Isn't judgement by 3-Judge Bench on Article 136 per incuriam because it undermines judgement by Supreme Court's 5-Judge Constitution Bench?

In V. Vasanthakumar vs. H.C. Bhatia, [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 36 of 2016], Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice T. S Thakur, R. Bhanumathi and Uday Umesh Lalit delivered a 25-page long judgement dated July 13, 2016, wherein, it expressed its pious wish to regain its true status as a Constitutional Court in an apparent breach of judicial discipline disregarding the judgement dated January 11, 2026 in Mathai @ Joby vs. George & Anr., (2016) and referred the matter to a Constitutional Bench "for an authoritative pronouncement. The Registry shall, accordingly, place the record before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate bench" upon hearing the writ petition which was filed on January 12, 2016, the very next day of the judgement by the Constitution Bench. Isn't judgement by 3-Judge Bench of Supreme Court per incuriam  for undermining a judgement by 5-Judge Constitution Bench? It is apparent that the Court's registry has aptly decided to comply with the judgement of the Constitution Bench.   

The 3-Judge Bench referred to the judgement of the 5-Judge Constitution Bench in Mathai @ Joby v. George & Anr., which had relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in N. Suriyakala vs. A. Mohandoss (2007) 9 SCC 196, Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees AIR 1959 SC 633, Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359, State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry AIR 1960 SC 391, Municipal Board, Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla (1982) 3 SCC 331, Ram Saran Das and Bros. v. CTO AIR 1962 SC 1326, Pritam Singh v. State AIR 1950 SC 169, Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1, Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Port of Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214, Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority (2002) 4 SCC 666, Ashok Nagar Welfare Assn. v. R.K. Sharma (2002) 1 SCC 749, which underlined that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution by the Supreme Court was discretionary and that the provision did not confer a vested right of appeal to a party in litigation. The Constitution Bench, however, declined to look into the question of interpretation of Article 136 of the Constitution or to enumerate the circumstances in which the extraordinary power vested in this Court under the said provision could or ought to be exercised. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Pritam Singh vs. The
State 1950 SCR 453 at page 457 Penu Balakrishna Iyer & Ors. vs. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer & Ors. (1964) 7 SCR 49 at Page 53 and Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 584, the Constitution Bench held that power under Article 136 had to be exercised with circumspection but considered it unnecessary to limit the use thereof forever by a process of interpretation. The Court was of the view that the question referred to the Constitution Bench stood answered by the three decisions mentioned above.

Admittedly, it was in this backdrop that the petitioner, a practicing Advocate filed the petition on the very next day of the judgement by the Constitution Bench in which he has sought a mandamus directing the respondents to consider his representation and to take steps for implementation of the suggestion of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bihar Legal Support Society vs. Chief Justice and Others (1986) 4 SCC 767, by establishing a National/Regional Courts of Appeal. The writ petition came up for preliminary hearing before on February 26, 2016, the 3-Judge Bench issued notice and requested Mukul Rohatgi, Attorney General for India to assist it. It also requested K.K. Venugopal and Salman Khurshid, senior counsels to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae.

Prior to this in Mathai Alias Joby vs. George (2016), Supreme Court's Constitution Bench of Justices Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph, Shiva Kirti Singh, Adarsh Kumar Goel, and Rohinton Fali Nariman delivered a 7-page long judgement dated January 11, 2016, wherein, it concluded: "Upon perusal of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid judgments, in our opinion, no effort should be made to restrict the powers of this Court under Article 136 because while exercising its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this Court can, after considering facts of the case to be decided, very well use its discretion. In the interest of justice, in our view, it would be better to use the said power with circumspection, rather than to limit the power forever. In the circumstances, we do not see any reason to answer the issue which has already been answered in the aforesaid judgments. We are of the opinion that no further elaboration is required on the issue involved in this case. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as infructuous." It referred to its decisions at page 457 in Pritam Singh vs. The State (1950) SCR 453, at page 53 in Penu Balakrishna Iyer & Ors. Vs. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer & Ors.(1964) 7 SCR 49 and at para 58 in Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 1991 (4) SCC 584. The judgement was authored by Justice Dave.

Earlier in Mathai Alias Joby vs. George 2010 SCC 4 358, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Markandey Katju and R.M. Lodha had delivered a 20-page long judgement dated March 19, 2010, wherein, it had issued notice to the Supreme Court Bar Association, Bar Council of India and the Supreme Court-Advocates-on-Record Association besides the respondents. The order reads:"Since the matter involved interpretation of Article 136 of the  Constitution, we feel that it should be decided by a Constitution Bench in view of Article 145(3) of the Constitution. Let the papers of this case be laid before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench, to decide which kinds of cases should be entertained under Article 136, and/or for laying down some broad guidelines in this connection." The Court was hearing a special leave petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated November 9, 2009 of the High Court of Kerala Ernakulam in W.P.(C) No. 31726/2009.  

The petitioner was one of the defendants in a suit in which he disputed the genuineness of a Will dated January 13, 2006. The Will in question was sent for expert opinion to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapurm. The Forensic Science Laboratory submitted its report to the Trial Court. Not satisfied with the report the Petitioner wanted another opinion from another expert. The prayer of the petitioner was rejected by the Trial Court and the writ petition filed against the order of the Trial Court was dismissed by the impugned order. Against the High Court’s order, the SLP was filed. 

The Division Bench's order reads:" 4. We are prima facie of the opinion that such special leave petitions should not be entertained by this Court. Now-a-days all kinds of special leave petitions are being filed in this Court against every kind of order. For instance, if in a suit the trial court allows an amendment application, the matter is often contested right up to this Court. Similarly, if the delay in filing an application or appeal is condoned by the Trial Court or the appellate court, the matter is fought upto this Court. Consequently, the arrears in this Court are mounting and mounting and this Court has been converted practically into an ordinary appellate Court which, in our opinion, was never the intention of Article 136 of the Constitution. In our opinion, now the time has come when it should be decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court as to in what kind of cases special leave petitions should be entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution. 5. Article 136, no doubt, states that the Supreme Court may in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. However, it is not mentioned in Article 136 of the Constitution as to in what kind of cases the said discretion should be exercised. Hence, some broad guidelines need to be laid down now by a Constitution bench of this Court otherwise this Court will be flooded (and in fact is being flooded) with all kind of special leave petitions even frivolous ones and the arrears in this Court will keep mounting and a time will come when the functioning of this Court will become impossible. It may be mentioned that Article 136, like Article 226, is a discretionary remedy, and this Court is not bound to interfere even if there is an error of law or fact in the impugned order." 

In N. Suriyakala vs. A. Mohandoss and Ors, (2007) 9 SCC 196, the Supreme Court observed: "In this connection we may clarify the scope of Article 136. Article 136 of the Constitution is not a regular forum of appeal at all. It is a residual provision which enables the Supreme Court to interfere with the judgment or order of any court or tribunal in India in its discretion."

