In The Patna High Court through its Registrar General, Patna High Court & Ors. vs. Chandan Kumar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Alok Kumar Sinha and Sangam Kumar Sahoo delivered a 33-page long judgement dated March 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as the same proceeds on an erroneous application of legal principles, extends the benefit of earlier judgments beyond their intended scope, and overlooks material aspects relating to delay, laches and the statutory framework governing the field. The reasoning so adopted does not stand to judicial scrutiny and has resulted in an unwarranted direction for consideration of the writ petitioner’s case. 61. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed; the impugned judgment and order is set aside, and the writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." The other Appellants in this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) were Registrar General, Patna High Court and. The Convenor, Co-ordination Committee-cum- District and Sessions Judge, Patna, District- Patna. The other Respondents were:The State of Bihar, through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar and the Law Secretary, Law Department, Government of Bihar. The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha.
In his 18 page-long judgement dated July 9, 2025, Justice Harish Kumar, the Single Judge had observed: "25. This Court thus, hereby, held that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered with those of the decision rendered by the learned Division Bench in LPA No. 650 of 2022 with other analogous cases and LPA No. 727 of 2023 as well as LPA No. 261 of 2020. 26. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. 27. The concerned respondent is hereby directed to consider the case of the petitioner, in view of the discussions made hereinabove and if the petitioner is otherwise eligible, issue necessary order in accordance with law and accord the similar treatment, as has been extended to the similarly situated candidates. The entire exercise must be completed preferably within a period of eight weeks, from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."
The L.P.A. was preferred by the appellants assailing the judgment and order dated July 9, 2025 passed by the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 10521 of 2022, whereby the Single Judge, had held that the case of the Chandan Kumar, writ petitioner–respondent No. 1 was squarely covered by the judgments and orders dated April 19, 2023 passed in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases, dated January 18, 2024 passed in L.P.A. No. 727 of 2023, and dated December 16, 2024 passed in L.P.A. No. 261 of 2024, was pleased to allow the writ petition with a direction to the appellants to consider the case of the said respondent No. 1 and, if found otherwise eligible, to issue necessary orders of appointment and posting on the post of Clerk in the Civil Courts of Bihar, in accordance with law, by extending similar treatment as granted to other similarly situated candidates, and to complete the entire exercise preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the said judgment; the appellants, being aggrieved thereby, preferred the LPA praying for setting aside the impugned judgment and order as being unsustainable in law.
The Division Bench framed the following issued for consideration:
(i) Whether the writ petition filed by the respondent–writ petitioner was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence, particularly in view of the expiry of the panel/wait-list dated September 26, 2018 under Rule 7 of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III & IV) Rules, 2009?
(ii) Whether the respondent–writ petitioner can be treated as a “fence-sitter” disentitled to relief, or whether he had approached the Court with sufficient diligence so as to claim consideration?
(iii) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in directing consideration of the respondent’s case for
appointment, in light of Rule 7 of the 2009 Rules and the admitted position that candidates with lower merit have already been appointed pursuant to judicial orders?
(iv) Whether the impugned judgment and order dated July 9, 2025 suffers from any legal infirmity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction?
With regard to Issue no.(i), the The Division Bench observed: "17. At the outset, it needs to be examined whether the writ petition filed by the respondent–writ petitioner was maintainable in the teeth of the settled principles governing delay, laches and acquiescence, particularly when the select panel/wait- list dated 26.09.2018 had admittedly exhausted its statutory life on September 26, 2020 under Rule 7(13) of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III & IV) Rules, 2009. 18. From the undisputed facts on record, it emerges that the respondent–writ petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition only on 22.07.2022. Even if his earlier attempt by way of filing I.A. No. 04 of 2022 on 09.05.2022 is taken into account, the same was also after the expiry of the two-year validity period of the panel, which came to an end on 26.09.2020. Thus, there is a clear and unexplained delay of more than one and a half years in invoking the writ jurisdiction. 19. It is well settled that though no rigid period of limitation applies to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the principles of delay and laches are nonetheless applicable with full force."
The Division Bench relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. vs. Harish Chandra reported in (1996) 9 SCC 309, while dealing with a claim arising out of an expired select list, categorically held that no mandamus can be issued for appointment once the select list has lapsed. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, it has been observed that: “10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution, a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provision of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, it any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority. Even though we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that on some occasion appointments have been made by the Appointing Authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the date of selection but such illegal action of the Appointing Authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4.4.87 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ Petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not.”
