Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Justice Sudhir Singh's judgement but concludes that it "shall not be treated as a binding precedent" and "question of law open to be considered and decided in appropriate case"

In The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Chandra Kishore Sharma & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih passed a 2-page long order dated August 18, 2026, wherein, it observed and concluded:"The petitioners challenge the judgment and order dated 09.04.2026 in LPA No.1120/2024 titled “State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Chandra Kishore Sharma & Anr.” passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. 2. In the attending facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. 3. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed leaving the question of law open to be considered and decided in appropriate case. 4. The impugned judgment and order shall not be treated as a binding precedent." 

Earlier, in The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Chandra Kishore Sharma & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Shailendra Singh delivered a 9-page long judgement dated April 9, 2026, wherein, it observed:"13. The limited issue for consideration before us is that whether the departmental proceeding against the writ petitioner after his superannuation was justified in the present facts and circumstances of the case. 14. Upon perusal of materials on record, it is evident that the writ petitioner had superannuated from service in the year 2018 itself. For more than four years the writ petitioner continued to receive the retiral benefits including pension. Thereafter, in light of the order dated 28.11.2022, the appellant- authorities considering the appointment of the writ petitioner illegal, passed the order of stopping the pension on 12.08.2023. 15. We fail to understand how the authorities could determine the legality of appointment of the writ petitioner, almost five years after his superannuation. The writ petitioner discharged his services satisfactorily till his superannuation, and no objections have been made in this regard. 16. Also, the writ petitioner continued getting his retiral benefits for more than four years after his superannuation. With his superannuation the employer-employee relationship came to an end, and therefore continuance of departmental proceeding under Service Rules is not permissible. The authorities could have initiated action against the writ petitioner under the Pension Rules, but they have not done so in the present case. The learned Single Judge has rightly dealt with the same in the impugned order." The judgement was authored by Justice Sudhir Singh.

Justice Sudhir Singh concluded:"17. As such, we are of the view that the impugned action of the appellant-authorities was bad in law, and has been rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. The appellants in the present case have been unable to substantiate the grounds of the appeal, and have not dislodged the findings of the learned Single Judge. 18. The scope of a Letters Patent Appeal is very limited, and in absence of any cogent reasons the court would not interfere with the order passed by the Writ Court. It is a well settled principle that merely because another view is possible, the court should not interfere with the order of the writ court. In the present case, the appellant-authorities have been unable to show any illegality or perversity in the order of the learned Single Judge. The impugned action of the authorities after almost five years of writ petitioner’s superannuation cannot said to be sustainable in law. 19. In view thereof, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The order of the learned Single Judge is affirmed, and the observations and the directions made therein shall follow. 20. Accordingly, the present intra court appeal stands dismissed." 

The Division delivered the judgement upon hearing, the LPA, an intra court appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent of Patna High Court Rules, against the order dated September 10, 2024 passed by Justice Harish Kumar, the Single Judge in CWJC No. 13706 of 2023, whereby the writ petition was allowed, and the appellants were directed to restore the pension of the respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner). 

In Chandra Kishore Sharma vs. The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Water Resources Department, Bihar & Ors. (2024), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated September 10, 2024, wherein, he concluded:"12.....this Court finds that while terminating the service of the petitioner, the respondent no. 4 did not even take pain to consider the explanation of the petitioner and has only given a finding that explanation submitted by the petitioner is found to be not acceptable without assigning the reason for non-acceptance. This Court also finds that the impugned order has been passed at the behest of or in compliance with the letter No. 2681 dated 01.06.2023 issued by the Water Resources Department. Thus, absolutely there is no independent application of mind, which is sine qua non while dispensing the services of the petitioner causing civil as well as evil consequences. Thus, the impugned order suffers from the vice of the arbitrariness, apart from complete violation of the principles of natural justice." 

Justice Kumar observed: “10. …..Once an employee is allowed to superannuate unconditionally and all the retiral benefits and other dues have been sanctioned and when the employee is getting regular pension, the tie between the employer and employee would automatically severed; in absence of any pending departmental proceeding. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the only remedy which had left with the State respondent authorities was the procedure available under the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 but the same has not been done. The termination of the service of an employee after retirement is unknown to the legal jurisprudence in absence of any departmental proceeding on mere show cause notice. Once the relationship of the employer and employee comes to an end, there is no question of termination of service of an employee, that too on the ground that his initial appointment was bad in law. The delinquent employee would be deemed to be in service, although he has reached the age of superannuation, only if a valid departmental proceeding had been initiated. The departmental proceeding can not be said to be initiated merely on issuance of a show-cause notice. It is initiated only when a charge-sheet is submitted.”

