Saturday, October 17, 2026

Judgements in cases from Araria which were sets aside by Supreme Court or Patna High Court

January 2026: In Md. Anwar @ Anwar vs. The State of Bihar and Rahmina Praween (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgment dated January 6, 026, wherein, he set aside the judgment/order dated March 4, 2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge (Children Court) Araria and order dated January 13, 2025 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Araria rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for bail in connection with J.J.B. Case No.117 of 2024, which arose out of Araria Mahila PS Case No. 44 of 2024 for the offences under  Section 341, 376, 313, 417/34 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 

Justice Jha concluded: "I am of the considered opinion that the child in conflict with law could be released on bail and accordingly petitioner/CICL be released on bail..."14.Accordingly, the Judgment/Order dated  04.03.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge (Children Court) Araria and order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Araria are set aside and hence, the present revision petition stands allowed."

The case leading to the institution of the petition was that Rahmina Praween, the opposite party no. 2  lodged a case vide Araria Mahila P.S. Case No. 44 of 2024 with allegation that the while she was alone in  her house, this petitioner forced upon her by gagging her mouth  and later on gave her allurement of marriage. By giving this  inducement of marriage, he kept on committing rape with her. When she became pregnant, the petitioner gave her some medication and her pregnancy was aborted by taking her to a  doctor. The petitioner refused to marry the opposite party no. 2 and in panchayati the petitioner and his family members refused to solemnize marriage with the opposite party no. 2. The petitioner/child in conflict with law (CICL) was taken  in custody on October 17, 2024. The CICL moved before the Juvenile Justice Board, Araria for grant of bail but his prayer was rejected and his petition for bail was dismissed vide order dated January 13, 2025. The CICL preferred an appeal which also came to be dismissed vide order dated March 4, 2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum Special Judge (Children's Court) Araria. The CICL approached the High Court impugning the two orders. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was falsely implicated in this case due to ill motive of the victim. The petitioner was declared juvenile vide order dated  October 30, 2024 by the JJB Araria and the age of the petitioner was 12 years 06 months and 21 days on the date of occurrence and had got no criminal antecedent. The age of the victim is about 18 years. The counsel further submitted that the orders of the Courts below are bad in the eye of law as well as on facts. The Courts have not considered the false implication of the CICL and the fact that he was deprived of care and protection of his family by placing him in custody. There was no possibility of petitioner doing any harm to the victim or any of the witnesses. The Social Investigation Report and social background report did not make out any case to keep the CICL in custody. It was only mentioned that there was lack of discipline in the house and father of the CICL was a labourer. It was also mentioned that the CICL had studied up to Class V only. His friends were also illiterate. There was no chance of CICL falling in bad company and his family members did not have any criminal antecedent. Therefore, the petitioner ought to be released on bail after setting aside the impugned orders as both the Courts below passed erroneous orders.

Taking note of the provisions under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, Justice Jha  observed that it is clear that "a CICL could be denied bail only on the ground that on release, the said child would come in contact with criminal elements and there was danger to the moral, physical and psychological well being of the CICL or would defeat the ends of justice. If these grounds are not present, the bail could no be denied to a CICL."

Justice Jha drew on the relevant portion of Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which provides for the guiding principles of care and protection of children like (i) Principle of presumption of innocence: Any child shall be presumed to be an innocent of any mala fide or criminal intent up to the age of eighteen years, (ii) Principle of dignity and worth: All human beings shall be treated with equal dignity and rights, (iii) Principle of participation: Every child shall have a right to be heard and to participate in all processes and decisions affecting his interest and the childs views shall be taken into consideration with due regard to the age and maturity of the child, (iv) Principle of best interest: All decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential, (v) Principle of family responsibility: The primary responsibility of care, nurture and protection of the child shall be that of the biological family or adoptive or foster parents, as the case may be, (vi) Principle of safety: All measures shall be taken to ensure that the child is safe and is not subjected to any harm, abuse or maltreatment while in contact with the care and protection system, and thereafter....,(viii) Principle of non-stigmatising semantics: Adversarial or accusatory words are not to be used in the processes pertaining to a child....,(xii) Principle of institutionalisation as a measure of last resort: A child shall be placed in institutional care as a step of last resort after making a reasonable inquiry and (xiii) Principle of repatriation and restoration: Every child in the juvenile justice system shall have the right to be reunited with his family at the earliest and to be restored to the same socio-economic and cultural status that he was in, before coming under the purview of this Act, unless such restoration and repatriation is not in his best interest..."

