Patna High Court acquits murder convict, directs DGP, Bihar to initiate departmental proceedings against Mahesh Kumar Rajak, Investigating Officer for keeping material lacuna in prosecution case by his "improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation"

In Meghnath Choupal @ Medhnath Choupal Sharma vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "....we are not in a position to concur with the finding of the Trial Court. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. 16. The judgment and order of conviction dated 30th of May, 2018, and the order of sentence dated 31st of May, 2018, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura, are hereby set aside." It is apparent from the public record that Manmohan Sharan Lal was the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura at that time. 

Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. He observed:"2. Before we advert to the prosecution case, we are constrained to record that the instant appeal is a classic example of improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation on the part of the Investigating Officer keeping material lacuna in the prosecution case." 

The case was filed in the High Court on June 21, 2018. It was registered on July 2, 2018. The allegation against the appellant was of having shot dead the son of the informant. The A.P.P., had submitted that there was political rivalry between the parties and the young son of the informant has been shot at point blank range by the appellant. It was submitted that the appellant also was accused in eleven other cases under grave sections of the Indian Penal Code as well as the Arms Act. Further, it was submitted that there is direct identification of the appellant as the main assailant.  The murder took place on July 22, 2014, in the Madhepura district when the victim was intercepted and fatally shot on his way home from a funeral.

Notably, in its order dated April 12, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashwani Kumar Singh and Rajeev Ranjan Prasad had recorded: "In paragraph ‘8’ of the show cause reply filed on behalf of the State, a statement has been made that the appellant is a veteran criminal and he has been chargesheeted in as many as 12 cases. The case numbers are provided in paragraph ‘8’. Let the State file a supplementary affidavit clearly stating the present stage of all the 12 cases. The appellant shall also file an affidavit giving the present stage of the cases. List this matter on 13th May, 2022." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. 

Justice Chaudhary's judgement does not seem to factor in the fact about 12 criminal antecedents of the appellant.   

In his 3-page long order dated July 14, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah  and Purnendu Singh had concluded:"6. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and taking into account the materials and evidence which have come during trial, the Court is not inclined to allow the prayer for suspension of sentence and release of the appellant-applicant on bail during the pendency of the appeal." The order was authored by Justice Amanullah. 

The criminal appeal was filed against an order of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court at Madhepura in a Sessions Trial of 2014 which arose out of Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014 whereby and whereunder the Trial Judge by his judgement dated May 30, 2018 convicted the appellant for the offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC read with Section 27 Arms Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of life and also to pay fine of Rs. 50,000. For the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 1 year. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence are under challenge in the present appeal at the instance of the convict/appellant.

The prosecution case is that on July 22, 2014 at about 4:00 P.M., the informant, namely, Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji was returning to his house by a motorcycle after attending the last rites of his aunt. The son of the
informant was the pillion rider. While he was proceeding towards his house, he noticed near Chapariya Toll that some persons were following them on about four motorcycles. They crossed the motorcycle of the informant and registered them to proceed. The informant also stated that immediately thereafter, one Laltu Yadav and Birendra Choupal caught hold of him and placed a pistol beneath his ear. They instructed the informant not to raise any shout, failing which they would open fire at him. One Meghnand Choupal (the appellant), Bilash Mahto and Umesh Yadav caught hold of the son of the informant, namely, Anupam Ananad and Chandrahaas Choupal instructed them to bring Anupam to him. Chandrahaas was standing about 10 yards away on the western side from the place of occurrence. These named accused persons forcibly took away Anupam to Chandrahaas. When the informant requested Chandrahaas to release his son, the accused persons who caught hold of him assaulted him by fists and blows. At that time Chandrahaas told others that another vehicle is coming towards the place of occurrence. Hearing this, the motorcycle rider started their motorbike to proceed and on the instruction of Chandrahaas Choupal, Meghnad Choupal (the appellant) opened fire at the son of the complainant, touching pistol on his chest. All the accused persons then left the place of occurrence. The informant raised hue and cry and rushed towards his son, who was lying on the ground in pool of blood oozing out from his wound. The cousin brother of the informant, namely, Mantu Kumar and Rupesh Kumar were also present there. Subsequently, other relatives who went to attend the last ritual of the aunt of the informant appeared there and the injured was taken to Madhepura Hospital by a Scorpio Car. The Medical Officer examined him and declared him dead.

