Supreme Court constitutes two more Election Tribunals under BCI besides three Central Election Tribunals/Committees constituted on June 25, 2023

In Savita Devi @ Savita Dhanda & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Suryakant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi passed a 3-page long order dated May 18, 2026. The  order reads: "All the State Bar Councils are directed to keep the records intact till the election disputes are finally decided by the Tribunal(s)" upon exploring the possibility of the constitution of one or two Election Tribunals for the purpose of speedy adjudication of the disputes arising from the ongoing elections of different State Bar Councils." The Court constituted two additional election tribunals for expeditious adjudication of disputes which arise out of elections to various State Bar Councils, while hearing petitions concerning alleged irregularities in the electoral process and implementation of reservation for women candidates. 

Kumud Lata Das, the Advocate-on-Record, the counsel for the petitioners made her submission regarding the role of the Bar Council of India (BCI) and the election process. Das argued that "the BCI should not be part of the adjudicatory mechanism since the petition itself alleged that the BCI’s decision to adopt a 'single composite ballot paper' had contributed to the controversy." It is noteworthy that besides Election Tribunal, the other committees of BCI are:Executive Committee, Legal Aid Committee, Advocates’ Welfare Committee, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Educational Institutions, Finance Committee, Co-ordination of State Bar Councils, Co-ordination of Bar Associations of the country, Rules Committee, Building Renovation Committee, Five members of Legal Education Committee, All India Bar Exam (AIBE) Committee, High Powered Verification Monitoring Committee, Disciplinary Committee and AIBE Tender/Selection Committee. The application of the Rule of Ejusdem Generis and a joint reading of the BCI's notification and its url of the Committees makes it crystal clear that Election Tribunal is one of the several committees of BCI headed by Manan Kumar Mishra.

As per the verdict of Supreme Court dated February 5, 2018 passed in T.C. No. 126 of 2015, the three men-Central Election Committees/Tribunals headed by a former Chief Justice of some High Court and consisting of two former Judges of any High Court was to be constituted by the Bar Council of India. The BCI.notified Rules in this regard by notification dated December 30, 2020 in accordance with the verdict of the Supreme Court. 

Rule 9 of Chaper-IV of the notification dated June 23, 2023 published in the Gazette of India, Bar Council of India Rules (for qualification/Disqualification and produce for election and code of conduct for the elections of S.B.C/B.C.I.) 2023 made provision for Central Election Appellate Committee/Tribunal of Bar Council of India. It reads:"In order to secure transparency and fairness and also to avoid the multiplicity of litigations in courts and for early disposal of the election disputes, there shall be an Election Appellate Committee of Bar Council of India consisting of a former Judge of Supreme Court of India to be nominated by Bar Council of India in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and two former Judges of High Court(s) to be nominated by Bar Council of India. Any final order/decision passed by the Central Election Committee/Tribunal can be challenged before this Election Appellate Committee (which may also be called the Election Appellate Tribunal of Bar Council of India) within a period of 15 days of the order/decision of Central Election Committee/Tribunal. The Central Election Committee and the Appellate Committee shall have their secretariat in the premises of Bar Council of India. The Appellate Election Committee shall frame its own Regulations for the disposal of appeals. The hearings before the Appellate Committee shall be in Hybrid Mode depending upon the convenience of the parties. The pleadings of petitioners/appeals/Replies/Rejoinders may be online or offline as per convenience of the parties. 

Earlier, three Central Election Tribunals/Committees were constituted on June 25, 2023.  The notification provides details about the composition of the Tribunals. Tribunal No. 1 comprises of Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, Former Chief Justice, Patna High Court,  Justice Arun Tandon, former Judge, High Court of Allahabad and local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council. Tribunal No. 2 comprises of Justice S. Mukherjee, Former Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka,  Justice Shivaji Pandey, former Judge, Patna High Court and  local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council. Tribunal No. 3 comprises of Justice Rajendra Menon, Former Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi, Justice M. Sathyanarayanan, former Judge, Madras High Court and local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council.   

The BCI was required to make amendment in its notification in the light of the Supreme  Court's order dated May 18, 2026. The BCI has notified the Court's directions for the election disputes arising out of the elections to the State Bar Councils held in the year 2026. The directions provide for:

1. Constitution of Election Tribunals for State Bar Council Elections, 2026

For the purpose of adjudication of election petitions arising out of the elections to the State Bar Councils held with effect from the year 2026, the two Election Tribunals shall function as Election Tribunals of the Bar Council of India:

Election Tribunal I (a) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, former Judge, Supreme Court of India, as Chairperson; (b) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur, former Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh High Court, as Member; (c) Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, Senior Advocate, as Member.

Election Tribunal II (a) Hon’ble Ms. Justice Hima Kohli, former Judge, Supreme Court of India, as Chairperson; (b) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, former Chief Justice, Jharkhand High Court, as Member; (c) Ms. Kaveeta Wadia, Senior Advocate, as Member

2. Continuance of earlier pending matters
The constitution of the aforesaid Tribunals shall not, by itself, disturb election petitions, applications or proceedings relating to earlier elections or earlier assigned matters which are already pending before any existing Election Tribunal, including the Tribunal headed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajendra Menon, former Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi, along with its Members. Such pending matters shall continue before the Tribunal to which they already stand assigned, unless the Bar Council of India, for administrative reasons orders otherwise.

3. Filing of Election Petitions
Every election petition relating to the State Bar Council elections held with effect from the year 2026 shall be presented before the Secretary, Election Tribunal, Bar Council of India, who shall also act as the Secretary/Registry for the purpose of receipt, scrutiny and registration of such election petitions, complaints, applications or representations.

4. Allocation of matters
Upon presentation and registration of an election petition, the Bar Council of India shall allocate the matter to the concerned Election Tribunal (or the High Powered Election Supervisory Committee constituted by Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its Order dated 18.11.2025 having regard to the nature of the dispute, pendency, convenience and workload. The Bar Council of India may, for administrative convenience and expeditious disposal, allocate or reallocate matters among the Election Tribunals.

5. Limitation
Every election petition seeking to question or set aside an election, result or declaration of any returned candidate, or the election as a whole, shall be filed within thirty days from the date of declaration of the result. Provided that, in respect of those State Bar Councils whose results have already been declared before the date of publication of this notification, the election petition shall be filed within fifteen days from the date of publication of this notification in official gazette.

6. Fee
Every election petition shall be accompanied by proof of deposit of process fee of Rs.30,000/- in the account of the Bar Council of India and other complaints and/or applications shall be required to accompany a fee of Rs. 5,000/-as already prescribed under the Regulations notified in the Gazette of India on 10th October, 2023. The fee shall be payable to the Registrar of the Tribunal. No election petition shall be treated as duly filed unless accompanied by proof of such deposit, subject to such orders as may be passed by the concerned Election Tribunal.