Justice Jha observed: "10. Cumulative reading of these two provisions show the CICL could be released on bail unless the fact comes on record that there was chance of such child coming in contact with a known criminal or enlarging such child on bail might endanger his moral, physical or psychological well being. Further the courts being parens patriae are supposed to look into for protection of best interest of the child. All such steps are to be taken by the Courts for reformation and rehabilitation of a child in conflict with law.11. In the facts of the present case, no doubt the alleged offence is very serious but the bail to a child in conflict with law could be denied only under specific circumstances as mentioned hereinbefore. Otherwise the bail is a rule and jail is an exception in case of CICL as well. The CICL has remained in custody since 17.10.2024 and now his parents are ready and willing to take care of him and to protect his best interest so that he does not fall in bad company or get involved in any other offence." 

February 12, 2026: In Ankit Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarthna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court and granted leave granted. The appellant had challenged the order dated July 1, 2025 passed by Justice Singh. Apprehending arrest in connection with F.I.R. No. 5140075250013/2025 registered at Women Police Station, District–Araria for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 69, 352, 351(3), 351(2), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the appellant preferred an application before the High Court seeking anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Justice Singh had rejected the application for anticipatory bail. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the allegations as against the appellant are not true; however, investigation as against him is on and he has cooperated with the investigation; that the Supreme Court by order dated July 21, 2025 had granted interim protection to the appellant herein. The order was made absolute by setting aside the impugned order and allowing the appeal. Supreme Court observed:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 482 BNSS. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set-aside the order passed by the High Court. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail...."

March 11, 2026: 

April 2026:

 May 2026:

 June 2026:

July 2026:

 August 2026:

 September 2026:

 October 2026:  

 

 

  

 


Friday, October 16, 2026

Patna High Court to examine constitutional validity of specific provisions of Bihar Municipal Property (Assessment, Collection and Recovery) Rules, 2013 under Bihar Municipal Act, 2007

In Vinay Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Partha Sarthy passed a 2-page long order dated September 28, 2026, wherein, it has sought replies from the state government and Patna Municipal Corporation on a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of specific provisions of the Bihar Municipal Property (Assessment, Collection and Recovery) Rules, 2013.  The Rules were framed in exercise of the power conferred by section 127 (3) and Section 419 (1) of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007.  

The petitioner has contended that the provisions impose arbitrary and unjust property tax on residential and commercial buildings in urban centres of Bihar. He has submitted that the rules for assessment and collection of municipal property tax did not provide a transparent and fair mechanism for property tax assessment.  The judges also sought a reply from Patna Municipal Corporation on the alleged arbitrary mode of property tax collection in the capital. 

The four other respondents are: 2. The Secretary,     Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The Deputy Secretary to the Government, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, 4. The Patna Municipal Corporation through its Municipal Commissioner, Patna and 5. The Municipal Commissioner,  Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna. 

S.D. Sanjay, Advocate General was allowed four weeks time to file counter affidavit, on behalf of the State of Bihar, the Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar and the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Urban Development and Housing Department, the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3. The Patna Municipal Corporation through its Municipal Commissioner, Patna and the Municipal Commissioner,  Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 have also been asked to to file the counter affidavit within the same time period. The Cort has directed the petitioner to file his rejoinder  within a period of two weeks after filing of the counter affidavit by all the respondents. The matter is directed to re-notified on December 7, 2026 for hearing on admission. 

Responding to the case against the constitutional validity of the Bihar Property Tax (Assessment, Collection and Recovery) Rules, 2013, Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, a member of the Tax Justice Forum said, "now that Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2026 has been enacted, the pre-existing Bihar Municipal Property (Assessment, Collection and Recovery) Rules, 2013 under Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 will have to be factored in." Dr. Krishna pointed out that with the enactment of Bihar Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2026, minor offences have been decriminalised. The amendment under the provisions of Section 429 of he Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 has removed criminal sanctions and eliminated provisions for daily penalties. It signals a shift towards non-criminal, compliance-based governance. Earlier, Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2016 was enacted to amend Section 13 of the Act. After amendment in the proviso to the Section 13, it reads: "Provided that notwithstanding any thing contained in any other provision of this Act, until the relevant figures for the census of the year 2021 are published, it shall not be necessary for the State Government to re-determine the number of wards on the basis of population of the municipal area ascertained at 2011 Census."

