Patna High Court Advocates join the nation to express solidarity with students and youth protesting at Jantar Mantar, condemn police assault

Advocates of gathered at Gate No. 4 of Patna High Court amid heavy police presence to express their solidarity with the fast and peaceful demonstration by students and youth at New Delhi's Jantar Mantar who were attacked by the police in the heart of the national capital. The advocates termed the police attack as an attack on the fundamental right to speech and public protest which is recognised under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India i.e., the fundamental rights to free speech and expression, and to assemble peacefully. Significantly, the violent assault on students and youth was ordered by the Union Executive in the proximity of Parliament. The monsoon session of the Parliament is underway since July 20, 2026. Both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha witnessed uproar and sloganeering with Opposition demanding discussions on the NEET paper ‘leak’ issue and the police crackdown. Ahead of the day’s parliament session, Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi along with some Opposition MPs had met Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla demanding a discussion in the Lok Sabha on the “brutality unleashed” on students and the government’s “complete lack of accountability” for the nation-wide examination disaster. Photo:Yogesh Chandra Verma, Octogenarian Senior Advocate and President, Advocates Association, the oldest and largest organisation of Bihar protesting against the assault on the students and youth at Jantar Mantar in the national capital.          

The advocates included octogenarian Yogesh Chandra Verma, Senior Advocate and President, Advocates Association and veteran lawyers like Dr. S.S.P. Yadav, Ram Jiban Prasad Singh, Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Dr. Raja Ram Rai, Angad Kumar Singh, Uday Pratap Singh, Manilal Mahto, Bijendra Singh, Ashok Kumar, Maheshwar Prasad Das, Ravi Shankar, Arjun Prasad, Vishwa Ranjan Chaudhary, Ashok Sinha, P.K Sharma, Amarendra Sinha, Dr. Gopal Krishna and Sanjana Srivastava. The advocates condemned police assault on the students and youth. The noted senior trade union leader and General Secretary of AITUC also joined the protest. 

The advocates joined the nation to express the their support with the protesters at Jantar Mantar. The protest was organised by All India Lawyers Union (AILU), Patna High Court, Indian Association of Lawyers (IAL), Bihar Chapter, and All India Lawyers Association for Justice (AILAJ). The advocates pointed out that the Supreme Court has held in Kedarnath Singh vs. State of Bihar (1962) that the right to hold public meetings or have processions flows from the right to freedom of assembly.   

On July 22, 2026, Supreme Court refused to initiate suo motu proceedings to take cognisance of alleged police excesses during the July 20 crackdown on student protesters in the national capital. When a lawyer submitted that there was videographic evidence of police brutality against the protesters, Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant orally declined to examine the videos, saying that the court’s time should not be “wasted”. He was quoted as saying, "“We are not interested in videos. We don’t have time to watch them,” the Chief Justice orally remarked, declining to take cognisance of alleged videographic evidence of police violence on student protestors." The protesting students are seeking the resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, the Union Education Minister  over exam paper leaks. Advocate Narendra Mishra had mentioned the matter of the students who are raising important issues such as proper conduct of the NEET exam, and reforms in the National Testing Agency with nation-wide support. 

Notably, on July 21, the Delhi High Court had declined to urgently hear a similar matter, saying, "Don't drag the Court into this." But the Delhi High Court's 's Division bench of bench of Chief Justice Devendra Upadhyay and Justice Tejas Karia heard the matter on July 22 an issued notice.  Appearing for the petitioners, the senior counsels submitted before the Court that the peaceful protest has been underway for 20 days without disturbing peace. 

The petition was heard after the Court permitted urgent mentioning of the petition. The petition submitted that the incident had “shocked the conscience of the entire nation”. N. Hariharan, Senior Advocate, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Advocate and Vikas Singh, Senior Advocate appeared for the petitioners. S.V. Raju, Additional Solicitor General represented the Delhi Police and the Union Government. It was submitted that the demonstrators were exercising their constitutional rights under Articles 19 and 21. The disproportionate use of the force by the police was unimaginable. The students were beaten with lathis fitted with nails and subjected to pellets and electric batons, resulting in injuries to more than 90 protesters. There was no proclamation was issued prohibiting the assembly. The police had not warned the protesters to disperse before resorting to force. The senior counsels sought preservation of all material connected with the incident, including CCTV footage, PCR logs, videography and orders authorising the use of tear gas and batons and prayed to the Court to constitute a Special Investigation Team or appoint an independent agency to probe the allegations because the Delhi Police could not investigate accusations against its own personnel. The senior counsel submitted: “There are policemen who were molesting women, beating them on private parts. It is so ghastly... At least identifiable policemen, against them FIRs should be there. It is all in videos. An enquiry be made into the entire incident”. 

