Justice Purnendu Singh's judgement affirmed by Patna High Court's Division Bench in a case of termination of an employee from Begusarai

In Mithun Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 20-page long judgement dated October 28, 2026, wherein, it upheld the 11-page long judgment dated October 17, 2024 by Justice Purnendu Singh. The Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the appellant challenging the judgment by Justice Singh, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant questioning the order dated September 6, 2019 dispensing with his contractual service as Rural Housing Assistant under the Rural Development Department, Government of Bihar, came to be dismissed. The principal questions which arose for consideration were whether the Justice Singh, the Single Judge was justified in upholding the order passed by the Deputy Development Commissioner, Lakhisarai, in view of Memo dated October 3, 2013 and Memo dated October 21, 2014, and whether the procedure adopted by the respondents in dispensing with the appellant’s services suffered from any illegality warranting interference in the appellate jurisdiction. The Division Bench judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhuri.   

Justice Singh had concluded:"10. From the records of the case, I find that the petitioner was terminated from service on the allegation that he was absent from the duty, while he was favoring one candidate in Lok Sabha Election, 2019, which according to this Court, falls under the category of misconduct, as such, I find no reason to interfere with the order of termination. It is further made clear that the petitioner has nowhere pleaded in his writ petition, whether the order of termination is stigmatic, calling for any reasons for interference supported with evidence. Rather, the impugned order has been issued after following the due procedure prescribed in the Circulars issued from time to time. 11. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed."  

The appellant was selected for appointment as Rural Housing Assistant in connection with the implementation of the Indira Gandhi Awas Yojana under the Rural Development Department. He was appointed on March 19, 2014 and thereafter entered into an agreement of service on March 24, 2014. His appointment was contractual in nature and was governed by the terms and conditions prescribed by the department. The departmental instructions contained in Memo dated October 3, 2013 prescribed the service conditions governing contractual employees, including the procedure relating to termination of their services. Subsequently, the department issued further instructions by Memo dated October 21, 2014. The interpretation and applicability of these two departmental communications constitute the principal point of controversy between the parties. While the appellant was continuing in service, a show-cause notice dated April 18, 2019 was issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner, Lakhisarai, alleging financial irregularities in the distribution of funds to beneficiaries under the housing scheme. The allegations included irregularities concerning the construction of houses and the uploading of the same photograph of a toilet in respect of two different beneficiaries. Thereafter, a further communication dated
April 26, 2019 was issued in connection with information received by the Block Development Office, Chanan, concerning a video in which the appellant was allegedly seen making statements in favour of candidates contesting the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency. The appellant was also alleged to have been unauthorisedly absent from his place of work on April 25, 2019. The appellant submitted his explanation dated May 14, 2019. A further show-cause notice dated  May 20, 2019, was issued to him, and he submitted his reply dated June 18, 2019. The respondents did not accept the explanations furnished by him and, by order dated September 6, 2019, the Deputy Development Commissioner, Lakhisarai, dispensed with his services. 

The appellant challenged the said order before the District Magistrate, Lakhisarai. The appeal was rejected by order dated December 31, 2022, on the ground that the termination order had been passed on the directions of the District Magistrate and that the appeal was misconceived. The appellant thereafter preferred a revision petition before the Secretary, Rural Development Department, which was rejected by order dated December 5, 2023, communicated to him by letter dated January 2, 2024. 

The aggrieved appellant approached the High Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 15324 of 2024. The Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions and the departmental instructions relied upon by the parties, dismissed the writ petition by judgment and order dated October 17, 2024. The appellant had questioned the said decision in the appeal. The counsel for the appellant contended that the order dated September 6, 2019 was passed by the Deputy Development Commissioner without jurisdiction and in violation of Memo dated October 21, 2014. According to the appellant, the said instructions prescribed a procedure under which the Block Development Officer was required to make a recommendation, the Deputy Development Commissioner was required to prepare the charge memorandum, and the District Magistrate was required to consider the matter after affording the concerned employee an opportunity of personal hearing before passing the final order. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that Memo dated October 21, 2014 introduced a procedure different from that contained in Memo dated October 3, 2013 and that the respondents could not have relied upon the earlier instructions to sustain an order passed in violation of the subsequent procedure. The appellant also questioned the termination on the ground that the allegations relating to financial irregularities were not established upon subsequent review and that the termination in fact rested upon the allegation concerning his alleged expression of political support during the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency.

The respondents submitted that the Deputy Development Commissioner was the competent authority under Clause 11 of Memo dated October 3, 2013 and that Memo dated October 21, 2014 was issued in continuation of, and by way of clarification of, the earlier instructions. According to the respondents, Memo dated October 21, 2014 did not supersede the terms and conditions governing appointments already made under Memo dated October 3, 2013. The respondentssupported the judgment of Justice Singh.

Justice Chauduri considered the applicability of Memo dated October 21, 2014 to the appellant’s appointment. It was not in dispute that the appellant was appointed on March 19, 2014, whereas Memo dated October 21, 2014 was issued subsequently. He observed: "The distinction is material because the learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that the subsequent communication clarified the service conditions without disturbing the terms and conditions of appointments already made before its issuance. 15. The effect of a subsequent administrative instruction upon an appointment already made must be determined from the language of the instruction itself. The mere fact that a subsequent communication deals with the same subject does not, by itself, establish that it supersedes the earlier instructions or retrospectively alters the conditions governing an existing contractual engagement. Equally, the description of a communication as clarificatory cannot be conclusive if its operative provisions disclose a substantive alteration of the earlier procedure." 

In this case, Justice Singh, the Single Judge had examined Memo dated October 21, 2014 and held that it had been issued in continuation of Memo dated October 3, 2013, without affecting the terms and conditions of appointments already made before its publication. The Single Judge also held that the subsequent communication did not have a superseding effect and that the Deputy Development Commissioner, being the appointing authority under the earlier instructions, was competent to take action
under Clause 11 thereof. The appellant had not merely relied upon the subsequent date of the communication but had questioned the extent to which Memo dated October 21, 2014 altered the procedure for termination. The objection, therefore, requires consideration with reference to the operative provisions of both departmental communications. In the absence of a demonstrated provision retrospectively substituting the authority competent to terminate an appointment already made, the appellant’s contention that the procedure contained in Memo dated October 21, 2014 necessarily governed his appointment cannot be accepted merely on the ground that the termination took place after October 21, 2014. The appellant’s appointment preceded the issuance of Memo dated October 21, 2014. 

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "The relevant question is whether the later instructions expressly or by necessary implication displaced the earlier terms governing such an appointment. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the subsequent instructions were clarificatory and did not supersede Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013 is supported by the interpretation recorded in the impugned judgment. No material placed before us has been shown to establish that Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014 expressly substituted the District Magistrate as the sole authority competent to terminate every contractual employee whose appointment had already been made under Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013. 19. The principle that an authority must act within the limits of the power conferred upon it is well settled. In Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, reported in (1979) 4 SCC 289, the Supreme Court examined the validity of an order of removal passed by an authority subordinate to the authority which had appointed the employee. The Court held that the delegation of appointment powers does not, by itself, elevate the delegate to the rank of the delegating authority or confer a power of removal contrary to the applicable constitutional guarantee. 20. The principle laid down in Krishna Kumar requires the Court to ascertain the authority by which the employee was appointed, the authority which passed the order of removal, and the legal source of the power exercised by the latter. The decision cannot, however, be applied without regard to the nature of the appointment and the provisions governing the service in question. In the present case, the appellant’s appointment was contractual, and the question of competence has to be examined primarily with reference to Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013, Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014, and the terms governing his engagement." 

The judgement reads: "21. Article 311 of the Constitution of India protects persons falling within its scope against dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed. The mere fact that an individual is engaged by a government department does not, by itself, establish that every constitutional protection applicable to a holder of a civil post is available to that individual irrespective of the nature of the engagement. The applicability of Article 311 must be determined by examining the status of the post and the nature of the appointment. In the present case, the appellant’s principal challenge also arises under the departmental instructions governing contractual employees, and that objection must be examined independently of the constitutional contention."

Justice Chaudhuri noted that Justice Singh had accepted the respondents’ contention that the Deputy Development Commissioner was the appointing authority under Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013 and that Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014 did not confer upon the District Magistrate an exclusive power of removal in respect of an appointment already made under the earlier instructions. He recorded:"The appellant has not demonstrated, from the operative provisions governing his appointment, that the Deputy
Development Commissioner lacked authority under the applicable instructions. The finding of the learned Single Judge on this aspect, therefore, does not warrant interference on the grounds urged."

