Justice Khatim Reza sets aside order by Bihar Land Tribunal comprising of Justice (Retd.) Mridula Mishra, Ram Pravesh Sharma, K. P. Ramaiah, remits the matter back to it, directs it to decide it preferably, within 9 months on merit in accordance with law after hearing all the parties

In Vishal Kumar Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Khatim Reza delivered a 15-page long judgement dated November 6, 2026, wherein, he set aside order dated October 3, 2016 by Justice (Retd.) Mridula Mishra led  Bihar Land Tribunal, remitted the matter back to it, directed it to decide it preferably, within nine months on merit in accordance with law after hearing all the parties. Justice Mishra was the Chairperson of the tribunal during January 16, 2012-January 17, 2017. Ram Pravesh Sharma was the judicial member during her tenure. 

Notably, K. P. Ramaiah was the administrative member during the tenure of Justice Mishra and even after that till his resignation in May 2019 after vigilance investigation bureau lodged an FIR against him Bihar Mahadalit Vikas Mission scam related to embezzlement of at least Rs 5.01 crore of central government funds for imparting computer training and of spoken English and other courses to Mahadalit youths under Dashrath Manjhi Skill Development Scheme, which was run by Bihar Mahadalit Vikas Mission. 

The tribunal is constituted under Chapter XIII of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 and Article 323B of the Constitution of India. The function of the tribunal extends to twelve laws including Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act,1956, Bihar Tenants' Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973, Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947, Bihar Government Estates Manual, 1953, Bihar Settlement Manual, Bihar Land Disputes Resolution Act, 2009, Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act ,2001and Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011.  

Justice Reza concluded: "16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions of the parties, it is apparent that the present proceeding is not related to reopening of the case. It is the case of continuation of original ceiling proceedings (Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76). The statutory remedy for an appeal against the final order passed under Section 11(1) of the Ceiling Act is prescribed under Section 30 of the Ceiling Act and the provision for revision against the order of appellate court is prescribed under Section 32 of the Ceiling Act. Both the sections give statutory right to the parties. These sections have not been repealed by Gazette notification. The pending proceedings under Section 30 & 32 as well as proceedings pending before the Bihar Land Tribunal against the order passed under Section 32 of the Ceiling Act shall not be abated under Section 45D of the Ceiling Act. The final adjudicatory authority is Bihar Land Tribunal which has the power to entertain any application against the final order under the Ceiling Act under Section 9 of the Bihar Land Tribunal Act, and, thus, the appeal, revision and B.L.T. Case are continuation of original ceiling proceedings. The question of abatement of the proceedings under Section 45D of the Ceiling Act does not arise. 17. Since the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is not on merit and it is only on technical issue, the impugned order dated 03.10.2016 passed in B.L.T. Case No. 7 of 2014 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Bihar Land Tribunal to dispose of the case afresh on merit in accordance with law after hearing all the parties. 18. Further, the Bihar Land Tribunal Patna is directed to dispose of the Bihar Land Tribunal Case No. 7 of 2014 as early as possible, preferably, within a period of nine (9) months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 19. In the result, this writ application is allowed." 

The five respondents were:2. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar, 3. The Collector, Kaimur at Bhabua, 4. The Additional Collector, Kaimur at Bhabua, 5. Circle Officer, Kudra, Kaimur at Bhabua and 6. Ramayan Paswan, Chilbili, Kudra, Kaimur (Bhabua).

The writ application was heard on remand by the Supreme Court vide order dated 17.02.2025 passed in Civil Appeal No. 4419 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 12649 of 2022 whereby the order of  Single Judge dated 10.05.2019 passed in CWJC No. 20355 of 2016 and judgment of Division Bench of the Patna High Court had passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 615 of 2019 on 04.07.2022 had been set aside by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that in this case, the issue to declare the land belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant as surplus is in question. In the cases where the land has been declared surplus and prior to dismissing the pending proceedings before the Tribunal the question of possession is relevant. In the case at hand, the land was declared as surplus and proceedings were pending before Tribunal at the time of declaring such proceedings as abated. Therefore, in such a situation dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches would not be justified. In such view of the matter, the orders of the High Court were set aside and the matter was remitted to be decided on merit. The writ application was filed for quashing the resolution dated October 15, 1993 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar in Case No. 226 of 1989 whereby the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar, affirmed the order passed by the Collector, Rohtas in Ceiling Case No. 05 of 1989 affirming the order of the Additional Collector (Ceiling) Kaimur in Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973-74/158 of 1975 / 76. 

