Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, the 48th Chief Justice of Patna High Court to superannuate after 11 years as a judge

Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, the 48th Chief Justice of Patna High Court is superannuating after 11 years as judge on July 11, 2026. Before joining as the Chief Justice of Patna High Court on June 5, 2026, she was judge of Sikkim High Court. She was elevated as Judge, the Sikkim High Court on April 15, 2015. She was the first lady from Sikkim to be elevated to the post. She

She was the Acting Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court on five occasions during July 2018 to January 2026. Before she arrived in Patna, there was a speculation that she is likely to be elevated as a judge of the Supreme Court. At present, there are only two women judges, namely, Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice V. Mohana, out 37 judges in the Supreme Court. The Court has strength of 38 judges. 

The Chief Justice had authored first two judgements in Manju @ Manju Pandey vs. The State of Bihar and in Gautam vs. The State of Bihar on June 18, 2026 after joining the High Court on June 5, 2026 as part of the Division Bench which included Justice Soni Shrivastava. 

In Manju"s case, as part of the Division Bench, in her 2-page long judgement, she concluded:"we are of the considered view that the instant petition cannot be entertained as a Public Interest Litigation and deserves to be dismissed and disposed of.6. The petition is accordingly dismissed and disposed of." 

The petitioner from Gopalganj was aggrieved by Yoginda Devi, the Public Distribution System dealer, who who did not distribute consumer goods during the financial years 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. She had alleged that on account of such non-distribution, widespread corruption has taken place. Yoginda Devi, the was appointed as a Public Distribution System dealer at Sihpur, Vijaipur from the first merit-list, issued by the authority to grant Public Distribution System License had submitted forged documents in connivance with the Appointment Committee and was not eligible to be a dealer. The counsel for the State submitted that the petitioner appeared to have a personal issue with Yoginda Devi, the dealer. 

In Raj Gautam's case, the Chieg Justice had concluded that it is the prerogative of the Government to construct essential and  necessary infrastructure which is required for official purposes on  Government land. 

Chief Justice Rai authored her last two judgements dated July 9, 2026 in The State of Bihar vs. Rohit Kumar and Surendra Jha vs. The State of Bihar. 

Justice Arvind Singh Chandel's judgment in favour of Bihar State Special Survey Contractual Employees Association, upheld by Division Bench led by Chief Justice Rai against Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Land Records and Survey Directorate

In Rohit Kumar's case, Chief Justice Rai concluded in her 11-page long judgement dismissed the LPA. She upheld the impugned 11-page long judgment by Justice Arvind Single Chandel, the Single Judge dated April 22, 2025, in Rohit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar CW.J.C. No. 12384 of 2023 is accordingly upheld. But bearing in mind the lapse of time and the employment of the respondent/petitioner being contractual, the period of contract no longer survives, having lapsed on 31.03.2024, she observed:"In such circumstances, for the period from 19.03.2023 up to 31.03.2024, he cannot be reinstated, as ordered by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, it is ordered that he be paid his wages, without addition of any interest for the period 19.03.2023 to 31.03.2024, as that was the period of his then existing contract, which admittedly had been extended for two years from 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2024."

The other four respondents were: Additional Chief Secretary-cum-Appellate Authority, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, Director, Land Records and Survey Directorate, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, Assistant Director, Land Records and Survey Directorate, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar and District Magistrate, Begusarai.

Notably, the Single Judge, while allowing the Writ Petition, had ordered the appellants/respondents to reinstate the services of the respondent/petitioner forthwith and issue necessary orders within two weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the impugned Judgment. The appellants/respondents, however, were also afforded liberty to proceed against the respondent/petitioner, if so advised, in accordance with law. 

The respondent’s/petitioner’s case was that pursuant to an advertisement issued in the year 2019, he was appointed as Special Survey Amin on March 31, 2020 by the Appellant/Respondent No. 3, Directorate of Land Records and Survey, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, on contractual basis, for a period of 11 months from the date of joining. The terms of the Appointment Letter stipulated that, a fresh contract would be issued after every 11 months, subject to satisfactory performance. The services of the respondent/petitioner were extended for the period April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2024. In the course of the discharge of his duties, on information allegedly received from the Settlement Officer, a show-cause notice, bearing Memo No. 535, dated January 18, 2023 was issued to the respondent/petitioner by the Assistant Director, Land Records and Survey Directorate, directing him to respond to the allegations of obstruction of the works of special survey since January 10, 2023 on the call given by the Bihar State Special Survey Contractual Employees Association and for having instigated other contractual employees to do the same. It is further averred that 500 other contractual employees also working as Special Survey Amins were issued the exact same notice on the same date. As required, he responded within 24 hours, on January 19, 2023, by email requesting inter alia that, the report of the Settlement Officer, Begusarai be furnished to him, to enable him to respond adequately. 

Notably, given the paucity of time, the other contractual employees who also received the same show-cause notice, had furnished the exact same response as the respondent/petitioner, however the contract of the respondent/petitioner was terminated on January 19, 2023, for purported violation of Rule 8(4) of the “Bihar Special Survey Honorarium Based Contractual Employment Rules, 2019” while the other similarly situated employees were untouched. 

The respondent/petitioner had appealed against the order of termination, before the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, on January 24, 2023. The Appellate Authority, vide its order, dated 05.06.2023, rejected the appeal and upheld the order, dated January 19, 2023. 

Being aggrieved, the respondent/petitioner approached the Writ Court, seeking quashing of the order of termination bearing Memo No. 1073, dated January 19, 2023, and the order bearing Memo No. 4704, dated June 5, 2023. He had also sought a direction for restoration of his contractual service of Special Survey Amin with consequential benefits.  

The Single Judge had opined that more than 500 employees were issued identical show-cause notices on the same allegations as that of the respondent/petitioner and all had filed identical responses, but only the service of the respondent/petitioner was terminated, indicating the arbitrariness of the appellants/respondents. 

Justice Chandel's decision in favour of Bihar State Special Survey Contractual Employees Association referred to decision in Anuj Shuckla vs. The BIADA & Ors.C.W.J.C. No. 18494 of 2024 which was based on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Dr. Vijaykumaran CPV vs. Central University of Kerala & Others (2020) 12 SCC 426 and Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Others (2009) 2 SCC 570.

Justice Chandel had propounded that, when a stigmatic order of termination was issued against a contractual employee, it required a full-fledged departmental enquiry, where the show cause and defence taken by the employees should be considered and an appropriate opportunity of hearing should be extended to him. That, such opportunity was not afforded to the respondent/petitioner. The orders of termination were concluded to be stigmatic, thus both the impugned orders, dated January 19, 2023 and June 5, 2023 were set aside and the Writ Petition allowed with the directions. 

The counsel for the State appellants/respondents, reiterated the facts before the Division Bench and contended that, after the respondent/petitioner was appointed as Special Survey Amin on March 31, 2020, his contract was extended for two years from April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2024 along with other similarly placed employees. The counsel submitted that the respondent/petitioner instigated the other contractual workers and obstructed the works of the special survey operation, consequent upon which show-cause notice dated January 18, 2023 was issued to him, which he responded to on January 19, 2023 denying the charges, but raised unrelated issues of non-payment and inadequate payments to contractual employees. 

