Supreme Court sets aside 2019 judgement by Justices A.P. Sahi Anjana Mishra of Patna High Court, P.K.Shahi's arguments vidicated

In Priyanka Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Anil Chandurkar delivered a 14-page long judgment dated February 18,2026, wherein, it set aside the 9-page long judgment dated April 11, 2019 by Division Bench of 42nd Chief Justice A.P. Sahi and Anjana Mishra in LPA from 2018. The librarians in Bihar whose services were terminated because the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh university from which they obtained their degrees was later declared defunct. The Supreme Court has set aside the High Court's judgment and ordered their reinstatement. It held that degrees earned when the governing law was in force and recognized cannot be invalidated due to subsequent legal developments. Notably, the case was filed in the Supreme Court on September 21, 2022, verified on November 20, 2022 but registered on February 5, 2026.

Supreme Court concluded:" From the facts on record, it is evident that the services of the appellants were terminated only for the reason that the institution in which they had studied was declared to be unrecognised. Accordingly, the orders vide which the services of the appellants were terminated have to be declared as illegal. Ordered accordingly. 18. As a consequence, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High Court is allowed. They are directed to be reinstated back in service, with continuity. However, considering the fact that they have not performed their duties for the intervening period, and it cannot be said to be a case where only the respondent-State is at fault, in our view, they should not be entitled to any back wages." The judgement was authored by Justice Bindal. The judgement of High Court's Division Bench was authored by Justice Sahi.  

The High Court's Division Bench had upheld the 20-page long judgement dated February 22, 2018 by Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay, the Single Judge. Justice Upadhyay concluded:"....the court finds that the University in question was established under the State Act of Chhatisgarh and the Apex Court after due scrutiny of the legislative power in the matter of setting up of the University clearly held out the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act to be ultra vires as a result thereof, the Apex Court has also quashed the notification notifying the University and as such the University constituted under Sections 5 and 6 of Chhatisgarh Act shall be deemed to be non-existent University and as such the degree obtained from such University is only a waste paper." The petitioners had obtained Bachelor of Library degree in the Sessions 2003-04 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. In response to the advertisement issued in the year 2009, petitioners had applied for appointment on the post of Librarian. The University from which the petitioners had obtained B.Lib. Degree was constituted under the Act of the State of Chhatisgarh. On February 11, 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the provisions of Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya (Sthapana or Viniyaman) Adhiniyam 2002 and as per the direction of the Supreme Court the University ceased to exist. However, liberty was granted to such institution to take affiliation from the State University. The petitioners had claimed that Department of Education, Chhattisgarh had certified that the degree obtained in the year 2004 was a valid degree. The petitioners claimed that degree of B.Lib. obtained by petitioners was valid and genuine. The petitioners claimed that the Education Department of the State of Bihar had also, on verification, found that the certificate granted to the petitioners as legal and valid and after five years of their appointment, the petitioners had been terminated without compliance of principles of natural justice.

In his judgement, Justice Sahi had observed: "The learned Single Judge has after narrating the facts as also the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Prof. Yashpal and another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 420 has arrived at the conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to the academic benefits of the said University which has been declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Apex Court aforesaid and therefore their employment on the basis of any degree by the University was rightly terminated." 

In the case of Prof. Yashpal & Ors. and Gopalji Agarwal vs. Union of India & Ors., in its 31-page long judgment, Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench declared the provisions of Section 5 and 6 of the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya (Sthapana Aur Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 2002 to be ultra vires and struck it down. It observed: "As a consequence of such declaration, all notifications issued by the State Government in the Gazette in the purported exercise of power under Section 5 of the aforesaid Act notifying the Universities (including respondent nos.3 to 94) are quashed and such Universities shall cease to exist. If any institutions have been established by such Universities, steps may be taken for their affiliation to already existing State Universities in accordance with the direction contained in paragraph 45 above. Parties would be at liberty to approach the High Court if any dispute arises in implementation of this direction. All Writ Petitions, Civil Appeals and Transferred Cases filed by the private Universities are dismissed."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma because of committing "an egregious error" in exercising his discretion in favour of murder accused persons by granting anticipatory bail

In Ramakant Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed an order dated February 11,  2026, wherein, it set aside the impugned order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of the Patna High Court. The accused persons i.e. Respondent Nos.2 and 3, Omprakash Singh and Rajneesh Kumar Singh @Aman Kumar @Aman Singh respectively were ordered to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of one week from February 11, 2026.