The case of the petitioners was that the Land Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973-74 was initiated against the land holder, namely, Late Baijnath Singh and Late Shiv Shankar Singh, both sons of Late Kalki Singh under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. According to the verification report of the Circle Officer, the descendants of Late Kalki Singh possessed 63.02 acres of land on September 9, 1970 out of which of the land except 4 acres of land has no facility for irrigation. As per the genealogical table mentioned in the verification report of the Circle Officer, Late Baijnath Singh had two sons, namely Rajendra Prasad Singh and Chandra Bhan Singh and one daughter, namely Godawari Devi. Late Shiv Shankar Singh had also two sons, namely, Mritunjay Singh and Karunesh Singh and one daughter, namely, Kumari Madhu Singh. Accordingly, a draft statement under Section 10(2) of the Ceiling Act was published in the official gazette of the district. The land holder filed their objections under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act. As per the verification report of the Circle Officer, Shiv Shankar Singh wrongly shown as dead. The age of Rajendra Singh and Chandra Bhan Singh, both sons of Baijnath Singh, are shown to be 28 years and 23 years on the appointed day i.e. on September 9, 1970. 

It was further case of the petitioners that in the said report, Mritunjay Singh, father of the petitioners and Karunesh Singh, son of Late Shiv Shankar Singh are shown to be aged about 24 years and 20 years respectively on the appointed day. The Additional Collector (Ceiling) again called for a verification report from Circle Officer, Kudra, which was submitted vide Letter No. 738 dated 14.05.1977. In the said report, the facts stated in the earlier reports were reiterated. It was also pleaded that the land holders filed a matriculation certificate of Rajendra Singh and a certificate issued by the Head Master of Madhya Vidhyalay, Jehanabad and also appointment letter of Chandra Bhan Singh, but even then, the Additional Collector (Ceiling) neither accepted the verification report nor the certificate submitted by the land holders and held that Rajendra Singh, Chandra Bhan Singh, Mritunjay Singh and Karunesh Singh were minors on the appointed day and only two units of land; one for Baijnath Singh and another for Most. Ram Pyari Kunwar were allowed and all the lands were classified as Class-II land and thus 27.02 acres land was found to be surplus by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Kaimur on 11.08.1988 in the said Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973-74 / 158 of 1975-76. An appeal was preferred before the District Collector, Rohtas which gave rise to the Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989. The Collector modified the order of the Additional Collector (Ceiling) dated 11.08.1988 and disposed of the appeal by its order dated May 9, 1989 allowing one unit with three additional units to the members of the family of land holders. The order dated May 9, 1989 came to be challenged by way of revision under Section 32 of Ceiling Act giving rise to Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 which came to be dismissed by order dated 15.10.1993.

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue dated 15.10.1993, a writ application was filed by the land holders before the High Court which gave rise to C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006. The said writ petition was disposed of by order of this Court dated 05.12.2013 by transferring the same to the Bihar Land Tribunal, Patna after noticing the fact that the dispute was amenable to the jurisdiction of Bihar Land Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the Bihar Land Tribunal Act, 2009. Applying the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 2009 read with Rule 5(6) of the Bihar Land Tribunal Rules, 2010, the records of the writ proceedings were transferred to the Tribunal for adjudication which was numbered as B.L.T. Case No. 07 of 2014 which was disposed of as abated by the order dated October 3, 2016 passed by the Chairman of the Bihar Land Tribunal in view of repealing Section 45B by inserting Section 45D of the Ceiling Act which is under challenged in the present writ application.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that original petitioners filed C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006 before the High Court against the order passed in Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue against the allotment of the units to the land holders. The impugned orders arise out of Land Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975- 76 passed by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Kaimur as well as order dated 09.05.1989 passed by the Collector, Rohtas in Ceiling Appeal Case No. 5 of 1989 and order passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue in Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 which was ultimately transferred by a Bench of the High Court to Bihar Land Tribunal for adjudication. It is further submitted that all the aforesaid orders have been passed in continuation of original proceedings. However, the order passed by the Additional ollector and the Collector were not passed under Section 45B of the Ceiling Act and no any proceedings has ever been initiated against the land holders under Section 45B of the Ceiling Act. The Tribunal wrongly assumed that the present proceedings is initiated under Section 45B of the Ceiling Act. Against the order of Additional Collector passed on 11.08.1988 in Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76, the land holders filed Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 before the Collector. The Collector modified the order of Additional Collector to the detrimental of the petitioners to the extent of allowing only one unit of land to the family of the land holders and declared 39.62 acres of Class-II land as surplus. Against the aforesaid order of the Collector, the land holders filed Revision Case No. 226 of 1989, which, too, was dismissed vide Resolution dated 15.10.1993 by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue. Against the aforesaid revisional order, the original petitioner filed C.W.J.C. No. 740of 2006. It is apparent from the proceedings which was challenged in C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006 arising out of Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76 that a direction was given for transferring the records of the case to the Bihar Land Tribunal.