The Division Bench observed: "20. Therefore, it can be inferred that even if certain appointments were made beyond the life of the select list, such illegal acts would not confer any enforceable right upon others to seek similar relief through Court."
The Division Bench relied on the decision in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal reported in (2021) 13 SCC 225, wherein, the Supreme Court reiterated that a candidate who approaches the Court after expiry of the validity of a select list cannot claim appointment merely because others with lesser merit, who were vigilant and approached the Court in time, have been granted relief. The Court emphasized that delay defeats equity and that stale claims ought not to be entertained in writ jurisdiction.
Justice Sinha observed: "22. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the respondent–writ petitioner did not assert his rights within the subsistence of the panel. In contrast,
the writ petitioners in C.W.J.C. Nos. 21219 of 2018 and 6259 of 2019 had approached the Court during the validity of the panel itself, i.e., within the two-year period. It is this distinguishing factor which weighed with the Division Bench while granting relief to them in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022. Thus, the foundation of the relief granted in those cases was timely assertion of rights, which is conspicuously absent in the case of the present respondent. 23. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that he had filed an interlocutory application in the year 2022 while earlier writ petitions were pending does not improve his case. The cause of action, if any, had arisen when the panel was in force and vacancies allegedly remained unfilled. The respondent, however, chose not to approach the Court during that period and remained indolent. The mere pendency of other litigations cannot extend the life of a statutory panel nor can it revive a stale cause of action."
Justice Sinha observed: "24. The reliance placed by the respondent on State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (Supra), is also misplaced. While paragraph 22.2 of the said judgment does lay down that similarly situated persons should ordinarily be treated alike, it equally carves out a clear exception in cases of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically held that: '22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier
in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.' 25. Therefore, those people cannot claim parity and are liable to be treated as fence-sitters. The present case, in the considered view of this Court, falls squarely within the said exception."
Justice Sinha recollected that coordinate Benches of the High Court, in C.W.J.C. No. 1063 of 2024 and C.W.J.C. No. 4175 of 2024, rejected identical claims raised by similarly situated candidates on the ground of delay and laches. The Division Bench judgement reads: "The respondent’s case stands on no better footing and, in fact, suffers from the same infirmity. The submission that the authorities themselves were at fault in not operating the panel in terms of Rule 7 does not entitle the respondent to seek relief after the expiry of the panel. Even assuming there was an illegality on the part of the authorities, the law is well settled that such illegality must be challenged within a reasonable time. A litigant cannot be permitted to sleep over his rights and thereafter seek equitable relief at his convenience. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the respondent–writ petitioner was clearly barred by delay, laches and acquiescence, having been instituted after the expiry of the statutory period of validity of the panel/wait-list dated 26.09.2018. The learned Single Judge, with respect, erred in overlooking this fundamental aspect and in entertaining the writ petition despite the respondent’s belated approach. 29. Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the appellant."
With regard to Issue no.(ii) the Division Bench considered whether the respondent–writ petitioner can be treated as a “fence-sitter” and thereby disentitled to relief, or whether he had approached the Court with due diligence so as to claim consideration. The concept of a “fence-sitter” has been consistently explained by the Supreme Court to denote those persons who, despite having a cause of action, choose not to assert their rights within a reasonable time and approach the Court only after others have succeeded in similar litigation. Such persons are ordinarily denied relief on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence.
Justice Sinha relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347, wherein, while laying down the principle of parity, carved out a clear exception in paragraph 22, observing that those who do not challenge the wrongful action in time and wake up only after seeing the success of others, cannot claim the benefit of such judgments. The Court held that such persons are to be treated as “fence-sitters” and their claims can be legitimately rejected on the ground of delay and acquiescence.
