Bar Association to boycott court of Justice Ajay Bhanot in Allahabad, Delhi Advocate Associations on strike against police action

In a letter dated October 27, 2026, Senior Advocate Dr. C.P. Upadhyay, newly elected President of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad has communicated to Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court, it's concern regarding the respect and dignity of advocates. The was signed by Advocate Santosh Kumar Mishra, newly elected General Secretary of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad. 

The letter reads: "It is to inform you that today, dated 27.10.2026, in Court No. 49, where Hon’ble Justice Shri Ajay Bhanot is sitting, he has made a rule that in his court room, a separate chair shall be placed in the front row for a police officer or any other senior officer to sit. In this sequence, in Hon’ble Justice Shri Ajay Bhanot’s Court No. 49, a Superintendent of Police of some district was sitting in the row behind the Ld. Additional Government Advocate (AGA). An advocate respectfully said to him, “Please sit behind; this is not your seat.” On this, the Ld. AGA scolded the advocate and said that he would complain about him when Hon’ble Justice arrived. As soon as Hon’ble Justice entered the court room, the Ld. AGA complained to the Hon’ble Justice. Upon this, the Hon’ble Justice pointed a finger at that advocate and, in very stern words, passed an order to send the advocate to jail. When the advocate apologized, he was told to apologize to that Superintendent of Police. The advocate also apologized to the Superintendent of Police, but Hon’ble Justice Shri Ajay Bhanot compelled the advocate to apologize to the Superintendent of Police. At the same time, he also mocked senior advocate Shri V.P. Srivastava, who was sitting in his court room, thereby hurting the dignity of respected advocates. The conduct of the Hon’ble Justice falls within the category of contempt."

The letter concluded:"Therefore, it is humbly requested that you kindly take serious cognizance of the above matter and take appropriate action; otherwise, the High Court Bar Association will boycott the court of Hon’ble Justice Shri Ajay Bhanot, and this new practice of seating a particular person in a special manner. It is clear from this that if the court is free to insult an advocate, then the advocate will also not hesitate to insult the court."

The letter is copied to Registrar General,  Supreme Court, New Delhi and Justice Ajay Bhanot of Allahabad High Court.

Justice Bhanot is alleged to have humiliated an advocate during court proceedings and also mocked a Senior Advocate V.P. Srivastava. 

A circular dated October 27 for abstention was issued in the evening hours by advocate Neeraj, Chairman, Coordination Committee of the elhi Bar Association after a meeting of the Committee. It has resolved to go for indefinite abstention from judicial work. It reiterated its demand of immediate suspension of the ACP and SHO of Shahdara Police Station. Coordination Committee of the Delhi Bar is protesting against the registration of an FIR at Shahdara Police Station against advocates and threats to advocates in the police station by an ACP. The Committee said that judicial work shall be abstained from until the Suspension of the ACP and SHO of Shahdara Police Station. New Delhi Bar Association (NDBA), Saket Bar Association, Central Delhi District Bar Association and others have expressed their support to the call of the coordination committee. NDBA has declared a protest march towards Delhi Police Headquarters from Patiala House court on October 29. NDBA Secretary Tarun Rana also issued a circular. 

The grievance originated from an FIR concerning an incident in which Advocate Lalit Bansal sustained serious head injury following an assault. Advocate Amulya Ratan is the complainant in the matter. The photograph depicted the head injury sustained by Advocate Lalit Bansal. It also said that on the evening of October 23, 2026, several advocates visited Police Station Shahdara in connection with the  incident and to seek appropriate legal action against the persons concerned. October 24, the advocates came to know that the persons concerned had not been arrested and had reportedly been released. 

The circular stated that when advocates approached the police station to express their concern regarding the handling of the matter and to seek accountability in accordance with law, an incident involving ACP Manasvi Vashishta occurred. It is alleged that the ACP threatened and intimidated the advocates. The Coordination Committee has demanded the immediate suspension of ACP Manasvi Vashishta and the concerned SHO, pending an impartial Inquiry. 

Earlier, in May 2026, Patna Court's Co-ordination Committee of three Advocate Associations had also raised the issue of rift between Bar and Bench, pointed out uncharitable, uncouth, abusive, insulting behaviour of judges towards advocates. 

To go on strike/boycott courts is a fundamental right of Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and it is a mode of peaceful representation to express the grievances by the lawyers’ community is concerned. In Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India & Anr. (2002), the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of Supreme Court has recognized "protest abstention from work" if the issue involves "dignity or integrity or independence of the Bar and/or the Bench.

In June 2025, Telangana High Court Advocates' Association had boycotted the court of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya, citing insults, humiliation, and heavy costs. 

Senior advocates have pointed out that the level of gratuitous rudeness in the courts has increased to a point that it has become insufferable.

