Can any sane person applaud “swiftness” of passage of legislations without completing process of three readings of the Bills under Article 107?

Disregarding any pretense of pre-legislative Consultation, and feigning ignorance about Pre-legislative Consultation Policy, 2014, which was formulated by the Committee of Secretaries under the Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary on January 10, 2014, on July 22, Bihar Assembly passed 13 key Bills, including legislation on prison reforms, private universities, urban development, ease of doing business, crime control, panchayat governance and the establishment of new specialised universities without meaning full discussion and deliberation. The Bills were not referred to multi-party select committees. The assembly did not incorporate the amendments  in the bill. These Bills are:

1. Bihar Urban Development Bill 2026
2. Bihar Private University (Amendment) Bill 2026 in the name of improving access to quality education, reducing migration of students to other states, retaining educational spending within Bihar and to create more academic opportunities for youth.
3. Bihar Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) (Repeal) Bill 2026
4. Indian Stamp (Bihar Amendment) Bill 2026, , for stricter penalties for undervaluation of property during registration; 
5. Registration (Bihar Amendment) Bill 2026
6. Bihar Ease of Doing Business Bill 2026
7. Bihar Panchayat Raj (Amendment) Bill 2026
8. Bihar Prison and Correctional Services Bill 2026
9. Bihar Crime Control (Amendment) Bill 2026
10. Bihar Specific University Bill 2026
11. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science University Bill 2026
12. Bihar Engineering University (Amendment) Bill 2026
13. Shaheed Jubba Sahni Architecture and Civil Engineering University Bill 2026.

Earlier, on July 21, the passing of seven Bills in the Assembly within one hour showed the "swift" work of the government without any legislative debate.  

These Bills: 1. Bihar Gambling (Prohibition) Bill, 2026, 

2. Bihar Goods and Services Tax (Amendment) Bill, 2026,  

3. Bihar Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) (Repeal) Bill, 2026, 

4. Bihar Land Mutation (Amendment) Bill, 2026, 

5. Bihar Medical (Amendment) Bill, 2026, 

6. Bihar Nurses Registration (Amendment) Bill, 2026 and 

7. Bihar Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) (Amendment) Bill, 2026.

These Bills were passed hurriedly when the opposition parties had walked out in protest against the lathi charge on students and youth. 

The passage of these Bills with such exemplary swiftness is a lesson for all the present and future legislators. It shows how the legislators were not give sufficient time to prepare for the deliberation on Bills. Can any sane person applaud such “swiftness” of government’s work?

A day may come when High Court or Supreme Court will declare them ultra vires on the ground that these bills were passed without due diligence.   

The Bills Originating in the legislative council involves three readings. 

First Reading: The legislative process starts with the introduction of the Bill in either the legislative assembly or the legislative council with permission .It is necessary to ask for leave to introduce the Bill. IIf leave is granted by the House, the Bill is introduced. This constitutes the First Reading of the Bill. After a Bill has been introduced, it is published in the Official Gazette as soon as possible. Subsequent to introduction of the Bills, in the council or the assembly, the same may be referred to the legislative committees by the presiding officer of the legislature for examination and report. 

Second Reading: The Second Reading consists of consideration of the Bill which is in two stages. The first stage consists of a discussion on the Bill as a whole when only the principles of the Bill and its provisions are discussed in general. The presiding officer can refer the Bill to a Select Committee.  In the case of a Bill having been referred to a Select/Joint Committee, the Committee considers the Bill clause-
by-clause just as the House does. Amendments can be moved to the various clauses by members of the Committee. The Committee can also take evidence of associations, public bodies or experts who are interested in the measures. After the Bill has thus been considered, the Committee submits its report to the House which considers the Bill as reported on by the Committee. 

The second stage of the Second Reading consists of a clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill, as introduced or as reported by Select/ Joint Committee. Discussion takes place on each clause of the Bill and amendments to clauses can be moved at this stage.  After the clauses, the schedules, if any, the Enacting Formula, Long Title and Short Title of the Bill have been adopted by the House, the Second Reading is deemed to be over.

Third Reading: Thereafter, the Member-in-charge can move that the Bill (or the Bill, as amended) be passed. This stage is known as the Third Reading of the Bill. At this stage debate is confined to arguments either in support of the Bill or for its rejection, without referring to the details thereof further than is absolutely necessary. Only formal, verbal or consequential amendments are allowed at this stage. When passing an ordinary Bill, a simple majority of the Members present and voting is sufficient.

The record of the proceedings of the Bihar legislature can reveal how most of the Bills passed did not complete the process of the three readings of the Bills.   A careful reading of the constitution and the rules of the house demonstrates that Bills passed without discussion cannot be deemed constitutional. Article 107 of the Constitution states that no Bill shall be deemed to have been passed unless both Houses have agreed to it. The word “agreed” has been presumably used with intent. There cannot be agreement to a proposal without discussion. The word "agreement" presupposes discussion. The term "agreed" means mutual assent. It reflects the fundamental "meeting of the minds". Can there be mutual assent without discussion in the legislature? 

