Supreme Court requests Chief Justice, Patna High Court to issue necessary instructions to Registry to list bail application of Rishu Shree as per roster as early as possible, and preferably within one week, Justice Satyavrat Verma has fixed Nov. 27 for the case

In Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Cour's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated November 4, 2026, which reads: "The instant Special Leave Petition is directed against an order of adjournment, in terms whereof the regular bail application of the petitioner was adjourned, and no date has now been fixed. 2. Since the petitioner is in custody, we request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to issue necessary instructions to the Registry to list the bail application as per the roster as early as possible, and preferably within one week. 1 3. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, disposed of. 4. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of." The fact remains that in his order dated October 15, 2026, Justice Satyvrat Verma states: "10. Put up this case on 27.11.2026 at 3.00 P.M."

Meanwhile, it has come to light that ED questioned suspended 2017-batch IAS officer Yogesh Kumar Sagar on November 4, 2026 in connection with links with contractor Rishu Shree, a contractor. Sagar, a former managing director of the Bihar Urban Infrastructure  Development Corporation (Buidco), was suspended by the state goveernment on May 30, 2026, after his name surfaced in the tender scam. Rishu Shree allegedly spent Rs 21.92 lakh on a trip to Austria for him and eight members of his family members.  IAS officer Dharmendra Kumar too was questioned at the ED office in Patna on November 4, 2026 about his closeness with Rishu Shree, the Saran born contractor and his foreign trips. IAS officer Abhilasha Kumari Sharma was questioned November 2, 2026 and IAS officer Sunil Yadav on November 3, 2026. So far The ED has already summoned six IAS officers from Bihar including Anand Kishore, Santosh Kumar Malla, Dharmendra Kumar, Yogesh Kumar Sagar, Abhilasha Kumari Sharma and Sunil Yadav in this case regarding their alleged collusion with Rishu Shree. After Rishu Shree's bail plea was rejected by the Vigilance Court, he had filed a petition in the Patna High Court. During the hearing in October, 2026, the High Court questioned the role of senior officials in the case and the action taken against them. It remarked that Rishu Shree was a minor pawn, and what action had been taken against senior officials. Rishu Shree is an accused in an alleged corruption and money laundering case involving senior IAS officer Sanjiv Hans and other officials. The Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) has filed a money laundering case against him. Rishu Shree allegedly favoured government officials and employees, in exchange for receiving advance information regarding government tenders. It is alleged that he colluded with officials to alter tender conditions and award work to contractors of his choice. The possibility of receiving commissions and receiving a portion of this commission from the relevant officials has also been under investigation. It is suspected that Rishu Shri attempted to secure government contracts by securing postings for officials of his choice. The ED investigation has revealed allegations of spending approximately ₹19 lakh on foreign travel by IAS officer Abhilasha Kumari Sharma and her family. WhatsApp chats between the two were also cited in the investigation. The foreign travels of Dharmendra Kumar, the then MD of BMSICL, also came under scrutiny. It has been reported that on September 10, 2025, the ED wrote to the Patna SSP alleging that Rishu Shree had been threatening to commit suicide via FaceTime and Telegram to officials. Heallegedly resorted to using a fake medical certificate to evade summons.

Earlier, in Rishu Shree s/o Shri Binod Kumar Sinha @ Vinod Kumar Sinha vs. Directorate Of Enforcement Through Its Assistant Director Government of India, Patna Zonal Office (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court passed a 19-page long order dated September 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"16. The Court for the present is not expressing any opinion on the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, but then directs the ED to file a counter affidavit answering the queries which are being framed by this Court.
(i) Since petitioner was not an accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023, based on which ECIR-4 was instituted, then what material transpired during the course of investigation of ECIR-4, based on which M/s Reliable Infra Service Private Limited, a company of the petitioner and house
of petitioner was raided on 16.07.2024- 

(ii) What was disclosed by the petitioner with regard to sale deeds and mobile phones seized from his house in his statement recorded on 18.07.2024, 18.09.2024, 20.09.2024, 21.09.2024 and 1.10.2024; 

(iii) since ED shared information under Section 66 PMLA to SP, Vigilance Unit, Patna on 20.08.2024 based on material collected on 16.07.2024 and statement of the petitioner recorded on 18.07.2024, based on which Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 dated 14.09.2024 was instituted, then why petitioner was not made a named accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024; 

(iv) since based on information shared by ED to SP, Vigilance on 20.08.2024, the Vigilance PS Case No. 05 of 2024 was instituted in which petitioner was not an accused then why in the addendum instituted by ED on 20.09.2024, the petitioner was not named as an accused, when ED by then had
recorded the statement of the petitioner on 18.07.2024, 18.09.2024 and 20.09.2024; 

(v) whether the ED till 20.09.2024 i.e. date of registering the addendum was not having any material against the petitioner connecting him with the offence, but if ED was having material against the petitioner connecting him with the offence, in that event whether ED raised any objection with SP, Vigilance for not arraigning the petitioner as an accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024; 

(vi) further if there was material against the petitioner then why he was not made an accused in the addendum; 

(vii) what the petitioner disclosed in his statement recorded on 21.09.2024 and 01.10.2024 during investigation of ECIR-4 and the addendum which was shared by the ED on 25.02.2025 under Section 66 PMLA to the ADG, Economic Offence Unit based on which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 dated 30.04.2025 (Annexure-12) was instituted against Sanjeev Hans, Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar and other unknown government officials, based on which ECIR-13 also came to be instituted; 

(viii) whether the ED investigated who were the unknown government officials involved in helping petitioner in manipulating government tenders or it was only Sanjeev Hans who was involved, since in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 only IAS named is Sanjeev Hans; 

(ix) further ED shall also disclose with clarity that as to whether while sharing information under Section 66 PMLA based on which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 came to be instituted whether in the said information, name of any other officials apart from Sanjeev Hans was mentioned or not and if
YES then did ED raise any objection before ADG, SUV that why name of other officials were not impleaded as accused in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025; 

(x) if an ECIR is instituted based on an FIR with regard to predicate offence and in the FIR accused are not implicated by name, whether ED while investigating the ECIR can issue summons to those whose name transpired while investigating the ECIR or ED will wait for the police agency to investigate the FIR and if name of unknown accused transpires during the course of investigation then only ED can issue summons to those accused for investigation; 

(xi) if an accused based on an investigation of an ECIR is arrested after furnishing grounds of arrest under Section 19 PMLA, whether the remanding Court is entitled to examine the grounds of arrest for the purposes of remanding the accused to judicial custody, if YES then whether the remanding Court in absence of an ECIR or a complaint case instituted based on investigation of the ECIR can examine the ground of arrest or ground of arrest furnished by the ED to the accused without supplying copy of an ECIR or without instituting a complaint case is sacrosanct- this question is being put since petitioner contends that he apprehends arrest based on ground of arrest in absence of him knowing whether the ground of arrest is based on the material which transpired during the course of investigation of ECIR or not; 

(xii) the ED shall also clarify whether ECIR is to be instituted based on an FIR instituted for predicate offence or based on an ECIR, the jurisdictional police based on information shared by the ED can institute an FIR with respect to predicate offence; 

(xiii) the ED shall clarify with clarity that if any manipulation of government tender was resorted to by this petitioner whether the petitioner alone could have manipulated the government tenders or the government tenders if manipulated, in such manipulation connivance of other senior officials was there or not, if YES then what steps ED took to question them; 

(xiv) the ED shall with clarity record the reason for instituting an addendum to ECIR-4 based on SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 for the reason that SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 was instituted based on an information shared by ED under Section 66 of PMLA, 2002 to the SP, Vigilance Unit based on the investigation which transpired while investigating ECIR-4, hence if SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 was based on an information shared by ED then what subsequent material transpired after instituting SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 necessitating institution of an addendum and 

(xv) the ED shall with clarity record that what material transpired connecting the petitioner with the offence based on an investigation of ECIR-4 and its addendum based on which the petitioner was named as an accused in Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No. 13 of 2025; 

(xvi) further what are the differences in the allegations against the petitioner as alleged in Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No. 13 of 2025 and the allegations being alleged in ECIR-13.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the ED sought four weeks’ time for filing a counter affidavit duly. The counter affidavit shall be sworn by the Joint Director, ED, Bihar.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the Supreme Court while giving liberty to the petitioner to move the High Court for seeking anticipatory bail had stayed the arrest of the petitioner for four weeks. It was submitted that the instant anticipatory bail application was filed within a period of two weeks from the date of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but then certain defects were pointed out by the stamp reporter, hence the case could not be taken up and now the ED has sought four weeks’ time for filing counter affidavit and regular bail application of the petitioner in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 was pending consideration before the High Court, hence the petitioner apprehended that in the event if regular bail application of the petitioner in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 was allowed, the petitioner may get arrested in the instant ECIR-13, hence, the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner sought protection from arrest for the petitioner. The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner seeks liberty to mention the case for taking it up out of turn, in the event the petitioner is granted the privilege of regular bail in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025. 