The judgement noted that the report dated November 3, 2023 referred to by the appellant was relevant to the extent that it recorded the departmental position concerning the financial irregularities. The appellant relied upon that report to contend that the financial allegations were not found to be true. Thus, the financial irregularities constituted, at most, an initial allegation or possible motive for examining the appellant’s conduct; they were not, according to the appellant, the established foundation of the termination order. "The existence of the report does not, however, dispense with the necessity of examining the actual termination order and the contemporaneous proceedings to determine the ground which formed the basis of the action taken in 2019." 

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "25. The distinction between misconduct which merely furnishes the motive for termination and misconduct which forms the foundation of a punitive order has been explained by the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., reported in (1999) 2 SCC 21. The Court held that the true nature of a termination must be determined from the substance of the proceedings and the circumstances in which the order was passed, rather than merely from the terminology employed in the formal order. Where the finding of misconduct forms the foundation of termination, the consequences are materially different from a case in which an employer, without determining the truth of an allegation, decides not to continue an employee in service. 26. Applying the above principle, the financial irregularities alleged in the show-cause notice dated 18.04.2019 must be distinguished from the political-expression allegation contained in the communication dated 26.04.2019. The subsequent departmental review relied upon by the appellant reportedly did not establish the financial
allegations. The appellant’s specific case is that the actual basis of the order dated 06.09.2019 was the allegation that he had made political statements in favour of candidates contesting the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency. If the authority treated that allegation as proved and terminated the appellant as a consequence of such finding, the allegation would constitute the foundation of the order and the termination would assume a punitive character, attracting the procedural safeguards applicable to such action. If, on the other hand, the allegation merely led the competent authority to decide not to continue a contractual engagement without recording a finding of misconduct, it would operate only as the motive for the decision. 27. The record, as reflected in the writ petition and the judgment under appeal, shows that the appellant was issued notices concerning both the financial irregularities and the alleged political statements and that explanations were submitted by him. The appellant’s case is that the financial allegations were not established and that the termination ultimately rested upon the allegation concerning the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The respondents, on the other hand, have maintained that the appellant’s conduct was unsatisfactory and that his services were terminated in accordance with the applicable conditions of appointment. 28. The relevant inquiry is not whether the allegation concerning the political statements is serious in the abstract, but whether the order dated 06.09.2019 was passed in exercise of a contractual power of termination or as a punitive consequence of a concluded finding of misconduct." 

Justice Chaudhuri noted that the judgment of the Justice Singh recorded that the appellant was terminated after the authority found that he had committed misconduct. The appellant’s contention that the order was founded upon a specific allegation therefore requires consideration of the contemporaneous termination order and the record of the proceedings. The mere existence of an allegation cannot, without more, determine the legal character of the order; the Court must ascertain whether the political-expression charge was merely the motive for discontinuance or the actual foundation of the termination. The allegation in question related exclusively to the 2019 Lok Sabha election from the Begusarai parliamentary constituency. Any reference to a 2021 Lok Sabha election would be inconsistent with the record and cannot form the basis of the decision. The legality of the termination must be examined with reference to the allegation actually made in the communication dated April 26, 2019 and the material relied upon by the competent authority at the time of passing the order dated September 6, 2019.

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "33. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under the Letters Patent is not exercised merely because another view of the facts or the departmental instructions may be possible. Interference is warranted where the judgment under appeal discloses an error of law, a material misappreciation of the record, or a conclusion which cannot be sustained on the applicable provisions. The question before this Court is whether the learned Single Judge committed such an error in dismissing the writ petition." 

The Division Bench judgment noted that Justice Singh, the Single Judge considered the competing interpretations and concluded that the subsequent communication was clarificatory and did not supersede the earlier instructions. The appellant did not demonstrate a sufficient basis for reversing that conclusion. The legal principles governing punitive termination and the requirement to examine the true foundation of an order remain applicable. 

Justice Chaudhuri concluded that "....the appellant has not demonstrated that the learned Single Judge committed an error warranting interference in concluding that the termination was sustainable under the applicable contractual and departmental framework....36. We make it clear that the conclusion reached in the present appeal rests upon the grounds raised and the material placed before the Court. Memo No. 165209 dated 03.10.2013 and Memo No. 205985 dated 21.10.2014 must be applied according to their actual terms. Likewise, the financial irregularities and the political-expression charge must not be conflated: the former were reportedly not established upon review, whereas the latter was the allegation relied upon as the actual basis of the termination. Neither the contractual nature of the appointment nor the mere issuance of a show-cause notice can, by itself, determine the legality of a termination. In the present case, however, the appellant has not established the jurisdictional or procedural error necessary to warrant
reversal of the judgment under appeal. 37. For the reasons recorded above, we find no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment and order dated 17.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 15324 of 2024. 38. The Letters Patent Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment and order dated 17.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge are affirmed. 39. There shall be no order as to costs."

Justice Chaudhuri wrote: "40. Before parting with the judgement, this Court places on record its deep appreciation for the research and assistance rendered by Mr. Aditya Shekhar and Mr. Ribhav Raj, Legal Researchers, attached with this Court." He wrote these words of appreciation in two judgements authored and delivered on the last working day as a judge on October 28, 2026. 
 

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri retires, glimpses from his verdicts, his last judgement appreciates judicial clerks, Aditya Shekhar, and Ribhava Raj for their "valuable assistance" in preparation of judgment

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri superannuated from Patna High Court on October 31, 2026. During his tenure between November 24-October , 29, 2026, Justice Chaudhuri was part of benches which delivered 634 judgements. 

1. First judgement by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri. In Naubat Ram vs.The Union Of India (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chakradhari Sharan delivered a 17-page long judgement dated December 8, 2023, wherein, Justice Chaudhuri authored the judgement. He concluded: "23. In the instant case, the prosecution Agency failed to comply with the provision of Section 52A (2)(c) of the said Act. Therefore, preparation of sample bags, transmitting the same for scientific examination and report thereof had not been proved beyond shadow of doubt. The learned Trial Judge did not wish to consider the decision of Mohanlal (supra) because the said decision was delivered on 28th January, 2016 and according to him at the relevant point of time the provision contained in Section 52A (2)(c) was not applicable. It is sufficient to point out in this regard that a judgment of the higher Courts has the authority having retrospective effect. Therefore, a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be ruled out merely by saying that the declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not applicable in view of its prospective nature. The declaration of law made by the higher Courts will always have retrospective effect. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Parihar vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 72 may be relied on in this regard. 24. Before we part with, we have noticed a disturbing feature in the instant appeal. It is not clear from the record of the Appellate Court as well as the Lower Court as to whether the contraband articles have been destroyed or not. If the contraband articles are not destroyed as yet, it is a serious lapse on the part of the Investigating Agency because storing of such huge quantity of cannabis in a godown may have serious consequences if it becomes somehow open for human consumption. In such case, the entire purpose of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act will be frustrated.  25. For the reasons stated above, the Director of the DRI, Patna is specifically directed to destroy the seized articles within one month from the date of communication of this order, following specific provisions of the Act, if not already destroyed. 26. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, both these appeals are allowed. 27. Consequently, the judgment dated 21st July, 2018 and orderof conviction and sentence dated 24th July, 2018, passed by the learned 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur in Trial No. 06 of 2018 (Arising out of DRI Case No. 51 of 2016), sentencing the Appellants for committing offence under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c) and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, are set aside."

The Appellants had preferred these appeals under Section 374 (2) and 389 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure assailing the judgment dated 21st July, 2018 and order of conviction and sentence dated 24th July, 2018, passed by the  1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur in trial of 2018. 

