Traffic Manager on contract, the petitioner entitled to all consequential benefits, termination order unsustainable in law: Justice Dr Anshuman

In Santosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman delivered a 11-page long judgement dated April 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order is stigmatic in nature and has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, subject to the outcome of any fresh decision taken by the respondents after due process." 

The five other respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar, Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Bihar State Road Corporation, Patna through its Managing Director, Phulwarisharif, Patna, Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna and Regional Manager, Bihar State Road Transportation, Gaya. 

The writ petition has been filed for quashing Letter No. 570 dated 19.02.2024 issued by Respondent No. 5, namely the Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, whereby the contractual engagement of the petitioner was terminated on the ground of alleged unauthorized absence from duty with effect from December 15, 2023. The petitioner had prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities to reinstate him on his post, as he remained willing and available to discharge his duties during the subsistence of the contractual period. The petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Traffic Manager on a contractual basis for a period of one year issued by the Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, pursuant to an advertisement issued by the Corporation. Prior thereto, an offer of appointment was issued by letter dated October 23, 2018, requiring the petitioner to execute a bond and submit an acceptance letter. The petitioner duly complied with the said requirements and joined his duties, which was formally accepted by Memo dated November 16, 2018. It was submitted that the petitioner continuously discharged his duties satisfactorily and no complaint was ever made against him. His contractual engagement was extended from time to time through various orders. Subsequently, by letter dated September 1, 2021, he was transferred from the post of Depot Superintendent to the Head Office, Patna. Thereafter, he was again transferred to Aurangabad Depot, where he assumed charge as Depot Superintendent and duly joined on June 17, 2022. During his posting at Aurangabad, the petitioner repeatedly requested the Regional Manager, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Gaya, through letters dated 16.05.2023, 18.06.2023, 01.07.2023, 29.08.2023, and 16.11.2023, to conduct physical verification of the store and accounts, apprehending possible manipulation by certain staff members. However, no such verification was undertaken despite repeated requests. It was further submitted that the petitioner sustained a fracture in his leg and, accordingly, submitted a leave application dated 10.10.2023 seeking leave from 12.10.2023 to 18.10.2023. Subsequently, vide letter dated 14.12.2023, the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, BSRTC, Patna directed all Regional Managers/Assistant Regional Managers (Accounts) to conduct physical verification of stores and accounts twice a month and submit reports, warning of strict administrative action in case of irregularities. Pursuant thereto, the Regional Manager, BSRTC, Gaya conducted verification at Aurangabad Depot and alleged financial irregularities amounting to Rs. 4,00,140/-. Consequently, an FIR bearing Town P.S. Case No. 896 of 2023 dated 15.12.2023 was lodged against the petitioner and one Rajeev Raj, an outsourced cashier.

The senior counsel submitted that the allegations were wholly misconceived. It was contended that the responsibility for maintaining cash, making entries in the account register, and depositing cash in the bank lies solely with the cashier, and not with the Depot Superintendent. The petitioner had no role in the alleged misappropriation. It was further submitted that by letter ated 15.12.2023, the petitioner was directed to stop work at Aurangabad Depot during the pendency of the enquiry and remain present at the headquarters. Thus, the allegation of unauthorized absence from 15.12.2023 is factually incorrect, as the petitioner was complying with official directions. However, without conducting any enquiry and without issuing any show cause notice, the respondent authority abruptly terminated the petitioner’s contract vide Memo dated 19.02.2024 on the ground of absence. It was submitted that such termination is arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice, and was serious civil consequences. The petitioner’s contractual tenure was valid up to 5.05.2024, and at the time of termination, the contract was still subsisting. 

The senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner had already been granted bail by the High Court vide order dated 13.05.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 24489 of 2024, with a direction to deposit Rs. 2,00,000/- in installments, which has been duly complied with. In such a backdrop, it was submitted that the impugned order was liable to be set aside, and the petitioner deserved to be reinstated to the post of Traffic Manager, as the post was still vacant.

To substantiate his submissions, senior counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Swati Pridarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2024) 19 SCC 128. He relied upon the judgment rendered in Bhola Nath vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95, wherein the Supreme Court held that the State, being a “model employer”, cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by continuing them on a purely contractual basis for an indefinite period so as to evade its obligations of regular employment. It was also held that abrupt discontinuation of long-serving employees merely on the ground of contractual nomenclature, and that too without a reasoned or speaking order, was manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

Justice Dr Anshuman observed that the impugned order was "passed without adherence to the principles of natural justice, is unsustainable in law."

Construction of a Pacca road over raiyati lands of petitioner cannot be permitted without consent of petitioner: Justice Sourendra Pandey

In Radha Raman Lal vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Madhubani & Ors. (2026), Justice Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated April 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"14. The petitioner is only aggrieved by the fact of construction of a pacca (concrete) road constructed on his land by government funds and it is the said issue which needs to be adjudicated....the construction of a Pacca road over the raiyati lands of the petitioner cannot be permitted, if the same has been done without any consent and willingness by the petitioner and the same needs to be demolished. 16. The District Magistrate, Madhubani is directed that he shall ensure that the concrete construction made on the land of the petitioner is demolished within a period of one month from the date of production/communication of this order. The state shall be at liberty to recover the amount used in such construction of road from the erring persons after fixing the liability. 17. The writ application is allowed."