Justice Kumar added:"14.....the impugned order causing termination of the service of the petitioner as contained in Memo No. 2637 dated 12.08.2023 is held to be wholly unjustified, perverse and illegal and not sustainable in the law; accordingly the same stands set aside. The consequential order, as contained in Memo No. 1567 dated 16.08.2023, issued by the respondent no. 5, is also hereby set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to restore the pension of the petitioner forthwith within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall also be entitled to get an amount of Rs.20,000/-as litigation cost." 

The other five respondents were: 2. Additional Chief Secretary, Water Resources Department, Bihar, 3. Deputy Secretary, Water Resources Department, Bihar, 4. Chief Engineer, Flood Control and Drainage, Water Resources Department, Patna, 5. Executive Engineer, Punpun Flood Protection Division, Anisabad (Patna) and 6. Accountant General, Bihar, Patna. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the office order dated dated August 12, 2023 issued under the signature of the Chief Engineer, Flood Control and Drainage, Water Resources Department, Patna by which the pension of the petitioner has been stopped after having worked for 4 years and 8 months of his superannuation from the post of Mapak on account of termination of his service with immediate effect. The petitioner also sought quashing of the consequential order dated August 16, 2023 issued by the respondent no. 5 requesting the Accountant General, Bihar, Patna to stop the pension of the petitioner with immediate effect. 

The facts which led to filing of the writ petition was that the petitioner was appointed as Mapak vide office order dated February 27, 1987 issued by the Rehabilitation Officer, Medium Irrigation Project, Deoghar after getting due approval of the Director, Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation, Patna. While the petitioner had been discharging his service on the post, all of a sudden, after 14 years of his appointment, he was terminated by the Director, Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation, Patna vide letter dated February  11, 2000. The order of termination was put to challenge in CWJC No. 603 of 2001 and the writ petition came to be allowed vide order dated January 16, 2001 and the order of termination was quashed with an observation that the case of the petitioner will be governed by the order passed in CWJC No. 6586 of 1998 which was later affirmed by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court vide order dated November 7, 2000 passed in a LPA of 2000. Despite the order of the court, when the petitioner was not allowed to join his service, a contempt application bearing a MJC of 2001 was filed, in the meanwhile, the respondents issued a second show cause notice to the petitioner vide letter dated May 31, 2001. The petitioner, left with no option, again approached before this Court by filing CWJC No. 9031 of 2001 challenging the show cause notice. While the writ petition and the contempt petition were pending, the respondent authorities reinstated the petitioner in service with effect from the date of termination and sanctioned payment of salary and other allowances. In view thereof, finding compliance of the order dated January 16, 2001 in CWJC No. 603 of 2001, the contempt petition came be dismissed. On being reinstated, the petitioner has duly discharged his duties without any hindrances and on attaining the age of superannuation came to be retired on November 30, 2018 while working in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Patna Flood Protection Project, Patna. After his superannuation, he has been accorded all his post retirement benefits, including full pension and gratuity, vide Pension Payment Order dated October 5, 2018. 

The counsel for the petitioner contended that after having received all the post retiral benefits and while he has been getting his regular pension, the writ application bearing CWJC No. 9031 of 2001 came to be listed, counsel for the petitioner on being found it infructuous sought permission of the  Court to withdraw the same. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated February 21, 2023. Till the pendency of the aforenoted writ petition, the petitioner was never served with any notice or informed with regard to the dismissal of any SLP or Civil Appeal. However, all of a sudden, after 4 years and 8 months of the superannuation of the petitioner, he was served with a show cause notice, as contained in Letter dated June 14, 2023 issued in the light of departmental instruction contained in Letter dated June 1, 2023. The petitioner in response thereto submitted a detailed show cause/explanation vide his letter dated June 30, 2023 explaining the entire facts and the circumstances under which he legally and satisfactorily discharged his duties in pursuance of the order of the Court and requested to exonerate from all the baseless charges. The explanation of the petitioner was placed before the respondent no. 4 and the Chief Engineer, Flood Control and Drainage, Water Resources Department, Patna but surprisingly without considering the show cause/explanation, the same was rejected vide office order dated August 12, 2023 as it was found to be not acceptable. It was this order, which was challenged before the High Court's Single Judge Bench.

