Deadline over but Department of Home, Bihar is yet to file review report in cases prosecution's lapses, inquiries and action, Gorakh Ram, S.H.O., Runisaidpur Police Station is under inquiry

In Subodh Kumar Singh @ Subodh Kumar @ Guddu Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 43-page long judgement dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it observed:"56. In recent times, this Court has given directions to the Department of Home, Government of Bihar and the DGP, Bihar to look into the matters in which due to lapses on the part of the Investigating Officers, acquittals have taken place. It is not known whether the orders of this Court are being complied with and the directions in this regard have yielded any significant result. In the opinion of this Court, it is high time for the Department of Home. Government of Bihar, the DGP, Bihar and the Director, Directorate of Prosecution to sit together and review its policy in this regard....60. This Court calls upon the Department of Home, Government of Bihar to apprise the Court as to its policy in the matter of reviewing the cases where lapses on the part of the prosecution and the investigation have been pointed out by this Court. In how many cases inquiries have been instituted and with what result be informed to this Court within one month from today. Such report of the Department of Home shall be placed before this Court for perusal even as these appeals stand allowed. 61. Let a copy of this judgment along with records be sent down to the learned trial court. 62. A copy of the judgment be also sent to the Department of Home Government of Bihar, Office of the Director General of Police, Bihar and the Director, Directorate of Prosecution, Government of Bihar." 

More than one month has passed but the High Court's web page with regard to the case in question does not show any filing in compliance with the the Court's judgement by Department of Home, Government of Bihar to apprise the Court as to its policy in the matter of reviewing the cases where lapses on the part of the prosecution, where the investigation have been pointed out by the Court and in how many cases inquiries have been instituted and with what result.  

Justice Prasad had observed: "57. We are of the opinion that the manner in which the Investigation Officer (PW-3) has conducted the investigation, which has been discussed in preceding paragraphs, would be required to be reviewed by a team of Senior Police Officers. 58. We direct the Director General of Police, Bihar to constitute a three-member committee of Senior Police Officers of repute to take a view on the manner in which the investigation was done by the I.O. (PW-3) and based on that report, take an appropriate view of the matter in administrative side within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this Judgment." 

It is not clear as to whether the Director General of Police (DGP), Bihar has constituted the 3-member committee of Senior Police Officers of repute to take a view on the manner in which the investigation was done by Gorakh Ram, the I.O. (PW-3) in compliance with the Court's directions. Based on that report, DGP was directed take an appropriate view of the matter in administrative side within a period of three months. The deadline for doing the same will end on November 23.  

The prosecution case was based on the fardbeyan of Sudhir Singh (PW-2) recorded by S.H.O., Runnisaidpur at 23.12 hours on November 2, 2018 at Ma Janki Hospital, Muzaffarpur, who stated that on November 2, 2018 in the evening, he, his son Deepak Singh and cousin brother Dinkar Singh went where a bridge was being built on the dam. It was stated that the son of the informant and his cousin brother were eating Mudhi-Kachri near the shop, in the meantime, at about 6.00 PM, 11 persons arrived on five motorcycles and started indiscriminate firing on the informant's son and cousin brother. The informant was at some distance, he came and saw that (i) Ranjit Singh (ii) Randhir Singh (iii) Sanjit @Munnu (iv) Vikram Kumar (v) Baidyanath Purvey (vi) Amarnath Kumar (vii) Subodh Kumar (viii) Ayush Kumar @ Golu (ix)Prashant Kumar @ Gudgud (x) Ashik Kumar and (xi) Deepak Kumar started fleeing away towards west direction by motorcycle. The informant tried to chase them but all the persons succeeded in fleeing away. At that time, the informant's uncle Chotan Singh and co-villagers Mukesh Singh, Shivam Kumar, Prince Kumar and Jai Prakash Singh were also present. They were helping the informant in taking his injured son and cousin brother to hospital, they also saw all the accused persons fleeing away and identified them. In course of treatment in S.K.M.C.H., Muzaffapur, the informant's cousin brother died. The treatment of informant's son was going on in Janki Hospital, Muzaffarpur. The son of the informant was in unconscious condition so he said that as and when he would regain consciousness, he will give his statement. All the accused persons were lashed with small weapon in their hand and they fled away towards west direction. Cause of occurrence was that earlier in the year 2014, the informant's wife was murdered by all the accused persons and in course of compromise of that matter, the present occurrence has occurred. The fardbeyan was recorded by S.H.O. of Runisaidpur Police Station, namely, Gorakh Ram (PW-3) on November 2, 2018 at 23:12 hours at Maa Janki Hospital, Muzaffarpur. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant (PW-2), Runisaidpur P.S. Case No. 663 of 2018 dated November 3, 2018 was registered under Sections 302/307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the accused, namely, (1) Ranjit Singh, (2) Randhir Singh, (3) Sanjit @ Munnu, (4) Vikram Kumar, (5) Baijnath Purvey, (6) Amarnath Kumar, (7) Subodh Kumar, (8) Ayush Kumar, (9) Prabhat Kumar, (10) Aashik Kumar and (11) Deepak Kumar. After investigation, police submitted chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 09 of 2019 dated January 19, 2019 against accused, namely, (1) Subodh Kumar, (2) Amarnath Kumar, (3) Baijnath Purvey and (4) Randhir Singh under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi, vide order dated March 14, 2019 took cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellants and transferred it in the court of SDJM, Sitamarhi for commitment. SDJM, Sitamarhi, vide order dated September 18, 2019, committed the records to the court of Sessions.Charges were read over in Hindi and explained to the appellants to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, vide order dated January 13, 2020 charges were framed against them under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27(i) of the Arms Act.  In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses.  

The Division Bench heard the appeals for setting aside the judgment of conviction dated October 18, 2022 and the order of sentence dated October 21, 2022 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge-XV, Sithamarhi in Sessions Trial No. 419 of 2019 arising out of Runisaidpur P.S. Case No. 663 of 2018. The appellants have been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27(i) of the Arms Act. They were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs10,000/- under Section 302/34 IPC. They were also sentenced to undergo three years imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000/-. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.  

Justice Prasad noticed that Sudhir Kumar Singh, the informant (father of the deceased Deepak Kumar), PW-2 could not say whether Daroga Ji had gone to the place of occurrence or not. His son was wearing full shirt and full pant. Daroga Ji had not seized the clothes of his son. In his cross-examination on behalf of Subodh Kumar Singh, he stated that in the said case Subodh Kumar Singh was not an accused. He has though stated in paragraph '14' that at the time of the statement of Deepak he was present but in his fardbeyan he has stated that Deepak was in unconscious condition and the I.O. (PW-3) stated in his deposition that when he went to the hospital, he had not taken any step to record the dying declaration of Deepak. The I.O. has stated in paragraph '41' that Deepak was injured and Sudhir Singh, the informant, had told him that Deepak was not in a position to make his statement. Therefore, the I.O. had recorded the
statement of the informant. In paragraph '18' he claims to have recorded the statement of Deepak but on record, no statement of Deepak had been brought and it was not the part of evidence. Mere recording in paragraph '18' of the case diary that Deepak had made statement cannot be treated as a substantive piece of evidence in this regard. When the High Court looked into the evidence of the I.O. (PW-3), it found that the I.O. has stated in paragraph '45' of his deposition that Chhotan Singh had not given statement before him that near Murhi Kachri shop where bridge was under construction, along with him Jay Prakash Singh, Prince Kumar and Mukesh Kumar were present and that they had seen Deepak Singh, S/o Sudhir Singh and Dinkar Singh @ Sunny eating Murhi Kachri at the shop of Murhi Kachri. The I.O. stated in paragraph '46' that in Murhi Kachri shop he had not found any Machan.

The High Court has recorded the I.O., Gorakh Ram (PW-3) claimed that he had recorded PW-2's fardbeyan at 23:12 hours at Maa Janki Hospital and had investigated the case. During his cross-examination, this witness admits several inspective deficiencies such as the nearby residents were not examined; the shop-keeper/staffs were not properly brought into the ambit of the investigation; the blood stain was not sent to FSL; empty cartridges were not forensically examined; the photographs/video of the blood stained place was not taken and the I.O. had not obtained medical certification of Deepak's fitness before recording his statement or record the time of that statement. PW-3 has confirmed that PW-1 did not give the Police the detailed version subsequently stated in court. He has also confirmed the contents of the informant's fardbeyan regarding being at some distance and seeing the accused fleeing. The testimony of the I.O. (PW-3) would show that he had reached the place of occurrence on the date of occurrence at 19:05
Hours. It means he had reached the place of occurrence in the evening hours itself when the injured persons had already been taken away to PHC, Runisaidpur and SKMCH at Muzaffarpur. The I.O. had not recorded the time of his visit to the place of occurrence, therefore, the defence suggested that he had not followed the procedures required to be complied with for conducting an inspection of place of occurrence during the night hours, therefore, he had not mentioned the time of his visit in the case diary. The witness denied this suggestion but he has stated that in course of his investigation, he had not gone in the village for enquiry and he had not taken any steps to record dying declaration of Deepak Kumar. Deepak Kumar was treated in Maa Janki Hospital but in support thereof, neither bed-head ticket nor admission register or any other certificate was produced. He had not got conducted any test of the seized empty cells of cartridges, he did not find the caliber of the pistol or the gun and he had not found out whether khokha was fired by what capacity of projectile. At the time of occurrence, he was Officer-In-Charge of Runisaidpur Police Station, the Runisaidpur health center is at a distance of 500 yards in east but Sudhir Singh (PW-2) had not lodged any Sanha entry or FIR regarding occurrence prior to his fardbeyan. In paragraph '39', he stated that he had started writing the case diary on November 3, 2018, below the same 04:50 was written which has been cut down and he had put initial thereon whereafter the date is written as November 2, 2018 and then 19:05 was mentioned. This statement of PW-3 would create doubt about his credibility. He has stated that he had reached the place of occurrence on November 2, 2018 at 19:05 Hours but in whose presence, he had inspected the place of occurrence is not known. Cutting in case diary, changing the date and time would make the entry in the diary suspicious. PW-3 stated that Chhotan Singh (PW-1) had not made any statement that near the Murhi Kachri on the ridge a bridge was under construction where along with him Jay Prakash Singh, Prince Singh and Mukesh Singh were present and he had seen that Dinkar Singh @ Sunny and Deepak Kumar S/o Sudhir Singh were eating Murhi Kachri. He had not found any Machan at the Murhi Kachri shop. 

