Buxar (Town) P.S. FIR of 2020 regarding alleged bribe of Rs 500, proceedings before Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna quashed for inexplicable inaction of 5 years, 10 months: Justice Ansul

In Ratneshwar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, he concluded:"14. The delay in this case is entirely attributable to the investigating agency. The petitioner has not caused it, has not absconded and has been present. Nothing has been placed before this Court to show any extraordinary or exceptional reason for five years and ten months of inaction. The burden which the Full Bench of this Court laid down in Madheshwardhari Singh(supra) has not been discharged by the State in any measure. 15. In the result, this petition is allowed. The FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated 05.09.2020 under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 at Town Police Station, Buxar, and all proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, are hereby quashed." 

Prior to the judgement, Justice Ansul had passed an order dated March 24, 2026 directing the respondents  "to conclude the investigation within a month. If the investigation is not concluded within a month, the Court will be constrained to apply its mind towards quashing of the F.I.R on the grounds of delay in submission of charge-sheet." 

The other six respondents were: 2. District Magistrate, Buxar, Additional Collector, Buxar Bihar 4. The Superintendent of Police, (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna, 5. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Bihar, Patna, 6. S.H.O. Town Police Station, Buxar and 7. Senior Treasury Officer, Buxar. In its order dated June 16, 2026, it was recorded that "Till 21.04.2026 the investigation was not concluded." despite High Court's order. The case was regarding an alleged bribery. The Buxar police failed to trace the recipient of the Rs 7500, the alleged bribery amount.  

The judgement relied on paragraph 27 and paragraph 50 of the judgement by High Court's Full Bench of 19th Chief Justice Surjit Singh Sandhawalia, Justices S. Shamsul Hasan and Ram Nandan Prasad in Madheshwardhari Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324, which considered the question whether the right to a speedy public trial is applicable only to the proceedings in court stricto sensu or includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. 

The Full Bench held: “27. … it is held that the right to speedy public trial is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation in a criminal prosecution as  well......Xxx 50. A sharp note of caution must be sounded. The aforesaid finding must not be misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than seven years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought to be laid down is the extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed and the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established. Really, I am somewhat hesitant in spelling out even the aforesaid outer time limit which, perhaps, errs on the side of strictitude. But since we are following binding precedent, the same has to be unreservedly accepted. Nor is it sought to be laid down that in a lesser period than seven years an accused person would not be able to establish circumstances pointing to the patent prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the guarantee of speedy public trial under Art. 21. That is a question which can be properly considered and adjudicated where it may expressly arise. In both the cases before us the delay is admittedly even far beyond the outer limit of seven years. What indeed is sought to be laid down here is that beyond this period of seven years the continuation of the investigation and trial would bring in the weightiest presumption that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is violated and the prosecution should be halted in its tracks. This would per se be indicative of prejudice. Thereafter the burden would automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of the State to show that such grave delay was either entirely the handiwork of the accused himself or was occasioned by such special and exceptional circumstances so as to merit condonation thereof. A criminal prosecution by the State cannot be allowed to become an inquisitorial persecution of the accused. Nor cap, a fair speedy trial be allowed to become an unending travail for him....Xxx 52. … it is held that an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. It is further held that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art. 21.” 

Justice Ansul noted that the constitutional foundation underlying this position was laid by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, which held that the procedure under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just, and that a procedure which is not so is void. Building on that, the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 held that “no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21” and that “the State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources.” 

The judgement referred to the judgement by Supreme Court's Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 which crystallised this into a set of propositions at paragraph 86, the governing ones being that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and encompasses all stages including investigation, and that ordinarily where this right is found to have been infringed the charges shall be quashed. 