Justice Pandey considered two issues which required adjudication in the writ application. One was as to whether government funds can be used to construct a P.C.C. Road over a Raiyati land? The other, whether a right of easement granted by the petitioner through a Panchnama can be withdrawn subsequently by getting the P.C.C. road demolished? 

The nine other respondents were:2. Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani, 3. Circle officer (C.O.) Block Bishfi, Madhubani, 4. Blok Development Officer, Block Bishfi, Madhubani, 5. LOk Shikayat Nivaran Padadhikari, Benipatti, Madhubani, 6. Superintendent of Police (S.P.), Madhubani, 7. Mukihya, Dilip Kumar Safi, Panchayat Singhia Purvi, Block Bisfi, Madhubani, 8. Binay Kumar Jha, 9. Yoganand Jha and 10. Abhilashanand Jha. 

The writ application prayed for protecting the interest of the petitioner by directing the respondents to remove the illegal construction of road from the private/khatiyani land of the petitioner; for directing the respondents to remove the illegal construction of the road which was constructed in connivance with the authorities without acquiring the land and also without taking consent from the petitioner;for directing the respondents to take action against the encroachers/respondents as per law and for any other consequential relief or reliefs for which the petitioner is found entitled during the course of hearing of this writ petition.

The facts which gave rise to the writ application was that the petitioner was the owner of the land namely 8732 (old) 15521, 16335 (new) situated at Itharwa, Block Bisfi, Madhubani and is in possession of the same however the private respondent in connivance with Ward Commissioner/Zila Parshad has constructed a P.C.C. road on the Raiyati land of the petitioner without taking any consent/acquisition of land by the Government, which was exclusively for the personal use of the private respondent.

The senior counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner acquired the land through Bandobasti and is paying rent to the government, which also found mention in Khatiyan. It was submitted that upon several representations filed by the son of the petitioner before officer-in-charge, Bishfi P.S., before Lok Shikayat Nivaran Padadhikari, Benipatti Sub-Division, Madhubani and also before Janta Darbar of the Chief Minister, who, thereafter, directed Circle Officer to send Government appointed Amin to measure the land, who submitted the report which was found in favour of the petitioner. It was also submitted that Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani directed the Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani to provide possession of land to the petitioner, who did not take action for the same and upon inquiry stated that he is seeking legal opinion of ADC, Madhubani. It was further submitted that District Magistrate, Madhubani instructed the Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani to comply with the same whereafter the said Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani fixed specific date for the petitioner to be present at site, so that encroachment be removed and possession be given but the Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani, himself, did not turn up.

Subsequently, Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani failed to provide any information and allegedly the land was encroached by respondents for giving benefit to one person and more so, no objection signature has fraudulently been taken from Binay Kumar Jha (private respondent) and he has also presented false facts before SDM Court.

It was submitted through the rejoinder that the construction took place on February 6-7, 2021 and an application was submitted with wrong Panchnama on October 29, 2021. The Panchnama itself suffered from a number of infirmities which cannot be legally acceptable. It was submitted that the petitioner acquired the land legally and was paying rent to the Government of Bihar. It was also submitted that no subsequent mention about use of land for transport was ever mentioned by respondents. The senior counsel submitted that since the land was not closed, the same was being used by people as a passage but that does not give right to the Mukhiya to use government funds to construct a concrete road over the same. The senior counsel prayed that the illegal construction of P.C.C. road be demolished.

On behalf of Respondent No. 1 to 3, the G.P.-18 submitted that the petition was barred by principle of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. It was submitted that the land appertaining to Khata No. 801 was recorded as Gairmajarua Khaas under cadastral survey and was not a raiyati land as claimed by the petitioner and the land was being used as passage for time immemorial and thus no consent was required for construction of P.C.C. road. It was submitted that Binay kumar Jha and Yoganand Jha had filed an application before Circle Officer, Bishfi, Madhubani on October 29, .2021, wherein, they had produced a copy of panchnama dated January 8, 1979 stating that petitioner had admitted the passage for ingress and outgress and allowed the land to be used as road. It was submitted that petitioner had never acquired land from an ex-landlord or from the State and rent receipt did not create or extinguish the title. It was also submitted that in C.S, Khatiyan land was entered as Gairmajarua Khaas while in revisional survey Records of Rights, land is mentioned as raiyati land and no NOC was obtained from Circle Officer, Bishfi,
Madhubani hence direction was sought from Additional Collector for vacating the land in question. It was lastly submitted that upon question being posed on Circle Officer as to why the direction of Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani was not complied it was stated that the same could not be done on account of non availability of police force. The State relied on the panchanama dated January 8, 1979, whereby the petitioner was allowed passage and earlier Kharanja road was constructed and later P.C.C. road was constructed over the same. 