Supreme Court' s Division Bench observed: "17. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed an egregious error exercising its discretion in favour of the accused persons by granting them anticipatory bail. 18. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. 19. The impugned Order passed by the High Court is set aside....21. Once they surrender before the Trial Court, they shall be remanded to judicial custody. It will be open for both the accused persons to thereafter pray for regular bail. 22. We are informed that the investigation is over and charge- sheet has been filed. 23. The regular bail application that may be filed by the accused persons shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law, having regard to the materials in the charge-sheet. 24. It is needless to clarify that the regular bail application shall be decided without being influenced by any of the observation made by us in the present order. We have said in so many words that the principles governing grant of anticipatory bail differ to a considerable extent from the principles governing grant of regular bail. This shall be kept in mind by the concerned Court while considering the regular bail application of the accused persons."

This appeal arose  from the Order passed by the High Court dated July 30, 2025 by which the anticipatory bail application was preferred by the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 in connection with Bishanpur Police Station Case No.14 of 2025 registered on 27-1-2025 for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109, 352, 351(2), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita respectively. Later, in point of time as the injured succumbed to the injuries, Section 103(1) of the BNS, 2023 (erstwhile Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code came to be added.

The appellant before the Supreme Court was the son of the deceased. He also happened to be the original informant. The First Information Report lodged by the appellant with the Police Station in Darbhanga on January 27, 2025. 

In all six persons were named as accused in the FIR inclusive of the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 respectively before us. The Respondent Nos.2 and 3 apprehending arrest prayed for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court declined to grant them anticipatory bail.

In such circumstances, they went before the High Court. The High Court accepted their plea and granted them anticipatory bail. The High Court while granting anticipatory bail observed in para 6 as under:-

“6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no specific allegation of assault against these petitioners and specific allegation of assault is against co-accused person, namely, Ratneshwar Singh and there is case and counter case between the parties and there is also land dispute between the parties for which one Title Suit is pending between the parties, let the petitioners, above named, in the event of arrest or surrender before the court below within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 25,000/- (Twenty Five Thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga in connection with Bishanpur P.S. Case No. 14 of 2025, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure / Section 482(2) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and with other following conditions:-

i. Petitioners shall co-operate in the trial and shall be properly represented on each and every date fixed by the court and shall remain physically present as directed by the court and on their absence on two consecutive dates without sufficient reason, their bail bond shall be cancelled by the Court below.

ii. If the petitioners tampers with the evidence or the witnesses, in that case, the prosecution will be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail.

iii. And further condition that the court below shall verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioners and in case at any stage it is found that the petitioners have concealed their criminal antecedent, the court below shall take step for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioners. However, the acceptance of bail bonds in terms of the above-mentioned order shall not be delayed for purpose of or in the name of verification.”

The appellant, being the son of the deceased, was before the Supreme Court with the present appeal being aggrieved by the grant of anticipatory bail to the two accused persons i.e. the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 respectively before us. 

Division Between underlined that "11. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that the accused persons are alleged to have been involved in a serious crime like murder. We do not say for a moment that in connection with an offence of murder, Court should not grant anticipatory bail”. But, it observed: "....the principles governing grant of anticipatory bail are quite different compared to the principles governing grant of regular bail. 13. Anticipatory bail may be granted by the Court even in a case of murder provided the Court is convinced that the accused persons praying for anticipatory bail have been falsely implicated due to some personal vendetta, political rivalry etc. The accused praying for anticipatory bail has to make out more than a prima facie case of false implication. 14. Grant of anticipatory bail is not a matter of course. Here is a case where the accused persons have been named in the FIR. The first informant is none other but an eye-witness to the incident. He may be the son of the deceased but that by itself is not sufficient to disbelieve what he has alleged in the FIR more particularly when the investigation is going on. We also take into consideration the fact that the deceased died of multiple head injuries. Postmortem Report reveals there were multiple fractures. Prima facie, the ocular version as narrated is in tune with the medical evidence on record. 15. Just because a title suit is pending between the parties by itself could not have been a ground to believe that the accused persons have been falsely implicated."

Supreme Court noted that from the submissions made by the Additional Public Prosecutor before the High Court it is apparent that the Respondent No.2 has five criminal antecedents and the Respondent No.3 had also few criminal antecedents.

Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's bail denying order

In Amit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 7-page long order dated February 13, 2026 reversing the order dated October 17, 2025 by Justices Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The appellant had approached the Supreme Court against order of rejection of regular bail by the High Court and to seek bail. Justices Maheshwari and Chandurkar concluded:"....we direct to release the petitioner on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court." 

Supreme Court noted that "....the maximum sentence as prescribed for the offence is up to three years and the petitioner has already served about eight months, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for regular bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 registered for the offence under Sections 304(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner is accused of chain snatching. The face of the petitioner was captured in the CCTV footage and the informant had identified the petitioner as one of the accused. The petitioner was in custody since April 5, 2025 and had 13 criminal antecedents. 

Justice Kumar had observed: "5. Considering the gravity of the offence and the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected."