On the basis of the complaint, S.H.O. Shankarpur Police Station, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak took up the investigation by registering Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014, dated July 23, 2014. It appeared from the Lower Court Record that the investigation of this case culminated in filing charge-sheet under Section 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant Meghnad Choupal and one Bilash Mahto. After filing of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and subsequently it was transferred for trial and disposal to the Court of the ddl. Sessions Judge, 2nd at Madhepura. The prosecution examined all 8 witnesses, including the informant (P.W. 8), The Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem (P.W. 6) and the Investigating Officer (P.W. 7). Amongst other witnesses, P.W. 2, Tarni Sharma, was declared hostile by the prosecution. Only P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav claimed to be the eye-witness of the occurrence and on the basis of his evidence, the Trial Court held the present appellant guilty for committing offence under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and convicted and sentenced him accordingly. Other witnesses being P.W. 3 Rajendra Sah, who is a signatory to the seizure list. P.W. 4 Rupesh Kumar who is the cousin brother of the informant and he did not see the occurrence. P.W. 5 Rajesh Kumar is also a seizure list witness but so far as the incident is concerned, his evidence is in the nature of hearsay. P.W. 7 is the I.O. and P.W. 8 Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji is the informant of the case. 

On perusal of the LCR, the High Court found that the Trial Judge relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 alone and convicted the appellant on the ground that the Court can even hold an accused guilty on the basis of solitary evidence of one eye-witness only. In support of his contention, he referred to series of decisions, viz, Jarnail Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab -2009 (9) SCC 719, Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar vs. State of Maharashtra-AIR 2008 SC 927, Ramji vs. State of Bihar-2007 (57) ACC 385 (SC), Syed Ibrahim vs. State of Andhra Pradesh-AIR 2006 SC 2908, Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.-2005 1 SCC 184 and Chhitar Lal vs. State Of Rajasthan-2003 6 SCC.

Justice Chaudhary observed:"At the foremost, we inclined to record that the informant who’s the author of the case did not support his case and did not utter even a single word against the appellant involving him in committing the offence. Surprisingly enough, the informant was not declared hostile by the prosecution. Therefore, his examination in-chief stands firm on the ground and when an incident took place in presence of the informant, the FIR was lodged by the informant as an eye-witness. His contrary evidence on dock suffers most. The Trial Court held that P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav is the eye-witness of the incident. However, Trial Court failed to consider the cross-examination of P.W. 1 when he stated that he saw the deceased in injured condition. He received his injury on his chest. Thus, if the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of P.W. 1 are taken together for appreciation, a doubt arises as to whether P.W. 1 was present
at the place of occurrence before the deceased received injury or he appeared after the victim suffered gun-shot injury and was lying with blood oozing out from the wound. If we accept the version of P.W. 1 to be true during the cross-examination, then we find that P.W. 1 also reached the place of occurrence after the deceased received the gun-shot injury. 9. In view of such contradiction, we are not in a position to hold that the evidence of P.W. 1 is of sterling character." 

Justice Chaudhary drw on the Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep @Deepu vs. State of NCT Of Delhi reported in 2012 (8) SCC 21, wherein, it described a sterling witness. It reads: "22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

The decision was subsequently followed in a judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Nirmal Premkumar & Anr. vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 260. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "11. In view of the discrepancies pointed out, we are not in a position to hold that the P.W. 1 is a witness of sterling character and only on the basis of sole evidence of P.W. 1, the appellant could be convicted. There are series of lacunae in the prosecution case. During trial, the seizure list witness was not confronted with their signatures on the seizure list. Though they deposed but their signature on the seizure list was not marked exhibit. In his cross-examination, P.W. 5 stated that he put his signature on a blank paper under the instruction of the Investigating Officer. 12. There is no doubt that the victim of this case received gun-shot injury and succumbed to the said injury on the way to Madhepura Hospital." 

The judgement reads: "From the evidence of Investigating Officer, we find that he seized one motorcycle, one Samsung Mobile phone and an empty cartridge from the place of occurrence. Surprisingly enough, the ownership of the motorcycle was not asserted by the I.O. Had it been asserted at least this Court could have come to a conclusion as to whether any of the FIR named accused persons were present at the spot and left his motorcycle after the occurrence. Ownership of Samsung Mobile Phone was also not asserted. The empty cartridge was not sent to Forensic Laboratory to ascertain as to whether the said empty cartridge was used to commit murder of the son of the informant. These were primary duties of the I.O. for investigation of a case like this. It appears to us that either the I.O. did not know the basic principles of investigation or purposefully withheld the evidences which could have been brought during investigation to save the accused persons. 13. In our view, the process of the investigation by the I.O. of this case is a clear instance of dereliction of his duty. Therefore, we direct Director General of Police, Bihar Patna to initiate departmental proceeding against the Investigating Officer, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak, who was
posted as S.H.O. Medhapur Police Station on 22nd of July, 2014. Due to lackadaisical investigation, both the Trial Court and this Court are deprived of having best evidence against the real culprits of the incident."

