Transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas in exercise of statutory powers is valid in law

In Civil Court Bar Association & Anr. vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Ors. ( 2026), Division Bench of Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Swarupama Chaturvedi held on May 26 that where an action is taken under statutory authority, its validity cannot be questioned independently without first challenging the provision conferring such power.

The Allahabad High Court has held that transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas in exercise of statutory powers is valid in law.

The Court also held that a challenge to administrative or consequential action is not maintainable in the absence of any challenge to the statutory provisions under which such action is taken.

The Court was hearing writ petitions challenging administrative orders directing transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas under the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008.

It observed that “where an administrative or consequential action is founded upon a statutory provision, the same cannot be set aside without first dislodging the statutory foundation itself”, held: “The challenge to impugned orders is not maintainable in the absence of any challenge to the validity of the statutory provision under which it is passed, and further, applying the settled principle that a later enactment prevails over an earlier enactment in case of inconsistency, the transfer of maintenance proceedings from the Family Court constituted under the Family Courts Act, 1984 to the Gram Nyayalaya under Section 16 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 is held to be valid”.

The petitioners had challenged administrative orders passed by the District Judiciary transferring maintenance proceedings pending before Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas. The principal contention raised was that such a transfer deprived litigants of their statutory right of appeal to the High Court under the Family Courts Act, 1984 and was contrary to the legislative scheme.

It was also submitted that Family Courts, being special courts constituted for the adjudication of family disputes, possessed exclusive jurisdiction which could not be divested through administrative orders. The petitioners also argued that the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, operated in a distinct field and could not override the Family Courts Act.

The respondents submitted that the transfer by relying upon Sections 12 and 16 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, which empower Gram Nyayalayas to entertain maintenance claims and authorise transfer of pending proceedings.

The Court noted that Section 12 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act confers jurisdiction upon Gram Nyayalayas to entertain maintenance proceedings, while Section 16 empowers the District Judge to transfer pending cases. It further observed that Section 18 provides an overriding effect to the Act in criminal matters, thereby reinforcing the legislative intent to expand access to justice at the grassroots level.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that where two special statutes are irreconcilable, the later enactment must prevail. Relying on Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. (2001) and subsequent decisions, the Court held that the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, being a later enactment, would prevail to the extent of inconsistency.

The Court further held that the petitioners had failed to challenge the vires or applicability of the relevant provisions of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, namely Sections 12, 16, and 18, which constituted the very source of the power exercised.

It observed that “the validity of the action taken thereunder cannot be assailed in isolation,” and reiterated the principle that a consequential order cannot be challenged without assailing the foundational statutory provision.

The Court relied upon precedents, including V.K. Majotra vs. Union of India (2003) and Edukanti Kistamma vs. S. Venkatareddy (2010), to emphasise that courts cannot nullify actions taken under statutory authority without first striking down the enabling provision.

The judgement reads: “In the absence of any challenge to the vires or applicability of the statutory provisions, the validity of the action taken thereunder cannot be assailed in isolation, …it is a well-settled legal principle that where an administrative or consequential action is founded upon a statutory provision, the same cannot be set aside without first dislodging the statutory foundation itself, … the impugned orders, having been passed in exercise of powers provided in the enactment, cannot be termed as without jurisdiction so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution”.

The Court also observed that the impugned orders, being administrative in nature and traceable to statutory power, could not be termed as without jurisdiction to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The High Court held that the challenge to the administrative orders was not maintainable in the absence of any challenge to the statutory provisions under which such orders were passed.

The Court upheld the validity of the transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas under Section 16 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 and dismissed the writ petitions.

Any individual possessing special skills and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics can validly sign Part B of the standard-form certificate under Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

In Pune Bar Association vs. Union of India & Ors. (2026), 3-Judge Bench of Supreme Court of Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, Justice Vipul M. Panhcoli clarified that any individual possessing special skills and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics can validly sign Part B of the standard-form certificate under Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), provided the Court is satisfied. 

While disposing of a petition filed by the Pune Bar Association, the Court heard the challenge the constitutionality of Section 63(4) of the BSA and its accompanying Schedule. The petitioner had argued that the dual requirements of disclosing a digital record's hash value under Part A and obtaining a signature from a government-notified expert under Part B imposed an extremely onerous obligation on ordinary litigants, rendering the provision manifestly arbitrary and unjust.

The judgement read: "If the two sub-sections are read harmoniously, it is possible to hold, in addition to entities notified as Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A, if the Court is satisfied, on the basis of unimpeachable material, that any other person has special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics, opinion of such person may be held relevant as an expert with regard to electronic/digital record and such person may sign Part B of the Schedule as an expert."

It observed: "We are further fortified to make such observation as sub-section (2) of Section 39 (unlike 63(4) and erstwhile 65B) is not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records. The High Court had deferred adjudication of such issue and directed the State to notify adequate number of persons under Section 79A. Under these circumstances, we hold that the finding of the High Court that Part B must be filled up by an expert notified under Section 79A of the IT Act shall not be treated as a binding precedent."

The Pune Bar Association submitted that Section 63(4) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20231, read with the Schedule thereto, was unconstitutional as it imposed undue hardship on an ordinary litigant by requiring submission of a certificate prescribed in the Schedule comprising Part A, which needed disclosure of the hash value of digital records, and Part B, which must be signed by an expert. It was argued that the imposition of such pre-requisites for admissibility of electronic records is an extremely onerous obligation on a litigant and renders the provision manifestly arbitrary and unjust.