Article 136(1) of the Constitution states: "Article 136(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India." 

Division Bench points out that "The use of the words "in its discretion" in Article 136 clearly indicates that Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal upon any party but merely vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to interfere in exceptional cases vide
M/s. Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Their Employees AIR 1959 SC 633(635), Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. 2000(6) SCC 359 and State of Bombay Vs. Rusy Mistry AIR 1960 SC 391(395). In Municipal Board, Pratabgarh & Anr. Vs. Mahendra Singh Chawla & Ors. 1982(3) SCC 331 and in Chandra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 2889 (vide para 43 & 45), this Court observed that under Article 136 it was not bound to set aside an order even if it
was not in conformity with law, since the power under Article 136 was discretionary. Though the discretionary power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 is apparently not subject to any limitation, the Court has itself imposed certain limitations
upon its own powers vide Ram Saran Das and Bros. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta & Ors. AIR 1962 SC 1326(1328) and Kunhayammed Vs. State of Kerala 2000(6) SCC 359 (para 13)." 

The Supreme Court has laid down that this power has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only. Thus, in Pritam Singh vs. The State AIR 1950 SC 169, this Court observed (vide para 9): "On a careful examination of Art.136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article."

In Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 2351, the Supreme Court observed: "It is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court with implicit trust and faith, and extraordinary care and caution has to be observed in the exercise of this jurisdiction. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party but vests a vast discretion in the Supreme Court meant to be exercised on the considerations of justice, call of duty and eradicating injustice." 

In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai AIR 2004 SC 1815 (para 33), the Supreme Court observed:"The discretionary power of the Supreme Court is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. The very conferment of the discretionary power defies any attempt at exhaustive definition of such power. The power is permitted to be invoked not in a routine fashion but in very exceptional circumstances as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision sought to be impugned before the Supreme Court shocks the conscience. This overriding and exceptional power has been vested in the Supreme Court to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of the cause of justice in the Supreme Court in exceptional cases only when special circumstances are shown to exist." It also observed: "It is well settled that Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer a right to appeal on any party; it confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. Article 136 cannot be read as conferring a right on anyone to prefer an appeal to this Court; it only confers a right on a party to file an application seeking leave to appeal and a discretion on the Court to grant or not to grant such leave in its wisdom. When no law confers a statutory right to appeal on a party, Article 136 cannot be called in aid to spell out such a right. The Supreme Court would not under Article 136 constitute itself into a tribunal or court just settling disputes and reduce itself to a mere court of error. The power under Article 136 is an extraordinary power to be exercised in rare and exceptional cases and on well-known principles." 

In Narpat Singh vs. Jaipur Development Authority (2002) 4 SCC 666, this Court observed: "The exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Art.136 of the Constitution on the Supreme Court is discretionary. It does not confer a right to appeal on a party to litigation; it only confers a discretionary power of widest amplitude on the Supreme Court to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice. On one hand, it is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly, with caution and care and to remedy extraordinary situations or situations occasioning gross failure of justice; on the other hand, it is an overriding power whereunder the Court may generously step in to impart justice and remedy injustice."

In Ashok Nagar Welfare Association vs. R.K. Sharma AIR 2002 SC 335, the Supreme Court observed that even in cases where special leave is granted, the discretionary power vested in the Court continues to remain with the Court even at the stage when the appeal comes up for hearing." 

The Division Bench observed: "14. Now-a-days it has become a practice of filing SLPs against all kinds of orders of the High Court or other authorities without realizing the scope of Article 136. Hence we feel it incumbent on us to reiterate that Article 136 was never meant to be an ordinary forum of appeal at all like Section 96 or even Section 100 CPC. Under the constitutional scheme, ordinarily the last court in the country in ordinary cases was meant to be the High Court. The Supreme Court as the Apex Court in the country was meant to deal with important issues like constitutional questions, questions of law of general importance or where grave injustice had been done. If the Supreme Court entertains all and sundry kinds of cases it will soon be flooded with a huge amount of backlog and will not be able to deal with important questions relating to the Constitution or the law or where grave injustice has been done, for which it was really meant under the Constitutional Scheme. After all, the Supreme Court has limited time at its disposal and it cannot be expected to hear every kind of dispute." 

By now it is crystal clear that Supreme Court has gradually converted itself into a mere Court of Appeal which has sought to correct every error which it finds in the judgments of the High Courts of the country as well as the vast number of tribunals. The Court has strayed from its original character as a Constitutional Court and the Apex Court of the country. If the Apex Court seeks to deal with all kinds of cases, it necessarily has to accumulate vast arrears over a period of time which it will be impossible to clear in any foreseeable future. According to him, this is a self-inflicted injury, which is the cause of the malaise which has gradually eroded the confidence of the litigants in the Apex Court of the country, mainly because of its failure to hear and dispose of cases within a reasonable period of time. It is a great tragedy to find that cases which have been listed for hearing years back are yet to be heard. 

Delivering R.K. Jain Memorial Lecture on January 30, 2010, K.K. Venugopal,a noted Senior Advocate observed: "We have, however, to sympathize with the judges. They are struggling with an unbearable burden. The judges spend late nights trying to read briefs for a Monday or a Friday. When each of the 13 Divisions or Benches have to dispose off about 60 cases in a day, the functioning of the Supreme Court of India is a far cry from what should be desiderata for disposal of cases in a calm and detached atmosphere. The Judges rarely have the leisure to ponder over the arguments addressed to the court and finally to deliver a path-breaking, outstanding and classic judgment. All this is impossible of attainment to a Court oppressed by the burden of a huge backlog of cases. The constant pressure by counsel and the clients for an early date of hearing and a need to adjourn final hearings which are listed, perforce, on a miscellaneous day i.e. Monday or a Friday, where the Court finds that it has no time to deal with those cases, not only puts a strain on the Court, but also a huge financial burden on the litigant. I wonder what a lawyer practising in 1950 would feel if he were today to enter the Supreme Court premises on a Monday or a Friday. He would be appalled at the huge crowd of lawyers and clients thronging the corridors, where one finds it extremely difficult to push one’s way through the crowd to reach the Court hall. When he enters the Court hall he finds an equally heavy crowd of lawyers blocking his way. I do not think that any of the senior counsel practicing in the Supreme Court, during the first 3-4 decades of the existence of the Court, would be able to relate to the manner in which we as counsel argue cases today. In matters involving very heavy stakes, 4-5 Senior Advocates should be briefed on either side, all of whom would be standing up at the same time and addressing the court, sometimes at the highest pitch possible. All these are aberrations in the functioning
of an Apex Court of any country."

He had pointed out that in the year 1997 there were only 19,000 pending cases in the Supreme Court but now, there were over 55,000 pending cases in 2010. He had predicted that in a few years time the pendency will cross one lakh cases. In 2009 almost 70,000 cases were filed in the Court of which an overwhelming number were Special Leave Petitions under Article 136. At present all these cases have to be heard orally, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court hears only about 100 to 120 cases every year and the Canadian Supreme Court hears only 60 cases per year.