7. Time frame for disposal
The Election Tribunals shall endeavour to dispose of election petitions as expeditiously as possible and, as far as practicable, within a maximum period of six weeks from the date of filing. The Election Tribunal may regulate its own procedure, curtail unnecessary adjournments, call for records, direct production of election papers, decide preliminary issues, and pass such procedural directions as may be necessary for expeditious and effective adjudication of election disputes.

8. Records and cooperation
All State Bar Councils, Returning Officers, Assistant Returning Officers, Observers, officers and other authorities connected with the election process shall extend full cooperation to the Election Tribunal and the Bar Council of India and any authority acting under the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court or the Election Tribunal, and shall produce records, election papers, result sheets, ballot-related material, correspondence and other relevant documents as and when requisitioned.

9. Power to issue clarifications
The Bar Council of India may issue such administrative clarifications, allocation orders, filing instructions, registry directions or consequential directions as may be necessary for giving effect to this notification and for ensuring timely disposal of election disputes.

Notably, in Yogamaya M.G vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 581/2024, Diary No. 38583/2024] and Shehla Chaudhary vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 1060/2025], the Court had issued notice in September 2024 in the matter of the under-representation of women, queer individuals, persons with disabilities, and marginalised communities in the BCI and State Bar Councils. The Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Bagchi has ordered, "We have to ensure that women members who are contesting/proposing to contest elections in the four Bar Councils of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab & Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Telangana, will contest the elections with full spirit. The Advocate-voters will also endeavour to ensure that adequate representation is provided to the women members of the bar. The elections to the Bar Councils of Bihar and Chhattisgarh are also notified. So these two bar councils are also to be excluded. In so far as the remaining State Bar Councils are concerned, it is directed that women must receive 30% representation. The 20% of these seats will be filled by way of election, and10% will be filled through co-option...A proposal explaining how the co-option of women advocates will be carried out shall be placed before this Court."

Appearing for the BCI, Manna Kumar Mishra, the Chairman, BCI addressed Lata saying, “you must stop levelling allegations against BCI every time. This is very bad. Leave this habit.” Kumud Lata Das responded, “You can’t shout at me! I am not under your disciplinary authority! I am an AOR; I know well how to submit to the Court. You are virtually a permanent Chairman, so you think the bar is identified with you....” Lata was alluding to Mishra's unopposed re-election as the Chairman of the BCI for the seventh consecutive term.

Guru Krishna Kumar, senior advocate, Dr. Ram Sankar, advocate. and M/s. Ram Sankar & Co. appeared for the respondents.

The Chief Justice observed that there appeared to be only a “communication gap” between the parties, and both Das and Mishra were there to assist the Court and represent their clients. The Court also noted that issues relating to the co-option of women candidates had already been referred to the supervisory committee headed by Justice (Retd.) Sudhanshu Dhulia. The matter will continue before the Court after the tribunals begin functioning and examine the election disputes."

The four other respondents were: Union of India, Bar Council of India, High Powered Election Committee, Election Commission of Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana and Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. The other 27 petitioners were:Navneet Kaur Waraich, Parveen Dahiya, Suman Dahiya, Sarbjit Kaur, Neelam Choudhary, Bhagyashri Setia, Monika Jhangra, Sunita Sheokhand, Priya Legha, Savita Devi, Nimrata Gill, Sonia Tanwar, Pooja Sharma, Omkala Yadav, Veena Bhardwaj, Meenu Rani, Kamlesh Panchal, Suman Rawat, Anisha Sharma, Pratibha Mehra, Dimple Chaudhary, Bhanu Priya Sharma, Anita Tripathi, Neelam Kathuria, Sharad Harish Arora, Rabeena and Sonia Rohilla. The Court's record reveals that notices were sent to 25 secretaries of the states including Bihar. The other counsels for the petitioners were:  Bibhuti Krishna, Harsh Ajay Singh, Ashutosh Saini, Ravi Agarwal, Siddhant Narayan Das, Puneet, Bela, Savita Devi, Navneet Kaur, Suman Dahiya, Devadatt Kamat, Aditya Singh, Aakash Sirohi, Indra Lal, Amit Rawal and Neema. 

Meanwhile BCI has filed an application before the Court seeking its approval of a vote-linked mechanism for co-opting women candidates to State Bar Councils under the 10% co-option quota, in the matter of M. Vardhan vs. Union of India, WP(C) No. 1319 of 2023. The BCI proposed that women candidates who narrowly missed election in the State Bar Council polls, based on their finishing position, be co-opted against the reserved co-option quota where 25 members are to be elected, candidates finishing in the 26th and 27th positions; where 20 members are to be elected, candidates finishing in the 21st and 22nd positions; and where 15 members are to be elected, the candidate finishing in the 16th position. The BCI has submitted that linking co-option to the actual votes polled by women candidates ensures that the process remains connected to the democratic choice expressed by advocates. The BCI has placed the same proposal before the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Committee overseeing the election process. It has prayed for a specific direction from the Court in this regard. 

Earlier, in Bihar, on March 17, 2025, advocates had held a press conference on a petition filed against the Bihar State Bar Council elections in Muzaffarpur. It was reported in Hindustan newspaper. Advocates Sudhir Ojha, Sanjay Kumar Sinha, Kamlesh Kumar, Mantu Kumar Singh, Raju Kumar Choudhary and others held a press conference in connection with the election petition filed against the Bihar State Bar Council elections. They informed that while hearing the petition, the Election Tribunal of the BCI issued notices to the opposite parties Giving two weeks time, the opposition was asked to respond. The notice states a case of disobeying of the order passed by the Tribunal. Notices have been issued to 23 members, including the chairman of the Bihar State Council, seeking their replies. On October 12, 2025, it was reported in Hindustan newspaper that the Election Tribunal refused to dismiss the three petitions against the bungling in the elections of Bihar State Bar Council. Advocates Sudhir Kumar Ojha, Umesh Prasad Singh, Ratan Kumar, Mahendra Singh, Praveen Kumar, Bhola Kumar, and Alka Pandey have filed a petition alleging irregularities in the election. The petitioner advocate Sudhir Ojha stated that the tribunal's order makes it clear that a case will be filed regarding his allegations of election rigging. Sachchidanand Singh is a respondent in the case. The dispute is pending with the Central Election Tribunal. 