The defence has pointed out to this witness that the page numbers of the case diary are arranged in serials but in his case diary, the pages were not arranged serially. This witness accepted this fact but said that it was due to shortage of diary. On an analysis of the evidence of I.O. (PW-3), the High Court found that he had not conducted the investigation properly. He himself admitted several shortcomings in his investigation. The minimum which he could have done by examining the shopkeeper of Murhi Kachri shop has not been done. There is a huge doubt that he had visited the place of occurrence as his claim that he visited the place of occurrence on November 2, 2018 at 07:05 hours would not inspire confidence of this Court in absence of any seizure list of the articles, seizure list of the empty cartridges, photographs etc. of the place of occurrence. He casually stated about recording of statement of Deepak Kumar. The fact is that no statement of Deepak Kumar is available on record and he himself stated that when he reached the hospital, Deepak Kumar was not in a position to give statement, therefore, he had recorded the statement of his father. In paragraph '18' of his case diary, he mentioned that he recorded the statement of Deepak Kumar but during trial, he admitted that he had not taken certificate of any Medical Officer about the condition of Deepak Kumar to give his statement and the time of recording the statement of Deepak Kumar is not mentioned. On the face of these evidences available on the record, the High Court reached the considered opinion that none of the prosecution witnesses fall in the category of a wholly reliable witness. If no one amongst the prosecution witnesses was wholly reliable witness then the prosecution cannot contend that the evidence of neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable witness may find corroboration from another neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable witness. The Court, in fact, disbelieved that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 were the eye witnesses of the occurrence. 

Justice Prasad observed:"53. Before we part with this judgment, it would be necessary to observe as to how the I.O. (PW-3) has conducted the investigation of this case. This Court finds that the absence of any
seizure list of the articles, empty cartridges, photographs etc. as also not bringing the nearby residents of the place of occurrence and the shopkeeper/ staffs into investigation, creates huge doubt that the I.O. (PW-3) had ever visited the place of occurrence. He has casually stated about the recording of the statement of Deepak Kumar but the fact is that no statement of Deepak Kumar is available on the record. Further, he himself has admitted several shortcomings in his investigation."

 

 

 

 

Justice Satyavrat Verma sets aside anticipatory bail denial order by 1st Additional Sessions Judge- cum-Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bhojpur at Ara

In Nitish Kumar @ Nitish Prasad & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court passed a 4-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, he set aside the order by 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bhojpur at Ara. 

The counsel for the appellant submitted that appellant was falsely implicated in the instant case by the complainant. From perusal of the allegations as alleged in the FIR, it would be manifest that on account of dispute in between the children, it is alleged that the accused Turani Devi, Urmila and Abhishek entered the house of the complainant and Abhishek dragged her and appellant is alleged that he was holding the daughter of the complainant from behind. It was submitted that the allegations do not inspire confidence and on account of dispute amongst children, an altercation had taken place in which both sides pushed each other. It is also submitted that the occurrence took place not on the ground that informant belongs to Scheduled Caste Category, but on account of dispute amongst the children. The Special P.P. as well as the counsel appearing on behalf of Fulpato Dev, the complainant opposes the appeal. Justice Verma concluded:"9. Regard being had to the aforesaid submissions, the order dated 08.09.2025 is set-aside. 10. The appeal stands allowed. 11. The appellant no.2, Shablu Prasad @ Shablu Kumar @ Jhablu Prasad, above-named, in the event of their arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of eight weeks, are directed to be released on bail on their furnishing bail-bonds in the sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum- Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bhojpur at Ara in connection with ABP No.2368 of 2025 arising out of Complaint Case No.34(c) of 2023, subject to the conditions laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. 

The counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant, at the outset, submitted that appellant no.1 had not approached the Court with clean hands. It was submitted that appellant no.1 was a person with clean antecedent when he had antecedent of one case i.e. Krishnagarh P. S. Case No.141 of 2024. It was submitted that he had a copy of the FIR. The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants after perusing the FIR sought permission to withdraw the appeal with respect to appellant no.1, Nitish Kumar @ Nitish Prasad. The permission was accorded. Accordingly, instant appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with respect to appellant no.1, Nitish Kumar @Nitish Prasad. 

The appellant no.2 had challenged the order dated 08.09.2025 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bhojpur at Ara in connection with ABP No.2368 of 2025 arising out of Complaint Case No.34(c) of 2023, instituted for the offences under Sections 323, 354(B) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r), 3(2) (va) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, whereby his prayer for grant of anticipatory bail has been rejected.The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that appellant no.2 is a person with clean antecedent and the informant alleged that on May 26, 2023 at about 5.30 P.M. on account of dispute in between the children, Turani Devi, Urmila Devi and Abhishek Prasad entered her house variously armed and Abhishek dragged the complainant out of the house and accused appellant no.2 was holding complainant’s daughter from behind. Further, the occurrence was witnessed by Rakesh, Vicky and Mansha Kumari and the accused persons also snatched chain worth Rs.15,000/- and assaulted her daughter.

Division Bench upholds judgement by Justuce Harish Kumar in a land acquisition compensation case from Araria

In Pramod Kumar Mandal vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms De -partment, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh, and Rajesh Kumar Verma passed a 20-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"11. The limited issue which arises for consideration before this Court in the present appeal is as to whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from any illegality, infirmity or perversity warranting interference by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction....It is not in dispute that the acquisition in question was undertaken by invoking the urgency provisions contained in Section 40 of the Act, 2013. Sub-section (3) of Section 40 contemplates payment of eighty per cent of the compensation as estimated by the Collector before taking possession. Thus, the payment made at that stage cannot, by itself, be treated as the final determination of compensation, particularly when the award contemplated under Section 37 of the Act, 2013 had not yet been prepared and approved. Section 40(4) further empowers the appropriate Government, in cases where the urgency provision is invoked, to direct that the provisions of Chapters II to VI shall not apply and permits a declaration under Section 19 to be made accordingly. 13. In this regard, the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge in Girish Kedia vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 and analogous cases, decided on 29.11.2024, is directly relevant. In the said decision, this Court, while considering the very same acquisition proceedings, held that the initial payment made under Section 40(3) was on the basis of an estimate and that the process of acquisition could not be treated as finally concluded in the absence of an award under Section 37. The learned Single Judge also noticed the Government instructions providing for verification of the nature, category and rate of the acquired land through the Six Men Committee. 14. The contention of the appellant that the respondents had no authority to undertake such verification merely because the earlier notifications described the land as residential, therefore, cannot be accepted at this stage. The question of the correct nature and valuation of the land would necessarily have a bearing upon the final determination of compensation, which is yet to be crystallised by a final award. The principle that executive instructions cannot supplant statutory provisions, does not advance the case of the appellant, since the exercise undertaken by the respondents is not shown to be contrary to the Act, 2013; rather, it is directed towards determination of the correct compensation in accordance with the statutory scheme. 15. We also find no substance in the submission that the appellant is without any statutory remedy against the determination ultimately made by the acquiring authority. Section 64 of the Act, 2013 specifically provides for a reference to the Authority at the instance of a person interested who has not accepted the award, including an objection relating to the amount of compensation. The provision, therefore, operates upon the making of an award and provides a statutory mechanism for questioning the determination contained therein. 16. In the present case, admittedly, the final award has not yet been prepared and approved. Consequently, the appellant cannot invoke Section 64 at this stage merely to challenge the ongoing process of determination of the compensation. At the same time, this does not deprive the appellant of the statutory remedy. Once the award is prepared, if the appellant remain aggrieved by the determination of the nature of the land or the amount of compensation, it would be open to the appellant to avail the remedy available under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, subject to the requirements and limitation prescribed therein. The Authority  constituted under the Act has original jurisdiction over a reference made under Section 64. 17. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant upon the order dated 14.03.2022 passed by the LARRA, Purnea in Land Acquisition Reference Case No. 01 of 2019 also does not alter the position. The said proceeding arose in its own factual context and, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, the order passed by the Authority cannot, in the absence of identical facts and circumstances, be treated as determinative of the nature of the land involved in the present case. More importantly, the question presently before us concerns the authority of the respondents to undertake determination before the final award is prepared. 18. It is well settled that executive power encompasses governmental functions which remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away, though such power cannot be exercised in contravention of the Constitution or any law. In the present case, the exercise undertaken by the respondents for verification of the nature and valuation of the acquired land, in the absence of a final award, cannot be said to be contrary to the statutory scheme. 19. We, therefore, are of the view that the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the statutory scheme of the Act, 2013 and has rightly declined to interfere with the ongoing determination of the compensation. However, as rightly noticed in the impugned order, any recovery of the differential amount has to be undertaken strictly in accordance with law as observed by learned Single Judge and after finalisation of the award. The appellant shall remain at liberty to avail the statutory remedy under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, if aggrieved by the award ultimately passed. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. The issue framed is answered against the appellant. 21. Accordingly, the present intra court appeal stands dismissed. 22. The observations and directions contained in the impugned order shall continue to operate." The judgement was authored by Justice Singh.  