Referring to the impugned order, the counsel for the petitioner vigorously contended that apart from the order being non-speaking and without application of any mind, the same has been passed on the dictate of the authorities of the Department or in the light of the departmental instruction contained in Letter dated June 1, 2023 and thereby terminated the service of the petitioner with immediate effect and withholding the entire pension of the petitioner. It was also the contention of the counsel that the very termination of service of the petitioner after 4 years and 8 months of his retirement was wholly illegal and unsustainable in law. The respondent-Chief Engineer was neither the competent authority nor the disciplinary authority, as such, he had no jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding against the petitioner after his superannuation. Any penalty affecting the pension of a government employee can be awarded after only exhausting the due procedure under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, that too in respect to an event which took place not more than four years. While passing the impugned order, the respondent authorities had given a complete go by to all the procedures which is bad in law. 

The counsel for the State submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was illegal and void ab initio, as the petitioner was appointed on a temporary basis only for three months when there was a complete ban on such appointment. The appointment process and reservation policy were not followed in the  appointment of the petitioner and all the more right to make ad hoc appointments, as earlier had been given to the Special Land Acquisition Officer vide departmental Letter dated February 18, 1978, which had already been withdrawn vide departmental dated December 2, 1983. On being found the appointment of the petitioner illegal and void, ab initio, the service of the petitioner was dispensed with. However, in the light of the order of the High Court in CWJC No. 603 of 2001, the petitioner was re-instated with a caveat, the case of the petitioner was to be governed by the orders passed in CWJC No. 6586 of 1998 and the LPA No. 270  of 2000. 

Taking note of these facts, the petitioner was reinstated and a fresh show cause notice vide departmental order No. 971 dated 31.05.2001 was issued. The Court having heard the parties directed to maintain status quo with an observation that his case shall be affected by the final outcome of CWJC No. 9031 of 2001 and MJC No. 2934 of 2001. CWJC No. 9031 of 2001 and other analogous case was heard by the Court and vide order dated November 22, 2004 the Writ Court directed status quo to be continued in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court in SLP No. 7233-7235 of 2003. 

The SLP was registered as Civil Appeal No. 5682-5684/2004 and it came to be dismissed on July 11, 2006 in view of the Constitution Bench Judgment in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors vs. Uma Devi [(2006) 4 SCC 1].

It was next contended that subsequent there to, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil No. 3431/2017) was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on November 28, 2022. The petitioner knowing the entire facts withdrew the writ petition bearing CWJC No. 9031 of 2001. In such circumstances, the Water Resources Department decided to terminate the service of the petitioner and other similarly circumstanced persons who were illegal appointed in the Department and accordingly letters were issued to all the Chief Engineers to take action against the illegal/irregular appointments. Pursuant thereto, the Executive Engineer issued show cause notice to the petitioner. In response, the petitioner has submitted his explanation which was duly considered by the Chief Engineer and the final order came to be passed vide Memo No. 2637 dated August 12, 2023. So far the submission of the petitioner that the Chief Engineer lacks jurisdiction to proceed departmentally has no force as after dissolution of the Directorate and offices of the Special Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation in the year 2019, the Water Resources Department, Bihar vide its letter dated June 1, 2023 authorised the Chief Engineer as appointing-cum-disciplinary authority to proceed against the petitioner. In similar terms, the Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar terminated the services of the persons who were appointed illegally in the same fashion. Thus, Advocate for the State urged that there is no illegality in the impugned order as the very appointment of the petitioner was subject to the final outcome of SLP No. 7233-7235 of 2003 which finally came to be dismissed in the light of the Constitution Bench judgment in Uma Devi’s case (supra). 

Justice Kumar observed: "8. This Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions advanced and also perused the materials available on record. Some facts are admitted that the petitioner was appointed way back in the year 1987 on the post of Mapak and after 14 years, his service was terminated. The order of termination was put to challenge; and this Court while allowing the writ petition by quashing the impugned order of termination in CWJC No.6030 of 2001 had observed that the case of the petitioner will also be governed by the order passed in CWJC No. 6586 of 1998 which was also affirmed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 270 of 2000. In the light of the observation given by the Division Bench, a show cause was issued under Memo dated May 31, 2001 and on being challenged in CWJC No. 9031 of 2001 it was directed to list ‘for admission’ after disposal of LPA No. 1588 of 2000. 

The Division Bench vide its order dated March 27, 2003 disposed of the LPA in terms of the order in LPA No. 675 of 2000 and others analogous cases by which the appeal was allowed and the order of the  Single Judge setting aside the termination of the petitioner of the said writ petition and others similarly situated person was over turned. The Court, on being apprised while hearing C.W.J.C. No. 9031 of 2001, that the leave was granted in S.L.P. No. 7233-7235/ 2003 and status quo was directed to be continued, considering the fact that the petitioners of C.W.J.C. No. 9031 of 2001 as well as C.W.J.C. No. 9037 are also the person affected by the order of LPA Court directed to maintain, status quo and order to be listed after disposal of SLP as mentioned above. It is the fact that the SLP No. 7233-7235 of 2003 was registered as Civil Appeal No. 5682-5684/2004 and all the Civil Appeals came to be dismissed on July 11, 2006 in the light of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra). 