Hearing concluded, judgment reserved in Tutu Ali's appeal against conviction in NDPS case

In Tutu Ali vs. The Union of India, through Intelligence Officer, DRI, RU Muzaffarpur Bihar (2026), the hearing was concluded and the judgment was reserved. The case was registered in the High Court on August 3, 2024. It arose out of a Muzaffarpur Police Station Case dated August 3, 2017. The appellant was arrested at the spot. From the truck in which the appellant was riding, 190.500 kgs. of ganja is said to have been recovered. The appellant claimed that he was not even present at the place of occurance. It was heard along with  Bagicha Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) Bihar. The judgment is reserved on June 17, 2026.  The case was filed on July 31, 2024 by Late Vaishnavi Singh. The petitioner's counsel included Late Ritwik Thakur. The father-in-law of Vaisnavi Singh, Ajay Thakur appeared for the the petitioner. 

The appellant was convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 vide judgment dated May 28, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Court-II (NDPS), Muzaffarpur in NDPS Case No. 02 of 2017, which arose out of DRI Case No. 2 of 2017. By order dated May 30, 2024, he was sentenced to undergo R.I. for fifteen years, to pay a fine of Rs. 1,50,000. 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad sets aside judgement of conviction by trial court, Begusarai in a POCSO case

In Ranjay Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 27-page long judgement dated July 1, 026, wherein, it concluded:"55. In ultimate analysis, this Court is of the opinion that it would not be safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim in this case which this Court has found as no wholly reliable piece of evidence. The impugned judgment and order are, therefore, set aside. 56. This appeal is allowed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The Court observed:"52. While this Court finds that there are some evidence that the victim girl had suffered abortion but save and except the statement of the victim that she was subjected to rape 6-7 months ago by this appellant and one Gaurav Kumar, there is no corroborating evidence to take a safe view of the matter that the appellant is guilty of commission of rape on the victim girl. Suppression of age of the victim has to be kept in mind and the fact that the prosecution witnesses are not wholly reliable would further create doubt in the mind of this Court in taking a clear view of the commission of offence by this appellant. The victim in this case is not a wholly reliable witness. She has stated that she had no complaint against this appellant. This statement of the victim is significant. Why is she saying that she had no complaint with the appellant. 53. We have further noticed that the occurrence in this case is said to have taken place about 6-7 months prior to the date of lodgment of the case i.e. 25.05.2018. The date of occurrence would, therefore, relate back to 6-7 months prior to 25.05.2018. At the relevant time, Section 376(3) IPC was not in existence. It has been inserted vide Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2018 with retrospective effect from 21.04.2018. 

Justice Prasad observed: "54. On the date of occurrence, i.e. 6-7 months prior to amendment, the minimum punishment prescribed under these provisions were 7 years but the learned trial court seems to have proceeded to convict the appellant under these provisions and awarded him a sentence under the newly substituted/amended/inserted provisions. The learned trial court has awarded rigorous imprisonment of 20 years and fine of Rs.50,000/- fo committing offence under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act. No separate sentence has been awarded for the offence under Section 376(3) IPC in view of the mandate under Section 42 of the POCSO Act. 

Section 376(3) IPC, Section 5(j)(ii) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act reads: "376 1[(3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim: Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim." 

Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act reads:"Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, which-(i) ...... (ii) in the case of female child, makes the child pregnant as a consequence of sexual assault;[6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.--(1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death. (2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.] " 

The appeal was filed in the High Court for setting aside the judgment of conviction dated February 2, 2023 and the order of sentence dated February 6, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court (POCSO Act)-cum-6th Additional Sessions Judge, Begusarai in a POCSO Case of 2018 which arose out of Muffasil (Lakho O.P.) P.S. Case of 2018. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal and Section 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. By the impugned order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years with a fine of Rs.50,000/-under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act. 

The prosecution case was based on the written application of the father of the victim (PW-2) wherein he stated that on May 25, 2018 at around 08:00 A.M., his daughter told him that her stomach was aching. Then for treatment, he brought his daughter to the nearby private hospital, where the doctor told him that his daughter is pregnant. Thereafter, when the informant repeatedly asked his daughter then she told him that about 5-6 months ago, when she was coming from school alone, then (1) Ranjay Singh (appellant) and (2) Gaurav Kumar caught hold of her and took her inside the maize field and committed rape upon her
one after another. The victim also alleged that they threatened her not to disclose this to anyone otherwise they will kill her and her father. On the basis of the written information of the informant, FIR being Muffasil (Lakho O.P.) P.S. Case was registered on May 25, 2018 under Section 376 IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act against (1) Ranjay Singh and (2) Gaurav Kumar. After investigation, Police submitted first chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 435 of 2018 dated July 20, 2018 against Gaurav Kumar keeping investigation pending against Ranjay Kumar. The trial court vide order dated August 6, 2018 took cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 376 of the IPC as well as under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act against accused Gaurav Kumar and after finding him juvenile in conflict with law, learned trial court sent his records to the Juvenile Justice Board, Begusarai vide order dated August 6, 2018  and ordered for opening of supplementary records against Ranjay Singh, the appellant. Later on, supplementary Chargesheet dated August 31, 2018 was submitted against Ranjay Singh, the appellant under Sections 376(D), 313, 506/34 IPC and Section  5(8) of the POCSO Act. By order dated March 6, 2019, the trial court found that the cognizance of the offence in the case was already taken, accordingly, fixed the case for supply of police papers. After supply of police papers, charges were explained to the appellant in Hindi which he denied and claimed to be tried, accordingly, the charges were framed vide order dated April 8, 2019 under Section 376 IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. 7. In course of trial, the prosecution had examined as many as ten witnesses and exhibited several documents. 

