In Neha vs. The State NCT of Delhi 2026 DHC 9436, Justice Subramonium Prasad of Delhi High Court delivered a 46-page long judgement dated October 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"50. In the opinion of this Court, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye (Supra) have not been violated at this stage. The SEM shall ensure that the principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court and the provisions of Chapter IX of the BNSS are not given a go by at later stages of the proceedings against the Petitioner also. 51. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the Impugned Notice meets the requirements of a show cause notice under Chapter IX of the BNSS. However, it is always open to the Petitioner to raise a challenge at an appropriate stage. 52. This Court, however, deems it fit to state that the SEM must necessarily keep in mind the import of Section 135 of the BNSS and leaves it open for the SEM to decide on the insistence of a bond at the first instance, as the provision provides for furnishing a bond only if there is an apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance after the commencement and before the completion of the enquiry. Needless to state, at the time of passing an order under Section 135(3) of the BNSS, the SEM will take into account the safeguards given by the five Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye (Supra), followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Aldanish Rein (Supra). 53. It is further needless to state that there will be several opportunities to the Petitioner to take recourse to the remedies under law at different stages of enquiry, including after passing of the final order upon conclusion of the enquiry. 54. It is made clear that all the observations in this Judgment are only limited to the purport of interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the stage of issuance of a show cause notice. Undoubtedly, the SEM would apply his own mind to the material/information placed before him and only then, arrive at a conclusion regarding furnishing of a personal bond or bail bond. 55. With these observations, the Writ Petition is dismissed, along with pending Application(s), if any."
Notably, on October 19, 2026, the Neha Bora, the petitioner had prayed for exemption from personal appearance on health grounds. The petitioner was called on October 24, 2026 at 02:00 P.M to appear before the SEM.
Neha appeared before the special executive magistrate (SEM) at Mandir Marg Police Station on October 24. In compliance with the High court's directions, her counsel was provided the documents that formed the basis of the police allegation that there was a likelihood of breach of peace and gave her time to reply by October 29.
Earlier, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, senior counsel for the petitioner appaered before the High Court and placed reliance on Paragraph 42 and 43 of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court's 5-Judge Constitution Bench in Madhu Limaye vs. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746. It reads:"“42. In our opinion the words of the section are quite clear. As said by Straight J. in Emperor v. Babua, [ILR 6 All 132] the order under Section 112 is on hearsay but the inquiry under Section 117 is to ascertain the truth of the necessary information. Sub-section (1) contemplates an immediate inquiry into the truth of the information. It is pending the completion of the inquiry that an interim bond can be asked for if immediate measures are necessary, and in default it is necessary to put the person in custody. Therefore, as the liberty of a person is involved, and that person is being proceeded against on information and suspicion, it is necessary to put a strict construction upon the powers of Magistrate. The facts must be of definite character. In Nafar Chandra Pal v. King Emperor [28 CWR 23] there was only a petition and a report and these were not found sufficient material. In some of the cases before us no effort was made by the Magistrate to inquire the truth of the allegations. The Magistrate adjourned the case from day to day and yet asked for an interim bond. This makes the proceedings entirely one-sided. It cannot be described as an inquiry within an inquiry as has been said in some cases. Some inquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered. We, therefore, approve of those cases in which it has been laid down that some inquiry should be made before action is taken to ask for an interim bond or placing the person in custody in default. In an old case reported in A.D. Dunne v. Hemchandra, [(1869) 12 WR (Cr) 60] a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court went into the matter. The case arose before the present Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, there was no provision for an interim bond. But what Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J., said applies to the changed law also not only with regard to the ultimate order but also to the interim order for a bond. The section even as it is drafted today is hedged in with proper safeguards and it would be moving too far away from the guarantee of freedom, if the view were allowed to prevail that without any inquiry into the truth of the information sufficient to make out a prima facie case a person is to be put in jeopardy of detention. A definite finding is required that immediate steps are necessary. The order must be one which can be made into a final order unless something to the contrary is established. Therefore it is not open to a Magistrate to adjourn the case and in the interval to send a person to jail if he fails to furnish a bond. If this were the law a bond could always be insisted upon before even the inquiry began and that is neither the sense of the law nor the wording or arrangement of the sections already noticed.