The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Madhubani, Deputy Development Commissioner (DDC), Madhubani and Circle officer (C.O.) Block Bishfi, Madhubani were was respodent no.s 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 

The counsel representing Binay Kumar Jha, the respondent No. 8 submitted that the petitioner tried to mislead the High Court by stating that the passage was his personal land however the same was being used for more than 40 years as Rasta, which the petitioner had himself permitted to the father of the answering respondent. It was submitted that with the efflux of time the said land being permitted to be used as Rasta (Passage) created a right of easement and therefore the same cannot be disturbed only because a P.C.C. road was constructed upon the same. He emphatically asserted that once the petitioner allowed the passage to be used for others the right of easement accrued to the respondents and as there was a Khranja road existing on the said land the same was converted into a concrete road and therefore there was no new change to the usage of the land and hence the writ petition is fit to be dismissed.

Justice Pandey noted that the land in question was a Raiyati land of the petitioner, which was not denied though the State has raised a vague question as to how a Gair Majarua Khas entry was converted into a Raiyati land. The ownership and possession of the petitioner was not denied and in fact the same was admitted, if the Panchnama is taken into consideration. The land being Raiyati Land and if there is no ‘No Objection’ from the petitioner granting permission to construct a Concrete road, government funds could not have been used for such construction. Such construction of road using raiyati lands of people are permissible only when the persons agree and willingly give their no objection for such construction. Hence, the construction of a road on such land is not permitted and was rightly directed to be removed.

With regard to the right of easement raised by the private respondent no. 8 on the basis of some Panchnama said to be executed way back in 1979, Justice Pandey observed that it "can be answered simply that the right of easement is enforceable and if the respondent no. 8 is aggrieved by any such action of the petitioner of denying him the right of passage as decided in the year 1979 then he can move a competent court of civil jurisdiction and claim his right. From the prayers made in this writ petition and also the pleadings this writ petition has not been filed to decide the rights of the parties and claim and counter claims with respect to the land in question and the same cannot also be decided in a writ jurisdiction hence the arguments being raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 8 cannot be looked into in the present proceedings, which is not even dealing with the said issue." 

Notably, under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, no person can be deprived of their property except by authority of law. The oral consent from a landholder is insufficient to permit road construction over private land. For any permanent road construction, the land must be acquired by the procedure prescribed in law, with compensation paid. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State cannot deprive a citizen on his property without sanction of law. The right to property as a constitutional and human right. No person can be deprived of his property without due procedure of law. The property can only be acquired for public purpose on payment of reasonable compensation in accordance with law. It has been held in Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh; (2020) 2 SCC 569, D.B. Basnett vs. Collector East District, Gangtok Sikkim and another; (2020), Sukh Dutt Ratra vs. State of H.P.; (2022), Kukreja Construction Co. vs. State of Maharashtra; (2024) and Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. State of Karnataka; (2025). 

In the case of Vidya Devi case, it has been held as follows: “12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution." 

In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chennai; (2005) 7 SCC 627, wherein this Court held that: “6. ... Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy; (2008) 15 SCC 517, this Court held that: “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.”
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors.; (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379, para 30)
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat; (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596 this Court held as follows: “48. ...In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession Under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the Rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. v. M.I.D.C. and Ors.; (2013) 1 SCC 353 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the Rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if
the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. v. M.I.D.C. and Ors.; (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: (SCC p. 359 para 11)
“11.There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, Under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”

Supreme Court has underlined that the State being a welfare State cannot be permitted to take a plea of adverse possession. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizen. 

Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) reconstituted with 12 members with Justice B.V. Nagarathna as its Chairperson

An Office Order dated April 30, 2026 issued by Kuntal Sharma Pathak, Registrar (J), Court & Building, Supreme Court's Administration General  Branch, in exercise of powers conferred by Clause 4(2) of the Gender Sensitization & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Regulations, 2013 states that Justice Surya Kant, the Chief Justice of India has re-constituted a 12-member,  Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) with effect from May 1, 2026. These Regulations came into force on July 17, 2013 in the backdrop of enactment of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 after it was assented by the President of India and publication in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, on April 23, 2013 and the framing of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, the Union Government made the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 29 of the Act which was published in the Gazette of India on December 9, 2013. 

The composition of the ICC is as under:-
1. Justice B.V. Nagarathna Chairperson
2. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Member
3. Ms. Kaveri, Registrar (J) [Officer in service of the Supreme Court of India], Member Secretary
4. Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate, Senior Member,  Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(b)], Member 
5. Ms. Nina Gupta, Advocate, Senior Member, Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(b)], Member
6. Mr. Soumyajit Pani, Advocate, Representative, Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(c)] ,Member
7. Ms. Sakshi Banga, Advocate, Representative, Supreme Court Bar Association under Clause 4(2)(c)], Member
8. Ms. Prabha Swami, Advocate-on-record, Representative, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association under Clause 4 (2)(d)], Member
9. Mrs. Sushma Rawat, Representative, Supreme Court Bar Clerks Association under Clause 4(2)(e)],
Member
10. Ms. Sneh Sharma, Founder, Vividhta Consulting, Nominee, Chief Justice of India under Clause 4 (2)(f)], Member
11. Ms. Liz Mathew, Senior Advocate, Nominee, Chief Justice of India under Clause 4(2)(h)], Member and 
12. Ms. Maheravish Rein, Advocate, Nominee, Chief Justice of India under Clause 4(2)(h)], Member

Prior to this, there 11 members including Dr. Leni Chaudhuri, Executive Director, University of Chicago Centre in India Pvt. Ltd., the nominee of the Chief Justice of India and Bansuri Swaraj, Senior Advocate who are not there in the reconstituted committee.   