 

2. In Pappu Singh @ Shivendra Bahadur & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary Home police Department, Patna (2024), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri had delivered a 14-page long judgement dated February 12, 2024, wherein, he elaborated and concluded:"18. In Ramesh Chandra Singh Vs. State of Allahabad, reported in 2007 (4) SCC 247, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the Officers of a Subordinate Judiciary merely because the Judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The logic behind such verdict is that the appellate and revisional Courts have been established to rectify the mistakes committed by the Judge of the first jurisdiction. For taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, extra care and caution is required. 19. In Krishna Prasad Verma through legal representatives Vrs. The State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2019 SCC online SC 1330, the provisions contained in Article 235 of the Constitution of India has been referred to through which the High Courts control the subordinate court. A High Court therefore,
ought not to take action against the Judicial Officer, by way of disciplinary measure only because a wrong order has been passed. It was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that nobody can claim that he has never ever erred in his life. At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court sounded an order of caution that one has to care against production of Judicial Officer, but cannot be done only without identifying the wrong Judgment/orders passed by the Judges. There is no allegation made by the petitioners that the order of remand passed by the Judicial Officer was made for some extraneous consideration or to obtain illegal gain. The order of remand was passed on 07.02.2017. 20. The High Court of Judicature at Patna issued Circular No. 1 of 2023 on the basis of the decision made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Md. Asfaque Alam Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Another reiterated the law laid down in Arnesh Kumar (supra). The petitioner has failed to produce any circular issued by this Court immediately after the decision of Arnesh
Kumar (supra) to the learned Magistrate for strict compliance of the same. 21. At the same time, this Court is of the view that ignorance of law cannot be said to be a defence by even a common man far less a Judicial Officer. However, following the consistent views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of initiation of disciplinary proceeding against a Judicial Officer, only for passing an erroneous Judgment/order, this Court is of the view that disciplinary proceeding cannot be an answer against such erroneous order. 22. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2023 (3) BLJ 688, Sangita Rani Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. may be relied on in this regard. 23. However, considering the plight of the petitioners and violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, this Court seriously cautioned the concerned Judicial Officer, respondent no. 10 and records that recurrence of any such incident will be seriously viewed. 24. At the same time, this Court is of the view that the Investigating Officer committed a substantial error by arresting the petitioner no.1 after he was released on bail bond without recalling the bond through a Magestrial order. For such wrong, petitioner’s valuable fundamental right was violated. 25. For the reasons stated above, the Police authority, State of Bihar, is directed to pay compensation to the petitioner no. 1 amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- (Two Lakhs). Such compensation shall be paid from the exchequer of the State within 60 days from the date of communication of this order to the Director General of Police, respondent no. 2. After payment, the said money shall be deducted from the salary of the concerned Police Officer, respondent no. 9 in ten monthly installments, if not superannuated. If superannuated, the said money will be deducted from his pensionary benefit in 20 monthly installments. 26. The instant writ petition is thus disposed of." 

 

The other nine respondents were:2 . The Director General of Police, Bihar, 3. Inspector General of Police, SC and ST Act, Bihar, 4. Inspector General of Police, Patna Zone, 5. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Patna Division, Patna. 6. Superintendent of Police, Nalanda at Biharsharif, 7. Parvendra Bharti, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hilsa, Nalanda, 8. Rajesh Malakar, Station House Officer, Chiksaura Police Station, Nalanda, 9. Investigation Officer, Chikaura Police Station, Nalanda and 10. Vishwa Vibhuti Gupta, The Then A.C.J.M Ist Hilsa nnd Now Posted As Additional Dist. And Session Judge Xvi Bhagalpur, Bihar. 

 

The petitioners had filed the writ petition for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents to explain, as to why the petitioner no. 1 was arrested in flagrant violation of the mandate of law, enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41(A) of the Cr.P.C. and also for a direction upon the Investigating Officer for flouting the law involved in the subject with brazen proclivity in support of his superior officials with a coordinate prayer directing the respondents to pay compensation for wrongful arrest of the petitioner. In the Chiksaura P.S. Case No. 89 of 2016, registered under Sections 341/504/506/354(B) of the I.P.C. and Section 3(i) (iii) (vi) (x) (xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1995. After registration of the said case, Police issued notice upon petitioner no. 1 namely Pappu Singh @ Shivendra Bahadur under Section 41(A) of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner no. 1 duly complied with the said provision attending the local Police Station. The Investigating Officer interrogated him and he was released by the Police. Subsequently, the Investigating Officer made an application on February 7, 2017, praying for Police remand against the petitioner no. 1 stating, inter alia, that the petitioner is the prime accused in connection with Chiksaura P.S. Case No. 89 of 2016; against him ample materials had been collected; he had been fleeing here and there to evade arrest. Subsequently, he was arrested following the prevailing law and he should be remanded to judicial custody. In course of hearing of the writ petition, a Coordinate Bench of the High Court passed an order dated July 24, 2023 allowing the petitioner to add the concerned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Hilsa, namely Vishwa Vibhuti Gupta, respondent no. 10 who passed the order of remand. The respondent no. 10 was directed to file his show cause within one week as to why contempt proceeding be not initiated against him for violating the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vrs. State of Bihar, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273.

In support of his contention the counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Rini Johar & Anr. vs. State of M.P. & Ors., reported in 2016 (11) SCC 703  relating to unlawful arrest in violation of the direction made by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar’s case. Supreme Court in paragraph-27 of its decision in Dr. Rini Johar's case observed as hereunder:-
“27. In the case at hand, there has been violation of Article 21 and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation. They have been treated with an attitude of insensibility. Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in D.K. Basu [D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 92], there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A CrPC. The investigating officers in no circumstances can flout the law with brazen proclivity. In such a situation, the public law remedy which has been postulated in Nilabati Behera [Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527], Sube Singh v. State of Haryana [Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 3 SCC 178: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 54], Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P. [Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P., (2012) 1 SCC 748 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 684], comes into play. The constitutional courts taking note of suffering and humiliation are entitled to grant compensation. That has been regarded as a redeeming feature. In the case at hand, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, we think it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs 5,00,000 (Rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence. It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.”

 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned A.C.J.M., respondent no. 10 herein committed a grave error by taking the petitioner no. 1 into custody in violation of release bond issued by the Investigating Officer under Section 41 (A) of the Cr.P.C. without asking him to produce the check list as required to be filed under Section 41 (1) (b) (ii) of the Cr.P.C. It was submitted by him that respondent no. 10 is liable not only to disciplinary action, but the petitioner should be compensated by the respondent no. 10. The respondent no. 10 filed a counter affidavit in the nature of show cause on September 25, 2023. In the said show cause supported by an affidavit the respondent no. 10 has tendered unconditional and unqualified apology to the High Court for not being carried out the direction made by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar (supra) in its true letter and spirit. 

 

In Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, the Supreme Court has laid down the following guidelines:- 
“11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 CrPC;
11.2. All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which
necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
11.4. The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the
police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise
detention;
11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the
date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the
Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks
from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers
concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to
be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11.8. Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.
12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to  seven years, whether with or without fine.”

 

3. In Bihar State Road Development Corporation Through its General Manager & Ors. vs. Shiv Shankar Prasad & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered 77-page long judgement dated October 1, 2026, one of his last judgements as a judge, wherein, he concluded:"47. In the instant case, the land in Khesra No. 3243 was acquired vide notification, dated 4th of March, 2014, i.e., prior to 1st of January, 2015. Relying on the decision of ManavBhanot (supra), the private respondents / writ petitioners are entitled to solatium, interest and interest on solatium as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 48. This is not the end of our adjudication. 49. On perusal of the order of the Arbitrator, dated 4th of August, 2018, we find that the Arbitrator/Additional Collector, Gaya did not consider the market value of the land on the date of publication of notice. Secondly, the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land. Thirdly, the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of land, by reason of the acquisition, injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner or his earnings and lastly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change. 50. The above are the essential requirements to  settle the compensation under NHAI Act. The order of the Arbitrator does not contain any adjudication on the above-mentioned points contemplated in Section 3G(7) of the said Act. The order dated 4th of August, 2018 only states that as there are some pucca pillars and constructions in the vicinity of the acquired land, the land in question is developing land. The arbitral award did not speak about the amount of compensation, differing from the compensation fixed by the competent authority. 51. The provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of payment of solatium, interest on solatium and interest, was not, at all, considered by the Arbitrator. Therefore, the order of the Arbitrator and the appellate order passed by the Mines Tribunal are bad in law, inoperative and capricious. Therefore, we have no other alternative, but to set aside those orders. 52. We have already come to this finding that Annexure-10 being a letter, issued by the Deputy General Manager (Technical), Bihar State Road Development Corporation Limited to the Arbitrator-cum-Additional Collector, Gaya, cannot be acted upon, because Gazette Notification, dated 21st of June, 2018 shall have prospective effect and the same is not applicable in pending cases.  53. In view of the above discussions, while maintaining and affirming the order, passed by the learned Single Judge, for setting aside the letter, dated 21st of December, 2018 (Annexure-10), we set aside the remaining part of the order, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 16226 of 2019, dated

16th of January, 2024. 54. Accordingly, we direct the competent authority to reassess the amount of compensation of acquisition of land in Khesra No. 3243 along with solatium, interest and interest on solatium on compensation as per the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order."