In an article entitled Judicial Misbehaviour,  senior advocate P V Dinesh recalled how a single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court who lost his temper and ordered the imprisonment of a young lawyer with only two years of practice. The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) and the Bar Council of India (BCI) invited the attention of the Chief Justice of India through representations and resolutions. The Supreme Court suo motu seized the issue, and after registering two writ petitions, gracefully closed the matter on the judicial side by observing:

"Members of the judiciary at all levels must exhibit patience, compassion and a spirit of encouragement towards all, especially young members of the Bar. While it is certainly a solemn duty of senior members of the Bar to inculcate discipline, professional ethics and continuous learning, the responsibility does not lie with the Bar alone, but with the Bench as well, to nurture a sense of duty and integrity, so that every lawyer sees themselves as an officer of the court first" 

He also referred to the observation of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court which urged the judges to refrain from making harsh or disparaging remarks against counsels, parties or witnesses, unless it is absolutely necessary for deciding the case and until they are heard. 

Dinesh cited Tushar Mehta's book titled The Bench, the Bar and the Bizarre, wherein, he has devoted an entire chapter to "Bullies on the Bench" but the Solicitor General of India not dare to name the specific "bullies" in the Indian judiciary. 

The fact is that only a small percentage of the judicial community falls in the category of bullying judges. 

Notably, there has also been occasions wherein, bar associations have gone on a strike in defence of the independence of judiciary. 

Also read: Chairman, Bar Council of India "requested and directed" Chairman, Co-ordination Committee of three advocate associations of Patna High Court to recall call for boycott of court's work

Patna High Court's Co-ordination Committee of three Advocate Associations flag rift between Bar and Bench, point out uncharitable, uncouth, abusive, insulting behaviour of judges

Senior Advocates barred from oral mentioning before any Court

Supreme Court bars Senior Advocates from oral mentioning before any Court from November 2, 2026. Will it be applicable to High Courts as well? A circular dated October 27, 2026 states that young and junior counsel may instead be encouraged to make oral mentioning before the Courts.

Bihar State Road Transport "Corporation and State of Bihar, cannot be permitted to defeat the legitimate and equitable claims of the workmen", Bihar Chief Secretary asked to be in Supreme Court, judgement authored by Justice Rajiv Roy set aside

In Bihar State Rajya Path Parivartan Nigam Karamchari Sangathan vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), after the lapse of a period of three months from the date of its judgement dated May 22, 2026, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Aparesh Kumar Singh passed a 2-page long order dated October 26, 2026, wherein it has directed that if compliance affidavit is not filed before December 14, 2026, the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar shall remain present before the Court. If the compliance is made, the personal presence would not necessary. The State prayed for six weeks’ time to ensure compliance of the directions as contained in judgment dated May 22, 2026. Earlier, on September 25, 2026, the State had prayed for four weeks’ time to file status report. Prior to that Court's direction dated May 22, 2026 reads; "The State of Bihar shall file a compliance affidavit by 31st August, 2026. List on 1st September, 2026 for perusal of the said compliance affidavit." 

In its final order dated May 22, 2026, Supreme Court has concluded:  23. The plea of financial incapacity, raised by the Corporation and State of Bihar, cannot be permitted to defeat the legitimate and equitable claims of the workmen, particularly when the inability of the Corporation to implement the second phase of regularization was neither attributable to any fault on the part of the workmen nor within their control. The concerned workers had devoted the most productive years of their service career to the Corporation with a legitimate expectation that the settlement entered 10 into pursuant to the directions of this Court would be honoured in its true letter and spirit. 24. Prolonged denial of fair and reasonable compensation to the concerned workmen has resulted in grave injustice, especially when many of them have either attained advanced age or are no longer in a position to secure alternative means of livelihood. In such circumstances, the perceived reference to the alleged financial distress of the Corporation cannot constitute a valid ground to deny the affected workmen just, fair and equitable monetary relief. The Corporation being an entity under the pervasive control of the State of Bihar, the latter is under a moral, legal and constitutional obligation to satisfy and indemnify the legitimate claims of the destitute workers. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon balancing the competing considerations arising in the present matter, including the prolonged service rendered by the concerned workmen on the one hand and the precarious financial condition of the Corporation on the other, we deem it appropriate to direct the State of Bihar to pay a lump sum amount 11 of Rs. 7,50,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Fifty Thousand only) to each of the 330/338 members of the appellant-Union towards full and final settlement of their claims. The State of Bihar shall ensure that the aforesaid amount is disbursed to the concerned members of the appellant-Union within a period of three months from today. 26. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. 27. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 28. The State of Bihar shall file a compliance affidavit by 31st August, 2026. List on 1st September, 2026 for perusal of the said compliance affidavit. 26. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order is set aside and the appeal is allowed." The impugned judgement was authored by Justice Rajiv Roy as part of a Division Bench. 

The other four respondents are: 2.The Principal Secretary, Transport Department, Bihar, 3. The Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, through its Managing Director, 4. The Administrator, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and 5. The Labour Commissioner, Bihar. 

