Justice Sandeep Kumar passes conditional no coercive order

In Pradeep Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated February 20, 2026 wherein, he directed the petitioner to pay a maintenance amount of Rs. 25,000/- from the month of February, 2026 to the informant and the maintenance for the month of February, 2026 shall be paid to the informant before 25.02.2026 and thereafter the maintenance amount from the month of March, 2026 shall be paid to the informant every month before the 10th day of the month, as a condition of ordering that no coercive action in connection with Noorsarai P.S. Case of 2024 pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Nalanda at Biharsharif.

The counsels for the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 submitted that both the parties were ready to explore the possibility of settlement.

Justice Kumar observed:"Considering the aforesaid submissions, let this matter be referred to Mediation and Conciliation Centre, Patna High Court and both the parties are directed to be personally present in Mediation and Conciliation Centre after one week for settlement of the disputes."

The order reads:"3. List this matter after three months along with the report of the Mediation and Conciliation Centre. 4. In the meantime, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner in connection with Noorsarai P.S. Case of 2024 pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Nalanda at Biharsharif."

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]. 

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."

Justice Ansul modifies order of sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in an attempt to murder case from Nawada

In Bijali Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated February 3, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"16. Having carefully considered the witnesses', testimony and the medical evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the appellant's conviction. 17. However, the matter arises out of a land dispute and the Appellant is facing prosecution for last about eighteen years. Therefore, taking a holistic view to meet the ends of justice to be served upon the appellant, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence."

This appeal was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated December 8, 2010 and December 14, 2010 respectively passed by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in a case which arose out of Akbarpur P.S. Case of 2008, whereby the Trial Court had convicted the appellant and sentenced under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code with R.I. for one year, under Section 307/34 IPC with R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- (in default of payment of fine he will further go R.I. of six months) and under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs. 5,000/.

As per fardbeyan, the prosecution case is that an informant, namely, Rambalak Yadav (P.W.-6) on the night of July 7, 2008 in when he was sleeping at Verandah alongwith his son Indradeo Prasad (P.W. 1) at about 11.30. P.M. he heard a sound of crying to shoot upon which he awakened and saw in the light of lantern that his villagers Dinesh Chaudhary and Bijali Chaudhary were standing armed with pistol with intention to kill him and they opened fire twice out of which one bullet was shot at left side neck and second shot did not hit him. Thereafter, they sought for rescue and on hearing the shouting his wife, Sugiya Devi and other neigbours Sarjug Mahto, Sanjay Mahto, Rambachan Yadav and others came there and they saw the accused persons fleeing in light of torch, thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. 

After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-sheet on December 31, 2008 under Sections 447, 324, 307/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant before the learned Trial Court. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant framed the charges under Sections 324 and 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 

Justice Ansul observed: "12. It appears from perusal of record that altogether eight witnesses have been examined during trial. P.W.-1, Indradeo Prasad, who is son of the informant has deposed that the accused persons fired indiscriminately and one bullet hit on the neck of his father and the other was misfired. P.W.-2, Ram Sugia Devi, who is the wife of the informant has stated that the accused persons had shot fire to her husband, Rambalak Yadav when he was sleeping at Verandah along with his son and he sustained injury. P.W.-3, Sanjay Yadav has stated that the accused persons have shot fire causing injury to the informant and her wife was rushing out from the house. P.W-4, Ganesh Yadav has stated that on hearing the sound of firing he went to Dalan of Rambalak Yadav where he saw gun-shot injury on his neck. P.W-5, Sanjay Mahto has stated that he had not seen the occurrence and came at the place of occurrence after hearing sound of firing and found the informant in injured condition. P.W. 6, Rambalak Yadav is the informant of the case and has supported the case as narrated in the fardbeyan. P.W. 7, Narendra Sharma who is the Doctor of the case and has stated that he was posted at Sadar Hospital, Nawadah and on 08.07.2008 at 2.10 A.M. he examined the informant, Rambalak Yadav and found 1/2 CM circular wound on the right side of the neck and injury was caused by firearm and, thereafter, he referred the informant to PMCH in serious condition. P.W. 8, Dhananjay Jha, the Investigating Officer has investigated the case and he proved the fardbeyan of the informant. 13. It also appears that there is an admitted land dispute between the parties. This casts shadow of doubt on the prosecution version. 14. In context of evidence of P.W. 3, the presence of the wife of the informant P.W. 2 Sugiya Devi appears to be doubtful. She claimed to be eye-witness of the occurrence while P.W. 3 stated that he rushed from his house after shot fire at a distance of half kilometer away and he saw the wife of the informant rushing towards the place of occurrence. 15. There is also no clarity as to who fired upon the injured the injured exactly." 