Also read: Bihar Bar Council Journal removes names of members of Bihar State Bar Council due to pending dispute before Central Election Tribunal 

After 7 years, bar council elections to took place in Bihar 

Supreme Court adjudicates on constitutionality of Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in State of Bihar after declaration of result, governmet formation

In the aftermath of declaration of results of the election to the 18th Bihar legislative assembly on November 14, 2025 and formation of the State government on November 20, 2025, in Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) & Ors. v. Election Commission of India & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi delivered a 124-page long judgement on the constitutionality of Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the electoral rolls in State of Bihar and the power of the Election Commission of India under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. The judgement was authored by the Chief Justice India. The ADR case was heard along with 18 other writ petitions but the judgement does not name them. Their petitions are:-

1.Manoj Kumar Jha vs. Election Commission of India, 
2.Mujahid Alam vs. Election Commission of India, 
3.Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. Union of India, 
4.People's Union For Civil Liberties vs. Election Commission of India, 
5.Yogendra Singh Yadav vs. Election Commission of India, 
6.Mahua Moitra vs. Election Commission of India, 
7.K.C.Venugopal vs. Election Commission of India, 
8.Rajeev Ranjan vs. Union of India, 
9.Arshad Ajmal vs.Election Commission of India, 
10.Akhtarul Iman vs. Election Commission of India, 
11.Zarif Hosain vs. Election Commission of India, 
12.Mohammad Adeeb vs. The Election Commission of India, 
13.Sudhakar Singh vs. Election Commission of India, 
14.Thol Thirumavalavan vs. Election Commission of India, 
15.National Federation for Indian Women vs. Election Commission of India, 
16.P.K. Kunhalikyutty vs.Election Commission of India, 
17.Rajesh Ranjan@Pappu Yadav vs. Election Commission of India, 
18.Vaibhav Mishra vs. Election Commission of India 

The Court concluded:"The Impugned SIR exercise neither stands in direct conflict with the RP Act and the 1960 Rules, nor does it detract from  the constitutional imperative of free and fair elections. It is, instead, an exercise traceable to Section 21(3) of the RP Act read with Article 324 of the Constitution, undertaken to  advance the very objective which Part XV of the Constitution  is designed to protect." The Court pronounced the judgement, upon hearing a batch of writ petitions instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, assailing the impugned  order directing SIR in Bihar. The petitioners contended that, unless quashed, the impugned order is liable to result in the arbitrary disenfranchisement of lakhs of voters in the State of Bihar, thereby imperilling the conduct of free and fair elections. The Court recorded:"9. We deem it appropriate to clarify that certain petitions (for instance, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 855 of 2025) have in fact been instituted in support of the SIR exercise. The petitioner(s) in these cases have urged that such an exercise ought to be conducted at regular intervals to prevent and curb the inclusion of ineligible persons in the electoral rolls on account of illegal  influx.

It all began with the issuance of the impugned order by the Election Commission of India in purported exercise of its powers under Article 324 of the Constitution of India, read with  Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RP Act), directing an SIR of the electoral rolls in every Assembly constituency of the State of Bihar. The impugned order recorded that the last intensive revision in the State of Bihar was conducted in 2003, and that, over the past  two decades, substantial changes in the electoral rolls have  occurred inter alia on account of rapid urbanisation and large￾scale migration. Therefore, in furtherance of its constitutional  mandate to safeguard the integrity of the electoral rolls and ensure free and fair elections, the Commission resolved to undertake a nationwide SIR. 

Given that general elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly were anticipated later in 2025, the Commission directed the conduct of SIR in the State of Bihar.. In terms of Clause 11 of the impugned order, the Commission decided to treat the 2003 electoral roll, with January 1, 2003 as the  qualifying date, as probative evidence of eligibility, unless rebutted. The impugned order, in Clause 12, further stipulated that any person not listed in the 2003 roll must produce one or more prescribed government documents to establish their eligibility as an elector. The impugned order also provided that for the aforesaid purpose, the Commission shall release an Enumeration Form to be filled  and submitted by July 25, 2025, failing which the elector’s name  would be excluded from the draft rolls. The Enumeration Form provided an indicative list of Eleven (11) documents that could be submitted along with the Enumeration Form, each of which would be considered a sufficient document in itself. Clause 14 of the impugned order read with the accompanying Guidelines (SIR Guidelines) thereafter added that, after the publication of the draft roll, the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO)/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO) were required to scrutinise the eligibility of the proposed electors in  accordance with Article 326 of the Constitution, read with Sections 16 and 19 of the RP Act. Upon such scrutiny, where the eligibility of any person is found to be doubtful, the ERO/AERO was mandated to issue a show-cause notice setting out the  grounds for the proposed exclusion, allow the concerned elector to submit a response, and thereafter render a reasoned and  speaking order in the matter.  

The impugned order further added that any person aggrieved by a decision of the ERO shall be entitled to  prefer an appeal before the District Magistrate under Section 24(a) of the RP Act, read with Rule 27 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 (1960 Rules). Furthermore, it was also stipulated that if the elector remains dissatisfied with the decision of the District Magistrate, a second appeal may be filed before the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) within thirty days, in terms of Section 24(b) of the RP Act, read with Rule 27 of the  1960 Rules. Along with thei mpugned order, the Commission also published detailed SIR Guidelines for the conduct of the exercise. It was envisaged that the exercise would be carried out through a structured House￾to-House enumeration, the rationalisation of polling stations, and the preparation of electoral rolls. It was also stipulated that Booth Level Officers (BLOs) would visit each household, distribute pre-filled enumeration forms to existing electors, and collect the duly filled forms along with requisite documents, with an additional facility for online submission and verification. In addition, the SIR Guidelines also contemplated that the draft electoral roll would include only those electors from whom  enumeration forms had been received, either physically or through verified online submission, while the names of those who failed to submit such forms would not be included at the draft stage. Shortly after the publication of the Impugned Order and the SIR Guidelines, the Commission issued a Press Note on June 28, 2025 declaring the commencement of the SIR in the State of Bihar.

Referring to the measures adopted by the Election Commission of India, the judgement reads: "The Impugned SIR exercise, as conducted, satisfies the requirements of proportionality. The measures adopted bear a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, are not manifestly excessive, and are accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exclusion. The  Impugned exercise was founded upon a legitimate and  constitutionally grounded purpose, namely, the restoration  of the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the electoral  rolls. Having regard to the nature of the problem sought to be addressed, the scale of the exercise undertaken, and the procedural safeguards incorporated during its implementation, the measures adopted by the Commission cannot be said to be disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved."