Nandita Rao, the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the copy of the ECIR till date has not been supplied by the ED to the petitioner nor a complaint case has been filed based on the ECIR, as such, the original certified copy of the ECIR cannot be obtained, 6(2)-Original certified copy of anticipatory bail rejection order with authentication fee, on which it is submitted that petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail in ECIR No. 13 of 2025, but then petitioner has not been arrested based on the said ECIR nor a complaint case has been filed, hence petitioner has moved directly before the High Court in terms of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court. 

The senior counsel submitted that the petitioner is in custody in connection with SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025, based on which ECIR 13 of 2025 has been instituted, but since petitioner has not been remanded in ECIR-13 of 2025, as such, the petitioner is seeking the privilege of anticipatory bail, but since he is in custody with respect to an FIR with regard to predicate offence. The petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail in ECIR 13 of 2025 instituted by the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ED’) in pursuance of SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025. It is submitted that petitioner is in custody in connection with SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 since June 17, 2026.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 dated January 9, 2023 came to be instituted against an IAS officer, Sanjeev Hans and Gulab Yadav by one Gayatri Kumari under Sections 376, 376(D), 313, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, alleging multiple instances of rape by the accused persons. The petitioner herein was not an accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023. She submitted that Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 was quashed by an order dated August 6, 2024 in Cr.WJC No. 310 of 2023 and order of the High Court dated August 6, 2024 was not interfered by the Supreme Court. It was also submitted that on basis of Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023, the ED registered an ECIR-4 (Annexure-3), the petitioner was not named as an accused in ECIR-4. It was further submitted that in pursuance of ECIR-4, the ED on July 16, 2024 conducted search and seizure under Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) at various premises including the office of M/s. Reliable Infra Service Private Limited, a company of which petitioner is a Director, from where digital devices and documents were seized, further the house of the petitioner was also searched from where two mobile phones, including that of petitioner along with several sale deeds were seized. The ED also recorded the statement of petitioner under Section 17 PMLA, it was submitted that petitioner was forced to affix his signature on his statement, though the statement contained factually incorrect facts. It was submitted that thereafter the statement of the petitioner based on ECIR-4 was recorded by ED on July 18, 2024, September 18, 2024, September 20, 2024, September 21, 2024 and October 1, 2024 and petitioner was made to sign his statements forcefully, it was reiterated and submitted that the statement recorded contained factually incorrect facts, thus, breaching Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and Section 164(2) Cr.P.C. / 183 (2) BNSS, i.e. protection against self incrimination.

Zohaib Hossain, senior counsel who connected virtually appearing on behalf of the ED objected to the allegation that any force was used for making the petitioner sign his statement. He was assisted Advocate Prabhat Kumar Singh. 

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that based on material collected by ED on July 16, 2024 and statement of petitioner recorded under Section 17 and Section 50 of PMLA, 2002, the ED on August 20, 2024 sent a letter to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Unit Patna, Bihar under Section 66 PMLA, sharing the information, based on which Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 dated September 14, 2024 was instituted against Sanjeev Hans and others under Sections 61, 318(4) BNS read with Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b) and 13(3) of Prevention of Corruption Act (the second FIR). It was submitted that petitioner was not made an accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 dated September 14, 2024 also. She submitted that ED on September 20, 2024 registered an addendum to ECIR-4, whereby the allegations made in second FIR was made part of the addendum to ECIR-4. The petitioner was not named as an accused in the addendum to ECIR-4. It was submitted that the allegations of the second FIR was made part of ECIR-4 by way of addendum on the ground that investigation is going on in ECIR-4. 

It was further submitted that based on inquiry being carried out in ECIR-4 including the addendum, the ED on February 25, 2025, shared an information under Section 66 PMLA to the ADG, Economic Offence Unit recording involvement of petitioner in other cognizable offence relating to alleged manipulation of government tenders in the State of Bihar. It was submitted that in the information shared by the ED on February 25, 2025 under Section 66 PMLA, 2002 to the ADG, Economic Offence, it was alleged that 

(1) out of Rs. 90 Lakhs paid by Sanjeev Hans to Gayatri Kumari, Rs. 20 Lakhs was transferred to one Sunil Kumar by M/s Reliable Infra Service Private Limited (subject matter of Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023), who transferred the said amount to Gayatri Kumari, hence it is alleged that petitioner was executing government contracts relating to WRD, where during the relevant period, Sanjeev Hans was the Secretary, hence the amount was the bribe money meant for Sanjeev Hans; 

(2) from the data extracted from the devices seized from the petitioner’s residence as well as from statement of the petitioner recorded, it revealed his involvement in manipulating and rigging government tenders in connivance with senior government officials; 

(3) petitioner disclosed in his statement that commission was paid ranging from 2% to 3.5% to officials of the bill amount where his associated entities were executing contracts, as contractors or sub-contractors;

(4) petitioner’s connection with senior officers and employee helped him in getting crucial information in advance; 

(5) by way of this modus operandi, the companies in contact with the petitioner used to get tenders and petitioner got benefitted by receiving 8-10% charges of the contract value; 

(6) by resorting to the aforesaid modus operandi, the petitioner engaged his entities as sub-contractors for tender awarded to different companies and thus used to raise periodic inflated bills to them, so that commission and bribe money get mixed with routine business and the entire process thus appears fair and transparent; 

(7), further by way of resorting to the aforesaid modus operandi, the petitioner got the tender floated by WRD awarded to M/s. Chevorox Construction Private Limited and later got the work sub-contracted to M/s Matriswa Construction (a firm controlled by his associate namely Santosh).  

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that allegations in the letter dated February 25, 2025 were premised on the statement of the petitioner recorded by ED while investigating ECIR-4 with specific reference to the statement of the petitioner recorded on January 29, 2025. It was submitted that based on the Letter dated February 25, 2025 of the ED, SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025 was instituted against the petitioner, Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar and other unknown government officials under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 3(2), 6(2) and 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 and Sections 61, 318(4), 338 and 340 of the BNS, 2023. She submitted that third FIR i.e. SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 was registered based on the statement of the petitioner recorded under Section 50 PMLA in connection with ECIR-4 and specifically the statement recorded on September 21, 2024, it was also submitted that petitioner filed Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 seeking quashing of SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 i.e. the third FIR, but was withdrawn by an order dated April 18, 2026. It was further submitted that based on SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025, ED registered ECIR-13 dated May 22, 2025 (in which petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail by filing the instant anticipatory bail application). 

Justice Verma recorded that it was submitted that "ECIR is an internal document of the ED, hence, has not been provided to the petitioner, but petitioner apprehends that he is arraigned as an accused in the ECIR-13." 

It was also submitted that ED provisionally attached movable and immovable properties to the extent of Rs. 68,09,58,540/- and out of the alleged estimated proceed of crime to the tune of Rs. 265.73 Crores by a Provisional Attachment Order bearing No. 08 of 2025 and thereafter ED filed O.C. No. 364 of 2025 under Section 5 PMLA, before the adjudicating authority, PMLA, seeking confirmation of the provisional attachment order (PAO) no. 08 of 2025, it is submitted that the Provisional Attachment Order bearing No. 08 of 2025 and O.C. No. 364 of 2025 arises from ECIR-4, the adjudicating authority confirmed PAO 08 of 2025 by its order dated January 5, 2026 in O.C. No. 364 of 2025. 

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that ED based on ECIR-13 issued summons under Section 50 PMLA directing the petitioner to appear on September 16, 2025 and September 22, 2025, but petitioner sought time on grounds of illness, hence ED directed him to appear on October 7, 2025. It was also submitted that petitioner cooperated in the investigation conducted by ED based on ECIR-4, but he was made to sign his statement under duress containing factually incorrect assertion hence petition apprehends that ED will again resort to the same coercive technique in garb of investigating ECIR-13. The learned Senior counsel submits that it would not be out of place to submit here that petitioner filed Cr. WJC No. 2942 of 2025 for quashing the entire criminal prosecution arising out of ECIR-13 being violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and further not to take any coercive steps in connection with ECIR-13 and ECIR-4, the Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025 was filed in pursuance of liberty granted by the Supreme Court by an order dated October 17, 2025 in W.P. (Criminal) No. 411 of 2025. It was submitted that Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025 was dismissed by a judgment dated May 18, 2026, against which the petitioner filed SLP (Criminal) No. 10433 of 2026 before the Supreme Court assailing the judgment dated May 18, 2026 in Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025, in the said SLP (Criminal) No. 10433 of 2026, the petitioner also sought protection from arrest in ECIR-13, based on which the Supreme Court passed an order dated June 16, 2026 recording- that while deciding the anticipatory bail of the petitioner, the Court shall decide the case on its own merit without being influenced by the order dated May 18, 2026 in Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025 and the petitioner was granted interim protection by the Supreme Court for four weeks i.e. the time within which the instant anticipatory bail application was to be decided.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that from narration of the facts as recorded, it would manifest that one Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 came to be instituted against Sanjeev Hans and Gulab Yadav in which petitioner was not an accused, but then based on Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023, ECIR-4 was instituted by the ED and the ED started investigating the case in pursuance whereof the house and office of the petitioner was raided and some material alleged to be incriminating were seized, but then Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 was quashed by this Court by an order dated August 6, 2024 in Cr.WJC No. 310 of 2023 with respect to Sanjeev Hans only, it was thus submitted that after Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 came to be quashed by this Court with respect to Sanjeev Hans, in that event what would happen to the ECIR which came to be instituted based on the said FIR, as the claim of the ED is that petitioner in connivance with Sanjeev Hans and senior IAS officials have looted the State of Bihar by manipulating government tenders. It is also submitted that it absolutely does not stand to reason that as to what kind of investigation is being conducted by the ED that ED despite sharing information twice with the SUV, based on which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 and SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 were instituted, but then in the FIR only Sanjeev Hans along with other private players were named, when it is being alleged by the ED that government tenders were manipulated on account of which hundred of crores has been siphoned off by the accused persons including the petitioner, hence, it is submitted that is it possible for the petitioner to siphon of hundred of crores of rupees as submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the ED without the connivance of senior officials of the State Government. It was also submitted by the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that based on ECIR-4, the ED filed Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No. 13 of 2025, in which petitioner has been arraigned as an accused. It is submitted that what the ED intends to investigate in the instant ECIR i.e. 13 of 2025 already stands investigated in ECIR-4 based on which Complaint Case No. 13 of 2025 has been instituted. 