In Bihar Legal Support Society vs. Chief of Justice of India and Anr. (1986) 4 SCC 767 (vide para 3), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed: "It may, however, be pointed out that this Court was never intended to be a regular court of appeal against orders made by the High Court or the sessions court or the magistrates. It was created for the purpose of laying down the law for the entire country ...............It is not every case where the apex court finds that some injustice has been done that it would grant special leave and interfere. That would be converting the apex court into a regular court of appeal and moreover, by so doing, the apex court would soon be reduced to a position where it will find itself unable to remedy any injustice at all, on account of the tremendous backlog of cases which is bound to accumulate. We must realize that in the vast majority of cases the High Courts must become final even if they are wrong".

Prof. Paul Freund, the constitutional law professor Harvard Law School referred to the opinion of Louis Dembitz Brandei, the celebrated Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court during 1916-1939 in the following words: "... he was a firm believer in limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on every front as he would not be seduced by the Quixotic temptation to right every fancied wrong which was paraded before him. ...... Husbanding his time and energies as if the next day were to be his last, he steeled himself, like a scientist in the service of man, against the enervating distraction of the countless tragedies he was not meant to relieve. His concern for jurisdictional and procedural limits reflected, on the technical level, an essentially stoic philosophy. For like Epictetus, he recognized ’the impropriety of being emotionally affected by what is not under one’s control’. The only way found practicable or acceptable in this country (U.S.A.) for keeping the volume of cases within the capacity of a court of last resort is to allow the intermediate courts of appeal finally to settle all cases that are of consequence only to parties. This reserves to the court of last resort only questions on which lower courts are in conflict or those of general importance to the law."

Justice K.K. Mathew, an eminent Judge of the Supreme Court, in an article published in (1982) 3 SCC (Jour) 1, referred to the opinion of Justice Felix Frankfurter, the judge  of the Supreme Court of the United States (1939-1962), as follows: "The function of the Supreme Court, according to Justice Frankfurter, was to expound and stabilize principles of law, to pass upon constitutional and other important questions of law for the public benefit and to preserve uniformity of decision among the intermediate courts of appeal. The time and attention and the energy of the court should be devoted to matters of large public concern and they should not be consumed by matters of less concern, without special general interest, merely because the litigant wants to have the court of last resort pass upon his right. The function of the Supreme Court was conceived to be, not to remedying of a particular litigant’s wrong, but the consideration of cases whose decision involved principles, the
application of which were of wide public or governmental interest and which ought to be authoritatively declared by the final court. Without adequate study, reflection and discussion on the part of judges, there could not be that fruitful interchange of minds which was indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions and therefore Justice Frankfurter considered it imperative that the docket of the court be kept down so that its volume did not preclude wise adjudication. He was of the view that any case which did not rise to the significance of inescapability in meeting the responsibilities vested in the Supreme Court had to be rigorously excluded from consideration". 

Justice Mathew advised that the Supreme Court, to remain effective, must continue to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved. He wrote: "To say that no litigant should be turned out of the Supreme Court so long as he has a grievance may be good populistic propaganda but the consequence of accepting such a demand would surely defeat the great purpose for which the Court was established under our constitutional system. It is high time we recognize the need for the Supreme Court to entertain under Article 136 only those cases which measure up to the significance of the national or public importance. The effort, then, must therefore be to voluntarily cut the coat of jurisdiction according to the cloth of importance of the question and not to expand the same with a view to satisfy every litigant who has the means to pursue his cause."

The Division Bench took note of Venugopal's suggestion about the categories of cases which alone should be entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution, (i) All matters involving substantial questions of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of India; (ii) All matters of national or public importance; (iii) Validity of laws, Central and State; (iv) After Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 217, the judicial review of Constitutional Amendments; and (v) To settle differences of opinion of important issues of law between High Courts. It observed: "22. We are of the opinion that two additional categories of cases can be added to the above list, namely (i) where the Court is satisfied that there has been a grave miscarriage of justice and (ii) where a fundamental right of a person has prima facie been violated. However, it is for the Constitution Bench to which we are referring this matter to decide what are the kinds of cases in which discretion under Article 136 should be exercised. 23. In our opinion, the time has now come when an authoritative decision by a Constitution Bench should lay down some broad guidelines as to when the discretion under Article
136 of the Constitution should be exercised, i.e., in what kind of cases a petition under Article 136 should be entertained. If special leave petitions are entertained against all and sundry kinds of orders passed by any court or tribunal, then this Court after some time will collapse under its own burden. 24. It may be mentioned that in Pritam Singh Vs. The State AIR 1950 S.C. 169 a Constitution Bench of this Court observed (vide para 9) that "a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting Special Leave". Unfortunately, despite this observation no such uniform standard has been laid down by this Court, with the result that grant of Special Leave has become, as Mr. Setalvad pointed out in his book ‘ My Life’, a gamble. This is not a desirable state of affairs as there should be some uniformity in the approach of the different benches of this Court. Though Article 136 no doubt confers a discretion on the Court, judicial discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 "means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful"

Notably, 3- Judge Bench recollected that in Bihar Legal Support Society vs. Chief Justice and Others (1986) 4 SCC 767, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while disposing of a Writ Petition in which the petitioner had prayed for adoption of a uniform approach and sensitivity in special leave petitions filed by the less fortunate of the litigants as was shown in the case of two big industrialists for whom the Court had held a late night sitting to consider their prayer for bail, held that special leave petitions filed by “small men” were entitled to the same consideration as is given to those filed by “big industrialists”. The Supreme Court declared that it had always regarded the poor and the disadvantaged to be entitled to preferential consideration over the rich and the affluent, the businessmen and the industrialists. That is because the weaker section of the Indian humanity had been deprived of justice for several years on account of their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, and on account of their social and economic backwardness and resultant lack of capacity to assert their rights. The Court had rejected the suggestion that it was not giving to the “small men” the same treatment as it was giving to the “big industrialists”. 

Supreme Court reverses denial of reguar bail order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a POCSO case

In Madhav @ Madho Kumar vs. 1. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed 3-page long order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, and considering the delay in lodging the FIR and as alleged, the story of political rivalry has been contemplated, in addition, taking note of the fact that the medical evidence do not corroborate with the allegation, at present, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail. 3. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court. 4. Petitioner to abide all the conditions as imposed and shall regularly attend the trial until exempted by the Court. Violation, if any, may give a cause to take recourse as permissible and the trial Court is at liberty to do the needful."

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court to seek bail against an order rejecting the regular bail by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The petitioner is in custody w.e.f. March 30, 2025 in connection with a FIR dated March 29, 2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 64, 352, 351(3) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) registered with Police Station Paharpur, District Motihari, Bihar. Prior to this Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey had called for case diary along with the statement of the victim recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS from the Court of 6th District & Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive Special Judge, POCSO Act, East Champaran, Motihari by his order dated September 3, 2025.

