedly became nervous and gave evasive replies. Thereafter, the police decided to conduct search of their persons as well as the bags allegedly carried by them.

According to the prosecution, before conducting the search, the accused persons were informed about their legal right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, and it was alleged that they consented to be searched by the police party itself. Thereafter, the contraband articles were seized, seizure list was prepared at the place of occurrence, and the accused persons were taken into custody.

On the basis of the written report of the informant, a Ramgarhwa P.S. Case of 2023 was registered under the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act, and investigation was taken up. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons, whereafter cognizance was taken and the case was committed for trial. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons, whereafter cognizance of the offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c), 23 and 25 of the NDPS Act was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS, where it came to be registered as NDPS Case No. 10 of 2024. Charges were framed on June 19, 2024 against all the accused persons. The contents of the charges were read over and explained to them in vernacular, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined altogether six witnesses. Upon a careful reading of their cross-examination, it appears that these witnesses have not been able to furnish clear and consistent details regarding the manner in which the seized articles were handled after recovery. There is no definite evidence regarding sealing of the contraband at the place of occurrence, nor is there any clarity as to the procedure adopted for sampling. It also came on record that although public persons were present, none were made witnesses to the seizure and no explanation, except a general statement of refusal, was substantiated.

Justice Chaudhury observed: "29. Thus, the entire case of the prosecution rests upon the testimony of police witnesses and the documents prepared during investigation, without any independent corroboration with respect to the alleged recovery, search and subsequent handling of the seized contraband."

Justice Chaudhury added: "29. After referring to the earlier judgments, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that non-compliance with requirement of Sections 42 and 50 is impermissible whereas delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. The Constitution Bench noted the effect of the aforesaid two decisions in para 5. The present is not a case where insofar as compliance with Section 42(1) proviso even an argument based on substantial compliance is raised there is total non-compliance with Section 42(1) proviso. As observed above, Section 43 being not attracted, search was to be conducted after complying with the provisions of Section 42. We thus, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that non-compliance with Section 42(1) and Section 42(2) were proved on the record and the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the conviction order.

Upon hearing and upon consideration of the materials available on record, the following questions arise for determination in the appeal before the Division Bench: (i) Whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged contraband was recovered from conscious and exclusive possession of the appellant in the manner alleged? (ii) Whether the prosecution has complied with the mandatory requirements of Sections 42, 52A, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act in course of search, seizure, sampling and subsequent handling of the seized articles? (iii) Whether the prosecution has been able to establish a complete and reliable chain of custody with respect to the alleged seized contraband from the stage of seizure till forensic examination? (iv) Whether non-examination of seizure witnesses, non-production of seized contraband before the Court and the contradictions appearing in the evidence of prosecution witnesses create reasonable doubt in the prosecution case? (v) Whether the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Trial Court can be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the present case?

The judgement reads: "60. The prosecution case rests entirely upon the testimony of official witnesses. Admittedly, no independent witness has been examined in the present case, although the prosecution itself asserts that several persons had assembled at the place of occurrence. The prosecution has sought to explain such non-examination by stating that public persons declined to become witnesses. However, except such bald assertion, no material has been brought on record to show that any sincere effort was made to secure participation of independent persons. 61. It further appears from the record that even the chowkidars, namely Nawal Kishore Rai and Raushan Kumar Patel, who according to the prosecution were present during the alleged search and seizure, have not been examined during trial. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished regarding their non-examination. In a case resting solely upon police witnesses, non-examination of such material witnesses assumes significance and creates doubt regarding fairness of the alleged recovery proceedings."

It has recorded: "66. The evidence on record further reveals serious infirmities with regard to seizure, sampling and preservation of the alleged contraband. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, though members of the raiding party, have not stated anything regarding sealing of the seized articles at the place of occurrence or drawing of samples at the spot. Their evidence is conspicuously silent regarding the manner in which the
seized contraband was preserved after seizure. 67. The evidence of PW-6, the Investigating Officer, assumes considerable importance in this regard. In paragraph 40 of his evidence, he has admitted that samples were not drawn at the place of occurrence. In paragraph 42, he has stated that he was not aware as to when and where the seized articles were sealed. He has further stated that samples were drawn on 15.10.2023, i.e., more than three months after the alleged seizure dated 05.07.2023....70. Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the prosecution has failed to prove preparation of inventory in accordance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act. There is no evidence to show that samples were drawn before a Magistrate or that any inventory was certified as required under law.....72. This Court also finds substance in the submission advanced regarding non-production of the seized contraband before the Court. The alleged seized article has not been produced and marked as material exhibit during trial. In
Vijay Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 527 it has been held that failure to produce the seized contraband before the Court creates serious doubt regarding the prosecution case." 

