Full Court Farewell Reference for Patna High Court's 47th Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo after 148 days of his tenure

The Registrar General of Patna High Court issued a notice dated June 1, 2026 about the Full Court Farewell Reference at 12 noon on June 4, 2026 in the Centenary Hall of the High Court in the honour of Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, the 47th Chief Justice, upon his superannuation on that day after 148 days of his tenure. He is retiring on a day, prior to his 62nd birthday on June 5.  Justice Sahoo had joined Patna High Court as Chief Justice on January 7, 2026 which was without Chief Justice since October 22, 2025 after the retirement of Justice P.B. Bajanthri, the 46th Chief Justice. Till June 4, there is likely to be a speculation that Justice Sahoo is likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court. 

In the first two judgements dated January 7, 2026 authored by 47th Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo as part of the Division Bench-I which included Justice Sudhir Singh, the judgments by Justices Satyavrat Verma and Nawneet Kumar Pandey, was upheld in Meera Devi Mantri vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Government of Bihar (2026) and  Saroj Kumar Rakshit @ Nanu Da @ Saroj Rakshit @ Nanu Baba vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Land and Revenue Department, Government of Bihar (2026) respectively.  

In the first month of his tenure, Chief Justice Sahoo's division bench delivered 41 judgements in 24 days. In the second month, his division bench delivered 73 judgements in 24 days. In the third month, it delivered 35 judgements in 21 days. In April 2026, it delivered 96 judgements in 28 days. In May 2026, his bench delivered 10 judgements. During his short tenure, his bench delivered 255 judgements and passed 4175 orders. Most of them were authored by Chief Justice Sahoo.       

His bench heard a case based one news report in Hindustan with regard to air pollution load and air quality index in several cities of the State and passed detailed orders. His 30-page long order dated February 12, 2026 recorded the state of air pollution in the State. The order captures the diagnosis but the remedy is nowhere in sight. His orders in this regard will act as a stepping stone.      

As the Chief Justice of Patna High Court his last order as part of the Division Bench with Justice Harish Kumar, was passed on May 15, 2026 in Dr. Ranganathan Rajya Pustakalaya Samiti & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), wherein, he concluded:"In the eyes of the law, a vacant librarian post, especially in a University is not merely an administrative oversight; it is seen as a functional breakdown in the "administration of justice" and the "academic health" of an institution. The vacancy of a librarian is not an administrative choice but a failure of the State's duty to provide the necessary infrastructure for education and justice. In the absence of a Librarian, physical collection of books deteriorate without proper preservation protocols, reference services remain absent, institutional subscriptions to journals and databases are not procured, managed, or optimised, and no systematic weeding or collection takes place. 7. With the aforesaid direction and observation, the matter be listed on 06.07.2026." The order was authored by the outgoing chief justice. The case will now be heard by the next chief justice. The case was filed on December 17, 2020 and registered on January 23, 2021. Significantly, five chief justices, namely, Justices Sanjay Karol, K. Vinod Chandran, Vipul Manubhai Pancholi, P.B. Bajanthri and now Sahoo have heard the case since June 2021 but the posts of the librarians have not been filled up. Since 1990, vacancies for the post of librarians in the universities in Bihar have not been filled up. At 289 posts of librarians are lying vacant. Underlining the significance of librarians, Chief Justice Sahoo cited Neil Gaiman, the author of The Graveyard Book who said, “Google can bring you back 1,00,000 answers, a librarian can bring you back the right one."  

Justice Sahoo's last judgement was delivered on May 12, 2026 in Sakali Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), wherein he dealt with an error in reporting death of the appellant. The core legal dispute was the erroneous abatement of a criminal appeal based on an incorrect police report stating the appellant, Sakali Devi, had died. The High Court accepted apology of Rakesh Kumar Sharma, SHO, Tajpur Police Station, SP, Samastipur who reported her to be dead. During a short span of 148 days, his division bench delivered 255 judgements. 

Justice Sahoo' second last judgement dated May 7, 2026 was in Siya Singh vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Labour,  Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), wherein, he observed: "Labour law is not merely an adjunct of the law of contract; it is a charter of human rights at the workplace. The Government cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with its own employees. To deny a workman his lawful dues by juggling with procedural niceties is to negate the very rule of law." As part of the Division Bench, he set aside the judgement by Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy. He concluded:"we are of the humble view that when the foundational award has not been challenged before the learned Single Judge, the impugned order disturbing the effect of such award, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, the impugned order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, is hereby set aside." 

In April 2026, a Suo Motu Public Interest Litigation was initiated by the Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice Sahoo pursuant to the report dated February 17, 2026 submitted by the Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Services Authority (BSLSA). BALSA's inspection report with respect to the shortcomings of mental health facilities in the State of Bihar as well as in Bihar State Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS), Koelwar, Bhojpur is an independent report. In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Sahoo passed a 25-age long order dated May 12, 2026,  in the matter of compliance with the provisions of Section 18, 19, 20, 21, and 27 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, pertaining to right to access mental healthcare, right to community living of every person with mental illness, right to protection from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, right to equality and non-discrimination of every person with mental illness to be treated as equal to persons with physical illness in the provision of all healthcare and  right to free legal aid of persons with mental illness. The 48th Chief Justice is likely to hear this matter which is listed for June 23, 2026.

In a Death Reference No. 1 of 2026, in The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Chief Justice Sahoo authored the 176-page long judgement dated March 26, 2026 on behalf the Division Bench comprising Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, wherein, he reversed the decision of the trial court upon hearing it along with a batch of cases. Notably, the sentence imposed by the trial Court on these two appellants for the offence of trying to escape from police custody under section 224 of the IPC was upheld. Justice Prasad authored the concurring judgement, underlining that the hearing procedure was "a learning experience". The case had arisen from a trial conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara. In a 176-page judgment, the Patna High Court set aside the conviction of multiple accused persons in the Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and reiterating that “suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.” In the context of the admissibility of 'electronic evidence", Chief Justice Sahoo observed:"In the case in hand,even though the prosecution has exhibited Call Detail Record (CDR) of the mobile phones seized during investigation to prove the essential metadata like timestamp, call details which includes duration, type (incoming, outgoing, missed), source/destination numbers and device identifiers but since there is no signature of any official, there is no certificate as required under section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act nor any nodal officer of the service provider or any responsible officer in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case, in view of the settled position of law as discussed above, the CDR cannot be legally admissible. In this case, it is nonetheless the duty of the prosecution, when found that the requisite certificate is missing in the CDR available in the charge sheet, ought to have applied before the Court making a prayer for summoning a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) referred to in section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act to produce the requisite certificate on CDR and after it is so produced, a copy thereof should have been furnished to the accused persons before commencement of the trial so that there would not have been any kind of prejudice to the accused persons since the certificate under section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of the evidence by way of electronic record. Accordingly, we accept the contention raised by the learned Amicus Curiae that all the CDRs exhibited by the prosecution are not admissible in evidence." The quality of the judgement especially with reference to "electronic evidence" is such that it ought to be taught in law schools and judicial academies. 