Decoding the plight of legal reporting in Dainik Bhaskar

Journalism of “innocent fraud”: The great decline of legal journalism in Bihar: Decoding the plight of legal reporting in Dainik Bhaskar: Part 3

 Dr. Gopal Krishna 

 When lawyers are asked to define what they do, they string together long sentences in which they unfailingly use the adjective "legal" to qualify everything they say, without troubling to explain, without even realizing that they are caught up in a tautology!

- Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns. p.359, 2013

If journalists are asked to define what they do, they would say, they attempt to communicate stories around the 5Ws and one H (Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How) to provide a complete account of an event. If the legal reporters are asked the same, they would say all their news reports are “provisional reports” till the largest bench of the Supreme Court has decided the case or till the next legislation enacting a new law or amending an existing one with reference to the case in question. The series of articles is undertaking content analysis of newspapers, beginning with Dainik Bhaskar. All the newspapers because of diverse constraints either publish only the “provisional reports” or do not publish all that is newsworthy.

In July 2015, Dainik Bhaskar newspaper expanded its operations in Bihar and launched its city editions across the state. Its investigative reporting is better than other newspapers in Bihar. But its legal reporting in general and court reporting in particular leaves a lot to be desired. Its reporting on the law making process in both the houses of state legislature too is quite unsatisfactory.

On July 22, 2026, Dainik Bhaskar reported a “Bhaskar Analysis” on its front page, which, reads: “विधानसभा में 1 घंटे के भीतर 7 विधेयकों का पास होना सरकार के तेज काम को दिखाता है।” (The passing of 7 bills in the Assembly within one hour shows the swift work of the government.) The passage of seven bills in one hour shows how the legislators were not give sufficient time to prepare for the deliberation on bills. But the newspaper confined itself to applauding “swiftness” of government’s work. The seven Bills which were passed are: Bihar Gambling (Prohibition) Bill, 2026, Bihar Goods and Services Tax (Amendment) Bill, 2026,     Bihar Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) (Repeal) Bill, 2026, Bihar Land Mutation (Amendment) Bill, 2026, Bihar Medical (Amendment) Bill, 2026, Bihar Nurses Registration (Amendment) Bill, 2026 and Bihar Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Bill, 2026, when the opposition parties had walked out in protest against the lathi charge on students and youth. Was Dainik Bhaskar being sarcastic when it referred to the swiftness of the government instead of the swiftness of the legislature?  

Disregarding the rules which require circulating each bill at least two days before introduction, all seven bills were circulated among legislators only on July 20, 2026 before it was taken up for passage without discussion. The legal reporters of the newspaper did not even attempt to undertake scrutiny of the specific benign and malignant provisions of the bills. The passage of these bills without even an iota of any debate demonstrates death of deliberation in the legislature, which has undermined deliberative democracy. This kind of law-making is going on for quite sometime. The government is less accountable and laws are being passed with almost non-existent scrutiny. The government's preference for speed over scrutiny illustrates a political calculation that tight legislative control outweighs the institutional cost of reduced oversight. The legislators are encouraged to blindly follow the party whip. The anti-defection law, which binds legislators to party positions, reduces the incentive for individual members to demand more deliberative time. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, binds legislators to party voting instructions and has reduced legislative independence. The legislators who might individually favour more deliberation or committee referral cannot vote for it in defiance of a party whip without risking disqualification. This has transformed legislature from a collection of representatives exercising independent judgment into a body that ratifies decisions made by party leadership. Isn’t passage of Bills without debate undermines the purpose of the legislature? Isn’t this sad plight of law-making process newsworthy? Shouldn’t all the legislators/law-makers be asked by reporters as to what role did they play in the making and passage of these Bills? Why do they get themselves elected  as law makers, if they have nor role in the making of these laws? Did the reporters of Dainik Bhaskar inquire as to whether or not these bill are complying with the provisions of Constitution of India ad will the bill survive if their constitutionality is challenged in the court?  