Thec ounsel for the petitioners submitted that the Tribunal has not passed order on merit. The order passed
by the Tribunal is purely on technical issue. The Tribunal misdirected itself that Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act has been repealed and a new Section 45-D has been added after Section 45-C in the Ceiling Act. As per Section 45-D after repeal of Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act, proceedings pending before the State or the Bihar Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be abated and the proceedings reopened earlier under the repealed Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act and are pending before the Collector shall also stand abated. Since the matter is still pending, as such, it shall also stand abated.

The counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the appeal was in continuation of original proceedings bearing Land Ceiling Case No. 43/1973-74 / 158/1975-76 against the order of the Additional Collector, whereby 27.02 acres of Class-II land held by the landlord was found to be surplus. The Collector in Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 found that wrongly one major units and three additional units were to be given to the land holders and thus, the order of the Additional Collector referred to above was modified by giving one major unit and three additional units (1/10th of an unit) to the land holders. The said order was challenged by the land holders before the Additional Member,  Board of Revenue vide Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989 which was not interfered with and Board of Revenue dismissed the aforesaid revision petition on 15.10.1993. The aforesaid proceedings were in continuation of original aforesaid land ceiling case proceedings and B.L.T. Case is also in continuation of original Ceiling Proceedings. The order passed by the Additional Collector, the Collector and the Additional Member, Board ofRevenue, Govt. of Bihar are not arising out of reopening of Ceiling Case under Section 45-B of the Ceiling Act. 

The counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the Appellate Court's order is bad in law became in absence of any appeal by the State Government, the units were reduced to one from two as given in the original proceedings merely on the ground of death of Baijnath Singh, who died during the pendency of the proceedings and was very much alive on September 9, 1970 i.e. the cut of death as fixed in the Act itself and the same was even affirmed by the revisional court.

So far denial of unit to one Chandra Bhan Singh is concerned, it was submitted that since he was not matriculate, therefore, only School Leaving Certificate was provided which shows his date of birth as 17.01.1946, meaning thereby that on the appointed day, he was major and not only this, his appointment letter and confirmation letter of Hindalco Industries Limited, Renukut, was also given, but it was not considered and he, too, was not allotted any unit. By now, he has retired on 18.01.2004 from the aforesaid employment and a certificate to this effect was given to him stating therein that he was in continuous service from October 3, 1965 and on his PAN Card also, the date of birth is given as 17.01.1946. The genealogical table shows that at least three more units should have been given to the land holders and the land in question should have been declared as Class-IV land and any improvement of irrigation facility after 09.09.1970 could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of declaration of nature of land under the Act. The report of the Circle Officer clearly stated the aforesaid persons as major and apart from 4 acres of land over 59 acres of land was declared to be Class-IV land but that, too, was not considered by any of the authorities.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that it is admitted fact that till date the land, in question, is in possession of the petitioners and the land holders, which would be evident from the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the respondents before the Bihar Land Tribunal in which they themselves have admitted this fact that the land is in possession of the land holders.

On the other hand, counsel for the State submitted that the Ceiling Case No. 43 of 1973 / 158 of 1975-76 was initiated against Baijnath Singh and Shiv Shankar Singh, both the sons of Late Kalika Singh before the Additional Collector, Rohtas, in which show-cause was called for from the land holders. They filed their show-cause mentioning therein that their lands under Ceiling Act are unirrigated save and except 4 acres of irrigated land. As such, their land comes under category of Class-IV and also claimed 6 units on the basis of genealogical table. After hearing the parties, the Additional Collector passed an order on 11.08.1988 by which one unit each to Ram Dulari Kunwar, wife of Baijnath Singh and Ram Pyari Kunwar, wife of Shiv Shankar Singh was allowed and the land was declared as Class-2 land and accordingly, 36 acres land was allowed to be retained by land holders and rest 27.02 acres of land was declared as Surplus.