He also drew on Supreme Court's decision in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 471, wherein the Court reiterated that a person who sleeps over his rights and allows the situation to settle cannot be permitted to disturb the same at a belated stage. The Court cautioned that stale claims should not be entertained, particularly where rights of others have crystallized in the meantime. Justice Sinha observed:"34. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is evident that the respondent–writ petitioner did not approach the Court during the subsistence of the panel/wait-list, which remained valid till 26.09.2020. On the contrary, the candidates who were granted relief in earlier rounds of litigation had approached the Court in the years 2018–2019 itself, i.e., within the validity period of the panel, asserting their rights in a timely manner. 35. The respondent, however, chose not to take recourse to legal remedy during this crucial period. His first attempt to intervene was made only on 09.05.2022 by filing I.A. No. 04 of 2022, which too was subsequently withdrawn. Thereafter, the writ petition came to be filed on 22.07.2022. By this time, not only had the panel expired nearly two years earlier, but even the earlier writ petitions had already been heard and were on the verge of being decided. 36. The submission advanced on behalf of the respondent that he cannot be treated as a fence-sitter because he approached the Court before the decision in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 does not merit acceptance. The relevant consideration is not whether he approached the Court before or after the appellate judgment, but whether he asserted his rights within the period when the cause of action was alive. In the present case, the cause of action arose during the validity of the panel, yet the respondent failed to act within that period. The distinction between vigilant litigants and fence-sitters is thus clearly borne out from the record. The earlier writ petitioners were vigilant and approached the Court at the appropriate time, whereas the respondent remained passive
and approached the Court only after a considerable lapse of time. The fact that he filed the writ petition before the appellate decision does not erase the delay which had already occurred.
Justice Sinha pointed out that in the judgment in Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel vs. Union of India (Supra), the Court extended the benefit to similarly situated persons in the absence of delay attributable to them. However, the said judgment itself recognizes that in exceptional cases, particularly where delay and acquiescence are present, the benefit may be denied. The present case clearly falls within such exception. He observed: "39. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conduct of the respondent reflects that he chose to remain on the sidelines and did not assert his rights when the opportunity was available. It is only after considerable delay that he approached the Court seeking parity with those who had been vigilant. Such conduct squarely attracts the doctrine of fence-sitting as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 40. Accordingly, this Court holds that the respondent–writ petitioner is liable to be treated as a “fence-sitter” and is not entitled to claim relief on the basis of parity with those candidates who had approached the Court with due diligence. This issue is, therefore, answered in favour of the appellant.
With regard to the Issue no.(iii), the High Court considered whether the learned Single Judge was justified in directing consideration of the respondent–writ petitioner for appointment in the light of Rule 7 of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III & IV) Rules, 2009, particularly when it is an admitted position that certain candidates, securing marks lower than that of the writ petitioner, have already been appointed pursuant to judicial orders.
The Division Bench noted that Rule 7(12), (13) and (14) of the Rules, 2009 clearly envisage preparation of a common merit panel and its operation for a period of two years for the purpose of filling not only existing vacancies but also anticipated vacancies arising on account of non-joining, resignation, etc. The Division Bench, while deciding L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases (order dated 19.04.2023), has
already interpreted these provisions and returned a categorical finding that the authorities were under a statutory obligation to operate the panel for the said period and consider eligible candidates in order of merit.
The crucial question was not the existence of vacancies or the merit position alone, but whether such a direction for consideration can be extended to every candidate irrespective of the nature and scope of the earlier judgment. The Division Bench noted that "it is evident that the benefit flowing from the judgment dated 19.04.2023 was extended only to those candidates who were parties to the earlier litigation or who had asserted their rights within a reasonable time. The appellants have consistently contended that the said judgment is one in personam and not in rem. This distinction is of considerable importance. Even if it is accepted that certain candidates with lower marks have been appointed pursuant to orders passed in earlier rounds of litigation, although they came to the court within stipulated time frame, such appointments cannot automatically confer an enforceable right upon the present writ petitioner. The doctrine of equality enshrined under Article 14 is a positive concept and does not envisage repetition of an illegality."
In Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel vs. Union of India (Supra), while the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that
similarly situated persons should not be driven to litigation repeatedly, the same was in the context where the earlier judgment was not restricted in its operation. In the present case, however, there was nothing to indicate that the Division Bench intended its judgment in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 to operate universally for all candidates irrespective of their conduct or delay. It is also important to bear in mind that the direction issued by the Division Bench was for “consideration” of the cases of the appellants therein against vacancies arising within the validity period of the panel. Such a direction was clearly confined to those who had approached the Court and cannot be stretched to revive a lapsed panel for all candidates at large.