Justice Surya Kant wrote:"While inclusion in the electoral roll gives rise to a presumption of validity, such presumption is rebuttable and cannot be construed as imposing a blanket embargo on the powers of the Commission to undertake a Special Intensive Revision. The decision in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) does not compel a contrary conclusion, being confined to the context of adjudicatory proceedings and not extending to a systemic, inquisitorial exercise undertaken in furtherance of the Commission’s constitutional mandate." He added: "The deletions effected pursuant to the Impugned SIR exercise cannot be said to be contrary to the procedure prescribed under Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules. The  safeguards of notice and hearing are preserved in substance,  and the process adopted by the Commission remains within the bounds of the statutory mandate." The judgement reads: "The documentation regime prescribed by the Commission  represents a considered exercise of its administrative discretion in furtherance of its Constitutional mandate. The classification of documents, including the exclusion of certain categories (apart from Aadhar Card, which was directed to be included vide Order dated 08.09.2025), is  based on intelligible criteria having a direct nexus with the objective of ensuring the integrity of the electoral roll. We  are, therefore, unable to hold that the impugned documentation framework is arbitrary or violative of the  statutory scheme." 

The Division  Bench concluded:"The Commission is empowered, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate, to undertake a limited enquiry into citizenship for the purpose of satisfying itself as to eligibility for inclusion in the electoral roll. Such an enquiry does not amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict sense, and any action taken pursuant thereto is confined to  electoral consequences alone. The consequence of such a determination is correspondingly limited. It affects the individual’s entitlement to be included in the electoral roll, and thereby their right to participate in the electoral process. It does not, however, operate to divest the individual of claims of citizenship, nor does it foreclose a determination of 
that question by the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act. g) In cases where the Commission is not satisfied that a person  meets the statutory conditions for inclusion in the electoral  roll, it would be incumbent upon it to refer such an individual to the competent authority within the Central Government for adjudication in accordance with law. The Commission’s determination, being confined to electoral  purposes, cannot assume finality on the question of citizenship. Any deletion effected on this ground shall, therefore, remain subject to the outcome of such adjudication by the appropriate authority. h) Regarding persons whose names have been deleted from the 2003 roll on account of the Commission being of the opinion that they are not citizens, the Commission shall refer such cases within 4 weeks to the Competent authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955, for adjudication of their citizenship. The Competent Authority shall take the necessary decision in accordance with law, preferably before the next  Parliamentary, Assembly, Local Body elections, whichever is earlier, after giving notice and an opportunity of hearing to 
the deleted individuals, if any. In the event the Competent Authority holds that such deleted individuals are citizens, they shall be included in the electoral roll. In addition  thereto, all persons who are domiciled in Bihar and whose names have been erroneously deleted on the ground that they are absent, dead, shifted or in duplication may assail the decision of the Commission by way of judicial review. 

The Court arrived at these findings after grappling with the following issues: 1. Whether the Election Commission of India has power to  conduct the Impugned Special Intensive Revision? 2.  Whether the Impugned Special Intensive Revision is founded on a legitimate purpose, and if so, whether the measures adopted  by the Election Commission of India are proportionate to the object sought to be achieved? 3.  Whether the procedure adopted by the Election Commission of India in conducting the Impugned Special Intensive Revision is contrary to, or in violation of, the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960? 4. Whether, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate of preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls, and in furtherance of the statutory conditions governing such  registration, the Election Commission of India is empowered to scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll?

Given the fact that democracy is a government by dialogue, the judgment is nothing but articulation of judicial viewpoint in the ongoing dialogue. There are catena of judgments of the Supreme Court of India and elsewhere that demonstrate the a lot of Division Bench judgements do not have a long life. It is nothing more than a viewpoint of two of the judges of the Court, which may or may not be consequential. The continued possession of the illegitimate money cornered through electoral bonds despite 232-page long judgement dated February 15, 2024 by 5-Judge Constitution Bench of CJI Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Justices B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra and Sanjeev Khanna in Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2024) is illustrative.

The Constitution Bench concluded: "a. The Electoral Bond Scheme, the proviso to Section 29C(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 (as amended by Section 137 of Finance Act 2017), Section 182(3) of the Companies Act (as amended by Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017), and Section 13A(b) (as amended by Section 11 of Finance Act 2017) are violative of Article 19(1)(a) and unconstitutional; and b. The deletion of the proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act permitting unlimited corporate contributions to political parties is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 217. We direct the disclosure of information on contributions received by political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme to give logical and complete effect to our ruling. On 12 April 2019, this Court issued an interim order directing that the information of donations received and donations which will be received must be submitted by political parties to the ECI in a sealed cover. This Court directed that political parties submit detailed particulars of the donors as against each Bond, the amount of each bond and the full particulars of the credit received against each bond, namely, the particulars of the bank account to which the amount has been credited and the date on which each such credit was made." 

Justice Khanna in his separate but concurring judgement had concluded:"In case the Bonds issued (within the validity period) are with the donor/purchaser, the donor/purchaser may return them to the authorised bank for refund of the amount. In case the Bonds (within the validity period) are with the donee/political party, the donee/political party will return the Bonds to the issuing bank, which will then refund the amount to the donor/purchaser. On failure, the amount will be credited to the Prime Ministers Relief Fund." 

The billion dollar question is: what has Election Commission of India done with the "information of donations received and donations" submitted by political parties to it in a "sealed cover"? What has Supreme Court of India done about it? what will happen if some day it comes to light that the influence of electoral bond is found to be behind the entire SIR process? 

 

 

 

Supreme Court upholds 2017 judgement by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Mohit Kumar Shah affirming judgement by Trial Court in a 43 year old case from Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur

In Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh & Ors vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh delivered a 13-page long judgement dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"28. We are satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offences charged against the appellants. The concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 29. The brutality of the incident, in which five persons belonging to the same family lost their lives and several others including women and children sustained serious injuries, shocks the judicial conscience. The Courts below have rightly observed that the case leaves no room for misplaced sympathy or leniency. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. 31. Consequently, the appeals stand dismissed. 32. The surviving accused persons, except those who have been granted the benefit of juvenility by this Court or Courts below, are directed to surrender forthwith before the Trial Court concerned and serve the remaining part of their sentence. Their bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled." 

The High Court's 142-page long judgement dated August 3, 2017 was delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Mohit Kumar Shah. It was authored by Justice Kumar. 

The High Court's order dated recorded hat Vidya Nand Rai son of Bhujawan Rai,  Ramadhar Rai, son of Subudh Lal Rai and Rama Nand Rai, son of Mahendra Rai were juvenile on the date of occurrence. Justice Kumar's judgement remitted their cases to the Juvenile Justice Board for imposing appropriate fine to be paid to the family of the victim. The trial court's sentence in respect of these three appellants was set aside. Their current fate is not known. 

