Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by DIG, Saran Range, Chapra, his subordinates dismissing ASI Mohammadpur police station, Gopalganj

In Ajay Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 12-page long judgement dated August 22, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....neither the order of punishment of dismissal nor the order rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner can be sustained. Consequently, the Saran Range Order no.186/2020 contained in memo no.3134 dated 10.12.2020 issued under the signature of the DIG, Saran Range, Chapra as also the order of the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order, Bihar, Patna) communicated to the petitioner contained in Saran District Order no.1047/2021, memo no.3435 dated 20.5.2021 under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Saran are both hereby set aside. 21. In view of the nature of the allegations and the material available on record, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner from the stage of commencement of the enquiry. 22. The writ application is allowed with the above observations and directions."  

The petitioner had filed the application in the High Court for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order contained in Memo No. 3134 dated 10.12.2020 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Saran Range, Chapra by which the petitioner has been dismissed from Service with immediate effect and also for quashing the appellate order dated 19.05.2021 passed by the Additional Director General of Police (Law and order) Bihar which was communicated by the Superintendent of Police, Saran vide memo no. 3435 dated 20.03.2021 whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 10.12.2020 has been rejected.

The petitioner had also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to reinstate the service of the petitioner with all consequential benefits with interest.

The case of the petitioner was that while the petitioner was posted as an Assistant Sub-Inspector at Mohammadpur police station in the district of Gopalganj, while on patrolling duty in the morning of April 6, 2018, the vehicle/police jeep in which the petitioner was present met with an accident in which a woman got injured and was taken to the hospital. The local people became agitated and took into custody the petitioner as also a Homeguard, while the driver of the vehicle fled away. It was the case of the petitioner that the agitated local people planted a bottle of liquor and a live chicken in the back side of the jeep to implicate the petitioner and others. A report with respect to the incident was sent by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Gopalganj to the Superintendent of Police, Gopalganj finding the petitioner guilty. Blood and urine sample was sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Muzaffarpur for analysis.

By the order dated April 6, 2018 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Gopalganj, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and he was served with the memo of charge on May 23, 2018. As directed, the petitioner filed his detailed defence denying the charges levelled against him. An enquiry report dated December 3, 2020 was submitted by the enquiry officer finding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. The petitioner was served with a second show cause notice on December 4, 2020. The petitioner submitted his reply on December 6, 2020. By order dated December 10, 2020, issued under the signature of the DIG of Police, Saran Range, Chapra, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal was rejected by order dated April 24, 2021 passed by the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order), Bihar, Patna and communicated to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Saran, by his District Order no.1047/2021 dated May 19, 2021. The petitioner preferred the application against the order of punishment of dismissal passed against him as also the order rejecting his appeal.

The senior counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570. The judgement relied on the  judgment in Roop Singh Negi's case, wherein, the Supreme Court held: “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book.  Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.”

Justice Sarthy relied on High Court's Division Bench's judgement in Devendra Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (judgment dated 19.10.2023 passed in LPA no.1302 of 2017), following the decision in Roop Singh Negi's case, it observed: “7. As has been held in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others; (2009) 2 SCC 570, the documents produced in a departmental inquiry has to be proved by examining witnesses. Even an F.I.R. was held to be not evidence by itself without actual proof of facts stated therein. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also held that even an admission or confession to the police itself is not sufficient to find the delinquent employee guilty in a departmental proceeding if no evidence is brought on record to prove the offence or misconduct alleged. Departmental inquiry was held to be a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer functions in the status of a quasi-judicial authority. Not only should evidence be led in a departmental inquiry, the conclusions arrived at should be based on evidence which brings forth a probability that the delinquent has committed the misconduct alleged and charged against him. No Inquiry Report based on conjectures and surmises can be sustained and even in a departmental inquiry, the standard of proof is not a mere suspicion. However high the degree of suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for legal proof.”