The judgement recorded that the respondent/petitioner failed to explain the obstruction charges and sought to justify the legitimacy of an unauthorized Association, resultant, his contractual employment was terminated on  January 19, 2023, which was revelatory of the fact that he was singled out and discriminated against, which is in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. That, the impugned orders are not in consonance with Rule 8(4) of the “Bihar Special Survey Honorarium Based Contractual Employment Rules, 2019”, which requires the authority to provide an opportunity of hearing. It was further contended that as the principles of natural justice were not complied with, the orders dated 19.01.2023 and 05.06.2023 be quashed and his prayers be granted. 

Chief Justice Rai observed:"11. So far as the conclusion of the learned Single Judge regarding the stigmatic order of termination is concerned, on careful perusal of the order, dated 19.01.2023, which is in Hindi and roughly translated into English reads as follows; “From the above facts, it is clear that he is unauthorizedly absent from his camp office and this act of his is indicative of total arbitrariness, causing hindrance in Government work, and defiance of orders of higher officials. The accused has created hindrances in the ambitious scheme of the Government, which is a time-bound programme. Along with this, other employees have also been provoked to disrupt work, which is contrary to the conduct of a qualified employee. Retaining such employee in service creates an adverse impact on other employees. Therefore, under the provisions described in Rule-8(4) of the “Bihar Special Survey Honorarium Based Contractual Employment Rules, 2019”, the contractual engagement of Shri Rohit Kumar, Special Survey Amin (AEN03112), is terminated with immediate effect”. 

Chief Justice Rai observed:"it is clear that certain aspersions were cast on the respondent/petitioner,over and above the observations of his conduct. Hence, in our considered view, no error arises on the finding of the learned Single Judge regarding the observation that, when a stigmatic order of termination was passed against a contractual employee, it requires a full-fledged departmental enquiry, which in the instant case was denied to the respondent/petitioner. 13. In addition to the above, we are also of the considered view that, although 500 similarly situated employees had been issued show-cause notice on the exact same lines as the respondent/petitioner, and the 500 employees had also responded in the same language as the respondent/petitioner, blindsiding the similarity of their responses to that of the respondent/petitioner, they were afforded the privilege of continuing their contractual term until it was completed, however the services of the respondent/petitioner were terminated forthwith. Although, to augment and justify this circumstance, learned counsel for the appellants/respondents had argued that the contractual employment of the 500 employees were subsequently terminated, records reveal that such termination was on completion of their period of contract and not their services having been truncated before the period of contract was over." 

The judgement of the Division Bench reads:" 14. In view of the foregoing observations, we are of the considered view that there is no reason to differ from the observations made by the learned Single Judge." 

Division Bench ought not to interfere with Single Judge judgement "simply because an alternative view is possible", Justice Anil Kumar Sinha's judgement upheld

In her last 14-page long judgement as 48th Chief Justice of Patna High Court in The Chairman Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority & Ors. vs. Surendra Jha, Justice Rai concluded:"18. It is evident from a perusal of the catena of decisions referred to above, there are differing views regarding the percentage of back wages to be paid to the dismissed employee, who is reinstated and it can be culled out that the percentage of back wages to be paid in essentially left to the discretion of the Court, after it examines various factual circumstances of the case under consideration. There is no strait-jacket formula prescribed. A subjective view in such matters has therefore been permitted by the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. In view of the foregoing discussions, and considering the reasoned Judgment of the learned Single Judge, we do not find any ground to interfere with the findings therein, including the order of payment of 70 percent of back wages to the private appellant. 20. Needless to reiterate that, in a Letters Patent Appeal against a Single Judge’s order, interference is warranted only when the impugned Judgment suffers from a manifest error, patent illegality or perversity. Where the Single Judge has given a reasoned Judgment, the Division Bench ought not to interfere simply because an alternative view is possible." 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha was the Single Judge who had delivered the 13-page long judgement dated October 14, 2025.

The Division Bench which included Justice Soni Shrivastava dismissed both the appeals, namely, The Chairman Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority & Ors. vs. Surendra Jha and Surendra Jha vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. against Justice Sinha's judgement. 

In effect, Justice Rai upheld the judgement by Justice Sinha who had grappled with the question as to whether the petitioner, whose compulsory retirement was quashed, is entitled to back wages for the intervening period from December 1, 2007 to July 3, 2014. He drew on  Supreme Court's decision in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd v. Employees of Hindustan Tin works Pvt.Ltd., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 80, wherein, it held that ordinarily, a workman, whose service has been illegally terminated, would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case, viz., to resist the workman's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances, reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages.

Justice Sinha had relied on the decision in Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324, wherein, the Supreme Court has held that denial of back wages would amount to indirectly punishing the employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages, whether employer wants to pat back wages or the employee is entitled to deny back wages or contest the employee’s entitlement to get consequential benefits, the employer has to plead and prove that employee was gainfully employed during the intervening period.

Justice Sinha referred to the decision of the Supreme Court, in Pradeepvs vs. Manganese Ore (India) Ltd., reported in (2022) 3 SCC 683, and also a 14-page long decision dated August 11, 2025 by Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy Division Bench of the Patna High Court, in The Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Vs. Subhash Singh L.P.A. No. 317 of 2024. The Division Bench had upheld the 17-page long judgement dated January 15, 2024 by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma who had set aside orders by BIADA, allowed the writ application is allowed and had directed BIADA  to pay the arrears of salary of the petitioner within a period of three months. 

Justice Sinha recorded that "the  Managing Director as well as the Appellate Authority have denied back wages by relying on past service record and temporary nature of petitioner’s appointment. These grounds are unsustainable. Once the order of compulsory retirement was set aside, the alleged misconduct could not be the basis to deny consequential benefits, particularly in the absence of a lawful departmental enquiry establishing such misconduct. The reasoning that the petitioner was a temporary employee also does not impress this Court. The petitioner had rendered over 28 years of service, received time bound promotion and pay revision. To treat the petitioner as a temporary employee for denying back wages is arbitrary." He noted the employee, was illegally kept out of service, cannot be penalized for the employer’s own act of termination.

Justice Sinha had recollected that the Managing Director, BIADA, vide Memo No. 269, dated 10.11.2007, had imposed punishment of compulsory retirement to the petitioner with effect from 30.11.2007. The petitioner challenged the order of punishment of compulsory retirement in C.W.J.C. No. 9420 of 2008, which was allowed by the High Court on June 18, 2014 and the order of compulsory retirement was set aside. It was further directed to the respondents to resolve the grievance of the petitioner for payment of back wages in terms of the order, dated May 5, 2009, passed in CWJC No. 11196 of 2007, wherein reliance had been placed in the case of Novartis India Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2009) 3 SCC 124. 

The order, dated June 18, 20214, passed in CWJC No. 9420 of 2008, the petitioner submitted a representation on November 3, 2014 seeking payment of back wages for the period of his compulsory retirement, i.e., from 01.12.2007 to 03.07.2014. However, the Managing Director, BIADA, vide Memo No. 6861, dated December 5, 2014, had rejected the claim of the petitioner for grant of back wages on the factually ground that (i) the petitioner was only a temporary employee; (ii) he had exhibited indiscipline; (iii) he was also in the habit of remaining on unauthorized absence; (iv) he had not averred anything regarding his gainful employment;and (v) the work during the absence of the petitioner, was performed by others who were duly paid and the authority could not be compelled to make double payment for the same period without any work performed by the petitioner.

Justice Sinha observed:"27.... a workman, whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to back wages except during the period of absence from duty. The order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner has been set aside by this Court and the matter was referred back to the Authority to take a decision on the issue of payment of back wages." He set aside the impugned orders, dated 05.12.2014 and 27.02.2017. 