Justice Sahoo was elevated as Judge of the Orissa High Court on July 2, 2014. Justice Sahoo did his LL.B. from The Law College, Cuttack. He enrolled as an Advocate on November 26, 1989 under Orissa State Bar Council, Cuttack. He started practice under the guidance of his father Sarat Chandra Sahoo, Advocate who was a renowned criminal law practitioner and Dr. Manoranjan Panda, Advocate, a service and constitutional law expert. Justice Sahoo has practiced criminal law and service matter.He has practiced throughout Odisha  in the District Courts, High Court, Consumer Forum, SAT and CAT. He was born on June 5, 1964. He did his Matriculation from Nuabazar High School, Cuttack, ISc., B.Sc. from Stewart Science College, Cuttack and M.A. (English) and M.A. (Oriya) from Utkal University, Bhubaneswar.

Notably, the tenure of the 46th Chief Justice, Justice Bajanthri was merely 32 days. As Chief Justice this was the third shortest in the history of the High Court only behind 1 day tenure of Justice Bhagwati Prasad Jha and 5 day tenure of Justice Sushil Kumar Jha. After retirement, the Supreme Court had designated Bajanthri as a Senior Advocate on December 11, 2025. He is all set to be designated as a Senior Advocate like his predecessor. As an advocate, he used to practice under the guidance of his father, Late Sarat Chandra Sahoo, and Dr. Manoranjan Panda. Now a new crop of advocates will learn under his guidance.   

Supreme Court stays execution of the death sentence of Aman Singh, Sonal Singh confirmed by Patna High Court

In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar 2026 INSC 424, Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta, and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 13-page long order April 27, 2026, whereby, it directed:"The execution of the death sentence of the appellant(s) shall remain stayed pending the hearing and final disposal of the present appeal(s)" with  reference to proceedings which arose from the judgment and order dated January 22, 2026 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference No.2/2024 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.691 of 2024. In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court's Division Bench had delivered a 67-page long judgement dated January 22, 2026, wherein, the death sentence was confirmed and the criminal appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed. The Judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. The second appellant was Sonal Singh. It was heard along with the criminal appeal. 

The death reference case was registered in the High Court under Section 366 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the criminal appeal was preferred by the two appellants arose out of the judgment of conviction dated May 2, 2024 and the order of sentence dated  May 9, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-19, Rohtas at Sasaram in Sessions Trial of 2022 arose out of a Darihat P.S. case 2021 dated July 13, 2021 registered under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in Manoj & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023) 2 SCC 353, in the context of death reference cases, the 3-Judge Bench underscored that while reformation is a foundational goal of criminal punishment, repeatedly affirmed in its jurisprudence, the absence of a structured and measurable framework, coupled with the inadequate implementation of meaningful prison. 5reforms, has significantly hampered the system’s ability to achieve genuine rehabilitation. In this backdrop, the Court proposed the formulation of practical guidelines to aid courts in systematically collecting and evaluating mitigating circumstances, moving beyond vague considerations such as general conduct or family background, and thereby enabling a more informed assessment of an accused’s potential for reformation, while also serving as a precursor to a comprehensive legislative framework. Crucially, the Court emphasized that it is incumbent upon trial Courts to consider such mitigating circumstances at the earliest possible stage of proceedings in cases involving a potential death sentence, so as to ensure a balanced sentencing approach and to avoid slipping into a purely retributive response driven by the brutality of the crime, an outcome that the Court observed has become increasingly common by the time such matters reach the appellate stage. 

Supreme Court's order reads:" 11.....we are constrained to take note of a troubling trend being presented in multiple cases wherein reports on mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not being called for at the earliest stages of proceedings in a case involving a potential death sentence, namely, at the stage of sentencing before the trial Court or even at the stage of the reference for confirmation before the High Court. This omission creates a piquant situation in which such crucial material is, for the first time, sought only at the stage of appeal before this Court, thereby causing a long gap and avoidable delay in the collection of information essential for a proper, timely and informed determination on the question of sentence. Delayed consideration of these factors undermines the very objective of a balanced sentencing process and impedes the meaningful application of reformative principles. 12. It is also necessary to note that in a significant number of cases involving a potential death sentence, the quality of defence afforded to the accused remains inadequate, resulting in ineffective legal representation at crucial stages of the proceedings. Such deficiencies are often reflected in lackadaisical investigation and slackness in trial proceedings. There is hardly any attempt to collect data relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, thereby depriving the Courts of a complete and balanced perspective necessary for a just determination and imposition of sentence. The absence of competent and effective prosecution and defence not only undermines the fairness of the process but also increases the risk of a disproportionate, unjust, and uninformed sentencing outcome. This state of affairs renders it expedient to strengthen the legal aid framework in such cases, by ensuring the provision of skilled and adequately resourced legal representation, so that the accused is effectively assisted and the Court is 8meaningfully aided in discharging its functions in accordance with constitutional principles." 

In relation to the ineffective consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the need to ensure meaningful legal representation in cases involving a potential death sentence, the Court issued following directions:-
A. The report pertaining to aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall, as a matter of course, be called for by the trial Court itself once the accused is convicted, prior to the determination of sentence.
B. In the event such a report has not been called for or placed on record before the trial Court, the High Court shall mandatorily call for the same at the stage of admission of the death reference.
C. The concerned authorities shall ensure that such reports are comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated timeframe so as to avoid any delay in the adjudicatory process, and to aid and enable the Courts to undertake a meaningful, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing exercise. Upon receipt of such report, the Court concerned shall afford adequate opportunity to the parties to peruse the same and to advance oral submissions thereon. In cases where the reports procured by the trial Court are found to be ineffective or lacking in proper details, the High Court would be at liberty to call for a fresh report.
D. In every death sentence confirmation reference brought before the High Courts and this Court, the Legal Services Committee concerned shall assign a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two advocates having a minimum of 7 years practice, to represent the convicted person. Such representation shall be provided irrespective of whether the convict has engaged private counsel, so as to ensure full and effective assistance to the Court in matters involving death penalty, which necessitate a careful balancing of the interests of justice, societal concerns, and the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation. The appointed legal team shall be furnished with the complete case records and afforded adequate time to prepare, conduct research, and present a comprehensive assessment of mitigating circumstances. The legal aid team so appointed shall work in cohesion with the representing private counsel, if any.
E. Each High Court, under the aegis of the High Court Legal Services Committee, shall constitute and maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters.
F. The National Legal Services Authority shall frame and circulate appropriate guidelines identifying the relevant fields of enquiry for gathering mitigating circumstances and may engage trained teams, including legal and social science professionals, to undertake fieldwork involving interaction with the convict, their family, and relevant authorities, for the purpose of collecting detailed information regarding background, antecedents, socio-economic conditions, mental health status, and other relevant factors. Such information shall be made available to the appointed legal team, which shall, in turn, place before the Court a holistic and well-documented account of the convict’s potential for reformation along with all pertinent mitigating and aggravating circumstances to assist in a just and informed determination of sentence. 