P.D.T. Acharya is former secretary general of the Lok Sabha says, "Experience shows that the government immensely benefits from this detailed scrutiny. A much-refined Bill results in a better law and less litigation. The people need better laws, and parliament owes it to them. A Bill introduced in the midst of din and passed within a few minutes. It is passed by a voice vote of the treasury benches. This is such a ridiculously mechanical exercise that everyone, including those who voted, end up losing all respect for the sanctity of lawmaking. Laws are made without the lawmakers knowing much about what laws they have made. Lawmaking is too serious a business to be cavalierly handled by the uninitiated, who want quick passage without scrutiny. This is certainly going to affect citizens because an unscrutinised Bill may retain harmful provisions. No democratic parliament in the world passes Bills without detailed discussion and scrutiny. If the house is not in order, no business can be transacted until order is restored. It is the responsibility of the government of the day to create conditions conducive to the smooth running of the House." He added: what Article 107 of the Constitution makes clear is that Bills shall be deemed to have been passed only when both Houses discuss them and then agree to them. The makers of the constitution could have used the word “passed” in place of “agreed”. The word “passed” appropriately refers to the act of passing, namely, the voting etc. But they wanted both houses to fully discuss legislative proposals before agreeing to them. Hence the word “agreed”. Discussion is implied in this word.

The Rules for passing Bills have been framed under this Article 107. If legislature passes a Bill without discussion and scrutiny, it may end up as a bad law which would be detrimental to citizens. The passing of Bills without discussion in legislature constitutes a violation of Article 107 and the rules of the house, and are fit case for judicial intervention.

The total disregard for pre-legislative consultation in their drafting, make these Bills illegitimate. Aren't the passage of these Bills, case laws to study, what legislature should not do pass Bills? 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order of cognizance by CJM, Gopalganj with all its consequential proceedings in a Complaint Case of 2016

In Kishori Devi vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page long judgment dated July 24, 2026 concluded that in view of factual and legal submissions and "by taking note of fact as the effective disputes between the parties, prima-facie appears land dispute being coparcener for which a title suit is already pending between the parties since 2013 i.e., Title Suit No.309/2013, where petitioners are coparcener, accordingly this court is convinced that present criminal case was filed out of oblique motive to settle the land dispute by lodging this criminal prosecution, which is prima-facie un-occasioned and unwarranted. Accordingly, by taking note of legal ratio as mentioned in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) & Rikhab Birani Case (supra), impugned order of cognizance dated 22.11.2017 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named petitioners arising thereof as passed in Complaint Case No. 3727 of 2016, pending before learned CJM, Gopalganj is hereby quashed and set aside. 10. Hence, this application stands allowed."

The quashing petition was preferred for quashing the order dated November 22, 2017 passed in TR No.2525/2017 which arose out of Complaint Case No. 3727/2016 passed by CJM, Gopalganj where cognizance was taken for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. 

Justice Jha recorded that despite repeated calls Dhrup Narayan Singh, the Opposite Party No. 2, failed to join the present proceedings. 

The prosecution case, as stated in the complaint petition, was that Mahanth Rai had four sons, namely Daroga Singh, Dharmnath Singh, Sipahi Singh and Kapildeo Singh. Kapildeo Singh died leaving behind two sons, Uday Narayan Singh and Dhup Narayan Singh, and two daughters, Radha Devi and Rema Devi,
while the other three sons died issueless. Dhup Narayan Singh had two sons, Krishna Pratap Singh and Chandan Kumar Singh, and three daughters, Kishori Devi, Rekha Kumari and Simple Kumari, of whom Kishori Devi was married to accused no. 5. It was alleged that accused no. 5, in connivance with others, falsely claimed Rakesh Ranjan Singh and his wife to be the son-in-law and daughter of Uday Narayan Singh and started executing sale deeds in respect of valuable ancestral lands without partition, compelling the complainant to institute Partition Suit No. 309/2013 before the Court of the Sub-Judge-XI, Gopalganj. Despite having knowledge of the pending partition suit, petitioner no(s). 1 and 2 allegedly executed a sale deed by falsely representing petitioner no. 1 as the daughter of Uday Narayan Singh, whereas she was in fact the daughter of the complainant. On April 26, 2016, when the complainant came to know about the alleged forgery and demanded return of the forged documents from petitioner no(s). 1 and 2, the accused persons allegedly assaulted him and forcibly snatched Rs.10,000/- and his mobile phone. 

The counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the ingredients for constituting offences under Sections 419, 323 and 504 of the IPC was not made out prima-facie and, therefore, cognizance as taken against the petitioners in the background of land dispute is appearing bad in the eyes of law. It was submitted that for the land dispute complainant preferred a Title Suit No. 309/2013 prior to lodging of this case, pending before the Court of learned Sub Judge-I, Gopalganj. It was also submitted that the accused/petitioners are coparcener and party of the said suit and to create unnecessary pressure or to settle personal vengeance out of oblique motive the present criminal case was lodged, which was completely un-occasioned and unwarranted and, therefore, cognizance order is fit to be quashed/set aside. The counsel submitted that cognizance should not be taken in such a mechanical manner. In support of his submissions learned counsel relied upon the reports of Supreme Court as available through State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335 and Rikhab Birani &  Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2025 SCC OnLine SC 823].