Justice Sinha concluded:"30. The BIADA is directed to pay 70 per cent of back wages to the petitioner for the period 01.12.2007 to 03.07.2014, in the entirety of the facts of this case. The payment shall be made to the petitioner within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 31. In the result, this writ application is allowed." His judgement stands vindicated. Justice Rai has upheld his decision as part of Division Bench which included Justice Soni Shrivastava. 

Bihar Civil Courts Act, 2026 repeals Bengal, Agra , Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887

The President of India gave his assent to the Bihar Civil Courts Act, 2026 passed by Bihar legislature on June 16, 2026. Subsequent to the assent, the Act was published in the Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) on June 30, 2026 pursuant to the order of the Governor of Bihar issued by Balram Dubey,  Secretary, Government of Bihar. The 10-page long text of the new law includes Hindi and English version of the Act. It replaces 19-page long Bengal, [Agra] and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. 

The latter was  amended in its application to—West Bengal, by Bengal Act 19 of 1935, West Bengal Acts 59 of 1950, 16 of 1957, 26 of 1969, 55 and 58 of 1978;Bihar and Orissa, by Bihar & Orissa Act 4 of 1922;Bihar, by Bihar Act 12 of 1960 and Uttar Pradesh by U.P. Acts 14 of 1970 and 57 of 1976. It was amended on several occasions during 139 years of its colonial and post colonial existence. 

The preamble of the Bihar Civil Courts Act reads:"Preamble.- Whereas the existing Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 was enacted by Central Government jointly for the state of Bengal, Agra and Assam and present Bihar was a part of Bengal. Whereas State of Bihar is now separated from Bengal and organized as independent State and therefore separate Civil Courts Act is necessary and expedient; Now therefore be it enacted by the Bihar State Legislative in the Seventy Seventh year of the Republic of India....". 

The new Act has come into force from the date of notification in the official Gazette. 

According to Section 3 of the Act, there are four classes of Civil Courts namely:-(i) The Court of the Principal District Judge; (ii) The Court of the District Judge; (iii) The Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division); and (iv) The Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division)"

Section 4 of the Act states that "The State Government may determine or modify the cadre strength of District Judges and Civil Judges in consultation with High Court from time to time."

Section 5 of the Act states that "Whenever the office of District Judge or Civil Judge is vacant by reason of the death, resignation or removal of the Judge or other cause or whenever an increase in the number of District or Civil Judges, the vacancy may be filled up as per the provisions contained in Article- 233 and 234 of The Constitution of India." It adds:"Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent High Court from appointing a District Judge or Civil Judge to discharge, for such period as it thinks fit, in addition to the functions devolving on him as such District Judge or Civil Judge, all or any of functions of another District Judge or Civil Judge, as the case may be."

Section 6 of the Act states that "Subject to the superintendence of the High Court, the Principal District Judge shall have administrative control over all the Civil Courts under this Act within local limits of his jurisdiction."

Section deals with "Temporary charge of District Court". It reads:"In the event of the death, resignation or removal of the Principal District Judge or his being incapacitated by illness, transfer or otherwise from the performance of his duties or on his absence from the place at which his court is held, the Senior Most District Judge shall without relinquishing his ordinary duties, assume charge of the office of the Principal District Judge and shall continue in the charge thereof until the office is resumed by the Principal District Judge or assumed by an officer appointed thereto."

Section 8 makes provision for "Transfer of proceedings on vacation of office of Civil Judge". It reads: "1) In the event of vacancy accrued on account of death, resignation or removal of a District Judge or a Civil Judge, or of his being incapacitated by illness, transfer, leave for the period exceeding one month or otherwise from the performance of his duties, the Principal District Judge may transfer all or any of the proceedings pending to other Competent Court under his administrative control competent to dispose them or to his own Court. (2) Proceedings transferred under the sub-section (1) shall be disposed of as if they had been instituted in the Court to which they are so transferred: Provided that the Principal District Judge may re-transfer any proceedings transferred under sub-section (1) to his own or any other Court from the Court of the District Judge or Civil Judge.  (3) For the purpose of proceedings which are not pending in the Court of the Civil Judge on the occurrence of an event referred to in sub-section (1) and with respect to which that Court has exclusive jurisdiction the Principal District Judge may exercise all or any of the jurisdiction of that Court."

Section 9 deals with "Power to fix local limits of jurisdiction of Courts". It reads:(1) The State Government may in consultation with the High Court by notification in the Official Gazette, fix and alter the local limits of the jurisdiction of any Civil Court under this Act. (2) If the same local jurisdiction is assigned to two or more Civil Judges, the Principal District Judge may assign to each of them such civil cases as the case may be, subject to any general or special orders of the High Court, it may think fit. (3) When Civil proceeding arising in any local area is assigned by the Principal District Judge to one of two or more Civil Judges under sub-section (2), a decree or order so passed shall not be invalid by reason only of the case in which it was made having arisen wholly or in part in a place beyond that local area if that place is within the local limits fixed under sub-section (1). (4) The present local limits of the jurisdiction of every Civil Court under this Act shall be deemed to have been fixed under this section. "

Section 10 provides for "Place of sitting of Courts". It reads: (1) The State Government may in consultation with the High Court fix or alter the place or places at which any Civil Court under this Act is to be held by notification in the Official Gazette. Provided that in emergent situation, the High Court may fix any other place of sitting of the Court within local limits of the said Court. (2) All places at which any such Courts are now held shall be deemed to have been fixed under this section. 

Section 11 deals with "Vacations of Courts". It reads:"(1) The High Court shall prepare a calendar of holidays to be observed in each year in the Civil Courts. (2) The calendar so prepared shall be published in the Official Gazette. (3) A judicial act done by a Civil Court on a holiday specified in the calendar shall not be invalid by reason only of its having been done on that day."

Chapter III of the Act deals with "Ordinary Jurisdiction". Under it Section 13 provides for "Extent of original jurisdiction of Principal District Judge". It reads:"Save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, the jurisdiction of a Principal District Judge extends, subject to the provisions of Sections 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to all original suits for the time being cognizable by Civil Courts."

Section 14 deals with "Extent of jurisdiction of Civil Judge". It reads:(1) Save as aforesaid and subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall extend to all like suits of which the value does not exceed Ten Lakh rupees. (2) Save as aforesaid and subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (Senior Division) shall extend to all suits exceeding the value Ten Lakh rupees; (3) The High Court may direct, by notification in the Official Gazette, with respect to any Civil Judge (Junior Division) named therein that his jurisdiction shall extend to all suits of such value not exceeding Fifty lakh rupees as may be specified in the notification; Provided that the High Court may by notification in the Official Gazette, alter or amend the pecuniary jurisdiction from time to time."

Section 15 provides for "Appeals from the Judgments and Orders of the District Judges". It reads:"Save as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal from a decree or order of a District Judge shall lie to the High Court."

Section 16 provides for "Appeals from the orders or Decrees of Civil Judges". It reads:"(1) Save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judges shall lie- (a) to the Principal District Judge where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceedings arising out of which the decree or order was made was less than Fifty lakh rupees; and (b) to the High Court in any other case; Provided that the High Court may by notification in the Official Gazette, alter or amend the pecuniary jurisdiction as fixed herein, from time to time. (2) Where the function of receiving any appeals which lie to the Principal District Judge under sub-section (1) has been assigned to a District Judge, the appeals may be preferred to the District Judge."