Earlier, Justice Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated October 15, 2025. The application for grant of regular bail, wherein, the petitioner was accused of committing rape with a minor girl. The counsel for the informant had submitted that the trial had started and in the trial the informant and the victim had already been examined and they had supported the prosecution case. Justice Kumar had concluded: "5. Considering the aforesaid facts and also the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of X
vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3539, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner Accordingly, this bail application is rejected." Supreme Court has reversed this order. 

Supreme Court reverses conditional pre-arrest bail order by Justice Purnendu Singh in a rape case, vindicates bail order by Justice Satyavrat Verma

In Ghutuk Miyan @ Ismail Miyan vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page order dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it reversed the conditional order dated April 28, 2026 by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It issued notice and concluded: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail in connection with P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered SLP (Crl.) No(s). 8811/2026  at Police Station Gopalpur, District West Champaran, Bihar...." The respondent no. 2 from village, Mahesda, Gopalpur, West Champaranis is not named because it is a rape case. The Court's order vindicates the order dated March 12, 2026 by Justice Satyavrat Verma. 

Earlier, Justice Singh had passed an order wherein, he had observed:"7. Having heard the rival  submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, having perused the allegation made in the FIR, from the manner in which the entire story has been narrated, it appears to be shaky to the extent that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has rightly submitted that no one can carry a female in his lap without her desire. No force was applied by the informant, however, the informant has supported the allegation made in the FIR, in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS and the same is also supported by the 11 years old child in his statement recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer." 

The order reads: "8. In such circumstances, I direct the learned District Court to first get the statement of the 11 years old child of the informant recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS by a child friendly Court and if the learned District Court finds that the 11 years old child of the informant has not supported the allegation as alleged in the FIR, then in that case, the petitioner, above named, is directed to be released on pre-arrest bail, in the event of his/her arrest or surrender before the learned District Court within a period of four weeks from today, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District Court where the case is pending, in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. 9. If the child supports the allegations made in the FIR, in his statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, then in that case, the petitioner is directed to be taken into custody forthwith. 10. The learned District Court is directed to verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner as stated in paragraph no. 3 of the bail application. If any other case is pending against the petitioner as what has been stated in paragraph no. 3, this order will lose its force automatically." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 192 of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 64, 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the BNS. According to the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner had allegedly committed rape upon the informant while her husband was not present in the house. The rape was allegedly committed in presence of her 11 years old son. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the manner in which the allegation was narrated, itself makes the allegation of commission of rape doubtful as it is the case of the informant that she was taken into lap and, thereafter, without having resisted to the same act of the petitioner, she was taken to another room where the rape was committed in presence of her 11 years old son, who supported the prosecution case along with the victim, who was the informant of the case. She also submitted that the victim was examined by the doctor and the doctor opined that there was no trace of any recent sexual assault having been committed. She submitted that Rs 70, 000 of the petitioner was due with the informant and in order to avoid payment of the same, the informant lodged the FIR. She had also submitted that on these grounds, co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had granted interim relief to the petitioner and, as such, in absence of any evidence, the petitioner deserve to be released on pre-arrest bail.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the informant, referred to the impugned order of the District Court, submitted that enough evidences have been collected in course of investigation and the petitioner having taken advantage of the absence of the husband of the informant, had committed rape, which was in presence of her 11 years old son and the statement of her son was also recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer, in which, he supported the prosecution story. He also  submitted that it was not a case of tutoring of the 11 years old child, who is innocent and his version is required to be given emphasis, particularly, in case where rape is committed. He submitted that the petitioner had not taken any plea that the child was tutored and narrated a false story under Section 180 of the BNSS before the Investigating Officer. He also submitted that evidence was there, which suggested that the petitioner had committed rape upon the victim, who is the informant. He had vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail.

Prior to this Justice Satyavrat Verma had passed an order dated March 12, 2026. The case arose from a Gopalpur P.S. Case of 2025 from the Court of Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned Exclusive Special Judge Rape and POCSO Act, Bettiah, West Champaran. The order reads: "4. There shall be no coercive action against the petitioner until the anticipatory bail application is finally adjudicated by this Court, as it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is a person with clean antecedent and from perusal of the allegation as alleged in the FIR, it would manifest that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship and when the child of the informant woke up, the petitioner fled and thereafter the instant FIR came to be instituted after a delay of six days. It is also submitted that the informant in the FIR alleges that after making her children sleep, she also went to sleep without locking the door and petitioner taking advantage of the same entered the house and came to her room, lifted her in his arms and brought her in another room and on the point of knife threatened and raped her. It is submitted that it does not appear probable that petitioner would have been knowing that the door was unlocked on the date of occurrence, this fact also creates a suspicion that petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship."

Justices Nani Tagia and Ansul set aside judgement by Additional Sessions Judge-II, Bhagalpur in a murder case of 1992

In Gainu Mandal & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Nani Tagia and Ansul delivered a 18-page long judgement dated May 13, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court finds absolutely no reliable material to affirm the impugned judgment. 25. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and judgment of conviction dated 18.12.1997 and order of sentence dated 20.12.1997 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Bhagalpur in Sessions Trial No. 421 of 1993, arising out of Sanhaula P.S. Case No. 61 of 1992 (G.R. No. 1740 of 1992) dated 14.08.1992, whereby the appellants have been convicted under Sections 302/34 and 120B of Indian Penal Code are set aside. Consequently, the appellants of the present appeal are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 26. If the appellants are in jail, they shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Their bail bonds are discharged." The judgement was authored by Justice Ansul. 

In the appeal, the appellants had challenged the judgment of conviction by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Bhagalpur in a Sessions Trial of 1993. The appellants were convicted under Sections 302/34 and 120B of Indian Penal Code. For the offence under section 302/34 IPC, the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. No separate sentence was awarded under Section 120B IPC. As per the F.I.R. , the informant Sujeet Kumar Sah (PW-9) lodged information with police stating therein that on 14.08.1992, his mother Mala Devi, was sleeping in the courtyard. His Fua, namely, Sakun Devi came to call him. When he went to the Thakurbari of Chhoku Singh, he saw at his house that his mother was lying in the middle of courtyard on the cot, in injured condition and she was bleeding from her abdomen. Upon asking, his mother showed her inability to speak and signaled him by way of showing four fingers. The informant further stated that he would gather information as to who has tried to stab his mother and kill her and would disclose the names of the culprits to the police. The FIR was lodged on August 14, 1992 itself but the same was forwarded to the Chief Judicial Magistrate on August 19, 1992. The writer of the F.I.R. is Munnilal Sah, was not examined.

After completion of necessary formalities, police submitted charge-sheet against six persons. The charge-sheet gave list of fourteen prospective witnesses. Charges were framed on December 19, 1994 and thereafter trial commenced. During the course of trial, altogether eleven witnesses were examined in support of the prosecution case. 