Referring to the judgement authored by Justice Kumar, Supreme Court observed: “The High Court has meticulously summarised the role of each accused person and identified those who ignited the straw, those who set the house on fire, those who chased the fleeing victims and those who inflicted fatal blows upon the deceased persons”. All the appellants were residents of village Jamalpur Kodai, Police Station Gaighat, District Muzaffarpur and they were convicted by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur on June 5, 1989 in Sessions Trial No. 21 of 1985 and 127 of 1985. 

Supreme Court asserted: "20. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced and upon perusal of the entire material on record, we find no merit in the appeals. 21. The High Court’s assessment of the evidence is detailed and reasoned.....23. The findings recorded by the High Court clearly establish that the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly, were armed with deadly weapons and acted in furtherance of their common object of setting the house ablaze and causing death of members of the family of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. 24. Once the common object of the unlawful assembly stands established, every member thereof becomes vicariously liable for acts committed in prosecution of such common object. The liability contemplated under Section 149 IPC squarely stands attracted in the facts of the present case." 

 With regard to Jagannath Ravidas, "both the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently found that he had actively facilitated the commission of the offence by disarming the victims at a crucial stage and thereby emboldening the mob. We find no reason to take a different view."

The court dismissed the appeals filed by Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh and others, the convicts had challenged the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld their conviction and life imprisonment awarded by the trial court. The incident occurred on the day of Holi in March 1983 in a village in Muzaffarpur district. A mob of at least 58 persons, armed with deadly weapons, surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, set it on fire and brutally killed five persons while injuring several others, including women and children. The court noted that the evidence clearly established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, were armed with lethal weapons, and acted in furtherance of their common object to set the house ablaze and cause the deaths. Once the common object is proved, every member becomes vicariously liable for the acts committed. The accused actively participated at different stages — surrounding the house, setting it on fire, chasing the victims, and assaulting them. Several appellants had died during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court, leading to abatement of their cases. It directed the surviving convicts — except those who received the benefit of juvenility — to surrender immediately before the trial court and serve the remaining part of their sentences.

The High Court had affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants in connection with a gruesome incident of mass violence which took place on March 29, 1983 in village Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur. 

The incident was reported to the police, leading to registration of Gaighat P.S. Case of 1983. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheets were laid and the accused persons were sent up for trial. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 436, 302/149, 324/34, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The accused Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, was separately charged under Sections 302/109, 436/109, 379/109, 324/109 and 323/109 IPC on the allegation that he had actively abetted the commission of the offences.

The prosecution case disclosed that the genesis of the occurrence lay in an earlier dispute relating to a pumping set and refusal by the prosecution side to withdraw a criminal case concerning the alleged loot of a khesari crop. On the date of occurrence, which coincided with the festival of Holi, a large mob armed with deadly weapons including lathi, bhala, garasa and farsa surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. At the relevant time Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, one of the deceased, was attempting to defend the inmates of the house with his licensed gun and revolver. The prosecution had alleged that Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, arrived at the place of occurrence, forcibly seized the licensed firearm and revolver from the deceased, displayed the same before the mob and thereby emboldened the assailants to proceed with the attack. Immediately thereafter, the mob allegedly set the house ablaze. The family members who attempted to flee from the burning house towards the southern field were chased and mercilessly assaulted by the members of the unlawful assembly.  The investigation disclosed that Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, Braj Bhushan Choudhary, Dr. Indranand Mishra, Lalan @ Ravi Bhushan Choudhary, and Anil Kumar Jha, died as a result of ante-mortem injuries sustained during the occurrence. The injured persons included Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, Mani Kumari, Uma Devi, Maheshwari Devi, Satyendra Jha, Saraswati Devi, Urmila Devi, Murti Devi, Ram Chandra Mahto, Abinash Choudhary, Dauli (child), Arvind Kumar, Usha Mishra, Rita Devi, Punam Kumari, Doyal Mona, Ajay Kumar Choudhary, Munish Kumar and others, many of whom had sustained grievous injuries. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 46 witnesses including numerous injured eyewitnesses. The defence examined 13 witnesses. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a case from Jehanabad

In Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George passed a 4-page long order dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:" 7. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 27.04.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to take any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 8. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail. 9. The impugned judgment and order dated 12.03.2026 is set aside." The impugned order was passed by Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh.

The appellant had challenges the judgment and order by Justice Singh. On April 27, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads: "8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.5790020250137 of 2025 of Kako Police Station, Jehanabad District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. However, in the attending facts, one of the conditions shall necessarily be that if the petitioner possesses a passport, the same shall be deposited before the Competent Authority/Court, till the
conclusion of the Trial or directed otherwise. 9. The petitioner shall make himself available before the Investigating Officer on 04.05.2026 at 10:00 a.m. and on all such dates as he may be required. 10. Needless to add, till the investigation is not complete in all respects, the petitioner would fully cooperate, and if the challan/charge sheet is filed, he would maintain good conduct and not attempt to influence any
of the witnesses in any manner till the completion of the trial.”

Supreme Court's May 2026 order pointed out that "5.Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty It is not in dispute that the conditions stand fully complied with; the appellant has cooperated during the investigation; he has not threatened or intimidated any of the witnesses; or has tried to influence the investigation in any manner. 6. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed.

Earlier, in Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Prabhat Kumar Singh passed a 2-page long order dated March 12, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"3. As per F.I.R., this petitioner is alleged to have created obstruction in construction of ‘pucca nala’ work and also assaulted informant, who is a government employee while executing his government lawful duty, and due to which, the construction work could not be completed. 4. Considering the nature of accusation, the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioner is rejected." Supreme Court has reversed Justice Singh's order. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in Kako P.S. Case of 2025, registered for offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 126(2), 115(2), 110 and 132 of the Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023, which pertain to rioting, wrongful restraint,  voluntarily causing hurt, and attempt to commit culpable homicide respectively. The case was filed in the High Court on September 8, 2025 and registered on September 10, 2025.

Justice Ansul quashes order of 2020 by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in a matter of new FIR post settlement of dispute relating to dowry, marriage

In Ashok Kumar Choubey @ Ashok Choubey & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Ansul delivered a 4-page long judgement dated May 27, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "7. In view of the matter that the dispute relating to dowry and marriage was settled between the parties and the new FIR relates to allegation of molestation and continuance of this prosecution is bad in law, malafide and abuse of the process of the Court. The FIR lodged at Delhi is continuing and the same may be taken to its logical conclusion. In view thereof, order dated 14.09.2020 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 is hereby quashed. 8. Accordingly, the application stands allowed." The judgement was reserved on March 18, 2026 upon hearing the parties. Prior to Justivce Ansul the case was heard by Justices Prabhat Kumar Singh, Partha Sarthy, Sandeep Kumar and Soni Shrivastava. 