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by DGP, Bihar and SP, Vaishali against a constable, grants all consequential benefits after 13 years

In Ramashish Ram vs. The State of Bihar through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page long judgement dated July 3, 2026, wherein, he set aside the order of punishment dated March 27, 2004 by SP, Vaishali and the order by the Director General of Police, Bihar, and allowed the writ application of the petitioner, a constable with all consequential benefits. The case was filed in the High Court on June 24, 2013. It was registered on July 22, 2013. 

Before the final judgement, the case was heard by over a dozen judges like Justices Shivaji Pandey, Purnendu Singh, Nani Tagia, Dr. Anshuman, Alok Kumar Sinha, Partha Sarthy, and G. Anupama Chakravarthy and again by Partha Sarthy. Notably, the roaster of the judge was changed even after the final hearing was concluded, prior to the judgement. 

The other four respondents were:Director General of Police, Bihar, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Tirhut Range, Muzaffarpur, Inspector of Police-Cum-Inquiry Officer, Mahua, Hazipur, Vaishali and the Superintendent of Police, Vaishali at Hazipur.

The petitioner had approached the High Court for issuance of appropriate writ for quashing the letter dated June 8, 2007 issued under the signature of Dy. Inspector General of Police, Tirhut Range, Muzaffarpur, the respondent no. 3 by which appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected with liberty to prefer a memorial before the Director General of Police but letter dated June 8, 2007 was not supplied to the petitioner, only purport of the said letter was communicated vide letter dated July 18, 2007 issued by SP, Vaishali, the respondent no.5, by which the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the post of constables, was passed by respondent no.5 vide letter dated March 27, 2004 was affirmed without considering the facts and circumstances, that allegation leveled against the petitioner for depositing the forged/documents in respect of the land and recommendation letter issued under the signature of respondent no.5 for getting the 2nd installment of house loan was not issued by respondent no.5. Though the petitioner was nowhere involved no opportunity was provided to the petitioner for participating in departmental inquiry/proceeding the inquiry/proceeding which was completed since at that time petitioner was behind the bar for the same occurrence for which a separate criminal case has been lodged by the respondent authorities. The petitioner had sought quashing of the enquiry report dated September 30, 2003 submitted by inquiry officer which was passed behind the back of the petitioner. He had also prayed for keeping the order of dismissal in abeyance and for payment of subsistence allowance during pendency of the writ application.

The case of the petitioner was that he had joined as a constable in the police department in the Government of Bihar on August 6, 1984 and his service was satisfactory in the opinion of all concerned. On the allegations of the petitioner having submitted a forged title deed in obtaining a house loan from the respondent authorities, an FIR being Hajipur Town P.S. Case no.281 of 2003 was registered against him under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and a departmental proceeding was also started. 

The charge in the departmental proceeding was framed against the petitioner on May 22, 2003 and after conduct of the enquiry ex-parte, the enquiry report came to be submitted on September 30, 2003.  The petitioner was served with the copy of the enquiry report to which he had filed his reply. The respondents thereafter came out with the order of punishment dated March 27, 2004 under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Vaishali at Hajipur imposing the punishment of dismissal from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by order dated July 18, 2007 and the memorial filed was also rejected by order dated June 8, 2007 passed by the Director General of Police, Bihar. 

Shri Prakash Tiwari, the counsel of the petitioner submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding as also the criminal case were identical and during pendency of the criminal case, the respondents should not have proceeded with the departmental proceeding. It was also submitted that in connection with the criminal case, the petitioner was taken into custody on May 22, 2003 and was granted bail by the Court by order dated September 16, 2003. He was released from custody on September 19, 2003. He submitted that copy of the memo of charge was not served on the petitioner. On his release from custody, the petitioner filed a representation asking for the relevant documents to enable him to file an effective reply or in fact any reply, however the petitioner was not provided with the documents, no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and the Enquiry Officer in a hurried manner proceeded to submit his enquiry report on September 30, 2003. It was thus submitted that there being violation of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the proceedings, the order of punishment as also order rejecting the appeal and the memorial filed by the petitioner were not sustainable and thus be set aside. 

The application is opposed by Kameshwar Pd. Gupta, GP-10, the counsel for the State of Bihar. He  submitted that the charges against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding were very serious of his having obtained housing loan by furnishing a forged title deed, on discovery of which led to lodging of the criminal case as also the proceeding against the petitioner. It was submitted that the petitioner was served with a copy of the memo of charge and was repeatedly given opportunity to appear in the departmental proceeding and present his case. It was after leading of evidence that the Conducting Officer in his enquiry report found the charges to have been proved. There being no violation of either principles of natural justice or any of the provisions of the relevant rules, there is no illegality in the order of punishment and thus the writ application be dismissed. 