P.W.-1 Kamla Kant Jha
P.W.-2 Etwari Sah
P.W.-3 Amrendra Sah
P.W.-4 Suresh Sah
P.W.-5 Bijoy Chandra Jha
P.W.-6 Shankar Sah
P.W.-7 Gaibi Sah
P.W.-8 Sakun Devi
P.W.-9 Sujeet Kumar Sah
P.W.-10 T.N. Biswas
P.W.-11 Dr. Kailash Jha
7. Apart from the oral evidences, the documentary evidences were also exhibited on behalf of the prosecution

8. PW-1 Kamlakant Jha is also the witness of seizure list. He stated that at 12:31 AM he received information that Mala Devi has been stabbed. She was sent to hospital and thereafter to Bhagalpur. He raised suspicion against Nishia Devi and her son and Gainu Mandal, Sarvind Sah and Mohan Sah. 
9. PW-2 Etwari Sah is a witness of the seizure list.
10. PW-3 Amrendra Sah is also a witness to the inquest report.
11. PW-4 Suresh Sah is the son of the deceased. He is not an eyewitness, and he admitted that at the time of occurrence he was at his Sasural. He stated that his Fua Sakun Devi gave him the information that Mohan Sah, Gainu Mandal and Sarvind Sah were assailants of the deceased and some other person whose
named starts from the letter “P”, however she was not able to say the full name as she was injured.
12. PW-5 is a homeopathic doctor. He states that Sakun Devi told him that his Bhabhi has been stabbed and that the deceased had disclosed the names of Gainu Mandal, Sarvind Sah and Shiv Mohan Sah and someone whose name starts with letter “P”, alleging that they have stabbed her.
13. PW-6 is Shankar Sah. He is the husband of the deceased who stated that he came to know from Sakun Devi that his wife disclosed the name of Sarvind Sah, Shiv Mohan and Gainu Mandal and she could not completely state the name of the fourth person. The deceased was taken to hospital however, she succumbed to the injuries, on her way to the hospital. After two days of killing he came to know at Kolkata through his nephew Munilal Saw about the occurrence. He admitted that his sons were not at his house. He repeated that he came to know about the occurrence from his sister.
14. P.W. 7 was declared hostile.
15. PW-8 is Sakun Devi. She is the star witness. She states that she asked them to call the doctor and she did not disclose the name of the persons who killed her. Hence, the star witness has declared hostile.
16. PW-9 is the informant. He states that he was not an eye witness.
17. PW-10 is the Investigating Officer. He states that Sakun Devi told him that Gainu Mandal, Shiv Mohan and Sarvind Sah were the assailants.
18. PW-11 is the doctor who found sharp cut wound on left side abdomen on the body of the deceased. The homicidal death of the deceased is not in dispute.
19. We have considered the submissions of the parties and perused the materials available on record. This Court is flabbergasted and perplexed as to how at all on the basis of materials mentioned above a trained judicial officer could record a finding of guilt. The consistent prosecution case is that the first person who reached at the place of occurrence was Sakun Devi (PW-8) and all the witnesses have clearly stated that they came to know about the said occurrence through Sakun Devi. However, Sakun Devi, herself was declared hostile. The trial court has relied upon the statement of PW-1, 4, 5 and 6 as the persons who stated the name of the accused persons. The learned Sessions judge seems to have lost site of the basic principle of Evidence Act as contained in Section 60 that oral evidence has to be direct. It would be relevant here to quote Section 60 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows:-
60. Oral evidence must be direct.-Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct: that is to say-
If it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it;
If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it;
If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner;
If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds:
Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable. Provided also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection. 20. The oral evidence has to be direct and not hearsay  The statement of PW 1, 4, 5 and 6 is oral evidence without any doubt but the same is not direct. The statement thus has to be completely taken out of consideration in view of Section 60 of the
Indian Evidence Act. 21. Moreover, there is yet another angle of the matter. The FIR has been lodged on 14.08.1992 itself by PW-9. His version in the FIR clearly shows that he had met Sakun Devi prior to lodging of the FIR and it is thus impossible that his version has not gone into making of the FIR. In such situation the FIR does not remain a document which could only be used to contradict or corroborat e the maker of it but becomes a relevant fact under Section 11 of the Evidence Act and the entire prosecution version could be tested with reference to the FIR. Omission of the name of the assailants in the FIR which contained the version of Sakun Devi (PW8) also is a material omission and it makes it clear that Sakun Devi has not at all initially taken the name of the accused persons but the same was later added. 

Justice Ansul relied on para 9 of Supreme Court's decision in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. reported as (1975) 3 SCC 815. It reads: “9. No doubt, an FIR is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it. But, in this case, it had been made by the father of the murdered boy to whom all the important facts of the occurrence, so far as they were known up to 9-15 p.m. on March 23, 1970, were bound to have been communicated. If his daughters had seen the appellant inflicting a blow on Harbinder Singh, the father would certainly have mentioned it in the FIR We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.” 

The FIR was lodged on August 14, 1992 but the same was sent to the Court on August 19, 1992. There was absolutely no explanation at all for the same forthwith coming from Investigating Officer.  

Justice Ansul observed: "No doubt no question has been asked from the Investigating Officer regarding the explanation for the delay but in the considered opinion of this Court the requirement of Section 157 CrPC as settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court is to send the FIR to the concerned court forthwith which has been interpreted as not more than twenty-four hours."  