The other six respondents were: 2. The Principal Secretary, Land Acquisition Department, Govt. of Bihar, 3. The Director, Land Acquisition and Rehabitation Department, Govt. of Bihar, 4. The District Magistrate/Collector, Araria, 5. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Araria, 6. The District Land Acqusition Officer, Araria and 7. The Excutive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division,
Araria.

Justice Singh led bench passed the order upon hearing the intra court appeal against the 36-page long judgement dated December 10, 2024 passed in Madan Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), whereby the writ petition preferred by the writ petitioner (appellant herein) came to be dismissed. The facts are that a total area of 456.01.200 acres of land situated in 64 villages falling under four Anchal areas, namely, Narpatganj, Forbesganj, Kurshakanta and Sikta, was proposed to be acquired by the State Government for construction of the Indo-Nepal Border Road. Pursuant thereto, Notification dated May 11, 2016 was issued under Section 11(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which was published in the official gazette as well as in the newspapers. Thereafter, notification dated May 12, 2016 was issued under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013, containing the declaration and summary of rehabilitation and resettlement in respect of the land proposed to be acquired. In the course of the acquisition proceedings, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Araria called upon the landowners to furnish documents relating to their title and interest in the land, possession certificates, rent receipts and other relevant particulars. The appellants submitted the requisite documents and affidavits. Thereafter, possession of the acquired land was taken and compensation along with solatium was paid to the landowners on different dates. The acquired land was subsequently handed over to the concerned agency for construction of the Indo-Nepal Border Road, and the road was constructed over the acquired land and put to public use.Subsequently, in the year 2017, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Araria, acting upon certain complaints, initiated an enquiry into the nature of the acquired lands. By Memo dated July 28, 2017, the landowners were informed that, according to the enquiry conducted by a committee constituted for the purpose, the lands in question were agricultural in nature, whereas compensation had been paid treating them as residential lands. The landowners were called upon to appear before the Collector and submit their response. Some of the landowners accordingly appeared and submitted their replies. Thereafter, on the basis of the report of a six-member committee, the District Land Acquisition Officer issued Memo dated March 17, 2018 calling upon the landowners to repay the alleged excess amount of compensation on the ground that the lands were agricultural in nature and that compensation had been paid treating the same as residential lands. The said subsequent action for recovery of the differential amount became the subject matter of challenge before the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 6876 of 2018. 

The Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition by observing as follows: “8. Similar issue as has been raised in this batch of writ petitions have come up for consideration in C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 (Girish Kedia Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and other analogous cases wherein this Court having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the learned Advocate for the petitioners as well as the State respondents and after anxiously perusing the materials available on record vide its order/judgment dated November 29, 2024 dismissed all the writ petitions with certain observations. 9. In the ends of justice, this Court deems it proper to encapsulate the relevant paragraphs of the said decision [C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 (Girish Kedia Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.)], which also governed the issues raised in the present batch of the writ petitions: "25. Undisputedly the land, in the question, was acquired from Raiyats/petitioners for constructing road over Indo-Nepal Border under the Emergency Provision of Section 40 of the Act, 2013. Section 40 of the Act, 2013 deals with the Special powers in case of urgency to acquire land in certain cases. 26. Section 40 (1) clearly stipulates that in cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of thirty days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 21, take possession of any land needed for a public purpose: 27. Sub-Section 3 of Section 40 makes it clear that before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall tender payment of eighty per cent of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the person interested entitled thereto. 28. Sub-Section 4 of Section 40, which would be relevant in the present matter needs to be quoted hereinbelow: "(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub - section (3) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that any or all of the provisions of Chapter II to Chapter VI shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 19 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the preliminary notification under sub-section (1) of section 11. 29. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is explicit that the appropriate Government is Empowered to direct that any or all of the provisions of Chapter II to Chapter VI shall not apply, and, if it does so direct that a declaration made under section 19 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the preliminary notification. The initial payment of compensation is only based upon estimation done by the Collector. 30. Admittedly after issuance of notification under Section 11(1) of the Act, 2013 immediately further notification under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013 as contemplated to invoke the Emergency provisions under Section 40 of the Act, 2013 has been issued on 12.05.2016. 31. From cumulative reading of both the notifications issued under Section 11(1) and Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013, it is axiomatic that the land, in question, is acquired under the Emergency Provision of Section 40 of the Act, 2013 and thus the social impact assessment study provided under Section 4 and the provisions of hearing of objections under Section 15 of the Act, 2013 shall not be applicable; in as much as the compensation paid by the Collector was based upon estimation. Thus any acquisition proceeding commenced under Section 40 of the Act, 2013 excludes the provision of Chapter II to Chapter VI, if otherwise it is directed under Section 19 of the Act, 2013. 32. In view of the aforesaid facts, the submission of the learned Advocates for the petitioners to the effect that at all the stages, as discussed above, the nature of land as to whether it is residential or agricultural have brought to the attention of the acquisition authority and such an important aspect would not have been eluded the attention of the authorities while carrying out such an exercise with ground level, in the opinion of this Court does not stand substantiated.  33. It is noteworthy that the Government of Bihar in the Department of Revenue and Land Reforms vide its letter contained in Memo No. 450 dated 12.04.2017 and further in Memo No. 150 dated 15.02.2018, brought on record by way of counter affidavit, issued under the signature of Principal Secretary of the concerned Department communicated to all the Collectors of the State of Bihar in public interest that to resolve the dispute with regard to acquisition of the land and its nature, category or the rate, a committee was required to be constituted under the Chairmanship of the District Magistrate. Accordingly, Government of Bihar took a decision to constitute a Six Men Committee consisting of District Magistrate, Additional Collector-cum Rehabilitation and Resettlement Officer, District Land Acquisition Officer, District Sub-Registrar, Representative of Requisitioning Authority, Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer. The aforenoted letter also made it clear that after publication of notification under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013 and before issuance of notice upon the affected land holders/raiyats, there shall be a proper inspection of the notified land and thereupon the rate of the land shall be determined. 34. In Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1955 SC 549, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The executive Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution.  35. In the case of J & K Public Service Commission vs. Narinder Mohan (Dr), reported in (1994) 2 SCC 630, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the executive power could be exercised only to fill in the gaps but the instructions cannot and should not supplant the law, but only supplement the law. Accordingly exercising of Executive power cannot be in contravention of the Constitution or any other law. 36. While executive power is circumscribed by the limits imposed by the Constitution, and by any other law, this does not imply that executive power can be exercised only when there is a law already in existence. The executive's powers are not restricted solely to carrying out the laws passed by Parliament. It includes other functions such as supervising general administration, formulation, and execution of policy, etc.  37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also consistently held that such clarificatory circulars cannot amend or substitute principal legislation. But if the principal legislation made thereunder is silent, then the Government can issue clarifications to supplement principal legislation by issuing instructions. 38. In the case in hand, the notification under Sections 11(1) and 19(1) of the Act, 2013 have been issued on 11.05.2016 and 12.05.2016 before issuance of the aforenoted letters, nonetheless the modalities as contemplated there, in the letters of the State Government is not in any manner contrary to the prescriptions as provided under the Act, 2013. 39. It is axiomatic that administrative decision which is not based on a dispute between the two parties and which is not rendered after hearing the parties, does not operate as res judicata. The party affected by it as also the authority making the decision are amenable to review the same. The interests of fairness to individuals whose interests will otherwise be directly and prejudicially affected may lead the Courts to attribute binding effect to administrative acts and decisions which the competent authority wishes to repudiate or rescind. Indeed, it would seem that the legal competence of administrative bodies to
rescind their decisions depends at least as much on considerations of equity and public policy as on conceptual classification (Prof. S.A.De Smith in his "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", 3rd Edn.). 40. Any administrative decision, there is no legal obligation upon the person charged with the duty of reaching the decision to consider and weigh submissions and arguments or to collate any evidence, to solve any issue. The grounds upon which he acts, and the means which he takes to inform himself before acting, are left entirely to his discretion. Subsequently, not only administrative action, but also administrative decision can be reviewed to redress injustice caused thereby. It is implicit in this principle that in redressing injustice to one injustice should not be caused to some other.  41. The law is well settled that any amount paid/received without the authority of law can always be recovered barring exceptions of extreme hardships or prohibited under any Statute/ Rules, but not as a matter of right. In such situation, law implies an obligation on the payee to repay the money, otherwise it would amount to unjust enrichment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on various occasions held that the excess payment of public money which is often described as "tax payers money" belongs neither to the officers who have effected over-payment nor that of the recipients. Possibly, effecting excess payment of public money by officers, may be due to various reasons like negligence, carelessness, collusion, favouritism etc. because and payments have been received by the recipients also without any authority of law. This Court is also not unmindful of the fact that the land of the petitioners have been acquired by the State Government in terms of the prescription of Act, 2013 and thus they should be compensated adequately in commensurate with the valuation of the land. In case, the land holders get less payment against the value of their acquired land, it would be certainly transgress the statutory and constitutional right to property as mandated under Article 300A of the Constitution, but once they receive excess payment to the value of their land, it would certainly amount to unjust enrichment. 42. In view of the above, this Court does not find any error in the action of the respondents in determining the nature of the land and its rate, if the same was found to be unjust, all the more, the Government is entitled to review an administrative decision, if the same is unjust and contrary to law; that too, in the case in hand, when the process of acquisition is yet to be finalized by preparation and approval of the award under Section 37 of the Act, 2013. 43. This Court does not find that it is a case where the Collector has reviewed his order; on the contrary, the process has completed inasmuch as award has never been never been prepared and approved. The compensation paid to the petitioners were only based upon estimation; Later on having apprised and acquainted with the mistake committed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the other responsible authorities, the same has been rectified by constituting a Six Men Committee and action has been taken against the erring officials. 45. So far the contention of the petitioners that in case of difference of opinion on the point of nature of the land, such dispute is always amenable to Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the LARRA') is concerned the same does not find any substance The Act, 2013, in the facts of this case. especially Section 51 of the Act provided a forum i.e. LARRA to adjudicate the disputes relating to acquisition of land, compensation payable and the preparation of compensation of which interested persons have made different claim. If there would have been any dispute with regard to the determination of the nature of the land, such a dispute may be referred to the jurisdiction of the said authority having sufficient mechanism available for redressal of grievance of any of the parties to a land acquisition proceeding, which might have arisen in relation to any issue associated with such proceeding.  46. There is no dispute that if the Collector comes to the conclusion that the lands, question, are agricultural, but the compensation has been paid by treating it as Pesidential, in such circumstances, the aggrieved party was supposed to take recourse to the remedy available, as provided under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 by getting the matter referred to the said authority, only if there is an award and parties are aggrieved and not accepted the award. 47. Section 64 contemplates under the Act, 2013 empowering the Collector to refer the dispute to the Authority, if any person interested, who has not accepted the award may by written application require that the matter be referred for determination of the Authority, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation. Section 64 (2) of the Act, 2013 mandates that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken, provided that such application shall be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; and in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 21, or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. 48. Perusal of the prescriptions as contemplated under Section 64 of the Act, 2013, clearly indicates that to invoke this provision it is absolutely necessary to challenge the award, if any person interested has not accepted the award. In the case in hand, it is the admitted position that award has not even been approved till date. 49. Reliance of the petitioner on a decision of this Court in the case of Dhan Jee Pandey (supra) has no application in the case in hand as that was the case where land was acquired under the National Highway Authority Act, 1956, which is a self contained code and, moreover, there was already an award passed by the competent authority, but later on a decision has been taken by the State to get the excess amount refunded, which had already been paid, on account of having found the nature of the land agriculture instead of residential. 50. This Court has also gone through the materials on record and found that before reassessment/determination of the land, in question, the land owners have been noticed and many of them filed their response, thus, the contention of the petitioners' that no notice or any opportunity was given prior to determination of land also does not get supported form the record. 51. In view of the aforesaid facts, circumstances and the position in law, this Court does not find any merit in this batch of the writ petitions. Let the award may be passed within a period of three months, if not passed till date after completing all the formalities. Suffice it to observe that the petitioners would have the liberty to assail the same in accordance with prescription, as provided under the Act, 2013, if any person interested has not accepted it. 52. Now coming to the legality of the impugned action of the respondent Collector to the extent whereby, apart from directing the petitioners to ensure the payment of deferential amount of compensation; for the said purpose has frozen the Bank accounts of the petitioners, this procedure is apart from illegal and arbitrary, do not have any sanction of law. Thus this Court deprecate such action. However, the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to recover the differential amount by taking recourse of Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 or through any other Act, in accordance with law, after finalization of the award, but without any interest accrued thereupon, as the petitioners were never at fault. 53. All the writ petitions stand dismissed with the aforesaid observation. Apart from the issues finally adjudicated, as noted hereinabove, in C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 and other analogous cases, the petitioners have also placed reliance upon an order passed by the LARRA in Land Acquisition Reference Case No.1 of 2019, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 14.03.2022 holding one of the land holder, namely, Sushila Devi, entitled to get/receive the compensation amount for her acquired land, being Residential in nature and, accordingly, the office was directed to prepare the award. Suffice it to observe that any order passed by the LARRA in a case, which was referred by the competent authority under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 is dependent upon the specific facts and circumstances of the said case and cannot be treated as a binding precedent unless the land holders would be able to show that his/her/their case(s) is/are identical to the said case. It has also not been disclosed to this Court as to whether in such case, there had been an award passed by the concerned Collector or not. So far the jurisdiction and power of the LARRA is concerned, the same has been duly considered by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 6863 of 2018 (Girish Kedia Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and other analogous cases, especially in paragraph nos. 45 to 49." 