Notably, Justice Sandeep Kumar had stayed the proceedings of the trial court by his order dated March 27, 2025 during pendency of the application. The case was filed in the High Court on January 24, 2022 and registered on February 4, 2022 in the matter arising out of P.S.case dated July 28, 2018.

The application was filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated September 14, 2020 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the learned Court has taken cognizance under Sections 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The prosecution case was that the informant alleged that marriage of her daughter was fixed between respective parents Ashok Kumar Choubey (petitioner no. 1) and Om Prakash Tiwari. Ring Ceremony was held at Delhi at the residence of Petitioner no. 1. On May 12, 2018, Petitioner no 1 visited Patna and informant’s husband gave Rs. 6 lakhs cash to him. On June 15, 2018 informant and her husband visited at the residence of Petitioner no. 1 where the petitioners demanded Rs. 10 lakh cash and one Honda City Car. Thereafter, marriage was cancelled on July 21, 2018. Later the marriage was attempted to be settled but due to unavoidable issues the marriage negotiations broke down. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the parties had gathered before the SHO, Rajendra Nagar on July 22, 2018 i.e. the petitioner no. 1, the proposed bridegroom and father of the bride. Both the parties gave a letter to the SHO claiming that they have decided not to get the marriage ceremony conducted and they have returned the goods of each other and they have no complaint against each other. Moreover, the girl an filed FIR in the Rajendra Nagar (New Delhi) Police Station. The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that police submitted final form in this case bearing final report dated October 31, 2019 stating that the case was found to be false. However, magistrate differing with the final form took cognizance under Section 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Justice Ansul observed: "The crux of the allegation is that a marriage negotiation went bad. Even though some gadgets or money were exchanged but there is a document clearly showing that the parties returned their gifts and settled their dispute amicably. Still the instant case was filed and thereafter the daughter of the informant filed Central Delhi Rajendra Nagar P.S. Case No. 182 of 2018 on 19.09.2018. The lady in the FIR has not stated that the document signed by the parties on 22.07.2018 was either forged or obtained by any wrongful means. She has plainly written about the same and then has stated that she wishes to lodge the FIR in view of the later development." 

 

As a CBI judge I have learnt State as a litigant is fully capable of tampering with Medico-Legal Case reports, postmortem reports, forensic reports: Jay Thareja, Central Project Coordinator, e-Courts Project, Delhi High Court

Jay Thareja, who has served as a judge of CBI special courts and is currently the Central Project Coordinator, the e-Courts Project at the Delhi High Court, observed: "....a lot of process re-engineering is coming from the legislature. As sir has rightly pointed out but we are now even looking at med and e forensics where the legislature and the executive now want us that the MLC should also be stored with them and as a judge doing a trial I should only get a hyperlink through which I go to that particular portal and access that MLC. So the question is do we want traditionally the document has been housed with us once the MLC comes on my file and it is with my helm or my court custodian I maintain the sanctity if it continues with them then yes you can probably involve blockchain technology but what it only guarantees as I have learned now that if there is a change I will get to know there's a change but the original document is most likely lost so we while doing our criminal trials and this criminal juris to students really need to think that whether these these videos made as per section 105 of BNSS, the MLC's the postmortem reports and the forensic reports are to be housed with us maybe as a copy or are to be still housed with the state which is a litigant before me and fully capable of as I have learned lively in my tenure as a as a CBI judge as well fully capable of tampering with them so this is my input on the subject now what happens. If there is electronic evidence and you store a copy as you say does it not become secondary evidence. I concur and I would genuinely believe that a lot of process re-engneering would apart from requiring change in rules will require change in statute. There's been a push towards cloud storage also but personally I may think of data storage on site with us but then there's been a great push for cloud storage. I know sir as as a CPC I have encountered documents of the government of India insisting that we should go towards cloud storage but I absolutely concur with you I have always been susceptible about keeping things with the executive on the other side I want control with myself and that's the view which my chairperson at the Delhi high court also shares." MLC refers to Medico-Legal Case. These observations imply that UID/Aadhaar electronic database too can be tampered with.

                                                                        Prior to that Thareja said, "....if a high court truly has to achieve process re-engineering, there has to be some synergy between the rules committee and the IT committee. And one way I would suggest of achieving that is there should be identity of members. At least two or three members in both the committees should be the same that results in very quick transmission of ideas and plans. The other suggestion or idea I have is that the registister rules of the high court should ideally be someone who's previously been CPC. I am not pitching a case for my elevation to that position but or somebody who has been a master trainer of the E committee because that again makes this process of alignment very easy between those two committees. The next thing which I have to say I agree with Justice Bishnoi  process realignment re-engineering the precondition is e filing or digitization at your level apart from that I genuinely believe that every high court needs a data center that is the center point at which you are supposed to house everything and if today Madhya Pradesh is succeeding as it is succeeding it's because of that excellent data center that they have so that is a precondition that is where every data of the high court or the district court should be brought in and Then we have to see how the processes can be aligned around that data."  

                                                                   Thareja was a  discussant for Session on Rule, Process Alignment, and Re-engineering. He was spoke on May 1, 2026 during the National Conclave on Technology and Judicial Education organised by the High Court of Sikkim in collaboration with the eCommittee, Supreme Court of India during May 1-2, 2026 in Gangtok. The panel included Justice Atul Sreedharan, Judge, Allahabad High Court, Justice Ravindra Maithani, Judge, Uttarakhand High Court and Justice Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar, Judge, Madhya Pradesh High Court. The discussion was moderated by Justice Anjani Mishra, former Judge Vice Chairman, e-Committee, Supreme Court of India. It is noteworthy that no academician who deal with technology and law was included as a speaker as part of the conclave.

                                                                    Professor (Dr.) S. Sivakumar, President, Commonwealth Legal Education Association remarked that the deliberations had gone beyond mere digitisation and focused on broader institutional transformation, where technology is used to improve access, efficiency, and transparency in a meaningful way. He stated that discussions on e-filing emphasised not just technical implementation but also usability, inclusiveness, and trust. The focus was on re-engineering judicial processes to simplify procedures and enhance institutional clarity. He observed that tools such as blockchain could strengthen the security and integrity of judicial records, while artificial intelligence offered opportunities to support research, organisation, and case management. He stressed that there must be a balanced approach, where technology assists judicial functions without replacing human judgment, which remains central to the delivery of justice. He also underscored the importance of judicial education in adapting to these changes, noting that learning systems must evolve to integrate legal knowledge with technological understanding. He stressed that collaboration across jurisdictions, particularly within the Commonwealth, would play a key role in strengthening capacity and sharing best practices. Highlighting concerns around the digital divide, he cautioned that unequal access to technology could lead to unequal access to justice, and stressed the need for inclusive systems. He stated that the true measure of technological advancement in the judiciary lay not only in efficiency, but in ensuring fairness, protecting rights, and strengthening the justice delivery system, and called for a continued commitment to innovation, collaboration, and ethical governance. 

Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, Judge, High Court of Sikkim mphasised that the changing nature of the justice delivery system, he stated that technology was no longer merely an administrative tool but an integral part of judicial infrastructure. He added that the discussions reflected a growing recognition within the judiciary that delays often stem from systemic inefficiencies, which must be addressed through timely and thoughtful reforms. He also observed that the judiciary was entering a new phase of transformation, focused on redesigning institutions to make them more responsive and efficient. He emphasised that such progress must be guided by constitutional values and human sensitivity to ensure that justice remains fair and accessible. 

In his address, Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque, Chief Justice of the High Court of Sikkimh spoke on the collaborative nature of the conclave. Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Judge, Sikkim High Court also shared her refelctions. The conclave concluded with a note of gratitude delivered by Sonam Denka Wangdi, Central Project Coordinator, High Court of Sikkim. The welcome address was delivered by Tashi Rapten Barfungpa, President, Bar Association of Sikkim (High Court and Subordinate Courts).  In his valedictory address, Om Prakash Mathur, the Governor of Sikkim underscored the urgent need to integrate technology with legal education and judicial processes, while ensuring inclusivity and accessibility, during the concluding session of a two-day conference on Judicial and Technological Education. Referring to innovations such as e-processes, paperless courts, digital records, e-filing, hybrid court models, and live streaming of proceedings, the Governor said these initiatives are redefining judicial administration across the country. Sikkim has begun the transition towards becoming India’s first fully paperless judiciary, in line with the broader vision of Digital India. The Governor spoke about the expanding role of Artificial Intelligence and digital management systems, describing them as essential to equipping judicial institutions to address complex legal challenges, particularly in the evolving cyber landscape. He called for a balanced approach to ensure that technological advancement does not compromise accessibility. He advocated for greater use of local languages in judicial proceedings, supported by translators and modern applications, to make the system more citizen-friendly. He also cautioned against the misuse of publicly accessible court proceedings on social media platforms, urging the need for safeguards and stricter legal provisions to counter misinformation and propaganda related to judicial decisions. 

 

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Harish Kumar set aside judgement by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma in case of compassionate appointment of peon's son

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Ravi Shankar Kumar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench f Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 33-page long judgement dated May13, 2026, wherein, it concluded:".....this Court, with utmost respect to the learned Single Judge, is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment/order suffers from patent illegality and is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kirti Narayan Prasad and Devendra Sharma (supra). Accordingly, the judgment/order dated 28.02.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 12607 of 2014 is hereby set aside. Consequently,the writ petition stands dismissed. The present Letters Patent Appeal stands allowed." 

The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar set aside the judgement by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma. Justice Kumar relied on Supreme Court's 16-page long judgment dated November 30, 2018, in State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Kirti Narayan Prasad [(2019) 13 SCC 250 and 39-page long judgement dated October 17, 2019 in State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Devendra Sharma [(2020) 15 SCC 466. The former was delivered by a 3-Judge Bench of the Court and authored by Justice S. Abdul Nazeer. The latter was delivered by a Division Bench of the Court and authored by Justice Hemant Gupta. Justice Kumar had relied on these judgements in his 21-page long judgement dated June 19, 2025 in Mulmul Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025) as well but to set aside the order dated August 4, 2022 passed by the Civil Surgeon Cum Chief Medical Officer, Supaul, the respondent no.3. He had concluded: "35. This Court directs the concerned respondent(s) to ensure payment of all the admissible death-cum-retiral/outstanding dues to the petitioner...." The six respondents were: The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar, Director in Chief (Nursing), Health Services, Bihar, The Civil Surgeon Cum Chief Medical Officer, Supaul, Incharge Medical Officer, Primary Health Centre, Basantpur, Supaul, District Treasury Officer Supaul and Accountant General, Bihar.The writ petition was allowed to the indicated extent.  

In the present LPA, Justice Kumar as part of the Division Bench grappled with following five issues and concluded:  (i) As to whether the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kirti Narayan Prasad (supra) and Devendra Sharma (supra) would be applicable to the case of the present writ petitioner, particularly when neither the petitioner nor his father was a party to the said proceedings? The law laid down by the Supreme Court "in Kirti Narayan Prasad and Devendra Sharma (supra) shall squarely apply to the case of the present writ petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that neither the writ petitioner nor his deceased father was a party to the aforesaid cases." 

(ii) Whether the services of the petitioner’s father, who died in harness on April 15, 2012, can be declared “illegal” posthumously, without affording him an opportunity to contest such findings? Once the Division Bench of the High Court found that the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Kirti Narayan Prasad and Devendra Sharma (supra) are fully applicable to the facts of the present case, and further that the services of the petitioner’s father had already been categorized as “illegal” during his lifetime, based upon the report of the Committee, the finding of which was duly accepted in the above noted cases, "this Court finds no difficulty in reaffirming and accepting such finding of illegal appointment in light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Even, if it is after the death of the petitioner’s father, in view of the settled position of law that when death occurs after conclusion of inquiry or the matter is pending, either for final order or appellate stage, there can be no abatement of proceeding." 

(iii) Whether, the State and its authorities having extended all consequential service benefits, including salary and death-cum-retiral dues to the petitioner’s father, it is open to them at this stage to treat his appointment as illegal? Irrespective of the fact that the petitioner’s father had been granted consequential service benefits, including salary and death-cum-retiral dues during the pendency of the proceedings, "there exists no legal impediment even at this stage in treating the very appointment as illegal in terms of the law laid down in Kirti Narayan Prasad and Devendra Sharma (supra)."

(iv) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the State is legally justified in declining to consider the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds?  The Division Bench judgement reads: "....the State is legally justified in declining to consider the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground."

(v) Whether the petitioner’s claim of parity with similarly situated persons, such as Munna Kumar, can be denied without any justifiable basis?  The judgement reads: "Once this Court has already concluded and held that the appointment of the petitioner’s father was illegal in terms of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as noticed hereinabove, the petitioner’s claim of parity with Munna Kumar and others, who are stated to have been granted compassionate appointment, is wholly untenable both in law and on facts.

The intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (LPA), was directed against the order dated February 28, 2025 passed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma, the Single Judge had delivered a 12-page long judgement dated February 28, 2025, wherein, he allowed the writ petition. He set aside the memo dated March 27, 2014 and memo dated February 23, 2023 issued by Superintendent, Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College Hospital, Bhagalpur and directed him and District Magistrate, Bhagalpur cum chairman District Compassionate Appointment Committee, Bhagalpur "to take a fresh decision in accordance with law for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground, considering all the aforesaid facts within a period of three months from the date of production/receipt of copy of this order and take the matter to a logical conclusion considering his father to be in service on the date of his death." 