Gopal Sankaranarayanan appearing for Senior Advocate another PIL submitted that his team had verified nearly 130 videos relating to the incident. He alleged that several persons seen using force were neither in police uniform nor wearing identification badges. He pointed out that one of the videos, showed Additional DCP Sandeep Lamba slapping a woman protester. “Videos show Additional DCP Sandeep Lamba slapping a woman who was doing nothing. Let's not be scared to name our thugs in uniform. He slaps her across the face. They were in charge to protect us”. citing Supreme Court's 252-page long judgment dated February 23, 2012 in Re-Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt.4/5.06.2011 vs. Home Secretary, Union of India (2012) 5 SCC 1, he argued that the authorities had failed to follow the prescribed protocol for dispersing crowds, which requires prior announcements and treats tear gas as a measure of last resort. 

In the Ram Lila Maidan case, the Supreme Court held that "From the facts and circumstances that emerge from the record before this Court, it is evident that it was not a case of emergency. The police have failed to establish that a situation had arisen where there was imminent need to intervene, having regard to the sensitivity and perniciously perilous consequences that could have resulted, if such harsh measures had not been taken forthwith."  The Court observed: "Freedom of speech, right to assemble and demonstrate by holding dharnas and peaceful  agitation are the basic features  of a democratic system.  The people of a democratic country like ours have a right to raise their voice against the decisions and actions of the Government or even to express their resentment over the actions of the government on any subject of social or national importance.  The Government has to respect, and in fact, encourage exercise of such rights.  It is the abundant duty of the State to aid the exercise of right to freedom of speech as understood in its comprehensive sense and not to throttle or frustrate exercise of such rights by exercising  its executive or legislative  powers and passing orders or taking action in that direction in the name of reasonable restrictions”. The Court's direction reads: "a. Take disciplinary action against all the erring police officers/personnel who have indulged in brick-batting, have resorted to lathi charge and excessive use of tear gas shells upon the crowd, have exceeded their authority or have acted in a manner not permissible under the prescribed procedures, rules or the standing orders and their actions have an element of criminality. This action shall be taken against the officer/personnel irrespective of what ranks they hold in the hierarchy of police."

Vikas Singh, senior counsel submitted that the march to Parliament had been publicly announced in advance and that the authorities were aware that the gathering would swell on July 20. The protest involved students, doctors, lawyers and persons from different walks of life. Singh maintained that there was nothing on record to suggest that the gathering constituted an unlawful assembly. 

He referred to Section 149 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, to submit that officers dispersing assemblies are required to use “as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly”. 

Opposing the petitions, ASG Raju argued that the petitioners had failed to avail alternative remedies, including approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. He submitted that prohibitory orders under Section 163 BNS had been promulgated. He questioned the maintainability of the PILs, Raju contended that individuals claiming to have been assaulted should pursue appropriate legal remedies instead of invoking the Court's public interest jurisdiction. 

The Court asked: “Is it a case of some isolated incidents? Perhaps not. If it was an unlawful assembly, as you say, there is law on how to deal with it. If these issues are raised in a PIL, how can you say every individual should lodge an FIR?”. 

Drawing the Supreme Court's decision in Anita Thakur vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Court observed that remedies for alleged violations of fundamental rights arising from police action could also be pursued under public law. The Court directed preservation of “the relevant record in relation to the incident as mentioned in the writ petitions, including CCTV footage and videography, if any”, in accordance with the standard operating procedures issued by the Delhi Police and the Union Government. The matter has been listed for further hearing on September 11. 