The Court concluded: "14. The Registry shall forthwith communicate this order to all the High Courts through their respective Registrar Generals; Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority; and Member Secretaries of Legal Services Authorities of all the States and Union Territories for necessary compliance."

Delhi High Court directs Google, Indian Kanoon, and all other search engine operators and intermediary platforms to recognize person's "right to be forgotten" in its operations

In Laksh Vir Singh Yadav vS.  Union of India & Ors. (2026), Justice Sachin Dutta of Delhi High Court delivered a 144-page long judgement dated May 29, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"Google LLC/ Google Inc./Google India Private Ltd. and all other search engine operators are directed to de-index the relevant content, orders, judgments and associated reportage from name-based search results, and shall be complied in the same manner, as a direction under Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. 285. Indian Kanoon (iKanoon Software Development Private Limited) is directed to restrict name-based search functionality within its platform in respect of the records of the petitioners identified above. The judgments and orders shall remain accessible on Indian Kanoon by case number, citation, Court details and date. 286. All petitioners in respect of whom de-indexing has been directed shall be at liberty to seek masking from the concerned Court that rendered the original order or judgment. 287. The Union of India, through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY), is directed to ensure compliance with these directions by the respondent intermediaries within the aforementioned time period. MEITY shall immediately communicate these directions to Google LLC/ Google Inc., Indian Kanoon and all other search engine operators and intermediary platforms operating within the jurisdiction of India, and shall file a compliance affidavit within a period four weeks from today." 

The 30-page long Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 has been framed under Section 87 (1) (z) (zg) and Section 87 (2) of section 87 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 by Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY). It was published in the Gazette of India on February 25, 2021, in the aftermath of Supreme Court's unanimous judgement dated August 24, 027 in K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India, 2017 10 SCC 1. 

The judgement reads: "141. The right to be forgotten, understood as subsuming the right of an individual to seek removal or restriction of personal information from public digital accessibility, where such information is no longer relevant or serves no legitimate public purpose, flows naturally and necessarily from the constitutional recognition of informational privacy under Article 21." He pointed out: "146. India presently lacks a comprehensive statutory framework explicitly governing the right to be forgotten. However, the absence of specific  legislation does not preclude Constitutional Courts from recognizing and enforcing this right."

Justice Dutta recorded that  "Google has submitted that it performs a passive and neutral function" to state that "This is inaccurate. By actively collecting, indexing, organizing and serving personal data through name-based search results, and by deriving commercial revenue through advertising linked to those search results, Google is an active processor of personal data, which materially contributes to the invasion of informational privacy. The same has also been traced by the European Court of Human Rights, in the judgment rendered in Hurbain v. Belgium (Grand Chamber, Application No. 57292/16)...." He noted that "the functioning of Google (and similar search engines) is entirely automated and algorithmic....A purely mechanical process driven by algorithmic logic cannot constitute an exercise of freedom of speech and expression." Justice Dutta referred to the decision in Google Spain, S.L. vs. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja González (Case C-131/12) to state that "the activities of Google cannot be equated with those of the 'publishers of websites'. In Google Spain, it has been observed:“35 In this connection, it should be pointed out that the processing of personal data carried out in the context of the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from and is additional to that carried out by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an internet page.” 176. It follows that Google’s indexing and serving of judicial and other records in response to name-based searches is not an exercise of any fundamental right that can be legitimately pitted against the petitioner’s fundamental right to informational privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. Such search engines are not ‘passive channels of information’, instead they are in the nature of a ‘commercial platform’, deriving revenue by leveraging user searches and associating them with advertising opportunities."  

Justice Dutta drew on Justice S.K Kaul's concurring judgement as part of 9-Judge Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017). Justice Kaul observed: “629. The right of an individual to exercise control over his personal  data and to be able to control his/her own life would also encompass his right to control his existence on the internet. Needless to say that this would not be an absolute right. The existence of such a right does not  imply that a criminal can obliterate his past, but that there are variant degrees of mistakes, small and big, and it cannot be said that a person should be profiled to the nth extent for all and sundry to know....631. The impact of the digital age results in information on the internet being permanent. Humans forget, but the internet does not forget and does not let humans forget. Any endeavour to remove information from the internet does not result in its absolute obliteration. The footprints remain. It is thus, said that in the digital world preservation is the norm and forgetting a struggle....634....People change and an individual should be able to determine the path of his life and not be stuck only on a path of which he/she treaded initially. An individual should have the capacity to change his/her beliefs and evolve as a person. Individuals should not live in fear that the views they expressed will forever be associated with them and thus refrain from W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & Connected Matters Page 73 of 144 expressing themselves. 635. Whereas this right to control dissemination of personal information in the physical and virtual space should not amount to a right of total eraser of history, this right, as a part of the larger right to privacy, has to be balanced against other fundamental rights like the freedom of expression, or freedom of media, fundamental to a democratic society. 636. Thus, the European Union Regulation of 2016 [ Regulation No. (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27-4 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive No. 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).] has recognised what has been termed as “the right to be forgotten”. This does not mean that all aspects of earlier existence are to be obliterated, as some may have a social ramification. If we were to recognise a similar right, it would only mean that an individual who is no longer desirous of his personal data to be processed or stored, should be able to remove it from the system where the personal data/information is no longer necessary, relevant, or is incorrect and serves no legitimate interest. Such a right cannot be exercised where the information/data is necessary, for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information, for compliance with legal obligations, for the performance of a task carried out in public interest, on the grounds of public interest in the area of public health, for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Such justifications would be valid in all cases of breach of privacy, including breaches of data privacy.”

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decsion, Justice Dutta wrote: "....the present proceedings are directed at enforcing the fundamental rights of the petitioners, originating from Article 21 of the Constitution, the rights that the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, expressly recognized as operating against both State and non-State actors" The relevant observations read: “328. Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy. The dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only from the State but from non-State actors as well…… 367. Claims for protection of privacy interests can arise against the State and its instrumentalities and against non-State entities, such as, individuals acting in their private capacity and bodies corporate or unincorporated associations, etc., without any element of State participation. Apart from academic literature, different claims based on different asserted privacy interests have also found judicial support. Cases arose in various jurisdictions in the context of privacy interests based on (i) common law; (ii) statutory recognition; and (iii) constitutionally protected claims of the right to privacy.....644. The right to privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right which  protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from  both State and non-State actors and allows the individuals to make autonomous life choices.”