Against the order dated August 11, 1988, the land holders preferred a Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 before the Collector, Rohtas at Sasaram. After hearing the parties, the appellate court passed order on May 9, 1989 whereby the order of Additional Collector was modified to the extent that only one unit was granted to the appellant nos. 1 & 3 (minor) in family which were given as 1/10th of a unit and the petitioners were allowed to be entitled to retain only 23.04 acres of land of Class-II land and remaining 39.62 acres of land was declared as surplus.

Against the aforesaid order, the petitioners moved before the Board of Revenue in Ceiling Revision Case No. 226 of 1989. The said revision application was dismissed on October 15, 1993 and the order of District Collector, Rohtas at Sasaram was affirmed. The petitioners preferred C.W.J.C. No. 7407 of 2006
which was ultimately transferred to the Bihar Land Tribunal. After receiving the above writ application, B.L.T Case No. 7 of 2014 was registered in the registry of Bihar Land Tribunal, Patna.

During the pendency of B.L.T Case, Section 45B of the Ceiling Act was repealed and a new Section 45D of the Ceiling Act was added by the State Government through amendment. Since the matter was kept in suspended animation, the record of the Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1989 was sent to the S.D.M., Mohania for
compliance of the order. The S.D.M., Mohania after hearing the parties, passed an order on 27.04.2019 / 22.06.2019 declaring 39.62 acres of Class-II land as surplus in the light of order dated 12.04.1989 / 09.05.1989 was passed by the Collector, Rohtas and a Gazette notification was published under Section 11(1) of the Ceiling Act on 20.08.2019. Against the order dated 27.04.2019 /22.06.2019 passed in Ceiling Case No. 5 of 1989, the land holders (petitioners) filed Ceiling Appeal No. 1 of 2019 before the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Kaimur, Bhabhua. After hearing the parties, the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 07.11.2019 and S.D.M., Mohania was directed to implement his own order dated 27.04.2019 / 22.06.2019 as soon as possible. Accordingly, District Gazette Notification under 11(1) of the Ceiling Act was published on August 20, 2019, whereby 23.40 acres of land were allowed to retain the land holders and 39.62 acres of class-II lands were declared as surplus.

Can electoral convenience be presented as social service to justify nomination of Deepak Prakash, son of Union Minister Upendra Kushwaha as MLC under Article 171 of Constitution of India?

In Prince Kumar Ojha vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Joint Registrar (List) Patna High Court granted permission to file PIL vide order dated October 15, 2026. The other respondents are:2. The Principal Secretary to the Governor of Bihar, 3. The Principal Secretary, Election Department, Government of Bihar, 4. The Chief Electoral Officer-cum-Secretary, Election Department, Government of Bihar and 5. Deepak Prakash, Nominated Member of the Bihar Legislative Council (MLC). The case is listed for order before the Chief Justice on November 18, 2026.  The petitioner has argued that his nomination violates Articles 171(3)(e) and 171(5) of the Constitution, which restrict Legislative Council nominations to specific fields such as social service, literature, science, art, and the cooperative movement, rather than serving as political rehabilitation.

Deepak Prakash was appointed as a member of Legislative Council on August 5, 2026 by Bihar Governor Syed Ata Hasnain to fill the vacancy following the resignation of Devesh Kumar. Devesh was made to resign as member of Legislative Council on July 31, 2026. 