It observed that with the rapid advancement of technology, the digital space encroached upon all spheres of human life, and consequently, evidence in the form of electronic records became commonplace in all forms of litigation.

"Electronic record is a unique species of evidence which is liable to continuous mutation and modification affecting its authenticity, integrity and intrinsic evidentiary value. Challenges to admissibility and probative value of electronic records are further accentuated with the advent of artificial intelligence and deepfake technology. Such fast and varied transformation in technology necessitated reviewing the erstwhile Evidence Act and the BSA was enacted". 

It noted that such fast and varied transformations in technology necessitated a review of the erstwhile Evidence Act, which ultimately led to the enactment of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA). It observed that Section 63(4) of the BSA improved upon the certification envisaged under the old law by mandating a standard-form certificate prescribed in the Schedule.

The Court underlined that the hash value of electronic data was synonymous with an electronic fingerprint and provided a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data. Therefore, it observed that the necessity of incorporating the hash value in Part A of the certificate was intended to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the electronic record, and could not be said to lack a rational nexus with the object of the Act.

It observed that the requirement of a certification by an expert in Part B provided an additional layer of authenticity to secondary electronic evidence. It held the view that the new provision possessed a clear and rational nexus with the object of the law, and could not be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable so as to suffer from the vice of manifest arbitrariness.

It was pointed out that the judgment of the Madras High Court it merely referred to sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the BSA while omitting sub-section (1). Section 39(2), unlike Section 63(4) or the erstwhile Section 65B, was not prefaced by a non-obstante clause so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) from the arena of electronic records.

The Court noted that if sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 39 were read harmoniously, it was possible to hold that in addition to the entities notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, any other person possessing special skill and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics could be treated as an expert.

If the Court was satisfied on the basis of unimpeachable material regarding such expertise, the opinion of such a person would be relevant and they could validly sign Part B of the Schedule.

Supreme Court constitutes two more Election Tribunals under BCI besides three Central Election Tribunals/Committees constituted on June 25, 2023

In Savita Devi @ Savita Dhanda & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Suryakant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi passed a 3-page long order dated May 18, 2026. The  order reads: "All the State Bar Councils are directed to keep the records intact till the election disputes are finally decided by the Tribunal(s)" upon exploring the possibility of the constitution of one or two Election Tribunals for the purpose of speedy adjudication of the disputes arising from the ongoing elections of different State Bar Councils." The Court constituted two additional election tribunals for expeditious adjudication of disputes which arise out of elections to various State Bar Councils, while hearing petitions concerning alleged irregularities in the electoral process and implementation of reservation for women candidates. 

Kumud Lata Das, the Advocate-on-Record, the counsel for the petitioners made her submission regarding the role of the Bar Council of India (BCI) and the election process. Das argued that "the BCI should not be part of the adjudicatory mechanism since the petition itself alleged that the BCI’s decision to adopt a 'single composite ballot paper' had contributed to the controversy." It is noteworthy that besides Election Tribunal, the other committees of BCI are:Executive Committee, Legal Aid Committee, Advocates’ Welfare Committee, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Educational Institutions, Finance Committee, Co-ordination of State Bar Councils, Co-ordination of Bar Associations of the country, Rules Committee, Building Renovation Committee, Five members of Legal Education Committee, All India Bar Exam (AIBE) Committee, High Powered Verification Monitoring Committee, Disciplinary Committee and AIBE Tender/Selection Committee. The application of the Rule of Ejusdem Generis and a joint reading of the BCI's notification and its url of the Committees makes it crystal clear that Election Tribunal is one of the several committees of BCI headed by Manan Kumar Mishra.

As per the verdict of Supreme Court dated February 5, 2018 passed in T.C. No. 126 of 2015, the three men-Central Election Committees/Tribunals headed by a former Chief Justice of some High Court and consisting of two former Judges of any High Court was to be constituted by the Bar Council of India. The BCI.notified Rules in this regard by notification dated December 30, 2020 in accordance with the verdict of the Supreme Court. 

Rule 9 of Chaper-IV of the notification dated June 23, 2023 published in the Gazette of India, Bar Council of India Rules (for qualification/Disqualification and produce for election and code of conduct for the elections of S.B.C/B.C.I.) 2023 made provision for Central Election Appellate Committee/Tribunal of Bar Council of India. It reads:"In order to secure transparency and fairness and also to avoid the multiplicity of litigations in courts and for early disposal of the election disputes, there shall be an Election Appellate Committee of Bar Council of India consisting of a former Judge of Supreme Court of India to be nominated by Bar Council of India in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and two former Judges of High Court(s) to be nominated by Bar Council of India. Any final order/decision passed by the Central Election Committee/Tribunal can be challenged before this Election Appellate Committee (which may also be called the Election Appellate Tribunal of Bar Council of India) within a period of 15 days of the order/decision of Central Election Committee/Tribunal. The Central Election Committee and the Appellate Committee shall have their secretariat in the premises of Bar Council of India. The Appellate Election Committee shall frame its own Regulations for the disposal of appeals. The hearings before the Appellate Committee shall be in Hybrid Mode depending upon the convenience of the parties. The pleadings of petitioners/appeals/Replies/Rejoinders may be online or offline as per convenience of the parties. 