In Bihar State Rajya Path Parivartan Nigam Karamchari Sangathan vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Benc of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta granted leave by its 11-page long final order dated May 22, 2026. The appellant, Bihar State Rajya Path Parivahan Nigam Karamchari Sangathan had approached the Court by way of the instant appeal, by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, assailing the judgment dated October 5, 2023 authored by Justice Rajiv Roy as part of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, Justice Roy dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-Union and declined to interfere with order dated 2nd April, 2018 passed by Justice Ashwini Kumar Singh the Single Judge in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 12436 of 2017, whereby the writ petition instituted by the appellant-Union came to be dismissed. The said writ petition had been filed seeking quashing of the order dated 23rd September, 2016 passed by the Labour Commissioner, Bihar. 4. The appellant-Union is a registered union espousing the cause of the workmen who had been engaged by the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation3 on casual/ad-hoc basis during the period between the years 1980 and 1985. At the relevant point of time, the appellant-Union represented approximately 925 such workmen who 2 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”. 3 Hereinafter, referred to as “Corporation”. 3 had been continuously discharging duties under the Corporation for several years. 

The grievances of the aforesaid workmen first came to be considered in proceedings culminating in Civil Appeal No. 1509 of 1987 before the Supreme Court, wherein the Court vide order dated December 16, 1987 directed the Corporation to frame an appropriate scheme for regularization of the concerned casual labourers and to ensure payment of wages to them at par with regular employees with effect from 1st January, 1987. Pursuant to the directions of the Court, a settlement/agreement dated July 11, 1988 came to be executed between the management of the Corporation and the appellant-Union, whereby it was agreed that the process of regularization would be undertaken in two phases. In terms of the first phase of the aforesaid settlement, 425 conductors/clerks and 162 casual helpers came to be regularized in service. However, the remaining approximately 500 workmen, who were to be considered in the second phase of 4 regularization, were never absorbed into regular service, despite rendering long and continuous service under the Corporation. The implementation of the second phase of regularization could not materialize on account of the deteriorating financial condition of the Corporation. Owing to the mounting financial crisis, the Corporation progressively curtailed the engagement of casual labourers and, by the year 1995, the availability of work for such employees had substantially diminished. Ultimately, by order dated September 2, 2009, the services of the remaining workmen were dispensed with on the ground of severe financial crisis and inability of the Corporation to sustain their engagement. 

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action, the concerned workmen and the appellant-Union initiated various legal proceedings challenging the termination/removal of the workmen from service. However, the reliefs sought by the appellant-Union did not find favour before the Courts concerned. Thereafter, the matter reached the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22998 of 2010, wherein the Court, while taking note of the prolonged service rendered by the workmen as well as the inability of the Corporation to implement the settlement dated July 11, 1988, observed that the issue may appropriately be resolved through determination of a one-time settlement in lieu of regularization. Accordingly, the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, was directed to examine the matter and determine suitable compensation payable to the concerned workmen. Pursuant thereto, the Labour Commissioner, Bihar, passed an order dated September 23, 2016 directing payment of lump sum compensation to the concerned workmen while treating the matter as one of retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, according to the appellant-Union, the amounts so determined ranged merely between Rs.10,000/- and Rs. 55,000/- approximately, despite the fact that several workmen had rendered nearly 19 years of continuous service under the Corporation. 

The appellant-Union challenged the aforesaid order dated September 23, 2016 and consequent determination of the aforesaid amounts, on the ground that the compensation awarded was wholly illusory, arbitrary and shockingly inadequate, having no reasonable nexus with the length of service rendered by the workmen, the legitimate expectations arising from the settlement dated July 11, 1988, and the repeated assurances extended over the years regarding their absorption in regular service. The challenge raised by the appellant-Union, however, came to be rejected by the Single Judge of the High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 12436 of 2017, and the Letters Patent Appeal preferred against, being LPA No. 593 of 2018, was also dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated October 5, 2023. Being aggrieved, the appellant-Union approached the Supreme Court by way of appeal by special leave. 

The counsel for the appellant-Union submitted that Justice Roy of the High Court, while passing the impugned judgment, failed to appreciate that the controversy before it was no longer confined to the issue of regularization, which had attained finality in earlier proceedings, but rather pertained to the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the one-time settlement and compensation determined pursuant to the directions issued by this Court. It was submitted that the appellant-Union is presently espousing the cause of approximately 330/338 surviving members/workmen, many of whom had devoted prime years of their working lives in service of the Corporation without being accorded the status and benefits of regular employees. 

It is pertinent to note that during the course of present proceedings i.e., February 16, 2026, the Supreme Court observed that "payment of a lump sum amount of Rs. 10 lakhs to each of the affected workmen may constitute a fair and reasonable settlement in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case." However, this proposal was opposed by the counsel appearing on behalf  of the Corporation as well as the State of Bihar on the ground that the financial condition of the Corporation continues to remain extremely precarious and burdened with substantial accumulated losses, thereby rendering it incapable of bearing any further financial liability. 