LiveLaw has reported that Delhi Police has registered at least nine FIRs in connection with the alleged “violence, stone-pelting and vandalism” during the march. The FIRs have been lodged at police stations including Parliament Street, Barakhamba Road and Connaught Place. The charges include rioting, assaulting public servants on duty, damaging government and private property, and attempting to murder a Rapid Action Force (RAF) personnel.

On July 21, the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, Rahul Gandhi, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, MP and Akhilesh Yadav, Samajwadi Party chief  were detained after leading a sit-in protest outside Lok Kalyan Marg, the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s residence, demanding his resignation. Besixdes these leaders, Mallikarjun Kharge, the Leader of Opposition in Rajya Sabha and several senior MPs reached the site around 3.30 pm and staged a dharna, accusing the government of shielding those responsible for the alleged NEET paper leak and ordering police action against protesting students. Supriya Sule, the NCP (SP) leader joined the demonstration later. The Union government sent Dr. Jitendra Singh, Minister of State in the PMO to hold talks with Rahul Gandhi. Union Home Secretary Govind Mohan was also with the minister but the discussions failed to break the deadlock because of the demand for the resignation of Dharmendra Pradhan, the Union Education Minister. The leaders demands included a statement from Amit Shah, the Home Minister in Parliament on police violence, a judicial inquiry into the alleged police excesses against protesting students, and an immediate discussion on NEET in both Houses. Rahul Gandhi was taken to Chhatrasal Stadium in Model Town, while Priyanka Gandhi was detained at Mandir Marg police station. Both were released later at night. Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Parliamentary Party chairperson reached the police station where Priyanka was being held. Notably, Karnataka Chief Minister D K Shivakumar and Kerala Chief Minister V D Satheesan also joined the protest. 

Earlier, Rahul Gandhi along with other opposition leaders had met Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla, urging him to allow a discussion in Parliament on the police ‘brutality’ and NEET controversy, but was informed that the government’s approval was a must to take up the discussion.  

The First Amendment to the United States (US) Constitution, reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The first three words of the Constitution of India and US Constitution are the same. The words are: "We, the people". 

Can "We, the people" be subservient to the illegitimate and immoral acts of the Police and non-State actors masque?    

 

From Archives:Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah set aside judgement by trial court, Munger

In State of Bihar vs. Gurusharan Ram & Ors. Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 (2012), Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah  as judge of Patna High Court had delivered a 6-page long judgement dated July 23, 2012, wherein, while disposing of the matter, had concluded: "this Court, exercising suo motu power of revision under the Code quashes the order dated 06.06.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270/45 of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 838 of 1999/13 of 2000. The Court below shall forthwith take steps for framing charges against the opposite parties and thereafter conduct the trial in accordance with law. The application stands disposed off in the aforementioned terms." The other two  respondents were: 2. Mukesh Ram and Tinku Ram. The case was filed in the High Court The case was instituted on the basis of the order dated February 26, 2004 passed in Kaushalya Devi & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2012) Cr. Revision No. 992 of 2002 by which the High Court had exercised suo motu revisional power and issued notice to the opposite parties asking them to show cause as to why the order dated 06.06.2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270/45 of 2001 be not set aside. The order dated February 26, 2004 is not available on the High Court's website. The 4-page long judgement dated July 23, 2012 in the Kaushalya Devi's case too was authored by Justice Amanullah. Pranav Kumar was the A.P.P. in both the cases.   

In the Kaushalya Devi's case, the revision application was directed against the order dated July 22, 2002 passed in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/45 of 2001 by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger by which the petition under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the petitioner was rejected. The case was filed and registered in the High Court on October 31, 2002. 