Earlier, in  Ravi Shankar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Health, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma had delivered a 12-page long judgement dated February 28, 2025, wherein, he allowed the writ petition. He set aside the memo dated March 27, 2014 and memo dated February 23, 2023 issued by Superintendent, Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College Hospital, Bhagalpur and directed him and District Magistrate, Bhagalpur cum chairman District Compassionate Appointment Committee, Bhagalpur "to take a fresh decision in accordance with law for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground, considering all the aforesaid facts within a period of three months from the date of production/receipt of copy of this order and take the matter to a logical conclusion considering his father to be in service on the date of his death." 

The other four respondents were: Director in Chief Health Services, Bihar, Patna, Director, Health Services, Bihar, Superintendent, Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College Hospital, Bhagalpur and District Magistrate, Bhagalpur cum chairman District Compassionate Appointment Committee, Bhagalpur. 

The writ petition was filed for quashing the memo dated March 27, 2014 issued under the signature of Superintendent, Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College Hospital, Bhagalpur, the Respondent No. 4 whereby the petitioner was informed that his application for compassionate appointment will be considered after disposal of LPA and for quashing the memo dated March 23, 2023 issued under the signature of Respondent No. 4 by which the application filed by the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has been rejected by the Respondent No. 4 on the ground that the service of the father of the petitioner was not valid.

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the father of the petitioner was initially appointed on daily wage basis on March 28, 1987. Thereafter, vide memo dated March 29, 1990, the service of the father of the petitioner was absorbed to the post of peon in the scale of 775-1025 with effect from the date of joining and after more than 12 years from his appointment, the father of the petitioner has received a letter dated May 29, 1999 by which the father of the petitioner was informed that his appointment is prima facie irregular and father of the petitioner was restrained from work and his salary was also stopped by the authority concerned. The father of the petitioner had filed a writ petition bearing CWJC No. 6541 of 1999 and during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition the father of the petitioner was terminated from the service with effect from May 30, 1999 after the holding that his joining was irregular. The same was challenged by the father of the petitioner in the writ petition of 1999 and the same was heard along with other similar matters on February 26, 2004 and it was held that the petitioners came to the High Court seeking their salary but during the pendency they were terminated from service and the petitioner and other similarly situated persons are given liberty to take appropriate proceeding before the appropriate forum challenging the order of termination. The father of the petitioner had again filed a writ petition bearing CWJC No. 5114 of 2004 for quashing the order dated September 21, 1999 whereby he was terminated from service with effect from May 30, 1999 and the same was heard along with other similar cases and by common order dated June 26, 2006 passed in LPA No. 946 of 2003 and analogous cases, it was disposed of with direction to the authority, namely, Health Department, Government of Bihar to reconsider the cases of all the affected employees in light of the Constitution Bench Judgment passed in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi reported in 2006(3) PLJR 386 then after more than two year from the order dated June 26, 2006 passed in LPA No. 946 of 2003 and analogous cases, an enquiry report was communicated to the father of the petitioner by which his appointment was held illegal by the enquiry committee.

The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that before issuing enquiry report with respect to father of the petitioner, neither the father of the petitioner was given any opportunity of hearing nor any notice to the show cause was issued to him by the enquiry committee. Enquiry committee had issued the enquiry report in clear violation of principle of natural justice, equity and fair. Then father of the petitioner had again filed CWJC No. 8225 of 2009 for quashing the enquiry report with respect to him whereby appointment was held illegal and further for directing the respondent authority to reinstate him on the post on which he was working earlier before termination from service with all the salary and other consequential benefits. The writ petition was also heard along with other similar cases and finally vide order dated October 6, 2009 the imugned enquiry report as well as termination order was quahsed and the concerned authorities were directed to reinstate the petitioners on the post on which they were working before the termination with all the consequential benefits. The order dated October 6, 2009 passed in CWJC No. 6575 of 2009 and analogous cases was affirmed upto the Supreme Court. The father of the petitioner had filed a contempt petition bearing MJC No. 4848 of 2010 for initiating contempt of court proceeding against concerned authority for violation of order dated October 6, 2009 passed in CWJC No. 8225 of 2009. During the pendency of the contempt petition, an order was issued vide memo dated January 30, 2012 under the signature of the Respondent No. 4 by which father of the petitioner has been reinstated on the post on which he was working. Soon thereafter, the father of the petitioner died in harness on April 15, 2012 due to illness while working as Darban in the Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College Hospital, Bhagalpur. The entire dues salary due to the father of the petitioner from the date of termination until his reinstatement in terms of the order dated October 6, 2009 passed in CWJC No. 8225 of 2009 was paid to the petitioner vide order dated December 14, 2022.

The counsel for the petitioner had submitted the High Court that the father of the petitioner was reinstated pursuant to the direction of the High Court on 30.01.2012 and while he was working, he died in harness on April 15, 2012 due to illness which suggests that father of the petitioner was in service on the date of his death. So the petitioner was eligible for appointment on compassionate ground and apart from that the similarly situated person, namely, Munna Kumar whose case was considered by the authority concerned and Munna Kumar was appointed on the basis of compassionate ground by the authority concerned and in the present case the authority has intentionally not considered the case of the petitioner and the respondents have rejected the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground by referring some orders passed in Civil Appeal No. 8649 of 2018 as well as Civil Appeal No. 7879 of 2019 by the Supreme Court in which neither the petitioner nor his late father was a party and apart from that from perusal of the order dated 11.01.2024 passed in MJC No. 47972 of 2018, the High Court had held that the aforesaid orders passed by the Supreme Court are in personam and not in rem. 

Justice Verma had observed that on the date of death, the father of the petitioner was in service and apart from that the state authority had paid all the retirement cum death benefits to the petitioner. On "one hand the state has admitted that his father was in service and on other hand, the state has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that his father was not in service." The judgement recorded that apart from that the letter no. 1323 dated February 23, 2023 by which the respondents have rejected the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, refers some orders of the Supreme Court in which neither the petitioner nor his late father was a party and apart from that the order passed in MJC No. 47972 of 2018, it is crystal clear that the High Court has held that the aforesaid orders passed by the Supreme Court are in personam and not in rem. 

Now the Division Bench has reversed the judgement by Justice Verma. A comparison between judgement dated June 19, 2025 by Justice Kumar as Single Judge and the judgement dated February 28, 2025 by Justice Verma as Single Judge is likely to offer fruitful insight.