Chapter IV deals with "Special Jurisdiction". Under it Section 17 reads:"Exercise of jurisdiction of District Court in certain proceedings by Civil Judge.— (1) The High Court may, by general or special order, authorize any Civil Judge to take cognizance of, or any Principal District Judge to transfer the proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 to a Civil Judge under his administrative control. (2) The Principal District Judge may withdraw any such proceedings taken cognizance of by or transferred to a Civil Judge, and may either himself dispose of them or transfer them to a Court under his administrative control competent to dispose of them. (3) Disposal of proceedings referred to in last foregoing section- Proceedings taken cognizance of, or transferred to a Civil Judge, as the case may be, shall be disposed of by him subject to the rules applicable to like proceedings when disposed by the District Judge."

Section 20 of the Bihar Civil Courts Act, 2026 has repealed the Bengal, Agra , Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 as was applicable to the State of Bihar.

Section 20 (2) reads: "Notwithstanding such repeal all Court constituted, appointments, nominations, rules, notifications, and orders made for jurisdiction and power conferred under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, or any enactment thereby repealed, or purporting expressly or impliedly to have been so constituted, made, conferred and published shall be deemed to have been respectively constituted, made conferred and published under this Act; and (3) Any actions taken or purported to have been taken under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 shall be deemed to have been taken under the provisions of this Act; and (4) Any enactment or document referring to the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, or to any enactment thereby repealed, shall be construed to refer to this Act or to the corresponding portion thereof."

Section 18 of Bihar Civil Courts Act reads:" 1.Judges not to try suits in which they are interested.—(1) The Presiding Officer of a Civil Court shall not try any suit or other proceedings to which he is a party or in which he is personally interested. (2) The Presiding Officer of an appellate Civil Court under this Act shall not try an appeal against a decree or order passed by himself in another capacity. (3) When any such suit, proceeding or appeal as is referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) comes before any such officers, the officer shall forthwith transmit the record of the case to the Court to which he is immediately subordinate with a report of the circumstances attending the reference. (4) The Superior Court shall thereupon dispose of the case under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court." 

Section 19 of the Act reads:"19. Conduct.—The Civil Courts shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience in all matters before it."

Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Justice Soni Srivastava upholds judgement by Justice Rajiv Roy in case of land acquistion for Bharatmala Patna-Sahebganj corridor from Bakarpurhat to Manikpur, Muzaffarpur

In Ashok Rai @ Ashok Ray Son of Late Rajendra Ray & Ors. vs.  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava delivrered a 14-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"we find that the impugned Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2026, of the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case (C.W.J.C) No. 19292 of 2024) warrants no interference. Consequently, this LPA stands dismissed and disposed of." The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Rai. It is one of the 39 judgments delivered by her Division Bench upon joining the High Court as its 48th Chief Justice on June 5, 2026. During her brief tenure she authored 791 orders besides some 40 judgements.  

In Ashok Rai @ Ashok Ray Son of Late Rajendra Ray & Ors. vs.  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway & Ors. (2026), Justice Rajiv Roy of Patna High Court passed a 14-long order dated March 13, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"25. The petitioners who chose not to file any objection and sat over the matter are themselves to be blamed. It is further clear that knowingly, they suppressed this fact about the second notification while invoking the writ jurisdiction. The petition/representation claim to have been filed is/are belatedly in the year 2023 after the final notification was published on 14.06.2022. 26. Considering the aforesaid facts and taking into account the submissions/documents on record, this Court can only record that now that the land in question stands acquired and ‘the MOTH’ has taken the due legal process before issuance of the notification dated 14.06.2022, the petitioners if so want can take steps for getting the compensation amount inaccordance with law after showing their bona fide for the land that stands acquired. 27. So far as the writ petition is concerned, it is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The interim protection granted to the petitioners stands vacated."

The other six respondents were: Chief General Manager, National Highway Authority of India, Regional Office, Regional Director, National Highway Authority of India, Regional Office, Patna, Project Director, National Highway Authority of India, Motihari, District Land Acquisition Officer, Muzaffarpur, District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur. 

The appellants by filing the L.P.A had assailed the judgment by Justice Roy by which the writ petition was dismissed concluding that it was devoid of merit. The appellants seek the setting aside of the impugned Judgment. 2. The appellants’/petitioners’ case was that, vide Notification No. 2456(E) dated June 22, 2021 the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH) declared its intention to acquire the lands detailed in the Schedule thereto for building, maintenance, management and operation of Bharatmala Patna-Sahebganj corridor (Adalwari-Manikpur Section) ending in the stretch of land from Bakarpurhat to Manikpur, District-Muzaffarpur. The Notification was published in the Hindi newspaper Prabhat Khabar and Hindustan, both dated July 10, 2021 and Dainik Bhaskar and Times of India, both on December 1, 2021. Necessary measurements were undertaken and map prepared. Pursuant to such steps, objections were raised by some stakeholders, which were considered but disallowed by the competent authority. Subsequent thereto, the MORTH issued another Notification, dated June 14, 2022, bearing No. 2724(E), declaring its intention to acquire lands specified in the annexed Schedule. The appellants had submitted that the second Notification indicated an alteration in the acquisition of the lands, vide which the earlier alignment was deviated by about 400 feet allegedly to favour the owner of the ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel. By such deviation, only a small portion of the property of ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel, would be acquired, but a larger area of the appellants’ property would be taken thereby infringing on the property rights of the appellants. 

The contention of the counsel for the appellants is that on publication of the first Notification, the map regarding acquisition was prepared which proposed a straight alignment, for the formation of the four lane highway to minimize, and ensure equal distribution of acquisition on both sides of the existing road. However, subsequently without any technical justification or prior notice to the appellants, the alignment was altered exclusively as already agitated. Such realignment shifted the entire burden on to the appellants’ land and livelihood. Relying on Dev Sharan and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others  (2011) 4 SCC 769, it was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed therein that, Section-5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, embodies a very just and wholesome principle of giving proper and reasonable opportunity to a landuser of persuading the authorities that his property should not be acquired. That, Section-5A has to be read in tandem with the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It is next put forth that, despite the appellants having approached the concerned competent authorities on the matter, no steps were initiated. It is contended that the impugned Judgment of the Single Judge, erroneously held that the appellants were at fault for not objecting to the Notification of 2021, when in fact no reason arose for the appellants to object to the said Notification, as it did not infringe upon their rights. That, the injury to the appellants was only caused by the subsequent clandestine re-measurement and revised map. 

The counsel also submitted that the finding of the Single Judge that non-joinder of ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel owner is fatal, is legally flawed. On this count, strength was drawn from the decision in Smt. Savita Garg vs. The Director, National Heart Institute (2004) 8 SCC 56, wherein the Supreme Court held that so far as the law with regard to non-joinder of necessary party under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) Order 1 Rule 9 and Order 1 Rule 10, lays down that no suit shall fail because of mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties. In any event the Court has the power under Order 1 Rule 10(4) to give directions to implead a person who is a necessary party. That, no such direction was given by the Single Judge. 

The counsel for the respondents walked the High Court through the provisions of Section 3A, 3C and 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956, and emphasized that it provides for as follows; Section 3A vests the Central Government with power to acquire land for public purpose, for construction of National Highway and to declare its intention a notification with description of land is to be published in the Official Gazette; Section-3C provides for hearing of objection raised by any person aggrieved by such acquisition and the competent authority has the discretion to allow or disallow the objection; Section-3D provides for declaration of acquisition and the purpose of such acquisition by 2 (2004) 8 SCC 56 publication of the declaration in newspapers. That it is specifically provided that once a declaration is made by the Central Government, it shall not be called into question by any Court or by any other authority. It was next contended that one two-lane Railway Under Bridge (RUB) was already in existence and another was proposed to be constructed. Since a mandatory distance was required to be maintained between the two Railway Under Bridges, the realignment of the road was proposed for that purpose. 