The paragraph no. 102 of the Bhajan Lal Case reads: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused. 
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 

The paragraph no(s). 19 and 20 of the Rikhab Birani Case reads: “19. It is the duty and obligation of the court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing process, particularly when the matter is essentially of civil nature. 13 The prevalent impression that civil remedies, being time-consuming, do not adequately protect the interests of creditors or lenders should be discouraged and rejected as criminal procedure cannot be used to apply pressure. 14 Failure to do so results in the breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to misuse and abuse of the legal process.20. In yet another case, again arising from criminal proceedings initiated in the State of Uttar Pradesh this Court was constrained to note recurring cases being encountered wherein parties repeatedly attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts by filing vexatious complaints, camouflaging allegations that are ex facie outrageous or are pure civil claims. These attempts must not be entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. Reference was made to a judgment of this Court in Thermax Limited v. K.M. Johny which held that courts should be watchful of the difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though there can be situations where the allegation may constitute both civil and criminal wrongs. Further, there has to be a conscious application of mind on these aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence on record and may even put questions to the complainant/investigating officer etc. to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations. The summoning order has to be passed when the complaint or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence. The summoning order should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.”

Has FIR been lodged and CID probe ordered against SHO Kamal Nayan Pandey for breaking Manish Kumar's legs in custody, in compliance with Justice Jitendra Kumar's judgement?

On June 16, 2026, Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement in the case of Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Director General of Police, Bihar and six others, wherein, he directed the Station House Officer, Murar Buxar to lodge FIR against Kamal Nayan Pandey, the then Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar and directed the Director General of Police, Bihar to take compliance report from the Station House Officer, Murar, Buxar, Ara regarding lodging of the FIR and entrust the investigation to the Crime Investigation Department because the case was lodged against a police officer. Justice Kumar concluded: “11. In case, the Petitioner is not satisfied by the investigation of the C.I.D. also, then he would be at liberty to file a further writ petition before this Court seeking appointment of C.B.I. to investigate into the matter, because this matter relates to protection of the fundamental right of the people and brutality committed by the police officer. If such conduct is not controlled and checked, the whole rule of law and constitutional protection of life and liberty of the citizen of the country would go to wind and the national police may become like one of Nazi Germany…..13. The D.G.P., Bihar is also directed to send a compliance report to the Registrar General of this Court to be put up on record within thirty days.”  It is not clear as to whether High Court’s Registrar General has received the compliance report from the  D.G.P., Bihar and whether the same has been up on record within thirty days from the date of the judgement dated June 16.  

 In this case, the petitioner had approached the Court seeking a direction for lodging of FIR against the Station House Officer (SHO), Murar, Buxar, pleading that despite the written report given by the petitioner to the Officer In-Charge, of the Police Station, and the Superintendent of Police, as well as the District Magistrate, FIR has not been lodged by the police station. The petitioner alleged that he was brutally assaulted by the SHO and both his legs were broken by him. As per the written report submitted by the Petitioner to the concerned police officer, the Petitioner had gone to the stall of his friend situated in the village Chaugaya on July 4, 2024 for online uploading of title documents in regard to his land. At 2 PM., when the petitioner was going to answer the call of nature, the SHO and other constables came on a vehicle of Murar police station came. The SHO called him and enquired about him and when he came to know that he belongs to a particular caste, he abused him and assaulted him with his danda because of which both his legs were broken. In its counter affidavit, SP , Buxar claimed that the police had not beaten the petitioner. His leg was broken he had slipped on account of rainy weather, which resulted into breaking of his legs. Justice Kumar examined the the X-Ray Report was not persuaded by this explanation of the police. He refused to believe that a poor man who does not gather courage to lodge FIR even against his co-citizen can dare to lodge false report against a police officer. 

Justice Kumar observed: “….as per the allegation, prima facie case of cognizable offence is clearly made out against Kamal Nayan Pandey, who was the then Officer in-Charge of Murar Police Station, Buxar, Ara. The Court noted that s per the allegation, prima facie cognizable offence is made out, warranting registration of FIR against the SHO. The Court observed that “for prosecution of the accused, who happened to be a police officer, does not require even sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC/ 218 B.N.S.S. because such brutal act on the part of the police officer against a poor man is not a part of his official duty. 7. It is shocking and disturbing that the cry of the victim for lodging of FIR before the concerned police officers, including the Superintendent of Police and the District

Magistrate, went unheard by the officers despite their duty to do the needful to prosecute the accused, even if the accused happened to be an officer. It is trite to say that ours is a constitutional democracy based on rule of law. Howsoever high one may be, the law is above all. There is also equality before law and equal protection of law of everybody, howsoever poor he may be.” 

He added: “8. At this stage, referring the Petitioner to the Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.PC/175(3) B.N.S.S. would be further injustice to the Petitioner. Moreover, as per the allegation, there is clear violation of fundamental right of the Petitioner as granted and guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution requiring immediate lodging of FIR, failing which, the people of the Country would lose faith not only in police but even in the Writ Court.”