Justice Sarthy drew on the contents of the enquiry report to observe: "this is a case of no evidence against the petitioner. 20. In this view of the matter, neither the order of punishment of dismissal nor the order rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner can be sustained. Consequently, the Saran Range Order no.186/2020 contained in memo no.3134 dated 10.12.2020 issued under the signature of the DIG, Saran Range, Chapra as also the order of the Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order, Bihar, Patna) communicated to the petitioner contained in Saran District Order no.1047/2021, memo no.3435 dated 20.5.2021 under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, Saran are both hereby set aside. 21. In view of the nature of the allegations and the material available on record, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner from the stage of commencement of the enquiry. 22. The writ application is allowed with the above observations and directions."

Sections 420, 406 IPC cannot travel together, Police, courts failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or violation of contractual terms: Supreme Court

In Rikhab Birani vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  passed a 15-page long judgement dated April 16, 2025 observed that "The chargesheet in the present case is bereft of particulars and details required and mandated in terms of Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It merely reproduces the contents of the FIR which makes reference to the payments made as well as the allegation that in the revenue records, the godown in question was recorded in the name of Rakesh Birani, the son of the appellant, Rikhab Birani. It is noted that the appellant, Rikhab Birani, informed the complainant that Rakesh Birani had expired. The complainant had then requested refund of money, etc. However, the FIR does not state the material and evidence available and collected during the course of the investigation to establish the offences under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Clearly, the ingredients of the aforesaid are not established and made out. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment/order and allow the present appeal quashing the FIR and the resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet."

The judgement reads:"We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations on the civil rights of complainant-respondent No.2. We are also constrained to impose costs of ₹50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) on the State of Uttar Pradesh as, in spite of repeated judgments/orders of this Court, we are being flooded with cases of civil wrongs being made the subject matter of criminal proceedings by filing chargesheets, etc. These costs will be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh...."

The Court observed:"We are constrained to pass this detailed speaking order, as it is noticed that, notwithstanding the law clearly laid down by this Court on the difference between a breach of contract and the criminal offence of cheating, we are continuously flooded with cases where the police register an FIR, conduct investigation and even file chargesheet(s) in undeserving cases. During the last couple of months, a number of judgments/orders have been pronounced by this Court, especially in cases arising from the State of Uttar Pradesh, deprecating the stance of the police as well as the courts in failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard to and violation of contractual terms; and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are quite different and requires mens rea at the time when the contract is entered into itself to not abide by the terms thereof."

In V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.(2009) 3 SCC 78, the Court observed that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of contract. 

Similar judgements have been delivered in S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960  Hari Prasad Chamaria vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128. 

Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Soni Shrivastava hearing amendment to Section 27 of Bihar Municipal Act through Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025

In Ghnshyam Bhrosh Pandit & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's  Division Bench of Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava heard the writ petition which was filed for quashing Act Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025 dated October 3, 2025. The ordinance was promulgated to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. 

By way of Act No. 3, an amendment has been carried out in sub-section (3) of Section 21, whereby the existing provision has been substituted with a new sub-section (3). Similarly, Act No. 4 introduces an amendment to sub-section (3) of Section 23, substituting it with a newly inserted provision. By Act No. 5, Section 27 has been amended and a new sub-section (3) has been inserted after sub-section (2). 

Upon perusal of the Ordinance, it appeared to the Court that the Governor of Bihar, being satisfied that circumstances existed warranting the exercise of powers conferred under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the said Ordinance to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, as the Legislature was not in session at the relevant time. 

In its order dated June 18, 2026 From the records of the case, vide order dated April 7, 2026, it was inter alia ordered that upon perusal of the Ordinance. The counsel for the State Election Commission had then sought time to obtain instructions regarding the present status of the Ordinance. The counsel submitted that now the Act has been enforced and there are several other writ petitions which are challenging the amendment to the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. He submitted that all the matters may be tagged together. The matter is listed for July 16, 2026. The Bench directed, "7. In the interregnum, steps be taken."

Notably, in Ashish Kumar Sinha vs. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat 3472, as Chief Justice of Patna High Court, Justice Sanjay Karol led Division Bench held that Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 as unconstitutional to the effect of amendments carried out in Sections 36, 37, 38 and 41 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 ran contrary to Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 are unconstitutional.

