In Punam Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justices Rana Vikram Singh and Bibek Chaudhuri delivered a 14-page long verdict dated October 8, 2026, "36. The Court noticed that the writ petitioner had
not acquired the requisite teachers’ training during the pendency of the proceedings and in view of the Notification dated 09.08.2017 issued under Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 as well as the consequential instructions issued thereunder, declined to direct her appointment against the post vacated by the appellant. 37. Therefore, the submission that the learned Single Judge mechanically substituted the writ petitioner in place of the appellant is not borne out by the judgment and order under appeal. 38. The jurisdiction of this Court in a Letters Patent Appeal is, undoubtedly, wide; nevertheless, interference is warranted only where the judgment and order under appeal suffers from an error of law, perversity, or material misappreciation of the records. 39. In the case at hand, the learned Single Judge has considered the relevant documents, the proceedings before the District Appellate Authority and the State Appellate Authority, the explanation furnished by the appellant and the marks admittedly obtained by her. The conclusion that the appellant’s appointment could not be sustained, once the foundation of her selection was found to be based upon a forged and fabricated marks-sheet, is firmly supported by the materials available on record. 40. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of
respondent Nos. 5 and 6 also substantially supports the factual position recorded in the judgment and order under appeal and does not disclose any material circumstance warranting a different view. 41. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the judgment and order under appeal suffers from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its intra-Court appellate jurisdiction. 42. Ex consequenti, the present appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 43. There shall be no order as to costs." The judgement was authored by Justice Rana Vikram Singh.
The Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the appellant, namely, Punam Kumari, against the judgment and order dated 12.01.2024 passed by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 4933 of 2019, whereby the writ petition preferred by respondent No. 11 herein (the petitioner in the writ petition) was allowed to the extent indicated in the said judgment and order and the orders dated 13.06.2018 and 10.12.2018 passed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara and the State Appellate Authority, Bihar, Patna, respectively, were set aside. Consequently, the appointment of the present appellant (respondent No. 11 in the writ petition) to the post of Panchayat Teacher in Gram Panchayat Raj Dumariya, Shahpur Block, District-Bhojpur was also set aside. 2. The memorandum of appeal reveals that the writ petitioner (respondent No. 11 herein) had challenged the order dated 10.12.2018 passed in Case No. Appeal/530/2018 by the State Appellate Authority, Bihar, Patna as well as the earlier order dated 13.06.2018 passed in Appeal (Case) No. 37 of 2017 by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, by preferring C.W.J.C. No. 4933 of 2019.
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant had unsuccessfully assailed the judgment and order under appeal, primarily on the ground that the learned Single Judge failed to properly appreciate the facts and circumstances surrounding the selection and appointment of the appellant. The appellant had been selected through a duly conducted selection process and had been appointed pursuant to the merit list prepared by the competent authority. It was contended that the Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the appointment after a considerable lapse of time, particularly when the appellant had continued in service for several years. It was urged that the Single Judge failed to appreciate the alleged infirmities in the case of the writ petitioner and that the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment in place of the appellant could not have been accepted merely on the basis of allegations regarding the authenticity of the marks-sheet. 6. The memorandum of Appeal further raises grounds questioning the appreciation of the evidence by the Single Judge and alleged, inter alia, that the finding regarding the forged document was not sustainable in the eyes of law and that the selection process was being questioned after a considerable lapse of time.
AC to AAG-13 appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand opposed the appeal and supported the judgment and order under appeal. It was submitted on behalf of the State that the appointment of the appellant was founded upon the marks secured by her in the Intermediate Examination and that the materials available on record demonstrated a substantial discrepancy between the marks reflected in the document relied upon for securing the appointment and the marks actually obtained by the appellant. It was submitted that the appellant’s own stand before the District Appellate Authority was that she had obtained 384 marks out of 900 marks and, therefore, the very foundation upon which she had secured a higher position in the merit list, stood seriously undermined. The State had also relied upon the fact that the Single Judge did not mechanically direct the appointment of the writ petitioner; rather, after setting aside the appointment of the appellant, the Single Judge specifically noticed that the writ petitioner had not acquired the requisite teachers’ training and, therefore, no positive direction for her appointment could be issued. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 also places reliance upon this aspect of the matter.