Justice Nath observed: "The controversy involved in the present matter cannot be examined in a purely technical or adversarial manner. The case pertains to a group of workmen who had continued in service of the Corporation for a considerable length of time pursuant to arrangements and assurances extended by the employer itself and whose claims have remained unresolved for decades despite repeated rounds of litigation and intervention by this Court. 22. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are of the considered view that the stand adopted by the Corporation and the State of Bihar is wholly untenable in facts and law and contrary to the Fundamental Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The workmen represented by the appellant-Union had rendered long, continuous and uninterrupted service to the Corporation and had continued to discharge duties against perennial and regular nature of work. Despite the settlement dated 11th July, 1988 and the assurances regarding their absorption, the concerned workmen were ultimately denied the benefits of regularization and were left remediless for several years."

Earlier, in its 18-page long judgement dated October 5, 2023, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Rajiv Roy had dismissed the LPA and upheld the 13-page long judgement dated April 2, 2018 by Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh. Justice Roy had authored the Division Bench judgement. Justice Singh had granted "liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the Commissioner of Labour in accordance with law before the appropriate forum."

The appellant-Union is representing the casual workers engaged in the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation. The case as narrated by the appellant is that altogether 925 persons were appointed in ‘the Corporation’ on the casual basis prior to 1985. Out of them, 425 were regularized in the first phase subsequent to the settlement arrived at in the year 1988, but the remaining 500 members who were supposed to be taken in the second phase were not considered by ‘the Corporation’. 

The first round of litigation started in the year 1985 when the petitioner-Union approached this Court by filing writ application bearing CW.J.C No. 3460 of 1985 with the prayer for regularization of their services. The said writ application was dismissed vide an order dated September 2, 1985. Against the said order of dismissal, Civil Appeal no. 1509 of 1987 was preferred before the Supreme Court of India. It was disposed of on December 16, 1987 with three fold directions:
a) to prepare reasonable scheme for the regularization of casual employees who have been working for more than a year;
b) the salaries and allowances be paid to them at par with the minimum pay in the pay scale of regularly paid employees in the corresponding cadres of the Corporation;
c) to pay all the arrears payable pursuant to the order.

Subsequent to the said order, a Review petition (C) no. 381/1988 was preferred by respondents. However, side by side the respondent authorities also took steps for an amicable settlement with the petitioner-Union and finally they entered into an agreement/settlement on July 11, 1988 whereby it was agreed to regularize 425 casual labourers in the first phase. In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, Supreme Court declined to interfere/entertain the review application and disposed it of on October 30, 1990.  However, as the respondents failed to act further, a letter was sent by the Union to the then the Chief Justice, Patna High Court. It came to be registered as CWJC No. 973 of 1993 which was disposed of vide an order dated February 21, 1994 directing the respondents to implement the order of Supreme Court in four months. The SLP preferred by the State Government against the order dated February 21, 1994 was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. However, as no regularization process took place and ‘the Corporation’ vide an order dated September 2, 2009 instead decided for the removal of the casual workers w.e.f September 10, 2009 citing its financial condition. The claim of the petitioner-Union is/was that till then, work was being taken by ‘the Corporation’ intermittently and they were not permanently disengaged at any point of time. Being aggrieved with the said order dated September 2, 2009, C.W.J.C No. 12926 of 2009 was preferred before Patna High Court. It was disposed of vide an order dated October 6, 2009 with the observations/directions that ‘the Corporation’ will look into the aspect that no statutory mandate is violated and if any person claims that they have been paid less than the Minimum Wages Act, then it would be open for them to raise those claims and ‘the Corporation’ would be bound to consider the same. The other observations given by the Writ Court against the removal was that it would be open for the employees to take steps under the Industrial Dispute Act. Aggrieved by the said order dated October 6, 2009 passed in C.W.J.C No. 12926 of 2009, the appellant -Union filed LP.A no. 1412 of 2009 which too came to be dismissed vide an order dated April 8, 2010. Against the said order dated April 8, 2010 passed in LP.A No. 1412 of 2009, appellant-Union preferred SLP (Civil) No. 22998 of 2010. It was disposed of on February 16, 2015/February 16, 2015 with the observation that appellant may approach the Commissioner of Labour for settlement of their claims. Thereafter, the appellant-Union filed Contempt Petition (Civil) no. 481 of 2016 before the Supreme Court as respondents were not taking steps towards the compliance of order dated February 16, 2015/March 16, 2015 passed in SLP (Civil) No. 22998 of 2010. During the pendency of contempt application, Commissioner of Labour, Bihar Patna passed the impugned order dated September 23, 2016 with the direction to retrench the members of appellant-Union under 25 N(A) of Industrial Disputes Act with following observations:
(i) the dues payment will be made in accordance with the Minimum Wages Act as fixed by the Bihar Government;
(ii) Gratuity amount will be paid in terms of payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 