In his order, Justice Amanullah recorded that initially the case was filed against five named persons including the petitioners. Upon investigation initially the police submitted chargesheet only against the other three co-accused and not against the petitioners. Later on supplementary chargesheet was submitted against the petitioners also on the basis of further investigation. The other three co-accused had thus moved a petition under Section 227of the Code. By order dated June 6, 2000 the same had been allowed and they were discharged. The High Court while hearing the Kaushalya Devi's case on February 26, 2004 had issued notice to the other three co-accused as to why in exercise of suo motu revisional power the order dated June 6, 2000 be not set aside. Thus, a separate case was registered being Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 in which the High Court passed orders on July 23, 2012, quashing the order dated June 6, 2000 passed by the VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/45 of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 838 of 1999/13 of 2000. In the said case, the High Court has gone through the evidence as recorded in the case diary and has came to the conclusion that there was sufficient material for proceeding with the trial and discharging the accused at that stage was not proper. Thus, for the same reasons as recorded in Criminal Revision No. 300 of 2004 in the order passed on July 23, 2022 in the case, as far as petitioner no. 1 who is mother-in-law of the deceased and was revision application stands dismissed. The order impugned dated July 22, 2002 as far as petitioner no. 1 is concerned, was upheld. As far as petitioner no. 2, who was the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased is concerned, her husband as well as various other villagers of the place where she resides in her matrimonial home had categorically stated that one of the co-accused, her brother namely, Mukesh Ram had gone to her matrimonial home to inform her about the death of the deceased and thereafter she alongwith her husband had gone to her maternal home (Naihar) on February 13, 1999. In view of the fact that she was already married and living separately with the husband and that on the fateful day also nothing has come during investigation to indicate that she was present in her maternal home where the incident took place, the High Court does not find that there is sufficient ground to proceed against her. Thus, the impugned order dated July 22, 2002 as far as petitioner no. 2 was concerned was set aside. Consequently, she stood discharged from the case as well as from the liabilities of her bail bonds and sureties. The interim order dated June 30, 2004 staying further proceeding in Sessions Case No. 270 of 2001/ 45 of 2001 stood vacated. The High Court ordered that the lower Court records be sent for proceeding with the trial in light of the order passed in the present case as well as in Cr. Revision No. 300 of 2004 passed on July 23, 2012. \

On the basis of the order dated February 26, 2004, the case was instituted and notices issued to opposite parties who entered appearance. It was also ordered by this very order that the case of State of Bihar vs. Gurusharan Ram & Ors. of 2004 be listed along with the case of Kaushalya Devi & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar of 2002.

The A.P.P. for the State took the Court through the order dated June 6, 2000 by which the opposite parties were discharged. He submitted that the order is erroneous both on facts as well as in law. The police had submitted chargesheet against the opposite parties on the basis of materials which came during investigation and thus to discharge the opposite parties prior to trial was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. The counsel submitted that the Court had wrongly understood both the statement of the doctor as well as one Dhaneshwar Ram and given the benefit to the opposite parties. He submitted that the informant, who was the mother of the deceased, in her reinstatement as well as brother-
in-law (Bhainsur) of the informant had supported the prosecution story and during supervision also sufficient materials were found to exist for the opposite parties to be sent up for trial and accordingly chargesheet was submitted. He submitted that the doctor in his statement at paragraph no. 89 of the case diary had stated that on February 8, 1999 he had treated the deceased who had complained of pain. He stated that on February 9, 1999 also somebody had come to take advice with regard to the deceased having pain and he had given some medicine and also asked him to bring the patient so that she could be properly
treated. It was also stated that neither the boy returned nor the patient was brought to him. He submitsed that if her in-laws found that the deceased was having problems and needed treatment then they ought to have brought the deceased to the doctor on the 10th which was not done and only on February 12/13, 1999 when she was supposed to have died. Thus, according to him, there was no explanation as to why for 3-4 days she was not taken to the doctor in spite of her complaining of pain. He further submitted that there was consistent allegation that the opposite parties had harassed the deceased since opposite parties no. 2 and 3 being the brother-in-law (Dewar) were trying to establish illicit relationship with the deceased which was resisted and opposite party no. 1 being the father-in-law had also taken the side of the sons, that is, opposite parties no. 2 and 3. It was thus submitted that there was sufficient material to put the opposite parties on trial. The A.P.P. assailed the findings of the trial court with regard to Dhaneshwar Ram whose statement was at paragraph no. 89 of the case diary. He submitted that Dhaneshwar Ram had not stated that he had gone to the informant to inform about her death. He had only stated that opposite party no. 1 had asked him to inform the informant. The counsel submitted that there was no explanation in the entire investigation which explains as to why the opposite parties no. 2 and 3, who were the Dewars, had not gone and informed about the death. He further submitted that nothing had come during investigation to infer that the informant or her family members were aware of the death and had participated in the cremation. Thus, according to him it was sufficient to hold that the opposite parties were not keen to inform the informant about the death which raises bona fide and genuine suspicion with regard to the conduct and commission of the crime.  