All the submissions by counsel were devoid of merit. Disputing his unsubstantiated submissions, Justice Partha Sarthy observed: "....there is no dispute with respect to the fact that while the charges in the departmental proceeding was framed on 22.5.2003, the petitioner was taken into custody on the same date and on grant of bail by the learned Court in the criminal case, he was finally released from custody only on 19.9.2003. It transpires from the material on record that the documents demanded by the petitioner including the memo of charge was not served on the petitioner and soon after the petitioner’s release on 19.9.2003, the enquiry report came to be submitted on 30.9.2003 finding the charges levelled against the petitioner to have been proved. 12. Even on perusal of the enquiry report (Annexure-7), it transpires that no occasion was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the three witnesses examined on behalf of the management. Reference has been made in the report with respect to letters dated 12.6.2003, 15.6.2003, 26.6.2003, 17.8.2003, 15.9.2003 and 25.9.2003 having been sent to the petitioner informing him about the departmental proceeding and asking him to submit his reply. As observed herein above, the petitioner was in custody from 22.5.2003 and pursuant to the release order, was released from custody only on 19.9.2003. The enquiry report came to be submitted on 30.9.2003. Thus all the letters except the one dated 25.9.2003 were written to the petitioner at a time when he was in custody."

The judgement reads: "13. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there being violation of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the proceedings and the petitioner not having been given adequate opportunity by the Conducting Officer, the consequent order of punishment based on the enquiry
report cannot be sustained. 14. Similarly, the order passed in appeal as also the memorial preferred by the petitioner having been rejected without considering the above aspects are also not sustainable." 

In her order dated January 28, 2026, Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy recorded:"1. The Learned counsel for the petitioner reported to the Court that the matter was completely heard by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, and prior to pronouncing the order, the roaster was changed. Therefore, he requested to send the matter back to the concerned/appropriate Bench. 2. Therefore, the Registry is directed to place the matter before appropriate Bench after obtaining necessary direction/permission from the Hon’ble Chief Justice." The change of the roaster after the matter was completely heard, prior to pronouncing the order creates a logical compulsion for the Court to inquire into circumstances under which such glaring discrepancy happened. J.S Arora was for the respondents and Kameshwar Pd. Gupta, GP10 and M. Virendra Kuar, AC to GP10 represented the State. 

Subsequent to order by Justice Chakravarthy, the matter got re-listed before Justice Partha Sarthy on March 11, 2026. His order dated April 3, 2026 reads: "The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.5 is available in record of learned counsel for the parties, however the same is not available in the record of the Court. 2. Learned counsel for the State of Bihar to file a fresh copy of the counter affidavit of respondent no.5 by 16.4.2026. 3. Put up this case on 17.4.2026." His order dated April 17, 2026 reads: "No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.5 inspite of the order dated 3.4.2026. 2. If no counter affidavit of respondent no.5 is available on the records of the Court on the next date, cost of Rs.10,000/- shall be imposed. 3. Put up this case on 1.5.2026." Similar warning was given by the Justice Shivaji Pandey on June 20, 2019. His order dated May 1, 2026 reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has been served with a copy of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.5 to the writ application as also to the interlocutory application in Court today. 2. Put up this case on 15.5.2026."

Earlier, in a 2-page long order dated June 20, 2019, Justice Shivaji Pandey had recorded that the petitioner was challenging the order of dismissal from service as well as the order passed by the appellate authority. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had been proceeded departmentally for the fraudulent act on account of getting benefit of loan on the basis of forged documents. While he was in custody, a departmental proceeding was initiated and finally he was dismissed from service without giving him an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to defend himself. He had submitted that against the order of dismissal, he had filed appeal before the appellate authority unsuccessfully and, thereafter, he had also filed memorial but, till date, no information has been communicated with regard to the fate of the memorial which is lying with the D.G.P. (Police), Bihar. Justice Pandey's order reads: "Let the State should file its counter affidavit within a period of three weeks, in failure, the same will be accepted only after deposit of Rs. 10,000/- in favour of Patna High Court Legal Services Committee. List this case after three weeks under the same list." 

Who caused a cruel delay of 13 years? Justice Partha Sarthy recognized that Kameshwar Pd. Gupta, the counsel for the State was defending the indefensible acts of the DGP, Bihar and SP, Vaishali. Cruelty manifests itself in myriad ways. 

 

 

Registrar General, Patna High Court issues circular to all Principal District & Sessions Judges, Bihar State Bar Council to comply with Supreme Court's directions in Zeba Khan vs. State of U.P.