Earlier too, the ICC was chaired by Justice B.V. Nagarathna. But its Member Secretary was Sujata Singh, Registrar, [Officer in service of the Supreme Court of India]. Its nine members included: Justice  Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate, Nina Gupta, Advocate, Soumyajit Pani, Advocate, Sakshi Banga, Prabha Swami, Advocate-on-record, Bansuri Swaraj, Senior Advocate, Liz Mathew, Senior Advocate and Dr. Leni Chaudhuri, Executive Director, University of Chicago Centre in India Pvt. Ltd., the nominee of the Chief Justice of India. Prior to this Justice Nagarathna was made the Chairperson, GSICC by order dated September 18, 2024 of Chief Justice of India. Prior to Justice Nagarathna, Justice Hima Kohli was the Chairperson of the GSICC. 

Notably, a circular dated February 14, 2014 issued by Rachna Gupta, Registrar, Supreme Court had communicated that the first meeting of Supreme Court Gender Sensitization and internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) headed by Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai was held in the Supreme Court's premises on December 9, 2013 to workout the modalities for the effective implementation of the "The Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013" and to take decision on related issues. In pursuance of the direction and with a view to sensitize the public to gender issues, it had informed that "The aggrieved women as defined in clause 2(a) of the Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013 may make a complaint in writing of sexual harassment at Supreme Court of India precincts to the GSICC through its Member Secretary - Ms. Rachna Gupta, Registrar. The contact details are:-Room No. First Floor (East wing), near Cash & Account-I Registry of Supreme Court of India Phone No. 011- 23381581, E-mail gupta.rachna@indianjudiciary.gov.in The Complaint shall be sent either by registered post, courier, speed
post or e-mail. It can also be handed over personally at the above said address. As required by Regulation 16 of the Gender Sensitisation and Sexual Harassment of Womeri.at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013, the confidentiality of the inquiry proceedings shall be maintained."

The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, aiming to provide a safe and secure working environment for women across all sectors was assented by the President of India and published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, on April 23, 2013. The Act covers all women, irrespective of age or employment status and extends its protection to both public and private sector workplaces, organized or unorganized, including domestic workers. The Act, 2013 is designed to be inclusive, intersectional and sector-agnostic. The interpretation of following key definitions enshrined in the Act, 2013 provides that the Act is unequivocally applicable to all women, irrespective of sector, employment status or nature of work. Its Hindi version is available here.

In Jaya Kodate v. Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University (2013), the Bombay High Court has held that “the definition of workplace is inclusive and deliberately kept wide by the Parliament to ensure that any area where women may be subjected to Sexual Harassment is not left unattended or unprovoked for."

Section 2(a) of the Act defines aggrieved woman  as any woman, of any age, whether employed or not, who alleges she has been subjected to sexual harassment at the workplace. This broad definition ensures that any woman present at a workplace regardless of her role is covered under the ambit of the Act. It also demonstrates the legislature's intention to provide statutory protection irrespective of her employment status.​

Section 2(f)- Definition of employee  includes persons employed on regular, temporary, ad hoc, or daily wage basis, either directly or through an agent, including volunteers or trainees. This includes contractual workers, apprentices, trainees, consultants and even unpaid interns. The definition ensures that economic dependency on the employer/ in-charge/ owner of a workplace is not a precondition for protection.

Section 2(g) of the Act defines employer as

1. in relation to any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit of the appropriate Government or a local authority, the head of that department, organisation, undertaking, establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit or such other officer as the appropriate Government or the local authority, as the case may be, may by an order specify in this behalf;
2. in any workplace not covered under sub-clause (i), any person responsible for the management, supervision and control of the workplace. (Explanation — For the purposes of this sub-clause “management” includes the person or board or committee responsible for formulation and administration of polices for such organisation);
3. in relation to workplace covered under sub-clauses (i) and (ii), the person discharging contractual obligations with respect to his or her employees;
4. in relation to a dwelling place or house, a person or a household who employs or benefits from the employment of domestic worker, irrespective of the number, time period or type of such worker employed, or the nature of the employment or activities performed by the domestic worker.

Under Section 2(o), the term workplace  is expansively defined to include government bodies, private sector organizations, non-governmental organizations and institutions carrying out commercial, professional, vocational, educational, entertainment, industrial, health services or financial activities. Accordingly, the Act applies to formal and informal sectors, organized and unorganized settings, and public and private spaces. It also covers home-based workers, field staff and women in transit for work purposes. 