Earlier, in Rakesh Kumar Singh alias Rakesh Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors.(2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Bagchi and Justice V Mohana on July 30, 2026 while hearing a petition, had asked the Bihar government as to how Deepak Prakash, an unelected minister, can hold the position even after six months after assuming office. He was first sworn in as Bihar’s Panchayati Raj Minister on November 20, 2025, in the Council of Ministers headed by then Chief Minister Nitish Kumar. At the time, he was not a member of either the Bihar Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council. After the resignation and dissolution of the Nitish Kumar-led Cabinet, NDA leader Samrat Choudhary assumed office as Bihar Chief Minister on April 15. Prakash consequently ceased to be a Minister and remained out of the Council of Ministers. After a gap of around 22 days, Prakash was re-inducted into the Cabinet and sworn in again as Panchayati Raj Minister on May 7, despite still not being an elected legislator. The petitioner had contended that Deepak Prakash had already utilised approximately four months and 26 days of the six-month period permitted under Article 164(4) of the Constitution for a person who is not a member of the State Legislature to continue as a Minister. The six-month period had  expired on May 19. The petitioner had argued that Deepak Prakash’s resignation and subsequent reappointment could not be used to reset or extend the constitutional time limit.

The PIL in the High Court was filed on September 24, 2026 and registered on October 27, 2026. It challenges the nomination of Deepak Prakash as a MLC. The PIL has alleged that the nomination of Prakash violates Article 171(3)(e) and Article 171(5) of the Constitution of India. The PIL seeks issuance of a writ of quo warranto, calling Deepak Prakash to show under what circumstances he occupies the public office of a nominated MLC. It has also sought a writ of certiorari quashing the notification through which he was nominated as MLC. 

The petitioner has pointed out that Article 171(5) restricts nominations to the Legislative Council to persons possessing special knowledge or practical experience in literature, science, art, the cooperative movement and social service. The petitioner has submitted that Prakash does not fulfill the constitutional requirement for nomination under Article 171(3)(e), which a person must posses the prescribed special knowledge or practical experience in the five exhaustive fields. The PIL has submitted that the constitutional intent behind Article 171 is not to create a ‘backdoor’ entry for active political personalities into the Legislative Council. 

No writ can be entertained under Article 227: Supreme Court

In Radhey Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors., reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423, the Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is distinct from writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court also observed in the same case that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by terming them as writ petition. The Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010)8 SCC 329 has also made it clear that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India no writ could be entertained. 

 

In Neeta Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761, the Supreme Court has held: “15. In view of the decision in Prakash Chand (supra), we hold that nomenclature of a petition read with the substance thereof does matter. Much depends on what the subject matter of the petition is and who is entrusted to hear and decide it. A Judge of a high court having been assigned petitions under Article 226 for hearing and decision by its Chief Justice cannot, if he (the Judge) finds that the petition filed under Article 226 should have ideally been filed under Article 227, treat the petition as one under Article 227 and proceed to hear and decide it, unless the Chief Justice has also assigned to such Judge petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution for hearing and decision. If not so assigned, the learned Judge may, in his discretion, direct the petition to be treated as one under Article 227 for being placed before the learned Judge having assignment. This is mandatory and, therefore, one finds the caution sounded by this Court in the opening sentence of paragraph 26 of Pepsi Foods (supra) to be of extreme significance.”

 

In conformity with judicial pronouncements, the Patna High Court Rules was amended on March 14, 2016 and Part A, Chapter XII, Sub Rule (v) of Rule 3 of Patna High Court Rules was incorporated which provides: “(v) Petitioner under Article-227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any order or any proceeding before any Criminal Court would be filed in Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction.”  Under Patna High Court Rules a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India needs to be filed under Criminal Miscellaneous jurisdiction.  Under the Subject Code Classification of the High Court, Group 54, pertaining to Criminal Writ  Jurisdiction Cases, is divided into sixteen distinct subject categories, including Subject No. 10, which specifically relates to Criminal Writ Petitions arising out of judicial orders. But the subject classification has not been amended to bring it in conformity with the amendment dated March 14, 2016, whereby Part A, Chapter XII, Rule 3, Sub-rule (v) of the Patna High Court Rules came into force, though subject of 'Criminal Miscellaneous under Article 227' has been put under Group 50 in the Constitution of Benches. The aforesaid rule specifically stipulates that a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in criminal matters, is required to be instituted as a Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction. The High Court would be failing in its duty if it were to disregard the nomenclature of ‘Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction’ prescribed under the aforesaid Rules.

 

The Subject Code Classification of Patna High Court, Group 54 pertains to Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Cases and is further classified into sixteen distinct subject categories, all of which are assigned to a Single Judge. The Subject No. 4 relates to matters concerning quashing of FIR/charge-sheet, whereas Subject No. 10 specifically pertains to matters arising out of judicial orders. As per the constitution of Benches of the High Court, all matters falling under the various subject categories of Group 54 are assigned to the same Bench. 