Justice Verma had fixed the case for hearing on October 9, 2026. 

On October 9, 2026, instead of the matter being listed before Justice Verma, the case Rishu Shree S/O Sh. Vinod Kumar Sinha vs. The Union of India through its Secretary, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, New Delhi & Ors.(2026) came up for hearing before the bench of Justice Arun Kumar Jha. The other four respondents are:2.The Directorate of Enforcement, through its Assistant Director Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, 3. Aman Saxena (Deputy Director) R/O The Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, 4. Bhoopesh (Assistant Director) R/O the Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office and 5. The State of Bihar through the Superintendent of Police, Special Vigilance Unit, Patna. Justice Jha's order dated October 9, 2026 reads: "It is a disposed of case and record has been placed before this Court for perusal of order dated 16.06.2026 passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 10433/2026 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 2. Perused the aforesaid order."

In Rishu Shree vs. Directorate Of Enforcement Through Its Assistant Director Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, Justice Verma passed a 8-page long order dated October 15, 2026 which reads: "2. A detailed order was recorded on 11.09.2026 and four weeks’ time was granted to ED for filing counter affidavit, while recording the order dated 11.09.2026, the Court had framed 16 questions for ED to answer, the ED has answered all the 16 questions but then after perusing the counter affidavit, it gives an impression that ED is basically trying to convince the Court that what the Hon’ble Supreme Court in different cases held with regard to the PMLA but then as far as the instant case is concerned, with respect to the same, the answer appears to be evasive."

Justice Verma observed:" 3. After going through the case record, it manifests that present petitioner was not a named accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No.18 of 2023, based on which, an ECIR No.4 of 2024 was instituted, but, then based on investigation of ECIR No.4 of 2024, the ED raided the premises of the petitioner despite he being not an accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No.18 of 2023 or ECIR No.4 of 2024, which amply demonstrates that even if a person is not an accused in an FIR instituted with regard to predicate offence based on which an ECIR is instituted and the person is not accused in the said ECIR also still if any material transpire the ED can question such an accused, this fact has been recorded since it has relevance. 4. The statement of the petitioner was recorded on several dates, based on ECIR-4 and the ED shared the said information under Section 66 PMLA to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Unit, Bihar, based on which, Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No.5 of 2024 dated 14.09.2024 was instituted against Sanjeev Hans and others, the petitioner was not made an accused in Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No.5 of 2024 also." 

The order noted that it has been submitted that the allegation of Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No.5 of 2024 was made part of ECIR-4 by way of an addendum on the ground that investigation is going on in ECIR-4, further based on an enquiry being carried out in ECIR-4 including the addendum, the ED on February 25, 2025, shared an information under Section 66 PMLA to the ADG, Economic Offence Unit recording involvement of petitioner in other cognizable offence relating to alleged manipulation of government tenders in the State of Bihar, based on the letter dated February 25, 2025 of the ED, SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025 was instituted against the petitioner, Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar and other unknown government officials under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Sections 3(2), 6(2) and 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 and Sections 61, 318(4), 338 and 340 of the BNS, 2023, based on SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025, ECIR-13 came to be instituted.

The order reads: "5. In this background the Court posed query no.9-“whether- while sharing information under Section 66 PMLA on the basis of which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 came to be instituted, the name of any govt. officials other than Sanjeev Hans was mentioned or not and if YES, whether ED raise any objection before the ADG, SUV as to why such other officials were not impleaded as accused in SVU P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025; The ED in its counter affidavit while replying the said query has recorded that the ED shared credible information against six senior govt. officials, resulting in registration of FIR against three such officers, namely, Mumukshu Chaudhary, Tarni Das and Umesh Kumar, further since SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 was explicitly registered against named entity as well as other unknown govt. officials, there was no procedural or legal necessity for ED to object, as an FIR against unknown public servants provide full scope to the State Investigating Agency to examine, array and charge any official whose role is substantiated during investigation or via supplementary charge sheet without restricting the independent authority of the ED to investigate and array all such officers under the PMLA, further though FIR was registered only against three of such officials, however this does not bar the ED to investigate such officers for their involvement in the offence of money laundering, the Court finds the answer to be evasive for the reason that when the petitioner disclosed the name of six senior officials and the FIR was instituted only against three officials, in that event, the ED ought to have issued summons to the officials who were named in the FIR and even those whose name was disclosed by the petitioner but then from perusal of the counter affidavit, it manifests that the same does not record that any summons were issued to the senior officials including those who were not named in the FIR i.e. SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025, which gives an impression that the investigation of the ED is not progressing in the manner it ought to have been, similarly, the 10th query posed was- “if an ECIR is instituted on the basis of an FIR relating to a predicate offence and certain accused persons are not named in such FIR, whether ED, while investigating the ECIR can issue summons to persons whose name transpired during investigation of the ECIR or whether ED is required to wait for the police agency to investigate the FIR and issue summons only after such persons are identified by the predicate agency.” 

Justice Verma observed: "The ED in reply pleaded that ED is not required to wait for the State police agency to identify or array a named individual in a predicate FIR before exercising its own power under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002, the ED possesses independent statutory authority to directly summon and examine any person whose involvement or connection with proceed of crime transpired during its investigation under money laundering, the answer is clear that ED has the power to issue summons but then Court fails to appreciate that why no summons were issued to the officials whose name transpired in the statement of the petitioner, as it does not appear probable that money laundering of such a magnitude would have been committed by the petitioner alone in connivance with private players. He added: "The Court also fails to appreciate the conduct of the SVU that when ED had shared information to the SVU under Section 66 PMLA, based on disclosure made by the petitioner, in which, he named six senior officials of the State Government then why SVU did not array all the senior officials, as an accused in SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025. It appears that either SVU was not convinced with the information shared by the ED with regard to senior officials, as such did not array them in the category of accused and ED by not issuing summons to the officials despite having information regarding them since 25.02.2025 also reflects that either no material during the course of investigation of ECIR transpired connecting them with the offence or attempt is being made to save some and implicate few."

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the ED submitted that ED requires to interrogate the petitioner for eliciting more information as he is the king-pin of money laundering by manipulating government tender. 

Justice Verma observed: "The Court is not able to appreciate the said submission rather it appears that petitioner is a pawn, king-pin are behind the curtains. 7. Since a stand has been taken in the counter that ED has no control over SVU, as such the ED did not raise any objection, hence learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is directed to add SVU through its Additional Director General, as O.P. No.2."

The Court directed Kumaresh Singh, the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner to serve two copies on the counsel appearing on behalf of the SVU. "The SVU shall file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the Additional Director General, SVU. The counter affidavit shall with clarity record that when ED shared information under Section 66 PMLA, disclosing the name of accused persons, including six senior officials, who were involved in the occurrence of money laundering, then why they were not arrayed as an
accused in SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025, the counter affidavit shall also with clarity record that what transpired during the course of investigation of SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 with regard to officials whose name was shared by the ED. The petitioner is in custody in connection with SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 based on which ECIR-13 of 2025 has been instituted and the case is a serious one as allegation is of money laundering worth hundred of crores, based on manipulating tenders, the petitioner alone could not have manged the tender until and unless he was helped by the bureaucrats as disclosed by the ED in its counter affidavit but then only petitioner along with some private players along with Sanjeev Hans and three senior bureaucrats have been made accused in SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 while the name of other officials disclosed by the ED stands omitted, hence the Court gets an impression that the authorities are trying to save some and implicate few when the law is same for everyone. 9. The Court expects that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner shall serve copy on the SVU on or before 28.10.2026."