Notably, the Internal Complaints Committee is an in-house redress mechanism to inquire into alleged complaints of sexual harassment in the institutions /organisations. Section 4 of the Act mandates that every employer of a workplace shall, by an order in writing, constitute a Committee to be known as the “Internal Complaints Committee”: and where the offices or administrative units of the workplace are located at different places or divisional or sub-divisional level, the Internal Committee shall be constituted at all administrative units or offices. The Internal Committees shall consist of the following members to be nominated by the employer, namely: —a Presiding Officer who shall be a woman employed at a senior level at workplace from amongst the employees, not less than two Members from amongst employees preferably committed to the cause of women or who have had experience in social work or have legal knowledge;one member from amongst non-governmental organizations or associations committed to the cause of women or a person familiar with the issues relating to sexual harassment: at least one-half of the total Members shall be women.

Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee and Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of Patna High Court 

Patna High Court has Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee which comprises of the Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Soni Shrivastava. Notably, the contact person for Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee, Patna High Court is Registrar, Establishment, Patna High Court who can contacted at sankalpvahini@nic.in 

Unlike the Supreme Court, which has 12 members, the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of Patna High Court has four members including Justice Soni Shrivastava, as the Chairperson. Its members are Rachna Shrivastava, Additional Registrar, Juvenile Justice Secretariat, Patna High Court, Surya Nilambari,  Advocate Patna High Court and Swapna, Deputy Registrar, Patna High Court.  

The Annual Reports of the High Court's Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace Committee and the ICC do appear to be in public domain. 

The relevant judgments on the issue include: Punjab and Sind Bank & Ors. vs Mrs. Durgesh Kuwar 2020 SCC OnLine SC 774,  Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors. vs Uoi & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 311 delivered on October 19 2012, D.S. Garewal vs. Vimmi Joshi (2009) 2 SCC 210, Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A. K. Chopra AIR 1999 SC 625/1999(1) SCC 759 delivered on January 20, 1999 and Vishaka & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3011.   

In Dr Sohail Malik v Union of India (2025) 2025 INSC 1415, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi delivered a 54-page long judgement dated December 10, 2025 wherein, it held that "The phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act, cannot be interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against a ‘respondent’ may only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’; (ii) Such a restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act will run contrary to the scheme of the Act, specifically in light of the all-encompassing and wide definition which has been given to the term ‘workplace’ in Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, particularly in light of Section 2(o)(v) which expands the scope of ‘workplace’ to include any place visited by the employee ‘arising out of or during the course of employment’; (iii) Under Section 13 of the POSH Act, the recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to the ‘employer’ which shall then take a decision with respect to initiation of disciplinary action....(iv) In case the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace is conducting a fact-finding inquiry under the POSH Act, the employer of the ‘respondent’, even if it is a different department, must abide its duties under Section 19(f) of the POSH Act to swiftly cooperate and make available information upon a request by the ICC of the aggrieved woman’s workplace." Thejudgement was uathored by Justice Maheshwari. 

Also read: Supreme Court Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (GSICC) reconstituted, reference to complaints omitted from GSICC Annual Report since 2022 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava suspend sentence, order release of appellant on bail during pendency of appeal on his personal bond

In Ranjit Kumar Jha @ Ranjit Jha vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava passed a 8-page long order dated April 29, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"....we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail during pendency of the appeal on his personal bond forthwith to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Samastipur in connection with Sessions Trial No. 17/2006/143/2006 arising out of Musarigharari P.S. Case No. 120 of 2000. 12. Fine, if any, imposed as part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 13. List this matter for further consideration on 14th May, 2026 at the top of the list." Justice Prasad has authored the order. 

The order reads: "8. It is evident on a bare reading of the affidavit of I.G., Prison, Bihar, Patna that the proposal sent by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur remained pending in the office of the Remission Board for more than 11 months. There is no explanation for this inaction. 9. We would like to know that who is responsible for keeping aside the proposal and not placing the same before the Remission Board for eleven months. How many applications are presently pending with the date of their pendency be placed before this Court.' 

Theorder reads: "10. We also call upon the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur as well as the I.G., Prison, Bihar, Patna to file their respective affidavits to show cause as to why this Court should not exercise its suo motu power as a Constitutional Court to award appropriate compensation to the appellant for his sufferings because of non-consideration of his case for grant of remission immediately after he became eligible for the same on completion of 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission and, in case, this Court comes to a conclusion that an appropriate amount of compensation is required to be given to the appellant, why such amount be not realised from the erring officials so that the Government Exchequer who is the custodian of the public money be not saddled with the burden of paying cost and compensation as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court in catena of judgments." 

In the appeal, the court considered the prayer of the appellant for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal. The appellant was convicted vide judgment dated October 29, 2009 and sentenced vide order dated November 6, 2009 by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Samastipur in connection with a Sessions Trial of 2006 which arose out of Musarigharari P.S. Case of 2000 for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1-B)a/27 of the Arms Act. He was ordered to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 

The court recollected its previous order dated April 17, 2026. It observed: "we are not required to examine the case of the appellant on merit for purpose of suspension of sentence and his release on bail during pendency of the appeal. It is an appeal in which the appellant being a poor person coming from lower strata of the society could not prefer an appeal for 16 years 2 months. Ultimately, with the legal assistance provided by the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee, the present appeal has been preferred. The order dated 17.04.2026 would throw some light on the facts and circumstances under which this appeal has been preferred." 