Despite the fact, the petitioner was allowed to continue in service and finally he superannuated on November 30, 2018. 10. At no point of time the respondent authorities brought this fact before the Court in C.W.J.C. No. 9031 of 2001 which remained pending since 2001 till the date on which the petitioner withdrew the writ petition, on February 21, 2023. The Government was well acquainted with all the facts, however, it never bothered to mention the matter in the light of the disposal of SLP No. 7233-7235/2003 and now after four years and eight months of the retirement of the petitioner the issue of illegal appointment is being raised. Once an employee is allowed to superannuate unconditionally and all the retiral benefits and other dues have been sanctioned and when the employee is getting regular pension, the tie between the employer and employee would automatically severed; in absence of any pending departmental proceeding. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the only remedy which had left with the State respondent authorities was the procedure available under the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 but the same has not been done. The termination of the service of an employee after retirement is unknown to the legal jurisprudence in absence of any departmental proceeding on mere show cause notice. Once the relationship of the employer and employee comes to an end, there is no question of termination of service of an employee, that too on the ground that his initial appointment was bad in law. The delinquent employee would be deemed to be in service, although he has reached the age of superannuation, only if a valid departmental proceeding had been initiated. The departmental proceeding can not be said to be initiated merely on issuance of a show-cause notice. It is initiated only when a charge-sheet is submitted. It is to be noted that for termination of service, the procedure should be in conformity with Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India even if the employee is not a civil servant, but a government servant. 

The Full Bench of the High Court in Shanbhu Sharan vs. State of Bihar & Ors.; 2000(1) PLJR 665 has held that even though the proceeding initiated in service period of an employee can be continued post retirement but the nature of punishment is different and no penalties as envisaged under the Bihar Government Servants (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 can be imposed. Law is well settled, in this regard, no punishment order can be imposed with retrospective effect nor any punishment is inflicted on a retired employee as envisaged under 2005 Rules. 

The withdrawal of the C.W.J.C. No.9031 of 2001 which was preferred only against the show cause notice issued by the Department and even if it stood dismissed as withdrawn, it would how affect the right of the petitioner to continue in service and getting all the benefits is quite surprising. In the earlier round of litigation, the order of termination stood quashed and duly affirmed by the Division Bench with only observation to continue the proceeding in accordance with law. It is also not disputed that the petitioner has not discharged his service to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. Once the service of the petitioner has been utilized by the Department without there being any condition and even for the sake of argument it is taken note of the fact that the order of status quo was granted by the Court in C.W.J.C. No. 9031 of 2001, that was only with respect to the continuance of the proceeding based upon a show cause notice subject to final outcome of S.L.P. No. 7233-7235/2003 which came to be dismissed on July 11, 2006 in the light of Uma Devi (supra). 

The respondent authorities had the liberty to get the order of status quo modified in the light of the subsequent development and to proceed further but the same was not done and allowed the petitioner to superannuate. Once the petitioner superannuated and the reitral benefits and the pension were accorded; there was complete severance of the bond of employee and employer relationship and no cause of action existed for continuance of the departmental proceeding by the efflux of time, that too without following any procedure.

Election of Bihar's minister of urban development, housing, information technology, Nitish Mishra faces challenge in Patna High Court from CPI candidate from Jhanjharpur, Madhubani

In Ram Narayan Yadav vs. Nitish Mishra & Ors.(2026), Patna High Court has admitted the election petition.  The case came up for hearing on August 19, 2026 before Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey. Coincidentally, Jagannath Mishra, Nitish Mishra's father who was once the face of Congress party in Bihar and who had become an admirer of the BJP in his final years, had departed due to cancer on August 19, 2019. Nitish Mishra was appointed the minister of urban development & housing and the information technology on May 7, 2026. 

 

Nitish Mishra has filed a I.A. questioning its maintainability. Returning Officer of Jhanjharpur has filed his written statement. Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna has filed an election petition on behalf of Ram Narayan Yadav, one of the candidates of the Communist Party of India (CPI). The result of the 2025 Bihar Assembly election was announced on November 14, 2025.  Under Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 there is a provision to challenge the validity of any election, if there is any violation of specified rules through election petition. The High Court has accepted the petition. Nitish Mishra from BJP has failed to disclose in his election affidavit that there is a FIR pending against him. 

