Digital Arrest Scams case in Supreme Court, Inter-Departmental Committee constituted

The order dated February 9, 2026 by Supreme Court has recorded that an Inter-Departmental Committee has been  constituted to look into Digital Arrest Scams. 

On December 1, 2025, the Court's order recorded that the Amicus Curiae after a preliminary examination
of the incidents brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, segregated these scams into the three categories: (i) Digital Arrest Scams – This is a category of cybercrimes where victims are led to believe that their hard-earned money is owed to a government authority, and as a result, they are subjected to coercive acts of extortion.(ii) Investment Scams – These involve situations where victims are induced to deposit large sums under the guise of lucrative investment schemes, only to be subsequently defrauded. Fraudsters routinely invent new terms to deceive their targets, and in some cases, the funds have been taken under the pretext of ‘advance tax’. (iii) Part-Time Job Scams – In these scams, victims are initially attracted with small, free tasks—for instance, posting positive reviews or watching YouTube videos—and later, they are persuaded to deposit large sums of money by claiming it is for ‘premium tasks’.

In Re: Victims of Digital Arrest Related to Forged Documents (2026), a Suo Moto Writ Petition (Criminal), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi had passed a 4-page long order dated October 17, 2025 upon hearing a the suo motu writ petition which had arisen out of a complaint dated 21.09.2025 received by the Court from a senior citizen couple, who have been defrauded of their life savings through a “digital arrest” scam perpetrated between September 3, 2025 and September 16, 2025. The victims alleged that they were contacted by persons impersonating CBI officers, ED officials and judicial authorities through telephone and video calls. The fraudsters displayed forged orders of the Supreme Court through WhatsApp and video conferencing. Under threat of arrest and property seizure, based upon those forged documents, the victims were coerced to transfer Rs.1,05,50,000 through multiple bank transactions. 2. The complainants have fairly disclosed that two FIRs bearing No.76/2025 and No.77/2025 have been registered at the Cyber Crime Branch, Ambala under Sections 127(2), 308(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340(2) and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, indicating a pattern of organized criminal activity targeting senior citizens. 

The order reads: "3. Ordinarily we would have directed the State Police to expedite the investigation and take it to a logical conclusion. We are, however, aghast at the fact that the fraudsters have fabricated
judicial orders in the name of the Supreme Court of India and various other documents, including:
i) A “Freeze Order” dated 03.09.2025 bearing reference number F.No. EC/IRA/BZO-I/02/2025, purportedly issued under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002;
ii) An “Arrest Order” dated 03.09.2025 bearing the stamp and designation of an officer of the Directorate of Enforcements, Mumbai along with another Court stamp;
iii) A “Surveillance Order” with forged judicial signatures; and 

iv) Various fictitious proceedings before the Bombay High Court and false claims of investigation by CBI and Enforcement Directorate."

It added: "4. The forgery of documents and the brazen criminal misuse of the name, seal, and judicial authority of this Court or a High Court is a matter of grave concern. The fabrication of judicial orders bearing forged signatures of Judges strikes at the very foundation of public trust in the judicial system, besides the rule of law. Such acts constitute a direct assault on the dignity and majesty of this institution, therefore, such grave criminal acts cannot be treated as ordinary or routine offences of cheating or cybercrime. 5. We are also inclined to take judicial notice of the fact that the instant case is not a solitary instance. It has been reported many times in responsible media reports that such like occurrences have happened in the past in different parts of the country. We are, therefore of the prima facie view that a stern action on Pan India basis with coordinated efforts between the Central and State Police are required to unearth the full extent of this criminal enterprise involving forgery of judicial documents, cyber extortion and cyber arrest of the innocent people, especially the senior citizens. 6. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to issue notice to:  i) Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs; ii) Central Bureau of Investigation through its Director; iii) State of Haryana through its Principal Secretary, Department of Home; and iv) Superintendent of Police, Cyber Crime, Ambala. 7. Having regard to the manner in which similar crimes are being committed, we request the learned Attorney General for India to assist the Court."

“NO”, Police has no powers to arrest even during the course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.PC", Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Ram Pukar Yadav & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and AArun Palli passed a 7-page long order dated June 16, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 2-page long order dated May 5, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. The Court passed the order upon hearing a anticipatory bail application which arose out of a Complaint Case No. 410 of 2023 pending on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Division, Madhubani, State of Bihar. 

As per prosecution case, these petitioners took Rs.6.5 lacs from the informant on the pretext of providing admission in B. Ed course with hostel fee in the college but later on they came to know that admission slip was forged. It is alleged that all the accused persons including these petitioners run a racket in the name of RK Consultancy in which petitioners are agent. The second petitioner before the High Court was Ram Babu Yadav. The second respondent was Deepak Kumar Basta.