Supreme Court asserts "Mere recovery of currency notes....cannot by itself constitute an incriminating circumstance against an accused", its relevance for Yashwant Varma case

In Pooranmal vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.(2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta, and N.V. Anjaria delivered a 31-page long judgement dated March 10, 2026, it observed:"33. Thus, the very factum of recovery of the currency notes comes under a grave cloud of doubt. That apart, mere recovery of currency notes, in the absence of any cogent evidence establishing a clear nexus between the said amount and the crime, would not by itself constitute an incriminating circumstance against the appellant-Pooranmal. Thus, the said circumstance was wrongly treated to be incriminating by the trial Court as the recovery itself is doubtful and additionally, the mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute incriminating evidence in absence of corroborative evidence." 

It held that that the prosecution had failed to establish a complete chain of incriminating circumstances connecting the appellant to the alleged offence. The Court held that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution was either doubtful, inadmissible, or insufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court and acquitted the appellant of all charges. The Court directed that the appellant, who was in custody, be released forthwith.

The Court delivered the judgement upon hearing a criminal appeal challenging the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201 of the IPC in connection with a murder case, where the prosecution had relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including recoveries and call detail records. 

The Court noted that the prosecution has failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the seized articles sent for forensic examination. Discrepancies between the testimony of police witnesses and entries in the Malkhana register created serious doubts regarding the safekeeping and movement of the sealed articles before their dispatch to the forensic laboratory. In this context, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the integrity of the chain of custody necessary for relying on the forensic report. Without such proof, the forensic report itself lost evidentiary value. The Bench also addressed the reliance placed by the prosecution on call detail records purportedly showing frequent communication between the accused persons. The Court held that electronic evidence in the form of call detail records can be admitted only upon compliance with the mandatory requirements under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. The prosecution could not produce the statutory certificate required under the provision. 

As a consequence, the call detail records were held to be inadmissible in evidence. The three circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, recovery of currency notes, recovery of the shirt, and call detail records were not proved in accordance with the law. These circumstances failed to form a complete and unbroken chain of evidence capable of establishing the guilt of the appellant. 

Relevance for Yashwant Varma case

All India Radio reported on May 19, 2026 that the Judges Inquiry Committee investigating allegations concerning Justice Yashwant Varma submitted its report to the Speaker Om Birla, Lok Sabha at the Parliament House. ​It was presented in accordance with the statutory requirements under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The committee was constituted on August 12 last year by the Lok Sabha Speaker to inquire into allegations against former High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma. The report will be laid before both Houses of Parliament in due course. The Presiding Officer of the Judges Inquiry Committee, Supreme Court's Justice Aravind Kumar, along with the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court Justice Chandrashekhar and Senior Advocate of the Karnataka High Court B.V. Acharya, presented the Report of the Judges Inquiry Committee to the Speaker, Lok Sabha. Notably, Justice Chandrashekhar's name was recommended for his elevation as judge of the Supreme Court on May 27, 2026 by the Collegium, comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari, B.V. Nagarathna and M.M. Sundresh. He is expected to serve approximately three years and eleven months on the Supreme Court bench, retiring in May 2030.  

The Speaker and the MPs ought pay attention to the judgement in Pooranmal vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.(2026), dated March 10, 2026 because mere recovery of currency notes....cannot by itself constitute an incriminating circumstance against an accused. The probe was initiated following the discovery of massive amounts of burnt currency notes at his official residence in his absence during a firefighting operation. The currency notes initially estimated to be up to Rs. 15 crore, was discovered in a storeroom at Justice Varma’s residence after a fire broke out on March 14, 2025. Who counted the cash? It was either Rs 15 crore or it was not. How can a specific figure be deemed an estimated  figure? If An initial Supreme Court in-house committee concluded in May 2025 that Justice Varma had "active control" over the room as if his absence from the residence was inconsequential. In May 2025, Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna had sent the report to the President and Prime Minister, recommending the initiation of removal proceedings, with ascertaining the chain of the custody of the currency notes, especially the source of the cash in question. Subsequently, on July 21, 2025, 14th Rajya Sabha Chairman Jagdeep Dhankhar informed Rajya Sabha that he received a notice for the removal of High Court Judge Yashwant Varma and asked the Secretary General, Rajya Sabha to take necessary steps. The notice was signed by more than 50 members of the Rajya Sabha. He observed: “Thus, it meets the numerical requirement of signing by members of Parliament for setting in motion the process of removal of a high court judge". There is no clarity as to what happened to the said notice after the abrupt resignation of Dhankar on on July 21, 2025. As a senior advocate he must have known that mere recovery of currency notes cannot by itself constitute an incriminating circumstance against an accused. Later, the Speaker, Lok Sabha had constituted a three-member statutory committee to formally investigate the charges under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 

Has the committee looked in to the question of the likely beneficiaries who gain from killing the reputation of judges? There's more to this than meets the eye. It is a scientifically established fact that appearances are deceptive.   

Advocates point out problems in implementation of three amended criminal laws since July 1, 2024

A Round Table meeting was held on "issues emerging from the implementation of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 enacted 'to consolidate and amend the provisions relating to offences', Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS)' to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure' and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) "to consolidate and to provide for general rules and principles of evidence for fair trial" at Patna District Bar Association library at the Civil Court on May 30, 2026. The advocates pointed out that the new amendments have not contributed to reducing delay in the disposal of cases. Instead of changing the serial number of the sections in IPC, Cr.PC and Indian Evidence Act should not have been changed, the same could easily have been inserted within the existing laws, with which judicial officers, advocates and litigants were familiar.  

The meting was addressed by senior advocate, Yogesh Chandra Verma, President of Advocates Association and member, Bihar State Bar Council, Patna High Court Arvind Kumar Mouar, President, District Bar Association (DBA), and Dr. Gopal Krishna, advocate, High Court. The meeting resolved to constitute a committee with Arvind Kumar Mouar as its convener to examine each of the three laws separately and to constitute another committee to undertake study of the problems being faced in the implementation of the civil laws. 

Senior advocate Y.C. Verma pointed out that proviso given in the various provisions of laws reveals the last intention of the legislature. Therefore, they must be given adequate attention. He drew the attention of the advocates towards the Supreme Court's decision dated may 22, 2026 in Pune Bar Association v. Union of India & Ors., wherein, it has held that that any individual possessing special skills and expertise in computer science and cyber forensics can validly sign Part B of the standard-form certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA, provided the Court is satisfied with their credentials on the basis of unimpeachable material.

Advocate Mouar pointed out that the probe by police takes 5-7 years and in some case it takes 20 years.    