Conviction under Section 306 IPC impermissible, in absence of proof of suicide, abetment within meaning of Sections 306, 107

In Ajay Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhary and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 20-page long judgment dated February 25, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"...there is no reliable evidence on record to establish that the deceased committed suicide or that the appellant abetted the commission of suicide. In absence of proof of suicide and abetment within the meaning of Sections 306 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code, conviction under Section 306 IPC would also be impermissible in law. 80. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. The prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally caused disappearance of evidence with the object of screening himself from legal punishment. The conviction under Section 201 IPC therefore cannot be sustained."

It added: "81. In view of the discussions and findings recorded. 82. The conviction of the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence imposed thereunder are set aside. 83. The conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code are also set aside .84. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges. 85.If the appellant is in custody, he shall be released forthwith, unless required in any other case. 86. If on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged."

Law is settled that if an order has been passed without taking note of relevant submissions, liberty is always to approach same Court

In The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Jyoti Kumar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice (Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha delivered a 8-page long judgement dated February 9, 2026, wherein, it observed:"5. The law is well settled that if an order has been passed without taking note of the relevant submissions of the parties, the liberty is always to approach the same Court. Also if any wrong noting has been made, it is open to the parties to approach the same Court while the matter is still fresh in its mind. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the petitioners which is stated to have been placed but not considered by the learned Single Judge may be agitated in a civil review petition or by taking such other recourse as may be available in law. Liberty is accordingly granted to the appellants to seek appropriate remedy available in law." 

The Letters Patent Appeal was filed by the State of Bihar and others challenging the order dated January 17, 2025 passed by the Single Judge in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 8049 of 2023. There were twenty three petitioners in the said writ petition. They had prayed for issuance of a writ/writs in the nature of certiorari to set aside an order dated December 22, 2022 issued by Director, Land Records and Survey, Revenue and Land Reform Department, Bihar Government (Respondent No 4) by which he has been pleased to hold that certificates of Diploma in Civil Engineering produced by the petitioners are forged one and their appointments on the posts of Special Survey Amin has been further cancelled. They prayed also for holding that Certificates of Diploma in Civil Engineering obtained by petitioners as genuine and bona fide. 

After issuance of notice, respondent no. 5, Dr. Momita Goswami, the Registrar of C.M.J University, filed
counter affidavit, supplementary counter affidavit, and second supplementary counter affidavit. The Single Judge in his judgment and order dated June 17, 2025, was pleased to hold as follows:-
“5. On perusal of the pleadings, the
supplementary affidavit dated 23.11.2024 of respondent No 5 and the documents annexed therein, it is clear that on the basis of an FIR registered against Respondent No 5, the State of Meghalaya vide its order dated 31.03.2014 passed the order of dissolution of the CMG University
(Respondent No 5) which has been challenged by the
University before the Meghalaya High Court and a
learned Single Judge of the Meghalaya High Court in
Writ Petition No 177 of 2014, on ground of non-
compliance of principles of natural justice, set aside the
order dated 31.03.2014 vide its judgment dated
16.07.2015 (Annexure F). The above order has been
challenged by the State of Meghalaya by filing Writ
Appeal No 14 of 2017 which was decided on 06.05.2021
and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated
16.07.2015 has been set aside and the matter was
remitted back to the learned Single Judge for
adjudication on merit. Respondent No 5 approached the
Supreme Court challenging the order dated 06.05.2021
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Meghalaya and vide order dated 01.06.2021, Hon’ble the
Supreme Court directed the parties to maintain status quo
as to the functioning of the University in SLP (C) No
7081 of 2021. A categorical stand has been taken by
Respondent No 5 that after passing of the order dated
16.07.2015 by the learned Single Judge of the Meghalaya
High Court, the State of Meghalaya allowed the
University to function for 9 academic years without any
complaint and Respondent No 5 continuously functioned
from 2015 till date without any demur. Categorical
pleading has been taken by the University that the State
Government/UGC had allowed the University to function
smoothly from the academic year, 2015-2016 to 2023-
2024. The above stand taken by the University has not
been rebutted by the other respondents in their counter
affidavit. Thus, it is quite clear that the University
(Respondent No 5) was functioning from academic year,
2015-2016 to 2023-2024.