The judgement referred to Supreme Court's decision in Chotkau vs. State of U.P. reported in (2023) 6 SCC 742, wherein, the Court held:“60. On the importance of promptitude, both in the registration of the FIR and in the transmission of the same to the court, reliance is placed by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel on the following passage in Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. [Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P., (1994) 5 SCC 188 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1391] : (SCC pp. 195-96, para 12) “12. FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. Prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of the copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest report, prepared under Section 174CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8. 61. While reiterating the above principles, a note of caution was also added by this Court in Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana [Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 421 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 241]. Paras 28 to 30 of the said decision read as follows : (SCC p. 431) “28. Thus, from the above it is evident that the Criminal Procedure Code provides for internal and external checks : one of them being the receipt of a copy of the FIR by the Magistrate concerned. It serves the purpose that the FIR be not ante-timed or ante-dated. The Magistrate must be immediately informed of every serious offence so that he may be in a position to act under Section 159CrPC, if so required. Section 159CrPC empowers the Magistrate to hold the investigation or preliminary enquiry of the offence either himself or through the Magistrate subordinate to him. This is designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation so as to enable him to control investigation and, if necessary, to give appropriate direction. 29. It is not that as if every delay in sending the report to the Magistrate would necessarily lead to the inference that the FIR has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-timed or ante-dated or investigation is not fair and forthright. Every such delay is not fatal unless prejudice to the accused is shown. The expression “forthwith” mentioned therein does not mean that the prosecution is required to explain delay of every hour in sending the FIR to the Magistrate. In a given case, if number of dead and injured persons is very high, delay in dispatching the report is natural. Of course, the same is to be sent within reasonable time in the prevalent circumstances. 30. However, unexplained inordinate delay in sending the copy of FIR to the Magistrate may affect the prosecution case adversely. An adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution when there are circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of manipulation in the FIR by falsely roping in the accused persons after due deliberations. Delay provides legitimate basis for suspicion of the FIR, as it affords sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments. Thus, a delay in dispatch of the FIR by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the prosecution's case in its entirety, particularly when the prosecution furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay in dispatch of the report or prosecution case itself is proved by leading unimpeachable evidence.” 62. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that the delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape. While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, courts may be duty-bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation. 63. Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith”. The legal consequences of the delay on the part of the police in forwarding the FIR to the court was considered by this Court in Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P. [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] Incidentally BrahmSwaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] is also a case where there was a delay of five days in sending the report to the Magistrate (as in the present case). After taking note of several earlier decisions of this Court, this Court held in Brahm Swaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] in para 21 as follows : (SCC p. 300) “21. In the instant case, the defence did not put any question in this regard to the Investigating Officer, Raj Guru (PW 10), thus, no explanation was required to be furnished by him on this issue. Thus, the prosecution had not been asked to explain the delay in sending the special report. More so, the submission made by Shri Tulsi that the FIR was ante-timed cannot be accepted in view of the evidence available on record which goes to show that the FIR had been lodged promptly within 20 minutes of the incident as the police station was only 1 km away from the place of occurrence and names of all the accused had been mentioned in the FIR.” 64. To come to the above conclusion, reliance was placed upon a decision of a three-Judge Bench in Balram Singh v. State of Punjab [Balram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 11 SCC 286 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 149] . In Balram Singh [Balram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 11 SCC 286 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 149] , the three-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention with regard to the delay in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate, on the ground that : (SCC p. 291, para 10) “10.… While considering the complaint in regard to the delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional Magistrate, we will have to also bear in mind the creditworthiness of the ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution and if we find that such ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the element of delay in registering a complaint or sending the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate by itself would not in any manner weaken the prosecution case.” 65. In State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan [State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 793] , this Court referred to Brahm Swaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] and interpreted the word “forthwith” appearing in Section 157(1) of the Code, as follows : (Daud Khan case [State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 793] , SCC p. 619, para 26) “26. … The purpose of the “forthwith” communication of a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate is to check the possibility of its manipulation. Therefore, a delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate is linked to the lodging of the FIR. If there is no delay in lodging an FIR, then any delay in communicating the special report to the Magistrate would really be of little consequence, since manipulation of the FIR would then get ruled out. Nevertheless, the prosecution should explain the delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate. However, if no question is put to the investigating officer concerning the delay, the prosecution is under no obligation to give an explanation. There is no universal rule that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version becomes unreliable. In other words, the facts and circumstances of a case are important for a decision in this regard.” 66. Therefore, the learned Additional Advocate General for the State may be right, in theory, that a delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more. But in the case on hand, the delay was not small. The FIR said to have been registered on 8-3-2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13-3-2012. It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the investigating officer about this delay. 67. But we have found that the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report. Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance. We agree that the word “forthwith” in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straitjacket formula cannot be applied in all cases. But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the court. The mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied. Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.  68. In the present case, it is not even known as to who took the first information report from PW 6 or PW 4 and submitted before the jurisdictional court. Neither PW 4 nor PW 6 spoke about the person who took the FIR to the court. They did not say that they took it to the court. It is not a case of mere delay in sending the first information report, but one involving the contradictory evidence by the prosecution witnesses on the manner in which the first information report is written. 69. On the question of compliance of Section 157(1) along with logical reasoning for doing so, the following passage from the decision in Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala [Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 436] may be usefully quoted as under: (SCC p. 462, paras 28-29) “28. The jurisdictional Magistrate plays a pivotal role during the investigation process. It is meant to make the investigation just and fair. The investigating officer is to keep the Magistrate in the loop of his ongoing investigation. The object is to avoid a possible foul play. The Magistrate has a role to play under Section 159CrPC. 29. The first information report in a criminal case starts the process of investigation by letting the criminal law into motion. It is certainly a vital and valuable aspect of evidence to corroborate the oral evidence. Therefore, it is imperative that such an information is expected to reach the jurisdictional Magistrate at the earliest point of time to avoid any possible ante-dating or ante-timing leading to the insertion of materials meant to convict the accused contrary to the truth and on account of such a delay may also not only get bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, there is also a danger creeping in by the introduction of a coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. However, a mere delay by itself cannot be a sole factor in rejecting the prosecution's case arrived at after due investigation. Ultimately, it is for the court concerned to take a call. Such a view is expected to be taken after considering the relevant materials.” 

Justice Ansul observed: "23. It is the considered opinion of this Court that when the statute as interpreted by Hon’ble Supreme Court prescribed a time limit then it is the duty of the prosecution to either do it within that time frame or to furnish an explanation without any question from the defence. This must be treated as part of proving the prosecution case. It is trite law that the prosecution case must stand on its own legs and it cannot take advantage of strength and weaknesses of the defence case."

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava set aside order by Conficating Authority, remit the matter back to it

In Raju Kumar Yadav @ Raju Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through Secretary of the Excise Department, Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 5-page long judgement dated May 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded that "a notice to show cause was required to be issued in the confiscation matter and only after hearing the petitioner or his authorised representative/counsel in the confiscation matter, an appropriate order would have been passed. This has not been done. In result, the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned orders were set aside. The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. 

The judgement reads:"The matter is remitted to the Confiscating Authority to consider the application for release of the vehicle afresh keeping in view the judgment of this Court in the case of Manjeet Kumar Yadav Vs. The State of Bihar and Others in CWJC No. 10126 of 2025. The Confiscating Authority shall first decide on the application for release within a period of one month from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 11. So far as the confiscation proceeding is concerned, it will be open to the Confiscating Authority to proceed with the confiscation matter separately by issuing notice to the petitioner calling upon him to submit his response. A reasoned order in confiscation matter shall be passed by the Confiscating Authority after giving appropriate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner/his authorised representative/counsel. 12. This writ application is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove." 

The five other respondents were: 2. Excise Commissioner, Bihar, 3.District Magistrate, Kaimur Bhabua. 4. Superintendent of Police, Kaimur Bhabua,  5. The Superintendent of Excise, Kaimur Bhabua and 6. Investigating Officer of Police Station Excise P.S.,Kaimur. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated July 24, 2025 passed by the Secretary (Prohibition and Excise), Bihar, Patna in Excise Revision Case of 2025 by which the Revisional Authority upheld the order passed by the Confiscating Authority and the Appellate Authority. The Revisional Authority rejected the revision application. The petitioner approached the High Court.