Thereafter the contempt application taken up was directed to be closed by the Supreme Court vide an order dated July 17, 2017 after taking note of the said order dated September 23, 2016 passed by Labour Commissioner with further observation: It would be open for the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the Commissioner of Labour in accordance with law. The appellant-petitioner thereafter moved in writ
petition before the Patna High Court with the following prayers:
i) to issue writ in the nature of certiorari to quash memo no. 3/D- 39/2015-310 dated 23.09.2016 passed by the Labour Commissioner, Bihar (respondent no 5) in an arbitrary manner and misconstruing/misinterpreting the order dated 16.02.2015 read with order dated 16.03.2015 passed by Hon'ble Apex court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) no. 22998/2010 by invoking section 25 N (a) of the Industrial Dispute Act to retrench them and further prayer to make payment of due amount on the basis of minimum wages fixed by Bihar Government.
ii) to issue writ to quash the newspaper publication issued by ‘the Corporation’ in consequence of the order dated 23.09.2016 passed by respondent no. 5;
iii) to issue further writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents especially respondent no. 5 to Act in a manner circumscribed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) no. 22998/2010 an well as the earlier settlement made in the year 1988 and 1990.
iv) to issue writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent no. 5 to consider the settlement of the year 1988 and 1990 and if "corporation" is proposing for one time settlement then the long service rendered be also considered and the settlement be done after giving a proper and reasonable compensation so that they may be able to maintain their livelihood. The matter was taken up by the writ court on April 2, 2018 and having gone through the facts of the case, the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. This judgement was upheld by Justice Roy as part of the Division Bench, which has now been set aside by the Supreme Court.  

Patna High Court sets aside cognizance order of 2017 passed by S.D.J.M., Khagaria in a Section Sections 498A case

In Karandeep Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Praveen Kumar delivered a 5-page long judgement dated October 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "8. Considering the facts and circumstances as well as the fact of general and omnibus allegations against the petitioners, as also in view of the judgments as discussed above, the order taking cognizance dated 13.11.2017, passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Khagaria as against the petitioner Nos. 2 to 9 are hereby quashed." 

The petitioners had filed the application for quashing of the order dated November 13, 2017, passed by the S.D.J.M., Khagaria, in Complaint Case No. 519(C) of 2017, whereby cognizance was taken against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the D.P. Act. As per the prosecution case, the complainant alleged that she was married to petitioner No. 1 (Karandeep Kumar) on January 27, 2012, according to Hindu rites and customs. At the time of marriage, her parents allegedly gave Rs. 5,00,000/- in cash, jewellery worth Rs. 1,50,000/-, a motorcycle worth Rs. 65,000/- and other articles as dowry. After ten days of marriage she came back to her parental house. It was also alleged that in the year 2013, she returned to her matrimonial home and, after petitioner No. 1 was selected in CISF on 29.09.2014, all the accused persons started demanding an additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/- and subjected her to cruelty. It was further been alleged that the accused persons threatened to solemnize another marriage of petitioner No. 1, if the demand for dowry was not fulfilled. It was alleged that on April 20, 2017, the accused persons ousted the complainant from her matrimonial home, whereupon she started residing at her parental home. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated in this case, as they were relatives of the husband of the complainant, who are consisting of the mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law as well as the married sister of the husband of the complainant. 

The counsel for the petitioners referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Priti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand as reported in 2010 (7) SCC 667 as well as in Geeta Malhotra & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. as reported in 2012 (10) SCC 741 and submitted that general and omnibus allegations, without attributing any specific overt act to the accused persons, who happen to be relatives of the husband of the complainant, is an abuse of the process of the Court. There is a tendency on the part of the complainant to implicate all the family members of her husband in order to put pressure in cases of matrimonial discord. 

The counsel of the petitioners also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal as reported in 1992 Supplementary (1) SCC 335 andsubmitted that the case of the petitioners falls under various categories as discussed in paragraph 102 of the said judgment. It was further submitted that Section 494 would not be applicable against the petitioners (except petitioner No.1), and with respect to the offences under Section 498A and 406.  

 

Registrar General, Patna High Court issues circular to comply with Supreme Court's verdict Wwhich holds rescued woman isn't state's property in Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE) case

“For the purposes of this Protocol: (a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; (d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.”

-Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol adopted 15th November 2000, entered into force 25th December 2003) which supplements UN  Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted 15th November 2000, entered into force 29th September 2003)

Ahead of the next date of hearing on December 14, 2026, in compliance of the 10-page long reminder order dated October 13, 2026 passed by the Supreme Court's  Division Bench of Justices J.B.Pardiwala and H.Mahadevan in Prajwala vs. Union of India & Ors.(2026), the Registrar General, Patna High Court has issued the Circular Order No. 03/2026 dated October 15, 2026 on the subject of "Judgment dated 29.05.2026 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Miscellaneous Application No. 530 of 2022 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 56 of 2004 (Prajwala versus Union of India and Others)." The judgement was authored by Justice Pardiwala.  