Nitish Mishra, the respondent and the elected MLA was required to disclose information about all the pending criminal cases, at whatever stages they are pending before any court. It is not that only such cases will be disclosed wherein cognizance has been taken or charges have been framed. Any violation of the 1961 Rules by non-disclosure which is otherwise warranted ; CPI. Supreme Court of India has settled the law in this regard in Meenakshi Natarajan vs. Election Commission of India [W.P.(C) No. 766/2026].

Ram Narayan Yadav who has challenged the election of Nitish Mishra was the candidate fielded by CPI in Bihar Assembly Election 2025. 
 

Earlier, Nitish Mishra was made a minister of the sugarcane  department of Bihar in 2005. He was minister of the disaster management department from 2008 to 2009 and the minister of the rural development department from 2010 to 2015. In 2024, he was appointed as the industry minister of Bihar.  
Nitish Mishra contested his first election from the Jhanjharpur seat but was defeated. After this election, Jagannath Mishra merged his party with Sharad Pawar's Nationalist Congress Party, then joined JDU. Nitish Mishra again contested from the Jhanjharpur seat on a JDU ticket, he defeated RJD's Jagdish Narayan Chaudhary. He had made his political debut with Bihar Jan Congress, the party of Jagannath Mishra, his father. Jagannath Mishra was the brother of Lalit Narayan Mishra, former union railway minister and one of Bihar's most powerful Congress leaders who was assassinated on January 3, 1975. Subsequent to his assassination, Jagannath Mishra became Chief Minister of Bihar on April 11, 1975 at the age of 38. He became Chief Minister for the second time in the year 1980 and for third and last time in the year 1989. 

 

In 2015, Mishra had left the JDU to join the BJP with his father, Jagannath Mishra. He faced defeat in the 2015 assembly elections.  In 2020, Nitish Mishra was elected MLA again from Jhanjharpur on a BJP ticket. He was also the Vice President, BJP,  Bihar in 2021.

 

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in Devnath Rai murder case from Maner

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 5-page long order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"The order passed by the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 8. The appellant shall be released on bail....".  The High Court's order was passed by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra. Supreme Court recorded:" 4. In this case, it appears that Vinay was an injured witness. His statement was not recorded at the time when the petition was filed and therefore, hearing on this petition was deferred to enable the Trial Court to record the statement of Vinay. 5. We have been informed that the statement of Vinay has been recorded in the trial and he has not identified the appellant as one of the participants in the incident....7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed." Notably, Shiv Kumari Devi, the informant, the wife of Late Devnath Rai, the victim who has allegedly been killed has not been made a party. She has not been able to rope any advocate to represent her in the Supreme Court. 

Earlier, in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated July 7, 2025, wherein, he had refused to grant bail in a murder case. He had concluded:"6 Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the nature and gravity of the offence as alleged against the petitioner as also taking into account the materials available in the case diary, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the prayer for bail of the petitioner, above named, is rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously." The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 from Maner  instituted for the offences under Sections 140(1), 109, 61(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Shiv Kumari Devi was not made a party in the case in the High Court. She was not able to rope any advocate to represent her in the High Court to represent her.

As per prosecution case, the accusation against the accused persons including the petitioner is to have killed the Informant’s husband and disappeared his dead body. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and had committed no offence as alleged against him and has falsely been implicated in the present case merely on the basis of suspicion. The petitioner has not committed any offence as alleged in the F.I.R. The informant is not the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that there was delay of one day in lodging the F.I.R. that too without there being any plausible explanation for the same, which created doubt in the veracity of the prosecution case. It was submitted that nothing incriminating was recovered from the conscious/physical possession of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no direct or specific allegation of any overt act against the petitioner rather the same is general and omnibus in nature. The petitioner had two criminal antecedents and is languishing in judicial custody since December 3, 2024 without any rhymes or reason.The A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioner. He had stated that the in this case, the injured Vinay Kumar was the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence who have supported the prosecution case. The petitioner, in his confessional statement, had also confessed his guilt. The petitioner  was named in the F.I.R. and, hence, he did not deserve bail. 