The Registrar General of Patna High Court has issued a 3-page long circular order dated July 2, 2026 on the subject of judgment dated February 11, 2026 passed by the Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 2026 which arose out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12669 of 2025 (Zeba Khan Versus State of U.P. & Ors.). In compliance with the observation made by the Supreme Court in para 48, 49 and 50 of its judgment the following directions have been issued to the District Judiciaries:-

l. Every pleading filed/presented in relation to bail matters before the District Judiciary shall appropriately disclose the following details:-
(i) Full particulars of the case from which the application arises including FIR Number and Date; Police Station, District and State or Complaint Case Number and the Court before which it is pending; Sections invoked and Maximum punishment prescribed; 

(ii) Detail of custody and procedural compliance i.e. date of arrest and total period of custody undergone;

(iii) Current status of trial i.e. Stage of proceedings (Investigation/Chargesheet/ Cognizance/ Framing of Charges/Trial), total number of witnesses cited in the chargesheet and number of prosecution witnesses examined;

 (iv) Detail of criminal antecedents including FIR number and police station or Complaint Case number and the name of the Court, section of offences and status i.e. Pending/ Acquitted/ Convicted;

(v) Detail of previous bail applications i.e. Whether the applicant had earlier approached any Court including the High Court or Supreme Court on any previous occasion for bail and if so, the case number, name of the court and outcome of the case; 

(vi) Detail of Coercive Processes i.e. whether any non-bailable warrant was issued and whether declared a proclaimed offender. 

The circular order reads: "The aforementioned instructions shall be followed scrupulously henceforth  by all concerned and its non-compliance shall be viewed seriously. A copy of the circular has been forwarded to the Secretary General, Supreme Court of India, New Delhi and the Chairman, Bihar State Bar Council, Patna with a request to forward this circular order to all the Bar Associations of the State for wide circulation amongst Bar. All the Principal District & Sessions Judges of Bihar have asked to circulate the circular order amongst the Bar and the Bench in their respective Judgeships for its strict compliance. A copy has also been forwarded to the Director, Bihar Judicial Academy, Gaighat, Patna.

Condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant the State, delay is owing to administrative difficulties would be impermissible: Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Kumar Mainsh

In The Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railway, Hazipur Bihar & Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Pvt. Ltd. through its Authorized representative Sri Arjun Rajput (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Kumar Manish delivered a 13-page long judgement, dated June 25, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered opinion that the learned District Judge is correct in taking a view that the miscellaneous arbitration application preferred by the present appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. In view of the clear mandate of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the learned Court could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of three months. Thus, no illegality or infirmity may be found in the impugned order. 16. This appeal fails." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing a commercial appeal which had been preferred seeking setting aside of the order dated August 17, 2023 passed by the District Judge, Patna in a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case  (Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railways, Hazipur, Bihar and Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Private Limited) whereby and whereunder the District Judge had dismissed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the Act of 1996’ as amended upto date) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed on behalf of the petitioners-respondents for setting aside the arbitral award dated December 14, 2021 passed by a sole Arbitrator in a Arbitration Case of 2019 which arose out of Request Case of 2019. 

The application was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the arbitral award was rejected on the ground of the same being hopelessly barred by limitation. The Sheristedar’s report was that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the application. 

An application seeking condonation of delay was filed. It was pointed out to the trail court that due to the COVID period delay was caused in preparation of the draft and its approval. It was submitted that after taking approval and sanction from the competent authority of the Railways, the matter was sent to Railway Lawyers for drafting the challenge petition in May, 2022 and the department was waiting for the final drafting of the petition. It was also stated that the counsel for the East Central Railways was delisted from its panel by the order of Ministry of Law and Justice and thereafter the deponent assigned the work to one of the learned Standing Government Counsel after approval of the same from the competent authority. It was finally submitted that the Supreme Court had also given a direction to condone the delay, if any, and after March 1, 2022, there was a delay of only 89 days in filing of the present application.

The District Judge had taken note of report of Sheristedar which showed that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the present case. The Court had also taken note of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and held that the delay of 222 days in filing of the case cannot be condoned. 

The counsel for the appellants argued before the High Court that the District Judge, Patna had not considered the order passed by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court during the COVID period in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 in which the period between March 15, 2020 and February 28, 2022 had been excluded in reckoning of the period of limitation. It was submitted that the trail court had merely considered the Sheristedar’s report and based on that the impugned order was passed. The impugned order suffers from non-consideration of the materials, therefore, it was liable to be set aside.

The counsel for the respondent submitted that on a bare perusal of the impugned order it was evident that the District Judge had duly considered the scope and ambit of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. So far as Sheristedar’s report is concerned, there was no contest that the appeal was filed on October 22, 2022 for setting aside of the arbitral award delivered on December 14, 2021. It was submitted that if the overall period is computed, the Sheristedar’s report was correct. So far as the COVID period was concerned, no doubt the District Judge had not specifically taken note of the said report in the impugned order but that would not make any change in the opinion of the court and the same would be totally irrelevant so far as the present case is concerned. Even if the period between December 14, 2021 and February 28, 2022 was excluded in reckoning the period of limitation, the fact remains that the application under Section 34(1) was preferred after eight months. The District Judge could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the period of limitation i.e. three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award by the party making the application.