The petitioner submitted that the vehicle in question was a Tractor. On December 15, 2023, the vehicle was intercepted by a police party. The allegation was that the vehicle was engaged in transportation of 261 liters of country made liquor. The driver of the vehicle was arrested. On the basis of his self-statement, the S.I. of Police registered Mohania P.S. Case of 2023 dated December 15, 2023. It was the case of the petitioner that he was engaged in agricultural work. For the release of the vehicle, the petitioner filed an application before the Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Kaimur. It was submitted that such application was filed in terms of Rule 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021. A report was called for from the S.H.O. of the concerned police station. In his report, the S.H.O. opposed the prayer for release of the vehicle.The counsel submitted that even as the Confiscating Authority had not issued any notice proposing to confiscate the vehicle in question and no opportunity to show case was given in the confiscation matter to the petitioner, the Confiscating Authority while rejecting the request of the petitioner to release the vehicle in question on the ground of the provision contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12A of the Rules of 2021, simultaneously passed an order of confiscation of the vehicle.  

It was submitted that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent State and its authorities, there is no averment that any notice to show cause was issued in confiscation matter. The counsel submitted that this being the position, the order of confiscation suffers from procedural infirmity and was liable to be set aside.

Justice Prasad observed: "....we are of the opinion that the order of confiscation suffers from violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as it appears that in the confiscation matter, no notice to show cause
was issued to the petitioner. It was the petitioner who had approached the Confiscating Authority under Rule 12A of the Rules of 2021 (as amended up to date) for release of the vehicle which was refused citing sub-rule (3) of Rule 12A of the Rules of 2021 (as amended up to date). At this stage, the Confiscating
Authority became functus officio insofar as the application was concerned but the Confiscating Authority did not stop there, he continued with the order and considered the matter of confiscation."

Supreme Court urges High Courts to constitute grievance redressal committees across courts in India to foster better relations between lawyers and judges

In Bar Council of India vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Supreme Court Bar Association vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi reminded the judiciary of its "institutional obligation" to treat young entrants with compassion and dignity, stressing that judges must act as mentors to ensure the integrity and growth of the legal profession. It observed: "We are thus of the view that the incident in question does not warrant any further action at our end. At the same time, we consider it appropriate to observe that members of the judiciary at all levels ought to exhibit patience, compassion, and a spirit of encouragement, particularly towards young entrants to the legal profession...The present juncture necessitates that young law graduates emerging from a wide variety of institutions are encouraged to join the Bar, especially at the level of trial and district courts, where they have to imbibe the foundational principles of legal practice."

The Court directed that such Grievance Redressal Committees should also be constituted at the district and taluka level with a fair representation from the members of the Bar. In such an institutionalized mechanism, it will ensure that the issues that may arise between the members of the Bar or the judiciary are amicably, effectively, and timely resolved in a congenial atmosphere.

The Court recorded: "The communication reveals that the incident originated from a disagreement between the learned judge and the young counsel regarding a judicial precedent applicable to the matter under consideration. The situation escalated when the learned judge formed an impression that the young counsel, in a state of frustration, had deliberately struck his file against the podium, whereas the young counsel kept on explaining that the file had inadvertently slipped from his hands. The report of the learned Chief Justice further revealed that the verbal exchange that ensued was recorded by an unidentified individual who then circulated it on social media."

The Court took note of a detailed report submitted by the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and heard submissions from the Senior Counsel appearing for the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA).

The controversy originated from a disagreement over a judicial precedent, during which a case file inadvertently fell from the hands of a young advocate. The Judge initially felt that the incident as a deliberate act of impropriety and made certain oral observations regarding police custody. The Bench noted that these remarks were never translated into a formal judicial order. 

The order reads: "The report records that the Hon'ble Chief Justice interacted with the young counsel, who affirmed that the misunderstanding had been amicably resolved and no complaint was lodged before the Bar Council or any other forum. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates’ Association also addressed the Chief Justice of their High Court, informing that the matter stood amicably settled with their intervention".

The Court ordered, "From the material placed before us, it appears that the learned judge, in the course of proceedings, sought to draw the attention of the young counsel to a reported decision which was supporting his case, whereas the young counsel insisted on placing reliance on another precedent which the learned judge thought was inapplicable to the facts of the case in hand. It further appears that in the course of exchange, the case file of the young counsel fell to the ground, which was not attended by any deliberate intent. The learned judge, however, appears to have construed the same as an act of impropriety, leading to certain strong oral observations, which were eventually not incorporated in the judicial order; consequently, no occasion arose to issue any executable direction. The matter thus stood concluded at that stage."

Following the unprecedented rift within the legal fraternity over the conduct of Justice Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao, the Bar Council of India (BCI) and the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) moved to the Supreme Court seeking urgent judicial intervention to address what they describe as a "grave assault on the dignity of the legal profession" and the "erosion of judicial temperament."

On May 6, 2026, an incident had occurred in the courtroom of Justice Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao at the Andhra Pradesh High Court during a hearing regarding a Look Out Circular. 

Justice Rao had orally directed that the young lawyer be taken into police custody for 24 hours. Despite the advocate apologizing with folded hands and begging for mercy, the judge remained firm in his rebuke. 

Notably, the Bar Council of India wrote a letter on May 6, 2026, to the Chief Justice of India. It expressed that such actions raise grave questions about judicial temperament, fairness, and proportionality. While a judge may correct or caution an advocate, sending a young member of the profession to custody for a procedural lapse is viewed as grossly inappropriate and damaging to the Bar's confidence in the judiciary. The BCI emphasized that advocates are officers of the court who should be entitled to correction without humiliation, as the relationship between the Bench and the Bar must be founded on mutual respect and institutional grace.

Responding to the incident, the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA)  expressed "deep concern and shock" regarding the incident and emphasized that the relationship between the Bench and the Bar must be built on mutual respect, dignity, and institutional balance. The SCBA warned that actions leading to the "fear, humiliation, or intimidation" of junior advocates could severely undermine the independence of the Bar. 

The association had urged the Chief Justice of India to take institutional cognizance of the matter, review the records, and implement corrective measures to preserve public confidence and maintain cordial Bar-Bench relations.

Union government notifies ‘rules’ under four labour codes, code on wages repeals Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, Equal Remuneration Act, 1976-Part 1

With 33 gazette notifications issued on May 8, 2026) and May 9, 2026, the union government fully operationalised the four Labour Codes. The rules have been published with “minor amendments” to the draft rules pre-published in December 2025. With this the union government has notified following ‘rules’ under the four new labour codes:

1. Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2026 (69 pages) Hindi version 30 pages and English version 39 pages

2. Social Security (Central) Rules, 2026 (259 pages) Hindi version 133 pages and English version 126 pages

3. Industrial Relations (Central) Rules, 2026 (92 pages) Hindi version 50 pages and English version 42 pages

4. Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (Central) Rules, 2026. (318 pages) Hindi version [138 pages] and English version (180 page)

Earlier, 32-page long The Code on Wages, 2019, 56-page long The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, 113-page long The Code on Social Security, 2020 and The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 has been operationalised with effect from November 21,  2025. These code have repealed pre-existing 29 labour laws. The notification dated May 08, 2026, the Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India has notified the Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2026, which are finalised after public consultation on the draft Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2025, published in December 2025. The Wage Rules are framed under Section 67 of the Code on Wages, 2019, which came into force on November 21, 2025.