Earlier, three Central Election Tribunals/Committees were constituted on June 25, 2023.  The notification provides details about the composition of the Tribunals. Tribunal No. 1 comprises of Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, Former Chief Justice, Patna High Court,  Justice Arun Tandon, former Judge, High Court of Allahabad and local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council. Tribunal No. 2 comprises of Justice S. Mukherjee, Former Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka,  Justice Shivaji Pandey, former Judge, Patna High Court and  local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council. Tribunal No. 3 comprises of Justice Rajendra Menon, Former Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi, Justice M. Sathyanarayanan, former Judge, Madras High Court and local former Judge to be nominated by the State Bar Council.   

The BCI was required to make amendment in its notification in the light of the Supreme  Court's order dated May 18, 2026. The BCI has notified the Court's directions for the election disputes arising out of the elections to the State Bar Councils held in the year 2026. The directions provide for:

1. Constitution of Election Tribunals for State Bar Council Elections, 2026

For the purpose of adjudication of election petitions arising out of the elections to the State Bar Councils held with effect from the year 2026, the two Election Tribunals shall function as Election Tribunals of the Bar Council of India:

Election Tribunal I (a) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, former Judge, Supreme Court of India, as Chairperson; (b) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur, former Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh High Court, as Member; (c) Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, Senior Advocate, as Member.

Election Tribunal II (a) Hon’ble Ms. Justice Hima Kohli, former Judge, Supreme Court of India, as Chairperson; (b) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, former Chief Justice, Jharkhand High Court, as Member; (c) Ms. Kaveeta Wadia, Senior Advocate, as Member

2. Continuance of earlier pending matters
The constitution of the aforesaid Tribunals shall not, by itself, disturb election petitions, applications or proceedings relating to earlier elections or earlier assigned matters which are already pending before any existing Election Tribunal, including the Tribunal headed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajendra Menon, former Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi, along with its Members. Such pending matters shall continue before the Tribunal to which they already stand assigned, unless the Bar Council of India, for administrative reasons orders otherwise.

3. Filing of Election Petitions
Every election petition relating to the State Bar Council elections held with effect from the year 2026 shall be presented before the Secretary, Election Tribunal, Bar Council of India, who shall also act as the Secretary/Registry for the purpose of receipt, scrutiny and registration of such election petitions, complaints, applications or representations.

4. Allocation of matters
Upon presentation and registration of an election petition, the Bar Council of India shall allocate the matter to the concerned Election Tribunal (or the High Powered Election Supervisory Committee constituted by Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its Order dated 18.11.2025 having regard to the nature of the dispute, pendency, convenience and workload. The Bar Council of India may, for administrative convenience and expeditious disposal, allocate or reallocate matters among the Election Tribunals.

5. Limitation
Every election petition seeking to question or set aside an election, result or declaration of any returned candidate, or the election as a whole, shall be filed within thirty days from the date of declaration of the result. Provided that, in respect of those State Bar Councils whose results have already been declared before the date of publication of this notification, the election petition shall be filed within fifteen days from the date of publication of this notification in official gazette.

6. Fee
Every election petition shall be accompanied by proof of deposit of process fee of Rs.30,000/- in the account of the Bar Council of India and other complaints and/or applications shall be required to accompany a fee of Rs. 5,000/-as already prescribed under the Regulations notified in the Gazette of India on 10th October, 2023. The fee shall be payable to the Registrar of the Tribunal. No election petition shall be treated as duly filed unless accompanied by proof of such deposit, subject to such orders as may be passed by the concerned Election Tribunal.

7. Time frame for disposal
The Election Tribunals shall endeavour to dispose of election petitions as expeditiously as possible and, as far as practicable, within a maximum period of six weeks from the date of filing. The Election Tribunal may regulate its own procedure, curtail unnecessary adjournments, call for records, direct production of election papers, decide preliminary issues, and pass such procedural directions as may be necessary for expeditious and effective adjudication of election disputes.

8. Records and cooperation
All State Bar Councils, Returning Officers, Assistant Returning Officers, Observers, officers and other authorities connected with the election process shall extend full cooperation to the Election Tribunal and the Bar Council of India and any authority acting under the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court or the Election Tribunal, and shall produce records, election papers, result sheets, ballot-related material, correspondence and other relevant documents as and when requisitioned.

9. Power to issue clarifications
The Bar Council of India may issue such administrative clarifications, allocation orders, filing instructions, registry directions or consequential directions as may be necessary for giving effect to this notification and for ensuring timely disposal of election disputes.

Notably, in Yogamaya M.G vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 581/2024, Diary No. 38583/2024] and Shehla Chaudhary vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 1060/2025], the Court had issued notice in September 2024 in the matter of the under-representation of women, queer individuals, persons with disabilities, and marginalised communities in the BCI and State Bar Councils. The Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Bagchi has ordered, "We have to ensure that women members who are contesting/proposing to contest elections in the four Bar Councils of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab & Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Telangana, will contest the elections with full spirit. The Advocate-voters will also endeavour to ensure that adequate representation is provided to the women members of the bar. The elections to the Bar Councils of Bihar and Chhattisgarh are also notified. So these two bar councils are also to be excluded. In so far as the remaining State Bar Councils are concerned, it is directed that women must receive 30% representation. The 20% of these seats will be filled by way of election, and10% will be filled through co-option...A proposal explaining how the co-option of women advocates will be carried out shall be placed before this Court."