Advocate Dr. Krishna stated that out of the 174 Sections of IPC have been changed, 8 new Sections added and 22 in the BNS Sections repealed. BNS 20 new offences have been added and 19 provisions in the repealed IPC have been dropped. The punishment of imprisonment has been increased for 33 offences, and fines have been increased for 83 offences. A mandatory minimum punishment has been introduced for 23 offences. Therefore, there is a need to undertake section by section analysis of the criminal laws by a high powered committee of the Advocates Association. Unlike Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), after 2015 amendments, which has incorporated provisions for electronic service, without crucial safeguards such as authentication, verification, and protection against manipulation, Supreme Court's decisions have ensured that under Cr.PC/BNSS service “by electronic mail service or by any other means of transmission of documents" is impermissible.  Unlike Cr.PC/BNSS, the Order V Rule 9(3A) of CPC authorizes service “by electronic mail service or by any other means of transmission of documents as may be prescribed by the High Court Rules.” Rule 9 (4) of CPC deems service effected when acknowledgment is received or postal articles are returned with endorsements of refusal. 

In the light of decision dated July 16, 2025 by Supreme Court's Division Bench in Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau Of Investigation  2025, the validity of Section 13 (3) of Adjudicating Authority (Procedure) Regulations, 2013 framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (15) of Section 6 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the Adjudicating Authority, in supersession of the Adjudicating Authority Regulations, 2006, which permits serving  of summon or notice, requires reconsideration. 

The Court has held:"27. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has specifically excluded the service of a notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 from the ambit of procedures permissible through electronic communication, that have been delineated under Section 530 of the BNSS, 2023. 28.While interpreting a statute, the legislative intent is to be gathered from a plain and simple reading of the language employed in the provisions, in a purposive manner, thereby upholding the objective behind the enactment. On a plain reading of the BNSS, 2023, the restrictions imposed by the Legislature on the use of electronic communication, to only certain procedures, precludes the use of electronic communication for any other procedure, for which it has not been specifically permitted by the BNSS, 2023. 29. This interpretation is countenanced by the objective sought to be achieved by the BNSS, 2023. As highlighted hereinbefore, the essence of Article 21 of the Constitution imbues the BNSS, 2023, which reflects the laudable objective of safeguarding the liberty of an individual, while facilitating the investigation into and adjudication of offences. The above mentioned restrictions on the usage of the mode of electronic communication, have been imposed in order to safeguard the right to life and personal liberty, guaranteed to an individual by the Constitution, from being impinged during the course of criminal investigation and proceedings. 30.Hence, it is manifestly apparent that the Legislature has particularly specified the circumstances in which usage of modes of electronic communication is permissible, being circumstances which do not have a bearing on the liberty of an individual."  Notices are issued under Section 35 of the BNSS and summons under Sections 63, 64 and 71 of the BNSS. 

The Court observed that 32."....the purpose of an investigation by an Investigating Agency, is markedly distinct from that of an inquiry or judicial proceedings by the Court. While the former is to investigate an offence, the latter is a search towards the truthful determination of an occurrence. Therefore, the procedure of one cannot be read into the other....33. A summons under Section 63(i) of the BNSS, 2023 is issued by a Court in writing, in duplicate, which shall be signed by the presiding officer of such Court, or by such other officer as directed by the High Court from time to time, and shall bear the seal of the Court. 34.A new form of summons has been contemplated by the legislature in the BNSS, 2023. Under Section 63(ii) of the BNSS, 2023, a summons issued by a Court can be in an encrypted or any other form of electronic communication, and shall bear the image of the seal of the Court or digital signature. 35.Section 64 of the BNSS, 2023 pertains to how summons shall be served. We are concerned with Section 64(2) of the BNSS, 2023 which mandates that a summons shall be served personally on the person summoned, if practicable, by delivering or tendering one of the duplicates of the summons. The proviso to Section 64(2) of the BNSS, 2023 provides a discretion of also serving summons by electronic communication, only when they bear the image of the Court's seal in a manner and form that the State Government may provide by rules. 36.From a cumulative reading of Sections 63 and 64 of the BNSS, 2023, the argument on behalf of the applicant that Section 64(2) of the BNSS, 2023 relates to system-generated summons i.e., the e-Summons App, hence the requirement of the Court's seal to make them look authentic, falls to the ground because, irrespective of the summons being issued under Section 63(i) or Section 63(ii) of the BNSS, 2023, it shall necessarily bear the seal of the Court, or the image of the seal of the Court, when the summons is being served.17 Section 71 of the BNSS, 2023."

It added:"37.Section 71 of the BNSS, 2023 provides for the service of summons on witnesses. We are concerned with sub-section (1) which states that a Court issuing a summons to a witness may direct a copy of such summons to be served by electronic communication. 38.The contention of the applicant that a notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 falls within the same category as a summons under Section 71 of the BNSS, 2023, and therefore, since the latter allows electronic mode of service, the former must also be permitted to be transmitted electronically, cannot be accepted, for the simple reason that a summons under Section 71 of the BNSS, 2023, has no immediate bearing on the liberty of an individual in case of its non-compliance. However, a notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 could have an immediate bearing on the liberty of the individual in case of its non-compliance, as laid down under Section 35(6) of the BNSS, 2023. 39.Furthermore, a summons issued by a Court under Sections 63 or 71 of the BNSS, 2023, and a notice issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 travel on different footings and cannot be equated with each other. A summons issued by a Court is a judicial act, whereas a notice issued by the Investigating Agency is an executive act. Hence, the procedure prescribed for a judicial act cannot be read into the procedure prescribed for an executive act."

The Court noted that "40. ....the BNSS, 2023 does not entirely preclude the use of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency. The Legislature has envisioned the use of electronic communication, during the course of investigation, and upon completion of investigation by the Investigating Agency, specifically provided for under Sections 94(1) and 193(3) of the BNSS, 2023 respectively."

It concluded:" 41.The usage of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency, has only been provided for effecting the procedure under Sections 94 and 193 of the BNSS, 2023. 42.Section 94 deals with issuance of summons, in an electronic form, to produce a document. Section 193 deals with the usage of electronic communication for forwarding the report to a Magistrate, upon completion of the investigation, or to inform the progress of the investigation to the informant or victim. None of these procedures have any bearing on the liberty of an individual. 43.Hence, when viewed from any lens, we are unable to convince ourselves that electronic communication is a valid mode of service of notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, since its conscious omission is a clear manifestation of the legislative intent. Introducing a procedure into Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, that has not been specifically provided for by the Legislature, would be violative of its intent." 

Senior Advocate Verma spoke about Section 41 and 41 A of the CrPC (Section 35 BNSS). 

Section 35 of BNSS reads: "When police may arrest without warrant. (1)Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person-

(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence; or 

(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:-(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary-(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or (b) for proper investigation of the offence; or

(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured,and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest; or(c) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven years whether with or without fine or with death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of that information that such person has committed the said offence; or

(d) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Sanhita or by order of the State Government; or

(e) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; or

(f) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful custody; or

(g) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or

(h) who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in, any act committed at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or

(i) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any rule made under sub-section (5) of section 394; or

(j) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another police officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition.

(2)Subject to the provisions of section 39, no person concerned in a non-cognizable offence or against whom a complaint has been made or credible information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists of his having so concerned, shall be arrested except under a warrant or order of a Magistrate.