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, the amicus curiae in special laws/special courts case recalled that the tender scam emerged to light after an FIR registered at the Rupaspur police station in Patna in 2023. Gayatri Devi had filed complaints accusing senior 1997-batch IAS officer Sanjeev Hans and former RJD MLA Gulab Yadav of sexual exploitation and blackmail. While investigating Gayatri Devi's case, the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) began tracking the financial trails and illicit money transfers. They uncovered substantial transactions where Sanjeev Hans had reportedly channeled over ₹90 lakh to Gayatri Devi through hawala channels and intermediaries. The probe into these suspicious funds led investigators straight to contractor Rishu Shree. Shree allegedly managed a syndicate that paid massive bribes and commissions (around 5% to 10%) to bureaucrats like Hans to secure government projects across departments like BUIDCO and the Water Resources Department. The Rishu Shree case centers on a multi-crore Bihar tender scam. A press release dated November 26, 2025 had disclosed that on November 25, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Patna Zonal Office conducted search operations at 9 locations across Ahmedabad, Surat, Gurgaon and New Delhi on 25.11.2025, under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 in a case related to a Patna based contractor Rishu Shree. During the search operations, cash of approx. Rs. 33 Lakh, digital devices, diaries, and several incriminating documents were found and seized. ED initiated investigation on the basis of FIR registered by Special Vigilance Unit (SVU), Bihar on April 30, 2025, names four accused, including Hans, businessman Rishu Shree, Santosh Kumar, and Pawan Kumar, besides unknown government officials. The case pertains to alleged irregularities in the award of government tenders and has been filed under provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Rishu Shree, who’s firms work as contractors/subcontractors in various Bihar Government departments, such as Water Resources, Health, Public Health Engineering, Urban Development, Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation (BUIDCO), Education, Building and Construction, and Rural Works Department, is alleged to have a nexus with various Government officials to facilitate tenders for illicit personal gains. Earlier in this case, search operations were carried out at several travel agents and also at the residential premises of several government officials in Patna. These searches had led to the seizure of a total of Rs.11.64 crore (approx.) in cash, along with various incriminating documents and digital evidences. Further, assets to the tune of Rs.68.09 crore belonging to Rishu Shree, his family members and entities were put under Provisional Attachment on August 1, 2025. In May 2026, the Patna High Court had dismissed Rishu Shree's petition seeking the quashing of the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) and Section 50 PMLA statements, ruling that an ECIR is an internal document and that ED officers are not "police officers" under standard Cr.PC confession safeguards. In October 2026, the High Court criticised the slow pace of action against principal actors higher up in the hierarchy, noting that the contractor appeared to be a "pawn" in a broader network. Supreme Court granted temporary protection and later directed the Patna High Court to expedite and decide on Rishu Shree's bail plea while allowing constitutional challenges regarding PMLA provisions (Sections 50 and 63) to be raised in connected batch petitions.

In early 2026, the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) had filed a chargesheet against seven accused, including senior IAS officer Sanjeev Hans, in a government tender scam. Hans, a 1997-batch Bihar cadre IAS officer, has been untraceable since contractor Rishu Shree was arrested on May 27, 2026. The chargesheet had been filed in the special vigilance court against seven accused. In the 4,000-page chargesheet, the investigating agency claimed to have collected substantial evidence of the accused's involvement in the case. Besides Hans, the chargesheet names Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar, Mumukchhu Choudhary, Tarini Das and Umesh Kumar Singh. Evidence has been found against government officials Mumukchhu Choudhary, Tarini Das and Umesh Kumar Singh. Tarini Das, who was posted as engineer-in-chief in the building construction department, helped companies was linked to Rishu Shree secure at least 10 government contracts. Joint secretary in the finance department Mumukchhu Choudhary and BUDCO executive engineer Umesh Kumar Singh were also alleged to have favoured him. Rishu Shree, Santosh Kumar, Tarini Das, Mumukchhu Choudhary and Umesh Kumar Singh are currently in jail, while Sanjeev Hans and Pawan Kumar are absconding. SVU teams have conducted raids in Sitamarhi and Saharsa. It is reported that Rishu Shree had helped an Ahmedabad-based company to secure the Kosi barrage contract and had also assisted a private company where Pawan Kumar was serving as director. During raids at locations linked to Rishu Shree, investigators recovered 99 property deeds and gold jewellery worth more than Rs 2.5 crore. His assets have been estimated at over Rs 265 crore.

Also read:Justice Ansul' s order is not in favour of "media gag", does not prevent fair, accurate, objective reporting of pending court proceedings or publication of facts in alleged tender scam case

Supreme Court grants interim protection to Rishu Shree against arrest for four weeks, finds no ground to interfere with Justice Arun Kumar Jha's judgement

Rishu Shree saga is linked to story of Advocate Gayatri Kumari, Sanjeev Hans, Gulab Yadav, Lalit and others-Part 1

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail denial order by Patna High Court in a murder case from Digha, Patna

In Rajnish Kumar @ Bawla vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of  Justices Aravind Kumar ad Vipul M. Pancholi passed a 6-page long order dated November 04, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"8. The appellant has been in custody since 09.12.2024 and on conclusion of the investigation chargesheet has been filed, as noticed hereinabove, and charges have also been framed on 01.02.2025. 9. The co-accused against whom similar allegations having been made namely Sanjay Yadav alias Madhusudhan Prasad has been granted bail by the jurisdictional High Court vide order dated 17.04.2025 and the fact that the person who was not named in the FIR namely Pintu Kumar also having been granted bail on 11.09.2025 by the jurisdictional High Court, we are of the considered view that on the ground of parity the appellant is also entitled for regular bail. 10. Hence, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct the appellant to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional Sessions Court deems fit to impose. 11. We make it clear that the observations made hereinabove are only for the limited purpose of considering the prayer for grant of bail and shall in no manner influence the trial." 

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated April 2, 2026 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court, who had rejected the prayer for grant of regular bail, the appellant had approached the Supreme Court. The prosecution case arose out of incident that occurred on July 23, 2024 wherein eight named persons riding motorcycles allegedly fired indiscriminately upon the informant’s son Neeraj Kumar alias Fatalki and his friend Raju Kumar causing injuries. The informant alleged that the assailants also fired at her, but she was not injured. Neeraj Kumar who was injured in the firing, expired subsequently. The application filed by the appellant for grant of regular bail before the trial Court and High Court was rejected. 

Supreme Court observed: "As seen from the allegations found in the FIR as well as in the chargesheet, the appellant was not named in the FIR which was registered initially against eight named persons only. In fact, appellant’s name did not figure in the FIR. It is only based on the subsequent statement of the deceased-Dhiraj Kumar recorded and also that of Raju Kumar who named the appellant, alleging that appellant along with Sanjay Yadav were keeping a watch upon the deceased and others informing the accused persons who were named in the FIR and appellant involved in a criminal conspiracy, the appellant and Sanjay Yadav were roped in as accused persons. However, the appellant contends that his implication essentially rests upon statements/confessions of co-accused." 

Earlier, in Rajnish Kumar @ Bawla vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"5. Considering the serious nature of the allegations, the involvement of multiple accused, and the fact that the appellant, along with others, fired indiscriminately, causing injury to the victim and resulting in the death of the deceased, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the appellant. 6. Accordingly, the appeal is rejected. The trial is directed to be expedited. 7. It is made clear that any observation made herein is prima facie in nature and limited solely for the purpose of adjudication of the present bail application. Such observations shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case and shall not influence the trial or any other proceedings in any manner."  

The appeal was filed by the appellant against the order dated November 7, 2025 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court (Sadar), Patna in Special Case No. 474 of 2024, which arose out of Digha P.S. Case No. 477 of 2024, registered under Sections 118, 109, 61(2) and 103 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 25(1-b)a, 26, 27, and 35 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, whereby the appellant’s prayer for bail was rejected. As per the prosecution case, eight miscreants riding on three motorcycles came and fired indiscriminately at the informant's son and his friend, causing injuries. They also fired at the informant, but she escaped. The informant also alleged that the co-accused persons, along with some unknown miscreants, fired at the informant's son and his friend indiscriminately with the intention to kill. Thereafter, nearby people started pelting stones at the accused persons, and then they fled, and the informant's son and his friend were taken to the hospital. The appellant has three criminal antecedents.

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, amicus curiae in special laws/courts case observed:"When the proceedings of the regular bail or  anticipatory bail are not concluded, the court may grant temporary bail for the time period until the  said proceedings are concluded. There is no statutory provision under the BNSS for granting interim bail. The concept of interim bail is wholly an outcome of judicial pronouncements. Interim bail is permitted when there is no chance that the accused will escape prosecution, when there is no chance that the defendant may tamper with the evidence, when there is no justifiable reason to conduct a confined interrogation, and when the hearing on the anticipatory bail claim must be postponed." Dr. Krishna pointed out that in Kamlendra Pratap Singh vs. State of U.P., 2009 (4) SCC 437, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that a judge considering a regular bail application has the inherent authority to grant interim bail while the ball case is being decided on in its entirety. When someone requests regular bail, the court usually lists that request after a few days so that it may review the case diary, which must be received from the police authorities. In the meanwhile, the applicant must remain in custody. Even if the applicant is  subsequently freed on bond, his image in society may have already been irreversibly damaged. A person’s reputation is a significant asset of his and one of the aspects of his right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court noted that the court involved has the inherent authority to grant interim bail to a person until the ultimate disposition of the bail application."