Supreme Court has held in SLP (Crl.) No.16221/2015 that in a complaint case the police has hardly any role to play. Relevant portion of the order passed in SLP(Crl.) No.16221/2025 reads: “7. We have noticed that there is a serious problem in two States, viz. the State of Bihar and State of Jharkhand, respectively. We fail to understand that in a private complaint how does the Police involve itself or is concerned, in any manner. What was the basis for the accused to express apprehension that the police would arrest them.  8. In a private complaint when cognizance is taken and process is issued all that the Court would do is to issue summons. We have explained many times in the past the purport of Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.PC.”) The Section 87 of the Cr.PC. reads thus:-“87. Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.—A Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to issue a summons for the appearance of any person, issue, after  recording its reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest— (a) if, either before the issue of such summons, or after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court sees reason to believe that he has absconded or will not obey the summons; or (b) if at such time he fails to appear and the summons is proved to have been duly served in time to admit of his appearing in accordance therewith and no reasonable excuse is offered for such failure.” 9. Section 87 empowers the Court to issue warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons. However, this power has to be exercised only in two contingencies as explained by the provision itself, i.e, (a) and (b), referred to above, respectively. 10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the  accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons. 11. We may give one another simple illustration. Take a case wherein on a private complaint, the magistrate deems fit to take cognizance under Section 200 of the Cr.PC. but postpones the issue of process till the conclusion of the magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. If a magistrate orders a Police inquiry under Section 202 and asks the police to give a report, then whether in the course of such inquiry, the police can arrest the accused. The answer is an emphatic “NO”, Police has no powers to arrest even during the course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.PC.” 

Supreme Court concluded: "4. That being the position, there is no question of the petitioners being taken into custody by the police. 5. Consequently, the impugned order dated 05.05.2026 is set aside. 6. The special leave petition is, accordingly, allowed.

Didn't Supreme Court's Constitution Bench hold that withdrawal of writ application will not bar invocation of jurisdiction of Court again in a petition under Article 226? Did it escape attention of Justice Harish Kumar?

Did Women Category candidate get 35% reservation in the appoint for post of Class-IV employees in Munger Civil Court  

In Anuradha Sinha vs. Registrar General, Patna High Court & Ors. (2026), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 4-page long judgement dated June 16, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....this Court finds that the present writ petition is nothing but a serious abuse of the process of the Court. Unconditional withdrawal of the writ petition bars the petitioner to file a second writ petition for the same cause of action not in terms with the Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in terms with the Public policy, which bars a person to approach the Court time and again for the same causes of action. Reference in this regard is also taken to the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mahanth Ram Kinkar Das Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors, 2017 (1) PLJR 909." The other two respondents were: District and Sessions Judge-cum-Chairman, Appointed Committee of Munger Judgeship, Munger and Judge-in-charge Administration, Civil Court, Munger. The case was filed on April 16, 2026 and registered on May 13, 2026 by advocate Sheo Nandan Prasad. The respondent's counsel was Piyush Lall. 

In Mahanth Ram Kinkar Das case, the 11-page long judgment dated January 17, 2017 was authored by Acting Chief Justice Hemant Gupta on behalf of a 3-Judge Bench which included Justices Anjana Mishra and Sudhir Singh. It held that "16. The unconditional withdrawal of the earlier writ petition would bar the second petition on the same cause of action not in terms of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in terms of public policy of not permitting the litigants to come to the Court time and again on the basis of same cause of action."

Chief Justice Gupta had referred to a judgement by Division Bench of the High Court in a judgment reported as The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Shri Ramesh Prasad & Anr., (2015) 1 PLJR 645 considered the Puran Singh‟s case (supra) and held that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure cannot per se apply to writ proceedings although certain principles enunciated therein have to be applied in writ proceedings from time to time. It was held that there cannot be any automatic application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of writ petitions or writ appeals. In Puran Singh & others vs. State of Punjab and others, (1996) 2 SCC 205, Supreme Court had let the matter of procedure to be decided by the High Courts. 

But the Constitution Bench judgment reported as Daryao and others vs. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1457 and B. Prabhakar Rao and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 210 has held that dismissal of the petition without speaking order which will include withdrawal of a writ application will not bar the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Court again in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.    