Appearing for the BCI, Manna Kumar Mishra, the Chairman, BCI addressed Lata saying, “you must stop levelling allegations against BCI every time. This is very bad. Leave this habit.” Kumud Lata Das responded, “You can’t shout at me! I am not under your disciplinary authority! I am an AOR; I know well how to submit to the Court. You are virtually a permanent Chairman, so you think the bar is identified with you....” Lata was alluding to Mishra's unopposed re-election as the Chairman of the BCI for the seventh consecutive term.

Guru Krishna Kumar, senior advocate, Dr. Ram Sankar, advocate. and M/s. Ram Sankar & Co. appeared for the respondents.

The Chief Justice observed that there appeared to be only a “communication gap” between the parties, and both Das and Mishra were there to assist the Court and represent their clients. The Court also noted that issues relating to the co-option of women candidates had already been referred to the supervisory committee headed by Justice (Retd.) Sudhanshu Dhulia. The matter will continue before the Court after the tribunals begin functioning and examine the election disputes."

The four other respondents were: Union of India, Bar Council of India, High Powered Election Committee, Election Commission of Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana and Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. The other 27 petitioners were:Navneet Kaur Waraich, Parveen Dahiya, Suman Dahiya, Sarbjit Kaur, Neelam Choudhary, Bhagyashri Setia, Monika Jhangra, Sunita Sheokhand, Priya Legha, Savita Devi, Nimrata Gill, Sonia Tanwar, Pooja Sharma, Omkala Yadav, Veena Bhardwaj, Meenu Rani, Kamlesh Panchal, Suman Rawat, Anisha Sharma, Pratibha Mehra, Dimple Chaudhary, Bhanu Priya Sharma, Anita Tripathi, Neelam Kathuria, Sharad Harish Arora, Rabeena and Sonia Rohilla. The Court's record reveals that notices were sent to 25 secretaries of the states including Bihar. The other counsels for the petitioners were:  Bibhuti Krishna, Harsh Ajay Singh, Ashutosh Saini, Ravi Agarwal, Siddhant Narayan Das, Puneet, Bela, Savita Devi, Navneet Kaur, Suman Dahiya, Devadatt Kamat, Aditya Singh, Aakash Sirohi, Indra Lal, Amit Rawal and Neema. 

Meanwhile BCI has filed an application before the Court seeking its approval of a vote-linked mechanism for co-opting women candidates to State Bar Councils under the 10% co-option quota, in the matter of M. Vardhan vs. Union of India, WP(C) No. 1319 of 2023. The BCI proposed that women candidates who narrowly missed election in the State Bar Council polls, based on their finishing position, be co-opted against the reserved co-option quota where 25 members are to be elected, candidates finishing in the 26th and 27th positions; where 20 members are to be elected, candidates finishing in the 21st and 22nd positions; and where 15 members are to be elected, the candidate finishing in the 16th position. The BCI has submitted that linking co-option to the actual votes polled by women candidates ensures that the process remains connected to the democratic choice expressed by advocates. The BCI has placed the same proposal before the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Committee overseeing the election process. It has prayed for a specific direction from the Court in this regard. 

Earlier, in Bihar, on March 17, 2025, advocates had held a press conference on a petition filed against the Bihar State Bar Council elections in Muzaffarpur. It was reported in Hindustan newspaper. Advocates Sudhir Ojha, Sanjay Kumar Sinha, Kamlesh Kumar, Mantu Kumar Singh, Raju Kumar Choudhary and others held a press conference in connection with the election petition filed against the Bihar State Bar Council elections. They informed that while hearing the petition, the Election Tribunal of the BCI issued notices to the opposite parties Giving two weeks time, the opposition was asked to respond. The notice states a case of disobeying of the order passed by the Tribunal. Notices have been issued to 23 members, including the chairman of the Bihar State Council, seeking their replies. On October 12, 2025, it was reported in Hindustan newspaper that the Election Tribunal refused to dismiss the three petitions against the bungling in the elections of Bihar State Bar Council. Advocates Sudhir Kumar Ojha, Umesh Prasad Singh, Ratan Kumar, Mahendra Singh, Praveen Kumar, Bhola Kumar, and Alka Pandey have filed a petition alleging irregularities in the election. The petitioner advocate Sudhir Ojha stated that the tribunal's order makes it clear that a case will be filed regarding his allegations of election rigging. Sachchidanand Singh is a respondent in the case. The dispute is pending with the Central Election Tribunal. 

Also read: Bihar Bar Council Journal removes names of members of Bihar State Bar Council due to pending dispute before Central Election Tribunal 

After 7 years, bar council elections to took place in Bihar 

Supreme Court adjudicates on constitutionality of Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in State of Bihar after declaration of result, governmet formation

In the aftermath of declaration of results of the election to the 18th Bihar legislative assembly on November 14, 2025 and formation of the State government on November 20, 2025, in Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) & Ors. v. Election Commission of India & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi delivered a 124-page long judgement on the constitutionality of Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the electoral rolls in State of Bihar and the power of the Election Commission of India under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. The judgement was authored by the Chief Justice India. The ADR case was heard along with 18 other writ petitions but the judgement does not name them. Their petitions are:-