The second supplementary counter affidavit of Respondent No 5 dated 20.01.2025 further shows that
again the University has taken the stand that the degree of the petitioners has been verified by the University and it was found that all the petitioners herein have passed
their examination in the year, 2018 which is also
mentioned in the document with the supplementary counter affidavit dated 20.01.2025.
7. As contained in the documen, it is quite clear that all the petitioners herein have passed their examination from the CMG University
(Respondent No 5) in the year, 2018, i e, prior to their
recruitment which has not been disputed by the counsel
for the other respondents, i e, the State of Bihar.
Therefore, on this ground alone, both the orders
impugned are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, both the orders impugned dated 22.12.2022 and 23.11.2023 are set aside.

The matter is remitted back to the concerned respondents to take a decision afresh in the light of the
stand taken by Respondent No 5 in this petition.
9. Needless to say that the concerned respondents will pass a reasoned order as early as possible preferably within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”
3. The grounds taken by the learned counsel for the appellants in the present Letters Patent Appeal in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15, reads as follows:-
“13. That on completion of pleadings, the
matter was heard and during hearing of the writ petition,
the copy of judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 9690 of
2024, (C.M.J. Foundation and other Versus State of
Meghalaya and others) dated 13.02.2025 was referred
before the Hon'ble Single Bench. The said appeal was
filed challenging the judgment and order dated 6th May,
2021 passed by the Division Bench of Meghalaya at
Shilong.in Writ Petition No. 14/17 whereby the
judgment and order dated 16.07.2017 passed by the
Hon'ble Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court in Writ
Petition (C) No. 177/14 was quashed and the matter was
remitted back to the Hon'ble Single Judge to take
appropriate decision regarding the validity of the order
passed by this Hon'ble Court dissolving C.M.J.
University. During hearing of the said Civil Appeal by
the said Hon'ble Supreme Court 3 issued were framed
determination and they are as follows:-
(i) Whether the appointment of Chancellor of
the C.M.J. University was made with due
adherence of the procedure as mandated by
law?
(ii) Whether the dissolution order dated
31;03.2014 was passed with due adherence to
the procedure provided under section 48 of the
C.M.J. University Act, 2009 and in compliance
of the direction issued by this Hon'ble High
Court vide order dated 13.09.2013 in Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 1967/13 titled as C.M.J.
Foundation and others Versus the State of
Meghalaya and others?
(iii) Whether the Division Bench of the Hon'ble
High Court of Meghalaya was justified in
remitting back to the Hon'ble Single Judge for
reconsideration of matter while allowing the
writ Appeal No. 14/17.
14. That after a detailed hearing, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the appointment of Chancellor
of C.M.J. University was nonest and void ab initio, the
dissolution order dated 31.03.2014 has been passed in
strict adherence to the procedural requirement of section
48 of the C.M.J. University Act, 2009. The Division
Bench of Meghalaya High Court was not justified in
remitting the matter back to the Hon'ble Single Judge for
consideration of merit and the decision of the State
Government dated 31st March, 2014 for dissolving the
C.M.J. University, Meghalaya 1st Set 1st Set was
affirmed.
15. That in spite of the above stated judgment being referred at the time of hearing of C.W.J.C. No.
8049 of 2023 the Single Judge passed the impugned judgment in contravention of the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding the dissolution of C.M.J. University to be proper and legal
and thus the Hon’ble Single Judge has committed an error.”

