Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in a theft and IT Act case from Gopalganj

In Sharvan Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha delivereda 8-page long judgment dated July 20, 2026, wherein, he set aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj. justice Jha concluded: "10....it is clear that only on the basis of evidences as surfaced during any inquiry or trial of an offence, a summon can be issued to any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. 11. In the present case, summon was not issued against petitioner on the basis of evidences surfaced during the trial. None of the prosecution witnesses have said anything incriminating during the trial against this petitioner, rather petitioner himself examined as PW-7. Interestingly, on the basis of petition of accused only, otherwise having all opportunity to examine himself on oath under section 315 of the Cr.P.C., this petitioner was summoned as an accused through impugned order, which is a perverse finding contrary to the settled position of law. 12. In view of aforesaid and by taking legal report of Hon’ble Apex Court in Neeraj Kumar’ case (supra), the impugned order dated 13.07.2018 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with T.R. No. 1640/2018 arising out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015, is hereby quashed and set-aside qua petitioner. 13. Accordingly, this quashing petition stands allowed." The respondent no.2 was Surendra Nath Pandey. 

The judgement was passed upon hearing the petition filed for quashing the impugned order dated July 13, 2018 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with Tr. No. 1640/18 which arose out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the Information Technology Act, whereby and whereunder on application of accused Rahul Kumar Jha, lC.J.M. issued summon against the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The prosecution case was that as per FIR, informant alleged that Rs. 11,00,000/- was withdrawn in between April 30, 2015 to June 22, 2015 by the IRCTC from his Bank Account of State Bank of India, Hathua Branch. It was alleged that informant was a retired teacher and when he came to the Bank and verify his account, then, he came to know that fraud which was committed with his account. On the basis of written report, a First Information Report was lodged with Hathua Police Station. After lodging the FIR, police started investigation and submitted charge-sheet only against co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and section 66(C) of the I.T. Act and investigation was kept pending to verify the I.P. address and on other points. Thereafter, trial court took cognizance only against accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences under sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the I.T. Act.

The petitioner 's counsel submitted that after taking cognizance the trial of the case begins with Tr. No. 1640/18 before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj, where altogether seven (7) prosecution witnesses were examined and out of seven prosecution witnesses, this petitioner was also examined as PW-7 on 03.04.2018. It was pointed out that none of the prosecution witnesses, PW-1 to PW-6 named this petitioner qua his any involvement with the crime in question during the trial and the petitioner was examined as prosecution witness No.7, for the reason that he was the distributor of Cable Internet Connection through his company namely, M/s ANI Network Pvt. Ltd. to co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha, who alleged to misappropriate the amount of Rs. 11 Lakhs from the account of the informant for purchasing railway tickets and, thereafter, transferring the amount to his own account after cancellation of purchased railway tickets. It was submitted that co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha was not examined before the learned trial court in view of section 315 of the Cr.P.C., rather he made one application before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj on 03.04.2018, stating therein that this petitioner may be summoned as an accused,which was allowed by the impugned order dated July 13, 2018. 

The counsel also relied upon ‘Para 7’ of the legal report of Supreme Court in Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639, which reads as under for better appreciation of the legal position in connection with issuance of summon under section 319 Cr.P.C. :-“7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite.
7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [(2014) 3 SCC 92] extensively discussed the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is
extracted hereunder: “90. … all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been
involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
xxx
106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. …

xxx
110. In Lal Suraj [Lal Suraj v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844], a two-Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been chargesheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 CrPC. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram [Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh, (2006) 10 SCC 192 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 532 : AIR 2006 SC 1892], wherein it was held that a person, though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. …. …… ……”

Justice Harish Kumar sets aside order of Vice-chancellor, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, terms it "wholly illegal and without jurisdiction" contrary to Bihar Universities Act, 1976

In Navin Kumar @ Naveen Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026),  Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 20-page long judgement dated July 202, 2026, wherein, he set aside order of Vice-chancellor, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, terms it "wholly illegal and without jurisdiction". The other six respondents were: 2. The Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, 3. The Director, Higher Education, Education Department, Government of Bihar, 4. The Vice-Chancellor, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, 5. The Registrar, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur, 6. The Finance Officer, B.R.A. Bihar University, Muzaffarpur and 7. The Prof-Incharge, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial College, Nawahi Sursand, District Sitamarhi.