1.Manoj Kumar Jha vs. Election Commission of India, 
2.Mujahid Alam vs. Election Commission of India, 
3.Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. Union of India, 
4.People's Union For Civil Liberties vs. Election Commission of India, 
5.Yogendra Singh Yadav vs. Election Commission of India, 
6.Mahua Moitra vs. Election Commission of India, 
7.K.C.Venugopal vs. Election Commission of India, 
8.Rajeev Ranjan vs. Union of India, 
9.Arshad Ajmal vs.Election Commission of India, 
10.Akhtarul Iman vs. Election Commission of India, 
11.Zarif Hosain vs. Election Commission of India, 
12.Mohammad Adeeb vs. The Election Commission of India, 
13.Sudhakar Singh vs. Election Commission of India, 
14.Thol Thirumavalavan vs. Election Commission of India, 
15.National Federation for Indian Women vs. Election Commission of India, 
16.P.K. Kunhalikyutty vs.Election Commission of India, 
17.Rajesh Ranjan@Pappu Yadav vs. Election Commission of India, 
18.Vaibhav Mishra vs. Election Commission of India 

The Court concluded:"The Impugned SIR exercise neither stands in direct conflict with the RP Act and the 1960 Rules, nor does it detract from  the constitutional imperative of free and fair elections. It is, instead, an exercise traceable to Section 21(3) of the RP Act read with Article 324 of the Constitution, undertaken to  advance the very objective which Part XV of the Constitution  is designed to protect." The Court pronounced the judgement, upon hearing a batch of writ petitions instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, assailing the impugned  order directing SIR in Bihar. The petitioners contended that, unless quashed, the impugned order is liable to result in the arbitrary disenfranchisement of lakhs of voters in the State of Bihar, thereby imperilling the conduct of free and fair elections. The Court recorded:"9. We deem it appropriate to clarify that certain petitions (for instance, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 855 of 2025) have in fact been instituted in support of the SIR exercise. The petitioner(s) in these cases have urged that such an exercise ought to be conducted at regular intervals to prevent and curb the inclusion of ineligible persons in the electoral rolls on account of illegal  influx.

It all began with the issuance of the impugned order by the Election Commission of India in purported exercise of its powers under Article 324 of the Constitution of India, read with  Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RP Act), directing an SIR of the electoral rolls in every Assembly constituency of the State of Bihar. The impugned order recorded that the last intensive revision in the State of Bihar was conducted in 2003, and that, over the past  two decades, substantial changes in the electoral rolls have  occurred inter alia on account of rapid urbanisation and large￾scale migration. Therefore, in furtherance of its constitutional  mandate to safeguard the integrity of the electoral rolls and ensure free and fair elections, the Commission resolved to undertake a nationwide SIR. 

Given that general elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly were anticipated later in 2025, the Commission directed the conduct of SIR in the State of Bihar.. In terms of Clause 11 of the impugned order, the Commission decided to treat the 2003 electoral roll, with January 1, 2003 as the  qualifying date, as probative evidence of eligibility, unless rebutted. The impugned order, in Clause 12, further stipulated that any person not listed in the 2003 roll must produce one or more prescribed government documents to establish their eligibility as an elector. The impugned order also provided that for the aforesaid purpose, the Commission shall release an Enumeration Form to be filled  and submitted by July 25, 2025, failing which the elector’s name  would be excluded from the draft rolls. The Enumeration Form provided an indicative list of Eleven (11) documents that could be submitted along with the Enumeration Form, each of which would be considered a sufficient document in itself. Clause 14 of the impugned order read with the accompanying Guidelines (SIR Guidelines) thereafter added that, after the publication of the draft roll, the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO)/Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO) were required to scrutinise the eligibility of the proposed electors in  accordance with Article 326 of the Constitution, read with Sections 16 and 19 of the RP Act. Upon such scrutiny, where the eligibility of any person is found to be doubtful, the ERO/AERO was mandated to issue a show-cause notice setting out the  grounds for the proposed exclusion, allow the concerned elector to submit a response, and thereafter render a reasoned and  speaking order in the matter.  

The impugned order further added that any person aggrieved by a decision of the ERO shall be entitled to  prefer an appeal before the District Magistrate under Section 24(a) of the RP Act, read with Rule 27 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 (1960 Rules). Furthermore, it was also stipulated that if the elector remains dissatisfied with the decision of the District Magistrate, a second appeal may be filed before the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) within thirty days, in terms of Section 24(b) of the RP Act, read with Rule 27 of the  1960 Rules. Along with thei mpugned order, the Commission also published detailed SIR Guidelines for the conduct of the exercise. It was envisaged that the exercise would be carried out through a structured House￾to-House enumeration, the rationalisation of polling stations, and the preparation of electoral rolls. It was also stipulated that Booth Level Officers (BLOs) would visit each household, distribute pre-filled enumeration forms to existing electors, and collect the duly filled forms along with requisite documents, with an additional facility for online submission and verification. In addition, the SIR Guidelines also contemplated that the draft electoral roll would include only those electors from whom  enumeration forms had been received, either physically or through verified online submission, while the names of those who failed to submit such forms would not be included at the draft stage. Shortly after the publication of the Impugned Order and the SIR Guidelines, the Commission issued a Press Note on June 28, 2025 declaring the commencement of the SIR in the State of Bihar.

Referring to the measures adopted by the Election Commission of India, the judgement reads: "The Impugned SIR exercise, as conducted, satisfies the requirements of proportionality. The measures adopted bear a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, are not manifestly excessive, and are accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exclusion. The  Impugned exercise was founded upon a legitimate and  constitutionally grounded purpose, namely, the restoration  of the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the electoral  rolls. Having regard to the nature of the problem sought to be addressed, the scale of the exercise undertaken, and the procedural safeguards incorporated during its implementation, the measures adopted by the Commission cannot be said to be disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved."