(3)he police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under sub-section (1) issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.

(4)Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice.

(5)Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested.

(6)Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.

(7)No arrest shall be made without prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in case of an offence which is punishable for imprisonment of less than three years and such person is infirm or is above sixty years of age.

Section 41A of the CrPC, which was a vital safeguard to prevent unnecessary arrests by mandating police to issue a 'notice of appearance' for questioning, rather than making an immediate arrest, has been directly incorporated into Section 35 of BNSS. 

In Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, the Supreme Court dwelt on the issue of unwarranted arrests and laid down guidelines for arrests to be made under Section 41 f Cr.PC, regarding all the offences punishable with imprisonment up to a period of 7 years. It laid down guidelines for preventing arbitrary arrests and to protect individual liberties protected under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court observed:“Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.”

In Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51, the Supreme Court observed that there was an absence of specific guidelines with respect to the mandatory compliance of Section 41-A of the Code. The Court took a note of the endeavour made by the Delhi Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar vs. Vijayanata Arya where not only the need for guidelines but also the effect of non-compliance towards taking action against the officers concerned was discussed. The Court ordered all State Governments and Union Territories to facilitate Standing Orders in accordance with procedural requirements under Section 41A of the CrPC, noting the Delhi Police’s Standing Order 109 of 2020. The  Court noted: “We also expect the courts to come down heavily on the officers effecting arrest without due compliance of Section 41 and Section 41-A. We express our hope that the investigating agencies would keep in mind the law laid down in Arnesh Kumar, the discretion to be exercised on the touchstone of presumption of innocence, and the safeguards provided under Section 41, since an arrest is not mandatory. If discretion is exercised to effect such an arrest, there shall be procedural compliance.”

It upheld the judgement of the Delhi High Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar vs. Vijayanata Arya and recognized the importance of following due procedure laid down under the CrPC while serving notice to an accused. The Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Rajesh Bindal observed: “It is made amply clear that service of notice through WhatsApp or other electronic modes cannot be considered or recognised as an alternative or substitute to the mode of service recognised and prescribed under the CrPC, 1973/BNSS, 2023.” It also noted that the Delhi High Court’s guidelines in Rakesh Kumar vs. Vijayanta Arya and Amandeep Singh Johar vs. State (NCT Delhi), both of which were upheld by the Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI, must be strictly followed by all States/UTs when issuing Standing Orders to their respective Police machinery pertaining to Section 41-A of CrPC, 1973/Section 35 of BNSS, 2023. 

There was discussion on Section 319, CrPC (Section 358 of the BNSS). On the petition of the informant or the State, the party is being made accused without hearing him. No notice is being issued because there is no law in this regard. Only informant is being heard and cognisance being taken. 

It was observed that Section 498 A of the IPC (Section 85 BNS), an anti-dowry and anti-domestic violence law should have been made compoundable.  

Section 358 of the BNSS grants courts the power to proceed against any person, not originally charged, who appears from evidence to have committed an offence and can be tried alongside the current accused. If evidence during an inquiry or trial indicates an uncharged person is involved in the crime, the court can initiate proceedings against them. If the individual is not in court, the judge may issue a summons or warrant for their arrest, depending on the situation. If the person is already present in the court (e.g., as a witness or spectator), the court may detain them to face trial. This power is reserved strictly for the trial stage; high courts have clarified that a Magistrate cannot use this section to take cognizance of a new offence on their own. For summoning additional accused under this Section, the courts have held the standard is “strong and cogent evidence”, which is higher than mere suspicion but lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction.

Section 358, which allows a trial court to summon a person to face trial, does not contemplate that a summoned person must be given an opportunity to be heard before being added as an accused to face the trial. A right of hearing would accrue only to a person who is already discharged in the very same proceeding prior to the commencement of the trial. This is different from holding that a person who has been summoned as per Section 358 has a right of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice before being added as an accused to be tried along with the other accused. 

Notably, Jamin & Anr vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr 2025 INSC 330, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J B Pardwala and R Mahadevan have clarified that after the rejection of an application filed under Section 319 under CrPC (358, BNSS) praying to summon other persons to face the trial, a right enures in favor of the proposed accused. "Thereafter, if in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is to pass an order that is prejudicial to the benefit which had already enured in favor of the proposed accused, then the High Court is obligated in law to provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused. This is also the mandate as contained in sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the CrPC". The judgement was authored by Justice Pardwala. 

There was discussion about the issue of search and seizure under special laws like NDPS Act, Excise Act, Vigilance, CBI, PMLA etc., examination of independent witnesses is necessary but not mandatory in the court. Earlier, there was 100 per cent acquittal in cases of illegal goods if there were independent witnesses. 

There was vociferous observations made regarding virtual cross-examinations because video conferencing eliminates physical presence, making it difficult to read a witness's body language or micro-expressions. It compromises a fair trial, as the screen restricts the ability to catch contradictions instantly and prevent remote coaching or witness intimidation. An effective cross-examination relies on observing eye contact, voice fluctuations, and hesitation, which video screens often blur. When a witness is examined remotely, defense advocates cannot be certain that others are not in the room coaching the witness or signaling answers. Presenting a document to a witness to catch them in a lie becomes logistically awkward, giving the witness time to think of an excuse rather than answering spontaneously. Under Section 530 of the BNSS, electronic hearings, including the recording of evidence and cross-examinations, are officially permitted. The government is implementing remote setups to speed up trials. Advocates are fiercely protesting this move which allows police officers to testify remotely directly from police stations. Bar associations have pointed out that allowing police to testify from within police-controlled premises—rather than a neutral, open courtroom—destroys judicial oversight and unfairly advantages the prosecution.

It was stated that juvenile have not been given right to anticipatory bail. There was reference made to a judgement by Justice Soni Srivastava in this regard. 

Senior Advocate Verma referred to Section 437 of Cr.PC (480 BNSS), the primary provision governing bail applications in non-bailable offences before courts other than the High Court or the Court of Session (that operates under the wider powers of Section 439). When a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested without warrant or appears before a magistrate, the magistrate may release them on bail. The use of the word “may” – as the Allahabad High Court has clarified – is deliberate and signals a discretionary authority, not a mandatory obligation. However, this discretion operates within clear constraints set by the statute itself. The magistrate cannot simply grant or refuse bail based on instinct. The law prescribes both absolute bars and factors to be weighed.