The appellants's counsel submitted that, even though the judgment pronounced in Civil Appeal No. 9690 of 2024 (C.M.J. Foundation and Ors vs. State of Meghalaya and Ors) was placed before the learned Single Judge, the same was not considered and therefore, the impugned order was passed remitting the matter back to the concerned respondents for taking a fresh decision in light of the stand taken by the
respondent no.5 in the writ petition. When a pertinent question was put to the learned counsel for the appellants as to whether any material was placed on record showing that the said decision referred to in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15 i.e. C.A. No.9690 of 2024, was placed before the Single Judge, the answer was in negative. However, he submits that the decision was placed and, if it had been taken into account, the result could have been otherwise.

The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Sahoo. He concluded: "6. It is made clear that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the case. 7. It is stated by learned counsel for the appellants that a contempt petition has already been filed by the respondents for non-compliance of the impugned order. In view of such submission, it is open to the appellants to take appropriate measure in its interest, as per law. 8. With the aforesaid observation, the LPA stands disposed of. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of."

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Dr. Anshuman set aside judgement, order in rape, murder case

In Shatrughan Ram @ Shatrudhan Das Vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 16-page long judgement, wherein, it set aside the judgement of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, 2nd Court at Patna on February 16, 2019, whereby and whereunder, the Trial Judge had held the appellant guilty for committing offence under Sections 376/302 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for life till the end of his natural life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It directed the appellant to be released at once.

On the basis of an oral statement made by one Jawahar Kumar Ray of village Mohaddipur, which was reduced to writing by Sub-Inspector, K. N. Paswan on December 17, 2007, S.K. Puri P.S Case of 2007 for the offence punishable under Sections 376 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered. It was alleged by the informant that at the relevant point when the alleged incident took place, he used to reside at New Punaichak, Jhuggi-Jhopadpatti by the side of the railway line within Police Station-S. K. Puri. On December 16, 2007 in the evening, the wife of the informant, namely, Kachan Devi sent her daughter, since deceased, aged about 8 years, to collect waste papers. At that place, the appellant was also present. His child also went to collect papers. When the informant returned at about 08:30 P.M. on December 16, 2006, after pulling rickshaw, he did not find his minor daughter at home. He and his wife conducted a search for their daughter at nearby area and asked the local people about her whereabouts but the local people failed to give any reply to them. Then they suspected that his daughter might be in the room of the appellant. He went to the house of the appellant to find out his daughter but found that the house 3/16 and the entrance gate of the appellant were locked and dark inside. 

On the following morning at about 07:00. A.M., the informant again conducted search of his daughter. 

During search, he peeped through the closed door of the room of the appellant and found that her daughter lying dead inside the room of the appellant. With the help of local people, the lock of the entrance gate and the door of the room were broken. The informant and others saw the dead body of her daughter having injuries and scratch marks all over her body. Her undergarment and pant were found open and blood was found near her buttock. He suspected that the appellant who was also residing at the relevant point of time at New Punaichak, Jhuggi-Jhopadpatti committed rape upon his daughter and thereafter murdered her by throttling.

The S.H.O., S.K. Puri, Police Station instructed S.I. K. N. Paswan to take up the investigation of the case. During investigation, he recovered the dead body of the daughter of the informant; held inquest over the dead body of the deceased at the place of occurrence; seized blood-stained earth from the place of occurrence; and one photocopy of voter identity card from the room of the appellant. He also examined available witnesses and recorded their statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Thereafter, he sent the dead body of the deceased for post-mortem examination to P.M.C.H. He also obtained forensic report of the seized blood- stained earth and wearing apparels of the victim.

On conclusion of investigation, he submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 376 and 302 of the IPC before the learned C.J.M., Patna on October 29, 2011. The Sessions Judge, Patna received the case record after commitment on January 4, 2012 and transferred the case to the 10th Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Patna.

The Additional Sessions, 10th Court at Patna, received the case records and framed charge against the accused/appellant on May 9, 2012, punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. When the charge, so framed, was written over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded not guilty. Accordingly trial of the case commenced.

Justice Chaudhuri observed:"10. At the outset, we like to record that after commencement of trial, no sessions trial case can be transferred from one Trial Court to another by issuing administrative order by the learned Principle Sessions Judge, Patna. However, the said procedural wrong was committed by the learned Principle Sessions Judge by issuing memo no. 3052-3054 dated 4th of March, 2017, directing the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 10th Court at Patna to transfer the case to the 2nd Fast Track Court at Patna. 11. However, when the trial of the case was concluded by the learned 2nd Fast Track Court at Patna by passing judgement of conviction and sentence, we treat the above-mentioned anomaly as procedural irregularity and proceed with the hearing of the instant appeal.