On April 29,, the court went through the affidavit filed on behalf of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur. In paragraph ‘6’ of his affidavit, it is stated: “6. That after completion of 20 years of life sentence, his proposal for premature release has been sent to Prison Head Quarter for consideration by State Sentence Remission Board vide Letter No-4126, dated-05-05-2025 by the office of S.K.R.B Central Jail Muzaffarpur, which however, is possible to be considered in next meeting by the Remission Board.” 

Justice Prasad observed: "6. It is evident from the statement made by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur that he has not clearly stated about the completion of 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission which is the condition required to be fulfilled for purpose of sending the case of a convict to the State Sentence Remission Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Remission Board”). We call upon him to make a clear statement as to when did the appellant complete 14 years of actual custody and 20 years with remission. 7. The I.G., Prison, Government of Bihar has filed an affidavit from which it is crystal clear that only after this Court passed its order on 17.04.2026, the Remission Board got awaken from slumber and the file of this appellant was moved in a hurry." 

The order reproduced paragraphs ‘10’ and ‘11’ of the affidavit by the I.G. Prison, wherein he stated: “10. That the proposal of the appellant for pre-mature release was put before the remission board in its meeting dated 21.04.2026. 11. That the Bihar State Sentence Remission Board in its meeting dated 21.04.2026 considered the proposal of the appellant and after due consideration sent their remarks to the competent authority for his decision and approval.”

Supreme Court stays execution of death sentence of appellants confirmed by Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sourendra Pandey

In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 13-page long judgement dated April 27, 2026, wherein, it wrote: "4. The execution of the death sentence of the appellant(s) shall remain stayed pending the hearing and final disposal of the present appeal(s). 5. The original record of the case be summoned from the Trial Court and the High Court. A copy of the translated record shall be supplied to the counsel for the parties."The order was passed upon hearing the proceedings which arose from the 67-page long judgment and order dated January 22, 2026 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference No.2/2024 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.691 of 2024. The matter will come up for hearing after twenty weeks. The case to High Court from the District Court, Rohtas.  

In the High Court, Ansul, senior counsel who had represented the informant had submitted that the records  showed that the Investigating Officer had not acted fairly and had created a mess by deliberately omitting to do what ought to have been done. It was submitted that the accused persons/defence cannot be allowed to take benefit of such acts or omissions of the prosecution which seem to have been deliberately done to favour the accused persons, otherwise it would amount to give premium to the accused for the wrongs of the prosecution which in the present case was apparently committed designedly to favour the appellants.  The senior counsel had relied upon paragraph 13 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the  Ram Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (1998) 4 SCC 517 and Harendra Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in (2023) 13 SCC 563,wherein, the Supreme Court had held that the three main stakeholders in a criminal trial, namely, the Investigating Officer, Public Prosecutor, and the Judiciary, all utterly failed to keep up their respective duties and responsibilities cast upon them. The Supreme Court had taken note of the subsequent conduct of the accused and had drawn adverse inference. The  Supreme Court had taken judicial notice of the judgment in the habeas corpus petition regarding conduct of the accused, the investigating agency, the Public Prosecutor and the Presiding Officer conducting the trial. 

The High Court was persuaded my the senior counsel's arguments, but the Supreme Court does appear to be persuaded. 

The order dated April 27 reads: "14. The Registry shall forthwith communicate this order to all the High Courts through their respective Registrar Generals; Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority; and Member Secretaries of Legal Services Authorities of all the States and Union Territories for necessary compliance."

The Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench referred to its earlier 122 page long judgement dated May 20, 2022 in Manoj & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1 (2023) 2 SCC 353, by the Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Bela. M. Trivedi wherein, it stated that the Court in the context of death reference cases, has underscored that while reformation is a foundational goal of criminal punishment, repeatedly affirmed in its jurisprudence, the absence of a structured and measurable framework, coupled with the inadequate implementation of meaningful prison reforms, has significantly hampered the system’s ability to achieve genuine rehabilitation. The judgment was authored by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat. 

The Court proposed the formulation of practical guidelines to aid courts in systematically collecting and evaluating mitigating circumstances, moving beyond vague considerations such as general conduct or family background, and thereby enabling a more informed assessment of an accused’s potential for reformation, while also serving as a precursor to a comprehensive legislative framework. Crucially, the Court emphasized that it is incumbent upon trial Courts to consider such mitigating circumstances at the earliest possible stage of proceedings in cases involving a potential death sentence, so as to ensure a balanced sentencing approach and to avoid slipping into a purely retributive response driven by the brutality of the crime, an outcome that the Court observed has become increasingly common by the time such matters reach the appellate stage.

The 3-Judge Bench observed :".....we are constrained to take note of a troubling trend being presented in multiple cases wherein reports on mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not being called for at the earliest stages of proceedings in a case involving a potential death sentence, namely, at the stage of sentencing before the trial Court or even at the stage of the reference for confirmation before the High Court. This omission creates a piquant situation in which such crucial material is, for the first time, sought only at the stage of appeal before this Court, thereby causing a long gap and avoidable delay in the collection of information essential for a proper, timely and informed determination on the question of sentence. Delayed consideration of these factors undermines the very objective of a balanced sentencing process and impedes the meaningful application of reformative principles."