The Division Bench considered the principal question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is whether the Single Judge was justified in interfering with the appointment of the appellant upon finding that the appointment had been obtained on the basis of a forged and fabricated marks-sheet. The controversy had its genesis in the selection and appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher in Gram Panchayat Raj Dumariya, under Shahpur Block, District Bhojpur, against the unreserved category of physically handicapped women candidates, during the second phase of teachers’ employment. For the said purpose, a merit list was prepared and published on January 6, 2009, wherein the appellant (respondent No. 11 in the writ petition) was placed amongst the selected candidates on the basis of the marks attributed to her in the Intermediate examination. The appellant was thereafter issued an appointment letter dated 14.08.2010 vide Memo No. 26 and was appointed as Panchayat Teacher. Subsequently, respondent No. 11, the writ petitioner before the Single Judge, obtained the appellant’s marks sheet from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council and alleged that she had, in fact, obtained only 384 marks out of 900 marks, i.e., 42.66% and not the marks on the basis of which she had secured her position in the merit list. The writ petitioner, consequently, alleged that the appellant had secured appointment on the strength of a forged and fabricated marks sheet. The said factual assertion as well as the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are also substantially reflected in the memorandum of Appeal and the documents annexed thereto.
Notably, the writ petitioner had earlier approached the High Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 23049 of 2012, which was disposed of on September 4, 2017, with liberty to her to approach the District Appellate Authority within thirty days. Pursuant thereto, Appeal Case No. 37 of 2017 was preferred before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur at Ara. The appellant appeared in the said appellate proceeding and filed her reply. Significantly, as borne out from the record considered by the learned Single Judge, the appellant herself stated before the District Appellate Authority that she had secured 384 marks out of 900 marks in the Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994. The District Appellate Authority, however, dismissed the appeal principally on the ground of inordinate delay in challenging the said appointment. The State Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeal preferred against the said order and thereby, upholding the decision of the District Appellate Authority.
The writ petition was, thereafter, considered by the Single Judge, who found that the issue of delay could not defeat the challenge when the writ petitioner had already approached this Court in the year 2012 itself and had, thereafter, pursued her remedy before the competent Appellate Authority pursuant to the order passed by this Court. The Single Judge further found that the appellant had secured appointment on the basis of a forged and fabricated mark-sheet and, consequently, held that the appointment was void ab initio.
The foundation of the appellant’s appointment was her position in the merit list. Her merit position, in turn, depended upon the marks attributed to her in the Intermediate examination. The records, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, disclosed that the appellant had been shown to have obtained 72.77% marks, whereas the material obtained from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council indicated that she had actually obtained 384 marks out of 900 marks, equivalent to 42.66%. More importantly, this was not merely a case where the writ petitioner had made an allegation which remained unsupported. The Single Judge noticed that the appellant herself had admitted before the District Appellate Authority that she had obtained 384 marks out of 900 marks. Thus, the basic factual foundation relied upon by the Single Judge cannot be said to be based merely upon an unsubstantiated allegation made by the writ petitioner. Once the marks actually obtained by the appellant were found to be substantially lower than those on the basis of which she had secured her position in the merit list, the very basis of her selection and appointment dissipates rendering her appointment unsustainable in the eyes of law. The Single Judge recorded a categorical finding that the appellant had secured appointment on the basis of a forged and fabricated marks sheet and that such appointment was consequently void ab initio.
The Division Bench referred to Fraus omnia corrumpit, the Latin maxim, which embodies the principle that “fraud vitiates everything”. Under this foundational legal principle, anything acquired or obtained through fraud is not only completely void but it is void since inception and nothing can legalize it nor can give it colour of legitimacy. When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.
It referred to Supreme Court's decision in Jainendra Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh though Principal Secretary, Home and Ors. : (2012) 8 SCC 748]. The above legal principle was strengthened by the Supreme Court in Vijay Kishanrao Kurundkar & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 834, wherein it has been held that“it is trite law that an appointment secured on the basis of a fraudulent certificate is void ab initio. It is not open to the government to circumvent the existing statutory mandate by indefinitely protecting the deceitful activities of such candidates through the use of circulars or resolutions”. The aforesaid legal principles find their foundational fulcrum in the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India Vs. Jagdish Balram Bahira : (2017) 8 SCC 670.An appointment obtained by placing reliance upon a document which does not represent the candidate’s actual academic qualification cannot be protected merely on the ground that the appointment was made several years ago. An appointment founded upon fraud or misrepresentation cannot acquire legitimacy merely by the passage of time. 26. The principle that “fraud vitiates the entire proceeding” squarely applies to the facts of the present case, where the very document, which formed the basis of the selection, has been found to be fabricated or materially false. 27. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the materials available on record, specifically recorded a finding that the appellant had secured appointment on the basis of a forged and fabricated document and that such fraud went to the root of the appointment.