Justice Prasad observed:"The facts are not in dispute. The arbitral award has been delivered on 14.12.2021. It is not the case of the appellant that the Award was served on the appellant on any other date. Thus, the period of limitation of three months for filing of an application under Section 34(1) of the Act of 1996 would have expired on 14th March, 2022. By virtue of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 were liable to be excluded. In this case, the last date for filing of the application under subsection (1) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was due to expire on 14th March, 2022. The period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are liable to be excluded for the purpose of filing of the application.  10. The application was not filed within a period of three months even if the period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are excluded, still on showing sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the prescribed period of limitation, the appellant would have got a condonation of another thirty days. Unfortunately, the appellant being such a big organisation having battery of lawyers, law officers and the senior officers dealing with the matter did not take care of the period of limitation and the mandatory nature of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. They have to blame themselves for this gross negligence on their part in not attending their matter within time. 

This is not the solitary case in which such inordinate delay has taken place. It is for the Railways to set their house in order and the means and ways by which it is to be taken care of or the responsibilities are to be fixed are in the domain of Railways." 

Sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 reads: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).(2) …...(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

Justice Prasad relied on the two judgments of theSupreme Court on this issue. In Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, the Supreme Court has held that condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant is the State and delay is owing to the administrative difficulties would be impermissible and in such cases, there would be no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It reads: “11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the extension of the prescribed period for any appeal or application subject to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to an application challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This has been settled by this Court in its decision in  Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein it held as follows : (SCC pp. 474-75, paras 12 &14) “12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of of interpretation would justify such a result. 

The history and scheme of the 1996 Act supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with the “exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide” in a court without jurisdiction, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions. The question whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been answered by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169. 

Supreme Court observed:“23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the 1996 Act, this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 ofthe 1996 Act, more particularly where no provision is to be found in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the 1996 Act would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside an arbitral award.”

Justice Prasad observed: "14. The position of law is well settled with respect to the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. By applying the facts of the present case to the well-settled position of law, we need to assess whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in condoning the delay for filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.”

In Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470, the Supreme Court has held that the application challenging the award filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would not be an application “in accordance with” subsection (3) as required under Section 34(1).

Justice Prasad concluded: 13. This Court has discussed both the judgments with the learned counsel for the appellant. Even as we have noticed that in its application under Section ‘5’ of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed before the learned District Judge, the appellant took a plea that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed for condonation of delay, if any, we are of the view that the blanket plea taken by the appellant before the learned District Judge has no basis to stand."

Justice Arun Kumar Jha grants bail to a child in conflict with law, sets aside order Appellate Court, Saran and Juvenile Justice Board in a gang-rape case

Name of the offender juvenile anonymized, but the name of the victim of gang rape disclosed in the judgement, ignoring Supreme Court's repeated directions

In X vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated June 29, 2026 concluded:"15. Let the petitioner, a child in conflict with law, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra/concerned Court in connection with JJB Case No. 51 of 2025, arising out of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the parents of the petitioner and the other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent and shall give undertaking that he / she shall keep proper care and upkeep of the petitioner. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board. (iii) If the petitioner is found involved in similar nature of offence in future, the learned J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra will be at liberty to move for cancellation of his bail bond. 16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is allowed." 

The respondent no. 2 is Tannu Kumari is the daughter of Rajendra Kumar Yadav, resident of village near Sadha Dhala, Bazar Samiti, Mufassil, Saran was impleaded as a opposite party no. 2 on the directions of Justice Jha by his order dated February 23, 2026. The order reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner is was directed to be implead the informant of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025 as opposite party no. 2 in course of the day."

Justice set aside the order by the Appellate Court dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra in Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2025. Subsequently, the order of the Juvenile Justice Board in a JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 was also set aside. 

The judgement records that in the revision petition, the identity details of the petitioner /child in conflict with law was disclosed, which is against the statutory provisions prescribed under Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which mandates protection of disclosure of identity of the child in conflict with law.  Therefore, the identity of the child in conflict with law is being referred to in the cause title as X. 3. Registry while uploading the order on the website shall also ensure that the cause title is reflected in similar manner. 

Notably, the petitioner is a son of Jitendra Ray, resident of village- New Basti Brahmpur, Bhagwan Bazar, Saran. His mother is Rinku Devi.  

The criminal revision petition was directed against the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra, in a Criminal (Juvenile) Appeal of 2025, whereby and whereunder the appeal was dismissed and the order of Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra dated September 8, 2025 passed in JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 70(1) and 3(5) of the B.N.S., 2023, was affirmed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 

As per prosecution case, the petitioner and other co-accused persons committed gang-rape with the informant. The petitioner was apprehended and was in custody since January 19, 2025 of the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. The petitioner was declared a child in conflict with law vide order dated August 11, 2025 passed by the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. 