Justice Surya Kant wrote:"While inclusion in the electoral roll gives rise to a presumption of validity, such presumption is rebuttable and cannot be construed as imposing a blanket embargo on the powers of the Commission to undertake a Special Intensive Revision. The decision in Lal Babu Hussein (Supra) does not compel a contrary conclusion, being confined to the context of adjudicatory proceedings and not extending to a systemic, inquisitorial exercise undertaken in furtherance of the Commission’s constitutional mandate." He added: "The deletions effected pursuant to the Impugned SIR exercise cannot be said to be contrary to the procedure prescribed under Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules. The  safeguards of notice and hearing are preserved in substance,  and the process adopted by the Commission remains within the bounds of the statutory mandate." The judgement reads: "The documentation regime prescribed by the Commission  represents a considered exercise of its administrative discretion in furtherance of its Constitutional mandate. The classification of documents, including the exclusion of certain categories (apart from Aadhar Card, which was directed to be included vide Order dated 08.09.2025), is  based on intelligible criteria having a direct nexus with the objective of ensuring the integrity of the electoral roll. We  are, therefore, unable to hold that the impugned documentation framework is arbitrary or violative of the  statutory scheme." 

The Division  Bench concluded:"The Commission is empowered, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate, to undertake a limited enquiry into citizenship for the purpose of satisfying itself as to eligibility for inclusion in the electoral roll. Such an enquiry does not amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict sense, and any action taken pursuant thereto is confined to  electoral consequences alone. The consequence of such a determination is correspondingly limited. It affects the individual’s entitlement to be included in the electoral roll, and thereby their right to participate in the electoral process. It does not, however, operate to divest the individual of claims of citizenship, nor does it foreclose a determination of 
that question by the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act. g) In cases where the Commission is not satisfied that a person  meets the statutory conditions for inclusion in the electoral  roll, it would be incumbent upon it to refer such an individual to the competent authority within the Central Government for adjudication in accordance with law. The Commission’s determination, being confined to electoral  purposes, cannot assume finality on the question of citizenship. Any deletion effected on this ground shall, therefore, remain subject to the outcome of such adjudication by the appropriate authority. h) Regarding persons whose names have been deleted from the 2003 roll on account of the Commission being of the opinion that they are not citizens, the Commission shall refer such cases within 4 weeks to the Competent authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955, for adjudication of their citizenship. The Competent Authority shall take the necessary decision in accordance with law, preferably before the next  Parliamentary, Assembly, Local Body elections, whichever is earlier, after giving notice and an opportunity of hearing to 
the deleted individuals, if any. In the event the Competent Authority holds that such deleted individuals are citizens, they shall be included in the electoral roll. In addition  thereto, all persons who are domiciled in Bihar and whose names have been erroneously deleted on the ground that they are absent, dead, shifted or in duplication may assail the decision of the Commission by way of judicial review. 

The Court arrived at these findings after grappling with the following issues: 1. Whether the Election Commission of India has power to  conduct the Impugned Special Intensive Revision? 2.  Whether the Impugned Special Intensive Revision is founded on a legitimate purpose, and if so, whether the measures adopted  by the Election Commission of India are proportionate to the object sought to be achieved? 3.  Whether the procedure adopted by the Election Commission of India in conducting the Impugned Special Intensive Revision is contrary to, or in violation of, the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960? 4. Whether, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate of preparation and maintenance of electoral rolls, and in furtherance of the statutory conditions governing such  registration, the Election Commission of India is empowered to scrutinise the citizenship status of persons seeking inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll?

Given the fact that democracy is a government by dialogue, the judgment is nothing but articulation of judicial viewpoint in the ongoing dialogue. There are catena of judgments of the Supreme Court of India and elsewhere that demonstrate the a lot of Division Bench judgements do not have a long life. It is nothing more than a viewpoint of two of the judges of the Court, which may or may not be consequential. The continued possession of the illegitimate money cornered through electoral bonds despite 232-page long judgement dated February 15, 2024 by 5-Judge Constitution Bench of CJI Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Justices B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra and Sanjeev Khanna in Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2024) is illustrative.

The Constitution Bench concluded: "a. The Electoral Bond Scheme, the proviso to Section 29C(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 (as amended by Section 137 of Finance Act 2017), Section 182(3) of the Companies Act (as amended by Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017), and Section 13A(b) (as amended by Section 11 of Finance Act 2017) are violative of Article 19(1)(a) and unconstitutional; and b. The deletion of the proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act permitting unlimited corporate contributions to political parties is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 217. We direct the disclosure of information on contributions received by political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme to give logical and complete effect to our ruling. On 12 April 2019, this Court issued an interim order directing that the information of donations received and donations which will be received must be submitted by political parties to the ECI in a sealed cover. This Court directed that political parties submit detailed particulars of the donors as against each Bond, the amount of each bond and the full particulars of the credit received against each bond, namely, the particulars of the bank account to which the amount has been credited and the date on which each such credit was made." 

Justice Khanna in his separate but concurring judgement had concluded:"In case the Bonds issued (within the validity period) are with the donor/purchaser, the donor/purchaser may return them to the authorised bank for refund of the amount. In case the Bonds (within the validity period) are with the donee/political party, the donee/political party will return the Bonds to the issuing bank, which will then refund the amount to the donor/purchaser. On failure, the amount will be credited to the Prime Ministers Relief Fund." 

The billion dollar question is: what has Election Commission of India done with the "information of donations received and donations" submitted by political parties to it in a "sealed cover"? What has Supreme Court of India done about it? what will happen if some day it comes to light that the influence of electoral bond is found to be behind the entire SIR process? 