Patna High Court Advocates join the nation to express solidarity with students and youth protesting at Jantar Mantar, condemn police assault

Advocates of Patna High Court gathered at Gate No. 4 amidst heavy police presence to express their solidarity with the fast and peaceful demonstration by students and youth at New Delhi's Jantar Mantar who were attacked by the police in the heart of the national capital. The advocates termed the police attack as an attack on the fundamental right to speech and public protest which is recognised under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India i.e., the fundamental rights to free speech and expression, and to assemble peacefully. Significantly, the violent assault on students and youth was ordered by the Union Executive in the proximity of Parliament. The monsoon session of the Parliament is underway since July 20, 2026. Both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha witnessed uproar and sloganeering with Opposition demanding discussions on the NEET paper ‘leak’ issue and the police crackdown. Ahead of the day’s parliament session, Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi along with some Opposition MPs had met Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla demanding a discussion in the Lok Sabha on the “brutality unleashed” on students and the government’s “complete lack of accountability” for the nation-wide examination disaster. Photo:Yogesh Chandra Verma, Octogenarian senior advocate and President, Advocates Association, the oldest and largest organisation of Bihar protesting against the assault on the students and youth at Jantar Mantar in the national capital.          

The advocates included octogenarian Yogesh Chandra Verma, senior  advocate and President, Advocates Association and veteran lawyers like Dr. S.S.P. Yadav, Ram Jiban Prasad Singh, Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Dr. Raja Ram Rai, Angad Kumar Singh, Uday Pratap Singh, Manilal Mahto, Bijendra Singh, Ashok Kumar, Maheshwar Prasad Das, Ravi Shankar, Arjun Prasad, Vishwa Ranjan Chaudhary, Ashok Sinha, P.K Sharma, Amarendra Sinha, Shambhu Sharan, Dr. Gopal Krishna and Sanjana Srivastava. The advocates condemned police assault on the students and youth. The noted senior trade union leader and General Secretary of AITUC also joined the protest. 

The advocates joined the nation to express the their support with the protesters at Jantar Mantar. The protest was organised by All India Lawyers Union (AILU), Patna High Court, Indian Association of Lawyers (IAL), Bihar Chapter, and All India Lawyers Association for Justice (AILAJ). The advocates pointed out that the Supreme Court has held in Kedarnath Singh vs. State of Bihar (1962) that the right to hold public meetings or have processions flows from the right to freedom of assembly.   

On July 22, 2026, Supreme Court refused to initiate suo motu proceedings to take cognisance of alleged police excesses during the July 20 crackdown on student protesters in the national capital. When a lawyer submitted that there was videographic evidence of police brutality against the protesters, Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant orally declined to examine the videos, saying that the court’s time should not be “wasted”. He was quoted as saying, "“We are not interested in videos. We don’t have time to watch them,” the Chief Justice orally remarked, declining to take cognisance of alleged videographic evidence of police violence on student protestors." The protesting students are seeking the resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, the Union Education Minister  over exam paper leaks. Advocate Narendra Mishra had mentioned the matter of the students who are raising important issues such as proper conduct of the NEET exam, and reforms in the National Testing Agency with nation-wide support. 

Like several other state assemblies across the country, Bihar state assembly also witnessed bitter protest against examination disaster during its Monsoon session, which is underway. The student protest near Gandhi Maidan, about three km away from the Governor’s residence faced tear gas shells, used water cannons and baton-charged from the Bihar Police on July 22, 2026 to stop them from a ‘Lok Bhavan March’, who were demanding resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, the Union Education Minister over the NEET paper leak disaster.

Notably, on July 21, the Delhi High Court had declined to urgently hear a similar matter, saying, "Don't drag the Court into this." But the Delhi High Court's 's Division bench of bench of Chief Justice Devendra Upadhyay and Justice Tejas Karia heard the matter on July 22 an issued notice.  Appearing for the petitioners, the senior counsels submitted before the Court that the peaceful protest has been underway for 20 days without disturbing peace. 

The petition was heard after the Court permitted urgent mentioning of the petition. The petition submitted that the incident had “shocked the conscience of the entire nation”. N. Hariharan, senior advocate, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, senior advocate and Vikas Singh, aenior advocate appeared for the petitioners. S.V. Raju, Additional Solicitor General (ASG) represented the Delhi Police and the Union Government. It was submitted that the demonstrators were exercising their constitutional rights under Articles 19 and 21. The disproportionate use of the force by the police was unimaginable. The students were beaten with lathis fitted with nails and subjected to pellets and electric batons, resulting in injuries to more than 90 protesters. There was no proclamation was issued prohibiting the assembly. The police had not warned the protesters to disperse before resorting to force. The senior counsels sought preservation of all material connected with the incident, including CCTV footage, PCR logs, videography and orders authorising the use of tear gas and batons and prayed to the Court to constitute a Special Investigation Team or appoint an independent agency to probe the allegations because the Delhi Police could not investigate accusations against its own personnel. The senior counsel submitted: “There are policemen who were molesting women, beating them on private parts. It is so ghastly... At least identifiable policemen, against them FIRs should be there. It is all in videos. An enquiry be made into the entire incident”. 