Being aggrieved by the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the Appellate Court, the petitioner moved the revision petition before the High Court. 

The counsel for the petitioner/child in conflict with law submitted that the child in conflict with law was falsely implicated in this case and he was innocent. The prosecution story was not believable. The FIR was registered after a delay of more than twenty-four hours without any plausible explanation. Though the child in conflict with law was named as an accused in the written report on which the FIR was instituted, the informant did not name this child in conflict with law in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the B.N.S.S., 2023. He also submitted that the medical report did not support the allegation of gang-rape. The main accused against whom there was specific allegation of kidnapping the informant and taking her to a secluded place and committing rape with her, was been granted bail by First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra. The counsel further submitted that the Courts below failed to appreciate the mandate of law as under Section 12 as well as Sections 3(i), 3(IV), 3(V) and 3(XIV) of the Act of 2015. The counsel also submitted that the Courts below failed to consider that prolonged detention of a child in conflict with law defeats the very objective of the J.J. Act which is reformative and rehabilitative in nature. It was submitted that mother of the child in conflict with law undertakes to take full care of her son and further undertakes that she would not allow the child in conflict with law to come in contact with bad elements. The child in conflict with law was having antecedent of five cases and  he was on bail in all these cases. 

APP for the State and the counsel for the OP No. 2 vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner/child in conflict with law. The counsel for the OP No. 2 submitted that the Courts below has correctly passed the orders considering the antecedent of the child in conflict with law. The child in conflict with law was having altogether five criminal cases and he committed all these offences while on bail in two such cases. There was every likelihood that the child in conflict with law would again commit some serious offence if he was enlarged on bail. He also submitted that thus there was apparent mental, physical and psychological danger to the child in conflict with law (CICL) and it was also very likely that the CICL would again come in contact with his associates who appear to be inveterate criminals.

Justice Jha observed: "10. Section 12 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that a CICL could be denied bail only on the ground that on release, the said child would come in contact with criminal elements or there was danger to the moral, physical and psychological well being of the CICL or the release would defeat the ends of justice. If these grounds are not present, the bail could not be denied to a CICL. 11. Further, the Act of 2015 is, in fact, child friendly. The central theme is that the interest of child is supreme. Section 3 of the Act of 2015 incorporates the general principles to be followed in the administration of the Act. According to which, “all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. In fact, Section 3(iv) of the Act of 2015 provides for the principle of best interest and for all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. Section 3(xii) of the Act of 2015 makes it abundantly clear that a child shall be placed in institutional care as a step of last resort after making a reasonable inquiry. Further, Section 3(xiii) of the Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for Principle of repatriation and restoration stating that a CICL shall have the right to re-unite with his family and be restored to the social, cultural and the economic background that he came from unless such restoration and repartition is not in the CICL’s best interest." 

The judgement reads: "12. Cumulative reading of aforesaid provisions show the CICL should be released on bail unless the fact comes on record that there was chance of such child coming in contact with a known criminal or enlarging such child on bail might expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger. Further, the Courts being parens patriae are supposed to look into for protection of best interest of the child. All such steps are to be taken by the Courts for reformation and rehabilitation of a CICL." 

Justice Jha recorded: "It is true that the CICL is having antecedent of five cases and it also appears that he has been named in this case after release on bail in two such cases, but the intent and purpose of the J.J. Act is to reform a child delinquent and if the Court refused to release the child and bring him to his family would defeat the purpose if prayer for bail is rejected on the ground of criminal antecedent, though it becomes relevant factor for considering whether the case of the CICL falls in any of the exceptions under Section 12 of the Act of 2015. Since the bail of the CICL is refused solely on the ground of criminal antecedent, I think the CICL can be given an opportunity to reform himself and for reformation and rehabilitation of the CICL, the best place is his family and as his mother has undertaken to take care of him, I think considering all these facts and circumstances and the mandate of law, the prayer for bail of the CICL could be sympathetically considered." 

While the removal of the name of the a child in conflict with law has rightly been protected from disclosure, the disclosure of the name of the informant does appear to be appropriate.  

In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Hukum Chand @ Monu 2026 INSC 290, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh concluded:"we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to all the Registrars General of the High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated prior to the passing of this Court’s judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (((2019) 2 SCC 703)) which has mandated the non-disclosure of the victim’s identity, and still pending, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is followed strictly. This has been the long-standing position in law but, it has not been followed. The primary reason thereamongst, one supposes, is the general indifference of the Courts below and possibly even the lack of awareness of the deep stigma that follows such offences." The Bench drew attention towards the Court's decisions in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh 1996) 2 SCC 384 which touched upon this issue in connection with Section 327 CrPC, and also towards Bhupinder Sharma vs. State of HP (2003) 8 SCC 551.