Trial court records withheld in Bihar, Supreme Court takes note of "incurable injustice" in a murder case, sets aside judgements by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Sanjay Sah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 10-page long order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained. The High Court was also in error in overlooking this crucial aspect and in confirming the conviction and sentences visited upon the appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and also the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated 25.01.2007 registered with Police Station–Adapur, District–East Champaran, Bihar) Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 shall stand restored on the file of the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, to enable fresh examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code strictly in accordance with the legal parameters applicable thereto. As we are informed that the appellants were on bail, prior to their conviction and sentencing, they would be entitled to the same relief pending the fresh exercise to be undertaken by the trial court. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed in the aforestated terms. The appellants shall be released on bail on such appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the trial court, pending the exercise to be undertaken by the trial court pursuant to this order. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The Appellant no. 2 was Awadhesh Kumar Gupta @Awadhesh Sah. The private Respondents were: Ram Sevak Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and  Srilal Sah. The tagged matters included Ram Sevak Sah vs. The State of Bihar and Mahanth Sah vs. The State of Bihar.

Although Supreme Court had directed the Registry to requisition the trial court records, being of the opinion that the aforestated judgments warranted interference, the Court records that "trial court records have not yet been received. Instead of awaiting receipt of the records, we deem it appropriate to resort to the alternative that is available to us, that is, to remit the matter to the trial court instead of undertaking adjudication of these appeals on merit." On January 21, 2026, the Court had ordered: "Registry shall requisition the trial court records at the earliest and undertake translation of documents in vernacular, if any. E-copies of the trial court records, once received, shall be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties." 

Earlier, on  September 2, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Kumar and Alok Aradhe had passed an order which recorded that the counsel for the State of Bihar had sought "some time to examine whether there was a separate examination by the trial Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, and if so, file a copy thereof. Registry may also call for the record of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if any, from the trial Court/High Court." In its order dated November 12, 2025, the Court recorded that Azmat Hayat Amanullah, counsel for the State of Bihar was present in the Court. "The learned counsel states that it would not be necessary to file a counter affidavit in this matter."

These appeals arose out of the 56-page long judgment dated March 6, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Nani Tagia in Ram Sevak Shah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), and 58-page long judgement in Laxman Sah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), confirming the conviction and the sentences visited upon the appellants, vide judgments dated August 27, 2016 and September 2, 2016, passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated January 25, 2007 registered with Police Station – Adapur, District – East Champaran, Bihar). The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment along with payment of fines. Both the High Court's judgements of the Division Bench were authored by Justice Shah. In the former Sanjay Sah, Awadhesh Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and Srilal Sah were the appellants besides Ram Sevak Shah. In the latter Inar Sah, Vijay Sah Son, Ajay Sah, Mahanth Sah and Ramekbal Sah were the appellants besides Laxman Sah.   

In the penultimate paragraph of his judgement in both Ram Sevak Shah case and Laxman Sah case, Justice Shah had concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence, which has been brought on record to prove the allegations levelled against the appellants beyond pale of any reasonable doubt as well as considering the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence of the prosecution, which has not been discredited during the course of cross-examination coupled with the postmortem report and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we find that there is no reason to create any doubt in our minds. We have examined the materials available on record and do not find any apparent error in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, hence, the same does not require any interference." 

The order reads: "We find from the material placed on record by the learned counsel for the appellants that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731, was brief to the point of being cryptic and was limited to just three questions. The first question was as to whether the accused had heard the statement of the witnesses. The second question was as follows:- “There is an allegation against you that on 24th February 2007 at 06.30 A.M., in village Harpur, police station Harpur, district East 1 For short “the Code”Champaran, you along with other accused for the fulfillment of a common purpose, killed Shivnath Shah, brother of Suresh Prasad, the complainant in this Case, by hitting with sticks, what do you have to say in this regard?” The third question was as to whether the accused had something to say in his defence. The aforestated three questions were posed to one of the accused/appellants, namely, Mahanth Sah. However, the same format was adopted for examination of the remaining accused. This is not in dispute. Needless to state, the aforestated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again." 

The Court referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of the Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused. 

The Court recollected its earlier decision by a 3-Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra”(1973) 2 SCC 793, wherein the in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was observed that great care is expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused. 

 

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Supreme Court sets aside part of conditional bail order by Justice Purnendu Singh

In Mithilesh Kumar Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 3-page long order dated February 13, 2026 wherein, it concluded:".....we set aside that part of the order of the High Court by which the High Court has directed the petitioner to appear before the District Mediation Centre for the purpose of mediation. 9. The rest of the part of the order granting anticipatory bail is not touched." 

The Supreme Court recorded that "there are some civil litigations also pending between the parties." Justice Singh too had observed:"4. Considering the nature of dispute to be purely civil in nature and the parties are contesting Civil Suit No. 135 of 2024 for specific performance of contract since 17.03.2025, at
the same time, I find that the parties can resolve their dispute outside the Court amicably by way of mediation. 5. The petitioner is directed to appear before the learned District Court on 25.09.2025 at 10.30 am." As per the allegation made in the FIR, petitioner and his son had committed forgery with the informant by receiving Rs. 55 lacs for executing a piece of land appertaining to Khata No. 130, Khesra Nos. 220 measuring total area two Bigha.