Gopal Sankaranarayanan, senior advocate appearing for another PIL submitted that his team had verified nearly 130 videos relating to the incident. He alleged that several persons seen using force were neither in police uniform nor wearing identification badges. He pointed out that one of the videos, showed Additional DCP Sandeep Lamba slapping a woman protester. “Videos show Additional DCP Sandeep Lamba slapping a woman who was doing nothing. Let's not be scared to name our thugs in uniform. He slaps her across the face. They were in charge to protect us”. 

 

Citing Supreme Court's 252-page long judgment dated February 23, 2012 in Re-Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt.4/5.06.2011 vs. Home Secretary, Union of India (2012) 5 SCC 1, Sankaranarayanan submitted that the authorities had failed to comply with the prescribed protocol for dispersing crowds. The protocol requires prior announcement. The use of tear gas is a measure of last resort as per the protocol. 

In the Ram Lila Maidan case, the Supreme Court held that "From the facts and circumstances that emerge from the record before this Court, it is evident that it was not a case of emergency. The police have failed to establish that a situation had arisen where there was imminent need to intervene, having regard to the sensitivity and perniciously perilous consequences that could have resulted, if such harsh measures had not been taken forthwith."  The Court observed: "Freedom of speech, right to assemble and demonstrate by holding dharnas and peaceful  agitation are the basic features  of a democratic system.  The people of a democratic country like ours have a right to raise their voice against the decisions and actions of the Government or even to express their resentment over the actions of the government on any subject of social or national importance.  The Government has to respect, and in fact, encourage exercise of such rights.  It is the abundant duty of the State to aid the exercise of right to freedom of speech as understood in its comprehensive sense and not to throttle or frustrate exercise of such rights by exercising  its executive or legislative  powers and passing orders or taking action in that direction in the name of reasonable restrictions”. The Court's direction reads: "a. Take disciplinary action against all the erring police officers/personnel who have indulged in brick-batting, have resorted to lathi charge and excessive use of tear gas shells upon the crowd, have exceeded their authority or have acted in a manner not permissible under the prescribed procedures, rules or the standing orders and their actions have an element of criminality. This action shall be taken against the officer/personnel irrespective of what ranks they hold in the hierarchy of police." The instant case creates a compelling logic for disciplinary action as well. 

Vikas Singh, the senior counsel submitted that the march to Parliament had been publicly announced in advance and that the authorities were aware that the gathering would swell on July 20. The protest involved students, doctors, lawyers and persons from different walks of life. Singh maintained that there was nothing on record to suggest that the gathering constituted an unlawful assembly. 

Singh referred to Section 149 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, to submit that officers dispersing assemblies are required to use “as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly”. 

Raju, the ASG who represented the Delhi Police and the Union Government submitted that the petitioners had failed to avail alternative remedies, including approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. He submitted that prohibitory orders under Section 163 BNS had been promulgated. He questioned the maintainability of the PILs. Raju argued that individuals claiming to have been assaulted should pursue appropriate legal remedies instead of invoking the public interest jurisdiction of the Court. 

Delhi High Court asked: “Is it a case of some isolated incidents? Perhaps not. If it was an unlawful assembly, as you say, there is law on how to deal with it. If these issues are raised in a PIL, how can you say every individual should lodge an FIR?”. 

Drawing the Supreme Court's19-page long decision dated August 12, 2016 in Anita Thakur vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2016) 15 SCC 525, the Court observed that remedies for alleged violations of fundamental rights arising from police action could also be pursued under public law. The Court directed preservation of “the relevant record in relation to the incident as mentioned in the writ petitions, including CCTV footage and videography, if any”, in accordance with the standard operating procedures issued by the Delhi Police and the Union Government. The matter has been listed for further hearing on September 11. 

In Anita Thakur's case, the Court observed: "When we examine the present matter in the aforesaid conspectus, we find that initially it was the petitioners/ protestors who took the law into their hands by turning their peaceful agitation into a violent one and in the process becoming unruly and pelting stones at the police. On the other hand, even the police personnel continued the use of force beyond limits after they had controlled the mob. In the process, they continued their lathi charge. They continued to beat up all the three petitioners even after overpowering them. They had virtually apprehended these petitioners making them immobile. However, their attack on these petitioners continued even thereafter when it was not at all needed. As far as injuries suffered by these petitioners are concerned, such a situation could clearly be avoided. It is apparent that to that extent, respondents misused their power. To that extent, fundamental right of the petitioners, due to police excess, has been violated. In such circumstances, in exercise of its power under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court can award compensation to the petitioners." 

The Court drew on its decisions in Saheli, A Women's Resources Center, Through Ms. Nalini Bhanot & Ors. vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters & Ors.(1990) 1 SCC 422; Joginder Kaur vs. The Punjab State & Ors.(1969) ACJ 28; The State of Rajasthan vs. Mst. Vidhywati & Anr.(1962) Supp 2 SCR 989; and Smt. Nilabati Behera@ Lalita Behera (through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) vs. State of Orissa & Ors.(1993) 2 SCC 746. 