The counsel for the appellant had submitted that the land in question was duly inspected and surveyed prior to acquisition and was treated as residential land in the reports preceding the acquisition. The notifications dated 11.05.2016 under Section 11(1) and 12.05.2016 under Section 19(1) of the Act, 2013 also described the land as residential. Compensation was thereafter determined accordingly, paid along with solatium, possession was taken and the land was utilised for construction of the Indo-Nepal Border Road. It was submitted that after completion of the acquisition proceedings and utilisation of the land for the public purpose, the respondents could not have reopened the nature of the land on the basis of a subsequent committee report and sought recovery of the alleged excess compensation by treating the land as agricultural. It is, therefore, submitted that the subsequent recovery proceedings are without jurisdiction and the Single Judge erred in declining to interfere with the same. 

The counsel for the respondents had submitted that the compensation paid to the appellant was found to have been determined on the basis of an incorrect classification of the acquired land as residential, whereas upon subsequent enquiry the land was found to be agricultural in nature. It is submitted that the respondents, upon coming to know of the discrepancy, were justified in verifying the nature of the land and taking steps for recovery of the excess amount paid to the appellant. The impugned action, therefore, calls for no interference.

In Madan Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), judgement by Justice Harish Kumar had concluded:"the issue raised in the present batch of writ petitions have already been duly answered in the case of Girish Kedia (supra), all these writ petitions stand dismissed in similar terms."

"an entry in the revenue record is not a document of title and that the revenue authorities cannot decide questions of title": Patna High Court cites Supreme Court's decision

In Ashim Sundar Das vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department. Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Rajesh Kumar Verma passed a 13-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"14. The learned Single Judge, while considering the writ petition, noticed that there was a dispute between the parties in respect of the land in question and that the revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate complicated questions of title. For the said proposition, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Faqruddin (Dead) through LRs. vs. Tajuddin (Dead) through LRs., reported in (2008) 8 SCC 12, wherein it has been held that an entry in the revenue record is not a document of title and that the revenue authorities cannot decide questions of title. 15. The aforesaid principle is not in dispute. However, from the order under appeal, it appears that the writ petition was taken up on 09.02.2026 itself and the appellant, who was respondent no.6 therein, had appeared and raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the order dated 29.12.2025 passed by the learned Additional Collector was appealable under Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011. The appellant had also sought an opportunity to place its case and the relevant materials before the learned Single Judge. 16. The appellant submits that no copy of the writ petition had been served upon him and that he was neither granted an opportunity to file a counter affidavit nor to place the documents and materials relied upon by him before the learned Single Judge. The order under appeal also does not indicate that any effective opportunity was granted to the appellant before the order of the learned Additional Collector was set aside. 17. The requirement of fair and effective opportunity of hearing is an essential facet of the principles of natural justice. It is well settled that where an order is passed in breach of natural justice, the Court is required to examine the prejudice caused to the affected party. 18. In the present case, the appellant had appeared on the very first date and had specifically sought an opportunity to place its case, while also raising the issue of availability of the statutory remedy. The appellant has asserted that it had relevant materials in support of its claim which could not be brought on record for want of such opportunity." The order was authored by Justice Singh. 

The order reads: "19. There is another aspect of the matter. The order challenged before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the learned Additional Collector and the statute itself provides an appellate remedy against such order. Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011 reads as follows: "9(6)(a) An Appeal against the order of the Additional Collector shall lie with the Collector of the district within thirty (30) days of the order appealed against. (b) The Collector of the district may condone the delay in filing appeals provided he is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons for the delay. (c) The Collector of the district shall not pass any order modifying, altering or setting aside the order appealed against unless the concerned parties have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 20. Thus, the statutory scheme not only provides a specific appellate remedy against an order of the Additional Collector, but also expressly provides for a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties before the appellate authority." 

Supreme Court has consistently held that where an efficacious statutory remedy is available, the writ jurisdiction ordinarily ought not to be invoked in disregard of such remedy, subject to the recognised exceptions. In United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, wherein the Court observed: “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” 

Justice Singh observed: "21. In the present case, the dispute between the parties concerns rival claims over the property and the parties rely upon their respective documents and revenue records. We are not inclined to examine the correctness or otherwise of such rival claims in the present intra-court appeal. In particular, the allegations made by the appellant regarding the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the writ petitioners are matters which, if raised before the competent authority, are required to be considered in accordance with law. Similarly, no opinion is being expressed by us on the correctness of the findings recorded by the learned Additional Collector. 22. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order dated 09.02.2026, passed in C.W.J.C. No.2008 of 2026 is set aside. 23. The appellant is directed to prefer an appeal before the Collector of the district under Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011 within a period of thirty days from today. 24. In the event such appeal is filed within the aforesaid period, the same shall be entertained and decided by the competent appellate authority in accordance with law, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. 25. It is made clear that the appellate authority shall consider the appeal independently on its own merits and shall not be prejudiced or influenced either by the observations made in the order dated 09.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge or by any observation made by us in the present order. The appellate authority shall examine the rival claims and the materials produced before it in accordance with law and pass a reasoned and speaking order. 26. Accordingly, the present appeal stands allowed."