Drawing strength from the decision in Union of India vs. Kushala Shetty and Ors.,2011) 12 SCC 69, it was canvassed that judicial review has a narrow scope and that the decision to alter any alignment as part of National Highways is a policy decision within the clear domain of the Central Government. 8. The allegations pertaining to mala fides are without any specific reasons assigned to the allegations and the contention that a change in the alignment will benefit a party is baseless, in the absence of specific materials to show the mala fides. To that extent, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr(1974) 4 SCC 3,wherein, it was observed that the 3 (2011) 12 SCC 69 4 (1974) 4 SCC 3 burden of establishing malafides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The alteration of the alignment by the competent authority, was in line with the objectives of the Bharatmala Project, sans influence of any land owner. That, at the time when the DPR was submitted for approval at the headquarters of the NHAI, there was no Railway Under Bridge (RUB) nor were there Railway tracks, hence, the consultant had no occasion to inquire from the Railways. Based on the approved Letter of Award of Contract (LAC), dated May 18, 2020, the first Gazette Notification dated 21.06.2021 was issued, however, after the DPR consultant learned of the RUB construction while taking data on the field for 3D notification, the realignment took place to include the RUB, pursuant to which the Gazette Notification dated June 14, 2022 came to be published. 

Chief Justice Rai observed: "The entire process has been carried out in a fair manner. The order of the learned Single Judge thereby warrants no interference." She added:"11. In our considered view, it is appropriate to point out that the law relating to the exercise of Intra Court Jurisdiction has been laid down by a Division Bench of the Supreme court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited vs. Workmen of Narendra & Company  (2016) 3 SCC 340: 

The Supreme Court has held that:- “5……………………… Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.” 

Chief Justice Rai observed: "12. That, having cleared the cloud on Intra-Court Appeals, after examining the pleadings and considering the arguments advanced before us, in our considered view the appellants have firstly failed to establish the mala fides against the concerned authorities, for the purpose of benefiting the owner of the ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel. Although, the learned counsel for the appellants hastened to point out to the Court, during the arguments advanced that no specific mala fides were alleged in the averments, however, we are inclined to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents, that, the suggestion that the road was being realigned for the benefit of ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel is sufficient to insinuate mala fides which is without substantiation. The submission on the facet of mala fides deserves to be and is accordingly, disregarded. 13. While considering the aspect on issuance of Notifications, the appellants concedely have no argument with regard to the first Notification. The grievance of the appellants is confined to the second Notification, dated 14.06.2022, which alleged was issued sans notice and to their prejudice. This submission cannot be countenanced for the fact that, the Notification was issued in the Government Gazette, which is an official legal process designed to bring inter alia administrative decisions into the public domain. Such publication is deemed sufficient notice to all interested parties fulfilling the requirements of transparency and in addition to the above it gives legal authority to governmental action including land acquisition." 

The judgedment reads: "14. On this facet strength is garnered from Union of India and Others Vs. Ganesh Das Bhojraj 2000 SCC OnLine SC 438, paragraph 14 which provides as follows; “14. From the aforesaid judgment it can be stated that it is an established practice that the publication in the Official Gazette, that is, the Gazette of India (sic is an) ordinary method of bringing a rule or subordinate legislation to the notice of the persons concerned. Individual service of a general notification on every member of the public is not required and the interested person can acquaint himself with the contents of the notification published in the Gazette. It is the usual mode followed since years and there is no other mode prescribed under the present statute except by the amendment in the year 1998 by Bill 21 of 1998.” 

Notably, reliance was also placed on Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 101, wherein at paragraph 16 the Supreme Court observed: “16. The requirement of publication in the gazette, therefore, serves a dual constitutional purpose, i.e. (a) it ensures accessibility and notice to those governed by the law, and (b) it ensures accountability and solemnity in the exercise of delegated legislative power. The requirement of publication in the gazette, is therefore not an empty formality. It is an act by which an executive decision is transformed into law. It is precisely for this reason that courts have consistently insisted that strict compliance with the publication requirements is a condition precedent for the enforceability of delegated legislation.” 

In the penultiumate paragraph of the judgement, the Division Bench observed: "16. Ignorance of publication of such Notification, cannot be a ground to demolish the case of the respondents. 17. Indeed, while agreeing with the submission of the appellants that they had no reason to object to the first Notification, as it appears that the objections raised by other stakeholders were considered but disallowed by the respondents, it is apposite to notice that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the National Highway Act, 1956 inter alia mentions therein that Parliament has exclusive powers of legislation with respect to Highways which are declared to be National Highways as proper development of road infrastructure is essential for economic development of the country. 18. Section-3A and 3C of the National Highways Act, 1956 as already discussed herein, also lays down the powers of the Central Government to acquire land where it is satisfied that for public purpose, any land is required for the building, maintenance, management or operation of National Highway or part thereof. The requirement of such intention is to be notified in the Official Gazette. Should objections be filed before the competent authority, it shall after hearing the objections and making further inquiries, may by order, either allow or disallow the objection. It is no one’s case that Notifications to acquire the property were not published, in the obtaining facts the respondents cannot be foisted with the responsibility of the lack of awareness of the appellants. We also cannot fault the observation of the learned Single Judge regarding non impleadment of the ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel. It was for the appellants to have either sought for impleadment of the said Hotel as a respondent to the petition or mentioned it before the Court to enable the Court to take appropriate steps. In any event, it was for the petitioner to have ensured impleadment of the party as no order can be issued behind the back of a party who is unaware of the Court proceedings, the decision of which would likely affect it." 

Also read:Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai all set to take charge as 48th Chief Justice of Patna High Court

Patna High Court acquits murder convict, directs DGP, Bihar to initiate departmental proceedings against Mahesh Kumar Rajak, Investigating Officer for keeping material lacuna in prosecution case by his "improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation"

In Meghnath Choupal @ Medhnath Choupal Sharma vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 11-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "....we are not in a position to concur with the finding of the Trial Court. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. 16. The judgment and order of conviction dated 30th of May, 2018, and the order of sentence dated 31st of May, 2018, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura, are hereby set aside." It is apparent from the public record that Manmohan Sharan Lal was the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura at that time. 

Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. He observed:"2. Before we advert to the prosecution case, we are constrained to record that the instant appeal is a classic example of improper, lackadaisical, and indifferent investigation on the part of the Investigating Officer keeping material lacuna in the prosecution case." 

The case was filed in the High Court on June 21, 2018. It was registered on July 2, 2018. The allegation against the appellant was of having shot dead the son of the informant. The A.P.P., had submitted that there was political rivalry between the parties and the young son of the informant has been shot at point blank range by the appellant. It was submitted that the appellant also was accused in eleven other cases under grave sections of the Indian Penal Code as well as the Arms Act. Further, it was submitted that there is direct identification of the appellant as the main assailant.  The murder took place on July 22, 2014, in the Madhepura district when the victim was intercepted and fatally shot on his way home from a funeral.

Notably, in its order dated April 12, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ashwani Kumar Singh and Rajeev Ranjan Prasad had recorded: "In paragraph ‘8’ of the show cause reply filed on behalf of the State, a statement has been made that the appellant is a veteran criminal and he has been chargesheeted in as many as 12 cases. The case numbers are provided in paragraph ‘8’. Let the State file a supplementary affidavit clearly stating the present stage of all the 12 cases. The appellant shall also file an affidavit giving the present stage of the cases. List this matter on 13th May, 2022." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. 