Notably, Justice Purnendu Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated September 10, 2025, wherein, he had concluded: "6. Learned District Court is directed to take necessary action to refer the matter before the learned mediator of the District Mediation Center. 7. Learned Mediator of the District Mediation Center concerned shall make his/her best efforts to settle the dispute amicably between the parties and thereafter submit his/her report before the concerned learned District Court, well within a period of three months, till then, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in connection with the aforesaid case.8. In case of failure on the part of the petitioner to appear on 25.09.2025 at 10.30 am. before the learned District Court or on any date fixed by the learned Mediator, the interim protection granted to the petitioner shall automatically lose its force. 9. In case, the parties fail to reconcile, then in that case, parties may avail appropriate remedy. 10. Accordingly, the present bail application stands disposed of."

Supreme Court observed:"6. The High Court thought fit to grant anticipatory bail but at the same time directed the petitioner to go for mediation. 7. We are of the view that once the High Court was convinced that a case was made out for grant of anticipatory bail, then the Court should not have asked the petitioner-accused to go for mediation." 

The petitioner, an aged person, had prayed for anticipatory bail before the High Court in connection with a Khanpur Police Station case of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 308(1), 308(5) and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, respectively.  Prima facie, the allegations against the petitioner was one of forgery and cheating. 

 

 

Supreme Court asserts "court's permission needed to arrest accused for offence added post grant of bail"

In Sumit vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B.Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan concluded:“In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.” It held that an accused who is already on bail cannot be automatically re-arrested by the investigating agency merely because a new cognizable and non-bailable offence has been added in the charge sheet.

The Court observed that the investigating agency cannot automatically arrest the accused only because new offences have been added. The  agency must first obtain an appropriate order from the court that granted bail before proceeding with the arrest in respect of the newly added offence.

It examined what the legal position would be in such circumstances and whether the  agency could directly arrest the accused based on the newly added offences alone.

Drawing on its decision in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand and Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi, the recollected the following principles:

(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.

(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his custody.

(iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.

(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal in a dowry death case against the Allahabad High Court's order granting a limited benefit of an anticipatory bail to the Appellant, the brother-in-law of the deceased victim. The High Court had ordered that the anticipatory bail order would be in operation till the filing of the charge sheet. 

Following High Court's denial of the extension of the anticipatory bail pursuant to the filing of the charge sheet, the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court.

Referring to 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2020) 5 SCC 1, the Court set aside the High Court's order. It observed: “once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry.”, and “the filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded.”

Consequently, the Court granted the benefit of the anticipatory bail to the Appellant. 

"preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations": Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

In Huzaif Ahmad Dar vs. Union Territory of J&K & Ors. (2026), Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Arun Palli and Justice Rajnesh Oswal delivered a 6-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered view that the judgment impugned in this appeal is not sustainable in the eyes of law and accordingly, the same is set aside. Resultantly, order of detention bearing Order No. 09/DMA/PSA/DET/2024 dated 20.04.2024, issued by the District Magistrate, Anantnag (respondent No. 2) under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, being unsustainable in law is, accordingly, quashed. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case."  The judgement was authored by Justice Oswal. 

The High Court observed: "It is a well-settled principle of law that preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations. The detaining authority is under a mandated constitutional obligation to furnish clear, precise, and proximate grounds. This requirement is a prerequisite to enabling the detenu to exercise his/her right to make an 'effective representation,' a fundamental safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India." 

Justice Oswal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme court in Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan Pathan vs. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr, (1989) 3 SCC 590, wherein it has been held that the order of detention passed on vague grounds deprives the petitioner of his right to make an effective representation against the order of detention." He also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik vs. State of Maharashtra’ (2012) 8 SCC 233, wherein the Court held: “27. As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Though there is no hard and fast rule and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf, however, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, it is incumbent on the part of the court to scrutinize whether the Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. 28. It is also the duty of the court to investigate whether casual connection has been broken in the circumstance of each case. We are satisfied that in the absence of proper explanation for a period of 15 months in issuing the order of detention, the same has to be set aside. Since, we are in agreement with the contentions relating to delay in passing the Detention Order and serving the same on detenue, there is no need to go into the factual details.”

Drawing on these decisions, Justice Oswal observed: ".....the impugned detention order, founded on vague, stale, and unsupported material, cannot be sustained. 14.We have carefully examined the judgment rendered by the learned Writ Court and are of the considered view that the issues noticed and discussed hereinabove have not been adequately addressed and, in fact, have escaped the attention of the learned Writ Court.