PIL seeks removal of encroachment from main canal connecting Ramrekha Ghat Simra of river Budhi Gandak to Moti Jheel in Motihari Town, to its original continuous flow

In Bhartiya Nyaypriya Nagrik Parishad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava heard a Public Interest Litigation, has been filed seeking issuance of writ in nature of writ of mandamus or any writ order commanding the Principal Secretary, Department of Minor Water Resources, Government of Bihar, Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of Bihar, Principal Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Government.of Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, East Champaran, Motihari and Superintendent of Police, East Champaran, Motihari, the respondents to henceforth, expeditiously remove encroachment on the either side of the main canal connecting Ramrekha Ghat Simra of river Budhi Gandak to Moti Jheel in Motihari Town and to restore the said canal to its original width and continuous flow. It also prayed for issuance of consequential writ in nature of writ of mandamus or any writ order commanding Additional District Magistrate, Motihari, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Motihari, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Motihari, Land Reform Deputy Collector, Sadar, Motihari, Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari and Circle Officer, Sadar, Motihari, the respondents to take expeditious steps accordingly before the onset of monsoon season in order to mitigate the travesty of flood in Motihari in pursuance of the letter dated December 24, 2022 issued by Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari, the respondent No. 12. 

The Division Bench's order dated June 18, 2026 noted that P.K. Verma, senior counsel, represents all the State-respondents sought file the report in the form of an affidavit. Surendra Prasad Singh, counsel appearing on behalf of Executive Officer, Motihari Municipal Corporation, East Champaran, Motihari., the Respondent No. 14, also sought to file report in the form of an affidavit. The  matter is going to taken up on July 30, 2026, and in the interregnum, all the reports were directed to be filed.

The other thirteen respondents are:  2. Principal Secretary, Department of Water Resources, Govt. of Bihar, 3.Principal Secretary, Department of Minor Water Resources, Govt. of Bihar, 4. Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Govt. of Bihar, 5. Principal Secretary, Department of Rural Development, Govt. of Bihar, 6. District Magistrate-cum-Collector, East Champaran, Motihari, 7. Superintendent of Police, East Champaran, Motihari, 8. Additional District Magistrate, Motihari, 9. Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Motihari, 10. Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Motihari, 11. Land Reform Deputy Collector, Sadar, Motihari, 12. Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari, 13. Circle Officer, Sadar, Motihari and 14. Executive Officer, Motihari Municipal Corporation, East Champaran, Motihari.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the canal in question connects Moti Jheel (Motihari) to Ramrekha Ghat, Simra, of the Budhi Gandak River. The canal is approximately 11 kilometers in length and has the potential to serve as an alternative channel for recharging the water of the Moti Jheel. It was also submitted that the canal can play an effective role in preventing and mitigating the threat of floods in Motihari. The attention of the High Court was drawn to the letter dated December 24, 2022 addressed to the District Magistrate, East Champaran, Motihari (Respondent No. 6) by the Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division, Motihari (Respondent No. 12). It was submitted that upon receipt of the letter, Respondent No. 6 constituted a committee to conduct an enquiry and directed it to submit a detailed report. It was submitted that despite several meetings having been held, enquiry report has not been submitted so far. Consequently, the inaction on the part of the respondent authorities is causing serious inconvenience to the residents of Motihari, particularly during the rainy season, when they are compelled to face flooding and waterlogging. In this case, the Court's first order was passed on March 26, 2026.

Application under Section 340 of CrPC is maintainable in a pre-existing CWJC case from Lakhisarai

In Asha Kumari @ Asha Devi vs. Ramchandra Prasad Vimal & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement dated June 19, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....this Court is of the considered opinion that the present Original Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1 of 2018 is not maintainable. The remedy available to the petitioner was to file an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the same Court in which the alleged false statements were made, and not by way of an independent Original Criminal Miscellaneous proceeding. 8. Upon verification by the Court Master, it has been informed that CWJC No. 7006 of 2017 has already been dismissed for default, whereas CWJC No. 15940 of 2017 is still pending. 9. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court holds that the present application, instituted under the Original Criminal Miscellaneous jurisdiction, is not maintainable because alleged wrong has been made either in CWJC No. 7006 of 2017 or in CWJC No. 15940 of 2017 where application
under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. 10. Accordingly, the present Original Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1 of 2018 stands dismissed...." The case was filed by Advocate Dhananjay Mishra on August 3, 2018 and registered on September 28, 2018. Earlier, the case was before the Court of Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma. 