The situation is with regard to reporting about judiciary is no better than the reprting of the legislature. There have been numerous instances wherein legislations have been declared unconstitutional by the Patna High Court and the Supreme Court. 

The judgments by judges of the trial courts are routinely either set aside, modified, upheld or sent back to the trial court for hearing by Patna High Court. The judgments by single judge bench of the High Court are routinely either set aside, modified, upheld or sent back for proper hearing by the division bench of the High Court. The judgments by the judges of the High Courts are either set aside, modified, upheld or sent back for hearing by the Supreme Court because under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, “The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” The rule of per incuriam being an exception to the doctrine of precedents is only applicable to the ratio of the judgment, i.e. the reason behind the judgment. A decision is deemed per incuriam when the judges act in ignorance of a previous decision of their own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it. In State of Bihar vs. Kalika Kuer (2003) 5 SCC 448, the Supreme Court had examined the circumstances in which a decision can be rendered per incuriam. It observed that where a case or statute had not been brought to the court’s attention and the court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute, it would be a decision rendered in per incuriam. 

In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(2005) 2 SCC 673, the Supreme Court has summed up the legal position of rules of judicial discipline. It reads: “(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.” But legal reporters of the newspapers like Dainik Bhaskar seem to miss the fact that Supreme Court  aspect on most of the occasions. The comprehensive rules of discipline for legal reporting is yet to be framed. 

In 2026 alone, over 30 orders of Patna High Court has been either set aside, modified, upheld or sent back for early or fresh hearing. But most of them were not considered to be “news” by the legal reporters of Dainik Bhaskar.       

Supreme Court restored order by Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi after 12 years, five years after his death, Justice I.A. Ansari's order was set aside.In Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority & Ors. vs. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih delivered a 18-page long judgement dated January 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...the impugned order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the Single Judge restored with the result that the present appeals succeed." It was heard along with State of Bihar vs. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(2026). The judgement was authored by Justice Datta. Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi had passed the 18-page long order dated January 24, 2014 as a Single Judge. Justice Datta observed:"We must also bear in mind the nature and extent of jurisdiction that an intra-court appellate Bench of a high court exercise. Such appellate jurisdiction is conferred either under the Letters Patent or by the relevant statutory provisions. It is pertinent to note that both-Single Bench and Division Bench-exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction is warranted only where the judgment or order under challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity. Such jurisdiction ought not to be invoked merely because another view is possible on the same set of facts, particularly where the view adopted by the Single Judge is a plausible and reasonable one. In other words, an intra-court appellate Bench ought not to substitute its own view, merely because such Bench considers its view to be better than the one taken by the Single Bench; so long as the view taken by the Single Bench is a plausible one, interference should stay at a distance." It was a landmark judgement but legal reporters of Dainik Bhaskar did not find it newsworthy.  

In Priyanka Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Anil Chandurkar delivered a 14-page long judgment dated February 18,2026, wherein, it set aside the 9-page long judgment dated April 11, 2019 by Division Bench of 42nd Chief Justice A.P. Sahi and Anjana Mishra in a case from 2018. The librarians in Bihar whose services were terminated because the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh university from which they obtained their degrees was later declared defunct. The Supreme Court has set aside the High Court's judgment and ordered their reinstatement. It held that degrees earned when the governing law was in force and recognized cannot be invalidated due to subsequent legal developments. Notably, the case was filed in the Supreme Court on September 21, 2022, verified on November 20, 2022 but registered on February 5, 2026.

Supreme Court concluded:" From the facts on record, it is evident that the services of the appellants were terminated only for the reason that the institution in which they had studied was declared to be unrecognised. Accordingly, the orders vide which the services of the appellants were terminated have to be declared as illegal. Ordered accordingly. 18. As a consequence, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High Court is allowed. They are directed to be reinstated back in service, with continuity. However, considering the fact that they have not performed their duties for the intervening period, and it cannot be said to be a case where only the respondent-State is at fault, in our view, they should not be entitled to any back wages." The judgement was authored by Justice Bindal. The judgement of High Court's Division Bench was authored by Justice Sahi. 

Wasn’t the decision of the Supreme Court setting aside the judgement authored by 42nd Chief Justice of the High Court newsworthy for the legal reporters of Dainik Bhaskar? 