In this appeal, the judgement and order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 16226 of 2019 @of January 16, 2024, is under challenge, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge of this Court quashed a letter, bearing No. 962, dated December 21 2018, issued by the Deputy General Manager (Technical), Bihar State Road Development Corporation Limited. It was also held that the notification, dated 21st of June, 2018, shall not have any effect on the arbitration proceeding of the petitioners. The respondents were subsequently directed to give effect to the arbitral award, dated August 4, 2018, passed by the Additional Collector, Gaya in R. A. 103 of 2016-17 along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum for the period of delay in making the payment, i.e., from the date of passing of the Award till the actual payment of the awarded amount. 

The writ petitioners were joint owners of the land in question from Wazirganj district. The Central Government decided to acquire certain portions of the land and it was published in the extraordinary gazette in exercise of its power under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1956, for the purpose of widening/four-laning of NH-82 to be carried out by the National Highways Authority of India in the districts of Gaya and Nawada, vide notification, dated March 4,2014. The petitioners came to know about the notification upon a paper publication and pursuant thereto they also received a notice from the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Collector, Gaya, informing them that they were required to be present before the concerned Officer to substantiate their claim with supporting documents to enable them to receive compensation for the aforesaid lands, measuring about 2.8676 acres. The sad land was described as agricultural land and the Land Acquisition Department determined the valuation of the land mentioned in the notice at Rs.3,75,75,241/- and Rs. 30,00,673/-. The petitioners had agreed to accept the amount of compensation under protest, as compensation determined by the competent authority was not on the basis of the true nature of the land, so acquired and it had completely ignored the present nature of the land in question, which the petitioners claimed, as commercial/residential land and it was also contended by the petitioners that by a notification, dated 10th of October, 2017.

4. In Manoj Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 39-page long judgement dated May 11, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"89. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt.....this Court deems it appropriate to observe that cases arising under the NDPS Act require strict adherence to the statutory safeguards prescribed under the Act. The investigating agency is expected to ensure scrupulous compliance of the mandatory procedural requirements relating to search, seizure, sampling and preservation of seized narcotic substances so as to maintain the sanctity and credibility of the prosecution case." It was heard along with Sheikh Amrullah vs. The State of Bihar (2026). The judgement also concluded:"91. The judgment of conviction, dated 14.05.2025 and the order of sentence, dated 19.05.2025, passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS Court No. II, East Champaran, Motihari in NDPS Case No. 10 of 2024, arising out of Ramgarhwa P.S. Case No. 277 of 2023, so far as it relates to the present appellant Sheikh Amirullah, are hereby set aside." The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhury. 

The criminal appeal was preferred by the appellant against the judgment of conviction dated May 14, 2025 and the order of sentence dated May 19, 2025 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS Court No. II, East Champaran, Motihari in NDPS Case No. 10 of 2024, arising out of Ramgarhwa P.S. Case No. 277 of 2023. By the impugned judgment, the Trial Court held the appellant along with co-accused persons guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c), 23 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/ each. 

The appellant, namely Sheikh Amirullah, who was arrayed as accused no. 2 before the Trial Court, had assailed the judgment on the ground that the conviction was recorded without proper appreciation of the evidence on record and in complete disregard of the mandatory safeguards provided under the NDPS Act. The prosecution case arose out of an alleged recovery of charas of commercial quantity was said to have been made from the possession of the accused persons on July 5, 2023, leading to institution of the police case and subsequent trial culminating in conviction. Being aggrieved by the recorded findings of the Trial Court and the sentence imposed, the appeal was filed seeking interference of the High Court.

The prosecution case emerged from the written report of the informant and the evidence adduced during trial, was that on July 5, 2023 at about 19:30 hours, the informant, namely Indrajeet Paswan, who was then posted as Officer-in-Charge of Ramgarhwa Police Station, along with other police personnel, proceeded on patrolling duty from the police station. It was stated that while the police party was engaged in routine checking of vehicles near Bela Canal Chowk, two motorcycles were seen approaching from the side of Ramgarhwa market. One motorcycle was being driven by a single person, while on the other motorcycle, two persons were riding. On noticing the police party, the accused persons allegedly turned their motorcycles and attempted to flee towards the market side, which aroused suspicion. The police party immediately chased the motorcycles and succeeded in intercepting them near Semar Chowk. 

Upon interception, the persons riding the motorcycles were apprehended and their identities were ascertained. The person on the first motorcycle disclosed his name as Manoj Yadav, whereas the two persons on the second motorcycle disclosed their names as Suresh Prasad Kushwaha and Sheikh Amirullah, the appellant. Upon questioning regarding the articles carried by them, the accused persons allegedly became nervous and gave evasive replies. Thereafter, the police decided to conduct search of their persons as well as the bags allegedly carried by them.

According to the prosecution, before conducting the search, the accused persons were informed about their legal right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, and it was alleged that they consented to be searched by the police party itself. Thereafter, the contraband articles were seized, seizure list was prepared at the place of occurrence, and the accused persons were taken into custody.

On the basis of the written report of the informant, a Ramgarhwa P.S. Case of 2023 was registered under the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act, and investigation was taken up. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons, whereafter cognizance was taken and the case was committed for trial. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons, whereafter cognizance of the offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(c), 23 and 25 of the NDPS Act was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Exclusive Special Judge, NDPS, where it came to be registered as NDPS Case No. 10 of 2024. Charges were framed on June 19, 2024 against all the accused persons. The contents of the charges were read over and explained to them in vernacular, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined altogether six witnesses. Upon a careful reading of their cross-examination, it appears that these witnesses have not been able to furnish clear and consistent details regarding the manner in which the seized articles were handled after recovery. There is no definite evidence regarding sealing of the contraband at the place of occurrence, nor is there any clarity as to the procedure adopted for sampling. It also came on record that although public persons were present, none were made witnesses to the seizure and no explanation, except a general statement of refusal, was substantiated.

Justice Chaudhury observed: "29. Thus, the entire case of the prosecution rests upon the testimony of police witnesses and the documents prepared during investigation, without any independent corroboration with respect to the alleged recovery, search and subsequent handling of the seized contraband."

Justice Chaudhury added: "29. After referring to the earlier judgments, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that non-compliance with requirement of Sections 42 and 50 is impermissible whereas delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. The Constitution Bench noted the effect of the aforesaid two decisions in para 5. The present is not a case where insofar as compliance with Section 42(1) proviso even an argument based on substantial compliance is raised there is total non-compliance with Section 42(1) proviso. As observed above, Section 43 being not attracted, search was to be conducted after complying with the provisions of Section 42. We thus, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that non-compliance with Section 42(1) and Section 42(2) were proved on the record and the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the conviction order.

Upon hearing and upon consideration of the materials available on record, the following questions arise for determination in the appeal before the Division Bench: (i) Whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged contraband was recovered from conscious and exclusive possession of the appellant in the manner alleged? (ii) Whether the prosecution has complied with the mandatory requirements of Sections 42, 52A, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act in course of search, seizure, sampling and subsequent handling of the seized articles? (iii) Whether the prosecution has been able to establish a complete and reliable chain of custody with respect to the alleged seized contraband from the stage of seizure till forensic examination? (iv) Whether non-examination of seizure witnesses, non-production of seized contraband before the Court and the contradictions appearing in the evidence of prosecution witnesses create reasonable doubt in the prosecution case? (v) Whether the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Trial Court can be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the present case?

The judgement reads: "60. The prosecution case rests entirely upon the testimony of official witnesses. Admittedly, no independent witness has been examined in the present case, although the prosecution itself asserts that several persons had assembled at the place of occurrence. The prosecution has sought to explain such non-examination by stating that public persons declined to become witnesses. However, except such bald assertion, no material has been brought on record to show that any sincere effort was made to secure participation of independent persons. 61. It further appears from the record that even the chowkidars, namely Nawal Kishore Rai and Raushan Kumar Patel, who according to the prosecution were present during the alleged search and seizure, have not been examined during trial. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished regarding their non-examination. In a case resting solely upon police witnesses, non-examination of such material witnesses assumes significance and creates doubt regarding fairness of the alleged recovery proceedings."