Justice Kumar concluded:"....this Court is of the conscious opinion that the impugned order of dissolution of the Governing Body taken by the Vice-chancellor in its reasoned order dated 22.05.2026 is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction, thus hereby set aside. Once the order of dissolution of the Governing Body does not survive, the consequential order for constitution of the Ad-hoc Committee would also be termed as illegal. However, the Court would not enter into the other aspects of the matter and the pleas taken by the learned Advocates regarding constitution and continuity of the Ad-hoc Committee on any other ground, as the same is not required to be dealt with at present. 29. This Court, however, in the facts of the case, further makes it clear that the order of this Court would not come in the way of the Vice-chancellor/University to deliberate upon and refer the matter to the Syndicate to take appropriate action/decision in the matter of continuation/dissolution of the Governing Body after following the mandate of Clause 28 of Statute 32 of the Act with the clear observance of the principles of natural justice, if the circumstances necessitate the same." 

The petitioner, an elected Secretary of the Governing College, Nawahi Sursand, Sitamarhi, constituted under Section 60 of the Bihar Universities Act, 1976, read with Statute 32, had approached the High Court being aggrieved with the reasoned order dated May 22, 2026 issued by the Vice-chancellor of the B.R.A. Bihar University under the signature of the Registrar of the University whereby and whereunder the Governing Body of the College was dissolved. He had also challenged order dated May 22, 2026 issued by the Registrar of the University by which Ad-hoc Committee has been constituted for the College, in question. The petitioner had also sought issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to restore the Governing Body constituted by Memo dated May 27, 2023.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the newly constituted Ad-hoc Committee submitted its report, regarding the action taken by the erstwhile Governing Body under letter dated June 23, 2026. Based upon such report the University by Memo dated June 25, 2026 constituted an enquiry committee to submit further reports on different points, the same was also challenged by filing an interlocutory application.

The College, in question, namely, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial College, Nawahi Sursand, Sitamarhi was established on July 10, 1965 and in course of time, the college was given permanent affiliation up to Honours level in the year 2009. In terms with Section 60 of the Bihar Universities Act, 1976 which mandates for constitution of a Governing Body for Management and Administration of each affiliated College, other than a college owned and maintained by the State Government or College establishment by a Minority Committee or an affiliated Technical or Medical College, as also read with Statute 32, a Governing Body was duly constituted for smooth functioning of the College, in question; and the petitioner, who was inducted as donor member further elected as Secretary of the Governing Body by the approval of the Vice-chancellor. The dispute began in the meeting of the Governing body dated October 26, 2024 wherein the Professor incharge, namely, Dr. Om Prakash Singh, who was the senior most teacher of the College and was to retire on October 31, 2024, his period was extended in the light of on going 4/20
NAAC Accreditation Process. The information in this regard was been given to the Registrar of the University by letter dated October 28, 2024 seeking approval for extension of service of incharge Principal of the College. Pending approval for extension of the services of Dr. Om Prakash Singh as Professor-cum-incharge Principal of the College, The petitioner being the Secretary of the Governing Body submitted his reply on December 16, 2025 mentioning that information regarding extension of service of Dr. Om Prakash Singh had already been communicated on October 28, 2024. It was made  clear that the College was bound to follow the direction of the University. On receipt of the show-cause notice, the Professor Incharge-cum-Principal Dr. Om Prakash Singh tendered his resignation on December 20, 2025, which was duly accepted by the Governing Body in its meeting held on January 4, 2026.

Dissatisfied with the response of the petitioner, the Vice-chancellor of the University vide its order dated
May 22, 2026 issued under the signature of University dissolved the Governing Body with immediate
effect and consequently all powers, authorities and financial control of the said Governing Body came to be ceased. In pursuance of the impugned order, a consequential order dated May 22, 2026 was also issued and an Ad-hoc committee was also constituted to manage the academic administration and financial affairs of the College until further orders or until constitution of a regular Governing Body in accordance with law, besides a direction to constitute an enquiry committee for examining the operation of accounts, utilization of grants as well as financial decision undertaken during the illegally extended tenure of the retired Principal.

The petitioner's senior counsel pointed out that the erstwhile Governing Body of the College was dissolved by an authority, which had no sanction under the law. It is only the Syndicate empowered under Clause 28 of the Statute 32 of the Act, which may on its own motion or at the instance of the Vice- chancellor dissolve a Governing Body and order for its reconstitution; provided, the Syndicate has given a reasonable opportunity to the Governing Body to show-cause against such action. At no point in time, any show-cause notice or reasonable opportunity was given by the Syndicate and the order of dissolution was passed by the Vice-chancellor, which was wholly illegal and against the teeth of all the prescriptions provided under Clause 28 of Statute 32. It is a settled law that in terms of Section 67 of the Act, 1976, the College or the University shall in no case extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employees after he attains the age of superannuation. 