The other eight respondents are: 2. The Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, 4. The Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, 5. The Circle Officer, Ara, 6. Devki Singh, Nawada, Bhojpur, 7. Ayodhya Singh, Ara, Nawada, Bhojpur, 8. Bhagwati Singh, Nawada, Bhojpur and 9. Rajendra Singh, Nawada, Bhojpur. 

The order was passed upon hearing the intra court appeal against the 6-page long judgment dated February 9, 2026 passed in Devki Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department. Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), whereby the writ petition preferred by the writ-petitioners (respondent no.6 to 9 herein) came to be disposed of while setting aside the order dated December 29, 2025 passed by the Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara in Jamabandi Cancellation Case No.25 of 2025-26. The dispute related to land bearing Old Khata No. 5, Old Khesra No. 26 measuring 5 decimals, Old Khesra No. 27 measuring 45 decimals and Old Khesra No. 28 measuring 24.5 decimals, situated at Mauza Nawada, Town Ara. The writ-petitioners (respondent nos.6 to 9 herein) claimed the aforesaid land through their predecessor, Late Hargovind Ahir, who is stated to have purchased the land from the recorded raiyat, Indradev Pathak, through registered sale deed dated August 23, 1929 bearing Deed No. 5691. They also relied upon earlier Mahadanamas dated July 3, 1922, September 12, 1924 and June 21, 1927 and the subsequent revenue records in support of their claim. It was the case of the writ-petitioners that after the aforesaid purchase, Late Hargovind Ahir came in possession of the land and Jamabandi No. 75 was created in his favour. They relied upon a rent receipt of the year 1957 bearing receipt no. 653773, as also subsequent rent receipts, to contend that after the death of Late Hargovind Ahir in the year 1982, the jamabandi was mutated in the names of his four sons, namely, Ayodhya Singh, Bhagwati Singh, Rajendra Singh and Devki Singh, as Jamabandi No. 75/5 in the year 1985. According to them, rent receipts bearing the said jamabandi number were issued thereafter up to the year 2025. The writ-respondent no. 6, the appellant in the LPA, on the other hand, disputed the aforesaid claim and asserted his right over the disputed land on the basis of the chain of title traced from Late Indradev Pathak. The appellant’s case was that Late Bindeshwari Pathak, son of Late Indradev Pathak, had transferred the land in favour of Dulhin Hiraman Biwi, wife of Shyam Sundar Das, from whom the property subsequently came in possession of Rishab Sundar Das and thereafter his descendants. On the basis of the said claim, the appellant questioned the validity of Jamabandi No. 75 standing in favour of the writ-petitioners. The appellant accordingly instituted Jamabandi Cancellation Case No. 25 of 2025-26 seeking cancellation of Jamabandi No. 75. Notice was issued to the writ-petitioners. After considering the materials placed by the parties, including the respective rent receipts and the rival claims over the land, the Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, by a reasoned order dated December  29, 2025, cancelled Jamabandi No.75.

Being aggrieved by the order of Additional Collector, Bhojpur at Ara, the writ-petitioners filed civil writ before the High Court seeking, inter alia, quashing of the order dated December  29, 2025 and restoration of Jamabandi No. 75 in their favour. Justice Purnendu Singh, the Single Judge disposed of the said writ
application, wherein, he observed: “7. Considering the nature of dispute and the manner in which the Circle Officers in Bihar from time to time in exercise of their jurisdiction has created frivolous cases by
putting one person in advantageous position and other to face the consequences of their illegal act. Present is the case where the petitioners claim to be in possession of the land, which has been disputed by the respondent no.6. The land has been described in above paragraphs of this writ petition. The Circle Officer in a very arbitrary and malafide manner has cancelled the Jamabandi standing in the name of the petitioners who also claim to be the owners. The record reveals that the respondent no.6 has filed application before the Circle Officer has admitted in his application that he was not in possession of the land. 8. It is well settled that the Revenue authorities have no power or jurisdiction to decide the complicated question of title and possession. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, reported in, (2008) 8 SCC 12, in para no. 44 and 45, held as under: 44. The jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue being limited, no title could have been conferred upon the plaintiff. Title in or over a land will depend upon the statutory provisions. A title does not remain in vacuum. It has to be determined keeping in view the law operating in the field viz. religious law or statutory law or customary law, etc. 45. Revenue authorities of the State are concerned with revenue. Mutation takes place only for certain purposes. The statutory rules must be held to be operating in a limited sense. The provisions of Rule 13 of the Matmi Rules laying down a rule of primogeniture will have no application in relation to the offices of
sajjadanashin and mutawalli, which are offices of different nature. They are stricto sensu not hereditary in nature. It is well settled that an entry in the revenue records is not a document of title. Revenue authorities cannot decide a question of title. 9. Considering the facts of the case as well as, the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of Faqruddin (Supra), I find that based on certain documents without verifying its genuity, the revenue authority has proceeded to decide the title of the parties and as such the order dated 29.12.2025 passed by the Additional Collector, Bhojpur is hereby set-aside and quashed. 10. The Collector, Bhojpur is directed to constitute a three-member committee of officials not below the rank of Additional Collector and based on the inquiry report, verify, as to whether, any other person also claim their interest with the original land holders in respect of the land in question and after providing opportunity to both the parties pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. 11. Accordingly, the present writ application stands disposed of.”

The counsel for the appellant had submitted that the impugned order dated February 9, 2026 was passed on the very first date of hearing, without affording any effective opportunity to the appellant to contest the writ petition. It was submitted that the appellant had appeared and raised an objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition, pointing out that the order of the Additional Collector was appealable under Section 9(6) of the Bihar Land Mutation Act. It was further submitted that the appellant had neither been served with a copy of the writ petition nor been granted an opportunity to file counter affidavit or advance submissions on merits. Despite the same, Justice Purnendu Singh, the Single Judge proceeded to set aside the reasoned order dated December 29, 2025, passed by the Additional Collector and directed constitution of a committee to enquire into the matter. The counsel submitted that the appellant had material documents in support of his claim and also disputed the documents relied upon by the writ petitioners, but these aspects could not be brought before the Single Judge for want of opportunity. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned order is in violation of the principles of natural justice and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted that the impugned order did not suffer from any illegality warranting interference in the appeal. It was submitted that the Single Judge had rightly exercised jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate any perversity in the impugned order. It was, therefore, submitted that the LPA deserved to be dismissed.
 

Supreme Court requests Chief Justice, Patna High Court to issue necessary instructions to Registry to list bail application of Rishu Shree as per roster as early as possible, and preferably within one week, Justice Satyavrat Verma has fixed Nov. 27 for the case

In Rishu Shree vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Cour's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated November 4, 2026, which reads: "The instant Special Leave Petition is directed against an order of adjournment, in terms whereof the regular bail application of the petitioner was adjourned, and no date has now been fixed. 2. Since the petitioner is in custody, we request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to issue necessary instructions to the Registry to list the bail application as per the roster as early as possible, and preferably within one week. 1 3. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, disposed of. 4. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of." The fact remains that in his order dated October 15, 2026, Justice Satyvrat Verma states: "10. Put up this case on 27.11.2026 at 3.00 P.M."

Meanwhile, it has come to light that ED questioned suspended 2017-batch IAS officer Yogesh Kumar Sagar on November 4, 2026 in connection with links with contractor Rishu Shree, a contractor. Sagar, a former managing director of the Bihar Urban Infrastructure  Development Corporation (Buidco), was suspended by the state goveernment on May 30, 2026, after his name surfaced in the tender scam. Rishu Shree allegedly spent Rs 21.92 lakh on a trip to Austria for him and eight members of his family members.  IAS officer Dharmendra Kumar too was questioned at the ED office in Patna on November 4, 2026 about his closeness with Rishu Shree, the Saran born contractor and his foreign trips. IAS officer Abhilasha Kumari Sharma was questioned November 2, 2026 and IAS officer Sunil Yadav on November 3, 2026. So far The ED has already summoned six IAS officers from Bihar including Anand Kishore, Santosh Kumar Malla, Dharmendra Kumar, Yogesh Kumar Sagar, Abhilasha Kumari Sharma and Sunil Yadav in this case regarding their alleged collusion with Rishu Shree. After Rishu Shree's bail plea was rejected by the Vigilance Court, he had filed a petition in the Patna High Court. During the hearing in October, 2026, the High Court questioned the role of senior officials in the case and the action taken against them. It remarked that Rishu Shree was a minor pawn, and what action had been taken against senior officials. Rishu Shree is an accused in an alleged corruption and money laundering case involving senior IAS officer Sanjiv Hans and other officials. The Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) has filed a money laundering case against him. Rishu Shree allegedly favoured government officials and employees, in exchange for receiving advance information regarding government tenders. It is alleged that he colluded with officials to alter tender conditions and award work to contractors of his choice. The possibility of receiving commissions and receiving a portion of this commission from the relevant officials has also been under investigation. It is suspected that Rishu Shri attempted to secure government contracts by securing postings for officials of his choice. The ED investigation has revealed allegations of spending approximately ₹19 lakh on foreign travel by IAS officer Abhilasha Kumari Sharma and her family. WhatsApp chats between the two were also cited in the investigation. The foreign travels of Dharmendra Kumar, the then MD of BMSICL, also came under scrutiny. It has been reported that on September 10, 2025, the ED wrote to the Patna SSP alleging that Rishu Shree had been threatening to commit suicide via FaceTime and Telegram to officials. Heallegedly resorted to using a fake medical certificate to evade summons.