It has recorded: "66. The evidence on record further reveals serious infirmities with regard to seizure, sampling and preservation of the alleged contraband. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, though members of the raiding party, have not stated anything regarding sealing of the seized articles at the place of occurrence or drawing of samples at the spot. Their evidence is conspicuously silent regarding the manner in which the

seized contraband was preserved after seizure. 67. The evidence of PW-6, the Investigating Officer, assumes considerable importance in this regard. In paragraph 40 of his evidence, he has admitted that samples were not drawn at the place of occurrence. In paragraph 42, he has stated that he was not aware as to when and where the seized articles were sealed. He has further stated that samples were drawn on 15.10.2023, i.e., more than three months after the alleged seizure dated 05.07.2023....70. Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the prosecution has failed to prove preparation of inventory in accordance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act. There is no evidence to show that samples were drawn before a Magistrate or that any inventory was certified as required under law.....72. This Court also finds substance in the submission advanced regarding non-production of the seized contraband before the Court. The alleged seized article has not been produced and marked as material exhibit during trial. In

Vijay Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 527 it has been held that failure to produce the seized contraband before the Court creates serious doubt regarding the prosecution case." 

5. In Sahdeo Gupta and Naresh Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar and Kanhaiya Lal (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Bibek Chaudhuri quashed and set aside the judgement and order of conviction and sentence passed in Trial No. 82 of 2008, arising out of Nawada P. S. Case No. 231 of 1994, corresponding to G. R. Case No. 1543 of 1994, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nalanda at Biharsharif and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Courts 1st, Nalanda at Biharsharif in Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 2008.

The criminal revision petition was directed against an order, dated May 30, 2018, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 2008, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Courts, 1st, Nalanda at Biharsharif, whereby the Court of Appeal upheld the order, dated March 12, 2008, passed in Trial No. 82 of 2008, arising out of Nawada P. S. Case No. 231 of 1994, corresponding to G. R. Case No. 1543 of 1994, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nalanda at Biharsharif, convicting and sentencing the petitioners to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year each for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment of six months with fine of Rs. 1,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Both the sentences were directed to be run concurrently.

Kanhaiya Lal had filed complaint case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nawada against the Petitioners and their family members, alleging that on March 1, 1993, the daughter of the Informant, namely, Jyoti Gupta was married with Naresh Gupta. After marriage, she went to her matrimonial home and she was subjected to physical and mental torture for one Maruti Car. The wife of Naresh Gupta expressed her inability to provide a Maruti Car to the petitioners. She was brutally assaulted by them. The Informant made all other allegations, implicating the Petitioners of dowry related harassment and cruelty towards his daughter.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that both the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court did not visualize the lack of specificity in the allegation against the petitioners. He pointed out that the de facto complainant claimed that his daughter was brutally tortured but she was never medically treated for such torture allegedly perpetrated upon her by the petitioners. 

The Court agreed with the counsel of the petitioners that both the Courts below relied on the statement of the wife Naresh Gupta recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as substantive piece of evidence. But they failed to consider that a statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence but only corroborative in nature, when it corroborates the statement made by the de facto complainant in the petition of complaint, the statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. can be relied on as a corroborative piece of evidence. It found that the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is exaggerated. 

Notably, the Court underlined that "neither the Trial Court nor the Court of Appeal consider that all the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution were either the family members or co-villagers of the Informant. They are interested witnesses and their evidences should not be considered as a gospel truth without proper scrutiny."

The High Court observed that "the case under 498 A of the Indian Penal Code is the outcome of personal grudge and differences between both the parties.

The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) wherein it was observed that“4. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-AIPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-AIPC is a cognizable and non- bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In quite a number of cases, bedridden grandfathers and grandmothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested.”

It cited the judgement of the Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010). It observed by the Apex Court that: “32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under Section 498-AIPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment is also a matter of serious concern.” 

Justice Chaudhury concluded that it is revealed that omnibus allegation was made against the petitioners. The complainant alleged that all the accused persons harassed her and brutally tortured her on demand of a Maruti Car. However, no specific distinct allegation have been made against either of the Petitioners herein, i.e., none of the petitioners have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of general allegations made against them. This simply led to a suggestion wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance to the offence. His order reads: "In view of such circumstances, this Court is not in a position to concur with the concurrent finding of both the Courts below."

 

Apparently, October 28, 2026 was the last working day for Justice Chaudhury. His last two judgements were delivered on October 28, 2026. 

 

6. One of the two last judgements: In The Union of India x & Ors. vs. Kiran Devi (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered 35-page long judgement dated October 28, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....the appeal is disposed of with the following directions:
1. The judgment and order dated 20.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 16222 of 2017 is set aside to the extent it places reliance on the decision in Sumitra Devi (supra) and issues a bare direction for consideration of the candidature of the writ petitioner’s son without laying down the parameters of such consideration.
2. The order dated 08.08.2017 passed by the General Manager (Personnel), East Central Railway, is quashed only to the extent it declines the request for change of nomination and closes the claim without examining the eligibility of the son and the other relevant aspects discussed in this judgment. The finding that the original nominee (husband) was age-barred is left undisturbed.
3. The matter is remitted to the competent authority of the East Central Railway for fresh consideration of the claim for appointment of the writ petitioner’s son, Chandan Kumar, strictly in accordance with the governing policy framework, the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022, and the observations made in this judgment.
4. In such fresh consideration, the competent authority shall specifically examine and record findings on the following aspects:
(a) whether the son fulfils the prescribed eligibility criteria relating to age (including any applicable relaxation), educational qualifications, medical fitness and suitability;
(b) whether the family continues to satisfy the basic conditions of the scheme, including the nature and extent of hardship caused by the acquisition;
(c) the effect of the long lapse of time from the date of acquisition and whether the object of the preferential appointment scheme still survives in the facts of the case;
(d) the plea of parity/hostile discrimination with reference to the authentic records of the other families
included in the list of 44 persons, particularly the case of Manju Devi; and
(e) any other condition prescribed by the applicable Railway Board circulars and policy guidelines.
5. The writ petitioner shall be given a reasonable opportunity to place all relevant documents and submissions before the competent authority. The authority shall pass a speaking order within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
6. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the ultimate entitlement of the son to
appointment. The competent authority shall decide the claim on its own merits and in accordance with law.
7. There shall be no order as to costs." 

 

The decision in Sumitra Devi (supra) refers to the decision in Sumitra Devi vs. Union of India, C.W.J.C. No. 21778 of 2019, wherein, a bare direction for consideration of the candidature of the writ petitioner’s son was given without laying down the parameters of such consideration. Justice Sandeep Kumar had delivered the 13-page long Single Judge Bench judgement dated April 20, 2024.  

 

Justice Kumar had concluded:"29.....this application is allowed and the order dated 08.08.2017 issued by the General Manager, Personnel, East Central Railway, Hajipur communicated under the signature of Assistant Personnel Officer/ Recruitment, East Central Railway, Hajipur is hereby quashed. 30. The Railway authorities are directed to consider the candidature of the son of the petitioner and offer him appointment forthwith. 31. The aforesaid exercise must be concluded within three months from the date of communication/receipt of a copy of this order. 32. This application stands allowed." 

 
The judgement was authored and delivered by Justice Chaudhuri as part of the Division Bench, upon hearing  the intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The appeal was directed against the judgment and order dated April 20, 2024 passed by Justice Kumar in Kiran Devi vs. The Union of India & Ors. (2024), whereby the order dated August 8, 2017 issued by the General Manager (Personnel), East Central Railway, rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment of her nominee on the ground of land acquisition, was quashed. Justice Kumar had also directed the Railway authorities to consider the candidature of the writ petitioner’s son for appointment within a period of three months. 

 

The core controversy that arose for consideration was whether the writ petitioner, whose land measuring 0.40 acres was acquired for the development of goods handling facilities at Fatuha Railway Station, was entitled to a direction for consideration of her son’s candidature for appointment under the land-loser preferential employment scheme of the Railways, in the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly after the long lapse of time, the earlier directions of the High Court, the rejection of the claim of the original nominee (her husband) on the ground of age-bar, and the subsequent refusal to permit change of nomination. 