 

 

 

Supreme Court upholds 2017 judgement by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Mohit Kumar Shah affirming judgement by Trial Court in a 43 year old case from Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur

In Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh & Ors vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh delivered a 13-page long judgement dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"28. We are satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offences charged against the appellants. The concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 29. The brutality of the incident, in which five persons belonging to the same family lost their lives and several others including women and children sustained serious injuries, shocks the judicial conscience. The Courts below have rightly observed that the case leaves no room for misplaced sympathy or leniency. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. 31. Consequently, the appeals stand dismissed. 32. The surviving accused persons, except those who have been granted the benefit of juvenility by this Court or Courts below, are directed to surrender forthwith before the Trial Court concerned and serve the remaining part of their sentence. Their bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled." 

The High Court's 142-page long judgement dated August 3, 2017 was delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Mohit Kumar Shah. It was authored by Justice Kumar. 

The High Court's order dated recorded hat Vidya Nand Rai son of Bhujawan Rai,  Ramadhar Rai, son of Subudh Lal Rai and Rama Nand Rai, son of Mahendra Rai were juvenile on the date of occurrence. Justice Kumar's judgement remitted their cases to the Juvenile Justice Board for imposing appropriate fine to be paid to the family of the victim. The trial court's sentence in respect of these three appellants was set aside. Their current fate is not known. 

Referring to the judgement authored by Justice Kumar, Supreme Court observed: “The High Court has meticulously summarised the role of each accused person and identified those who ignited the straw, those who set the house on fire, those who chased the fleeing victims and those who inflicted fatal blows upon the deceased persons”. All the appellants were residents of village Jamalpur Kodai, Police Station Gaighat, District Muzaffarpur and they were convicted by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur on June 5, 1989 in Sessions Trial No. 21 of 1985 and 127 of 1985. 

Supreme Court asserted: "20. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced and upon perusal of the entire material on record, we find no merit in the appeals. 21. The High Court’s assessment of the evidence is detailed and reasoned.....23. The findings recorded by the High Court clearly establish that the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly, were armed with deadly weapons and acted in furtherance of their common object of setting the house ablaze and causing death of members of the family of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. 24. Once the common object of the unlawful assembly stands established, every member thereof becomes vicariously liable for acts committed in prosecution of such common object. The liability contemplated under Section 149 IPC squarely stands attracted in the facts of the present case." 

 With regard to Jagannath Ravidas, "both the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently found that he had actively facilitated the commission of the offence by disarming the victims at a crucial stage and thereby emboldening the mob. We find no reason to take a different view."

The court dismissed the appeals filed by Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh and others, the convicts had challenged the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld their conviction and life imprisonment awarded by the trial court. The incident occurred on the day of Holi in March 1983 in a village in Muzaffarpur district. A mob of at least 58 persons, armed with deadly weapons, surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, set it on fire and brutally killed five persons while injuring several others, including women and children. The court noted that the evidence clearly established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, were armed with lethal weapons, and acted in furtherance of their common object to set the house ablaze and cause the deaths. Once the common object is proved, every member becomes vicariously liable for the acts committed. The accused actively participated at different stages — surrounding the house, setting it on fire, chasing the victims, and assaulting them. Several appellants had died during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court, leading to abatement of their cases. It directed the surviving convicts — except those who received the benefit of juvenility — to surrender immediately before the trial court and serve the remaining part of their sentences.

The High Court had affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants in connection with a gruesome incident of mass violence which took place on March 29, 1983 in village Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur. 

The incident was reported to the police, leading to registration of Gaighat P.S. Case of 1983. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheets were laid and the accused persons were sent up for trial. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 436, 302/149, 324/34, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The accused Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, was separately charged under Sections 302/109, 436/109, 379/109, 324/109 and 323/109 IPC on the allegation that he had actively abetted the commission of the offences.

The prosecution case disclosed that the genesis of the occurrence lay in an earlier dispute relating to a pumping set and refusal by the prosecution side to withdraw a criminal case concerning the alleged loot of a khesari crop. On the date of occurrence, which coincided with the festival of Holi, a large mob armed with deadly weapons including lathi, bhala, garasa and farsa surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. At the relevant time Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, one of the deceased, was attempting to defend the inmates of the house with his licensed gun and revolver. The prosecution had alleged that Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, arrived at the place of occurrence, forcibly seized the licensed firearm and revolver from the deceased, displayed the same before the mob and thereby emboldened the assailants to proceed with the attack. Immediately thereafter, the mob allegedly set the house ablaze. The family members who attempted to flee from the burning house towards the southern field were chased and mercilessly assaulted by the members of the unlawful assembly.  The investigation disclosed that Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, Braj Bhushan Choudhary, Dr. Indranand Mishra, Lalan @ Ravi Bhushan Choudhary, and Anil Kumar Jha, died as a result of ante-mortem injuries sustained during the occurrence. The injured persons included Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, Mani Kumari, Uma Devi, Maheshwari Devi, Satyendra Jha, Saraswati Devi, Urmila Devi, Murti Devi, Ram Chandra Mahto, Abinash Choudhary, Dauli (child), Arvind Kumar, Usha Mishra, Rita Devi, Punam Kumari, Doyal Mona, Ajay Kumar Choudhary, Munish Kumar and others, many of whom had sustained grievous injuries. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 46 witnesses including numerous injured eyewitnesses. The defence examined 13 witnesses. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a case from Jehanabad

In Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George passed a 4-page long order dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:" 7. We allow the present appeal by confirming the order dated 27.04.2026, passed by this Court, with a direction to the appellant to continue to cooperate during the investigation/trial and not to take any unnecessary adjournment. Also, the appellant shall report before the Investigating Officer every alternate Monday, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., till such time the investigation is complete in all respects. 8. If the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court feels that the investigation/trial is delayed on account of the appellant’s conduct, it shall be open to the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer/Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with the law, including cancellation of bail. 9. The impugned judgment and order dated 12.03.2026 is set aside." The impugned order was passed by Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh.