Shivkumari Devi is a permanent resident of Lodipur Jeevarakhand Tola, Vyapur Police Station, Maner, Patna. She informed the Maner Police that the incident occurred when her husband Devnath Rai and his friend Vinay Kumar, s/o Murari Rai of Lodipur had gone to Om Sai brick kiln to smoke at around 10 pm on August 5, 2024. At that time, a notorious criminal who is currently lodged in Beur Jail—1. Sagar Rai (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Lodipur Ganga Tola) and 2. Umashankar Yadav alias Shankar Kumar (son of the late Chandeshwar Rai; resident of Lodipur, currently residing at R.P.S. Mor, Bailey Road, Rupaspur Police Station)—conspired to recruit other notorious criminals into their fold. These recruits are: 3. Dharmendra Kumar (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Ganga Tola, Lodipur Bagicha), 4. Lalu Kumar (Dharmendra’s nephew; son of Buddhadev Rai; resident of Chakiya Tola, Chhitnava), and 5. Daroga Rai (son of the late Manik Rai; resident of Lodipur Buddha Tola). 6. Dhora Rai (son of Phudi Rai, alias Pahalban Singh; resident of Vyapur, Purvi Gali) and 7. Munna Rai (son of an unknown person; resident of Bhaggu Tola, Vyapur)—all belonging to the Maner Police Station area, District Patna—suddenly arrived by boat at the Om Sai Brick Kiln, where my husband and his friend, Vinay Kumar, were already present. All the assailants began firing with various weapons they were carrying, with the intent to kill. As a result, her husband and his friend, Vinay, were shot in the leg; Vinay Kumar then ran into the bushes to save his life. After being shot, her husband fled and hid inside the office of the Om Sai Brick Kiln. Inside the office, my husband and a staff member of the kiln—Mohan Rai (son of Shri Sukan Rai, resident of Lodipur, Maner Police Station, Patna)—locked the door from within. Then, all the named perpetrators approached the office while firing indiscriminately and began shooting at the door. Some of the perpetrators climbed onto the roof of the office and started removing the roof tiles. Mohan Rai, one of the named accused, was ordered to open the door; he complied, and then—acting in concert with the other accused—he joined them in murdering my husband. Subsequently, all these perpetrators disposed of my husband's body. Her husband's friend, Vinay Kumar, witnessed the entire incident while hiding in the bushes. Therefore, she request the SHO, Maner P.S. to please take necessary legal action against all the named eight accused persons. Manoj Kumar is the I.O.  of the case. 

Her compliant was registered on August 6, 2024. It reads:"सेवा में थानाध्यक्ष महोदय, मनेर थाना पटना। विषयः. मेरे पति देवनाथ राय के हत्या कर लाश गायब करने के संबंध में आवेदन। महाशय, विनम्रपुर्वक निवेदन के साथ कहना है कि मैं शिवकुमारी देवी पति देवनाथ राय सा० लोदीपुर जीवराखंड टोला पा० व्यापुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना कि स्थायी निवासी हूँ। मेरे पति देवनाथ राय एवं मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार पिता श्री मुरारी राय सा० लोदीपुर दोनो मिलकर दिनांक 05.08.024 को समय लगभग 10:00 बजे रात्रि में ओम साई ईंट भट्ठा पर धुमने गये हुए थे। उसी समय एक कुख्यात जो वेउर जेल में बंद है 1. सागर राय पिता काशी राय सा० लोदीपुर गंगा टोला एवं 2. उमाशंकर यादव उर्फ शंकर कुमार पिता स्व० चंदेश्वर राय सा० लोदीपुर वर्तमान पता R.P.S मोड़ बेली रोड थाना रूपसपुर इन दोनो साजिश करके कुछ कुख्यात अपराधियो को अपने मेल मे लाकर अपराधि का नाम 3. धर्मेन्द्र कुमार पिता काशी राय सा० गंगा टोला लोदीपुर बगीचा 4. लालु कुमार (धर्मेन्द्र के भगिना) पिता बुद्वदेव राय सा० चकिया टोला छितनावा 5. दरोगा राय पिता स्व0 मानिक राय सा० लोदीपुर बुद्वाटोला 6.ढोरा राय पिता फुदी राय उर्फ पहलबान सिंह सा० व्यापुर पुर्वी गली 7. मुन्ना राय पिता नामालुम सा० भग्गु टोला व्यापुर सभी थाना मनेर जिला पटना ने नाव से एकाएक ओम साई ईट भट्ठा पर पहुँचा जहा पहले से मेरे पति एवं उनके दोस्त विनय कुमार बैठे हुए थें। सभी अपराधी अपने अपने हाथ मे लिये कई तरह के हथियार से जान मारने कि नियत से फायरिंग करना शुरू कर दिया । जिससे मेरे पति एंव पति के दोस्त विनय को पैर में गोली लगी तब मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार जान बचाने के लिए झाड़ी में जाकर छिप गया। और मेरे पति गोली लगने के बाद ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के ऑफिस मे भागकर छिप गया। ऑफिस के अंदर मेरे पति के साथ ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के स्टॉफ 8. मोहन राय पिता श्री सुकन राय सा० लोदीपुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना दोनो ईंट भटठा के ऑफिस के अंदर दरवाज बंद कर लिया। तब सभी नामित अपराधी अंधाधुंध फायरिंग करते हुए ऑफिस के पास आकर दरवाजा पर गोली चलाने लगा। ओर कुछ अपराधी ऑफिस उपर चढ़कर खपड़ा हटाने लगा।नामित अभियुक्त मोहन राय को दरवाजा खोलने को कहा गया। जिसपर मोहन राय ने दरवाज खोल दिया जिसपर सभी उक्त अभियुक्त के साथ मोहन राय भी मिलकर मेरे पति कि हत्या कर दिया। और उक्त सभी अपराधी मिलकर मेरे पति के शव को ठिकाने लगा दिया। जिस घटना को घटित होते मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार ने झाड़ी से छुपकर देखा। अतः श्रीमान् से प्रार्थना है कि सभी नामजद 08 अभियुक्तो के विरूद्ध आवाश्यक कानुनी करवाई करने कि कृपा कि जाय। इसके लिए में श्रीमान् कि सदा आभारी रहूंगी। आपकी विश्वासी (शिवकुमारी देवी)". 