 

The essential facts are that the landed property of the writ petitioner measuring 0.40 acres was acquired by the State of Bihar for the East Central Railway for the purpose of development of goods handling facilities at Fatuha Railway Station. The acquisition proceedings were completed in L.A. Case No. 20/89-90. The Ministry of Railways had taken a policy decision to provide employment to members of families who were physically displaced on account of acquisition of their house or whose livelihood was materially affected by the acquisition of land. By letter dated July 30, 1991, the Railways informed the Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, to identify such individuals. A communication was also addressed to the District Magistrate, Patna on March 11, 1991 seeking a list of eligible persons. Pursuant thereto, the Sub-Divisional Officer conducted an enquiry and submitted a report to the District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna, identifying 44 families vide letter dated September 14, 1993. The name of the writ petitioner appeared at Serial No. 30 in the said list. The writ petitioner nominated her husband, Anil Kumar, for appointment and submitted a representation dated October 9, 1995. Several other similarly situated persons also raised claims. A batch of writ petitions, including C.W.J.C. No. 3274 of 1999, was disposed of on March 13, 1999 with a direction to the Railways to consider the cases of eligible persons within one year. The writ petitioner continued to represent her claim. In the meantime, one Manju Devi (whose name also figured in the list of affected families and whose land measuring 0.49 acres had been acquired) filed C.W.J.C. No. 7918 of 2006, which was dismissed on the ground of delay. Her Letters Patent Appeal No. 212 of 2012 was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on March 23, 2012 with a direction to the Railways to offer her appointment before May 31, 2012. Relying upon the said decision, the writ petitioner filed C.W.J.C. No. 517 of 2009 seeking a direction for consideration of her husband’s candidature. The said writ petition was disposed of on August 17, 2012 with a direction to the respondents to appoint the petitioner’s husband in accordance with his eligibility within a reasonable time, treating the case as similarly situated with that of Manju Devi. Alleging non-compliance, the writ petitioner filed Contempt Application M.J.C. No. 6273 of 2013. 

 

During the pendency of the contempt proceedings, the Railways issued communications dated August 21, 2014, April 27, 2015 and September 15, 2016 calling upon the petitioner to furnish certain documents. The petitioner submitted some documents and sought further time. On October 26, 2016 and thereafter, she requested that her son, Chandan Kumar, be considered in place of her husband, who had in the meantime become over- age. The Railways, by communication dated March 31, 2017, insisted that the claim be confined to the husband. As a consequence, further correspondence ensued. Ultimately, by the order dated August 8, 2017, the General Manager (Personnel), East Central Railway, closed the claim of the husband on the ground that he was age-barred (and was so even in 2012) and declined the request for change of nomination in favour of the son. The writ petitioner challenged the order dated August 8, 2017 by filing the writ petition which has given rise to the present appeal in question before the Division Bench. The Single Judge, by the impugned judgment and order dated April 20, 2024, quashed the order dated August 8, 2017 and directed the Railways to consider the candidature of the writ petitioner’s son within three months, placing reliance, inter alia, on the decision of a Single Judge in Sumitra Devi vs. Union of India, C.W.J.C. No. 21778 of 2019. It is not in dispute that the said decision in Sumitra Devi (id) was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022 (with analogous appeals) by judgment dated March 21, 2024, a short time before the pronouncement of the impugned order.

 

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment and order dated April 20, 2024 was unsustainable in law and on facts for the following principal reasons:
A. Foundation of the impugned order stands removed: The Single Judge has placed substantial reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge in Sumitra Devi (id). The said decision was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022 (with connected appeals) by judgment dated 21.03.2024, rendered about a month prior to the impugned order. The Division Bench has clearly held that any claim for appointment on the ground of land acquisition must be examined on its individual facts and strictly in accordance with the policy guidelines in force. The very foundation of the impugned judgment having been knocked out, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained.
B. Threshold eligibility is only a gateway: The claim must satisfy the principles governing compassionate appointment Even assuming that the writ petitioner had a threshold entitlement as a land-loser, the Railways are bound to examine the claim on the touchstone of the law governing compassionate appointment. The Division Bench in Sumitra Devi (id) has reiterated that the principles laid down in Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138, apply with equal force to land-acquisition related appointments. Preferential treatment is subject to fulfilment of all other conditions of the policy, including educational qualifications, age, medical fitness and suitability. Reliance was placed on Union of India vs. Shankar Prasad Deep, (2019) 16 SCC 286, and the Railway Board guidelines of 1983 and 2006, which confine the benefit to recruitment within a stipulated period, to persons who have not received alternative land or other benefits, and who fulfil the prescribed qualifications.
C. No statutory right to employment: The policy cannot enlarge the statute The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 confers only a right to compensation. The Supreme Court in Sanjeev Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1079) has held that on acquisition the landowner or his family is entitled only to compensation and that a policy of providing employment cannot prevail over the statutory scheme. The claim in the present case, raised and pursued after inordinate delay, is liable to be rejected on this ground as well.
D. Delay and non-survival of the object of the scheme: The land was acquired in L.A. Case No. 20/89-90. The original claim was for the husband in 2009; the son was put forward for the first time only in 2016-2017. Compassionate or preferential appointment is neither a vested nor a heritable right. It is intended to meet an immediate financial crisis and cannot be claimed after the crisis has passed or after a considerable lapse of time. Reliance has been placed on the principles restated by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari, (2025) 5 SCC 712. The Single Judge directed consideration of a substitute nominee first proposed in 2017, without adequately addressing the aspect of delay.
E. Change of nomination and eligibility: Railway Board circular RBE No. 99/2010 (particularly paragraph 7) contains no provision for change of nomination during the pendency of consideration of a claim. The request for substitution of the son in place of the husband was, therefore, rightly declined. Further, the Single Judge did not examine whether the son fulfills the eligibility criteria of age, educational qualification, medical fitness and suitability, or whether the acquisition resulted in loss of homestead or substantial livelihood. These are matters required to be verified by the Railways in terms of the policy and the law laid down in Shankar Prasad Deep (supra). 

On these grounds, it was prayed that the appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment and order dated April 20, 2024 be set aside, and the order dated August 8, 2017 of the Railway authorities be restored.

 

The counsel for the respondent (writ petitioner) supported the impugned judgment and order and submitted that the appeal was liable to be dismissed for the following reasons:
A. Parity and hostile discrimination: The case of the writ petitioner is identical to that of Manju Devi (L.P.A. No. 212 of 2012), whose land measuring 0.49 acres had been acquired and whose family member was appointed in the year 2014. The writ petitioner’s name appears at Serial No. 30 in the list of 44 families identified by the revenue authorities in 1993. It is asserted that 33 out of the said 44 families were extended the benefit of appointment. Specific serial numbers on the list were offered employment without insistence on age or eligibility bars. The appellants have not specifically denied these assertions in their counter-affidavit. The writ petitioner has, therefore, been subjected to hostile discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
B. Continuity of earlier judicial directions: In C.W.J.C. No. 517 of 2009, the High Court, by order dated August 17, 2012, directed the Railways to appoint the writ petitioner’s husband in accordance with his eligibility within a reasonable time, treating the case as similarly situated with that of Manju Devi. The subsequent contempt petition (M.J.C. No. 6273 of 2013) was disposed of with a positive direction to process and settle the claim in accordance with law. Relying upon Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board vs. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689, it was submitted that the directions issued in the first round of litigation continue to bind the authorities and can be enforced in subsequent proceedings.
C. Change of nomination and the principle that no party can take advantage of its own default: The original nominee (husband) became over-age solely on account of the prolonged inaction of the Railways. Having themselves caused the delay, the appellants cannot be permitted to reject the claim on the ground of age-bar and simultaneously refuse permission to substitute the son. There is no rule that prohibits or fetters the discretion of the Railway authorities to allow a change of nomination. An executive authority cannot unduly restrict its own discretionary power. Reliance has been placed on the principle approved by the Supreme Court in Jigya Yadav (Minor) v. CBSE, (2021) 7 SCC 535 (approving the Delhi High Court decision in Dhruva Parate vs. CBSE, ILR 2009 V Delhi 371).
D. Governing policy and inapplicability of later circulars: The claim was governed by the policy decision of the Railways reflected in the communications of 1990-1991, which provided for appointment of one member of a family that was displaced or whose livelihood was materially affected. The subsequent policy of 2006 and the Division Bench judgment in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022 have no application to the present case, which arises from an earlier acquisition and an earlier policy regime. Even otherwise, the Division Bench itself recognised that a subsequent policy would not govern claims arising under an earlier scheme.
E. Enforceability of the policy: Where the Union Government has framed a policy for providing employment to land-losers, the terms of such policy are enforceable in a court of law. Reliance has been placed on Anil Kumar vs. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 591. The prolonged wait of nearly three decades cannot be permitted to defeat the object of a welfare measure intended to achieve social justice.

On these grounds, it was prayed that the appeal be dismissed and the direction issued by the Single Judge for consideration of the candidature of the writ petitioner’s son be affirmed.