Justice Amanullah had verified the statements and submissions of learned A.P.P. for the State from the case records and was in agreement with the stand taken by him.

The A.P.P. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M.Punchhi and K.T. Thomas in Shri Satish Mehra vs Delhi Administration & Anr. 1997 BBCJ 53 (SC) as quoted and relied upon in the order dated June 6, 2000 did not support the case of the opposite parties and rather the ratio goes in favour of the prosecution inasmuch as in the said case the Supreme Court has held that if the Court feels that trial would be an exercise in futility and sheer wastage of time, the proceedings should be terminated. He submitted that in the present case due to adequate material and evidence being available, the Court at the stage of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not justified to discharge the opposite parties in the manner it was done by the order dated June 6, 2000. 

The A.P.P. took the High Court through the evidence of Raghubir Ram which is at paragraph no. 27 of the supplementary case diary and who is the husband of one of the accused, namely Rama Devi @ Rambha Devi, who is the sister-in-law (Nanad) of the deceased. He has stated that the informant and the brother-in-law of the informant had come to the house of the opposite parties on February 13, 1999 and were asking the opposite parties as to why they were not informed about the death of the deceased. Thus, it was stated that the informant and her family was not informed of the death and the body disposed off, which clearly proves that there was something to hide and thus discharge of the opposite parties at that stage was unjustified. It was stated that it will lead to miscarriage of justice. He also stated that his mother-in-law namely, Kaushalya Devi was unwell and bedridden since last two and a half months and thus the story and stand of the opposite parties that she had also accompanied the deceased while she had gone to ease herself is also falsified. He submitted that even the husband of the deceased was informed only belatedly, as per his own statement on February 14, 1999, which also goes to prove that the accused did not want anyone to see the body so as to enable them to know the real cause of death. Justice Amanullah had appreciated the assistance rendered by the A.P.P. for the State in the case.

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in a theft and IT Act case from Gopalganj

In Sharvan Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha delivereda 8-page long judgment dated July 20, 2026, wherein, he set aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj. justice Jha concluded: "10....it is clear that only on the basis of evidences as surfaced during any inquiry or trial of an offence, a summon can be issued to any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. 11. In the present case, summon was not issued against petitioner on the basis of evidences surfaced during the trial. None of the prosecution witnesses have said anything incriminating during the trial against this petitioner, rather petitioner himself examined as PW-7. Interestingly, on the basis of petition of accused only, otherwise having all opportunity to examine himself on oath under section 315 of the Cr.P.C., this petitioner was summoned as an accused through impugned order, which is a perverse finding contrary to the settled position of law. 12. In view of aforesaid and by taking legal report of Hon’ble Apex Court in Neeraj Kumar’ case (supra), the impugned order dated 13.07.2018 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with T.R. No. 1640/2018 arising out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015, is hereby quashed and set-aside qua petitioner. 13. Accordingly, this quashing petition stands allowed." The respondent no.2 was Surendra Nath Pandey. 

The judgement was passed upon hearing the petition filed for quashing the impugned order dated July 13, 2018 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with Tr. No. 1640/18 which arose out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the Information Technology Act, whereby and whereunder on application of accused Rahul Kumar Jha, lC.J.M. issued summon against the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The prosecution case was that as per FIR, informant alleged that Rs. 11,00,000/- was withdrawn in between April 30, 2015 to June 22, 2015 by the IRCTC from his Bank Account of State Bank of India, Hathua Branch. It was alleged that informant was a retired teacher and when he came to the Bank and verify his account, then, he came to know that fraud which was committed with his account. On the basis of written report, a First Information Report was lodged with Hathua Police Station. After lodging the FIR, police started investigation and submitted charge-sheet only against co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and section 66(C) of the I.T. Act and investigation was kept pending to verify the I.P. address and on other points. Thereafter, trial court took cognizance only against accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences under sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the I.T. Act.