Notably, applying these principles to a corruption matter arising from this State, the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Das vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 held at paragraphs 7 to 9 that “cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay” and that while interference at the investigation stage is ordinarily not called for, “it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of time.” Similary, In Ramanand Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 153, the Supreme Court quashed prosecution in a corruption matter from this State after finding that following an initial raid no action was taken for six years and that the prosecution, which had dragged on for thirteen years in all, had become a travesty of justice. In Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, which concerned a matter from this State where investigation had proceeded fitfully over seventeen years, the Court reiterated at paragraph 25 that where the right to speedy trial is infringed the charges may be quashed. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for quashing of the FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated September 5, 2020 and the entire proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, both arising out of alleged offences under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 

The petitioner, Ratneshwar Kumar, was a Data Entry Operator (Grade-A) at the Buxar Treasury and has been dismissed from service. On July 22, 2020, one Saryu Ojha, a pensioner, visited the Treasury and was paid his pension on the same day. This appeared to be the event at the heart of this prosecution, though what is curious is that the FIR was not registered on that date, nor was any complaint made anywhere near that date. A video surfaced on social media on August 28, 2020, more than a month later of the said occurrence, purporting to show the petitioner receiving money from Saryu Ojha. The  District Magistrate, Buxar, upon noticing the video, directed the Additional Collector to hold an enquiry. The Additional Collector returned a finding against the petitioner vide letter dated September 4, 2020 and recommended registration of a case. Accordingly, the Senior Treasury Officer, Ajmal Ali Ansari, addressed a written complaint vide letter dated September 5, 2020 to the SHO, Town Police Station, Buxar, and the present Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 came to be registered under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Investigation was entrusted to CI Mukesh Kumar Shree.  

The Court found that no specific demand is mentioned in the FIR therein, no occasion of acceptance is identified, no sum was described as a bribe, and no time or place where illegal gratification was said to have changed hands finds mention. The date of occurrence is recorded as August 28, 2020, being the date the video went viral, and not the date the pension was paid. The complainant, Ajmal Ali Ansari, was the petitioner’s superior officer at the Treasury and was plainly not present at the place of occurrence , where the alleged transaction between Ratneshwar Kumar and Saryu Ojhais said to have taken place. Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 require, at their very threshold, proof of acceptance or obtaining of undue advantage and such undue advantage must pass from an identifiable person to a public servant. But in this case, the only person from whom it is alleged to have passed is Saryu Ojha himself. It is in the context of that statutory requirement that the investigative record becomes fatal to the prosecution. Saryu Ojha’s statement was recorded during investigation. The Court considered that statement. Saryu Ojha, the alleged source of the bribe, the man whose visit to the Treasury on July 22, 2020 gave rise to this entire case, stated that he has no recollection of having paid any illegal gratification to the petitioner. Without his testimony implicating the petitioner, the essential ingredient of the offences alleged simply does not arise.

The case against the petitioner begins and ends with Saryu Ojha. But his statement does not support it. Ujjawal Ojha, who is the grandson of Saryu Ojha and the person who made and spread the video, gave a written statement before the Police Inspector, Town Anchal, Buxar. In that statement, as appears from the record, he stated that his grandfather had given a total of Rs. 8,000/-, out of which Rs. 500/-was given to the petitioner towards petrol and vehicle hire charges, and that no illegal gratification was paid to Ratneshwar Kumar. He also stated that the video was made due to a misunderstanding. Shrikant Ojha and Ramakant Ojha, both sons of Saryu Ojha, also stated to the police that their father had given no illegal gratification and that whatever money passed hands was on account of transport expenses. 

Justice Ansul recorded: "In the considered opinion of this Court, there is not even one person with direct knowledge of the events of 22.07.2020 who has supported the case that any bribe was paid. The prosecution rests entirely on a video, and the maker of that video has retracted.  9. Apart from the merits, there is the independent question of the delay in investigation. The FIR was registered on 05.09.2020. Today is 23.06.2026, which makes it five years and ten months. The pen drive which carries the viral video, the sole piece of material evidence in this entire prosecution, has not been sent for Forensic Science Laboratory examination. No chargesheet has been filed. No charge has been framed before the learned Special Judge till date. The order dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in Special Case No. 22 of 2020, which is Annexure-2 of the petition, reflects that even nearly three years after registration of the FIR, the final form had not been submitted. When the matter was taken up before this Court on the last date, the SDPO appeared and disclosed that the pen drive had been acquired, however no explanation was offered for the delay of five years and ten months of an inactive investigation." 