The Code on Wages (Central) Rules, 2026 provides a framework for fixation and revision of minimum wages and floor wage, prescribes formats and timelines for issuance of wage slips and maintenance of registers, provides procedural safeguards governing permissible deductions and recovery of advances, standardises of working hours, weekly rest days and treatment of night shifts and provides for principal employer accountability in contractor-based employment arrangements. 

Minimum wages and Floor wages: Under the Rules, the Minimum wages are to be fixed by the union government on a day basis, based on criteria separately notified through special or general orders under the Wage Code. The hourly wage rate is to be calculated by dividing the daily wage by eight (8), while the monthly wage rate is to be calculated by multiplying the daily wage by twenty-six (26), with rounding off rules prescribed for fractions. For establishments having less than six (6) working days in a week, the hourly minimum wage rate is to be used for deriving daily wages.  The union government may fix and revise Floor wages after consultation with the Central Advisory Board and State Governments, taking into account minimum living standards including food, clothing, housing and other relevant factors, with revision ordinarily at intervals not exceeding five (5) years. 

Working Hours of Work, Rest Days and Night Shift: The normal working day for employees whose wage period is fixed on a daily basis shall be eight (8) hours, while weekly working hours for other employees shall not exceed forty-eight (48) hours. Employees are entitled to one (1) weekly rest day, ordinarily Sunday in a six (6) day working week, while in establishments with less than six (6) working days, the rest period must include Saturday and Sunday unless another day is fixed by the employer. An employee cannot ordinarily work for more than ten (10) consecutive days without a rest day, and where work is performed on the rest day, a substituted rest day must be provided immediately before or after the original rest day. Employees working on a rest day are generally entitled to overtime wages for the rest day worked and wages for the substituted rest day, subject to specific exceptions such as for a six  (6) day working week, if daily wages are derived by dividing by twenty-six (26) and the same is not less than the notified minimum wage rate, then no wages shall be paid for the day. For night shifts extending beyond midnight, the twenty-four (24) hour rest period and calculation of the succeeding day are to be reckoned from the time the shift ends, and hours worked after midnight are treated as part of the previous day. 

Payment of Wages and Deductions: In the case of employees engaged through contractors, the principal employer is required to pay the contractor amounts payable towards wages in accordance with the Wage Code. Employees engaged on a part-time basis are not entitled to wages for a full normal working day where such arrangement is agreed under the terms of employmen. The total deductions from wages in any wage period cannot exceed fifty per cent (50%) of wages, and any excess must be carried forward to succeeding wage periods in instalments. Before imposing fines, deductions for absence from duty, or deductions for damage or loss, the employer must provide the employee an opportunity to explain within seven (7) days, and intimations must be issued electronically or in writing. Recovery of advances must be made in instalments, ensuring that deductions in any wage period do not exceed the prescribed ceiling of fifty per cent (50%) of wages. 

Payment of Bonus: Where employees are engaged through contractors and the contractor fails to pay statutory bonus, the principal employer/establishment is required to pay the minimum bonus upon receiving written information and confirming such failure. Separate methods are prescribed for computation of gross profits for banking companies and for establishments other than banking companies through Appendices B and C respectively. Certain specified prior charges are required to be deducted from gross profits before computation of allocable surplus, as detailed in Appendix D of the Wage Rules depending upon the type of establishment. Excess allocable surplus beyond the maximum bonus payable may be carried forward for up to four (4) accounting years, while deficiencies in allocable surplus for payment of minimum bonus shall similarly be carried forward as set off amounts. 

Registers, Forms and Wage Slip: Employers are required to maintain electronically or physically an Employee Register in Form I, Register of Wages, Overtime, Advances, Fines and Deductions in Form IV, and an Attendance Register-cum-Muster Roll in Form IX. Registers maintained under the Wage Rules are required to be preserved for a period of five (5) years from the date of the last entry.  Every employer must issue wage slips in Form V to employees electronically or physically on or before payment of wages. Claims relating to wages and discrimination may be filed in Form II, while appeals against orders of the authority are to be filed in Form III electronically or through speed post. Employees are required to make nominations in Form VII for payment of dues in the event of death, and employers must deposit undisbursed dues with the jurisdictional Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) after the expiry of six (6) months from the date the amount become payable. 

Offences and Penalties: Complaints relating to offences under the Wage Code may be filed by an authorised officer, aggrieved employee, registered trade union or Inspector-cum-Facilitator. Upon receiving a complaint and being satisfied that an offence has been committed, the concerned officer may issue summons to the alleged offender and conduct proceedings including recording of evidence and cross-examination. The officer is empowered to impose penalties where the accused pleads guilty or where offences are established after considering oral and documentary evidence. Compoundable offences may be settled through an application in Form VI, upon payment of fifty per cent (50%) of the maximum fine prescribed under the Code within thirty days. Where the composition amount is not deposited within the prescribed timeline, prosecution may be instituted before the competent court for the concerned offence. 

Notably, Section 69 of The Code on Wages reads:"Repeal and savings.—(1) The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (21 of 1965) and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (25 of 1976) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the enactments so repealed including any notification, nomination, appointment, order or direction made there under or any amount of wages provided in any provision of such enactments for any purpose shall be deemed to have been done or taken or provided for such purpose under the corresponding provisions of this Code and shall be in force to the extent they are not contrary to the provisions of this Code till they are repealed under the corresponding provisions of this Code or by the notification to that effect by the Central Government. (3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2), the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) shall apply to the repeal of such enactments." 

The fact remains there is continued ambiguity regarding the precise inclusion of variable remuneration, sales commissions, and bonuses in the code. By mandating that basic wages must be 50% or more of total CTC (cost to company), employee take-home pay might decrease, while contributions to PF and gratuity increase. The code allows the central government to set a "floor wage," but does not mandate a specific, objective methodology to calculate it. It leaves room open for arbitrariness. Section 56 of the code replaces criminal penalties (imprisonment) with civil penalties (fines) for several offences, with provisions for compounding. The "Inspector-cum-Facilitator" system in the code is intended to be transparent, but gives birth to concerns about reducing strict inspections.

Dr. Gopal Krishna  

The author is a practicing advocate and a law, mass communication and philosophy researcher. He is a member, Drafting Committee, Kisan Majdoor Commission. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislation. He is an ex-Fellow, Germany based International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC)-University of Potsdam. He has been a Guest Fellow of Ex-Guest Fellow, Faculty of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin. He is also the editor of www.toxicswatch.org. He is a columnist with  https://www.livelaw.in, https://www.moneylife.in and https://followupstories.com and Mainstream Weekly.