This judgment has been relied upon in the judgement dated June 16, 2026. The latter reads:"8. Considering the aforesaid factual position and the law settled in this regard, besides the averments made in the writ petition, which is nothing, but aspersion to a conducting lawyer, who had been engaged in earlier round of litigation, this earlier counsel and filing successive writ petition despite withdrawal of the earlier writ petition, this Court is of the view that a cost should be imposed, which is hereby quantified to the tune of Rs.5,000/-. The cost aforenoted must be deposited before the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee... " 

The petitioner had approached the High Court on being aggrieved with the final result dated July 29, .2017 published pursuant to Advertisement No. 1 of 2017 for the post of Class-IV employees by the District & Sessions Judge-cum-Chairman, Appointment Committee of Munger judgeship. The ground for challenge was only confined to the result which was published without providing 35% reservation to the Women Category candidate and, as such, 35% horizontal reservation to the women candidate has not been provided. 

The High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated February 10, 2026 passed by Justice Partha Sarthy in Anuradha Sinha & Anr. vs. District and Sessions Judge-Cum-Chairman, Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship & Anr. (2026) C.W.J.C. No. 11974 of 2017. Prashant Sinha was the counsel for the petitioner. Initially, Mrigank Mauli was the counsel for the respondent, as per High Court's order dated April 18, 2018. The High Court's order dated February 9, 2026 showed that Piyush Lall, was the counsel for the respondent. The order dated February 10, 2026 also showed the same.  The case was filed on August 9, 2017 and registered on August 19, 2017 in the High Court. 

From which it emerged that in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner along with one Shashank Kumar approached the High Court for identical relief and finally sought permission to withdraw the application. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. 

Piyush Lall, the High Court's counsel on behalf of District and Sessions Judge-Cum-Chairman, Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship and the Judge-In-charge, Administration, Civil Court, Munger stated that notwithstanding the same, a fresh writ petition was filed for the same relief, but only with the change of the counsel. It was submitted at the bar that on the part of the petitioner that there had never been any instruction for withdrawal of the earlier writ petition; nonetheless, the writ petition was withdrawn on behalf of both the petitioners. The submission of the Advocate for the petitioner was nothing but an aspersion upon the earlier counsel, which is highly deplorable and unethical. Besides this submission, the counsel also urged that once the petitioner had unconditionally withdrew the writ petition, the second writ petition for the same cause of action cannot be maintained; and if the contention of the petitioner was true, then instead of filing the writ petition she should have filed a modification/review application through the same counsel, but the same was not done.

Supreme Court stays order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a family dispute case

In Chandramohan Kumar & Anr. vs. 1. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 2-page long order dated June 16, 2026. The order reads: "4. The condition imposed by the impugned order is stayed until further orders, subject to the petitioner depositing or paying Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) to the respondent No. 2 within two weeks from today towards legal expenses for the present case." The respondent no. 2 is Aarti Kumari. Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had passed the 3-page long impugned order dated February 17, 2026.  

Earlier, Justice Kumar had concluded; "6. Considering the submission of the parties and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, this application of grant of anticipatory bail is allowed." He added: "7. Let the petitioners, above named, in the event of their arrest or surrender before the concerned Court below within four weeks from today, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- ( ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st class, East Muzaffarpur/ concerned court below in connection with Minapur Case No. 117 of 2025, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 482 of the BNSS. 8. As a condition of this order, the petitioner is directed to pay a maintenance amount of Rs. 6,000/- from the month of February, 2026 to the informant and the maintenance for the month of February, 2026 shall be paid to the informant within one week from the date of pronouncement of this order and thereafter, the maintenance amount shall be paid to the informant every month before the 10th day of the month." 

Justice Kumar made it clear that the order of maintenance passed by the High Court shall be subject to the outcome of maintenance case of the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court concerned, if any.

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with Minapur P.S Case No.117 of 2025 registered for the offence under sections 126(2),115 (2), 109, 85, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of BNS. 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioners were husband and devar of the informant. It was alleged that the petitioners and other family members started demanding Rs, 3 lakh and one motorycle. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the petitioners were innocent and they were falsely implicated in this case. There was no specific allegation against the petitioners. The petitioners have got clean antecedent. 

  

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Satyavrat Verma in a ca se from Govindganj, Motihari

In Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih passed a 5-page long order dated June 3, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "6. It is not in dispute that the conditions stand fully complied with; the appellant has cooperated during the investigation; he has not threatened or intimidated any of the witnesses; or has tried to influence the investigation in any manner. 7. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed. 8. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 21.04.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to seek any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the
Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 9. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail. 10. Further, if the appellant possesses a passport, the same shall be surrendered before the Competent Authority/Court until the conclusion of the trial or directed otherwise. 11. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.03.2026 is set aside."