Earlier, in Rishu Shree s/o Shri Binod Kumar Sinha @ Vinod Kumar Sinha vs. Directorate Of Enforcement Through Its Assistant Director Government of India, Patna Zonal Office (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma of Patna High Court passed a 19-page long order dated September 11, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"16. The Court for the present is not expressing any opinion on the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, but then directs the ED to file a counter affidavit answering the queries which are being framed by this Court.
(i) Since petitioner was not an accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023, based on which ECIR-4 was instituted, then what material transpired during the course of investigation of ECIR-4, based on which M/s Reliable Infra Service Private Limited, a company of the petitioner and house
of petitioner was raided on 16.07.2024- 

(ii) What was disclosed by the petitioner with regard to sale deeds and mobile phones seized from his house in his statement recorded on 18.07.2024, 18.09.2024, 20.09.2024, 21.09.2024 and 1.10.2024; 

(iii) since ED shared information under Section 66 PMLA to SP, Vigilance Unit, Patna on 20.08.2024 based on material collected on 16.07.2024 and statement of the petitioner recorded on 18.07.2024, based on which Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 dated 14.09.2024 was instituted, then why petitioner was not made a named accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024; 

(iv) since based on information shared by ED to SP, Vigilance on 20.08.2024, the Vigilance PS Case No. 05 of 2024 was instituted in which petitioner was not an accused then why in the addendum instituted by ED on 20.09.2024, the petitioner was not named as an accused, when ED by then had
recorded the statement of the petitioner on 18.07.2024, 18.09.2024 and 20.09.2024; 

(v) whether the ED till 20.09.2024 i.e. date of registering the addendum was not having any material against the petitioner connecting him with the offence, but if ED was having material against the petitioner connecting him with the offence, in that event whether ED raised any objection with SP, Vigilance for not arraigning the petitioner as an accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024; 

(vi) further if there was material against the petitioner then why he was not made an accused in the addendum; 

(vii) what the petitioner disclosed in his statement recorded on 21.09.2024 and 01.10.2024 during investigation of ECIR-4 and the addendum which was shared by the ED on 25.02.2025 under Section 66 PMLA to the ADG, Economic Offence Unit based on which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 dated 30.04.2025 (Annexure-12) was instituted against Sanjeev Hans, Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar and other unknown government officials, based on which ECIR-13 also came to be instituted; 

(viii) whether the ED investigated who were the unknown government officials involved in helping petitioner in manipulating government tenders or it was only Sanjeev Hans who was involved, since in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 only IAS named is Sanjeev Hans; 

(ix) further ED shall also disclose with clarity that as to whether while sharing information under Section 66 PMLA based on which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 came to be instituted whether in the said information, name of any other officials apart from Sanjeev Hans was mentioned or not and if
YES then did ED raise any objection before ADG, SUV that why name of other officials were not impleaded as accused in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025; 

(x) if an ECIR is instituted based on an FIR with regard to predicate offence and in the FIR accused are not implicated by name, whether ED while investigating the ECIR can issue summons to those whose name transpired while investigating the ECIR or ED will wait for the police agency to investigate the FIR and if name of unknown accused transpires during the course of investigation then only ED can issue summons to those accused for investigation; 

(xi) if an accused based on an investigation of an ECIR is arrested after furnishing grounds of arrest under Section 19 PMLA, whether the remanding Court is entitled to examine the grounds of arrest for the purposes of remanding the accused to judicial custody, if YES then whether the remanding Court in absence of an ECIR or a complaint case instituted based on investigation of the ECIR can examine the ground of arrest or ground of arrest furnished by the ED to the accused without supplying copy of an ECIR or without instituting a complaint case is sacrosanct- this question is being put since petitioner contends that he apprehends arrest based on ground of arrest in absence of him knowing whether the ground of arrest is based on the material which transpired during the course of investigation of ECIR or not; 

(xii) the ED shall also clarify whether ECIR is to be instituted based on an FIR instituted for predicate offence or based on an ECIR, the jurisdictional police based on information shared by the ED can institute an FIR with respect to predicate offence; 

(xiii) the ED shall clarify with clarity that if any manipulation of government tender was resorted to by this petitioner whether the petitioner alone could have manipulated the government tenders or the government tenders if manipulated, in such manipulation connivance of other senior officials was there or not, if YES then what steps ED took to question them; 

(xiv) the ED shall with clarity record the reason for instituting an addendum to ECIR-4 based on SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 for the reason that SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 was instituted based on an information shared by ED under Section 66 of PMLA, 2002 to the SP, Vigilance Unit based on the investigation which transpired while investigating ECIR-4, hence if SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 was based on an information shared by ED then what subsequent material transpired after instituting SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 necessitating institution of an addendum and 

(xv) the ED shall with clarity record that what material transpired connecting the petitioner with the offence based on an investigation of ECIR-4 and its addendum based on which the petitioner was named as an accused in Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No. 13 of 2025; 

(xvi) further what are the differences in the allegations against the petitioner as alleged in Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No. 13 of 2025 and the allegations being alleged in ECIR-13.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the ED sought four weeks’ time for filing a counter affidavit duly. The counter affidavit shall be sworn by the Joint Director, ED, Bihar.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the Supreme Court while giving liberty to the petitioner to move the High Court for seeking anticipatory bail had stayed the arrest of the petitioner for four weeks. It was submitted that the instant anticipatory bail application was filed within a period of two weeks from the date of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but then certain defects were pointed out by the stamp reporter, hence the case could not be taken up and now the ED has sought four weeks’ time for filing counter affidavit and regular bail application of the petitioner in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 was pending consideration before the High Court, hence the petitioner apprehended that in the event if regular bail application of the petitioner in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 was allowed, the petitioner may get arrested in the instant ECIR-13, hence, the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner sought protection from arrest for the petitioner. The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner seeks liberty to mention the case for taking it up out of turn, in the event the petitioner is granted the privilege of regular bail in SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025. 

Nandita Rao, the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the copy of the ECIR till date has not been supplied by the ED to the petitioner nor a complaint case has been filed based on the ECIR, as such, the original certified copy of the ECIR cannot be obtained, 6(2)-Original certified copy of anticipatory bail rejection order with authentication fee, on which it is submitted that petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail in ECIR No. 13 of 2025, but then petitioner has not been arrested based on the said ECIR nor a complaint case has been filed, hence petitioner has moved directly before the High Court in terms of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court. 

The senior counsel submitted that the petitioner is in custody in connection with SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025, based on which ECIR 13 of 2025 has been instituted, but since petitioner has not been remanded in ECIR-13 of 2025, as such, the petitioner is seeking the privilege of anticipatory bail, but since he is in custody with respect to an FIR with regard to predicate offence. The petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail in ECIR 13 of 2025 instituted by the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ED’) in pursuance of SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025. It is submitted that petitioner is in custody in connection with SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 since June 17, 2026.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 dated January 9, 2023 came to be instituted against an IAS officer, Sanjeev Hans and Gulab Yadav by one Gayatri Kumari under Sections 376, 376(D), 313, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, alleging multiple instances of rape by the accused persons. The petitioner herein was not an accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023. She submitted that Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 was quashed by an order dated August 6, 2024 in Cr.WJC No. 310 of 2023 and order of the High Court dated August 6, 2024 was not interfered by the Supreme Court. It was also submitted that on basis of Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023, the ED registered an ECIR-4 (Annexure-3), the petitioner was not named as an accused in ECIR-4. It was further submitted that in pursuance of ECIR-4, the ED on July 16, 2024 conducted search and seizure under Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) at various premises including the office of M/s. Reliable Infra Service Private Limited, a company of which petitioner is a Director, from where digital devices and documents were seized, further the house of the petitioner was also searched from where two mobile phones, including that of petitioner along with several sale deeds were seized. The ED also recorded the statement of petitioner under Section 17 PMLA, it was submitted that petitioner was forced to affix his signature on his statement, though the statement contained factually incorrect facts. It was submitted that thereafter the statement of the petitioner based on ECIR-4 was recorded by ED on July 18, 2024, September 18, 2024, September 20, 2024, September 21, 2024 and October 1, 2024 and petitioner was made to sign his statements forcefully, it was reiterated and submitted that the statement recorded contained factually incorrect facts, thus, breaching Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and Section 164(2) Cr.P.C. / 183 (2) BNSS, i.e. protection against self incrimination.

Zohaib Hossain, senior counsel who connected virtually appearing on behalf of the ED objected to the allegation that any force was used for making the petitioner sign his statement. He was assisted Advocate Prabhat Kumar Singh. 

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that based on material collected by ED on July 16, 2024 and statement of petitioner recorded under Section 17 and Section 50 of PMLA, 2002, the ED on August 20, 2024 sent a letter to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Unit Patna, Bihar under Section 66 PMLA, sharing the information, based on which Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 dated September 14, 2024 was instituted against Sanjeev Hans and others under Sections 61, 318(4) BNS read with Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b) and 13(3) of Prevention of Corruption Act (the second FIR). It was submitted that petitioner was not made an accused in Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 dated September 14, 2024 also. She submitted that ED on September 20, 2024 registered an addendum to ECIR-4, whereby the allegations made in second FIR was made part of the addendum to ECIR-4. The petitioner was not named as an accused in the addendum to ECIR-4. It was submitted that the allegations of the second FIR was made part of ECIR-4 by way of addendum on the ground that investigation is going on in ECIR-4. 