During trial, in order to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses. 

20. The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the sole ground of recovery of dead body from the house of the appellant on the basis of presumption that since the dead body of the victim girl was found in the room of the appellant, he had special knowledge about what had happened to the deceased after she left her home in the evening of 16th of December, 2007. It was held by the Trial Court that the incident that took place with the victim after she departed her home to bring waste papers was within the special knowledge of the appellant and he failed to discharge his burden as to how the deceased was ravished and subsequently murdered.

Notably, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act discusses the burden of proof on a person who has knowledge of a specific fact, such as being the last person known to have been with the victim.

Justice Chaudhary observed: "23. It is needless to say that in order to convict someone on the basis of circumstantial evidence invoking the last seen theory, the prosecution is under primary obligation to prove the circumstance beyond any shadow of doubt, the chain of which must lead to the inescapable conclusion of that person committing the crime. 24. In criminal cases, where direct evidences are hard to found, the entire case depends on the circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidences imply when all the evidences are clubbed together to form a complete chain of events in such a way that the accused may be convicted. The chain of events, so formed, must be without any reasonable doubt. Each circumstances and the evidences from which the chain is formed should be individually proved as direct evidences. The circumstantial evidence is always direct and primary which means the fact from which the existence of the fact in issue to be inferred must be proved by direct evidence. In case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances should be vested by absolute evidences and should form a complete chain to bring home the guilt of the accused without giving any alternative chance to any other hypothesis." 

He added:"25. In the instant case, there is absolutely no direct evidence against the appellant in support of the charge. Thus, the Trial Court bases its judgement of conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 26. The only circumstance appearing against the appellant is that the dead body of the victim was found in his room in the morning of 17th of December, 2007. The victim was missing from the evening of 16th of December, 2007. Nobody saw the appellant enticing the victim to his house after her departure from her own house to bring some waste papers. 27. It is unfortunate to note that the incident took place on 16th of December, 2007. The appellant was arrested and produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on the strength of warrant of arrest on 7th of August, 2011. Charge- sheet was filed on 29th of October, 2011. Charge was framed against the accused on 9th of May, 2012...."

The Court concluded: "29. After hearing the appeal, we are unfortunately note that the appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life on consideration of inadmissible evidence. The prosecution hopelessly failed to bring home the circumstances which were necessarily established beyond any shadow of doubt in order to come to a finding in support of hypothesis of guilt against the appellant. 30. This is a case where the appellant remained in custody for about 15 years though prosecution failed to produce any kind of evidence whatsoever against him during trial. However, we do not find any alternative but to lament for the unfortunate state of justice delivery system in our country and pray that timely justice shall be delivered both to the prosecution and defence in future. 31. In view of the above discussions, the instant Criminal Appeal is allowed on contest. 32. However, there shall be no order as to costs."

The transferee Court had received the record on March 10, 2017 and continued with the trial which was commenced before the 10th Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Patna. From the date of arrest/production before the Court till date, he was in custody. The Trial Court delivered the impugned judgement on February 16, 2019. 

The appeal was filed before the High Court on May 22, 2019. The appeal was admitted for hearing by a Coordinate Bench of the High Court after a lapse of six years on March 28, 2025. Thereafter, date was fixed for production of lower court records on August 1, 2025. 28. Subsequently, a Coordinate Bench passed an order for substitute service of notice upon Respondent/informant by paper publication. The Coordinate Bench vide order, dated December 19, 2025 had refused the prayer for suspension of sentence and bail. 

Supreme Court grants liberty to Jan Suraaj Party to approach High Court for seeking fresh free and fair elections for Bihar Assembly

In Jan Suraaj Party v. The Election Commission of India & Ors. W.P.(C) No. 107/2026, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi passed an order dated February 6, 2026, granting liberty to it to approach the jurisdictional High Court. The writ petition was dismissed, as withdrawn, with the aforesaid liberty. Jan Suraaj Party had moved the Court seeking fresh free and fair elections for Bihar Assembly. The petition had sought declaration of the result of Assembly Election 2025, as null and void.It had challenged the state-wide scheme for women known as Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana, wherein the Government of Bihar decided to provide financial help, through Direct Benefit Transfer, to one woman in every family by paying Rs.10,000/- to start self- employment. It had prayed for the direction in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus to declare deployment of 1.80 lakh women beneficiaries hailing from the self-help group JEEVIKA on the polling booth in both phases of polling as illegal and unfair.  