It added: "12. It is also necessary to note that in a significant number of cases involving a potential death sentence, the quality of defence afforded to the accused remains inadequate, resulting in ineffective legal representation at crucial stages of the proceedings. Such deficiencies are often reflected in lackadaisical investigation and slackness in trial proceedings. There is hardly any attempt to collect data relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, thereby depriving the Courts of a complete and balanced perspective necessary for a just determination and imposition of sentence. The absence of competent and effective prosecution and defence not only undermines the fairness of the process but also increases the risk of a disproportionate, unjust, and uninformed sentencing outcome. This state of affairs renders it expedient to strengthen the legal aid framework in such cases, by ensuring the provision of skilled and adequately resourced legal representation, so that the accused is effectively assisted and the Court is meaningfully aided in discharging its functions in accordance with constitutional principles. 13. In wake of the above discussion and the concerns noted in the preceding paras particularly in relation to the ineffective consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the need to ensure meaningful legal representation in cases involving a potential death sentence, the following directions are being issued: - A. The report pertaining to aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall, as a matter of course, be called for by the trial Court itself once the accused is convicted, prior to the determination of sentence.
B. In the event such a report has not been called for or placed on record before the trial Court, the High Court shall mandatorily call for the same at the stage of admission of the death reference.
C. The concerned authorities shall ensure that such reports are comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated timeframe so as to avoid any delay in the adjudicatory process, and to aid and enable the Courts to undertake a meaningful, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing exercise. Upon receipt of such report, the Court concerned shall afford adequate opportunity to the parties to peruse the same and to advance oral submissions thereon. In cases where the reports procured by the trial Court are found to be ineffective or lacking in proper details, the High Court would be at liberty to call for a fresh report.
D. In every death sentence confirmation reference brought before the High Courts and this Court, the Legal Services Committee concerned shall assign a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two advocates having a minimum of 7 years practice, to represent the convicted person. Such
representation shall be provided irrespective of whether the convict has engaged private counsel, so as to ensure full and effective assistance to the Court in matters involving death penalty, which necessitate a careful balancing of the interests of justice, societal concerns, and the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation. The appointed legal team shall be furnished with the complete case records and afforded adequate time to prepare, conduct research, and present a comprehensive assessment of mitigating circumstances. The legal aid team so appointed shall work in cohesion with the representing private counsel, if any.
E. Each High Court, under the aegis of the High Court Legal Services Committee, shall constitute and maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters.
F. The National Legal Services Authority shall frame and circulate appropriate guidelines identifying the relevant fields of enquiry for gathering mitigating circumstances and may engage trained teams, including legal and social science professionals, to undertake fieldwork involving interaction with the convict, their family, and relevant authorities, for the purpose of collecting detailed information regarding background, antecedents, socio-economic conditions, mental health status, and other relevant factors. Such information shall be made available to the appointed legal team, which shall, in turn, place before the Court a holistic and well-documented account of the convict’s potential for reformation along with all pertinent mitigating and aggravating circumstances to assist in a just and informed determination of sentence."

In view of the orders passed by the Supreme  Court in matters involving capital punishment, the 3-Judge Bench issued the following directions: a. The respondent-State of Bihar shall place before this Court the report(s) of all the Probation Officers relating to the appellant(s) within a period of sixteen (16) weeks. 
b. The Superintendent of Prison, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall submit a report with regard to the nature of work which have been performed by the appellant(s) while in jail and a report with regard to the conduct and behaviour of the appellant(s) while in jail within a period of sixteen (16) weeks. 
c. The Superintendent of Prison, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall also get done the psychological evaluation of the appellant(s) from the Government Medical Hospital. The report of the evaluation shall be submitted to this
Court through the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar within a period of period of sixteen (16) weeks.
d. Ms. Devika Rawat, Associate (Mitigation) and Ms. Sana Vohra, Associated with the Square Circle Clinic, NALSAR University of Law, are permitted to have access to the appellant(s) –Aman Singh and Sonal Singh respectively, who are presently lodged in Buxar Jail, Bihar, to conduct multiple in-person interviews for the purpose of collecting information relevant to sentencing and to submit a Mitigation Investigation Report on behalf of the appellant(s) through the appellants’ Advocate-on-Record within twenty (20) weeks. 
e. The Superintendent, Buxar Jail, Bihar, shall ensure that, for the sake of confidentiality, these interviews shall be conducted in a separate interviewing space without any prison official or police staff being within
earshot distance, and audio recorders be permitted to be used to record the interviews.
f. The person(s) nominated by Ms. Devika Rawat and Ms. Sana Vohra are permitted to accompany them to translate during the interview. 
g. Ms. Devika Rawat and Ms. Sana Vohra are granted permission to obtain documents pertaining to the appellant(s), including but not limited to medical records, jail conduct, certificates of any educational, vocational or employment opportunities undertaken, etc. that the appellant(s) may wish to submit for the purpose of sentencing information.
7. The Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the Standing Counsel for the State
of Bihar, who shall, in turn, ensure that the order is communicated to the relevant authorities for compliance. The Registry shall, in addition, send a due intimation to all the concerned authorities immediately for compliance.
8. All the reports shall be duly compiled and placed before this Court on the next date of hearing. 