Motihari trial court records were withheld in Bihar, Supreme Court took note of "incurable injustice" in a murder case. It set aside judgments authored by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah, but like other newspapers, the legal reporters of Dainik Bhaskar chose to ignore it. In Sanjay Sah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 10-page long order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained. The High Court was also in error in overlooking this crucial aspect and in confirming the conviction and sentences visited upon the appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and also the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar,” in Sessions Trials of 2009 and 2007.  Both the trials arose out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated January 25, 2007 registered with Police Station–Adapur, District–East Champaran, Bihar) Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 were restored on the file of learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, to enable fresh examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code strictly in accordance with the legal parameters applicable thereto.

Although Supreme Court had directed the Registry to requisition the trial court records, being of the opinion that the aforestated judgments warranted interference, the Court records that "trial court records have not yet been received. Instead of awaiting receipt of the records, we deem it appropriate to resort to the alternative that is available to us, that is, to remit the matter to the trial court instead of undertaking adjudication of these appeals on merit." On January 21, 2026, the Court had ordered: "Registry shall requisition the trial court records at the earliest and undertake translation of documents in vernacular, if any. E-copies of the trial court records, once received, shall be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties." 

Earlier, on  September 2, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Kumar and Alok Aradhe had passed an order which recorded that the counsel for the State of Bihar had sought "some time to examine whether there was a separate examination by the trial Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, and if so, file a copy thereof. Registry may also call for the record of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if any, from the trial Court/High Court." In its order dated November 12, 2025, the Court recorded that Azmat Hayat Amanullah, counsel for the State of Bihar was present in the Court. "The learned counsel states that it would not be necessary to file a counter affidavit in this matter." 

These appeals arose out of the 56-page long judgment dated March 6, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Nani Tagia in Ram Sevak Shah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), and 58-page long judgement in Laxman Sah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), confirming the conviction and the sentences visited upon the appellants, vide judgments dated August 27, 2016 and September 2, 2016, passed by the VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial of 2009 both arising out of FIR of 2007. The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment along with payment of fines. Both the High Court's judgments of the Division Bench were authored by Justice Shah. Now the Supreme Court has set it right. But the legal reporters of Dainik Bhaskar could not report about it.  

Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside Bhojpur trial court’s questionable order, Dainik Bhaskar is in dark about it. In Harendra Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 16-page long judgement dated June 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"24. The impugned judgment dated 18.04.2013 and order of sentence dated 20.04.2013 passed in Sessions Trial No. 149 of 2005 arising out of Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 by the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge II, Ara is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the above-named appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, as such, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him. 25. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 26. There shall be no order as to cost. 27. Office is directed to send back the lower court records along with a copy of the judgment to the learned District Court forthwith."

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the criminal appeal which was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2005. The case arose out of a Ara Nawada P.S.Case of 2003, by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge IInd, Ara, whereby the trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence committed under Section 366 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000.

The prosecution case was that the informant, Yogendra Yadav, while working in a Cotton Mill at Sapar, Rajkot (Gujarat), became acquainted with accused Nagendra Yadav, who was employed in the same establishment. On February 17, 2003, when the informant, along with his wife and minor son, was returning to his native village, Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and allegedly persuaded them to visit his residence at Ara Town. It was alleged that after reaching Ara on February 19, 2003 and staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, the informant found the very next morning that his wife, son and a box containing Rs.90,000/- were missing. Upon inquiry from the co-accused Ram Ayodhaya, he was informed that his wife and son had gone to the River Ganga and would return later, however, allegedly co-accused Ram Ayodhaya had allegedly served him food containing intoxicant and after consuming the same he remained unconscious for several days. The day he regained consciousness he found that his wife, son and the cash box were missing. Subsequently, on February 26, 2003, when the informant, along with witnesses had again approached the accused persons to know about the whereabouts of his son and wife, allegedly the accused demanded Rs.1,00,000/- to release his wife and son and in case of failure of fulfillment of the demand he had threatened that they would be killed, which led to institution of the complaint before the Chief Judicial  Magistrate.