The appellant had challenged the judgment and order dated March 24, 2026 in Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar”, passed by Justice Stayavrat Verma of the Patna High Court. 

On April 21, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads: "6. In the event of arrest in connection with FIR No. 280 of 2025, registered at Govindganj Police Station, District Motihari, Bihar dated 20.11.2025, the petitioner shall be released on bail by the Investigating/Arresting Officer on such terms and conditions as imposed and found to be just, fair and reasonable."

Earlier, in Chandan Singh @ Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated March 24, 2026, wherei, he had concluded:"the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the instant anticipatory bail application stands rejected." The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 318(4), 303(2), 336(4), 340(1), 340(2), 308(5), 61(2) and 111(1) of the BNS, 2023.  

Ajay Kumar Thakur, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner had antecedent of one case and the informant alleged that petitioner called him on his mobile and introduced himself as having business of jewellery and called him to Muzaffarpur for buying jewellery, the informant went to Muzaffarpur and saw jewellery worth crore of rupees and said that he will come back with money, accordingly, the informant along with his friend went to buy jewellery, but before reaching Muzaffarpur, made a call when petitioner asked him to come near Areraj accordingly, the informant along with his friend went to the place where he was called by the petitioner, further the petitioner took him to the hose of Amresh and disclosed that the house is also for sale and showed jewellery, further petitioner in the meantime made a call when 7-8 accused on 3-4 motorcycles came and took Rs. 19 Lakhs along with other articles and started fleeing, when his friend caught an accused who disclosed his name as Surendra and also disclosed that petitioner, Amresh and others are part of organized gang who fled with the articles and cash. 

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner had been falsely implicated in the instant case by the informant, it was also submitted that the mobile from which the informant got a call does not belong to the petitioner. It was submitted that even the informant dealt in business of purchasing looted jewellery. It was further submitted that petitioner was engaged in business with one Neha Kumari, wife of the brother of the petitioner and the informant had given money to Neha but when the deal failed, the instant false case came to be instituted.

A.P.P. for the State had opposed the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner and submitted that Neha is also an accused in the instant case. It was also submitted that if informant was dealing in purchasing looted jewellery in that event the same would surface during the course of investigation and appropriate action would be taken, but then as far as the petitioner was concerned, the mobile may not belong to him, but when informant before reaching Muzaffarpur called him on the mobile from which he had received a call from the petitioner earlier, the same was picked by petitioner again. It was submitted that the informant specifically alleged that petitioner along with others were operating an organized crime. It also submitted that investigation of the case is continuing and if privilege of anticipatory bail is granted to the petitioner, the petitioner may abscond.

Supreme Court upholds judgement by Justices A. M. Badar, Sandeep Kumar in a murder case from Bhojpur

In Sunil Roy vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sandeep Mehta and  Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 15, 2026, wherein, it upheld the 79-page long final judgment dated February 27, 2023 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices A. M. Badar and Sandeep  Kumar in Bharath Roy & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2023). 

The High Court had dismissed Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 518 of 2014 Bharath Roy & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 583 of 2014 Shakuntla Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2023) preferred by the petitioner and the co-accused and had upheld the judgment dated April 16, 2014 rendered by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No. 370 of 2012 convicting the accused persons including the petitioner herein for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment for life till their natural death along with fine of Rs.2,00,000/- payable by each accused. For the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the accused were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/- payment by each of them. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Badar. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-33 of 2012, Chaori Thana, Bhojpur. Sunil Roy was the petitioner no. 3 in the High Court. 

The co-accused Bharath Roy, Uma Shankar Roy alias Uma Roy and Shakuntla Devi, did not prefer any special leave petition for assailing their conviction, only the petitioner-Sunil Roy was before the Supreme Court by way of the instant special leave petition. The case involves brutal murder of five persons, amongst which two were real brothers of accused No. 1 Bharath Roy, two were his nephews and one was his sister-in-law. 

Supreme Court concluded: "7. The case of the prosecution has been well proved by the ocular testimony of PW-1 Akash Kumar @ Vikky Kumar and PW-4 Rubi Kumari, both of whom received injuries in the same incident. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not in a position to convince the Court that the reliance placed by the trial Court and the High Court on the testimony of these two witnesses was unjustified or that the witnesses were not present at the spot. As a matter of fact, the presence of the witnesses at the spot is well established and corroborated by the fact that both of them received injuries in the very same incident. 9. Two competent Courts have recorded concurrent findings of the facts in convicting the petitioner as well as the co-accused and affirming their conviction. The judgments rendered by the Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity and are rather based on sound and thorough appreciation of evidence available on record and assign detailed reasons for arriving at a finding of guilt against the accused persons. 10. In this background, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed as being devoid of merit."