The judgement in Anita Thakur's case concluded: "The ratio of these precedents can be explained thus: First, it is clear that a violation of fundamental rights due to police misconduct can give rise to a liability under public law, apart from criminal and tort law. Secondly, that pecuniary compensation can be awarded for such a violation of fundamental rights. Thirdly, it is the State that is held liable and, therefore, the compensation is borne by the State and not the individual police officers found guilty of misconduct. Fourthly, this Court has held that the standard of proof required for proving police misconduct such as brutality, torture and custodial violence and for holding the State accountable for the same, is high. It is only for patent and incontrovertible violation of fundamental rights that such remedy can be made available. Fifthly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to cases of fundamental rights violation and hence cannot be used as a defence in public law. 15. Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances of the present case and finding that even the petitioners are to be blamed to some extent, as pointed out above, the only relief we grant is to award compensation of ₹2,00,000 (rupees two lakhs only) to petitioner No.1 and ₹1,00,000 (rupees one lakh only) each to petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, which shall be paid to these petitioners within a period of two months." This judgement shows that Court holds the State is liable when it finds the police guilty of misconduct like brutality and torture.   

In the case of violence at Jantar Mantar, besides the violence by police, there were instances, wherein, some individuals with beard masqueraded as police and numerous masked faceless mercenaries resorted to violence, brutality and torture against the students and youth.  

LiveLaw has reported that Delhi Police has registered at least nine FIRs in connection with the alleged “violence, stone-pelting and vandalism” during the march. The FIRs have been lodged at police stations including Parliament Street, Barakhamba Road and Connaught Place. The charges include rioting, assaulting public servants on duty, damaging government and private property, and attempting to murder a Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel.

On July 21, the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, Rahul Gandhi, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, MP and Akhilesh Yadav, Samajwadi Party chief  were detained after leading a sit-in protest outside Lok Kalyan Marg, the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s residence, demanding his resignation. Besixdes these leaders, Mallikarjun Kharge, the Leader of Opposition in Rajya Sabha and several senior MPs reached the site around 3.30 pm and staged a dharna, accusing the government of shielding those responsible for the alleged NEET paper leak and ordering police action against protesting students. Supriya Sule, the NCP (SP) leader joined the demonstration later. The Union government sent Dr. Jitendra Singh, Minister of State in the PMO to hold talks with Rahul Gandhi. Union Home Secretary Govind Mohan was also with the minister but the discussions failed to break the deadlock because of the demand for the resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, the Union Education Minister. The leaders demands included a statement from Amit Shah, the Home Minister in Parliament on police violence, a judicial inquiry into the alleged police excesses against protesting students, and an immediate discussion on NEET in both Houses. Rahul Gandhi was taken to Chhatrasal Stadium in Model Town, while Priyanka Gandhi was detained at Mandir Marg police station. Both were released later at night. Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Parliamentary Party chairperson reached the police station where Priyanka was being held. Notably, Karnataka Chief Minister D K Shivakumar and Kerala Chief Minister V D Satheesan also joined the protest. 

Earlier, Rahul Gandhi along with other opposition leaders had met Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla, urging him to allow a discussion in Parliament on the police ‘brutality’ and NEET controversy, but was informed that the government’s approval was a must to take up the discussion.  

The First Amendment to the United States (US) Constitution, reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The first three words of the Constitution of India and US Constitution are the same. The words are: "We, the people". 

Can "We, the people" be subservient to the illegitimate and immoral acts of the Police and non-State actors masquerading as police and masked faceless mercenaries?    

 

From Archives:Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah set aside judgement by trial court, Munger

In State of Bihar vs. Gurusharan Ram & Ors. Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 (2012), Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah  as judge of Patna High Court had delivered a 6-page long judgement dated July 23, 2012, wherein, while disposing of the matter, had concluded: "this Court, exercising suo motu power of revision under the Code quashes the order dated 06.06.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270/45 of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 838 of 1999/13 of 2000. The Court below shall forthwith take steps for framing charges against the opposite parties and thereafter conduct the trial in accordance with law. The application stands disposed off in the aforementioned terms." The other two  respondents were: 2. Mukesh Ram and Tinku Ram. The case was filed in the High Court The case was instituted on the basis of the order dated February 26, 2004 passed in Kaushalya Devi & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2012) Cr. Revision No. 992 of 2002 by which the High Court had exercised suo motu revisional power and issued notice to the opposite parties asking them to show cause as to why the order dated 06.06.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270/45 of 2001 be not set aside. The order dated February 26, 2004 is not available on the High Court's website. The 4-page long judgement dated July 23, 2012 in the Kaushalya Devi's case too was authored by Justice Amanullah. Pranav Kumar was the A.P.P. in both the cases.   

In the Kaushalya Devi's case, the revision application was directed against the order dated July 22, 2002 passed in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/45 of 2001 by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger by which the petition under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the petitioner was rejected. The case was filed and registered in the High Court on October 31, 2002. 