The matter was listed on  October 13 for the first time after, the Court had delivered the final judgment, which "dealt with a very delicate, rather a very important and sensitive issue relating to the human trafficking of women and children for commercial sexual exploitation. The Court has provided an extensive ‘Victim Protection Plan’ for strict adherence by all stakeholders in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. It also dealt with, in detail, the prayer as regards the constitution of the Organized Crime Investigation Agency (OCIA). Moreover, from paragraphs 387 to 424, the Court has
provided certain recommendations and suggestions for serious consideration by the Union of India.

The stakeholders involved are:-(i) All Authorities, (ii) State Governments and Departments, (iii) High Courts, (iv) Magistrates, (v) Anti Human Trafficking Units, (vi) Rescue Teams and Leaders, (vii) NGOs and NGO Workers, (viii) Protective Homes, (ix) Social and Case Workers, (x) DLSA and Lawyers, (xi) Police Officers and Police Stations, (xii) Child Welfare Committees, (xiii) Medical and Mental Health Professionals, (xiv) Crime Records Bureau, (xv) Committees Overseeing Protective Homes and (xvi) Anti-Human Trafficking Cell. 

The exact ‘Roles and Duties’ assigned to each stakeholder under the ‘Victim Protection Plan’ has been delineated in a tabular format and also indicated the corresponding paragraphs/clauses from our judgment for ease of reference. Additional Solicitor General provided the Court with a status note highlighting what all has been done so far after the judgment was pronounced by the Court. The note specifically dealt with the compliance of the additional directions issued by the Court under paragraph 456 of the main judgment.
It revealed that the four additional directions issued by the Court have not been fully complied with by all the States/UTs, as on date.

The October 13 order reads:"10. We would like to remind the all States/UTs that, (i) notifying “recognized welfare institutions/organisations” in accordance with the explanation to Section 15(6A) ITPA and for the purpose of Section 17A ITPA, (ii) preparation of a State/UT-wide list of social welfare workers eligible to
form a part of the non-official advisory board under Section 13(3)(b) ITPA and the panel maintained by the Magistrate under Section 17(5) ITPA, (iii) designation of a Police Nodal Officer (PNO), and (iv) designation of a Government Nodal Officer (GNO), are absolutely necessary for the ground-level implementation of the ‘Victim Protection Plan’. Therefore, by the next date of hearing, the Union of India
must ensure that the four additional directions as mentioned in paragraph 456 of the main judgment are fully complied with by all States/UTs....12. We are of the view that by the next date of hearing, the Union shall call for the necessary information from all the stakeholders referred to in the note furnished by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, inquiring, in what manner each of the directions have been complied with and what has been done so far for meaningful implementation of the plan which we have provided in the judgment." ITPA refers to Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.  

The senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, an anti-trafficking organisation operating in Hyderabad, Telangana brought to Court's notice two additional aspects that need some urgent attention. First, the Anti-Human Trafficking Unit (ATHUs) should be given status of a police station, in accordance with the directions contained in Paragraph 362 b(iii) at page no.205 of the main judgment dated May 29, 2026, at the earliest. The Court's order reads: "16. In this regard, we direct all the State/UT Governments in their respective Home Departments to give effect to this direction at the earliest by issuing an appropriate notification, in accordance with law. 17. The Union shall also take up this issue at the earliest with all the States/UTs and see to it that appropriate notifications are issued." The petitioner had filed the original petition in 2004. 

Secondly, certain guidelines pertaining to the ‘threshold inquiry’ which is to be conducted by the Magistrate under Section 17 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA), are necessary. The Court's order reads:"19. In the ‘Victim Protection Plan’, at the stage of production of the rescued victim(s) who are adults (above the age of 18 years) before the Magistrate under Section 17 ITPA, we have incorporated some detailed directions pertaining to the conduction of a ‘threshold inquiry’ to identify voluntary sex workers and the manner in which their release/rehabilitation must be proceeded with. In other words, the need for an additional/parallel judicial determination to identify voluntary sex workers, by the Magistrate, within the framework of Section 17 ITPA, was emphasized by us. The rationale behind the need for such an inquiry is provided under paragraphs 330-356 of our judgment. 20. This judicial determination takes into account various aspects including the consent of the rescued victim and her views on whether she wishes to be placed under long-term safe custody, her statement about the voluntary/nonvoluntary nature of her work, the social worker’s assessment of said voluntariness, whether the victim’s position is influenced by any threats of coercion/undue influence/force, and whether there are any safety concerns placing the victim at real or immediate risk of danger/re-trafficking upon release, amongst others. 21. This threshold inquiry as regards the voluntary nature of the work of the rescued victim is triggered notwithstanding the opinion expressed by the rescued victim that her work is voluntary in nature. In other words, the magistrate must, under all circumstances, conduct this threshold inquiry to determine the further appropriate course of action for the protection, rehabilitation and reintegration of the rescued victim who is an adult. 