Justice Singh observed: "28. In our considered opinion, the answer to issue formulated in Paragraph 12 has to be in the affirmative. 29. The contention regarding delay also does not persuade us. 30. The learned Single Judge has rightly noticed that the writ petitioner did not remain inactive after the appellant’s appointment. The record shows that the writ petitioner had approached this Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 23049 of 2012 and pursuant to the order dated 04.09.2017, she had approached the District Appellate Authority within the time granted by this Court. 31. Thereafter, the writ petitioner challenged the order of the District Appellate Authority before the State Appellate Authority and after the order dated 10.12.2018, she approached this Court by filing the writ petition, which culminated in the judgment under appeal. 32. Thus, the present case cannot be treated as one where a person had slept over her rights and, after an unexplained and prolonged delay, sought to disturb a concluded appointment. The procedural history noticed by the learned Single Judge demonstrates that the writ petitioner had been diligently pursuing the matter before the competent forums. 33. The mere length of service, therefore, cannot validate an appointment where its very foundation has been found to be fraudulent. 34. There is another significant aspect of the matter, which deserves to be noticed. 35. The learned Single Judge did not direct the appointment of the writ petitioner merely on the ground that the appointment of the appellant was found to be illegal. On the contrary, after setting aside the appointment of the appellant, the learned Single Judge considered whether any positive direction could be issued in favour of the writ petitioner."
Earlier, in Sunita Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.(2024), Justice Anil Kumar Sinha delivered a 10-page long judgement dated January 12, 2024, wheren, he concluded:"19. Considering the aforesaid, this Court is satisfied that the respondent no. 11 has obtained the appointment on the post of Panchayat Teacher in the year 2009 on the basis of forged and fabricated mark sheet of Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994, and as such appointment of respondent no. 11 is void ab initio inasmuch as fraud unravels everything and goes to the root and vitiate the appointment. 20. Both the Appellate Authorities failed to appreciate the fact regarding respondent no. 11 having obtained the appointment on the post of Panchayat Teacher on the basis of forged document and rejected the appeals of the petitioner merely on the ground of delay. Both the Appellate Authorities also failed to appreciate that after appointment of respondent no. 11, the petitioner immediately approached this Court by filing CJWC No. 23049 of 2012 and upon direction being given by this Court, vide order, dated 04.09.2017, the petitioner immediately filed an appeal before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, in the year 2017 itself and after order of the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, in Appeal (Case) No. 37 of 2017, on 13.06.2018, the petitioner immediately in the year 2018 challenged the same before the State Appellate Authority. 21. The petitioner has been deprived of her legitimate right for appointment over and above respondent no. 11, having secured higher marks than respondent no. 11, i.e. 49.22 per cent."
Justice Sinha observed: "22. Accordingly, in my opinion, the orders passed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, and the State Appellate Authority, cannot sustain in the eyes of law. 23. As such, both the orders, i.e. order, dated 10.12.2018, passed by the State Appellate Authority, in Case No. Appeal/530/2018 and the order, dated 13.06.2018, passed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, in Appeal (Case) No. 37 of 2017, are hereby set aside. 24. The appointment of respondent no. 11, on the post of Panchayat Teacher in Gram Panchayati Raj Dumariya, under Shahpur block, in the district of Bhojpur, will also not sustain. As such, the same is also set aside, including the appointment letter of the respondent no. 11, issued under the signature of the Panchayat Secretary, on 14.08.2010, under Memo No. 26, dated 14.08.2010. 25. From perusal of the statements made in the writ application, it does not appear that the petitioner has acquired teachers training during the pendency of this writ application. Accordingly, as per notification, dated 09.08.2017, issued by the Union of India, under Section 23 (2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (in short, ‘the 2009 Act”), by which four years’ further time was granted from 31.03.2015 to complete the training and a general order having been passed by the Director, Elementary Education, dated 22.10.2019, in terms of the direction issued by the union of India, under Section 23 (2) of the 2009 Act, to remove those teachers, who have not acquired training by the end of the cut off date, i.e. 31.03.2019, as such, no direction can be issued by this Court for appointment of the petitioner upon the post vacated by respondent no. 11. 26. In the result, this writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above. 27. There shall be no order as to costs." One of the 11 respondents was Respondent no. 11, Punam Kumari.
The writ application was preferred by the petitioner for quashing the order, dated 10.12.2018, passed by the State Appellate Authority, in Case No. Appeal/530/2018 and further for quashing the order, dated 13.06.2018, passed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, in Appeal (Case) No. 37 of 2017. 2. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing the letter of appointment, dated 14.08.2010, by which the respondent no. 11, namely, Punam Kumari, was appointed on the post of Panchayat Teacher in Gram Panchayati Raj Dumariya, under Shahpur block, in the district of Bhojpur, and to further direct the respondent authorities to appoint the petitioner on the post of Panchayat Teacher in place of respondent no. 11 or to hold selection process for the above said post as the petitioner had higher marks than that of respondent no. 11.