Now the petitioner will have to move an application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the pre-existing CWJC No. 15940 of 2017, where such an application is maintainable.

In Asha Kumari vs. The State Of Bihar & Ors. CWJC No. 7006 of 2017, Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay had directed the respondents to file counter affidavit. In the Court's order dated November 10, 2017, he observed:"In the event the counter affidavit is found or replies are not specific then the court may proceed in accordance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Naseem Bano vs State Of U.P. And Others: AIR 1993 SC 2592.....It goes without saying that by filing the counter affidavit the respondents may raise the plea of maintainability, alternative remedy and delay and laches." In his order dated April 24, 2018, he observed:"....the State is required to file additional counter affidavit adverting to the issue of forged certificate of the petitioner." The other six respondents were:2. The Principle Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, Bihar, 3. The Director, Primary Education, Bihar, 4. The District Education Officer, Lakhisarai, 5. The District Programme Officer Establishment, Lakhisarai, 6. The Block Education Officer, Piparia, Prakhand- Piparia, Lakhisarai and 7. Smt. Rina Kumari. It is clear from the Court's record that the required counter affidavit and additional counter affidavits were filed in compliance with the Court's orders. It is also crystal clear that replies to counter affidavits were filed.  But when on one fine day when the case was listed on June 24, 2024 after more than six years, Justice Anil Kumar Sinha passed an order dismissing the petition because no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner to press this application. Binod Kumar, the petitioner's advocate could nor appear. The order reads: "1. No one appears on behalf of the petitioner to press this application. 2. Learned counsel for the State is present.This application stands dismissed for default." It is not clear as to whether petitioner's counsel had filed for the restoration of the petition.  

In Asha Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. CWJC-15940/2017 was filed on November 3, 2017 and registered on November 6, 2017 by petitioner's Advocate Dhananjay Mishra, Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay passed an order dated November 10, 2017 which reads:"Pendency of the writ application will not stand in the way of the respondents in making payment of the admitted dues of the petitioner."  It was last heard by the Court of Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay on April 24, 2018. This case is pending.

Upon a specific query from Justice Dr. Anshuman to the counsel for the petitioner as to whether the present Original Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1 of 2018, filed under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking initiation of an inquiry on the allegation that the opposite party had made false and frivolous statements in CWJC No. 7006 of 2017 and CWJC No. 15940 of 2017, is maintainable as an independent proceeding, or whether an application under Section 340 CrPC was required to be filed before the same Court where such false statement is alleged to have been made. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that, he was not in a position to answer the query but only submitted that the case was maintainable.

The Court requested Rajendra Narayan, Senior Advocate, and Ajay Kumar Sinha, Senior Advocate, who were present in Court, to express their views on the legal issue involved. Both of them unequivocally submitted that an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was maintainable only before the same Court in relation to whose proceedings the offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. was alleged to have been committed. 

Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure now Section 379 in Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 reads: “340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195 -(1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary;
a. record a finding to that effect;
b. make a complaint thereof in writing;
c. send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
d. take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
e. bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
2. The power conferred on a Court by Sub-Section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under Sub-Section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of Sub-Section (4) of section 195.
3. A complaint made under this section shall be signed;
a. where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;
b. in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195.” 

Justice Dr. Anshuman observed: "6. Bare perusal of aforesaid provision make it abundantly clear that when it appears to a Court where proceeding is pending that an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. has been committed in relation to a document produced or evidence given in a proceeding before that Court, it is that very Court which is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry, if considered necessary, and to take appropriate action in accordance with law."

Supreme Court requests Chief Justice of Patna High Court to list Usha Kaushik case before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on June 29, assigned bench requested to take up the same on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest

In Usha Kaushik vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Suryakant and V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated June, 19, 2026, wherein, the order reads:".....we dispose of this application with a request to Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to list CWJC No.15629/2025 before an appropriate Bench for final hearing on 29.06.2026. The learned Bench, to whom the matter is assigned, is requested to take up the same on an out-of-turn basis and decide the same at the earliest. 2. The parties are directed to extend full cooperation to the High Court for expeditious disposal of the above-stated writ petition. 3. The applicant shall also be at liberty to approach the High Court at any time for the grant of interim relief, if so required, in light of any subsequent events/developments." 