 

There is a need for necessary steps for amendment in the Subject Code Classification of the Court to bring it in conformity with the Patna High Court Rules. 

Patna High Court imposes cost of Rs 5, 000 upon the petitioner in a case from Chitragupta Nagar, Khagaria

In Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar Through Its Pr. Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 24-page long judgement dated October 30, 2026, wherein, it considered the question: can High Court interfere with the order granting remand of the accused on the ground of non-service of the written grounds of arrest upon the petitioner’s son at the time of his arrest on June 5, 2026. The Court concluded: "27. Having considered the facts of the present case in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that once the prejudice-oriented test is applied in the present case, this writ application is liable to fail. As has been noticed hereinabove, the petitioner's son was fully aware of the ground of his arrest and it is not one of those cases in which he was taken by surprise and that he was not in possession of any information/materials to oppose the remand. The fact is that his lawyer had appeared through video conferencing and opposed the remand order. 28. In our order dated 15.10.2026 and 28.10.2026, we have noted how this case has progressed and time of this Court has been wasted. We have also taken note of the conduct and manner in which the case has been conducted. At one stage, we were of the considered opinion that this aspect of the matter was required to be discussed and appropriate order is required to be passed but considering that sometimes in legal profession, the lawyers engaged by a party go on making submissions under some excitements without understanding the effect of the same and as we have been informed by learned counsel for the petitioner himself that he was mostly dealing in service matters and perhaps for that reason he could not take an appropriate view at the time of  filing of the present writ application, we have decided to drop this aspect of the matter and not to pass any order as regards the conduct etc. 29. Vide order dated 28.10.2026, this Court had imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- upon the petitioner which was required to be deposited within two weeks from the said order. If the receipt showing deposit of cost is not filed in the Registry within two weeks from the said date, steps shall be taken for recovery of the same in accordance with law. 30. This writ application, therefore, fails. It is dismissed accordingly."  

The counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500, Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 802. One of the contentions of the counsel was, that even if a non-bailable warrant was issued against the detenue that alone would not serve the purpose unless it was shown that the warrant of arrest was duly read out to the accused at the time of his arrest. In this connection, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2026) 8 SCC 275 (Paragraph ‘38’). The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ application as framed was well maintainable and in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court, the petitioner’s son would deserve his release on bail on the ground of non-furnishing of the written grounds of his arrest. 

The Advocate General submitted that the facts of the case would clearly show that the petitioner was well aware of the accusations against him, he was in possession of a copy of the First Information Report in which he was named accused, he was also aware of the issuance of non-bailable warrant and in fact he had filed an application for recall of the warrant of arrest. It was also pointed out that the petitioner’s son had filed an application seeking pre-arrest bail before this Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No.38639 of 2026 which was pending consideration, therefore on the face of these materials, the petitioner cannot be allowed to argue that the grounds of arrest were not known to the petitioner’s son. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702: (2026) 8 SCC 223 and State of Rajasthan vs. Jhabra Ram reported in 2026 INSC 1169, the  Advocate General submitted that the ratio of judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of Sri Darshan (supra) and Jhabra Ram (supra) would be applicable in the facts of this case. It was also submitted that the High Court has taken into consideration the various judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue of compliance with the requirement of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, in case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar
Ahmad Wani vs. Union of India through NIA, New Delhi (Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1478 of 2025). In it's judgment dated October 6, 2026, the High Court took note of the judgment in case of Sri Darshan (supra) and only after recording that the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra) was clearly distinguishable from that of Sri Darshan’s case, the High Court allowed the said writ petition. The  Advocate General informed that after the charge-sheet was filed and cognizance was taken, the records have been committed to the court of session. It was pointed out the petitioner admits filing of chargesheet dated July 11, 2026, order taking cognizance passed on July 18, 2026 by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khagaria and registration of Sessions Trial No. 508/2026 in the court of District and Sessions Judge, Khagaria.

Justice Prsad observed: "....the legal position which emerges is that the constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not a mere procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights. The intent and purpose of the constitutional mandate is to prepare the arrested person to defend himself. If the provisions of Article 22(1) are read in a restrictive manner, its
intended purpose of securing personal liberty would not be achieved rather curtailed and put to disuse.” 