The senior counsel drew on decision of the High Court's Division Bench in Vijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (L.P.A. No. 977 of 2024), wherein, by its judgment/order dated October 29, 2024, the provisions of Clause 28 of Statute 32, it highlighted cthat the Vice Chancellor does not have the competence or power to suspend or dissolve a properly constituted Governing Body.

The counsel also relied on reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan : (1989) 3 SCC 132, wherein the Court observed that the statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It was ab initio void and cannot be ratified. 

Justice Kumar observed:"....it is quite evident and imperative that it is the Syndicate, which may on its own motion or at the instance of the Vice-chancellor dissolve a Governing Body on account of the reasons mentioned therein, provided before the order of dissolution of the Governing body, the Syndicate shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Governing Body to show-cause against such action. 21. Since the mandate of the above noted prescription of law is very much clear that it is the Syndicate, who shall take a decision with regard to the dissolution of the Governing Body and, in fact, this position has not even been
disputed by any of the party, it need not require further emphasis that the order of dissolution of the Governing Body is to be taken in terms with Clause 28 of Statute 32 of the Act."

The Court examined as to whether the facts and circumstances of the case warrants immediate exercise of the emergency power assigned to the Vice-chancellor under Section 10(12) of the Act, 1976. Section 10(12) of the Act empowers the Vice-chancellor to take an immediate action involving the exercise of any power vested in the Syndicate or the Academic Council by or under this Act, he/she shall take such action as he deems fit, when the Syndicate or Academic Council is not in Session and he is satisfied that an emergency has arisen requiring its intervention.The Court observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no emergency situation had arisen, which required invocation of Section 10(12) of the Act, 1976.
Justice Kumar observed:"Undoubtedly, the power is vested with the Vice-chancellor to deal with the emergent circumstances, but in the present case, the exercise of such power appears to be wholly unwarranted." 
 

 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside order by Special Judge (SC/ST), Aurangabad, grants anticipatory bail in a SC/SCT case

In Saroja Devi @ Saroj Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 4-page long judgement dated July 17, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"07. Having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and considering the case and counter version and also considering the background of land dispute and further considering the possibility of false implication, let the appellant above named, in the event of her arrest or surrender before the court concerned within a period of eight weeks from today, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge (SC/ST) -cum- 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, Bihar in connection with Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 312 of 2024, subject to the condition as laid down under Section 482(2) BNSS and other following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be a close relative of the appellant. (ii) The appellant will remain present on each and every date fixed by the court below, if so required by the learned trial court. 08. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed."

The judgement records that "Despite valid service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of respondent no. 2" who is Anita Devi.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing  appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the refusal of prayer for anticipatory bail vide order dated September 23, 2024 passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST)-cum-1st Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, Bihar in A.B.P. No. 2009 of 2024. The case arose out of Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 312 of 2024, registered for the alleged offences under Sections 3(5), 109, 115(2), 118(1), 126(2) BNS and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w) & 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act.  

The prosecution case is that the appellant and other co-accused persons entered into the house of the informant and assaulted her. The counsel for the appellant submitted  that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. No occurrence as alleged has ever taken place. The case was the result of land dispute between the parties and there was a counter case instituted by co-accused Ramkrit Yadav being Rafiganj P.S. Case No. 311 of 2024 and the genesis of the occurrence is that the co-accused was fencing his land and the informant and her family members assaulted him causing injury to him. The counsel submitted that there was no intention to humiliate the informant side by taking their caste name rather it appears to be a case of scuffle and free fight between two groups over some land dispute and this fact depicts from the counter case and the present case has been lodged by the informant only with a view to save their skin from the counter case. The counsel also submitted that the appellant was a lady and there is no specific allegation against her that she insulted the informant by taking her caste name in a public place. No independent witness has supported the version of the informant and it appears that the informant has instituted the case in order to create defence. The appellant was having antecedent of one case which was instituted under different provisions of the IPC and sections 3(1)(r),3(2)(1), 3(2) (va) of SC/ST (PoA) Act in which she is on bail. The Special PP submitted that the appellant and other co-accused persons took
caste name of the informant and also assaulted her.

Supreme Court to hear Barun Yadav's case for premature release/remission on August 3

In Barun Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar passed a 2-page long order dated July 16, 2026. It reads: "the State would submit that the State Sentence Review Board has considered the petitioner's case in its meeting dated 11.07.2026 and the formal report/ decision taken in the meeting is awaited. 2. Post the matter on 03.08.2026." 

In its previous order, the Supreme Court had directed the respondent-State of Bihar to consider and decide the petitioner’s case for premature release/remission expeditiously. The petitioner’s case for pre-mature release/remission is under consideration which shall be decided in accordance with provisions of the Bihar Prison Manual.  