Justice Ansul recollected that Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339, decided on November 20, 2025, held that “investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed.”

The judgement referred to Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 laid down the categories of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised, and two of those categories are squarely attracted here. One is where the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support thereof do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused. The other is where continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 

The Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held at paragraph 36 that “the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the appellants herein.”

Justice Ansul clarified that he has not overlooked the position taken in Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta vs. B. Srinivas, (2008) 8 SCC 580 that mere delay in investigation does not by itself furnish universal ground for quashing and that each case must be evaluated on its own facts. That is precisely what has been done here. The present order does not rest on the ground of delay alone. It rests with equal force on the merits of the case as disclosed by the material collected during investigation, which does not make out any offence under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner.

Earlier, the case was before Justice Sandeep Kumar and Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. 

Pension can be withheld only when a person is convicted or when he is punished for grave misconduct: Justice Bibek Chaudhuri

In Prabhakar Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary State Tax, Commercial Tax Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgement dated June 23, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 12. It is needless to say that the pension is deferred portion of compensation for rendering long years of service. It is a hard earned benefit accruing to an employee in the nature of property. It is not a bounty to be disbursed contrary to rules, but very basis for grant of such pension is to facilitate a retired government employee to live with dignity in winter of his life. Such a right cannot be curtailed by way of an executive fiat. Power to curtail pension or any portion thereof must be based on valid ground in accordance with law. Section 43 clearly postulates that pension can be withheld only when a person is convicted or when he is punished for grave misconduct. Till date, the petitioner was not convicted in any criminal case nor punished with grave misconduct. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get the remaining amount of his retiral benefits, which was withheld unauthorizedly by the respondents. 13. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the instant writ petition is allowed. 14. The respondent authority is directed to clear the retiral dues to the petitioner, which has been withheld, within a period of four weeks from the date of this order." The judgement refers to Rule 43 of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950.  

The writ petitioner was a retired government employee, who filed the writ petition for issuance of an appropriate Writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions in the nature of certiorari to set aside the Memo issued by the State Tax Additional Commissioner-Cum-Joint Secretary, Department of Commercial Tax Government of Bihar respondent no. 3 i.e. State Tax Additional Commissioner Cum Joint Secretary, Department of Commercial Tax, Government of Bihar whereby he has wrote letter to Principal Accountant General, Bihar, Patna, the respondent no. 4 stating therein that only 90% provisional Pension has been sanctioned to the petitioner and withheld the sanction of gratuity amount to the petitioner till final conclusion has not came in Judicial Proceeding in the light of the letter  issued by finance department. The petitioner had sought a direction to the respondents to immediate Pay the 100% Pension amount of gratuity and amount of unutilized leave salary to the petitioner along with 18% interest per annum. 

The petitioner had retired from service on March 31, March, 2022. After his retirement on superannuation, he was entitled to get his retiral benefits, such as pension, gratuity, amount of group insurance and amount of unutilized leave salary. 

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "7. It is not in dispute that a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner was found guilty and minor punishment of withholding two increments was imposed. After completion of departmental enquiry, he again joined his service and worked without any allegation till the date of his superannuation. Thus, after the allegation of embezzlement of fund and completion of departmental enquiry, he performed his duties to the satisfaction of his authorities. 8. Now, the question that requires to be adjudicated is as to whether a portion of retiral benefit can be withheld by
the respondents on the ground of pendency of criminal cases for more than 22 years." 

A plain reading of the relevant provision revealed that the provincial government reserves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, if the petitioner is convicted of serious crime or be held guilty of grave misconduct. The judgement recorded: "11. Till date, the petitioner was not convicted in any criminal case, concerning embezzlement of fund. He was also not held guilty of grave misconduct. In the departmental proceeding, only minor penalty of withholding two increments was imposed. It is already recorded that subsequently the petitioner performed his duties till the date of his superannuation satisfactorily."