Justice Chaudhary's judgement does not seem to factor in the fact about 12 criminal antecedents of the appellant.   

In his 3-page long order dated July 14, 2022, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah  and Purnendu Singh had concluded:"6. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and taking into account the materials and evidence which have come during trial, the Court is not inclined to allow the prayer for suspension of sentence and release of the appellant-applicant on bail during the pendency of the appeal." The order was authored by Justice Amanullah. 

The criminal appeal was filed against an order of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court at Madhepura in a Sessions Trial of 2014 which arose out of Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014 whereby and whereunder the Trial Judge by his judgement dated May 30, 2018 convicted the appellant for the offence under Sections 302/34 of the IPC read with Section 27 Arms Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment of life and also to pay fine of Rs. 50,000. For the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 1 year. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence are under challenge in the present appeal at the instance of the convict/appellant.

The prosecution case is that on July 22, 2014 at about 4:00 P.M., the informant, namely, Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji was returning to his house by a motorcycle after attending the last rites of his aunt. The son of the
informant was the pillion rider. While he was proceeding towards his house, he noticed near Chapariya Toll that some persons were following them on about four motorcycles. They crossed the motorcycle of the informant and registered them to proceed. The informant also stated that immediately thereafter, one Laltu Yadav and Birendra Choupal caught hold of him and placed a pistol beneath his ear. They instructed the informant not to raise any shout, failing which they would open fire at him. One Meghnand Choupal (the appellant), Bilash Mahto and Umesh Yadav caught hold of the son of the informant, namely, Anupam Ananad and Chandrahaas Choupal instructed them to bring Anupam to him. Chandrahaas was standing about 10 yards away on the western side from the place of occurrence. These named accused persons forcibly took away Anupam to Chandrahaas. When the informant requested Chandrahaas to release his son, the accused persons who caught hold of him assaulted him by fists and blows. At that time Chandrahaas told others that another vehicle is coming towards the place of occurrence. Hearing this, the motorcycle rider started their motorbike to proceed and on the instruction of Chandrahaas Choupal, Meghnad Choupal (the appellant) opened fire at the son of the complainant, touching pistol on his chest. All the accused persons then left the place of occurrence. The informant raised hue and cry and rushed towards his son, who was lying on the ground in pool of blood oozing out from his wound. The cousin brother of the informant, namely, Mantu Kumar and Rupesh Kumar were also present there. Subsequently, other relatives who went to attend the last ritual of the aunt of the informant appeared there and the injured was taken to Madhepura Hospital by a Scorpio Car. The Medical Officer examined him and declared him dead.

On the basis of the complaint, S.H.O. Shankarpur Police Station, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak took up the investigation by registering Shankarpur P.S. Case of 2014, dated July 23, 2014. It appeared from the Lower Court Record that the investigation of this case culminated in filing charge-sheet under Section 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant Meghnad Choupal and one Bilash Mahto. After filing of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and subsequently it was transferred for trial and disposal to the Court of the ddl. Sessions Judge, 2nd at Madhepura. The prosecution examined all 8 witnesses, including the informant (P.W. 8), The Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem (P.W. 6) and the Investigating Officer (P.W. 7). Amongst other witnesses, P.W. 2, Tarni Sharma, was declared hostile by the prosecution. Only P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav claimed to be the eye-witness of the occurrence and on the basis of his evidence, the Trial Court held the present appellant guilty for committing offence under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and convicted and sentenced him accordingly. Other witnesses being P.W. 3 Rajendra Sah, who is a signatory to the seizure list. P.W. 4 Rupesh Kumar who is the cousin brother of the informant and he did not see the occurrence. P.W. 5 Rajesh Kumar is also a seizure list witness but so far as the incident is concerned, his evidence is in the nature of hearsay. P.W. 7 is the I.O. and P.W. 8 Arvind Kumar @ Munnaji is the informant of the case. 

On perusal of the LCR, the High Court found that the Trial Judge relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 alone and convicted the appellant on the ground that the Court can even hold an accused guilty on the basis of solitary evidence of one eye-witness only. In support of his contention, he referred to series of decisions, viz, Jarnail Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab -2009 (9) SCC 719, Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar vs. State of Maharashtra-AIR 2008 SC 927, Ramji vs. State of Bihar-2007 (57) ACC 385 (SC), Syed Ibrahim vs. State of Andhra Pradesh-AIR 2006 SC 2908, Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.-2005 1 SCC 184 and Chhitar Lal vs. State Of Rajasthan-2003 6 SCC.

Justice Chaudhary observed:"At the foremost, we inclined to record that the informant who’s the author of the case did not support his case and did not utter even a single word against the appellant involving him in committing the offence. Surprisingly enough, the informant was not declared hostile by the prosecution. Therefore, his examination in-chief stands firm on the ground and when an incident took place in presence of the informant, the FIR was lodged by the informant as an eye-witness. His contrary evidence on dock suffers most. The Trial Court held that P.W. 1 Subhash Yadav is the eye-witness of the incident. However, Trial Court failed to consider the cross-examination of P.W. 1 when he stated that he saw the deceased in injured condition. He received his injury on his chest. Thus, if the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of P.W. 1 are taken together for appreciation, a doubt arises as to whether P.W. 1 was present
at the place of occurrence before the deceased received injury or he appeared after the victim suffered gun-shot injury and was lying with blood oozing out from the wound. If we accept the version of P.W. 1 to be true during the cross-examination, then we find that P.W. 1 also reached the place of occurrence after the deceased received the gun-shot injury. 9. In view of such contradiction, we are not in a position to hold that the evidence of P.W. 1 is of sterling character." 

Justice Chaudhary drw on the Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep @Deepu vs. State of NCT Of Delhi reported in 2012 (8) SCC 21, wherein, it described a sterling witness. It reads: "22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

The decision was subsequently followed in a judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Nirmal Premkumar & Anr. vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 260. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "11. In view of the discrepancies pointed out, we are not in a position to hold that the P.W. 1 is a witness of sterling character and only on the basis of sole evidence of P.W. 1, the appellant could be convicted. There are series of lacunae in the prosecution case. During trial, the seizure list witness was not confronted with their signatures on the seizure list. Though they deposed but their signature on the seizure list was not marked exhibit. In his cross-examination, P.W. 5 stated that he put his signature on a blank paper under the instruction of the Investigating Officer. 12. There is no doubt that the victim of this case received gun-shot injury and succumbed to the said injury on the way to Madhepura Hospital." 

The judgement reads: "From the evidence of Investigating Officer, we find that he seized one motorcycle, one Samsung Mobile phone and an empty cartridge from the place of occurrence. Surprisingly enough, the ownership of the motorcycle was not asserted by the I.O. Had it been asserted at least this Court could have come to a conclusion as to whether any of the FIR named accused persons were present at the spot and left his motorcycle after the occurrence. Ownership of Samsung Mobile Phone was also not asserted. The empty cartridge was not sent to Forensic Laboratory to ascertain as to whether the said empty cartridge was used to commit murder of the son of the informant. These were primary duties of the I.O. for investigation of a case like this. It appears to us that either the I.O. did not know the basic principles of investigation or purposefully withheld the evidences which could have been brought during investigation to save the accused persons. 13. In our view, the process of the investigation by the I.O. of this case is a clear instance of dereliction of his duty. Therefore, we direct Director General of Police, Bihar Patna to initiate departmental proceeding against the Investigating Officer, namely, Mahesh Kumar Rajak, who was
posted as S.H.O. Medhapur Police Station on 22nd of July, 2014. Due to lackadaisical investigation, both the Trial Court and this Court are deprived of having best evidence against the real culprits of the incident."