It was further submitted that based on inquiry being carried out in ECIR-4 including the addendum, the ED on February 25, 2025, shared an information under Section 66 PMLA to the ADG, Economic Offence Unit recording involvement of petitioner in other cognizable offence relating to alleged manipulation of government tenders in the State of Bihar. It was submitted that in the information shared by the ED on February 25, 2025 under Section 66 PMLA, 2002 to the ADG, Economic Offence, it was alleged that 

(1) out of Rs. 90 Lakhs paid by Sanjeev Hans to Gayatri Kumari, Rs. 20 Lakhs was transferred to one Sunil Kumar by M/s Reliable Infra Service Private Limited (subject matter of Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023), who transferred the said amount to Gayatri Kumari, hence it is alleged that petitioner was executing government contracts relating to WRD, where during the relevant period, Sanjeev Hans was the Secretary, hence the amount was the bribe money meant for Sanjeev Hans; 

(2) from the data extracted from the devices seized from the petitioner’s residence as well as from statement of the petitioner recorded, it revealed his involvement in manipulating and rigging government tenders in connivance with senior government officials; 

(3) petitioner disclosed in his statement that commission was paid ranging from 2% to 3.5% to officials of the bill amount where his associated entities were executing contracts, as contractors or sub-contractors;

(4) petitioner’s connection with senior officers and employee helped him in getting crucial information in advance; 

(5) by way of this modus operandi, the companies in contact with the petitioner used to get tenders and petitioner got benefitted by receiving 8-10% charges of the contract value; 

(6) by resorting to the aforesaid modus operandi, the petitioner engaged his entities as sub-contractors for tender awarded to different companies and thus used to raise periodic inflated bills to them, so that commission and bribe money get mixed with routine business and the entire process thus appears fair and transparent; 

(7), further by way of resorting to the aforesaid modus operandi, the petitioner got the tender floated by WRD awarded to M/s. Chevorox Construction Private Limited and later got the work sub-contracted to M/s Matriswa Construction (a firm controlled by his associate namely Santosh).  

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that allegations in the letter dated February 25, 2025 were premised on the statement of the petitioner recorded by ED while investigating ECIR-4 with specific reference to the statement of the petitioner recorded on January 29, 2025. It was submitted that based on the Letter dated February 25, 2025 of the ED, SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025 was instituted against the petitioner, Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar and other unknown government officials under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 3(2), 6(2) and 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 and Sections 61, 318(4), 338 and 340 of the BNS, 2023. She submitted that third FIR i.e. SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 was registered based on the statement of the petitioner recorded under Section 50 PMLA in connection with ECIR-4 and specifically the statement recorded on September 21, 2024, it was also submitted that petitioner filed Cr.WJC No. 1046 of 2025 seeking quashing of SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 i.e. the third FIR, but was withdrawn by an order dated April 18, 2026. It was further submitted that based on SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025, ED registered ECIR-13 dated May 22, 2025 (in which petitioner is seeking anticipatory bail by filing the instant anticipatory bail application). 

Justice Verma recorded that it was submitted that "ECIR is an internal document of the ED, hence, has not been provided to the petitioner, but petitioner apprehends that he is arraigned as an accused in the ECIR-13." 

It was also submitted that ED provisionally attached movable and immovable properties to the extent of Rs. 68,09,58,540/- and out of the alleged estimated proceed of crime to the tune of Rs. 265.73 Crores by a Provisional Attachment Order bearing No. 08 of 2025 and thereafter ED filed O.C. No. 364 of 2025 under Section 5 PMLA, before the adjudicating authority, PMLA, seeking confirmation of the provisional attachment order (PAO) no. 08 of 2025, it is submitted that the Provisional Attachment Order bearing No. 08 of 2025 and O.C. No. 364 of 2025 arises from ECIR-4, the adjudicating authority confirmed PAO 08 of 2025 by its order dated January 5, 2026 in O.C. No. 364 of 2025. 

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that ED based on ECIR-13 issued summons under Section 50 PMLA directing the petitioner to appear on September 16, 2025 and September 22, 2025, but petitioner sought time on grounds of illness, hence ED directed him to appear on October 7, 2025. It was also submitted that petitioner cooperated in the investigation conducted by ED based on ECIR-4, but he was made to sign his statement under duress containing factually incorrect assertion hence petition apprehends that ED will again resort to the same coercive technique in garb of investigating ECIR-13. The learned Senior counsel submits that it would not be out of place to submit here that petitioner filed Cr. WJC No. 2942 of 2025 for quashing the entire criminal prosecution arising out of ECIR-13 being violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and further not to take any coercive steps in connection with ECIR-13 and ECIR-4, the Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025 was filed in pursuance of liberty granted by the Supreme Court by an order dated October 17, 2025 in W.P. (Criminal) No. 411 of 2025. It was submitted that Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025 was dismissed by a judgment dated May 18, 2026, against which the petitioner filed SLP (Criminal) No. 10433 of 2026 before the Supreme Court assailing the judgment dated May 18, 2026 in Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025, in the said SLP (Criminal) No. 10433 of 2026, the petitioner also sought protection from arrest in ECIR-13, based on which the Supreme Court passed an order dated June 16, 2026 recording- that while deciding the anticipatory bail of the petitioner, the Court shall decide the case on its own merit without being influenced by the order dated May 18, 2026 in Cr.WJC No. 2942 of 2025 and the petitioner was granted interim protection by the Supreme Court for four weeks i.e. the time within which the instant anticipatory bail application was to be decided.

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that from narration of the facts as recorded, it would manifest that one Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 came to be instituted against Sanjeev Hans and Gulab Yadav in which petitioner was not an accused, but then based on Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023, ECIR-4 was instituted by the ED and the ED started investigating the case in pursuance whereof the house and office of the petitioner was raided and some material alleged to be incriminating were seized, but then Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 was quashed by this Court by an order dated August 6, 2024 in Cr.WJC No. 310 of 2023 with respect to Sanjeev Hans only, it was thus submitted that after Rupaspur P.S. Case No. 18 of 2023 came to be quashed by this Court with respect to Sanjeev Hans, in that event what would happen to the ECIR which came to be instituted based on the said FIR, as the claim of the ED is that petitioner in connivance with Sanjeev Hans and senior IAS officials have looted the State of Bihar by manipulating government tenders. It is also submitted that it absolutely does not stand to reason that as to what kind of investigation is being conducted by the ED that ED despite sharing information twice with the SUV, based on which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2024 and SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 were instituted, but then in the FIR only Sanjeev Hans along with other private players were named, when it is being alleged by the ED that government tenders were manipulated on account of which hundred of crores has been siphoned off by the accused persons including the petitioner, hence, it is submitted that is it possible for the petitioner to siphon of hundred of crores of rupees as submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the ED without the connivance of senior officials of the State Government. It was also submitted by the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that based on ECIR-4, the ED filed Supplementary Prosecution Complaint No. 13 of 2025, in which petitioner has been arraigned as an accused. It is submitted that what the ED intends to investigate in the instant ECIR i.e. 13 of 2025 already stands investigated in ECIR-4 based on which Complaint Case No. 13 of 2025 has been instituted. 

Justice Verma had fixed the case for hearing on October 9, 2026. 

On October 9, 2026, instead of the matter being listed before Justice Verma, the case Rishu Shree S/O Sh. Vinod Kumar Sinha vs. The Union of India through its Secretary, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, New Delhi & Ors.(2026) came up for hearing before the bench of Justice Arun Kumar Jha. The other four respondents are:2.The Directorate of Enforcement, through its Assistant Director Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, 3. Aman Saxena (Deputy Director) R/O The Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, 4. Bhoopesh (Assistant Director) R/O the Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Patna Zonal Office and 5. The State of Bihar through the Superintendent of Police, Special Vigilance Unit, Patna. Justice Jha's order dated October 9, 2026 reads: "It is a disposed of case and record has been placed before this Court for perusal of order dated 16.06.2026 passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 10433/2026 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 2. Perused the aforesaid order."

In Rishu Shree vs. Directorate Of Enforcement Through Its Assistant Director Government of India, Patna Zonal Office, Justice Verma passed a 8-page long order dated October 15, 2026 which reads: "2. A detailed order was recorded on 11.09.2026 and four weeks’ time was granted to ED for filing counter affidavit, while recording the order dated 11.09.2026, the Court had framed 16 questions for ED to answer, the ED has answered all the 16 questions but then after perusing the counter affidavit, it gives an impression that ED is basically trying to convince the Court that what the Hon’ble Supreme Court in different cases held with regard to the PMLA but then as far as the instant case is concerned, with respect to the same, the answer appears to be evasive."

Justice Verma observed:" 3. After going through the case record, it manifests that present petitioner was not a named accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No.18 of 2023, based on which, an ECIR No.4 of 2024 was instituted, but, then based on investigation of ECIR No.4 of 2024, the ED raided the premises of the petitioner despite he being not an accused in Rupaspur P.S. Case No.18 of 2023 or ECIR No.4 of 2024, which amply demonstrates that even if a person is not an accused in an FIR instituted with regard to predicate offence based on which an ECIR is instituted and the person is not accused in the said ECIR also still if any material transpire the ED can question such an accused, this fact has been recorded since it has relevance. 4. The statement of the petitioner was recorded on several dates, based on ECIR-4 and the ED shared the said information under Section 66 PMLA to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Unit, Bihar, based on which, Special Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No.5 of 2024 dated 14.09.2024 was instituted against Sanjeev Hans and others, the petitioner was not made an accused in Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No.5 of 2024 also." 

The order noted that it has been submitted that the allegation of Vigilance Unit P.S. Case No.5 of 2024 was made part of ECIR-4 by way of an addendum on the ground that investigation is going on in ECIR-4, further based on an enquiry being carried out in ECIR-4 including the addendum, the ED on February 25, 2025, shared an information under Section 66 PMLA to the ADG, Economic Offence Unit recording involvement of petitioner in other cognizable offence relating to alleged manipulation of government tenders in the State of Bihar, based on the letter dated February 25, 2025 of the ED, SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 dated April 30, 2025 was instituted against the petitioner, Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar and other unknown government officials under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Sections 3(2), 6(2) and 15 of the Official Secret Act, 1923 and Sections 61, 318(4), 338 and 340 of the BNS, 2023, based on SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025, ECIR-13 came to be instituted.