Sri Saryug Mochi @ Saraug Mochi vs. The State Election Commission Through State Election Commissioner(Municipality) CWJC No. 15629/2025 was filed September 15, 2025. It was registered on September 19, 2025. Initially, the case was before Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of the High Court. Subsequently, it was listed before Justice A. Abhishek Reddy. At present, the Court's website shows it be pending before Justice Sinha.    

Earlier, in Saryug Mochi vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2022), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Madhuresh Prasad had delivered a 28-page long judgement dated May 9, 2022, wherein, it had concluded:" 35....in our opinion, is unsustainable being beyond jurisdiction in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench in case of Rajani Kumari (supra). In the Court's opinion, the authority exercising power under Section 18(2) of the Act by invoking Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act must always keep in mind the disasterous consequences of a declaration made in respect of date of birth of a child to a person before or after cut off date, i.e., 05.04.2008. Once, there is a finding recorded by the Commissioner that a person is disqualified by operation of Clause (m) of Section 18(1) of the Act, such disqualification shall permanently debar him to contest a Panchayat/Municipal Election. Further, such finding would also have serious bearing on the date of birth of such child/children for their own purpose on various counts. A conclusive finding recorded by Statutory Authority touching the date of birth of such persons is capable of creating multifaceted complications. In such view of the matter, extra care and caution is required by the authorities in determining such disputes exercising power under Section 18 (2) of the Act by applying Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act. More serious the consequence the stricter must be the degree of proof. In the present case, not only that the State Election Commissioner overlooked the Full Bench decision rendered in case of Rajani Kumari (supra) for the purpose of resolution of dispute in the light of the complaint made by respondent No. 5 and resistance made by the petitioner to such complaint, he undertook a casual procedure of causing an ex parte fact finding enquiry through the District Magistrate-cum-District Election Officer (Municipality). 36. From careful reading of the impugned order, we have noticed that the same does not disclose issuance of any notice to these petitioners for their participation in the enquiry conducted at the district administration level. 37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in our opinion, the impugned order is unsustainable being illegal, arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice as well as contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra). Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.03.2022 passed by the State Election Commissioner, Bihar in case No. 12/20 is hereby set aside. The consequences of quashing of the said order dated 02.03.2022 shall follow. 38. These applications are accordingly allowed with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only) each payable to the petitioners by the State Election Commission. The cost must be paid within one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 39. We have considered imposing cost as we are of the view that the Commission has completely ignored the enunciation of law by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) in which the Commission was the first respondent." The judgement was authored by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh. 

The other four respondents were: 2. The District Magistrate-Cum-District Election Officer (Municipality), Patna, 3. The State Election Commission, Bihar through its Secretary, Sone Bhawan, Patna. 4. The District Panchayati Raj Officer, Patna and 5. Usha Kaushik. It was heard along with teh cases of Punam Devi and Vijay Paswan. 

Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 lays down the disqualifications of a person for election, or after election for holding the post, as a member of municipality. One of such disqualifications is laid down as:“(m) If he is more than two living children:- Provided that a person having more than two children on or up to the expiry of one year of the commencement of the Act, shall not be deemed to be disqualified.”. The Act came into force with effect from the date of its publication in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) dated April 5, 2007. Clearly thus, a person having more than two children up to April 5, 2008 does not suffer disqualification by operation of Clause (m) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section 2 of the Act empowers the State Election Commission to decide the matters of disqualification on a complaint, application or information by any authority or upon taking suo motu cognizance of such matters, after allowing sufficient opportunity to the affected parties of being heard. The scope of the jurisdiction of the State Election Commission under sub-section 2 of Section 18 of the Act has been conclusively decided by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Rajani Kumari vs. The State Election Commission and Ors. reported in 2019 (4) PLJR 673. 