Justice Badar's judgement reads:"41. Culpable homicide is a genus and murder is its species. The Indian Penal Code practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. Culpable homicide of the first degree is the gravest form which is defined as 'murder' and is made punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The next may be termed as 'culpable homicide of second degree', which is made punishable under first part of Section 304 of the IPC. The last degree of culpable homicide is 'culpable homicide of third degree' which is made punishable under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. Barring the cases covered by an exception to Section 300 of Indian Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if an act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. Otherwise, for making out the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the prosecution is firstly required to establish that a bodily injury is present on the victim. Secondly, the prosecution is required to establish nature and size of the injury on the victim. Then the prosecution is enjoined to prove that there was intention to inflict the particular injury, by adducing clear and cogent evidence for clarifying that such an injury was not accidental or unintentional. Possibility of injury of other kind intended by the appellant/accused is required to be ruled out. Lastly, the prosecution has to establish that the injury so caused was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If all these factors are established, then only the offence defined under Section 300 of the IPC and punishable under Section 302 of IPC is made out. Similarly, it is well settled that in the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code all the ingredients of offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. Indian Penal Code are lacking, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code. Section 307 of Indian Penal Code does not take into consideration the effect of the act of the accused except as a measure of punishment to be imposed on him. In order to constitute the offence under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code actus reus and the requisite mens rea both must concur and the intention precedes the act attributed to the accused. The offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is made out when the accused have intended to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention does any overt act towards commission of murder. In order to establish the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, the prosecution is required to establish the intention or knowledge of committing murder and doing of an act towards it. Thus, Section 307 of the IPC contemplates intention or knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention." 

The High Court's Division Bench had concluded:"....the accused persons had inflicted blows of sharp cutting weapons on vital parts of bodies of all five deceased persons. As seen from the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution, deaths of Kamlesh Roy, Bikash Roy, Vijay Roy, Satyendra Roy and Shanti Devi were resulted because of cardio respiratory failure caused by haemorrhage and shock due to injuries sustained by them on vital parts of their body such as neck, chest and abdomen. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that blows of sharp cutting weapons were inflicted by the accused persons on the victims with an intention to cause death of their victims. Seat of injury and the weapons used for causing wounds so also the force by which the blows were given on the victims makes it clear that the accused persons were knowing that they were likely to cause death of the victims by inflicting blows by sharp edged weapons. Therefore, the prosecution has established that in furtherance of their common intention, the appellants had caused murders of five victims, thereby committing the offence punishable u/s 302 R/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, it is proved from evidence on record that in furtherance of their common intention the accused persons had attempted to commit murder of P.W.1 Akash Kumar @ Vikky Kumar by inflicting blow of sharp cutting weapon on his chest leading to his hospitalization for a one and half month at P.M.C.H., Patna. The blow was inflicted on his chest with sufficient force making the intention to eliminate him crystal clear. Thus, the prosecution has also proved commission of the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 43. As we have carefully gone through the entire case laws relied by the appellants and as we have acted upon the ratio which can be culled out from those rulings, we are not intending to reproduce the ratio by quoting relevant paragraphs from those judgments, for burdening this otherwise lengthy judgment. 44. In the result, both these appeals are devoid of merit and they are accordingly dismissed." 

 

Supreme Court grants interim protection to Rishu Shree against arrest for four weeks, finds no ground to interfere with Justice Arun Kumar Jha's judgement

In Rishu Shree vs. Union of India (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated June 16, 2026, wherein, it granted interim protection against arrest to the petitioner for a period of four weeks. It granted liberty to the petitioner "to meanwhile apply for bail in the High Court. Such an application shall be decided by the High Court as per its own merits without being influenced by the observations or findings in the impugned order dated 18.05.2026. Further, the High Court is requested to preferably decide the bail application within the period during which interim protection has been granted through this order." 

The Division observed:"....we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 18.05.2026 passed by the High Court."  

The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with pending applications. It arose out of impugned judgment in Rishu Shree vs. Union of India through its Secretary, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice & Ors. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 75-page long judgement dated May 18, 2026

Also read: Rishu Shree saga is linked to story of Advocate Gayatri Kumari, Sanjeev Hans, Gulab Yadav, Lalit and others-Part 1 

FIR under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 & provisions of IPC quashed: Justice Sandeep Kumar

High Court quashes FIR against Sanjeev Hans, no relief for Gulab Yadav, Lalit in Advocate Gayatri Kumari rape case, matter also pending in Supreme Court