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by DIG, Saran Range, Chapra, his subordinates dismissing ASI Mohammadpur police station, Gopalganj

In Ajay Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 12-page long judgement dated August 22, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....neither the order of punishment of dismissal nor the order rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner can be sustained. Consequently, the Saran Range Order no.186/2020 contained in memo no.3134 dated 10.12.2020 issued under the signature of the DIG, Saran Range, Chapra as also the order of the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order, Bihar, Patna) communicated to the petitioner contained in Saran District Order no.1047/2021, memo no.3435 dated 20.5.2021 under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Saran are both hereby set aside. 21. In view of the nature of the allegations and the material available on record, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner from the stage of commencement of the enquiry. 22. The writ application is allowed with the above observations and directions."  

The petitioner had filed the application in the High Court for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order contained in Memo No. 3134 dated 10.12.2020 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Saran Range, Chapra by which the petitioner has been dismissed from Service with immediate effect and also for quashing the appellate order dated 19.05.2021 passed by the Additional Director General of Police (Law and order) Bihar which was communicated by the Superintendent of Police, Saran vide memo no. 3435 dated 20.03.2021 whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 10.12.2020 has been rejected.

The petitioner had also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to reinstate the service of the petitioner with all consequential benefits with interest.

The case of the petitioner was that while the petitioner was posted as an Assistant Sub-Inspector at Mohammadpur police station in the district of Gopalganj, while on patrolling duty in the morning of April 6, 2018, the vehicle/police jeep in which the petitioner was present met with an accident in which a woman got injured and was taken to the hospital. The local people became agitated and took into custody the petitioner as also a Homeguard, while the driver of the vehicle fled away. It was the case of the petitioner that the agitated local people planted a bottle of liquor and a live chicken in the back side of the jeep to implicate the petitioner and others. A report with respect to the incident was sent by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Gopalganj to the Superintendent of Police, Gopalganj finding the petitioner guilty. Blood and urine sample was sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Muzaffarpur for analysis.

By the order dated April 6, 2018 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Gopalganj, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and he was served with the memo of charge on May 23, 2018. As directed, the petitioner filed his detailed defence denying the charges levelled against him. An enquiry report dated December 3, 2020 was submitted by the enquiry officer finding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The petitioner was served with a second show cause notice on December 4, 2020. The petitioner submitted his reply on December 6, 2020. By order dated December 10, 2020, issued under the signature of the DIG of Police, Saran Range, Chapra, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal was rejected by order dated April 24, 2021 passed by the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order), Bihar, Patna and communicated to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Saran, by his District Order no.1047/2021 dated May 19, 2021. The petitioner preferred the application against the order of punishment of dismissal passed against him as also the order rejecting his appeal.

The senior counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570. The judgement relied on the  judgment in Roop Singh Negi's case, wherein, the Supreme Court held: “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book.  Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.”

Justice Sarthy relied on High Court's Division Bench's judgement in Devendra Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (judgment dated 19.10.2023 passed in LPA no.1302 of 2017), following the decision in Roop Singh Negi's case, it observed: “7. As has been held in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others; (2009) 2 SCC 570, the documents produced in a departmental inquiry has to be proved by examining witnesses. Even an F.I.R. was held to be not evidence by itself without actual proof of facts stated therein. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also held that even an admission or confession to the police itself is not sufficient to find the delinquent employee guilty in a departmental proceeding if no evidence is brought on record to prove the offence or misconduct alleged. Departmental inquiry was held to be a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer functions in the status of a quasi-judicial authority. Not only should evidence be led in a departmental inquiry, the conclusions arrived at should be based on evidence which brings forth a probability that the delinquent has committed the misconduct alleged and charged against him. No Inquiry Report based on conjectures and surmises can be sustained and even in a departmental inquiry, the standard of proof is not a mere suspicion. However high the degree of suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for legal proof.”