Justice Chaudhuri framed the following points for determination:
1. Whether the impugned judgment and order dated April 20, 2024 was rendered unsustainable on the ground that the principal decision relied upon by the Single Judge [Sumitra Devi, (supra)] had already been set aside by a Division Bench of the High Court in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022 on March 21, 2024?
2. What is the governing policy framework applicable to the claim of the writ petitioner, and whether the principles governing compassionate appointment (including those relating to delay, eligibility, and non-heritable character of the right) apply to land-loser preferential appointments under the Railway scheme?
3. What is the effect and continuing efficacy of the directions issued by the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 517 of 2009 (order dated 17.08.2012) and in the consequential contempt proceedings (M.J.C. No. 6273 of 2013)?
4. Whether the Railway authorities were justified in declining the request for change of nomination from the husband to the son, particularly when the original nominee had become age-barred during the pendency of consideration?
5. Whether the claim stands defeated by inordinate delay and whether the object of the preferential appointment scheme survives after the long lapse of time from the date of acquisition?
6. Whether the writ petitioner has established a case of hostile discrimination or parity with other land-losers (including Manju Devi) who were allegedly extended the benefit of appointment?
7. What is the permissible scope of judicial review in such matters, and whether the direction issued by the  Single Judge for consideration of the son’s candidature within a stipulated period is legally sustainable?

 

Justice Chaudhuri's analysis and findings are as under: 

Point No. 1: Effect of the Division Bench judgment in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022 on the foundation of the impugned order: It is not in dispute that the Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, placed significant reliance on the decision rendered by a Single Judge of the High Court in Sumitra Devi (supra), particularly paragraphs 14 and 15 thereof. The operative direction to consider the candidature of the writ petitioner’s son within three months draws sustenance from the approach adopted in that decision. The said judgment in Sumitra Devi (id) was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 465 of 2022. The Division Bench held, inter alia, that any consideration of a claim for appointment on the ground of land acquisition must be based on the individual facts of the case and strictly in accordance with the policy guidelines in force. The Division Bench emphasised that preferential appointment in land-acquisition matters is not automatic and must conform to the conditions of the applicable scheme. The impugned judgment was pronounced on April 20, 2024, approximately one month after the Division Bench decision. There is nothing on record to indicate that the judgment of the Division Bench in Sumitra Devi (id) was brought to the notice of the Single Judge. When the principal authority relied upon by the Single Judge has been reversed by a coordinate Division Bench prior to the pronouncement of the impugned order, the foundation of the reasoning stands substantially weakened. The High Court is bound by the law declared by the Division Bench. Consequently, the approach adopted in the impugned judgment, insofar as it proceeds on the basis of the reversed decision in Sumitra Devi (id), cannot be sustained in its entirety. This, however, does not automatically result in the allowance of the appeal. The matter must still be examined independently on the remaining points for determination, on the basis of the factual matrix of the present case and the applicable legal principles.

Point No. 2: Governing policy framework and applicability of principles of compassionate appointment: The claim of the writ petitioner originates from the acquisition of her land in L.A. Case No. 20/89-90 for the goods handling facilities at Fatuha. The early communications of the Railways (letters dated July 30, 1991 and March 11, 1991) and the consequential identification of 44 families by the revenue authorities in 1993 form the starting point of the scheme under which the claim is founded. Those communications indicate that the Railways had decided to consider employment for one member of families that were physically displaced or whose livelihood was materially affected by the acquisition. The appellants have relied upon subsequent Railway Board circulars, including the guidelines of 1983 [as noticed in Anil Kumar v. Union of India, (supra)], the circular of April 19, 2006, and RBE No. 99/2010, as well as the general principles governing compassionate appointment. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that the claim is governed solely by the 1990-1991 policy regime and that later circulars, as well as the Division Bench judgment in Sumitra Devi (supra), have no application.

Justice Chaudhuri observed: "On a careful consideration, this Court is of the view that while the genesis of the claim lies in the earlier policy decision of the Railways, the subsequent circulars and the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be ignored while examining the manner in which such a claim is to be processed and decided. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankar Prasad Deep, (supra), and in Anil Kumar (supra) has treated land-loser preferential appointments as a form of special dispensation subject to the conditions of the scheme, including fulfilment of educational qualifications, age requirements, medical fitness and suitability. The Division Bench of this Court in Sumitra Devi (supra) has expressly held that the principles laid down in Umesh Kumar Nagpal, (supra), apply with equal force to land-acquisition related appointments. Preferential appointment on the ground of land acquisition is not a matter of right flowing directly from the Land Acquisition Act. It is a benefit conferred by policy and must be administered in accordance with the conditions of that policy and the larger principles that govern any exception to the normal mode of recruitment. Those principles include that the benefit is intended to mitigate immediate hardship, that it is not a vested or heritable right, and that it is subject to the candidate satisfying the prescribed eligibility criteria. The recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjeev Kumar (supra) further clarifies that the statute itself confers only a right to compensation and that a policy of providing employment cannot override or enlarge the statutory scheme. While that decision does not denude an existing policy of all force, it reinforces the limited and conditional nature of the benefit. Accordingly, this Court holds that the claim of the writ petitioner must be examined in the light of the original policy decision that generated the list of 44 families, read consistently with the subsequent authoritative pronouncements that regulate the grant of such preferential appointments. The benefit is not automatic; it remains subject to fulfilment of eligibility conditions and the overall object of the scheme."
 

Point No. 3: Effect and continuing efficacy of the directions issued in C.W.J.C. No. 517 of 2009 and the contempt proceedings:  By order dated August 17, 2012 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 517 of 2009, the High Court directed the Railway authorities to appoint the writ petitioner’s husband in accordance with his eligibility within a reasonable time, noticing that the case was similarly situated with that of Manju Devi (supra). The subsequent contempt petition (M.J.C. No. 6273 of 2013) was disposed of with a direction that if the petitioner furnished the required information within a stipulated period, the Railways would process and settle the claim in accordance with law within a further period of two months. The direction issued in 2012 was not an unconditional mandamus to appoint regardless of eligibility. It expressly qualified the obligation with the following words: "I find that the case of the petitioner is fully covered by decision dated 23.03.2012 passed in L.P.A. No. 212 of 2012. I accordingly issue similar direction to the respondents to appoint the petitioner’s husband in accordance with his eligibility within a reasonable time. The contempt order similarly directed settlement in the following words:"Keeping in view the aforesaid, it is directed that in case the petitioner submits the requisite information before the Competent Authority of the Railway Administration within a reasonable period, preferably within a period of two months from today, the competent authority of the Railway Administration shall process the claim and settle it in accordance with law within a period of further two months. These directions kept the claim alive for consideration. They did not crystallise an indefeasible right to appointment, nor did they preclude the authorities from examining age, suitability, or other policy conditions. The respondent’s reliance on Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board (supra), is well placed to the extent that earlier directions do not automatically lapse merely because contempt proceedings have concluded. At the same time, the authorities remained entitled, while complying with the direction to process the claim, to apply the eligibility criteria and the governing policy. The order dated August 8, 2017 records that the husband was age-barred (and was so even in 2012). Whether that finding is factually correct is a different matter; what is clear is that the earlier judicial directions did not prohibit the authorities from examining the question of
eligibility. Thus, while the claim could not be rejected on the ground that it had become stale solely by reason of the pendency of proceedings, the directions of 2012 and 2017 did not convert a conditional policy benefit into an absolute right, nor did they compel the Railways to ignore the age bar or to accept an automatic substitution of nominee.

Point No. 4: Legality of refusal to permit change of nomination: The original nominee of the writ petitioner was her husband, Anil Kumar. During the pendency of the claim, and particularly after the order dated August 17, 2012, the husband crossed the upper age limit. The writ petitioner thereafter requested, on more than one occasion between October 2016 and May 2017, that her son, Chandan Kumar, be considered in place of the husband. The Railway authorities declined the request and, by the order dated August 8, 2017, closed both the claim of the husband (on the ground of age-bar) and the request for change of nomination. The appellants have relied upon RBE No. 99/2010, paragraph 7 whereof, according to them, contains no provision for change of nomination once the process of consideration has commenced. The respondent contends that there is no express prohibition against change of nomination, that the age-bar arose solely on account of the prolonged delay attributable to the Railways, and that an authority cannot take advantage of its own default or unduly fetter its discretion.