The SLP arose out of impugned final judgment and order  in Barun Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chakradhari Sharan Singh and Rajiv Roy delivered a 11-page long judgement dated May 16, 2023, wherein it had concluded: "15. After having gone through the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, we do not find any justifiable reason to doubt the veracity of the depositions made by the prosecution's witnesses at the trial in the facts and circumstance as noted above. In our view, based on the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, the trial court has rightly held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 324 of the IPC for killing his father and his nephew in the wake of a dispute arising out of partition in the family and injuring PW-8. 16. We accordingly do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed." The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Singh.  The petitioner's counsel were Ajay Kumar Thakur, Ritvik Thakur and Vaishnavi Singh. 

Also read: Supreme Court directs Bihar Government to decide premature release/remission of Barun Yadav expeditiously

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Supreme Court grants bail to Shashi Kumar Ram, Justice Sandeep Kumar had denied it

In Shashi Kumar Ram vs, The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices  K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order dated July 16, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"5. Having considered the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms." 

The petitioner had questioned the correctness of the 2-page long order dated March 16, 2026 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Shashi Kumar Ram vs, The State of Bihar (2026) whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has already undergone approximately 7 months in custody, since he was arrested on December 29, 2025. He also submitted that the petitioner was roped in due to the confessional statement of the co-accused; there was no recovery of the contraband or incriminating material from the petitioner and the alleged recoveries have been made from the premises not owned, controlled and possessed by the petitioner. Taking the prosecution case at its highest, the petitioner was alleged to have handled the finances. The counsel submitted that the petitioner was not involved in the alleged activities like procurement, adulteration, storage or transportation. It was not in dispute that the other 4 accused are on bail.

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Ramgarhwa P.S. Case No.523 of 2025 registered for the offence under sections 111, 303(2), 287, 317(2), 317(4), 317(5), 318(4) of the B.N.S., 2023, under section 3/4 of the Explosive substance Act and under section 7 of the E.C. Act. The petitioner and others were found manufacturing adulterated petrol. The petitioner was in custody since December 29, 2025. During investigation, it emerged that the petitioner is the financer behind the illicit business of manufacturing adulterated petrol. Kustice Kumar had declined to grant bail to the petitioner. 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside cognizance order of 2018 by a Rohtas court

In Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 5-page long judgement dated July 16, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... it appears that to settle private vengeance present complaint case are lodged by complainant with general and omnibus allegation of cruelty. Petitioners are in-laws and complainant already solemnized her another marriage. 9. Considering aforesaid and further by taking note of golden principle of “Para-7” of Bhajan Lal case (supra), the cognizance order qua above named three petitioners, dated 24.07.2018 stands quashed/ set aside." The other two petitioners are: 2. Kamla Devi and 3. Ranjeet Singh.

The opposite party no. 2 was Kumari Kishlay, daughter of Raj Kumar Yadav @ Raju Yadav, a resident of Gopalganj, Sasaram, Rohtas. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of order dated July 24, 2018, passed by S.D.J.M, Sasaram, Rohtas, in Complaint P.S. Case no. 170 of 2018.

As per complaint case complainant married Baljit Singh (son of petitioner no.1 and 2) on April 27, 2015 as per Hindu rites. She claimed her father gave substantial dowry yet after the "Vedai," the accused began taunting her for insufficient dowry and pressurising her and her husband to bring a Maruti car, subjecting her to abuse and cruelty. The complainant alleged that when her husband fell seriously ill on duty, she was denied access to him by her in-laws, and he later died during treatment at a Varanasi hospital. After his last rites, she alleged the accused intensified their cruelty abusing her, confining her for two days allegedly to push her toward suicide, withdrawing her deceased husband's funds, and pressuring her to marry petitioner no. 3. She further alleged that on February 19, 2018, the accused assaulted her, snatched her ornaments, motorcycle, and her husband's mobile phone, then dropped her at her father's house with threats.

The counsel of the petitioner that husband of complainant/Opposite Party no. 2 and son of petitioner no. 1 and 2 and the brother of petitioner no. 3 died in the year 2017 just after 2 years of his marriage with complainant submitted that after his death the complainant got job on compensate ground in Indian Railway, where her husband was working. It was submitted that to check petitioner no. 3 who was the brother of the deceased husband from joint property, the false case was lodged. It was also submitted that with general and omnibus allegation all petitioners were implicated with the crime in question which was purely unfounded. He submitted that Kumari Kishlay, the complainant/O.P. No. 2 solemnized her second marriage after death of the son of the petitioner no. 1 and 2 as discussed aforesaid and enjoying her married life having one child out of said wedlock. The counsel for the informant Dharmendra Kumar Singh could not dispute the factual submission. 

The counsel relied upon paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court decision in State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335, which reads: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”