Justice Sarthy drew on the contents of the enquiry report to observe: "this is a case of no evidence against the petitioner. 20. In this view of the matter, neither the order of punishment of dismissal nor the order rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner can be sustained. Consequently, the Saran Range Order no.186/2020 contained in memo no.3134 dated 10.12.2020 issued under the signature of the DIG, Saran Range, Chapra as also the order of the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order, Bihar, Patna) communicated to the petitioner contained in Saran District Order no.1047/2021, memo no.3435 dated 20.5.2021 under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Saran are both hereby set aside. 21. In view of the nature of the allegations and the material available on record, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner from the stage of commencement of the enquiry. 22. The writ application is allowed with the above observations and directions."

Sections 420, 406 IPC cannot travel together, Police, courts failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or violation of contractual terms: Supreme Court

In Rikhab Birani vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  passed a 15-page long judgement dated April 16, 2025 observed that "The chargesheet in the present case is bereft of particulars and details required and mandated in terms of Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It merely reproduces the contents of the FIR which makes reference to the payments made as well as the allegation that in the revenue records, the godown in question was recorded in the name of Rakesh Birani, the son of the appellant, Rikhab Birani. It is noted that the appellant, Rikhab Birani, informed the complainant that Rakesh Birani had expired. The complainant had then requested refund of money, etc. However, the FIR does not state the material and evidence available and collected during the course of the investigation to establish the offences under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Clearly, the ingredients of the aforesaid are not established and made out. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment/order and allow the present appeal quashing the FIR and the resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet."

The judgement reads:"We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations on the civil rights of complainant-respondent No.2. We are also constrained to impose costs of ₹50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) on the State of Uttar Pradesh as, in spite of repeated judgments/orders of this Court, we are being flooded with cases of civil wrongs being made the subject matter of criminal proceedings by filing chargesheets, etc. These costs will be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh...."

The Court observed:"We are constrained to pass this detailed speaking order, as it is noticed that, notwithstanding the law clearly laid down by this Court on the difference between a breach of contract and the criminal offence of cheating, we are continuously flooded with cases where the police register an FIR, conduct investigation and even file chargesheet(s) in undeserving cases. During the last couple of months, a number of judgments/orders have been pronounced by this Court, especially in cases arising from the State of Uttar Pradesh, deprecating the stance of the police as well as the courts in failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard to and violation of contractual terms; and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are quite different and requires mens rea at the time when the contract is entered into itself to not abide by the terms thereof."

In V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.(2009) 3 SCC 78, the Court observed that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of contract. 

Similar judgements have been delivered in S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960  Hari Prasad Chamaria vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128. 

Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Soni Shrivastava hearing amendment to Section 27 of Bihar Municipal Act through Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025

In Ghnshyam Bhrosh Pandit & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's  Division Bench of Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava heard the writ petition which was filed for quashing Act Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025 dated October 3, 2025. The ordinance was promulgated to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. 

By way of Act No. 3, an amendment has been carried out in sub-section (3) of Section 21, whereby the existing provision has been substituted with a new sub-section (3). Similarly, Act No. 4 introduces an amendment to sub-section (3) of Section 23, substituting it with a newly inserted provision. By Act No. 5, Section 27 has been amended and a new sub-section (3) has been inserted after sub-section (2). 

Upon perusal of the Ordinance, it appeared to the Court that the Governor of Bihar, being satisfied that circumstances existed warranting the exercise of powers conferred under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the said Ordinance to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, as the Legislature was not in session at the relevant time. 

In its order dated June 18, 2026 From the records of the case, vide order dated April 7, 2026, it was inter alia ordered that upon perusal of the Ordinance. The counsel for the State Election Commission had then sought time to obtain instructions regarding the present status of the Ordinance. The counsel submitted that now the Act has been enforced and there are several other writ petitions which are challenging the amendment to the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. He submitted that all the matters may be tagged together. The matter is listed for July 16, 2026. The Bench directed, "7. In the interregnum, steps be taken."

Notably, in Ashish Kumar Sinha vs. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat 3472, as Chief Justice of Patna High Court, Justice Sanjay Karol led Division Bench held that Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 as unconstitutional to the effect of amendments carried out in Sections 36, 37, 38 and 41 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 ran contrary to Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 are unconstitutional.