Dr Krishna noted that in Hemant Soren vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (SLP (Crl.) No. 9599/2024), the Supreme has Court upheld the interim bail granted to Hemant Soren by the Jharkhand High Court in the alleged land scam case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). The Court dismissed the 
Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) Special Leave Petition. It upheld grant of interim bail on the basis of sound judicial reasoning and balanced appreciation of the facts on record and right to life and personal liberty.

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a cyber offence case from Nawada

In Gulshan Kumar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu passed a 6-page long order dated November 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"5. It is not in dispute that the appellant has joined investigation in terms of the earlier order of this Court. 6. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant’s detention for custodial interrogation is not necessary and that he may be admitted to an order for grant of bail in anticipation of arrest. 7. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment and order impugned in this appeal. 8. It is directed that in the event of the appellant being arrested, he shall be released on bail on terms and conditions to be imposed by the trial court." The appellant no. 2 is Kundan Kumar. 

Earlier, in Gulshan Kumar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court has passed a 2-page long order dated March 31, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "6. Considering the nature of accusation and gravity of of offence, materials available on record and other circumstances of the case, prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioners is rejected." The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 303(2), 318(2),318(4), 319(2), 336(2), 336(3), 338, 340(2) Β.N.S. and Section 66,66(B),66(D) of I.T. Act. As per F.I.R. informant alleged that a cyber fraud racket was being operated to defraud people under the guise of providing loans. Following surveillance and raids, the accused were arrested and incriminating mobile phones, SIM cards, and digital evidence were recovered.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the petitioners were innocent and were falsely implicated in this case . The name of these petitioners transpired in this case in the confessional statement of other co-accused person namely, Ranjit Kumar who were apprehended on the spot. Except confessional statement, there is no other material on record to show the complicity of these petitioners in the alleged occurrence. The petitioner had got no concern with the alleged occurrence. They have clean antecedent. The counsel for the State opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that there was specific allegation against the petitioners that these petitioners are accused of being involved in cyber fraud and also providing SIM cards, customer details and account details for soliciting money. 

Justice Singh had rejected the appellant’s prayer for bail in anticipation of arrest. Supreme Court has set aside his order. 

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna observed:"Anticipatory bail is granted to the individual or individuals who apprehend arrest. It can only be granted by the Session court or the High court. According to Section 482 of the BNSS (Section 438 of CrPC), if any person believes that he may be arrested for any non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High court or the Session court to direct for his release on bail on event of his arrest, subjected to the conditions as imposed by the respective court while considering the facts of the case. Under this Section the respective courts have discretionary powers while granting bail to the person apprehending arrest.  In N.S. Sahni vs. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 3810, the Supreme Court has held that the court has the discretionary powers in the matter of anticipatory bail and it is not an essential part of right to life  enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In Pratibha Manchanda vs. The State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181, it has held  that the High Court and the Court of Session while dealing with applications for anticipatory bail, should consider the nature and gravity of the alleged offence and its impact on the society."

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma in a murder case from Sakra, Muzaffarpur

 “The issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which
insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process.”
– Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in Gudikanti Narasimhulu vs. Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 SCC 240

In Shamshu Jama @ Shamsul Zama @ S. Zama vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu passed a 6-page long order dated November 5, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"8. Taking an overall view of the matter but without expressing any opinion either way on the cause of death, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant’s detention for custodial interrogation is not necessary and that he may be admitted to an order for grant of bail in anticipation of arrest. 9. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment and order impugned in this appeal. "The Court set aside the 3-page long order dated July 9, 2026 by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of Patna High Court. 

Supreme Court's order recorded that it appeared from counter affidavit filed by the respondent-State.that although the appellant figured as an accused in FIR No. 322/2025, there was a previous FIR, viz. FIR No.313/2025, wherein the victim figured as an accused. It is, therefore, clear that cross cases were registered. The postmortem report records that death of the victim was due to “lung disease”. Insofar as the injury on the victim was concerned, the report concluded that there appeared to be an injury on the long bone on his right arm. 

It observed:"13. We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail to the appellant in anticipation Criminal Appeal No.5261 OF 2026 3 of arrest will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case. 14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms."

Earlier, the petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Sakra P.S. Case No. 322 of 2025, F.I.R. dated June 20, 2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2),115,118,117,109,3(5) of the BNS, 2023 later on Section 103(1) of BNS was added but the police has found the case true under Sections 329(2),191(2)(3), 126(2),115(2),118(1), 117(1), 109(1), 352,351(2) of BNS. According to prosecution case, all the accused persons including this petitioner over a land dispute brutally assaulted the informant and his daughter and took away cash and gold chain from his house. 

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the petitioner had clean antecedent and was falsely  implicated in the case. From the FIR it was apparent that the incident of assault on Md. Sayeed Akhta rtook place due to partition dispute. The date of occurrence as alleged in the FIR is June 14, 2025 but the FIR was instituted on June 20, 2025 after delay of six days afterthought only to falsely implicate the petitioner. The date of occurrence as alleged in FIR is June 14, 2025 and Md. Sayeed Akhtar had died on July 4, 2025. The injury report of the injured person/deceased suggested that he had received the injury on both shoulders. The counsel for the informant and A.P.P. for the State, vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner had perpetrated the crime in question and the deceased died after twenty days of the occurrence from a bare perusal of the postmortem report of the deceased it appeared that the opinion regarding cause of death was being kept reserved pending the report. Time elapsed since death was within 2-03 days from the time of postmortem examination. 

Justice Verma had concluded: "6. Considering the aforesaid facts, this is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with Sakra P.S. Case No. 322 of 2025 pending in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-2nd Muzaffarpur." Supreme Court has reversed the order by Justce Verma. 

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna observed: "In a case where the appellant’s detention for custodial interrogation is not necessary, it is reasonable to grant anticipatory bail. The provision of anticipatory bail is a legal mechanism for the protection of individual liberty. It allows a person to seek pre-arrest bail in anticipation of being arrested for a non-bailable offence. The provision recognizes that arrest may be misused as an instrument of oppression or harassment. This provision is provided under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. With the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, anticipatory bail now finds its statutory basis under Section 482 of the BNSS.  The 41st Report of the Law Commission of India (1969) had recommended the inclusion of a provision empowering courts to grant pre-arrest bail in order to prevent abuse of the arrest process. The basic framework of BNSS, 2023 for anticipatory bail under Section 482 empowers the Court of Session or the High Court to issue a direction for release in the event of arrest. The language “if it thinks fit” has been retained, but without further codified criteria. Unlike CrPC, BNSS does not expressly enumerate the considerations for granting anticipatory bail. This increases judicial discretion and introduces the risk of inconsistent or arbitrary decision-making. Dr. Krishna pointed out that under the BNSS, there is a express bar on grant of anticipatory bail in specific sexual offences. Section 482(4) BNSS (Section 438(4) CrPC) imposes a statutory prohibition against granting anticipatory bail in cases of rape on a woman under 16 years of age (Section 65 (1), BNS, 2023- Section 376 (3) IPC) and gang rape on a woman under 18 years of age (Section 70(2), BNS, 2023).  

Section 438 of Cr.PC had vested the Court of Session and the High Court with concurrent jurisdiction to issue such a direction for non-bailable offences. Section 438 CrPC permitted a person to apply for anticipatory bail if there existed a reasonable apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence. The Section provided that:“...the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.” The Courts were required to consider relevant factors including the nature and gravity of the accusation, antecedents of the applicant, possibility of fleeing from justice, and the probability of tampering with evidence or threatening witnesses. 

In Balchand Jain vs. State of M.P., 1977 SCR (2) 52, Justice P.N. Bhagwati described anticipatory bail as an “extraordinary remedy” to be granted in exceptional circumstances, where: “...a person might be falsely implicated, or a frivolous case might be launched against him...”

The Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, reiterated the principle that an accused cannot be detained in custody merely on the presumption of guilt. “...bail is the rule and committal to jail is an exception.” Such interpretations emphasised that custodial detention should not be punitive, especially before conviction.

In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, where a Constitution bench, for the first time, laid down the scope of Section 438, CrPC. The Court interpreted Section 438(1) in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court laid down the following principles with regard to anticipatory bail:
1) Section 438(1) cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. “Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely.”

2) Where an application for anticipatory bail is preferred before the High Court or the Court of Session, it is incumbent upon the Court to apply its independent judicial mind to the matter and determine whether a prima facie case exists for the grant of such relief. The Court cannot abdicate this responsibility by deferring the decision to the Magistrate under Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at a later stage, as such a course of action would undermine the very purpose and intent of Section 438.

3) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to exercise of power under Section 438.

4) Anticipatory bail can be granted even after filing of FIR, as long as the applicant has not been arrested.

5) The provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest. After arrest the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 and Section 439.

6) Order under Section 438 would not affect the right of police to conduct investigation.

7) Conditions mentioned in Section 437 cannot be read into Section 438.

8) Although the power to release on anticipatory bail can be described as of an “extraordinary” character this would “not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only.” Powers are discretionary to be exercised in light of the circumstances of each case.

9) Initial order can be passed without notice to the Public Prosecutor. Thereafter, notice must be issued forthwith and the question ought to be re-examined after hearing. Such an interim order must conform to requirements of the Section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant.

In Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2018 (7) SCC 731, two major issues arose before the Supreme Court:
A. If the protection granted to a person under Section 438 Cr. P.C. should be restricted to a specific amount of time to enable the accused to surrender before the Trial Court and seek regular bail?
B. Whether the lifespan of anticipatory bail shall expire at the time and stage when the accused is called by the Court?

The Supreme Court has held that the time period for which anticipatory bail can be granted is discretionary and can vary depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. It placed reliance on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, wherein, it has been held that anticipatory bail was a question of personal liberty, and hence not subject to a time period. In the case in question, the Court answered the two issues based on the reasoning it provided, that an order passed under Section 438 should not ordinarily be limited to a fixed period, but if the situation demands conditions should be imposed under Sections 437(3) and 438(2). With regard to the second question, the Court said that the term of anticipatory bail does not expire when a summons is issued by the Trial Court but can be prolonged until the trial is completed. 

The Court laid down the following points which courts must take into account while dealing with cases under Section 438 of Cr. P.C. (Section 482 BNSS)-
• When a person complains of fear of arrest and seeks an order, the application should be based on concrete facts of the offense, focusing on why the person fears arrest as well as his account of the story, rather than ambiguous and universal allegations relating to one or more specific offenses;
• On the gravity of the threat of arrest the court should issue a notice to the Public Prosecutor and obtain facts even while granting provisional anticipatory bail;
• A person may apply for anticipatory bail before the FIR if the facts show that there is a  credible reason for the arrest;
• The Court held that nothing in Section 438 of the Cr. P.C. compels the court to set restrictions barring relief in terms of time, recording of witness testimony, or filling an FIR. While granting anticipatory bail, the Court should consider the seriousness of the crime such as the type of crime, evidence gathered, the harm is done to the victim, etc. before laying down any conditions on the petitioner;
• An order granting anticipatory bail, cannot extend to a future occurrence constituting a commission of a crime and there cannot be a ‘blanket’ order;
• Anticipatory bail can be extended until the completion of the trial once the charge sheet is filed;
• Anticipatory bail does not restrict or impede the rights and obligations of the police and investigative authorities in any way. It also said that under Section 439(2), the police can bring a claim to the court to arrest the accused again in certain circumstances;
• The accuracy of an anticipatory bail may be reviewed by a superior court, at the request of the investigating authorities. There is a possibility of the order being set aside on failure to consider relevant facts and critical circumstances. This does not mean cancellation of the order but simply dismissing it.

The term ‘bail’ is derived from the French word ‘baillier’ which means ‘to give away or deliver’. Bail is defined as “the setting free of the defendant by releasing him from the custody of law and entrusting him to the custody of his sureties who are liable to produce him to appear for his trial at a specific date and time.” According to Section 2 (1) (b) of the BNSS, the term means “release of a person accused of or suspected of commission of an offence from the custody of law upon certain conditions imposed by an officer or court on execution by such person of a bond or bail bond.” The definition has introduced two essential components i.e., bail bond and bond. The term ‘bail bond’ means an undertaking with sureties for the release of an accused from the custody while the term ‘bond’ a personal undertaking or bond without sureties for the release of an accused from the custody. 

Section 2(1)(c) BNSS (Section 2(a) of CrPC) “bailable offence” means an offence which is shown as bailable in the First Schedule, or which is made bailable by any other law for the time being in force. An accused can claim bail as a matter of right if he is accused of committing a bailable offence. Thus, in bailable offences, it is the duty of the police officer or the court to intimate the accused about his right to get bail. 

Section 47 (2) BNSS (Section 50(2) Cr.P.C.) makes it obligatory for a police officer arresting such a person without a warrant to inform him of his right to be released on bail. Under Section 478 BNSS (Section 436 of CrPC) a person accused of a bailable offence at any time while under arrest without a warrant and at any stage of the proceedings has the right to be released on bail.

Section 478 BNSS (Section 436 of CrPC) provides for in what cases bail to be taken and as per this, bail can be granted provided following conditions are fulfilled:
• When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence
• Is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court,
• If he is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail.
• Then such person shall be released on bail. 

Therefore, Section 478 BNSS (Section 436 of CrPC) is mandatory in nature and the court or the police have no discretion in the matter. Any accused person arrested for a bailable offence willing to provide
bail must be released.

Proviso to the Section further provides that such officer or Court:
• if he or it thinks fit, may, and
• shall, if such person is indigent and is unable to furnish surety, the courts shall release him on his execution of a bond without sureties.
Explanation to the Section further clarifies that where a person is unable to give bail bond within a week of the date of his arrest, it shall be a sufficient ground for the officer or the Court to presume that he is an indigent person for the purposes of this proviso.

Section 478(2) BNSS (Section 436(2) CrPC) allows the Court to refuse bail to a person who has previously violated the conditions of their bail bond, such as failing to attend court at the designated time and place, if they appear before the Court again in the same case, or are brought before the Court 
in custody. This refusal does not affect the Court’s power to impose penalties under Section 491 BNSS (Section 446 Cr.P.C). Therefore, the Court still has the power to make the person or their surety pay a penalty for breaking the bail bond conditions, as mentioned in Section 491 BNSS (Section 446 Cr.P.C).

In Amar Nath Singh vs. The State of Jharkhand, 26 October, 2021 case, where a person has failed to comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may by virtue of Section 436 (2) CrPC (Section 478(2) BNSS) refuse to release him on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he appears before the Court.

In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, Justice Bhagwati and Justice Krishna lyer highlighted the faulty bail system which needs reconsideration. In this case attention was brought to the impact of indigence of an accused on his right of bail. 

In R.D. Upadhyay vs. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 1946, it was brought to the notice of court that there are many undertrials languishing in jail for non-furnishing of surety despite bail order granted in favour of them. It was held by court barriers in certain categories of cases, court can consider release of such prisoners on personal bonds.

In Rasiklal vs. Kishore s/o Khanchand Wadhwani, AIR 2009 SC 1341, the Supreme Court has held that the right to bail for bailable offences is an absolute and in-defeasible right and no discretion can be exercised as the words of Section 436 CrPC (Section 478 BNSS) are imperative and the person accused of an offence is bound to be released as soon as the bail is furnished. The Court further observed that there is no need for the complainant or the public prosecutor to be heard in cases where a person is charged with a bailable offence. Moreover, the court has no discretion to impose any conditions except to demand security.

Supreme Court upholds dismissal order due to a delay of 1108 days in a Commercial Appeal case authored by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad

In The State of Bihar, through the Principal Secretary, Industries Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. The General Public & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi passed an order dated November 6, 2026, wherein, it upheld the order by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra. It concluded:"We do not find any good ground to entertain this petition. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed." 

Earlier, in The State of Bihar, through the Principal Secretary, Industries Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. The General Public & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Prasad and Mishra passed a 6-page long order dated September 30, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"8. In the facts of the present case, we have no iota of doubt that the appellants have not shown their bonafides in the matter of filing of appeal within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 read with Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. We also find that during this period, the award holder has acquired some equitable rights as the execution case has proceeded much ahead. 9. There being no cogent and sufficient ground and the delay being a huge period of 1108 days for which no bonafide explanations have come, we find no merit in the application. This application is dismissed. 10. As a result of the dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay, the appeal cannot be entertained. It is dismissed accordingly." 

By filing the application before the High Court, the appellants had sought condonation of delay of 1108 days in filing of the commercial appeal. The facts were not in dispute. These appellants were parties to the arbitration award dated August 20, 2014 rendered by the sole Arbitrator. The sole Arbitrator found the appellants liable to pay the following amounts:- "i). Rs.28,90,168/- (Twenty eight lacs ninety thousand one hundred sixty eight only) as dues towards total advance money paid by the claimant to the Mill authority with interest @ 12% P.A. from the date of 14.05.2000 till the date of realization. ii). Rs.2,00,000/- (Two lacs) only towards damages but without interest. iii). Rs.70,000/- (Seventy thousand) only as cost of litigation including amount of court fee. iv) Rs.1,80,000/- toward payment of fee by the claimant to the Arbitrator. Failing which the claimant/petitioner shall be entitled to recover the award amount through due process of law as provided in the Act with interest @ 18% P.A. on total award amount from the date of this award till final realization." 

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the award, the appellants had filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 giving rise to Misc. Case No.58 of 2014 in the court of  Principal District Judge, Patna. They were aggrieved against the part of the arbitral award. The respondent/award holder filed an Execution Case No.03 of 2016 for enforcement of the arbitral award and in course of the said execution proceeding, the Commercial Court passed coercive order dated June 17, 2025 whereby and whereunder the Collectorate, Madhubani was attached. 

It appeared to the High Court that the Misc. Case No.58 of 2014 was later on withdrawn with liberty, as informed to the High Court and Misc. Case No. 10 of 2016 was filed before the Principal District Judge-cum-Commercial Court, Madhubani for setting aside of the award. The said Misc. Case No.10 of 2016 was dismissed on June 3, 2023. It was evident that the execution proceeding was already going on during pendency of the Misc. Case No.10 of 2016. Therefore, the appellants were fully aware of the likelihood of passing of the coercive orders in the execution case if the order dated June 3, 2023 rejecting the Misc. Case No.10 of 2016 was not challenged to obtain an appropriate order from the appellate court, still no step was taken for filing of the appeal. 

On perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay, we have noticed that there has been delay in processing the files at various levels in the office of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Madhubani, Deputy Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Bihar and the District Legal Cell, Madhubani. 

From the statements made in paragraph '4' of the application, it appeared to the High Court that there had been a delay on the part of the respondents-appellants in obtaining the certified copy of the judgment/order dated June 3, 2023. 

The Government Pleader, Madhubani had already advised the appellants regarding necessity of filing of an appeal, vide his Letter No.39/GP Office, Madhubani dated October 12, 2023. Initially, some communications were made within a reasonable period but the files got stuck in the office of the General Manager, DIC, Madhubani and the Joint Secretary, Department of Industries, Bihar. The statements made in paragraph '13' of the application showed that the Joint Secretary, Department of Industries had initiated the process for appointment of a new Liquidator of the appellant no.3 after it went into the liquidation on November 9, 2022. Some scattered statements were made in the application to explain the delay but the High Court found that there was no cogent and sufficient ground stated in the application to condone such a huge delay of 1108 days in filing of the commercial appeal. 

Justice Prasad observed: "It is well settled by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer Vs. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 that the delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned." The paragraph '63' of the judgment in the case of Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd reads:- "63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches." 

 

Ahead of hearing in Jharkhand High Court on November 5, DM, Ramgrah extended detention order of Vikash Tiwari who is in Central Jail, Hazaribagh for 3-months under Jharkhand Control of Crime Act,

In Vikash Tiwari @ Vikash Nath Tiwari vs. The State of Jharkhand W.P. (Cr.) No. 633 of 2026, Jharkhand High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sujit Narayan Prasad and Akhil Kumar fixed the next date of hearing for November 20, 2026 upon hearing the case on November 5, 2026.. The State has filed its "counter affidavit" on November 3, 2026. The reply of the counter affidavit has not been filed as yet. The writ petition was filed in the High Court on October 8, 2026 and registered on October 14, 2026. The five other respondents are:2) The Department of Home Through Its Principal Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, 3) The Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ramgarh, 4) The Additional Chief Secretary,Home Prison and Disaster Management, 5) The Superintendent of Police, Ramgarh, and 6) The Jail Superintendent, Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narayan Central Jail, Hazaribagh. Notably, most of the orders issued by SP, Ramgarh and DM, Ramgarh with reference to Tiwari refer to Nishi Pandey, currently the vice president of Bharatiya Jantantra Morcha, a political party, without attributing any specific offence against her. She is the widow of Raj Kishor Pandey who was killed in Jamshedpur 2014.  

Meanwhile, pursuant to the recommendation letter of S.P., Ramgarh dated October 31, 2026 and the order dated September 16, 2026 by Under Secretary, Department of Home, Jail and Disaster Management, Jharkhand, the DC-cum-DM has issued an order dated November 3, 2026, wherein, it has extended its detention order dated August 19, 2026 which was to expire on November 18, 2026. The detention order has been extended for three months. The extension order lists 53 cases filed against Tiwari between November 22, 2008-October 29, 2026. The fact is that Tiwari who is in jail for the last 11 years has challenged the order dated August 19, 2026, the order under challenge issued by the Deputy Commissioner (DC)-cum-District Magistrate (DM), Ramgarh supposedly in exercise of power under Section 12 (1) and (2) of Jharkhand Control of Crime Act, 2002. But a bare perusal of the impugned order shows that it is not an independent self-contained order. The detention extension order reads: उपायुक्त सह जिला दण्डाधिकारी का कार्यालय, रामगढ़। (विधि शाखा)-निरूद्धादेश की स्वीकृति :-ज्ञापांक 2639/विधि रामगढ़, दिनांक- 03/11 / 2028 पुलिस अधीक्षक, रामगढ़ का ज्ञापांक-662/ बी०सी०बी०, दिनांक-31.10.20028 से प्राप्त कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं अभ्यस्त (Habitual), अपराधी विकास तिवारी, पे०-शम्भुनाथ तिवारी, सा०-पतरातू बस्ती, थाना- पतरातू जिला-रामगढ़ के विरुद्ध झारखण्ड अपराध नियंत्रण अधिनियम-2002 के अध्याय-2 की धारा-12(1)(2) के तहत् निरूद्धादेश अवधि विस्तार हेतु प्रस्ताव अनुशंसा सहित प्रस्ताव प्राप्त है। 

पुलिस अधीक्षक, रामगढ़ से प्राप्त प्रस्ताव के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं एक अभ्यस्त (Habitual), अपराधी विकास तिवारी, पे०-शम्भुनाथ तिवारी, सा०-पतरातू बस्ती, थाना-पतरातू, जिला-रामगढ़ वर्तमान में केन्द्रीय कारा, हजारीबाग में संसीमित है। इसके विरूद्ध रामगढ़ जिला के विभिन्न थाना / ओ०पी० क्षेत्र तथा राज्य के अन्य क्षेत्रों में भी कई काण्ड दर्ज है, जिसमें मुख्य रूप से रामगढ़ जिला के पतरातू भुरकुण्डा, बासल, बरकाकाना, माण्डू, रामगढ़ एवं अन्य थाना क्षेत्र तथा इसके अलावे झारखण्ड राज्य के हजारीबाग, धनबाद, पलामु लातेहार, चतरा एवं राँची जिला में भी कई काण्ड दर्ज है। साथ ही बिहार राज्य के सारण जिला के छपरा एवं अन्य जिला में भी सक्रिय है तथा काण्ड दर्ज है। इन क्षेत्रों में पाण्डेय गिरोह का काफी आतंक है। इनके गैंग के विरूद्ध प्रतिवेदित काण्डों में मुख्य रूप से लेवी के रूप में पैसा नहीं देने पर पेशेवर तरीके से पोस्टर चिपकाना, आर्थिक क्षति पहुँचाना, शस्त्र अधिनियम, विस्फोटक पदार्थ अधिनियम, हत्या एवं जानलेवा हमला करने जैसे जघन्य अपराधिक घटना को अंजाम देकर आमजनों, ठिकेदारों, ट्रांसपोर्टरों एवं अद्योगिक/व्यवसायी वर्ग में दहशत फैलाना मुख्य कार्य है. पाण्डेय गिरोह के सक्रीय सदस्य है। गैंग में इनके अलावे काफी संख्या में अपराधकर्मी शामिल है। ये काफी शातिर किस्म का अपराधकर्मी है। यह वर्त्तमान में अपने गुर्गों के माध्यम से भी आमजनों, ठिकदारों व व्यापारिक संगठनों को धमकाने की बात प्रकाश में आयी है। इनके अपराधिक से रामगढ़ जिला क्षेत्र में लोक शांति/लोक प्रशांति काफी प्रभावित हो रही है। ऐसी कुकृत्य स्थिति में इसे काराधीन रहने की अति आवश्यकता है, दिनांक-18.11.2026 को निरुद्धादेश अवधि समाप्त होने के उपरांत कारा से इनके मुक्त होते ही यह पुनः अपराधिक गतिविधियों में संलिप्त होकर लोक शांति एवं विधि व्यवस्था के लिए गम्भीर समस्या बन जायेगा।

पुलिस अधीक्षक, रामगढ़ द्वारा उक्त परिपेक्ष में कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं अभ्यस्त (Habitual), अपराधी विकास तिवारी को निरुद्ध करने हेतु अनुरोध किया गया है। गृह कारा एवं आपदा प्रबंधन विभाग झारखण्ड राँची का आदेश ज्ञापांक- 05/ सी०सी०९०/01/42/2020-331/CCA दिनांक- 16.09.2020 द्वारा संसूचित है कि झारखण्ड अपराध नियंत्रण अधिनियम 2002 के अध्याय-2 की धारा-12(1)(2) के तहत कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं अभ्यस्त (Habitual), अपराधी विकास तिवारी, पे०-शम्भुनाथ तिवारी, सा०-पतरातू बस्ती, थाना-पतरातू जिला-रामगढ़ को निरुद्ध करने के लिए यथेष्ट आधार विद्यमान है। तदनुसार झारखण्ड अपराध नियंत्रण अधिनियम 2002 के अध्याय-2 की धारा-12(1)(2) के तहत उक्त अपराधकर्मी को निरुद्धादेश पारित करने की तिथि से आगामी तीन माह (दिनांक-19082026 से दिनांक-18.11.2026) तक निरुद्ध किये जाने का संपुष्टि आदेश संसूचित है। पुलिस अधीक्षक, रामगढ़ से पुन: अनुशंसा सहित प्राप्त प्रस्ताव का समीक्षोपरांत में संतुष्ट हूँ कि कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी विकास तिवारी, पे०-शम्भुनाथ तिवारी, सा०-पतरातू बस्ती, थाना-पतरातू, जिला-रामगढ़ के जेल से बाहर रहने पर सामान्य जन-जीवन अस्त-व्यस्त होगा। विधि व्यवस्था एवं लोक प्रशान्ति पर प्रतिकुल रूप से प्रभावी होगी एवं इनके आतंक से लोगों के बीच भय एवं आतंक का माहौल हो जायेगा। 