While answering the question of whether the State Election Commission will have the power to consider disqualification of a candidate after election as such Election Commission is constituted for conduct of elections, the Full Bench in case of Rajani Kumari (supra) has held in no uncertain terms as follows:-“184. We are in agreement that the State Election Commission has got power under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and sub-section (2) of Section 136 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 to consider an issue of pre or post-election disqualification of a candidate subject to a caution which we have pointed out in our judgments in respect of a case which is in the nature of a purely election dispute and then a matter which cannot be decided without adducement of evidence by a competent court and authority in accordance with law. The State Election Commission shall entertain and consider the 'disqualification' issues on the basis of the unimpeachable materials placed before him. Whether a complaint brought before the Commission either suo-moto or by any other person, the Commission shall at the first instance enquire whether it is a purely election dispute and only when it is found that the dispute brought before it is not a purely election dispute, the Commission shall proceed to consider the same on the basis of unimpeachable materials. Whenever a disputed question of facts and a contentious issue is brought before the Commission as a ground and basis to render a candidate disqualified, the Commission would be required to relegate the parties to a competent court/tribunal or a fact finding body competent to decide such contentious issues after taking evidences and till such time the Commission shall not take a decision on such complaint either suo-moto or otherwise.” 

It can be easily culled out from what has been laid down in case of Rajani Kumari (supra) that; (i) The Election Commission has the power under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act to consider the issue of pre or post election disqualification of a candidate subject to a caution that a case which is in the nature of purely election dispute, it cannot be decided without adducement of evidence by a competent court and authority in accordance with law.
(ii) The State Election Commission, shall, at the first instance, inquire whether it is a purely election dispute only and only when it is found that the dispute brought before it is not a purely election dispute, the Commission shall proceed to consider the same on the basis of unimpeachable material.
(iii) Whenever a disputed question of facts and contentious issue is brought before the Commission as a ground and basis to render a candidate disqualified, the Commission would be required to relegate the parties to a competent court/tribunal or a fact finding body competent to decide such contentious issues after taking evidences and till such time the Commission shall not take a decision on such complaint either
suo motu or otherwise.

In the batch of three writ applications filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an order dated March 2, 2022 passed by the State Election Commissioner, Bihar, whereby it was declared the petitioners disqualified to hold the post of ward councilor by operation of Clause (m) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act is under challenge. After having declared so, the petitioners have been ordered to be removed from the posts of ward councillors of respective councils of the Nagar Panchayat, Naubatpur in the District of Patna. The petitioners have put to challenge the said order dated 02.03.2022 passed by the Commission. 

The primordial issue that required determination by the High Court in this batch of cases was as to whether the impugned action of the Commission is based on unimpeachable materials before reaching a conclusion that the petitioners incurred disqualification because of child/children born to them after the cut off date of April 5, 2008, in the given facts and circumstances of the case. It is worthwhile mentioning that the Full Bench decision in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) has made it mandatory for the Commission to enquire, at the first instance, whether it was a purely election dispute and only when it is the Commission is satisfied that the dispute brought before it is not a purely election dispute, the it shall proceed to consider the same. Whether the Commission has adhered to the statutory mandate as enunciated by the Full Bench in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) is a question which needs consideration in these cases.

The petitioners Saryug Mochi, Punam Devi, and Vijay Paswan were elected as the Ward Councillors of the Nagar Panchayat, Naubatpur for Ward Nos. 14, 6, and 2 respectively in the election held on February 23, 2020. Certificates were issued to them on February 25, 2020. One Usha Kaushik (the Respondent No. 5 in all the cases) filed an application before the State Election Commissioner asserting therein that the petitioners were disqualified to contest the election by operation of Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act since they had more than two surviving children and the last child/children born to them was after the cut-off date, i.e., April 5, 2008. 7. 

In respect of Saryug Mochi, she asserted that his 5th female child was studying in the Upgraded Middle School, Akopur under Naubatpur Anchal of Patna district, and according to the Usha Kaushik, the respondent No. 5, as per the date of birth recorded in the Admission Register she was born on March 5, 2010. She was admitted to the said school in standard one in the year 2014. 