PIL seeks removal of encroachment from main canal connecting Ramrekha Ghat Simra of river Budhi Gandak to Moti Jheel in Motihari Town, to its original continuous flow

In Bhartiya Nyaypriya Nagrik Parishad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava heard a Public Interest Litigation, has been filed seeking issuance of writ in nature of writ of mandamus or any writ order commanding the Principal Secretary, Department of Minor Water Resources, Government of Bihar, Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of Bihar, Principal Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Government.of Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, East Champaran, Motihari and Superintendent of Police, East Champaran, Motihari, the respondents to henceforth, expeditiously remove encroachment on the either side of the main canal connecting Ramrekha Ghat Simra of river Budhi Gandak to Moti Jheel in Motihari Town and to restore the said canal to its original width and continuous flow. It also prayed for issuance of consequential writ in nature of writ of mandamus or any writ order commanding Additional District Magistrate, Motihari, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Motihari, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Motihari, Land Reform Deputy Collector, Sadar, Motihari, Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari and Circle Officer, Sadar, Motihari, the respondents to take expeditious steps accordingly before the onset of monsoon season in order to mitigate the travesty of flood in Motihari in pursuance of the letter dated December 24, 2022 issued by Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari, the respondent No. 12. 

The Division Bench's order dated June 18, 2026 noted that P.K. Verma, senior counsel, represents all the State-respondents sought file the report in the form of an affidavit. Surendra Prasad Singh, counsel appearing on behalf of Executive Officer, Motihari Municipal Corporation, East Champaran, Motihari., the Respondent No. 14, also sought to file report in the form of an affidavit. The  matter is going to taken up on July 30, 2026, and in the interregnum, all the reports were directed to be filed.

The other thirteen respondents are:  2. Principal Secretary, Department of Water Resources, Govt. of Bihar, 3.Principal Secretary, Department of Minor Water Resources, Govt. of Bihar, 4. Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Govt. of Bihar, 5. Principal Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Govt. of Bihar, 6. District Magistrate-cum-Collector, East Champaran, Motihari, 7. Superintendent of Police, East Champaran, Motihari, 8. Additional District Magistrate, Motihari, 9. Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Motihari, 10. Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Motihari, 11. Land Reform Deputy Collector, Sadar, Motihari, 12. Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari, 13. Circle Officer, Sadar, Motihari and 14. Executive Officer, Motihari Municipal Corporation, East Champaran, Motihari.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the canal in question connects Moti Jheel (Motihari) to Ramrekha Ghat, Simra, of the Budhi Gandak River. The canal is approximately 11 kilometers in length and has the potential to serve as an alternative channel for recharging the water of the Moti Jheel. It was also submitted that the canal can play an effective role in preventing and mitigating the threat of floods in Motihari. The attention of the High Court was drawn to the letter dated December 24, 2022 addressed to the District Magistrate, East Champaran, Motihari (Respondent No. 6) by the Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari (Respondent No. 12). It was submitted that upon receipt of the letter, Respondent No. 6 constituted a committee to conduct an enquiry and directed it to submit a detailed report. It was submitted that despite several meetings having been held, enquiry report has not been submitted so far. Consequently, the inaction on the part of the respondent authorities is causing serious inconvenience to the residents of Motihari, particularly during the rainy season, when they are compelled to face flooding and waterlogging. In this case, the Court's first order was passed on March 26, 2026.

Application under Section 340 of CrPC is maintainable in a pre-existing CWJC case from Lakhisarai

In Asha Kumari @ Asha Devi vs. Ramchandra Prasad Vimal & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement dated June 19, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....this Court is of the considered opinion that the present Original Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1 of 2018 is not maintainable. The remedy available to the petitioner was to file an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the same Court in which the alleged false statements were made, and not by way of an independent Original Criminal Miscellaneous proceeding. 8. Upon verification by the Court Master, it has been informed that CWJC No. 7006 of 2017 has already been dismissed for default, whereas CWJC No. 15940 of 2017 is still pending. 9. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court holds that the present application, instituted under the Original Criminal Miscellaneous jurisdiction, is not maintainable because alleged wrong has been made either in CWJC No. 7006 of 2017 or in CWJC No. 15940 of 2017 where application
under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. 10. Accordingly, the present Original Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1 of 2018 stands dismissed...." The case was filed by Advocate Dhananjay Mishra on August 3, 2018 and registered on September 28, 2018. Earlier, the case was before the Court of Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma. 