In the case of Dr. Rajinder Rajan, the Supreme Court held:-“20. It is no longer res integra that supplying the grounds of arrest to the accused in writing before the arrest or, in a given case, under exceptional circumstances, immediately thereafter, is the mandate of the Constitutional guarantees provided under Article 22(1) read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The ratio of the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah conclusively holds that any deviation from the above principle would lead to the arrest of the accused being declared illegal entitling such accused to be released forthwith.”

In the case of Sri Darshan, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of counsel for the respondents-accused that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (now Section 47 of the Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Court held that in absence of demonstrable prejudice such an irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot by itself warrant bail.

The High Court had occasion to take note of the various judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue in the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra). The entire discussions have been summed up in paragraph '36' of the judgment in the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra) which we reproduce hereunder for a ready reference:-
"36. The upshots of the aforementioned discussions would lead to conclude this Court as under:-
(i) The constitutional mandate and the statutory mandate as contained under Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of the CrPC leave no room for doubt that it would be necessary for the investigating agency/arresting authority, that a copy of the written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. This has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576:
(ii) If the arrest memo is simply a proforma indicating that the grounds of arrest has been conveyed, it would not be a compliance with the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) and Dr. Rajindra Rajan (supra): and
(iii) Templates of the arrest memo containing the statement to the effect that the arresting officer explained the grounds of arrest to the accused before the arrest, is no compliance with the mandate of Article 22 of the constitution of India read with section 50 and 50A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Now Sections 47 and 48 of the BNSS); and
(iv) The judgment in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with a clear finding that the arrest memos and remand orders reflected that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. In such circumstance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that nomaterial has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the present case, the facts are entirely different, therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) is to be read as explained in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) in paragraph ‘8’ of the judgment."
24. We have further noticed that, in it’s recent judgment in the case of Jhabra Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken note of the prejudice-oriented test as has been laid down in Sri Darshan's (supra) case. We reproduce paragraph '19' of the judgment in Jhabra Ram as under:-
"19. In evaluating the effect of alleged procedural defects in communicating grounds of arrest, this Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan (supra) definitively established that the governing principle is the prejudice-oriented test. The Court categorically observed as follows:
“32.5. While Section 50 CrPC is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.
32.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (SCC OnLine Kar para 45), the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (SCC OnLine Kar para 50), and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (SCC OnLine Kar para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573], it concluded (SCC OnLine Kar paras 43, 49-50) that from 3-10-2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
32.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir Purkayastha [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573] is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.”
25. This Court further finds that in the case of Jhabra Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed its judgment in the case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra). In this connection, the discussions made in paragraphs '20', '21' and '22' of the judgment would be significant to take note of :-"20. In examining the constitutional object underlying Article 22(1)37 of the Constitution and Section 4738 of the BNSS, this Court in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (Supra) reiterated that the requirement of communicating grounds of arrest is designed to serve a substantive purpose rather than a mere formalistic routine. The Court observed as follows: “32. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of arrest should be communicated to the person arrested has been very succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar [Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799]. On learning about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an application before the appropriate court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the information will enable the arrested person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be communicated to the person arrested as soon as possible. 33. For the purposes of clause (1) of Article 22, it is not necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence. However, the information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why he has been arrested. The grounds to be communicated to the arrested person should be somewhat similar to the charge framed by the Court for the trial of a case.”
21. Applying these principles to the present facts, the record clearly reflects that the respondent was fully cognizant of the grounds for his apprehension and was effectively represented by counsel at the stage of remand. The substantive mandate of Article 22(1) thus stands meaningfully fulfilled, with no demonstrable prejudice having been suffered.
22. As affirmed in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra) and State of Karnataka (supra), the constitutional framework requires that the arrestee be informed of the grounds of arrest but does not insist upon written communication as an indispensable formality irrespective of the attendant circumstances. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice or denial of an opportunity to defend, an alleged procedural defect in the mode of service cannot ipso facto invalidate detention or entitle an accused to regular bail, more so in cases involving grave allegations of espionage affecting national security and sovereign integrity." 

The judgement by Division Bench reads: "26. At this stage, we are reminded of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. N.R. Vairamani and Another reported in (2004) 8 SCC 579 (para 9) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton2 (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,…””