The petitioner 's counsel submitted that after taking cognizance the trial of the case begins with Tr. No. 1640/18 before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj, where altogether seven (7) prosecution witnesses were examined and out of seven prosecution witnesses, this petitioner was also examined as PW-7 on 03.04.2018. It was pointed out that none of the prosecution witnesses, PW-1 to PW-6 named this petitioner qua his any involvement with the crime in question during the trial and the petitioner was examined as prosecution witness No.7, for the reason that he was the distributor of Cable Internet Connection through his company namely, M/s ANI Network Pvt. Ltd. to co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha, who alleged to misappropriate the amount of Rs. 11 Lakhs from the account of the informant for purchasing railway tickets and, thereafter, transferring the amount to his own account after cancellation of purchased railway tickets. It was submitted that co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha was not examined before the learned trial court in view of section 315 of the Cr.P.C., rather he made one application before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj on 03.04.2018, stating therein that this petitioner may be summoned as an accused,which was allowed by the impugned order dated July 13, 2018. 

The counsel also relied upon ‘Para 7’ of the legal report of Supreme Court in Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639, which reads as under for better appreciation of the legal position in connection with issuance of summon under section 319 Cr.P.C. :-“7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite.
7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [(2014) 3 SCC 92] extensively discussed the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is
extracted hereunder: “90. … all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been
involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
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106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. …

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110. In Lal Suraj [Lal Suraj v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844], a two-Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been chargesheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 CrPC. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram [Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh, (2006) 10 SCC 192 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 532 : AIR 2006 SC 1892], wherein it was held that a person, though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. …. …… ……”

Justice Harish Kumar sets aside order of Vice-chancellor, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, terms it "wholly illegal and without jurisdiction" contrary to Bihar Universities Act, 1976

In Navin Kumar @ Naveen Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026),  Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 20-page long judgement dated July 202, 2026, wherein, he set aside order of Vice-chancellor, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, terms it "wholly illegal and without jurisdiction". The other six respondents were: 2. The Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The Director, Higher Education, Education Department, Government of Bihar, 4. The Vice-Chancellor, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, 5. The Registrar, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, 6. The Finance Officer, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur and 7. The Prof-Incharge, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial College, Nawahi Sursand, District Sitamarhi.

Justice Kumar concluded:"....this Court is of the conscious opinion that the impugned order of dissolution of the Governing Body taken by the Vice-chancellor in its reasoned order dated 22.05.2026 is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction, thus hereby set aside. Once the order of dissolution of the Governing Body does not survive, the consequential order for constitution of the Ad-hoc Committee would also be termed as illegal. However, the Court would not enter into the other aspects of the matter and the pleas taken by the learned Advocates regarding constitution and continuity of the Ad-hoc Committee on any other ground, as the same is not required to be dealt with at present. 29. This Court, however, in the facts of the case, further makes it clear that the order of this Court would not come in the way of the Vice-chancellor/University to deliberate upon and refer the matter to the Syndicate to take appropriate action/decision in the matter of continuation/dissolution of the Governing Body after following the mandate of Clause 28 of Statute 32 of the Act with the clear observance of the principles of natural justice, if the circumstances necessitate the same." 

The petitioner, an elected Secretary of the Governing College, Nawahi Sursand, Sitamarhi, constituted under Section 60 of the Bihar Universities Act, 1976, read with Statute 32, had approached the High Court being aggrieved with the reasoned order dated May 22, 2026 issued by the Vice-chancellor of the B.R.A. Bihar University under the signature of the Registrar of the University whereby and whereunder the Governing Body of the College was dissolved. He had also challenged order dated May 22, 2026 issued by the Registrar of the University by which Ad-hoc Committee has been constituted for the College, in question. The petitioner had also sought issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to restore the Governing Body constituted by Memo dated May 27, 2023.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the newly constituted Ad-hoc Committee submitted its report, regarding the action taken by the erstwhile Governing Body under letter dated June 23, 2026. Based upon such report the University by Memo dated June 25, 2026 constituted an enquiry committee to submit further reports on different points, the same was also challenged by filing an interlocutory application.