Under Section 2(a) of the CrPC, a bailable offence is one expressly classified as such in the First Schedule of the Code or any other applicable law. For such offences, the accused has a right to be released on bail under Section 436, and no officer or court can refuse it once surety is furnished. A non-bailable offence is simply any offence not classified as bailable. The classification is not arbitrary – it generally tracks the gravity of the offence and the potential harm to individuals and society. Crimes like murder, culpable homicide, rape, and dacoity fall in this category precisely because their impact on victims and social order is severe. The term “non-bailable” is, however, often misunderstood to mean that bail is impossible. That is incorrect. It means only that bail is not a matter of right – the accused must apply to the court, and the court decides based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Section 437 is the primary provision governing bail applications in non-bailable offences before courts other than the High Court or the Court of Session (which operate under the wider powers of Section 439). When a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested without warrant or appears before a magistrate, the magistrate may release them on bail. This discretion operates within clear constraints set by the statute itself. The magistrate cannot simply grant or refuse bail based on instinct. The law prescribes both absolute bars and aspects to be factored in.

The two situations under Section 437(1) remove bail from the magistrate’s discretion entirely. First, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the magistrate shall not release them on bail. Second, bail is barred where the accused has previously been convicted of a cognisable offence punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for seven years or more – or has two or more prior convictions for cognisable offences carrying sentences between three and seven years. These are statutory prohibitions, and the magistrate must respect them. The only exception carved out by the proviso allows bail even in these cases if the accused is under sixteen years of age, is a woman, or is sick or infirm. This reflects a deliberate legislative choice to extend greater protection to vulnerable individuals within the system. 

Independent of the question of the guilt of the accused is the evidentiary assessment during the investigation itself. Section 437(2) provides that where, at any stage of the investigation, inquiry, or trial, the court finds insufficient grounds to believe the accused has committed a non-bailable offence – but sufficient grounds for further inquiry – the accused may be released on bail pending that inquiry. This is a critical safety valve: it prevents prolonged detention in cases where the evidence is weak or inconclusive, without foreclosing further investigation. 

Outside the ambit of absolute bars, the magistrate has genuine discretion – but it is structured discretion, not a blank cheque. Indian courts, through decades of jurisprudence, have crystallised the factors that must be weighed when considering a bail application in a non-bailable offence.

An offence carrying the death penalty or life imprisonment signals the highest level of societal condemnation and naturally tips the scales against bail. Conversely, a non-bailable offence that carries a moderate maximum sentence allows for more liberal consideration. Courts assess not just the label of the offence but the specific allegations – the manner and circumstances in which the act was allegedly committed. The past record of the accused  is given significant consideration-. A person with prior convictions for serious offences presents a greater risk of repeating the offence and may be less likely to comply with bail conditions. Section 437 itself imposes a bar on bail in certain cases of repeat offending, but even short of that statutory bar, prior criminal conduct remains a live factor in the magistrate’s assessment. First-time offenders, particularly those with stable employment and community ties, are generally viewed more favourably. Out of the two central considerations highlighted by the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh vs. State AIR 1978 SC 179, one is the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice. If there are concrete reasons to believe the accused will abscond – such as the absence of local roots, significant financial resources enabling flight, or prior instances of evasion – bail becomes harder to obtain. Courts look at the accused’s ties to the community: family, residence, employment, and the duration of stay in the jurisdiction.

The second key consideration from Gurcharan Singh is the potential for the accused to interfere with the course of justice – by tampering with physical evidence or intimidating prosecution witnesses. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu vs. Public Prosecutor (1978), the Supreme Court held that the granting of bail must balance personal liberty with societal interest, and concerns about evidence integrity go directly to that balance. The courts are particularly cautious in cases involving organised crime, public servants, or situations where witnesses are vulnerable.

The Supreme Court observed in Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) that even persons accused of non-bailable offences are entitled to bail if the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case. This underscores that the presumption of innocence – rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution – does not evaporate the moment a non-bailable offence is alleged.

A principle of Indian bail jurisprudence, firmly stated by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977), is that bail should be the norm and imprisonment the exception unless specific circumstances justify continued custody. Pre-trial detention is not punishment. Holding a person in jail before they have been found guilty is a serious curtailment of the liberty guaranteed by Article 21, and courts have consistently held that this curtailment must be justified – not assumed.

This principle was reiterated in Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012), which arose from the 2G spectrum case involving allegations of large-scale criminal conspiracy and corruption. The Supreme Court, despite acknowledging the gravity of the economic offences involved, held that the investigation had concluded and further detention served no legitimate purpose. Pre-trial detention, the Court ruled, must not be used as a punitive tool – bail conditions, not custody, are the appropriate safeguard once investigative necessity subsides.

Section 437 also addresses the problem of prolonged undertrial detention caused by delays in the judicial process. Under Section 437(6), if a trial before a magistrate in a non-bailable offence is not concluded within sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence, the accused – if in custody throughout that period – must be released on bail unless the magistrate records written reasons for denying it. This provision directly implements the constitutional mandate of speedy trial articulated by the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1979), where prolonged undertrial detention was held to violate the right to life and personal liberty.

When bail is granted under Section 437, it does not mean unconditional release. Courts routinely – and in certain cases mandatorily – impose conditions to ensure the accused’s continued participation in the legal process and to protect the integrity of the trial. Standard conditions include regular appearances before the investigating officer or the court, surrender of passport, and a prohibition on leaving the jurisdiction without prior permission. Courts may also specifically prohibit contact with prosecution witnesses or direct the accused to report to the local police station at fixed intervals.

Under Section 437(3), where the accused is charged with an offence punishable with seven or more years of imprisonment, or an offence under Chapters VI, XVI, or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, conditions regarding attendance, non-repetition of the offence, and evidence protection become mandatory. Courts are expected to tailor these conditions to strike a balance, protecting the integrity of the legal process without creating unnecessary hardship for the accused.

Granting bail is not irreversible. Section 437(5) empowers any court that has released a person on bail under this section to direct re-arrest if it considers it necessary – for instance, where new evidence emerges, where the accused violates bail conditions, or where there is credible information of witness intimidation. This power is not to be exercised lightly, and courts have held that cancellation requires cogent and overwhelming grounds beyond the initial reasons for grant. 

Section 437(4) mandates that the court or officer granting bail must record the reasons or special grounds in writing. This requirement serves a dual purpose: it disciplines the exercise of discretion (preventing arbitrary decisions) and enables higher courts to review those decisions if the accused or the prosecution challenges the order. A bail order passed without reasons is legally vulnerable to being set aside. With regard to bail for vulnerable accused persons, the proviso to Section 437(1) and the architecture of Section 437 both extend special consideration to certain categories of accused persons. The law recognises that women, children below sixteen years of age, and persons who are sick or infirm may be granted bail even in cases otherwise attracting the statutory bars. These are not loopholes – they reflect a deliberate legislative judgment that the criminal justice system must account for the vulnerabilities of those within it, without compromising the overall framework of discretion.

Advocates Ram Jiban Singh, Amarnath, ex-President, DBA, Amarendra Kumar Singh, Shivanand Giri, Dr. C.B. Verma, Sanjeev Kumar Sinha, Nand Kishor, Rekha Prem Samaiyar, Rajeev Kumar, Binod Kumar Singh, Sadan Kumar, Prashuram Singh, Ashok Kumar, Shyamal Kishor, Surendra Prasad, Uday Prasad Singh, Krishna Murari, A.K Vidyarthi, H.H. Razvi, Shyam Krishna Gupta, Mithlesh Kumar and Kranti Kumar participated in the discussion.  