In his order, Justice Amanullah recorded that initially the case was filed against five named persons including the petitioners. Upon investigation initially the police submitted chargesheet only against the other three co-accused and not against the petitioners. Later on supplementary chargesheet was submitted against the petitioners also on the basis of further investigation. The other three co-accused had thus moved a petition under Section 227of the Code. By order dated June 6, 2000 the same had been allowed and they were discharged. The High Court while hearing the Kaushalya Devi's case on February 26, 2004 had issued notice to the other three co-accused as to why in exercise of suo motu revisional power the order dated June 6, 2000 be not set aside. Thus, a separate case was registered being Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 in which the High Court passed orders on July 23, 2012, quashing the order dated June 6, 2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/45 of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 838 of 1999/13 of 2000. In the said case, the High Court has gone through the evidence as recorded in the case diary and has came to the conclusion that there was sufficient material for proceeding with the trial and discharging the accused at that stage was not proper. Thus, for the same reasons as recorded in Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 in the order passed on July 23, 2022 in the case, as far as petitioner no. 1 who is mother-in-law of the deceased and was revision application stands dismissed. The order impugned dated July 22, 2002 as far as petitioner no. 1 is concerned, was upheld. As far as petitioner no. 2, who was the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased is concerned, her husband as well as various other villagers of the place where she resides in her matrimonial home had categorically stated that one of the co-accused, her brother namely, Mukesh Ram had gone to her matrimonial home to inform her about the death of the deceased and thereafter she alongwith her husband had gone to her maternal home (Naihar) on February 13, 1999. In view of the fact that she was already married and living separately with the husband and that on the fateful day also nothing has come during investigation to indicate that she was present in her maternal home where the incident took place, the High Court does not find that there is sufficient ground to proceed against her. Thus, the impugned order dated July 22, 2002 as far as petitioner no. 2 was concerned was set aside. Consequently, she stood discharged from the case as well as from the liabilities of her bail bonds and sureties. The interim order dated June 30, 2004 staying further proceeding in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/ 45 of 2001 stood vacated. The High Court ordered that the lower Court records be sent for proceeding with the trial in light of the order passed in the present case as well as in Cr. Revision No. 300 of 2004 passed on July 23, 2012. \

On the basis of the order dated February 26, 2004, the case was instituted and notices issued to opposite parties who entered appearance. It was also ordered by this very order that the case of State of Bihar vs. Gurusharan Ram & Ors. of 2004 be listed along with the case of Kaushalya Devi & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar of 2002.

The A.P.P. for the State took the Court through the order dated June 6, 2000 by which the opposite parties were discharged. He submitted that the order is erroneous both on facts as well as in law. The police had submitted chargesheet against the opposite parties on the basis of materials which came during investigation and thus to discharge the opposite parties prior to trial was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. The counsel submitted that the Court had wrongly understood both the statement of the doctor as well as one Dhaneshwar Ram and given the benefit to the opposite parties. He submitted that the informant, who was the mother of the deceased, in her reinstatement as well as brother-
in-law (Bhainsur) of the informant had supported the prosecution story and during supervision also sufficient materials were found to exist for the opposite parties to be sent up for trial and accordingly chargesheet was submitted. He submitted that the doctor in his statement at paragraph no. 89 of the case diary had stated that on February 8, 1999 he had treated the deceased who had complained of pain. He stated that on February 9, 1999 also somebody had come to take advice with regard to the deceased having pain and he had given some medicine and also asked him to bring the patient so that she could be properly
treated. It was also stated that neither the boy returned nor the patient was brought to him. He submitsed that if her in-laws found that the deceased was having problems and needed treatment then they ought to have brought the deceased to the doctor on the 10th which was not done and only on February 12/13, 1999 when she was supposed to have died. Thus, according to him, there was no explanation as to why for 3-4 days she was not taken to the doctor in spite of her complaining of pain. He further submitted that there was consistent allegation that the opposite parties had harassed the deceased since opposite parties no. 2 and 3 being the brother-in-law (Dewar) were trying to establish illicit relationship with the deceased which was resisted and opposite party no. 1 being the father-in-law had also taken the side of the sons, that is, opposite parties no. 2 and 3. It was thus submitted that there was sufficient material to put the opposite parties on trial. The A.P.P. assailed the findings of the trial court with regard to Dhaneshwar Ram whose statement was at paragraph no. 89 of the case diary. He submitted that Dhaneshwar Ram had not stated that he had gone to the informant to inform about her death. He had only stated that opposite party no. 1 had asked him to inform the informant. The counsel submitted that there was no explanation in the entire investigation which explains as to why the opposite parties no. 2 and 3, who were the Dewars, had not gone and informed about the death. He further submitted that nothing had come during investigation to infer that the informant or her family members were aware of the death and had participated in the cremation. Thus, according to him it was sufficient to hold that the opposite parties were not keen to inform the informant about the death which raises bona fide and genuine suspicion with regard to the conduct and commission of the crime.  

Justice Amanullah had verified the statements and submissions of learned A.P.P. for the State from the case records and was in agreement with the stand taken by him.