The order reads: "5. In this background the Court posed query no.9-“whether- while sharing information under Section 66 PMLA on the basis of which SUV P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025 came to be instituted, the name of any govt. officials other than Sanjeev Hans was mentioned or not and if YES, whether ED raise any objection before the ADG, SUV as to why such other officials were not impleaded as accused in SVU P.S. Case No. 05 of 2025; The ED in its counter affidavit while replying the said query has recorded that the ED shared credible information against six senior govt. officials, resulting in registration of FIR against three such officers, namely, Mumukshu Chaudhary, Tarni Das and Umesh Kumar, further since SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 was explicitly registered against named entity as well as other unknown govt. officials, there was no procedural or legal necessity for ED to object, as an FIR against unknown public servants provide full scope to the State Investigating Agency to examine, array and charge any official whose role is substantiated during investigation or via supplementary charge sheet without restricting the independent authority of the ED to investigate and array all such officers under the PMLA, further though FIR was registered only against three of such officials, however this does not bar the ED to investigate such officers for their involvement in the offence of money laundering, the Court finds the answer to be evasive for the reason that when the petitioner disclosed the name of six senior officials and the FIR was instituted only against three officials, in that event, the ED ought to have issued summons to the officials who were named in the FIR and even those whose name was disclosed by the petitioner but then from perusal of the counter affidavit, it manifests that the same does not record that any summons were issued to the senior officials including those who were not named in the FIR i.e. SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025, which gives an impression that the investigation of the ED is not progressing in the manner it ought to have been, similarly, the 10th query posed was- “if an ECIR is instituted on the basis of an FIR relating to a predicate offence and certain accused persons are not named in such FIR, whether ED, while investigating the ECIR can issue summons to persons whose name transpired during investigation of the ECIR or whether ED is required to wait for the police agency to investigate the FIR and issue summons only after such persons are identified by the predicate agency.” 

Justice Verma observed: "The ED in reply pleaded that ED is not required to wait for the State police agency to identify or array a named individual in a predicate FIR before exercising its own power under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002, the ED possesses independent statutory authority to directly summon and examine any person whose involvement or connection with proceed of crime transpired during its investigation under money laundering, the answer is clear that ED has the power to issue summons but then Court fails to appreciate that why no summons were issued to the officials whose name transpired in the statement of the petitioner, as it does not appear probable that money laundering of such a magnitude would have been committed by the petitioner alone in connivance with private players. He added: "The Court also fails to appreciate the conduct of the SVU that when ED had shared information to the SVU under Section 66 PMLA, based on disclosure made by the petitioner, in which, he named six senior officials of the State Government then why SVU did not array all the senior officials, as an accused in SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025. It appears that either SVU was not convinced with the information shared by the ED with regard to senior officials, as such did not array them in the category of accused and ED by not issuing summons to the officials despite having information regarding them since 25.02.2025 also reflects that either no material during the course of investigation of ECIR transpired connecting them with the offence or attempt is being made to save some and implicate few."

The senior counsel appearing on behalf of the ED submitted that ED requires to interrogate the petitioner for eliciting more information as he is the king-pin of money laundering by manipulating government tender. 

Justice Verma observed: "The Court is not able to appreciate the said submission rather it appears that petitioner is a pawn, king-pin are behind the curtains. 7. Since a stand has been taken in the counter that ED has no control over SVU, as such the ED did not raise any objection, hence learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is directed to add SVU through its Additional Director General, as O.P. No.2."

The Court directed Kumaresh Singh, the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner to serve two copies on the counsel appearing on behalf of the SVU. "The SVU shall file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the Additional Director General, SVU. The counter affidavit shall with clarity record that when ED shared information under Section 66 PMLA, disclosing the name of accused persons, including six senior officials, who were involved in the occurrence of money laundering, then why they were not arrayed as an
accused in SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025, the counter affidavit shall also with clarity record that what transpired during the course of investigation of SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 with regard to officials whose name was shared by the ED. The petitioner is in custody in connection with SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 based on which ECIR-13 of 2025 has been instituted and the case is a serious one as allegation is of money laundering worth hundred of crores, based on manipulating tenders, the petitioner alone could not have manged the tender until and unless he was helped by the bureaucrats as disclosed by the ED in its counter affidavit but then only petitioner along with some private players along with Sanjeev Hans and three senior bureaucrats have been made accused in SVU P.S. Case No.5 of 2025 while the name of other officials disclosed by the ED stands omitted, hence the Court gets an impression that the authorities are trying to save some and implicate few when the law is same for everyone. 9. The Court expects that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner shall serve copy on the SVU on or before 28.10.2026."

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna, the amicus curiae in special laws/special courts case recalled that the tender scam emerged to light after an FIR registered at the Rupaspur police station in Patna in 2023. Gayatri Devi had filed complaints accusing senior 1997-batch IAS officer Sanjeev Hans and former RJD MLA Gulab Yadav of sexual exploitation and blackmail. While investigating Gayatri Devi's case, the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) began tracking the financial trails and illicit money transfers. They uncovered substantial transactions where Sanjeev Hans had reportedly channeled over ₹90 lakh to Gayatri Devi through hawala channels and intermediaries. The probe into these suspicious funds led investigators straight to contractor Rishu Shree. Shree allegedly managed a syndicate that paid massive bribes and commissions (around 5% to 10%) to bureaucrats like Hans to secure government projects across departments like BUIDCO and the Water Resources Department. The Rishu Shree case centers on a multi-crore Bihar tender scam. A press release dated November 26, 2025 had disclosed that on November 25, 2025, Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Patna Zonal Office conducted search operations at 9 locations across Ahmedabad, Surat, Gurgaon and New Delhi on 25.11.2025, under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002 in a case related to a Patna based contractor Rishu Shree. During the search operations, cash of approx. Rs. 33 Lakh, digital devices, diaries, and several incriminating documents were found and seized. ED initiated investigation on the basis of FIR registered by Special Vigilance Unit (SVU), Bihar on April 30, 2025, names four accused, including Hans, businessman Rishu Shree, Santosh Kumar, and Pawan Kumar, besides unknown government officials. The case pertains to alleged irregularities in the award of government tenders and has been filed under provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Rishu Shree, who’s firms work as contractors/subcontractors in various Bihar Government departments, such as Water Resources, Health, Public Health Engineering, Urban Development, Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation (BUIDCO), Education, Building and Construction, and Rural Works Department, is alleged to have a nexus with various Government officials to facilitate tenders for illicit personal gains. Earlier in this case, search operations were carried out at several travel agents and also at the residential premises of several government officials in Patna. These searches had led to the seizure of a total of Rs.11.64 crore (approx.) in cash, along with various incriminating documents and digital evidences. Further, assets to the tune of Rs.68.09 crore belonging to Rishu Shree, his family members and entities were put under Provisional Attachment on August 1, 2025. In May 2026, the Patna High Court had dismissed Rishu Shree's petition seeking the quashing of the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) and Section 50 PMLA statements, ruling that an ECIR is an internal document and that ED officers are not "police officers" under standard Cr.PC confession safeguards. In October 2026, the High Court criticised the slow pace of action against principal actors higher up in the hierarchy, noting that the contractor appeared to be a "pawn" in a broader network. Supreme Court granted temporary protection and later directed the Patna High Court to expedite and decide on Rishu Shree's bail plea while allowing constitutional challenges regarding PMLA provisions (Sections 50 and 63) to be raised in connected batch petitions.

In early 2026, the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) had filed a chargesheet against seven accused, including senior IAS officer Sanjeev Hans, in a government tender scam. Hans, a 1997-batch Bihar cadre IAS officer, has been untraceable since contractor Rishu Shree was arrested on May 27, 2026. The chargesheet had been filed in the special vigilance court against seven accused. In the 4,000-page chargesheet, the investigating agency claimed to have collected substantial evidence of the accused's involvement in the case. Besides Hans, the chargesheet names Santosh Kumar, Pawan Kumar, Mumukchhu Choudhary, Tarini Das and Umesh Kumar Singh. Evidence has been found against government officials Mumukchhu Choudhary, Tarini Das and Umesh Kumar Singh. Tarini Das, who was posted as engineer-in-chief in the building construction department, helped companies was linked to Rishu Shree secure at least 10 government contracts. Joint secretary in the finance department Mumukchhu Choudhary and BUDCO executive engineer Umesh Kumar Singh were also alleged to have favoured him. Rishu Shree, Santosh Kumar, Tarini Das, Mumukchhu Choudhary and Umesh Kumar Singh are currently in jail, while Sanjeev Hans and Pawan Kumar are absconding. SVU teams have conducted raids in Sitamarhi and Saharsa. It is reported that Rishu Shree had helped an Ahmedabad-based company to secure the Kosi barrage contract and had also assisted a private company where Pawan Kumar was serving as director. During raids at locations linked to Rishu Shree, investigators recovered 99 property deeds and gold jewellery worth more than Rs 2.5 crore. His assets have been estimated at over Rs 265 crore.

Also read:Justice Ansul' s order is not in favour of "media gag", does not prevent fair, accurate, objective reporting of pending court proceedings or publication of facts in alleged tender scam case

Supreme Court grants interim protection to Rishu Shree against arrest for four weeks, finds no ground to interfere with Justice Arun Kumar Jha's judgement

Rishu Shree saga is linked to story of Advocate Gayatri Kumari, Sanjeev Hans, Gulab Yadav, Lalit and others-Part 1