The College, in question, namely, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial College, Nawahi Sursand, Sitamarhi was established on July 10, 1965 and in course of time, the college was given permanent affiliation up to Honours level in the year 2009. In terms with Section 60 of the Bihar Universities Act, 1976 which mandates for constitution of a Governing Body for Management and Administration of each affiliated College, other than a college owned and maintained by the State Government or College establishment by a Minority Committee or an affiliated Technical or Medical College, as also read with Statute 32, a Governing Body was duly constituted for smooth functioning of the College, in question; and the petitioner, who was inducted as donor member further elected as Secretary of the Governing Body by the approval of the Vice-chancellor. The dispute began in the meeting of the Governing body dated October 26, 2024 wherein the Professor incharge, namely, Dr. Om Prakash Singh, who was the senior most teacher of the College and was to retire on October 31, 2024, his period was extended in the light of on going 4/20
NAAC Accreditation Process. The information in this regard was been given to the Registrar of the University by letter dated October 28, 2024 seeking approval for extension of service of incharge Principal of the College. Pending approval for extension of the services of Dr. Om Prakash Singh as Professor-cum-incharge Principal of the College, The petitioner being the Secretary of the Governing Body submitted his reply on December 16, 2025 mentioning that information regarding extension of service of Dr. Om Prakash Singh had already been communicated on October 28, 2024. It was made  clear that the College was bound to follow the direction of the University. On receipt of the show-cause notice, the Professor Incharge-cum-Principal Dr. Om Prakash Singh tendered his resignation on December 20, 2025, which was duly accepted by the Governing Body in its meeting held on January 4, 2026.

Dissatisfied with the response of the petitioner, the Vice-chancellor of the University vide its order dated
May 22, 2026 issued under the signature of University dissolved the Governing Body with immediate
effect and consequently all powers, authorities and financial control of the said Governing Body came to be ceased. In pursuance of the impugned order, a consequential order dated May 22, 2026 was also issued and an Ad-hoc committee was also constituted to manage the academic administration and financial affairs of the College until further orders or until constitution of a regular Governing Body in accordance with law, besides a direction to constitute an enquiry committee for examining the operation of accounts, utilization of grants as well as financial decision undertaken during the illegally extended tenure of the retired Principal.

The petitioner's senior counsel pointed out that the erstwhile Governing Body of the College was dissolved by an authority, which had no sanction under the law. It is only the Syndicate empowered under Clause 28 of the Statute 32 of the Act, which may on its own motion or at the instance of the Vice- chancellor dissolve a Governing Body and order for its reconstitution; provided, the Syndicate has given a reasonable opportunity to the Governing Body to show-cause against such action. At no point in time, any show-cause notice or reasonable opportunity was given by the Syndicate and the order of dissolution was passed by the Vice-chancellor, which was wholly illegal and against the teeth of all the prescriptions provided under Clause 28 of Statute 32. It is a settled law that in terms of Section 67 of the Act, 1976, the College or the University shall in no case extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employees after he attains the age of superannuation. 

The senior counsel drew on decision of the High Court's Division Bench in Vijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (L.P.A. No. 977 of 2024), wherein, by its judgment/order dated October 29, 2024, the provisions of Clause 28 of Statute 32, it highlighted cthat the Vice Chancellor does not have the competence or power to suspend or dissolve a properly constituted Governing Body.

The counsel also relied on reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan : (1989) 3 SCC 132, wherein the Court observed that the statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It was ab initio void and cannot be ratified. 

Justice Kumar observed:"....it is quite evident and imperative that it is the Syndicate, which may on its own motion or at the instance of the Vice-chancellor dissolve a Governing Body on account of the reasons mentioned therein, provided before the order of dissolution of the Governing body, the Syndicate shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Governing Body to show-cause against such action. 21. Since the mandate of the above noted prescription of law is very much clear that it is the Syndicate, who shall take a decision with regard to the dissolution of the Governing Body and, in fact, this position has not even been
disputed by any of the party, it need not require further emphasis that the order of dissolution of the Governing Body is to be taken in terms with Clause 28 of Statute 32 of the Act."