The order reads: "we request the National Judicial Academy to prepare a comprehensive protocol/guidelines to enable the Magistrates to conduct this inquiry." 

The order concluded: "23. There is one another important aspect that we wish to address. Time and again, we have observed that, although this Court painstakingly issues a slew of directions in the form of guidelines or sets up a framework to ensure that the fundamental rights of citizens are safeguarded and enforced in reality, yet once these directions are committed to the paper in the form of a judgment, the matter marks its abrupt end. This Court, more often than not, has no means of knowing whether the frameworks, guidelines or plans are making any measurable differences in people’s lives, or what hindrances stand in the way. The same anxiety grips us here. We have put in place a thorough ‘Victim Protection Plan’ but cannot tangibly ascertain whether it is having the desired impact or faltering in its implementation. To help us gauge this, we would like to hear from both the Petitioner and the Union of India on how they and other involved stakeholders can help us track progress and measure impact. 24. By the next date of hearing, let a fresh status report be placed on record by the Union of India. We would also
like to the petitioner to provide us a fair idea of the progress made by the National Judicial Academy in connection with the preparation of the aforesaid protocol/guidelines for Magistrates. Lastly, we expect both the petitioner and the Union to suggest concrete ways and methods that we can adopt to track the real implementation, progress and impact of the ‘Victim Protection Plan’. 25. Post this matter on 14th December, 2026."

The Supreme Court of India in its 298-page long judgment dated May 29, 2026 passed in Prajwala vs. Union of India & Ors.2026 INSC 609, has, inter alia, issued directions under the "Victim Protection Plan" concerning prosecution and trial of offences relating to trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. 

3. The relevant part of the signed reportable judgment is as under:- “That all the States/UTs notify “recognised welfare institutions or organisations” in accordance with the explanation to Section 15(6A) ITPA. That all States/UTs prepare a State-wide list of social welfare workers, with sufficient representation from all districts, who may be eligible to form a part of the non-official advisory body under Section 13(3)(b) ITPA. That all States/UTs designate the ADGP level police officer heading the Anti-Trafficking Bureau in their respective States/UTs as the Police Nodal Officers for the purpose of performing the functions as delineated by us in the Victim Protection Plan. That all States/UTs shall designate the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development in their respective States/UTs as the Government Nodal Officers for the purpose of performing the functions as delineated by us in the Victim Protection Plan. It shall be the responsibility of the respondent no. 1 to ensure that the aforesaid directions are duly complied with within a period of three months from the date of this judgment. For the purpose of reporting compliance with the additional directions mentioned in Paragraph No. 456, the Registry shall notify this matter once again sometime in September, 2026. Tackling human trafficking for CSE, with its hidden nature and multifarious forms, is indeed a very daunting task. However, there is recognition from all corners that it is an evil which needs urgent and consistent attention. Various measures have been undertaken by the multitude of stakeholders involved. However, throughout this judgment, we have noted that these measures have not yielded concrete positive results. Thus, there is no hiding away from the fact that much more needs to be done. By formulating a victim protection plan, we believe we have taken a major step in that direction. We hope this effort will have a domino effect, leading to much more sustained and coordinated action from all stakeholders. We are aware that a single plan will not be the answer to all the trials and tribulations victims face. However, our effort here should reflect more than just the formulation of a plan. It should reflect an endeavour to give the victim centre stage and to prioritise their needs. It should reflect an attempt to view victims not as passive beings but as agents in need of empowerment. Lastly, but most importantly, it should reflect a commitment to the victims that this Court will accord them the dignity that was always theirs. We direct the Registry to send one copy of the judgment to: a. All the High Courts; b. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India c. Principal Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development, Union of India." CSE refers to Commercial Sexual Exploitation.

In paragraph 362(g)(iv) of the judgment, the Supreme Court has specifically directed as follows:- "All the High Courts shall ensure the effective implementation of Section 395, BNSS i.e., Order to pay compensation, by all trial courts under their jurisdiction, giving particular regard to subsections 395(1)(b) and 395(3), BNSS respectively." 

In view of the direction of the Supreme Court, all the Principal District and Sessions Judges have been hereby directed to ensure effective implementation of Section 395 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 by all the trial courts under their respective jurisdiction, with particular attention to the requirements contained in Sections 395(l)(b) and 395(3) of the BNSS. 

The Circular reads:"The Principal District and Sessions Judges shall accordingly bring the aforesaid direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the notice of all the judicial officers presiding over the trial courts under their respective judgeships and shall ensure that the provisions of Section 395 BNSS are duly considered and implemented in appropriate cases, in accordance with law. The Trial Courts shall ensure that the requirement of passing appropriate orders relating to compensation under Section 395 BNSS is not ·overlooked in cases where the provision is attracted, particularly having regard to the specific emphasis placed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court upon Sections 395(1 )(b) and 395(3) BNSS. The Principal District and Sessions Judges are directed to monitor compliance with the aforesaid direction at the administrative level and to ensure that the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is effectively implemented by the trial courts under their respective jurisdiction." 