Justice Chaudhuri observed:"This Court is of the considered view that the question cannot be answered in the abstract. Preferential appointment under a land-loser scheme is ordinarily limited to one member of the affected family. The scheme does not create a family roster that can be activated at will by successive nominations over an indefinite period. At the same time, when the original nominee becomes ineligible by efflux of time during the pendency of consideration, and when that efflux of time is substantially attributable to the administrative process, a rigid refusal to consider an otherwise eligible substitute nominee from the same family may, in appropriate cases, partake the character of arbitrariness. The material on record shows that the Railways themselves took considerable time in processing the claim even after the 2012 direction and the contempt proceedings. Communications seeking documents were issued years later. In such circumstances, the refusal to examine the request for substitution solely on the ground that the circular is silent, without considering whether the son satisfies the eligibility criteria and whether the family continues to fulfil the object of the scheme, appears to be an unduly narrow exercise of
discretion. This is not to say that change of nomination is a matter of right, or that the son is automatically entitled to consideration. It only means that the authorities ought to have examined the request on its own merits rather than rejecting it on a pure technicality of absence of an enabling provision. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, not in error in taking the view that the rejection of the request for change of nomination, in the facts of the present case, could not be sustained on the grounds assigned in the order dated 08.08.2017."
 

Point No. 5: Delay and survival of the object of the scheme: The acquisition took place in L.A. Case No. 20/89-90. The writ petitioner’s name was included in the list of 44 families prepared in 1993. The first substantive writ petition by her was filed in 2009, and the son was put forward as a nominee only in 2016-2017. The impugned direction of the learned Single Judge was issued in 2024. The principles governing compassionate and analogous preferential appointments have been consistently reiterated by the Supreme Court. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal (supra) and more recently in Debabrata Tiwari, (supra), it has been held that such appointment is not a vested right, is not heritable, and is intended to enable the family to overcome an immediate financial crisis. It cannot be claimed after the crisis has passed or after an inordinate lapse of time. These principles apply with equal force to land-loser preferential appointments, as held by the Division Bench of the High Court in Sumitra Devi (supra) and as recognised by the Supreme Court in Shankar Prasad Deep (supra). The object of the scheme is to mitigate the hardship caused by acquisition, not to create a perpetual source of recruitment for successive generations of the family. At the same time, the delay in the present case is not entirely one-sided. The claim was kept alive by judicial orders of 2012 and by the contempt proceedings. The authorities themselves took years to call for documents and to pass a final order. In these circumstances, while the long passage of time is a relevant and weighty factor, it cannot be the sole ground for non-suiting the writ petitioner without a proper examination of whether the family still satisfies the basic conditions of the scheme and whether the proposed nominee is eligible. The Single Judge has not adequately addressed the aspect of delay and the survival of the object of the scheme. A bare direction to consider the son’s candidature, without requiring the authorities to examine the continuing relevance of the claim in the light of the long lapse of time, is incomplete. The factor of delay must form an essential part of any fresh consideration.

Point No. 6: Plea of parity with other land-losers: The respondent has laid considerable stress on the plea of parity and hostile discrimination. It is asserted that the writ petitioner’s case is identical to that of Manju Devi (supra), whose family member was appointed in 2014, and that 33 out of the 44 families identified in the 1993 list were extended the benefit of appointment. Specific serial numbers are stated to have received appointments without insistence on age or eligibility bars. It is further submitted that these assertions have not been specifically denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the appellants.

Article 14 of the Constitution requires that persons similarly situated be treated alike. If it is established that under the same scheme and in respect of the same acquisition, a large number of identically placed land-losers were granted the benefit while the writ petitioner was denied the same without any rational basis, a case of hostile discrimination would be made out. The material placed before this Court, however, is notconclusive. The assertion regarding appointment of the son of Manju Devi and of members of 33 other families rests largely on the pleadings of the writ petitioner and the alleged absence of specific denial. The appellants have not filed any comprehensive chart or affidavit placing on record the fate of each of the 44 claims. At the same time, the absence of a clear and categorical denial of the specific averments made in the writ petition does lend some weight to the respondent’s contention.

The High Court is of the view that the plea of discrimination cannot be finally decided only on the basis of
the affidavits presently on record. It is a matter that requires verification of primary facts by the Railway authorities themselves. If, upon such verification, it is found that a large number of similarly situated families from the same list were granted appointment while the writ petitioner was singled out for rejection on grounds not uniformly applied, the authorities would be obliged to remove the discrimination. Conversely, if the other appointments were made under distinguishable circumstances or in accordance with eligibility criteria that the present claimant does not satisfy, the plea of parity would fail. The Single Judge has not undertaken any detailed examination of this aspect. In the fresh consideration that the High Court proposes to direct, the plea of parity shall be examined by the authorities on the basis of authentic records. 

Point No. 7: Scope of judicial review and sustainability of the direction issued by the Single Judge: The scope of judicial review in matters of compassionate appointment is well settled. Such appointment is an exception to the constitutional norm of open and merit-based recruitment under Articles 14 and 16, and it can be made only under rules or executive instructions, not by individual discretion. A candidate has no vested right to it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of Baroda v. Baljit Singh, (2023) 13 SCC 343, has held that eligibility turns on the scheme in force at the relevant time, and the candidate must satisfy all of its conditions. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
"12. It is necessary to reiterate that the appointment of a candidate on compassionate basis does not create any vested right and that it is only when a candidate is covered under all clauses of the scheme applicable at the relevant point of time that he/she could be considered for compassionate appointment. The Court therefore does not sit in appeal over the employer’s decision, and it does not direct appointment in disregard of the policy. The Court’s enquiry is confined to whether the decision-making process was fair and the policy correctly understood and applied. Where the authorities have evaluated the claim in accordance with the scheme and applied its criteria even-handedly to all applicants, interference is unwarranted absent palpable arbitrariness. Reliance in this regard may be placed to Union of India v. Amrita Sinha, (2021) 20 SCC 695, the relevant paragraph of which is reproduced hereinbelow:
"12. The High Court has affirmed the view of the Tribunal by coming to the conclusion that the payment which was being made to the respondent was ad hoc in nature and was wrongly considered by the authorities while awarding merit points. This line of reasoning of the High Court is equally erroneous as that of the Tribunal. The payment of the family pension was not an ad hoc amount, but, was evidently in accordance with the applicable service rules. The application of the respondent was initially rejected in 2011 and was, thereafter, again reconsidered in 2014. Absent a case of palpable arbitrariness, we are of the view that there was no reason for the High Court or the Tribunal to interfere with the evaluation which was conducted by the authorities in terms of the applicable guidelines. Moreover, we are clearly of the view that the grant of compassionate appointment would not be in accordance with the basic purpose and object of such a scheme."

In the present case, the order dated August 8, 2017 rejected the claim of the husband on the ground of age-bar and declined the request for change of nomination. For the reasons already recorded, the refusal to consider the request for substitution, without examining the eligibility of the son and the continuing applicability of the scheme, cannot be sustained in the facts of this case. At the same time, the Single Judge has issued a direction to consider the candidature of the son within three months, without requiring the authorities to examine the aspects of delay, survival of the object of the scheme, eligibility criteria, and the plea of parity on the basis of authentic records. A direction for bare consideration, without indicating the parameters that must guide such consideration, is incomplete and may lead to further litigation. The proper course is to quash the order dated 08.08.2017 to the extent it rejects the request for change of nomination on a purely technical ground, and to remit the matter to the competent authority for fresh consideration of the claim of the son in accordance with the governing policy, the principles discussed above, and the observations made in this judgment.

Point No. 8: Conclusions and relief: In view of the analysis on the foregoing points, Justice Chaudhuri recorded the following conclusions:
(i) The impugned judgment dated 20.04.2024 is unsustainable to the extent it places primary reliance on the decision in Sumitra Devi (supra), which had already been set aside by a Division Bench of this Court.
(ii) The claim of the writ petitioner is governed by the original policy decision of the Railways that led to the identification of the 44 families, read consistently with the subsequent authoritative pronouncements regulating preferential appointments.
(iii) The earlier directions of this Court kept the claim alive for consideration in accordance with eligibility and law; they did not create an indefeasible right to appointment.
(iv) The refusal to examine the request for change of nomination, in the facts of the present case, was unduly rigid and cannot be sustained on the grounds assigned.
(v) Delay is a relevant and weighty factor that must be examined, but cannot be the sole ground for rejection without consideration of other relevant aspects.
(vi) The plea of hostile discrimination requires verification of primary facts by the authorities. (vii) The matter requires fresh consideration by the competent authority in accordance with law and the observations made herein."

Significantly, in the ultimate paragraph of the judgement, Justice Chaudhuri wrote:"8. We place on record our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by our Judicial Clerks, Shri Aditya Shekhar, and Shri Ribhava Raj, in the preparation of this judgment."