The appellant had challenges the judgment and order by Justice Singh. On April 27, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed an order, which reads: "8. In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.5790020250137 of 2025 of Kako Police Station, Jehanabad District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer. However, in the attending facts, one of the conditions shall necessarily be that if the petitioner possesses a passport, the same shall be deposited before the Competent Authority/Court, till the
conclusion of the Trial or directed otherwise. 9. The petitioner shall make himself available before the Investigating Officer on 04.05.2026 at 10:00 a.m. and on all such dates as he may be required. 10. Needless to add, till the investigation is not complete in all respects, the petitioner would fully cooperate, and if the challan/charge sheet is filed, he would maintain good conduct and not attempt to influence any
of the witnesses in any manner till the completion of the trial.”

Supreme Court's May 2026 order pointed out that "5.Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty It is not in dispute that the conditions stand fully complied with; the appellant has cooperated during the investigation; he has not threatened or intimidated any of the witnesses; or has tried to influence the investigation in any manner. 6. We have noticed the nature of crime and the manner in which it was allegedly committed.

Earlier, in Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Prabhat Kumar Singh passed a 2-page long order dated March 12, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"3. As per F.I.R., this petitioner is alleged to have created obstruction in construction of ‘pucca nala’ work and also assaulted informant, who is a government employee while executing his government lawful duty, and due to which, the construction work could not be completed. 4. Considering the nature of accusation, the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioner is rejected." Supreme Court has reversed Justice Singh's order. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in Kako P.S. Case of 2025, registered for offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 126(2), 115(2), 110 and 132 of the Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023, which pertain to rioting, wrongful restraint,  voluntarily causing hurt, and attempt to commit culpable homicide respectively. The case was filed in the High Court on September 8, 2025 and registered on September 10, 2025.

Justice Ansul quashes order of 2020 by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in a matter of new FIR post settlement of dispute relating to dowry, marriage

In Ashok Kumar Choubey @ Ashok Choubey & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Ansul delivered a 4-page long judgement dated May 27, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "7. In view of the matter that the dispute relating to dowry and marriage was settled between the parties and the new FIR relates to allegation of molestation and continuance of this prosecution is bad in law, malafide and abuse of the process of the Court. The FIR lodged at Delhi is continuing and the same may be taken to its logical conclusion. In view thereof, order dated 14.09.2020 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 is hereby quashed. 8. Accordingly, the application stands allowed." The judgement was reserved on March 18, 2026 upon hearing the parties. Prior to Justivce Ansul the case was heard by Justices Prabhat Kumar Singh, Partha Sarthy, Sandeep Kumar and Soni Shrivastava. 

Notably, Justice Sandeep Kumar had stayed the proceedings of the trial court by his order dated March 27, 2025 during pendency of the application. The case was filed in the High Court on January 24, 2022 and registered on February 4, 2022 in the matter arising out of P.S.case dated July 28, 2018.

The application was filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated September 14, 2020 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna (In-charge) in Jakkanpur P.S. Case No. 346 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the learned Court has taken cognizance under Sections 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The prosecution case was that the informant alleged that marriage of her daughter was fixed between respective parents Ashok Kumar Choubey (petitioner no. 1) and Om Prakash Tiwari. Ring Ceremony was held at Delhi at the residence of Petitioner no. 1. On May 12, 2018, Petitioner no 1 visited Patna and informant’s husband gave Rs. 6 lakhs cash to him. On June 15, 2018 informant and her husband visited at the residence of Petitioner no. 1 where the petitioners demanded Rs. 10 lakh cash and one Honda City Car. Thereafter, marriage was cancelled on July 21, 2018. Later the marriage was attempted to be settled but due to unavoidable issues the marriage negotiations broke down. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the parties had gathered before the SHO, Rajendra Nagar on July 22, 2018 i.e. the petitioner no. 1, the proposed bridegroom and father of the bride. Both the parties gave a letter to the SHO claiming that they have decided not to get the marriage ceremony conducted and they have returned the goods of each other and they have no complaint against each other. Moreover, the girl an filed FIR in the Rajendra Nagar (New Delhi) Police Station. The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that police submitted final form in this case bearing final report dated October 31, 2019 stating that the case was found to be false. However, magistrate differing with the final form took cognizance under Section 406, 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Justice Ansul observed: "The crux of the allegation is that a marriage negotiation went bad. Even though some gadgets or money were exchanged but there is a document clearly showing that the parties returned their gifts and settled their dispute amicably. Still the instant case was filed and thereafter the daughter of the informant filed Central Delhi Rajendra Nagar P.S. Case No. 182 of 2018 on 19.09.2018. The lady in the FIR has not stated that the document signed by the parties on 22.07.2018 was either forged or obtained by any wrongful means. She has plainly written about the same and then has stated that she wishes to lodge the FIR in view of the later development."