Will Shiv Kumar Devi, wife of Devnath Rai get justice? Isn't it a case where a habeas corpus petition should be filed in the High Court? 

Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Supreme Court directs Bar Council of India (BCI) to file counter affidavit in NALSAR convocation row case within two weeks, BCI chairman issues apology

In Mihira Sood & Anr. vs. Bar Council of India & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant, Justice Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana passed an order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it directed:"no punitive action shall be taken against the students or Faculty of NALSAR University of Law at the instance of Bar Council of India or any State Bar Council in respect of the incidents mentioned in the subject letters." The petitioner was represented by senior advocate K. Parameshwar and advocate-on-record Rupali Francesca Samuel. Upon hearing the counsel, the Court took the matter on board and issued notice, returnable on September 3, 2026. Radhika Gautam, the counsel appearing on behalf of Bar Council of India (BCI) accepted the notice. Gautam informed the Court that "the offending Circulars have since been withdrawn." The court's order reads:"4. Be that as it may, let the counter affidavit be filed within two weeks." 

 

It all began with the way CJI dismissively responded when the matter of police brutality at Jantar Mantar, New Delhi on July 20, 2026 was mentioned before his bench. This brutality took place during the Sansad Chalo march organized by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) and student and youth groups demanding the resignation of the Education Minister for national examination leak scam. The NALSAR students have expressed their strong disapproval of CJI's insensitive approach by protesting against the participation of CJI as the chief guest for their convocation. They wrote, “We feel that receiving our degrees from a dignitary whose recent public conduct, as reported, appears dismissive of serious allegations of police brutality against protesting citizens sits uncomfortably with what we have been taught to value during our time at NALSAR.” Their statement of condemnation stated that Section 7(1)(b), 7(1)(g), 7(1)(h), 7(1)(i) of the Advocates Act of 1961, establishes the functions of the BCI. "These provisions, the ones applicable to the University are only regarding the BCI's function to set standards for professional conduct and promotion of legal education. Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 restricts disqualifications from enrolment strictly to convictions for criminal offences, which did not take place in the present case. To then direct State Bar Councils to restrict the enrolment of students from the Batch of 2026 does not align with the BCI's statutory functions." 

 

Subsequent to the Court's order, nation-wide condemnation, and apprehending protest from students and youth, Manan Kumar Mishra, chairman, BCI issued an apology to law students in a letter issued on Independence Day amidst bitter criticism from students of NALSAR and National Law School of India University (NLSIU), Bangalore regarding BCI's arbitrary and unauthorised order in the backdrop of the row surrounding CJI's participation in NALSAR's 2026 convocation. Mishra's statement reads:"If anything connected with the present controversy, any of my words, or letter, has hurt the feelings of our law students, I sincerely regret and apologise for the same. There should be no hesitation in saying so. An expression of regret is not a matter of prestige or ego. It is simply an acknowledgment that the feelings and concerns of our students matter". 

BCI chairman had issued an order dated stop the enrolment for NALSAR's graduating batch of 2026 after they objected to the participation of CJI Surya Kant as the chief guest for their convocation. NALSAR's Student Bar Council had demanded a public apology from Mishra. NLSIU's graduating students, current students and alumni had also issued a joint statement in this regard. NLSIU, Bengaluru students have also rejected the presence of the BCI chairperson and the CJI at their own convocation. Mishra's statement reads:"No student should be compelled to attend, and no student should feel compelled to abstain. My only appeal is that the decision should be taken independently, after considering the matter in its entirety and according to their own judgment".