Dr. Gopal Krishna and Amish Kumar appointed Amicus Curiae in Excise Act-NDPS Act Special Court case by Full Bench of Patna High Court

In Md. Afsar @ Md. Afsar Alam vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Full Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Jitendra Kumar, and Dr. Anshuman passed an order dated May, 5, 2026, wherein, it appointed Dr. Gopal Krishna and Amish Kumar as Amicus Curiae in a Excise-NDPS Special Court case.  The case arose from a regular bail application in connection with Kadwa P.S. Case No. 144 of 2021 which had arisen out of G.R. No.2365/2021, lodged on June 20, 2021 under Sections 8, 20(b) (ii),C of the N.D.P.S. Act read with section 30(a) of Bihar Prohibition & Excise Act.

The Full Bench of the High Court has been constituted to answer the references made in paragraph ‘15’ of the judgment dated May 8, 2024 passed by Justice Dr. Anshuman, a Single Judge of the High Court in Cr. Misc. No. 19801 of 2024. The said paragraph ‘15’ reads: “15. After passing the order of disposal in this case, I find, there are questions necessary to be answered with a view to find solution to problem which has arisen ad-nauseam before the Trial Court. Therefore, it is essential to be tested by the Larger Bench for which reference is necessary to be framed which are as follows:-“The Trial of a criminal case has to be conducted before which Court? (a) When, the said criminal case has been lodged under two or more offences, which come under different Central Acts for which two or more different Special Courts assigned for trial under statutes. (b) When, the said criminal case has been lodged under two or more offences which comes under one or more Central act and one or more State act having two or more different Special Courts assigned for trial under statutes. (c) When, the said criminal case has been lodged under two or more offences which come under I.P.C. and Special Acts having different situations viz., (i) offences of I.P.C. provides higher punishment and Special Act provides lower punishment (For example:- a case under section 420 of the I.P.C. for which warrant trial prescribed with section 7 of the E.C. Act for which summary trial prescribed under law. (ii) section 302 of the I.P.C. for which Sessions Trial provided with offences under Excise Act for which Special trial provided. (iii) offences under I.P.C., Excise Act and E.C. Act (special law special trial) (iv) offences under section 420 I.P.C. for which warrant trial provided with offences of section 138 of N.I. Act for which summary trial provided.” 

The Court called upon N. K. Agrawal, senior counsel to first make a submission on the scope of the reference. Whether in a given case where the learned Single Judge has, upon hearing the matter with the assistance of the Advocate at the Bar, decided the issues raised therein and disposed of the matter, would be justified in framing certain questions which have not been discussed in connection with the said case, for purpose of reference to a larger Bench.

The Full Bench referred to judgments of the Kerala High Court and the Allahabad High Court in the case of Babu Premarajan vs. Superintendent of Police, Kasargode and Others reported in 2000 SCC OnLine Ker 138 and Suo Moto action taken by the Court vs. I.C.I.C.I. Bank Ltd., I.C.I.C.I. Bank Towers, Bandra Kurla complex, Mumbai through its Chairman and Others reported in 2003 SCC OnLine All 365 respectively have been referred to at the Bar. 

The Full Bench requested Advocate General to assist the Court. The Court's order reads:" 11. Let complete brief of the matter be made available to learned Advocate General, Mr. Amish Kumar, learned Advocate as also Mr. Gopal Krishna, learned Advocate. 12. We fix this matter for further consideration on 1st July, 2026 at 10:30 A.M."

 Also read:  Full Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Jitendra Kumar, Dr. Anshuman to hear a NDPS case referred by Dr. Anshuman

Change of counsel by party and filing of fresh vakalatnama by newly engaged counsel when permissible?

In Smt. Champa Devi vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, 1992 (2) ARC 634 (All),  a civil appeal which was dismissed by the court under Order 41, Rule 17 of the CPC and thereafter restoration application under Order 41, rule 19 of the CPC was moved, explaining rule 39 of Chapter II in part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975, it has been held that so far as the courts are concerned it is not open to a party to determine the appointment of a counsel without permission of the Court. It is not open to a client to withdraw the file of the case from his counsel without permission of the Court as required under Order 3, Rule 4 and ordinarily a Counsel cannot withdraw from the case, on his being engaged without leave of the
Court so far as the case is concerned, as if a party is deemed to be entitled to change Counsels one after other at his sweet will and take away from the file of the case from one Counsel without determining his appointment according to requirement of the rule and engage other and thereafter engages a third Counsel after taking the file of the second Counsel without consent in writing of the Counsel after taking the file of the second Counsel without consent in writing of the Counsel already on record of the case and without permission of the Court, disastrous consequences may ensue and follow. 