Now the petitioner will have to move an application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the pre-existing CWJC No. 15940 of 2017, where such an application is maintainable.

In Asha Kumari vs. The State Of Bihar & Ors. CWJC No. 7006 of 2017, Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay had directed the respondents to file counter affidavit. In the Court's order dated November 10, 2017, he observed:"In the event the counter affidavit is found or replies are not specific then the court may proceed in accordance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Naseem Bano vs State Of U.P. And Others: AIR 1993 SC 2592.....It goes without saying that by filing the counter affidavit the respondents may raise the plea of maintainability, alternative remedy and delay and laches." In his order dated April 24, 2018, he observed:"....the State is required to file additional counter affidavit adverting to the issue of forged certificate of the petitioner." The other six respondents were:2. The Principle Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, Bihar, 3. The Director, Primary Education, Bihar, 4. The District Education Officer, Lakhisarai, 5. The District Programme Officer Establishment, Lakhisarai, 6. The Block Education Officer, Piparia, Prakhand- Piparia, Lakhisarai and 7. Smt. Rina Kumari. It is clear from the Court's record that the required counter affidavit and additional counter affidavits were filed in compliance with the Court's orders. It is also crystal clear that replies to counter affidavits were filed.  But when on one fine day when the case was listed on June 24, 2024 after more than six years, Justice Anil Kumar Sinha passed an order dismissing the petition because no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner to press this application. Binod Kumar, the petitioner's advocate could nor appear. The order reads: "1. No one appears on behalf of the petitioner to press this application. 2. Learned counsel for the State is present.This application stands dismissed for default." It is not clear as to whether petitioner's counsel had filed for the restoration of the petition.  

In Asha Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. CWJC-15940/2017 was filed on November 3, 2017 and registered on November 6, 2017 by petitioner's Advocate Dhananjay Mishra, Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay passed an order dated November 10, 2017 which reads:"Pendency of the writ application will not stand in the way of the respondents in making payment of the admitted dues of the petitioner."  It was last heard by the Court of Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay on April 24, 2018. This case is pending.

Upon a specific query from Justice Dr. Anshuman to the counsel for the petitioner as to whether the present Original Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1 of 2018, filed under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking initiation of an inquiry on the allegation that the opposite party had made false and frivolous statements in CWJC No. 7006 of 2017 and CWJC No. 15940 of 2017, is maintainable as an independent proceeding, or whether an application under Section 340 CrPC was required to be filed before the same Court where such false statement is alleged to have been made. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that, he was not in a position to answer the query but only submitted that the case was maintainable.

The Court requested Rajendra Narayan, Senior Advocate, and Ajay Kumar Sinha, Senior Advocate, who were present in Court, to express their views on the legal issue involved. Both of them unequivocally submitted that an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was maintainable only before the same Court in relation to whose proceedings the offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. was alleged to have been committed. 

Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure now Section 379 in Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 reads: “340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195 -(1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary;
a. record a finding to that effect;
b. make a complaint thereof in writing;
c. send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
d. take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
e. bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
2. The power conferred on a Court by Sub-Section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under Sub-Section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of Sub-Section (4) of section 195.
3. A complaint made under this section shall be signed;
a. where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;
b. in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195.” 

Justice Dr. Anshuman observed: "6. Bare perusal of aforesaid provision make it abundantly clear that when it appears to a Court where proceeding is pending that an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. has been committed in relation to a document produced or evidence given in a proceeding before that Court, it is that very Court which is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry, if considered necessary, and to take appropriate action in accordance with law."