Hearing concluded, judgment reserved in Tutu Ali's appeal against conviction in NDPS case

In Tutu Ali vs. The Union of India, through Intelligence Officer, DRI, RU Muzaffarpur Bihar (2026), the hearing was concluded and the judgment was reserved. The case was registered in the High Court on August 3, 2024. It arose out of a Muzaffarpur Police Station Case dated August 3, 2017. The appellant was arrested at the spot. From the truck in which the appellant was riding, 190.500 kgs. of ganja is said to have been recovered. The appellant claimed that he was not even present at the place of occurance. It was heard along with  Bagicha Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) Bihar. The judgment is reserved on June 17, 2026.  The case was filed on July 31, 2024 by Late Vaishnavi Singh. The petitioner's counsel included Late Ritwik Thakur. The father-in-law of Vaisnavi Singh, Ajay Thakur appeared for the the petitioner. 

The appellant was convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 vide judgment dated May 28, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Court-II (NDPS), Muzaffarpur in NDPS Case No. 02 of 2017, which arose out of DRI Case No. 2 of 2017. By order dated May 30, 2024, he was sentenced to undergo R.I. for fifteen years, to pay a fine of Rs. 1,50,000. 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad sets aside judgement of conviction by trial court, Begusarai in a POCSO case

In Ranjay Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 27-page long judgement dated July 1, 026, wherein, it concluded:"55. In ultimate analysis, this Court is of the opinion that it would not be safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim in this case which this Court has found as no wholly reliable piece of evidence. The impugned judgment and order are, therefore, set aside. 56. This appeal is allowed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The Court observed:"52. While this Court finds that there are some evidence that the victim girl had suffered abortion but save and except the statement of the victim that she was subjected to rape 6-7 months ago by this appellant and one Gaurav Kumar, there is no corroborating evidence to take a safe view of the matter that the appellant is guilty of commission of rape on the victim girl. Suppression of age of the victim has to be kept in mind and the fact that the prosecution witnesses are not wholly reliable would further create doubt in the mind of this Court in taking a clear view of the commission of offence by this appellant. The victim in this case is not a wholly reliable witness. She has stated that she had no complaint against this appellant. This statement of the victim is significant. Why is she saying that she had no complaint with the appellant. 53. We have further noticed that the occurrence in this case is said to have taken place about 6-7 months prior to the date of lodgment of the case i.e. 25.05.2018. The date of occurrence would, therefore, relate back to 6-7 months prior to 25.05.2018. At the relevant time, Section 376(3) IPC was not in existence. It has been inserted vide Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2018 with retrospective effect from 21.04.2018. 

Justice Prasad observed: "54. On the date of occurrence, i.e. 6-7 months prior to amendment, the minimum punishment prescribed under these provisions were 7 years but the learned trial court seems to have proceeded to convict the appellant under these provisions and awarded him a sentence under the newly substituted/amended/inserted provisions. The learned trial court has awarded rigorous imprisonment of 20 years and fine of Rs.50,000/- fo committing offence under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act. No separate sentence has been awarded for the offence under Section 376(3) IPC in view of the mandate under Section 42 of the POCSO Act. 

Section 376(3) IPC, Section 5(j)(ii) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act reads: "376 1[(3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim: Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim." 

Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act reads:"Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, which-(i) ...... (ii) in the case of female child, makes the child pregnant as a consequence of sexual assault;[6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.--(1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death. (2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.] " 

The appeal was filed in the High Court for setting aside the judgment of conviction dated February 2, 2023 and the order of sentence dated February 6, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court (POCSO Act)-cum-6th Additional Sessions Judge, Begusarai in a POCSO Case of 2018 which arose out of Muffasil (Lakho O.P.) P.S. Case of 2018. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal and Section 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. By the impugned order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years with a fine of Rs.50,000/-under Section 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act. 

The prosecution case was based on the written application of the father of the victim (PW-2) wherein he stated that on May 25, 2018 at around 08:00 A.M., his daughter told him that her stomach was aching. Then for treatment, he brought his daughter to the nearby private hospital, where the doctor told him that his daughter is pregnant. Thereafter, when the informant repeatedly asked his daughter then she told him that about 5-6 months ago, when she was coming from school alone, then (1) Ranjay Singh (appellant) and (2) Gaurav Kumar caught hold of her and took her inside the maize field and committed rape upon her
one after another. The victim also alleged that they threatened her not to disclose this to anyone otherwise they will kill her and her father. On the basis of the written information of the informant, FIR being Muffasil (Lakho O.P.) P.S. Case was registered on May 25, 2018 under Section 376 IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act against (1) Ranjay Singh and (2) Gaurav Kumar. After investigation, Police submitted first chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 435 of 2018 dated July 20, 2018 against Gaurav Kumar keeping investigation pending against Ranjay Kumar. The trial court vide order dated August 6, 2018 took cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 376 of the IPC as well as under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act against accused Gaurav Kumar and after finding him juvenile in conflict with law, learned trial court sent his records to the Juvenile Justice Board, Begusarai vide order dated August 6, 2018  and ordered for opening of supplementary records against Ranjay Singh, the appellant. Later on, supplementary Chargesheet dated August 31, 2018 was submitted against Ranjay Singh, the appellant under Sections 376(D), 313, 506/34 IPC and Section  5(8) of the POCSO Act. By order dated March 6, 2019, the trial court found that the cognizance of the offence in the case was already taken, accordingly, fixed the case for supply of police papers. After supply of police papers, charges were explained to the appellant in Hindi which he denied and claimed to be tried, accordingly, the charges were framed vide order dated April 8, 2019 under Section 376 IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. 7. In course of trial, the prosecution had examined as many as ten witnesses and exhibited several documents. 

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by DGP, Bihar and SP, Vaishali against a constable, grants all consequential benefits after 13 years

In Ramashish Ram vs. The State of Bihar through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page long judgement dated July 3, 2026, wherein, he set aside the order of punishment dated March 27, 2004 by SP, Vaishali and the order by the Director General of Police, Bihar, and allowed the writ application of the petitioner, a constable with all consequential benefits. The case was filed in the High Court on June 24, 2013. It was registered on July 22, 2013. 

Before the final judgement, the case was heard by over a dozen judges like Justices Shivaji Pandey, Purnendu Singh, Nani Tagia, Dr. Anshuman, Alok Kumar Sinha, Partha Sarthy, and G. Anupama Chakravarthy and again by Partha Sarthy. Notably, the roaster of the judge was changed even after the final hearing was concluded, prior to the judgement. 

The other four respondents were:Director General of Police, Bihar, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Tirhut Range, Muzaffarpur, Inspector of Police-Cum-Inquiry Officer, Mahua, Hazipur, Vaishali and the Superintendent of Police, Vaishali at Hazipur.