Usha Kaushik, the respondent No. 5, had made an enquiry about the dates of birth of the children of said Saryug Mochi during the course of which she learnt that in connivance with the Headmaster of the School, the said Saryug Mochi had made certain interpolation in the original Admission Register to suit his interest and protect his post. There were interpolations and cuttings made in the Admission Register which were visible with the naked eye. She also relied on an entry made in account of the daughter of the petitioner Saryug Mochi, maintained for direct benefit transfer of payment against dress allowance under the Poshak Yojna of the Government, wherein her date of birth was mentioned as March 5, 2010. On these two entries, respondent No. 5 asserted in her complaint that the 5th child of Saryug Mochi was born much after the cut-off date. 

In respect of Punam Devi,  the respondent No. 5 relied on Ration Card which disclosed age of said Punam Devi and her children in years. She asserted that Ration Card in question was delivered to the consumers including Punam Devi in the year 2019 for which applications were received in 2017. Based on the age (not the date of birth) mentioned in the Ration Card, respondent No. 5 asserted that the eldest daughter was born ‘sometime in 2009’ and, therefore, other two children were apparently born after the cut off dated, i.e., April 5, 2008. 

In respect of Vijay Paswan, the respondent No. 5 asserted in her complaint that he was the father of 5 children and his last child was born on July 7, 2013. In support of this claim, respondent No. 5 relied on an entry made in the records maintained by Anganwari Center No. 141 under Naubatput Nagar Panchayat.  

Based on the pleadings on record including the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 5 in these cases, the Court could not discern as to when the complaint was filed. It is not clear from the complaint of respondent No. 5 that how was she aggrieved with the election of these petitioners, inasmuch as, there is no disclosure in her complaint that she had either contested for the posts in question or was an elector of either of the wards. 

Notably, the complaint of respondent No. 5 led to the registration of the case No. 12/2020 before the Commission. 

The Court observed:"33. In the Court’s opinion, the State Election Commission proceeded casually in considering the serious allegation of statutory disqualification under Clause (m) of Section 18 (1) of the Act by referring the matter to the District Election Officer (Municipality)-cum-District Magistrate, Patna for a fact finding enquiry. The State Election Commissioner, apparently, ignored the authoritative pronouncement of law laid down by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) which has held in no uncertain terms that the Commission can proceed to consider the issue of disqualification on the basis of unimpeachable materials only. In no ambiguous terms, the Full Bench in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) has held that whenever a disputed question of fact and contentious issue is brought before the Commission as a ground and basis to render a candidate disqualified, the Commission would be required to relegate parties to a Competent Court/Tribunal or a fact-finding body competent to decide such contentious issues after taking evidence. The Full Bench is in clear terms held that till such time such contentious issues are decided after taking evidences, the Commission shall not take a decision on such complaint either suo motu or otherwise. The Commission, it seems, was totally unmindful of the significance of these observations made in the case of Rajani Kumari (supra) in which the Commission was the first respondent." 

The Court relied on the decision in Purohit Lal Gupta Vs. Dharamsheela Devi and Ors. reported in 2015(4) PLJR 933, a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court wherein, it deprecated the conduct of the Election Commission in undertaking fishy enquiry based on which the first respondent was held to be disqualified to contest the Municipal Election in which he was declared elected.

Supreme Court reverses bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in SC/ST Act case from Nawada

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay, issued notice returnable on August 24. The order reads: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail in connection with Excl. Spl. SC/St Case No. 37/22 arising out of complaint case no. 37/2022 pending before Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Nawadah, Bihar, subject to their executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each, with one or more sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. However, the Petitioners are directed to cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so. List again on 24th August, 2026." 

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachu Das (supra), appellants’ prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail is rejected and this appeal stands dismissed. " 

In this case reliance was placed upon the decision dated February 3, 2014 by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471, wherein, the Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi considered the offence under Section 3(1), as well as the bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and, it concluded: "Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 

The Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State and counsel for Ram Binita Devi, the complainant/Respondent No. 2 submitted before the High Court that the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellants is not maintainable, as cognizance had already been taken by the trial court for the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 

The appeal in the Patna High Court was filed for setting aside order dated September 25, 2024 passed by the Special Judge, Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (POA) Act, Nawada in A.B.P. No. 2442 of 2024, which arose out of a complaint case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504, 506, 354B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, whereby the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants was rejected. Now the order by the trial court and by Justice Singh of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court.