The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner, along with respondent no. 11, Punam Kumari, and others, submitted applications for appointment on the post of Panchayat Teacher in the Gram Panchayati Raj Dumariya, under Shahpur block, in the district of Bhojpur, under unreserved category of physically handicapped (women), during the second phase of teachers employment. 4. A merit list was approved and published on January 6, 2009, in which the name of seven candidates were mentioned and the petitioner was shown at serial no. 3 with 49.22 per cent marks; whereas the name of respondent no. 11 figured at serial no. 7 with 72.77 per cent marks. Since, the marks obtained by the respondent no. 11 was higher amongst the seven candidates, appointment letter, vide memo no. 26, dated 14.08.2010, was issued in her favour. After the appointment of respondent no. 11 on the post of Panchayat Teacher, the petitioner obtained the mark sheet of respondent no. 11 from the Bihar intermediate Education Council, from which it transpired that the respondent no. 11 has secured only 384 marks out of 900, i.e. 42.66 per cent marks.The petitioner, after coming to know about the forgery being done by the respondent no. 11, moved before the High Court, by filing CWJC No. 23049 of 2012, which was disposed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide order, dated 04.09.2017, with a direction to the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara,, within a period of thirty days from the date of the order. During the pendency of the writ application, pursuant to the order, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, in CWJC No. 15459 of 2014, the petitioner made a complaint, on June 3, 2015, before the A.D.G., Vigilance Investigation Bureau, Patna, regarding the irregularity committed in the appointment of
respondent no. 11 on the basis of forged certificate, but no action was taken on the complaint of the petitioner. Prior to the above complaint, the petitioner had also made complaint regarding the forged certificated being produced by respondent no. 11 for obtaining employment on the post of Panchayat Teacher, to the District Magistrate, Bhojpur, on May 6, 2012, with copies to District Education Officer, Bhojpur and block Education Officer, Shahpur, but of no avail. The petitioner filed Appeal (Case) No. 37 of 2017 before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, in which respondent no. 11 appeared and filed her reply, stating therein that in the Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994, she obtained 384 marks out of 900, meaning thereby that she had accepted the case of the petitioner that respondent no. 11 had secured only 42.66 per cent marks in the Intermediate of Arts Examination and not 72.77 per cent marks. The appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, on the ground that the petitioner has approached the Authority after inordinate delay. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, before the State Appellate Authority, bearing Case No. Appeal/530/2018, also got dismissed, vide order, dated 10.12.2018, upholding the order passed by the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, on the ground of delay. the counsel for the petitioner argues that the merit list prepared contains the names of seven candidates, but the name of the petitioner appeared at serial no. 4, having secured 49.22 per cent marks and the name of the respondent no. 11 finds place at serial no. 7, having secured 72.77 per cent marks. One of the candidates, namely, Manimala, who was visually disable candidate, was not eligible for consideration for appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher and one candidate, namely, Neelam Kumari, filed an affidavit, duly sworn before the Executive Magistrate, Bhojpur, stating that she was not interested in the appointment on the said post. Since the petitioner was having higher marks than the respondent no. 11, who was appointed on the basis of forged certificate, the petitioner would be placed at serial number 1 in the merit list, having higher marks than all other willing candidates, i.e. 49.22 per cent. The respondent no. 11 secured the appointment on the basis of forged certificate of Intermediate of Arts, showing to have obtained 72.77 per cent marks and after procuring the correct mark sheet of respondent no. 11 from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council, it was detected that the respondent no. 11 had obtained only 42.66 per cent marks (384 out of 900), i.e. less than the marks of the petitioner.
Notably, no counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent no. 11, though counsel for the respondent no. 11 appeared before this Court. He was not in a position to demonstrate the correct marks obtained by respondent no. 11 and was also not in a position to meet the submissions of the petitioner. 16. The District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, has dismissed the case of the petitioner and refused to interfere with the appointment of respondent no. 11 merely on the ground that the petitioner approached the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, after inordinate delay, without appreciating the fact that the petitioner approached this Court in the year 2012 itself by filing CWJC No. 23049 of 2012 and this Court, vide order, dated 04.09.2017, directed the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, within a period of thirty days from the date of the order and in pursuance thereof, Appeal (Case) No. 37 of 2017 was filed by the petitioner before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara.In the reply filed by the respondent before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, she has admitted that she got only 384 marks out of 900 in the Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994, which comes to 42.66 per cent marks and not 72.77 per cent marks, on the basis of which respondent no. 11 was appointed, being the candidate having highest marks amongst the candidates whose names figured in the merit list. From the materials available on record, it transpired that the appointment of respondent no. 11 was made on the basis of forged certificate, showing 72.77 per cent marks obtained by her in the Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994; whereas, from the certificate produced by the petitioner of respondent no. 11, the respondent no. 11 has obtained only 384 marks out of 900 marks, which comes to 42.66 per cent. The respondent no. 11 was appointed on the basis of forged mark sheet of Intermediate of Arts Examination, 1994 produced by her, in which she has been shown to have secured 72.77 per cent marks. The respondent no. 11 had admitted before the District Appellate Authority, Bhojpur, Ara, in writing, that she has secured 384 marks out of total marks of 900 and not 655 marks out of total marks of 900.
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