The counsel of the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the main allegation is against co-accused Nagendra Yadav and the appellant were implicated solely because he is the brother of the co-accused, in spite of the fact, no material came against the appellant that he had participated in the alleged abduction of the informant’s wife or son and he had shared any common intention with the main accused, so as, to attract the provisions of 120-B of the IPC. Justice Singh referred to the testimony of Om Prakash Yadav, the son of the informant. The son gave varying versions regarding the circumstances in which his mother allegedly went away on her own, which creates serious doubt about the veracity of his testimony and the prosecution case as a whole. The counsel submitted that neither any witness nor any material was brought on record in course of trial to suggest that the victim was kidnapped by the appellant as would also appear from the deposition of the victim Meera Devi, who was the alleged victim too did not support the prosecution story. 

In her statement to police, Meera Devi stated that she had accompanied the co-accused on her own. This statement demolished the accusation of kidnapping and, as such, the prosecution having miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, renders the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence to be set aside.

Justice Singh observed: "12. To constitute the offence of abduction, it must be shown that a person was unlawfully taken away or induced to move from one place to another either by the use of force or through deceitful means. The essence of the offence lies in the intention with which the accused acts. It is the accused's conduct, volition and underlying purpose that are determinative of whether the offence is made out. The crucial issue in every case is the intention accompanying the act of taking or inducing the woman to leave a particular place. Once the requisite criminal intent on the part of the accused is established, the offence stands complete irrespective of whether the intended object was ultimately achieved and regardless of whether the woman subsequently consented to marriage or sexual relations. 13. It is a well-settled principle that, for bringing home a charge under Section 366 IPC, the prosecution must establish not merely that the woman was taken or induced to move from one place to another, but also that such inducement was effected by force or deceitful means and was accompanied by the requisite criminal intent contemplated under the provision. The prosecution is further required to prove that the abduction was committed with the intention that the woman may be compelled to marry any person against her will, or that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or with the knowledge that such consequences were likely to follow. Mere proof of abduction, by itself, is insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 366 IPC. The gravamen of the offence lies not only in the act of taking away the woman but also in the specific purpose and intention behind such act. Therefore, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving that the abduction was for one of the purposes enumerated under Section 366 IPC, a conviction under the said provision cannot be legally sustained.”

Justice Singh explored as to whether the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 366 and 120-B of the IPC was justified. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether five witnesses. Yogendra Yadav had claimed that Meera Devi was his second wife and that he had married her in the year 1995 after separating from his first wife.

Meera Devi, the alleged victim and the so-called second wife of Yogendra Yadav, the informant according to the prosecution case did not support the prosecution version and was declared hostile. She stated that she had never married the informant and also alleged that her statement recorded before the Magistrate had been made under pressure from the police. She specifically denied the prosecution allegation that accused Nagendra Yadav had forcibly abducted her after administering poison to the informant. Her evidence was completely contrary to the prosecution case and substantially weakened the allegation of kidnapping.

Justice Singh recorded that on the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellants/accused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against them, which they denied and show their complete innocence. Justice Singh observed:"....I find that the learned trial Court has erred in concluding that the present appellant, Harendra Yadav, shared the common intention or was a party to any conspiracy with the co-accused, Nagendra Yadav, so as, to attract the allegations under Sections 366 and 120B IPC. 22. From the evidence available on record, it transpires that the main allegation of taking away the victim is directed against co-accused Nagendra Yadav. Significantly, the alleged victim, P.W.5 (Meera Devi), has herself not supported the prosecution case and has categorically denied that she was forcibly abducted by the accused persons. She has further denied material aspects of the prosecution story and has not attributed any overt act whatsoever to the present appellant. Mere relationship of being brother of the co-accused and his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be established that there was prior meeting of mind for establishing offence under Section 366 and 120(B) of I.P.C without any independent corroboration."

The judgement recorded that five prosecution witnesses were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution to rest substantially upon the testimonies of two witnesses. Justice Singh observed that “Even their evidence does not disclose any specific act on the part of the appellant indicating that he had induced, compelled, or deceived the victim into going from one place to another, nor is there any material to establish that he possessed the requisite intention contemplated under Section 366 IPC. Likewise, there is no cogent evidence demonstrating any agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the co-accused so as to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. From the records of the case and the testimony of the victim herself, it is evident that no specific allegation has been levelled against the appellant so as to attract the ingredients of the aforesaid offences. In such circumstances, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial Court is not borne out of the evidence on record."