The petitioner had approached the High Court for issuance of appropriate writ for quashing the letter dated June 8, 2007 issued under the signature of Dy. Inspector General of Police, Tirhut Range, Muzaffarpur, the respondent no. 3 by which appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected with liberty to prefer a memorial before the Director General of Police but letter dated June 8, 2007 was not supplied to the petitioner, only purport of the said letter was communicated vide letter dated July 18, 2007 issued by SP, Vaishali, the respondent no.5, by which the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the post of constables, was passed by respondent no.5 vide letter dated March 27, 2004 was affirmed without considering the facts and circumstances, that allegation leveled against the petitioner for depositing the forged/documents in respect of the land and recommendation letter issued under the signature of respondent no.5 for getting the 2nd installment of house loan was not issued by respondent no.5. Though the petitioner was nowhere involved no opportunity was provided to the petitioner for participating in departmental inquiry/proceeding the inquiry/proceeding which was completed since at that time petitioner was behind the bar for the same occurrence for which a separate criminal case has been lodged by the respondent authorities. The petitioner had sought quashing of the enquiry report dated September 30, 2003 submitted by inquiry officer which was passed behind the back of the petitioner. He had also prayed for keeping the order of dismissal in abeyance and for payment of subsistence allowance during pendency of the writ application.

The case of the petitioner was that he had joined as a constable in the police department in the Government of Bihar on August 6, 1984 and his service was satisfactory in the opinion of all concerned. On the allegations of the petitioner having submitted a forged title deed in obtaining a house loan from the respondent authorities, an FIR being Hajipur Town P.S. Case no.281 of 2003 was registered against him under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and a departmental proceeding was also started. 

The charge in the departmental proceeding was framed against the petitioner on May 22, 2003 and after conduct of the enquiry ex-parte, the enquiry report came to be submitted on September 30, 2003.  The petitioner was served with the copy of the enquiry report to which he had filed his reply. The respondents thereafter came out with the order of punishment dated March 27, 2004 under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Vaishali at Hajipur imposing the punishment of dismissal from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by order dated July 18, 2007 and the memorial filed was also rejected by order dated June 8, 2007 passed by the Director General of Police, Bihar. 

Shri Prakash Tiwari, the counsel of the petitioner submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding as also the criminal case were identical and during pendency of the criminal case, the respondents should not have proceeded with the departmental proceeding. It was also submitted that in connection with the criminal case, the petitioner was taken into custody on May 22, 2003 and was granted bail by the Court by order dated September 16, 2003. He was released from custody on September 19, 2003. He submitted that copy of the memo of charge was not served on the petitioner. On his release from custody, the petitioner filed a representation asking for the relevant documents to enable him to file an effective reply or in fact any reply, however the petitioner was not provided with the documents, no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and the Enquiry Officer in a hurried manner proceeded to submit his enquiry report on September 30, 2003. It was thus submitted that there being violation of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the proceedings, the order of punishment as also order rejecting the appeal and the memorial filed by the petitioner were not sustainable and thus be set aside. 

The application is opposed by Kameshwar Pd. Gupta, GP-10, the counsel for the State of Bihar. He  submitted that the charges against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding were very serious of his having obtained housing loan by furnishing a forged title deed, on discovery of which led to lodging of the criminal case as also the proceeding against the petitioner. It was submitted that the petitioner was served with a copy of the memo of charge and was repeatedly given opportunity to appear in the departmental proceeding and present his case. It was after leading of evidence that the Conducting Officer in his enquiry report found the charges to have been proved. There being no violation of either principles of natural justice or any of the provisions of the relevant rules, there is no illegality in the order of punishment and thus the writ application be dismissed. 

All the submissions by counsel were devoid of merit. Disputing his unsubstantiated submissions, Justice Partha Sarthy observed: "....there is no dispute with respect to the fact that while the charges in the departmental proceeding was framed on 22.5.2003, the petitioner was taken into custody on the same date and on grant of bail by the learned Court in the criminal case, he was finally released from custody only on 19.9.2003. It transpires from the material on record that the documents demanded by the petitioner including the memo of charge was not served on the petitioner and soon after the petitioner’s release on 19.9.2003, the enquiry report came to be submitted on 30.9.2003 finding the charges levelled against the petitioner to have been proved. 12. Even on perusal of the enquiry report (Annexure-7), it transpires that no occasion was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the three witnesses examined on behalf of the management. Reference has been made in the report with respect to letters dated 12.6.2003, 15.6.2003, 26.6.2003, 17.8.2003, 15.9.2003 and 25.9.2003 having been sent to the petitioner informing him about the departmental proceeding and asking him to submit his reply. As observed herein above, the petitioner was in custody from 22.5.2003 and pursuant to the release order, was released from custody only on 19.9.2003. The enquiry report came to be submitted on 30.9.2003. Thus all the letters except the one dated 25.9.2003 were written to the petitioner at a time when he was in custody."

The judgement reads: "13. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there being violation of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the proceedings and the petitioner not having been given adequate opportunity by the Conducting Officer, the consequent order of punishment based on the enquiry
report cannot be sustained. 14. Similarly, the order passed in appeal as also the memorial preferred by the petitioner having been rejected without considering the above aspects are also not sustainable." 

In her order dated January 28, 2026, Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy recorded:"1. The Learned counsel for the petitioner reported to the Court that the matter was completely heard by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, and prior to pronouncing the order, the roaster was changed. Therefore, he requested to send the matter back to the concerned/appropriate Bench. 2. Therefore, the Registry is directed to place the matter before appropriate Bench after obtaining necessary direction/permission from the Hon’ble Chief Justice." The change of the roaster after the matter was completely heard, prior to pronouncing the order creates a logical compulsion for the Court to inquire into circumstances under which such glaring discrepancy happened. J.S Arora was for the respondents and Kameshwar Pd. Gupta, GP10 and M. Virendra Kuar, AC to GP10 represented the State. 

Subsequent to order by Justice Chakravarthy, the matter got re-listed before Justice Partha Sarthy on March 11, 2026. His order dated April 3, 2026 reads: "The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.5 is available in record of learned counsel for the parties, however the same is not available in the record of the Court. 2. Learned counsel for the State of Bihar to file a fresh copy of the counter affidavit of respondent no.5 by 16.4.2026. 3. Put up this case on 17.4.2026." His order dated April 17, 2026 reads: "No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.5 inspite of the order dated 3.4.2026. 2. If no counter affidavit of respondent no.5 is available on the records of the Court on the next date, cost of Rs.10,000/- shall be imposed. 3. Put up this case on 1.5.2026." Similar warning was given by the Justice Shivaji Pandey on June 20, 2019. His order dated May 1, 2026 reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has been served with a copy of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.5 to the writ application as also to the interlocutory application in Court today. 2. Put up this case on 15.5.2026."

Earlier, in a 2-page long order dated June 20, 2019, Justice Shivaji Pandey had recorded that the petitioner was challenging the order of dismissal from service as well as the order passed by the appellate authority. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had been proceeded departmentally for the fraudulent act on account of getting benefit of loan on the basis of forged documents. While he was in custody, a departmental proceeding was initiated and finally he was dismissed from service without giving him an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to defend himself. He had submitted that against the order of dismissal, he had filed appeal before the appellate authority unsuccessfully and, thereafter, he had also filed memorial but, till date, no information has been communicated with regard to the fate of the memorial which is lying with the D.G.P. (Police), Bihar. Justice Pandey's order reads: "Let the State should file its counter affidavit within a period of three weeks, in failure, the same will be accepted only after deposit of Rs. 10,000/- in favour of Patna High Court Legal Services Committee. List this case after three weeks under the same list." 

Who caused a cruel delay of 13 years? Justice Partha Sarthy recognized that Kameshwar Pd. Gupta, the counsel for the State was defending the indefensible acts of the DGP, Bihar and SP, Vaishali. Cruelty manifests itself in myriad ways.