It adds: "The matter relating to effective implementation of Section 395 BNSS, particularly Sections 395(1)(b) and 395(3) thereof, shall also be specifically included in the agenda of the meeting of District Criminal Injury Compensation Board, and the compliance/ implementation thereof by the trial courts under the respective judgeship shall be reviewed in the said meeting.  The aforementioned instructions shall be followed scrupulously henceforth by all concerned and its non-compliance shall be viewed seriously." 

The legal infrastructure addressing human trafficking for the purposes of Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE) in India comprises of multiple statutory instruments (i) Article 23 of the Constitution of India; (ii) ITPA; (iii) BNS; (iii) The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; and (v) Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) respectively. 430. Article 23 of the Constitution prohibits traffic in human beings, begar, and all other similar forms of forced labour.  

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, garnts bail in a cyber crime case from Nawada

In Kundan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu passed a 6-page long order dated October 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"7. Although the State contends that the appellant has a criminal antecedent, viz. he is involved in Case No.66 dated 20th November, 2024 registered at Police Station Nawada Cyber, District Nawada, Bihar under Sections 303(2), 318(4) Crl. Appeals @ SLP (Crl.) No.17699/2026 2 & 319(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, learned counsel for the appellant submits that he does not figure as an accused. 8. Be that as it may, taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that detention of the appellant for custodial interrogation is not required and that he may be admitted to an order for grant of bail in anticipation of arrest. 9. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment and order impugned in this appeal." 

The Court recorded:"Although the appellant was not named in the FIR, his name transpired, along with the names of Gulshan Kumar and Roushan Kumar, in the disclosure statement made by co-accused, Ranjit Kumar, in connection with the alleged commission of cyber-crime."

Earlier, in Gulshan Kumar & Kundan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order dated March 31, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"6. Considering the nature of accusation and gravity of of offence, materials avaialbe on record and other circumstances of the case, prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioners is rejected." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 303(2), 318(2),318(4), 319(2), 336(2), 336(3), 338, 340(2) Β.N.S. and Section 66,66(B),66(D) of I.T. Act. As per F.I.R. informant alleged that a cyber fraud racket was being operated to defraud people under the guise of providing loans. Following surveillance and raids, the accused were arrested and incriminating mobile phones, SIM cards, and digital evidence were recovered. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the petitioners were innocent and has been falsely implicated in the case. The name of these petitioners transpired in the case in the confessional statement of other co-accused person namely, Ranjit Kumar who were apprehended on the spot. Except confessional statement, there was no other material on record to show the complicity of these petitioners in the alleged occurrence. Petitioner had got no concern with the alleged occurrence. It was claimed that the petitioner had clean antecedent. The counsel for the State had opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that there is specific allegation against the petitioners that these petitioners were accused of being involved in cyber fraud and also providing SIM cards, customer details and account details for soliciting money.

 

Section 2(f) of RTI Act defines ‘information’

In The Muppathadam Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. vs. The State Chief Information Commissioner & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran delivered a 14-page long judgement, wherein, it referred to Court's judgement in Information Officer, Supreme Court of India vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481, wherein, it has been held that the access by a public authority to the information relating to a private body, as provided under the RTI Act, should not be shackled by restrictions or pre-imposed conditions. The Division Bench judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. 

In Subhash Chandra Agarwal's case, the Constitution Bench decision puts beyond any cavil a citizen’s right under Section 3 of the RTI Act corresponding to the statutory obligation of the public authority.  Section 2(f) of the RTI Act; defines ‘information’.  It reads: “2(f) "information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force.”

The Court observed:"12. Hence, it is not only the material, physically available with a public authority but also such material relating to a private body, which can be accessed by a public authority, on the strength of statutory powers conferred, would fall under the definition of information. As has been rightly noticed in the impugned judgment, the words ‘can be accessed by a public authority’ refers to access being statutorily provided. The power cannot be fettered at all."

The paragraph 21 of Court's decision in Subhash Chandra Agarwal'a case reads:“21. What is explicit as well as implicit from the definition of “information” in clause (f) to Section 2 follows and gets affirmation from the definition of “right to information” that the information should be accessible by the public authority and “held by or under the control of any public authority”. The word “hold” as defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon, 15th Edn., means to have the ownership or use of; keep as one's own, but in the context of the present legislation, we would prefer to adopt a broader definition of the word “hold” in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., as meaning; to keep, to retain, to maintain possession of or authority over. The words “under the control of any public authority” as per their natural meaning would mean the right and power of the public authority to get access to the information. It refers to dominion over the information or the right to any material, document, etc. The words “under the control of any public authority” would include within their ambit and scope information relating to a private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force subject to the pre-imposed conditions and restrictions as

applicable to access the information.”