Also read:Division Bench led by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad confirms death sentence in a case from Rohtas, Justice Sourendra Pandey authors concurring opinion, two accused persons still absconding 

Patn High Court orders impleadment of District Magistrate, Rohtas, directs "status quo" with reard to orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas

In the case Shashi Shankar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Anr. (2026), Justice Ajit Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated April 27, 2026. The order reads: "Issue notice to the respondent no.2 under both processes i.e. registered cover with A/D as well as ordinary process, for which requisites etc. must be filed within two weeks. Two weeks’ time is granted to the respondents to file counter affidavit. 4. List this case on 12.05.2026. 5. In the meantime, status quo as on today shall be maintained." The Court's direction regarding addition of the District Magistrate, Rohtas at Sasaram as respondent no.3 was complied with during the course of day. The Respondents no. 2 is Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas.  The Tribunal is constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the primary law regulating road transport in India. 

The Court passed the order upon hearing the I.A.s praying for stay on the orders of the Tribunal, expunging the adverse remarks against the Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section and for urgent hearing of the case.

Meanwhile, on April 21, 2026, the Tribunal heard the Execution Case no. 01/2014, Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Sanjay Kumar Gupta, and passed an order wherein, it has shifted the penalty of Rs 10,000 from Collector, Rohtas to Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section.  The case was listed for hearing before the Tribunal on April 28, 2026.   

Notably, Section 165 of the Act lays down that the State Government, by notification in the official gazette, may constitute one or more Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Section 166 of the MV Act specifies that an application for compensation in case of accident may be made by the person who has sustained the injury, or the owner of the property, or, the agent duly authorised by the person injured, or, iv. Any or all Legal representatives of the deceased. 

Section 168 of the Act deals with the power of the Claims Tribunal to grant an award by determining the amount of just compensation which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or by any of them, as the case may be. Thus, a conjoint reading of Section 165, 166 and 168 clearly provides that in case of any accident, the person injured or his agent (in case of injury) or the legal representative of the deceased (in case of death) shall file an application under section 166 before the Claims Tribunal specifying all the facts and circumstances of the case and the Claims tribunal, after hearing the parties may pass an award determining the amount of just compensation in favour of the aggrieved person. Provided there is no legal fault at the hands of the driver or owner of the vehicle, in practical discourse the amount of compensation is always paid by the insurance company which is holding the Third Party Risk Insurance Policy of the Vehicle. 

Section 173 provides for the statutory right of appeal wherein the claimant/s can challenge the award passed by the Claims Tribunal by preferring an appeal before the concerned High Court within 90 days from the date of the passing of the award.

Section 174 of the Act, reads: "174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue. - Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue."

The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between the claimant or claimants on one side and the insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants.

Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate is be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Section 168 (3) of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal exercises powers under Section 47 and Order 21 Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Significantly, what is barred by Section 175 of  the M.V. Act, 1988, is the jurisdiction of Civil Court and not the procedure to be applied under Civil Procedure Code. 

Supreme Court sets aside Justice Purnendu Singh's indefensible order ridden with glaring infirmities, requests High Court's roster bench to decide the case afresh, within 1 month

In Anjani Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated April 202, 026, wherein, it condoned the delay, granted leave and allowed the appeal after taking note of the order dated October 9, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court. It concluded: "4. The impugned order speaks for itself. The infirmities are so obvious and glaring that the same neither warrants detailed exposition nor is there any necessity to issue notice to the respondents. 5. The impugned order being indefensible, is set aside. We request the roster Bench of the High Court to decide Criminal Miscellaneous No.60503 of 2024 afresh upon granting due opportunity of hearing to the parties and in accordance with law, as early as possible and, subject to its convenience, within a month from date of receipt of a copy of this order. 6. We keep all contentions on merits open for being urged by the parties before the roster Bench."

In the impugned 2-page long order dated October 10, 2025 in Anjani Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Singh had observed:"2. The present quashing application has been notified on “Urgent Mentioning” made on behalf of the petitioner. 3. In spite of repeated calls, no one has appeared on behalf of the parties. 4. I proceed to pass order on merit on the basis of materials available on the record. 5. The present quashing application has been filed for for following issues:-'For setting aside/quashing of cognizance order dated 18.12.2023 passed in complaint case No. (C)1252/2023 by Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate XIII, Saran whereby cognizance has been taken under Section 420/466/471 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code for complaint filed for alleged offence under Section 194, 420, 466, 468, 469, 471, 504 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code and all other consequential proceeding.' 6.The charge-sheet was submitted on 29.09.2020 and the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate XIII, Saran took cognizance under Section 420, 466, 471 and 120B of the IPC having found sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused persons. 7. This Court finds that the instant case is one of the cases in which the parties may exercise to settle their dispute amicably and the learned District Court may also give opportunity to them, so that they can settle their dispute outside the Court. 8. The present quashing application stands disposed of with the aforesaid liberty."

Supreme Court detected obvious and glaring infirmities in Justice Singh's order and requested the roster bench to hear the case afresh.