Notably, on July 23, 2026, as chairman of BCI, Mishra had issued a public appeal to the country's legal fraternity, academicians, professionals and intellectuals, urging them to counter what he described as "anti-social and anti-national forces" who are attempting to exploit ongoing student protests to destabilise the country". The press release titled "An Appeal to the Intellectuals of the Country" reads:"Experts in stone pelting have been brought from Jammu and Kashmir and other states into Delhi... These miscreants are reportedly paid substantial sums to create disorder, assault police personnel, and damage public vehicles and property."

 

The case was mentioned on August 14.  When the matter was mentioned, the CJI-led bench observed:"This is absolutely uncalled for..It a dialogue between me and students."The bench added: “I myself, during student days, was involved in student activities. Peacefully they are raising voice, they should be allowed. Even if they are wrong, assuming, they have the right to protest. Who can stop them?. Why Bar Council or any other body should interfere?”.  

 

It is quite likely that the CJI will assign the case to some other bench to comply with the Latin maxim nemo judex in causa sua i.e. no one should be a judge in his or her own case incorporated in The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct adopted in 2002, endorsed by UN resolution in 2006 and reiterated in Regulation 5 (2) of Draft Regulations for Use of Artificial Intelligence in Courts, 2026 and The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, the judicial standards and principles to be observed and followed by the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts which was unanimously adopted in Full Court Meeting of the Supreme Court of India held on May 7, 1997.    

Also read: Supreme Court Bar Association condemns BCI's arbitrary decision to withhold enrolment of NALSAR University Law Graduates, BCI modifies, withdraws its order

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside proceedings of Caste Scrutiny Committee and order by State Election Commission, Bihar

In Md. Isa vs.The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 31-page long judgement dated August 14, 026, wherein, he concluded:"51. In view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, taking into consideration the report dated 31.12.2024 of the three member Committee constituted on the directions of the Criminal Investigation Department (Weaker Section) finding the petitioner to be belonging to Teli (Muslim) caste on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence discussed in detail therein and the contents of the report dated 4.3.2025 of the Committee, this Court is of the opinion that both the Caste Scrutiny Committee in its report dated 4.3.2025 as also the State Election Commission in its order dated 25.6.2025 passed in Case no.56 of 2023 committed an error in applying Act of 1991 as also Amending Act 15 of 2003 in the case of reservation to the post of Mukhiya. 52. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the proceedings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee dated  28.3.2025 contained in memo no.6574 dated 11.4.2025 as also the order contained in memo no.2876 dated 25.6.2025 passed in Case no.56 of 2023 (Subhash Kumar vs. Md. Isa) by the State Election Commission, Bihar both being unsustainable are hereby set aside. 53. The writ application is allowed."

It was against the Caste Scrutiny Committee proceeding dated March 28, 2025 contained in memo dated April 11, 2025 and the order dated June 25, 2025 passed in Case of 2023 of the State Election Commission that the petitioner had filed the writ application. The case of the petitioner was that in the election held in the year 2021, he was elected on the post of Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj Sahuria. A complaint was filed by respondent no.9 before the State Election Commission praying for disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the seat on which the petitioner had been elected was reserved for Extremely Backward Class (EBC) while the petitioner who belonged to Sheikh community had fraudulently obtained a caste certificate of EBC wrongly showing himself to belong to the caste of Teli (Muslim). Upon the direction of the Criminal Investigation Department (Weaker Section), a three member Enquiry Committee enquired into the caste of the petitioner and submitted its report dated December 31, 2024 according to which it confirmed that the petitioner belonged to Teli (Muslim) caste. The petitioner received a show cause dated February 7, 2025 asking him to respond to the report dated December 31, 2024. The petitioner had submitted his reply on March 4, 2025. Another report dated March 28, 2025 contained in memo dated April 11, 2025 came to be submitted by the three member Caste Scrutiny Committee wherein the claim of the petitioner for reservation in the EBC category on account of belonging to Teli (Muslim) caste was rejected. 

The Commission had proceeded with the Case of 2023 registered on the complaint filed by Subhash Kumar, the respondent no.9 and passed order contained in memo dated June 25, 2025 under the signature of the State Election Commissioner, Bihar holding that the petitioner was not a permanent resident of the State of Bihar and thus was not entitled for reservation on the ground of the illegal caste certificate. Thus his election as a Mukhiya was not proper and as a result he is removed from the said post. It was further ordered to recommend action against the concerned State employee who had issued the incorrect caste certificate to the petitioner. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.