The Court examined as to whether the facts and circumstances of the case warrants immediate exercise of the emergency power assigned to the Vice-chancellor under Section 10(12) of the Act, 1976. Section 10(12) of the Act empowers the Vice-chancellor to take an immediate action involving the exercise of any power vested in the Syndicate or the Academic Council by or under this Act, he/she shall take such action as he deems fit, when the Syndicate or Academic Council is not in Session and he is satisfied that an emergency has arisen requiring its intervention.The Court observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no emergency situation had arisen, which required invocation of Section 10(12) of the Act, 1976.
Justice Kumar observed:"Undoubtedly, the power is vested with the Vice-chancellor to deal with the emergent circumstances, but in the present case, the exercise of such power appears to be wholly unwarranted." 
 

 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside order by Special Judge (SC/ST), Aurangabad, grants anticipatory bail in a SC/SCT case

In Saroja Devi @ Saroj Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 4-page long judgement dated July 17, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"07. Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and considering the case and counter version and also considering the background of land dispute and further considering the possibility of false implication, let the appellant above named, in the event of her arrest or surrender before the court concerned within a period of eight weeks from today, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge (SC/ST) -cum- 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, Bihar in connection with Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 312 of 2024, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) BNSS and other following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be a close relative of the appellant. (ii) The appellant will remain present on each and every date fixed by the court below, if so required by the learned trial court. 08. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed."

The judgement records that "Despite valid service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of respondent no. 2" who is Anita Devi.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing  appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the refusal of prayer for anticipatory bail vide order dated September 23, 2024 passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST)-cum-1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, Bihar in A.B.P. No. 2009 of 2024. The case arose out of Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 312 of 2024, registered for the alleged offences under Sections 3(5), 109, 115(2), 118(1), 126(2) BNS and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w) & 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act.  

The prosecution case is that the appellant and other co-accused persons entered into the house of the informant and assaulted her. The counsel for the appellant submitted  that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. No occurrence as alleged has ever taken place. The case was the result of land dispute between the parties and there was a counter case instituted by co-accused Ramkrit Yadav being Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 311 of 2024 and the genesis of the occurrence is that the co-accused was fencing his land and the informant and her family members assaulted him causing injury to him. The counsel submitted that there was no intention to humiliate the informant side by taking their caste name rather it appears to be a case of scuffle and free fight between two groups over some land dispute and this fact depicts from the counter case and the present case has been lodged by the informant only with a view to save their skin from the counter case. The counsel also submitted that the appellant was a lady and there is no specific allegation against her that she insulted the informant by taking her caste name in a public place. No independent witness has supported the version of the informant and it appears that the informant has instituted the case in order to create defence. The appellant was having antecedent of one case which was instituted under different provisions of the IPC and sections 3(1)(r),3(2)(1), 3(2) (va) of SC/ST (PoA) Act in which she is on bail. The Special PP submitted that the appellant and other co-accused persons took
caste name of the informant and also assaulted her.

Supreme Court to hear Barun Yadav's case for premature release/remission on August 3

In Barun Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar passed a 2-page long order dated July 16, 2026. It reads: "the State would submit that the State Sentence Review Board has considered the petitioner's case in its meeting dated 11.07.2026 and the formal report/ decision taken in the meeting is awaited. 2. Post the matter on 03.08.2026." 

In its previous order, the Supreme Court had directed the respondent-State of Bihar to consider and decide the petitioner’s case for premature release/remission expeditiously. The petitioner’s case for pre-mature release/remission is under consideration which shall be decided in accordance with provisions of the Bihar Prison Manual.  

The SLP arose out of impugned final judgment and order  in Barun Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Rajiv Roy delivered a 11-page long judgement dated May 16, 2023, wherein it had concluded: "15. After having gone through the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, we do not find any justifiable reason to doubt the veracity of the depositions made by the prosecution's witnesses at the trial in the facts and circumstance as noted above. In our view, based on the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, the trial court has rightly held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the IPC for killing his father and his nephew in the wake of a dispute arising out of partition in the family and injuring PW-8. 16. We accordingly do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed." The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Singh.  The petitioner's counsel were Ajay Kumar Thakur, Ritvik Thakur and Vaishnavi Singh. 

Also read: Supreme Court directs Bihar Government to decide premature release/remission of Barun Yadav expeditiously

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."