The A.P.P. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M.Punchhi and K.T. Thomas in Shri Satish Mehra vs Delhi Administration & Anr. 1997 BBCJ 53 (SC) as quoted and relied upon in the order dated June 6, 2000 did not support the case of the opposite parties and rather the ratio goes in favour of the prosecution inasmuch as in the said case the Supreme Court has held that if the Court feels that trial would be an exercise in futility and sheer wastage of time, the proceedings should be terminated. He submitted that in the present case due to adequate material and evidence being available, the Court at the stage of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not justified to discharge the opposite parties in the manner it was done by the order dated June 6, 2000. 

The A.P.P. took the High Court through the evidence of Raghubir Ram which is at paragraph no. 27 of the supplementary case diary and who is the husband of one of the accused, namely Rama Devi @ Rambha Devi, who is the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased. He has stated that the informant and the brother-in-law of the informant had come to the house of the opposite parties on February 13, 1999 and were asking the opposite parties as to why they were not informed about the death of the deceased. Thus, it was stated that the informant and her family was not informed of the death and the body disposed off, which clearly proves that there was something to hide and thus discharge of the opposite parties at that stage was unjustified. It was stated that it will lead to miscarriage of justice. He also stated that his mother-in-law namely, Kaushalya Devi was unwell and bedridden since last two and a half months and thus the story and stand of the opposite parties that she had also accompanied the deceased while she had gone to ease herself is also falsified. He submitted that even the husband of the deceased was informed only belatedly, as per his own statement on February 14, 1999, which also goes to prove that the accused did not want anyone to see the body so as to enable them to know the real cause of death. Justice Amanullah had appreciated the assistance rendered by the A.P.P. for the State in the case.

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in a theft and IT Act case from Gopalganj

In Sharvan Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha delivereda 8-page long judgment dated July 20, 2026, wherein, he set aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj. justice Jha concluded: "10....it is clear that only on the basis of evidences as surfaced during any inquiry or trial of an offence, a summon can be issued to any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. 11. In the present case, summon was not issued against petitioner on the basis of evidences surfaced during the trial. None of the prosecution witnesses have said anything incriminating during the trial against this petitioner, rather petitioner himself examined as PW-7. Interestingly, on the basis of petition of accused only, otherwise having all opportunity to examine himself on oath under section 315 of the Cr.P.C., this petitioner was summoned as an accused through impugned order, which is a perverse finding contrary to the settled position of law. 12. In view of aforesaid and by taking legal report of Hon’ble Apex Court in Neeraj Kumar’ case (supra), the impugned order dated 13.07.2018 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with T.R. No. 1640/2018 arising out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015, is hereby quashed and set-aside qua petitioner. 13. Accordingly, this quashing petition stands allowed." The respondent no.2 was Surendra Nath Pandey. 

The judgement was passed upon hearing the petition filed for quashing the impugned order dated July 13, 2018 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with Tr. No. 1640/18 which arose out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the Information Technology Act, whereby and whereunder on application of accused Rahul Kumar Jha, lC.J.M. issued summon against the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The prosecution case was that as per FIR, informant alleged that Rs. 11,00,000/- was withdrawn in between April 30, 2015 to June 22, 2015 by the IRCTC from his Bank Account of State Bank of India, Hathua Branch. It was alleged that informant was a retired teacher and when he came to the Bank and verify his account, then, he came to know that fraud which was committed with his account. On the basis of written report, a First Information Report was lodged with Hathua Police Station. After lodging the FIR, police started investigation and submitted charge-sheet only against co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and section 66(C) of the I.T. Act and investigation was kept pending to verify the I.P. address and on other points. Thereafter, trial court took cognizance only against accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences under sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the I.T. Act.

The petitioner 's counsel submitted that after taking cognizance the trial of the case begins with Tr. No. 1640/18 before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj, where altogether seven (7) prosecution witnesses were examined and out of seven prosecution witnesses, this petitioner was also examined as PW-7 on 03.04.2018. It was pointed out that none of the prosecution witnesses, PW-1 to PW-6 named this petitioner qua his any involvement with the crime in question during the trial and the petitioner was examined as prosecution witness No.7, for the reason that he was the distributor of Cable Internet Connection through his company namely, M/s ANI Network Pvt. Ltd. to co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha, who alleged to misappropriate the amount of Rs. 11 Lakhs from the account of the informant for purchasing railway tickets and, thereafter, transferring the amount to his own account after cancellation of purchased railway tickets. It was submitted that co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha was not examined before the learned trial court in view of section 315 of the Cr.P.C., rather he made one application before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj on 03.04.2018, stating therein that this petitioner may be summoned as an accused,which was allowed by the impugned order dated July 13, 2018. 

The counsel also relied upon ‘Para 7’ of the legal report of Supreme Court in Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639, which reads as under for better appreciation of the legal position in connection with issuance of summon under section 319 Cr.P.C. :-“7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite.
7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [(2014) 3 SCC 92] extensively discussed the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is
extracted hereunder: “90. … all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been
involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
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106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. …

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110. In Lal Suraj [Lal Suraj v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844], a two-Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been chargesheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 CrPC. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram [Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh, (2006) 10 SCC 192 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 532 : AIR 2006 SC 1892], wherein it was held that a person, though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. …. …… ……”