सरकार के अवर सचिव, गृह, कारा एवं आपदा प्रबंधन विभाग झारखण्ड राँची का आदेश ज्ञापांक-05/सी०सी०ए०/01/42/अतः काराधीक्षक नियमानुसार निरूद्धित अपराधी को अभ्यावेदन के माध्यम से राज्य सरकार के समक्ष उनके पक्ष प्रस्तुत करवाना सुनिश्चत करेंगे। यदि निर्धारित अवधि के उपरांत सरकार स्तर से सम्पुष्टि अप्राप्त रहती है तो निरुद्धादेश स्वतः समाप्त समझा जायेगा। 

ज्ञापांक : 2639/ विधि, ह० /- उपायुक्त -सह- जिला दण्डाधिकारी, रामगढ़। दिनांक : 3/11 3/11/2026

प्रतिलिपि: सरकार के अवर सचिव, गृह, कारा एवं आपदा प्रबंधन विभाग, झारखण्ड सरकार, राँची को सूचनार्थ एवं संपुष्टि हेतु प्रेषित। (पुलिस अधीक्षक, रामगढ़ के ज्ञापांक- 862 / डी०सी०बी०, दिनांक-31.10.2026 द्वारा प्राप्त प्रस्ताव चार प्रतियो) प्रतिलिपि : पुलिस अधीक्षक, रामगढ़ का ज्ञापांक-862/डी०सी०बी०, दिनांक-31.10.2026 के संदर्भ में सूचनार्थ एवं आवश्यक कार्रवाई हेतु प्रेषित।

प्रतिलिपि : केन्द्रीय कारा, हजारीबाग को सूचनार्थ एवं आवश्यक कार्रवाई हेतु प्रेषित। प्रतिलिपि : कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं अभ्यस्त (Habitual), अपराधी विकास तिवारी, पे०-शम्भुनाथ तिवारी, सा०-पतरातू बस्ती, थाना-पतरातू जिला-रामगढ़ को सूचनार्थ प्रेषित। (पुलिस अधीक्षक, अधीक्षक, रामगढ के ज्ञापांक- 862/डी०सी०बी०, दिनांक-31.10.2026 द्वारा प्राप्त प्रस्ताव की प्रति) 

The operative part of the order contained in the last paragraph of the order reads:”कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं एक अभ्यस्त (Habitual), अपराधी विकास तिवारी, पे०-शम्भुनाथ तिवारी, वर्त्तमान में केन्द्रीय कारा, हजारीबाग में संसीमित है, पतरातु अनुमंडल अंतर्गत वर्तमान में पाण्डेय गिरोह की संचालिका निशी पाण्डेय पति - स्व० किशोर पाण्डेय, सा०- पतरातु, बस्ती, थाना- पतरातु, जिला-रामगढ़ जो अपने पति किशोर पाण्डेय की मृत्यु के पश्चात् विकास तिवारी के साथ मिलकर गिरोह का संचालन करने का काम कर रहें हैं। पाण्डेय गिरोह का कार्य क्षेत्र रामगढ़ जिले के विभिन्न थाना क्षेत्र तथा राज्य के अन्य क्षेत्रों में भी हैं, जिसमें मुख्य रूप से पतरातु, भुरकुण्डा, बासल, बरकाकाना, माण्डू, रामगढ हैं। इसके अलावे सीमावर्ती जिला हजारीबाग, धनबाद, पलामु, लातेहार, चतरा, राँची के साथ-साथ अन्य कई जिले में भी सक्रिय है। इन क्षेत्रों में इसका काफी आतंक है। पाण्डेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं एक अभ्यस्त (Habitual) अपराधी है।अतः झारखण्ड अपराध नियंत्रण अधिनियम-2002 के अध्याय-2 की धारा 12 (1) (2) के तहत प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए कुख्यात अपराधकर्मी पांडेय गिरोह के मुख्य संचालक एवं अभ्यस्त (हबिटुअल) अपराधी विकास तिवारी- पेo-शंभुनाथ तिवारी, साo-पतरातू बस्ती, थाना-पतरातू,जिला-रामगढ़ के विरुद्ध आदेश निर्गत करने की तिथि से तीन माह के लिए निरुद्ध करने की स्वीकृति प्रदान की जाती हैं.” 

Section 12 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 deals with power to make order detaining certain persons. It reads: 12-power to make order detaining certain persons (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements can not be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section:Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted."

Section 12A of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 deals with the grounds of detention severable. It reads: 12A-Grounds of detention severable [(1) Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention whether made before or after the commencement of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 under section 12 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly (a)  such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the ground (s) is or are. (i) vague; (ii) non-existent; (iii) non-relevant; (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person; or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever. and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in section 12 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention. (b) The Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in the section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds]." 

The legislature does not empower the DC-cum-DM to exercise power in an arbitrary and whimsical manner. The exercise of power of DC-cum-DM is limited by three pre-conditions. He is required to record his satisfaction with respect  to the person that “with a view to preventing him from acting in nay manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of the anti-social elements can not be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person.” He is required to demonstrate threat to “public order”. DM has to show and illustrate that there is no alternative but to detain him. For DM there is “an implicit duty is required to apply his mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant and remote”. There is no finding of close proximity in between the offence committed and order of detention. 

It may be recalled that 38-year old Raj Kishore Pandey of Patratu in Ramgarh, and his friend 37-year old Bablu Singh were killed by bike-borne assailants on October 16, 2014. 32-year old Suman Singh, bodyguard of Pandey who was with them sustained a bullet wound on his right leg. Pandey used to reside in Vijaya Heritage apartments in Kadma, Jamshedpur with Nishi Pandey, his wife and two children Bobby and Piyu. It was reported that Pandey’s murder was linked to his rivalry with one Sushil Srivastava, who operated from Patratu and Ramgarh. Sunil Srivastava was killed in June 2015. Kameshwar Pandey, father of notorious gangster Kishore Pandey, too was killed in Patratu by two shooters from South 24 Parganas district, West Bengal in October 2015 reportedly by Gautam Mandal (30), who was arrested, Sabir Khan (35) who was beaten to death after he was caught at the site and a person who came from West Bengal to kill Pandey with the help of Sabir Khan. Notably, Bharat Pandey and Deepak Saw who were booked in several criminal cases in Ramgarh were shot dead in January 2025 in Garda village under Chainpur police station area of Palamu. Justice Ambuj Nath of the Jharkhand High Court granted bail to Nishi Pandey, an accused in the double murder case in August 2025.

Prior to the current case of Vikas Tiwari, in Nishi Pandey @ Nishee Pandey vs. The State of Jharkhand,  Jharkhand High Court;s Division Bench of Justices Shree Chandrashekhar and Anubha Rawat Choudhary passed an order dated September 8, 2023, wherein, it concluded;"16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and the grounds on which the order dated 21st July 2023 has been passed, we are of the opinion that the impugned order does not satisfy the requirements in law. A power under clause (b) to sub-section (1) of section 3 which provides that the Deputy Commissioner may make an order against an "anti-social" element cannot be stretched to absurdity. Notwithstanding the powers conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner under clause (b) (i)&(ii) of sub-section (1) to section 3 of the Crimes Control Act, a condition requiring the petitioner to report to the police station and mark her attendance every day before the officer-in-charge of Patratu PS at 10:00 AM is arbitrary and illegal. Every executive decision even where it is made in the exercise of statutory power must be in consonance with the Constitutional guarantee. The direction under the order dated 21st July 2023 is definitely impinging upon the rights of the petitioner as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the order dated 21st July 2023 cannot be countenance in law and is, accordingly, quashed."

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, Amicus Curiae of the Patna High Court in the special courts/special laws case observed:"Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 has been enacted to make special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social elements with a view to maintenance of public order. Earlier, in Upendra Yadav vs. State of Jharkhand, 2025 SCC OnLine Jhar 3615, while adjudicating a writ petition challenging successive preventive detention orders passed under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, the Division Bench of Justices Sujit Narayan Prasad and Arun Kumar Rai, held that once the Advisory Board had opined sufficient cause for detention and the State Government had passed a confirmatory order, no further approval of the Advisory Board is required for extending detention up to the maximum period of twelve months. The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. The Court relied on Supreme Court's decision in Pesala Nookaraju vs. State of A.P., (2023) 14 SCC 641 to conclude no approval of the Advisory Board is required for extending the period of detention. Justice Prasad observed that the petitioner’s contention regarding illegal extension on the same facts and absence of Advisory Board approval was unsustainable in law and accordingly dismissed the petition. On the issue of Advisory Board approval, he observed that once the Advisory Board had opined sufficient cause for detention and the State Government had passed a confirmatory order, no further review was required for subsequent extensions. 

The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pesala Nookaraju's case to hold that detention could be continued up to the maximum period of twelve months without repeated Advisory Board approvals. Justice Prasad concluded that the impugned orders of extension of detention need not require interference, and the petition was dismissed.