A writ petition is filed by the Party under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking the issuance of writ of issue writ of Mandamus, declaring the fresh addition of beneficiaries in the Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana, and payment to them in course of election as illegal, unconstitutional and contrary to Articles 14, 21, 112, 202 and 324 of the Constitution of India. It had sought directions to the Election Commission of India to take appropriate action under Article 324 of Constitution of India and Section 123 of Representation of Peoples Act on Direct Benefit Transfer of Rs. 10,000 to 25-35 lakhs women voters during subsistence of M.C.C and in course of elections and thereafter as gratification/bribery/corrupt practices to benefit party in power in the State. 

In August 2025, the Government of Bihar, on the eve of the general assembly elections 2025, launched Mukhayamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana. The main objective was to provide financial support to one woman per family in Bihar to start a self-employment activity. The scheme stated that Rs 10,000 as the first instalment will be provided to all eligible women applicants who are members of Jeevika Self Help Groups, and further, additional assistance of Rs 2 lakh each will be provided by the government post assessment, however, after 6 months. The scheme benefits were to be given to women who were already registered with JEEVIKA; however, fresh applications for joining the self-help group were also invited. 

The petition reads: "The petitioner most respectfully submits that the then Government of Bihar resorted to corrupt practices to induce and allure the electors to vote in its favour by extending the benefit of Rs. 10,000/- each to be followed by Rs.2,00,000/- to new beneficiaries added post announcement of MCC and in course of elections; and the ECI failed miserably to put a check on such corrupt practices being adopted by the ruling party in the course of election schedule because of which it is humbly submitted that the election was vitiated as the other contestants/parties to the elections were deprived of level playing field which is a sheer violation of MCC, the Representation of People’s Act (RPA), 1951 and Articles 14 21 and 324 of the Constitution of India." 

It alleged: "It is most respectfully submitted that in course of elections and subsistence of M.C.C, new beneficiaries were added in the JEEVIKA and payments of Rs 10,000 were made to them. That the fresh addition to the DBT Scheme of estimated 25-35 lacs women voters during elections and same violates the principle of free and fair elections and principle of level playing field. The action of the State Government is an act actuated with malice to damage electoral prospects of the other parties and contenders and that the ECI failed miserably to put a check upon such corrupt practices being resorted to by the ruling government and has not followed guidelines issued by this Hon’ble Court and also its own guidelines dated 07.01.07 in compendium of Instructions Vol-III."

It also submitted that about 1.80 lac women members (beneficiaries) of the self-help group i.e JEEVIKA were deputed on polling booths as Volunteers in both phases of polling which has no basis, as JEEVIKA members (beneficiaries) are a non-government group and that most of them were beneficiaries of the DBT scheme, thus, their deputation on the polling booth can’t be called natural, fair and reasonable but were deputed for obvious reasons. 

The petition reads: "This action alone may shock the conscience of any common man to assume that such volunteers who had recently received the benefits under a Scheme, would be obviously biased in favour of the ruling Party, thereby influencing the election process and making it unfair".  It submitted "That the ECI failed to check that the instalment of DBT scheme were rolled out even on the date of proclamation of the M.C.C and announcement of election schedule in Bihar and even thereafter, during the course of election. DBT transfers were made even on days prior to polling, further, the ECI also failed to check that under the scheme in issue new beneficiaries were added during election process and the newly added beneficiaries number around 25-35 lacs (estimated) were added and paid Rs 10,000 each after proclamation of M.C.C and thereafter, which purely amounts to Bribery and thus, is a corrupt practice as envisaged under Section 123 of the R.P.A." Now if Jan Suraj approaches the High Court, it will decide the fate of the result of Assembly Election 2025. 

Also read:Patna High Court dismisses PIL on bribery of voters during recent Bihar Legislative Assembly Election