Also read: Implications of amendments in the criminal laws 

19 Chapters and 358 Sections of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) replaces 23 chapters and 511 Sections of Indian Penal Code

 

          

E-Certified Copy Rules of Patna High Court amended within 3 months

The e-Certified Copy Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (1st Amendment), 2026 states that in cases where the digitized record(s)/document(s) are not available, the Copying Department/Section of the Patna High Court, now it is required to "obtain the relevant record(s)/document(s), scan and digitize the same (as the case may be) and take necessary steps including providing the e-Certified Copy to the applicant" in light of the e-Certified Copy Rules of the the High Court. The Section is required to obtain the relevant records/documents, scan and digitize the same (as the case may be) and take necessary steps including providing the e-Certified Copy to the applicant in light of the e-Certified Copy Rules, 2026. The amendment was published in  the Bihar Gazette on May 20, 2026. Earlier, the e-Certified Copy Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2026 was notified in the Bihar Gazette on February 20, 2026

In exercise of the powers conferred under Article 225 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court had made this amendment in the e-Certified Copy Rules of the High Court.  

These Rules shall apply to the High Court as well as the District Court under its control and supervision. The facility of providing e-Certified Copy under these rules shall be in addition to the existing facility of providing certified copies as per the rules provided in Chapter-XIV under Part- IV of the Rules of the High Court at Patna, 1916 and Part- IV of the Civil  Court Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Volume- I) and Criminal Court  Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.

The preface of the Rules reads:"Preface.—These Rules will apply to electronic application(s) made for obtaining an e-Certified Copy of Order(s)/ Judgment(s)/ Petition(s)/ Document(s)/Evidence(s) available on the record of a pending or disposed off case. The procedure to scrutinize the application for e-Certified Copy shall be consistent with all the existing rules & circulars pertaining to obtaining the copies. Documents restricted under the Rules of the High Court at Patna, 1916, Civil Court Rules of the High Court of Judicature and Criminal Court Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall continue to remain restricted and shall not be supplied under these rules as well".

Rule 5 reads: "Entitlement to receive e-Certified Copy.—Applications for the e-Certified Copy of the Judgment(s)/ Order(s)/ Petition(s)/ Document(s)/ Evidence(s) available on the record of a pending or disposed off case in any proceeding may be made by:-
(a) A party to the proceeding, if the party has appeared in person. 
(b) The Advocate representing the party. 
(c) A Public Officer if the Copy is required for public purpose." Advocate with AUIN No. assigned to them need not register again and can proceed for application of e-Certified Copy.

The following seven details is embedded on the e-Certified Copy:- 
(i) Electronic Application Number 
(ii) Date of requisition 
(iii) Date of Preparation of e-Certified Copy 
(iv) Total Number of Pages 
(v) Total Cost 
(vi) Name and digital signature of Authorized Officer 
(vii) A unique QR Code to verify the authenticity of the e-Certified Copy

In exercise of the powers conferred under Article 225 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court had made the Rules and amended the e-Certified Copy Rules of the High Court.  

 

Transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas in exercise of statutory powers is valid in law

In Civil Court Bar Association & Anr. vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Ors. ( 2026), Division Bench of Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Swarupama Chaturvedi held on May 26 that where an action is taken under statutory authority, its validity cannot be questioned independently without first challenging the provision conferring such power.

The Allahabad High Court has held that transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas in exercise of statutory powers is valid in law.

The Court also held that a challenge to administrative or consequential action is not maintainable in the absence of any challenge to the statutory provisions under which such action is taken.

The Court was hearing writ petitions challenging administrative orders directing transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas under the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008.

It observed that “where an administrative or consequential action is founded upon a statutory provision, the same cannot be set aside without first dislodging the statutory foundation itself”, held: “The challenge to impugned orders is not maintainable in the absence of any challenge to the validity of the statutory provision under which it is passed, and further, applying the settled principle that a later enactment prevails over an earlier enactment in case of inconsistency, the transfer of maintenance proceedings from the Family Court constituted under the Family Courts Act, 1984 to the Gram Nyayalaya under Section 16 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 is held to be valid”.

The petitioners had challenged administrative orders passed by the District Judiciary transferring maintenance proceedings pending before Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas. The principal contention raised was that such a transfer deprived litigants of their statutory right of appeal to the High Court under the Family Courts Act, 1984 and was contrary to the legislative scheme.

It was also submitted that Family Courts, being special courts constituted for the adjudication of family disputes, possessed exclusive jurisdiction which could not be divested through administrative orders. The petitioners also argued that the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, operated in a distinct field and could not override the Family Courts Act.

The respondents submitted that the transfer by relying upon Sections 12 and 16 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, which empower Gram Nyayalayas to entertain maintenance claims and authorise transfer of pending proceedings.

The Court noted that Section 12 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act confers jurisdiction upon Gram Nyayalayas to entertain maintenance proceedings, while Section 16 empowers the District Judge to transfer pending cases. It further observed that Section 18 provides an overriding effect to the Act in criminal matters, thereby reinforcing the legislative intent to expand access to justice at the grassroots level.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that where two special statutes are irreconcilable, the later enactment must prevail. Relying on Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. (2001) and subsequent decisions, the Court held that the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, being a later enactment, would prevail to the extent of inconsistency.

The Court further held that the petitioners had failed to challenge the vires or applicability of the relevant provisions of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, namely Sections 12, 16, and 18, which constituted the very source of the power exercised.

It observed that “the validity of the action taken thereunder cannot be assailed in isolation,” and reiterated the principle that a consequential order cannot be challenged without assailing the foundational statutory provision.

The Court relied upon precedents, including V.K. Majotra vs. Union of India (2003) and Edukanti Kistamma vs. S. Venkatareddy (2010), to emphasise that courts cannot nullify actions taken under statutory authority without first striking down the enabling provision.

The judgement reads: “In the absence of any challenge to the vires or applicability of the statutory provisions, the validity of the action taken thereunder cannot be assailed in isolation, …it is a well-settled legal principle that where an administrative or consequential action is founded upon a statutory provision, the same cannot be set aside without first dislodging the statutory foundation itself, … the impugned orders, having been passed in exercise of powers provided in the enactment, cannot be termed as without jurisdiction so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution”.

The Court also observed that the impugned orders, being administrative in nature and traceable to statutory power, could not be termed as without jurisdiction to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The High Court held that the challenge to the administrative orders was not maintainable in the absence of any challenge to the statutory provisions under which such orders were passed.

The Court upheld the validity of the transfer of maintenance proceedings from Family Courts to Gram Nyayalayas under Section 16 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 and dismissed the writ petitions.