As such, it is not open to a party to subterfuge another Counsel before determining the appointment of the earlier one in accordance with law as provided under Order 3, Rule 4, except in the cases or in the circumstances provided by the modifying the rules or immediate appointment of the second Counsel with the consent writing of the Counsel already on record.Rule 39 of Bar Council of India Rules, per se shows as a rule of conduct on the part of Advocate and it imposes an obligation on Advocate that in cases or in any case where there is already an Advocate engaged by a party and vakalatnama has already been filed, no Advocate shall appear for that party except with the consent of the Advocate already on the record of the case and a reading of the rules indicates that as consent has to be produced before the Court, it means the consent should be in writing and if for some reasons or other the consent cannot be produced then the second Counsel put in appearance, in the case, with application for permission in which he shall state the reasons as to why he is unable to produce the consent and will seek the permission of the Court for appearing in that case.  

The law and spirit of this rule of conduct on the part of Advocate also emphasize and indicates its purposes, which is two-fold, namely, firstly, that keeping pace with the position of an Advocate, it is necessary that in order to maintain certain norms of lis and ethics of profession as well as to maintain their status and dignity, it should be provided that they should not themselves to make their own-selves or their colleagues, a subject matter or a tool or a thing in the hands of litigants or touts or like persons to be changed every now and then according to the whims of the litigants or control over them of unwanted touts or like persons on one hand and the rule casts a duty on them that the Counsel should not accept a brief in which an Advocate is already there to represent the party who intends to engage him and should not put in appearance for a party who has already been filed on the record of the case unless and until the Counsel already on record given his consent in writing or in some special circumstances and cases where consents have not been obtained or could not be obtained and produced before the Court, requires the Counsels, narrating those circumstances and reasons why the consent could not be obtained move application for permission and then the Court having the power in such a case to grant permission to the second Counsel to appear grants the permission after considering those circumstances justifying the grant of permission. 

The second object of the rule is to maintain certainly of representation of a party in the case by a specifically appointed Counsel and, thirdly, as far as possible not to allow the parties litigants to abuse such a situation and to make it (sic) of and cause for obtaining adjournments which might otherwise be refused. 

Personal attendance of accused may be dispensed with during an enquiry or trial and in absence of accused, proceedings may be conducted by his Advocate: Section, 228, 355 Cr. P.C.

There are two sections i.e. Section 228 BNSS (Section 205 Cr.P.C.) and 355 BNSS (Section 317 Cr.P.C.) which provide that the personal attendance of the accused may be dispensed with during an enquiry or trial and in absence of the accused, the proceedings may be conducted by his Advocate. 

The provisions of Sections 228 and 355 BNSS are as under:

Section 228. Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of a accused.—(1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his advocate.

(2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may, in his discretion, at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided.

Section 355 BNSS. Provision for inquiries and trial being held in absence of accused in certain cases.—(1) At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Sanhita, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that the personal attendance of the accused before the Court is not necessary in the interests of justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if the accused is represented by an advocate, dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such accused.

(2) If the accused in any such case is not represented by an advocate, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers his personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of such accused be taken up or tried separately.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, personal attendance of the accused includes attendance through audio-video electronic means.

As per Section 228 and 355 BNSS during an enquiry or trial, the accused is required to appear before the court in person, unless an exemption from personal appearance has been granted by a judicial magistrate or a judge.

There are four stages of criminal proceedings during which an accused may abscond. Upon following the prescribed legal procedure, the criminal proceedings shall be concluded. The stages and the corresponding legal procedures are as follows :-

First- An accused absconds during investigation and police report/charge sheet is submitted against him, declaring him a proclaimed offender.

Second- An accused is not arrested during the investigation; either his arrest is stayed by any court of law, or his arrest is not required and he subsequently absconds after summoning and till the conclusion of the trial.

Third- An accused is on bail during investigation, furnishing bail bond and surety and he absconds subsequently after summoning and till the conclusion of the trial. 

Fourth- An accused absconds after the framing of charge while he was released on bail/anticipatory bail, on furnishing his bail bond and surety.

Accordingly, the police, public officers, prosecutors and the court should strictly adhere to the following procedures prescribed under the BNSS and other relevant laws to ensure a speedy trial in cases involving an absconding accused at any stage of criminal proceedings.