The Single Judge was primarily influenced by the fact that candidates with lesser marks had already been appointed. However, such reasoning overlooks the settled legal position that parity cannot be claimed in illegality or irregularity, and that each case must be tested on its own merits, including the conduct of the claimant and the scope of the earlier judicial directions. The Division Bench was of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge was not justified in issuing a direction for consideration of the writ petitioner solely on the ground that persons with lower merit had been appointed. The direction fails to appreciate the limited and person-specific nature of the earlier judgments, as well as the settled principle that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality. "48. Accordingly, the issue is answered in favour of the appellants, holding that the impugned direction for consideration of the respondent–writ petitioner for appointment is unsustainable in law.
With regard to Issue no.(iv), teh Division Bench considered whether the impugned judgment and order dated July 9, 2025 passed by the Single Judge suffers from any legal infirmity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant interference in exercise of the Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction.
As part of the Division Bench Justice Sinha observed: "50. At the outset, it is well settled that the scope of
interference in an intra-court appeal is not as narrow as that under Article 226 against administrative action, yet the Appellate Court would ordinarily interfere where the judgment under appeal is found to be contrary to settled legal principles, based on misapplication of law, or resulting in manifest injustice. A finding can be said to be perverse when it is either based on no evidence, ignores material evidence, or applies incorrect legal standards. 51. Examining the impugned judgment on the touchstone of the above principles, it appears that the learned Single Judge proceeded on two principal considerations: first, that the writ petitioner was similarly situated to those candidates who had succeeded in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases; and second, that candidates having lower marks had already been appointed and, therefore, denial of similar benefit to the writ petitioner would be discriminatory. 52. However, in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Single Judge has failed to properly appreciate certain crucial aspects which go to the root of the matter. 53. Firstly, the learned Single Judge has treated the judgment rendered in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 as having a general or universal application, without examining whether the said judgment was intended to operate in rem or was confined to the parties before the Court. As has already been discussed, the direction issued therein was clearly for consideration of the cases of the appellants in those appeals. There is no indication that the Division Bench intended to extend the benefit automatically to all candidates forming part of the wait-list irrespective of their conduct or delay. The failure to draw this distinction has resulted in an erroneous extension of the benefit to the present writ petitioner. 54. Secondly, the learned Single Judge has placed substantial reliance on the fact that certain candidates with lower marks were appointed pursuant to judicial orders. While this factual position may not be in dispute, the legal inference drawn therefrom is flawed. The learned Single Judge, by directing consideration of the writ petitioner on the ground that persons with lesser marks have been appointed, has effectively applied the doctrine of negative equality, which is impermissible in law. This, in the considered opinion of this Court, constitutes a clear error in application of settled legal principles. 55. Thirdly, the issue of delay and laches, though noticed, has not been adequately appreciated in its proper legal perspective. The appellants had specifically contended that the writ petitioner approached the Court after a considerable lapse of time and, therefore, could not claim parity with those who had been vigilant in asserting their rights. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (Supra) has clearly held that though similarly situated persons are ordinarily entitled to equal treatment, this principle is subject to exceptions, particularly in cases involving delay, laches and acquiescence. Persons who wake up after long delay cannot claim the same relief as those who approached the Court in time. 56. The impugned judgment, however, proceeds to hold that the writ petitioner is not a fence-sitter without adequately reconciling this finding with the admitted timeline of events and the conduct of the petitioner. Such a conclusion, without proper analysis of the legal standards governing delay and acquiescence, renders the finding vulnerable. 57. Fourthly, the learned Single Judge has also not given due weight to the fact that the panel/wait-list in question had a statutory life of two years under Rule 7 of the Rules, 2009. Once the panel had lapsed, any direction for consideration would have to be strictly in accordance with law and cannot be issued in a routine manner, particularly when such direction has the effect of unsettling subsequent recruitment processes."
In the penultimate paragraphs, the Justice Sinha observed:" 58. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the impugned judgment suffers from misapplication of law, particularly in relation to (i) the scope and applicability of the earlier Division Bench judgment, (ii) the impermissible reliance on negative equality, and (iii) inadequate consideration of delay and laches. These errors go to the root of the matter and cannot be said to be mere errors of appreciation. 59. Accordingly, it is held that the impugned judgment and order dated 09.07.2025 does suffer from legal infirmity and error apparent on the face of the record, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction.