The legal reporters of Dainik Bhaskar did not consider such a miscarriage of justice by the Bhojpur trial court as newsworthy when it was set right by Justice Singh.

Supreme Court set aside order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma because of "an egregious error" was committed in exercising discretion in favour of murder accused persons by granting anticipatory bail in a case from Darbhanga   

In Ramakant Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed an order dated February 11,  2026, wherein, it set aside the impugned order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of the Patna High Court. The accused persons i.e. Omprakash Singh and Rajneesh Kumar Singh respectively were ordered to surrender before the Trial Court.

Supreme Court' s Division Bench observed: "17. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed an egregious error exercising its discretion in favour of the accused persons by granting them anticipatory bail. 18. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. 19. The impugned Order passed by the High Court is set aside....21. Once they surrender before the Trial Court, they shall be remanded to judicial custody. It will be open for both the accused persons to thereafter pray for regular bail. 22. We are informed that the investigation is over and charge- sheet has been filed. 23. The regular bail application that may be filed by the accused persons shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law, having regard to the materials in the charge-sheet. 24. It is needless to clarify that the regular bail application shall be decided without being influenced by any of the observation made by us in the present order. We have said in so many words that the principles governing grant of anticipatory bail differ to a considerable extent from the principles governing grant of regular bail. This shall be kept in mind by the concerned Court while considering the regular bail application of the accused persons."

This appeal arose  from the order passed by the High Court dated July 30, 2025 in the anticipatory bail application. Supreme Court's Division Between underlined that "11. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that the accused persons are alleged to have been involved in a serious crime like murder. We do not say for a moment that in connection with an offence of murder, Court should not grant anticipatory bail”. But, it observed: "....the principles governing grant of anticipatory bail are quite different compared to the principles governing grant of regular bail. 13. Anticipatory bail may be granted by the Court even in a case of murder provided the Court is convinced that the accused persons praying for anticipatory bail have been falsely implicated due to some personal vendetta, political rivalry etc. The accused praying for anticipatory bail has to make out more than a prima facie case of false implication. 14. Grant of anticipatory bail is not a matter of course. Here is a case where the accused persons have been named in the FIR. The first informant is none other but an eye-witness to the incident. He may be the son of the deceased but that by itself is not sufficient to disbelieve what he has alleged in the FIR more particularly when the investigation is going on. We also take into consideration the fact that the deceased died of multiple head injuries. Postmortem Report reveals there were multiple fractures. Prima facie, the ocular version as narrated is in tune with the medical evidence on record. 15. Just because a title suit is pending between the parties by itself could not have been a ground to believe that the accused persons have been falsely implicated." Dainik Bhaskar’s legal reporters did find "an egregious error" in exercising his discretion in favour of murder accused persons by granting anticipatory bail, to be newsworthy.

Patna High Court has a strength of 53 judges but it has 44 judges. The High Court has a pending case load of approximately 1.75 lakh cases. The continued vacancy of nine judges has not been deemed newsworthy. The paucity of judges is taking its toll on judicial remedies. It is apparent that paucity of trained legal reporters or vacancy of reporters trained in law reporting is also taking its toll in bringing truth about the ultimate status of judgments by trial court judges, single judges, division bench judges, full court judges and the Supreme Court.

 Unless it is brought to light as to which judgments of trial court judges got upheld after final adjudication by the superior court judges, almost all the court reporting amounts to publishing half-truth about whether justice was finally delivered to the aggrieved persons. If the journalists do not cover legislature’s law-making process and the judicial process till their conclusion, the reporters violate the required 5 Ws and one H (Who, What, When, Where, Why, How) of news, which undermines a credibility of news reports by creating blind spots, spreading misinformation, and allowing for editorial bias.          

(The author is a practicing advocate and a researcher of philosophy, mass communication and law. He is an ex-Fellow, Berlin-based International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC). He is also the editor of www.toxicswatch.org.)

Source: Jan Media, Year-15,  Volume-175, October 2026  

Also read: Journalism of “innocent fraud”: The great decline of legal journalism in Bihar-Part 1  

Legal reporting in Bihar fails Breath analyser test, reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025 Part 2