43. The power which is conferred under this Chapter is distinguished from the power of detention by executive action under Article 22 of the Constitution. Although the order to execute a bond, issued before an offence is committed, has the appearance of an administrative order, in reality it is judicial in character. Primarily the provision enables the Magistrate to require the execution of a bond and not to detain the person. Detention results only on default of execution of such bond. It is, therefore, not apposite to characterise the provision as a law for detention contemplated by Article 22. The safeguards are therefore different. The person sought to he bound over has rights which the trial of summons case confers on an accused. The order is also capable of being questioned in superior courts. For this reason, at every step the law requires the Magistrate to state his reasons in writing. It would make his action purely administrative if he were to pass the order for an interim bond without entering upon the inquiry and at least prima facie inquiring into the truth of the information on which the order calling upon the person to show cause is based. Neither the scheme of the chapter nor the scheme of Section 117 can bear such an interpretation. We accordingly, hold in the case of Madhu Limaye (Writ Petition 307 of 1970 — Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti that as the case was simply adjourned from time to time and there was no inquiry before remanding him to custody his detention was illegal. We may now briefly notice the remaining sections of the Chapter.”
The senior counsel also relied on the judgments passed by Delhi High Court in Aldanish Rein vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12207, Asha Pant vs. State, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 367, Vivek Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 417 and Ramavtar vs. State, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8027, the judgment passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Medha Patkar vs. State of M.P., 2007 SCC OnLine MP 591.
The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned notice does not meet the essential requirements prescribed by law under Section 126 of the BNSS. He stated that the Impugned Notice is nothing but a mere mechanical reproduction of the ingredients of the said provision. While issuing a notice under Section 126 of the BNSS, it was imperative on the part of the SEM to enquire into the material and satisfy himself that the information received by him would lead to an apprehension of breach of peace and disturb public tranquillity. He stated that without arriving at an independent opinion by conducting an enquiry on his own, the impugned notice could not have been issued by the SEM. Therefore, he submitted that without arriving at an independent opinion, neither an order under Section 130 no can a notice under Section 126 of the BNSS be issued. He drew the attention of this Court to the kalandara dated October 17, 2026, which according to him is the basis of the impugned notice, to submit that a notice under Section 126/130 of the BNSS cannot be issued only on the basis of a kalandara. He also stated that the kalandara indicates that the impugned notice was issued on the directions of “senior officers,” meaning thereby, that the impugned notice was issued as a performance of a command and not on the basis of an independent opinion arrived at by the SEM. He contended that the Order dated October 17, 2026 passed by the SEM also indicated that only the kalandara was submitted by SI Vaishali Tushir, the Investigating Officer (SI Vaishali Tushir) and on the inspection of the kalandara, the impugned notice was issued, which also was an indicator that without there being any enquiry as mandated at every stage of the proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS, the impugned notice was issued. The senior counsel drew the High Court's attention to the order dated August 23, 2026 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sub-Division, Parliament Street, New Delhi, to contend that Mandi House, where the protest was being called for by the Petitioner, did not fall in the area in which prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS had been passed, meaning thereby, that there was no restriction on any kind of protest to be carried out in that area. The senior counsel submitted that a reading of the impugned notice indicated that the "information" on which basis the same was issued by the SEM was only hearsay material, which was not sufficient to initiate proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS. He also stated that Neha, the petitioner had never urged people to protest in the Central Park, Connaught Place, where the protest was called for by another group. He also states that staging a peaceful protest cannot lead to breach of peace and therefore, the entire basis of the proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS initiated by the SEM was unsustainable. He submitted that the impugned notice did not conform to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and other Courts.
The High Court recorded that the petitioner had sought quashing of the Notice dated October 17, 2026 (the impugned notice) issued by the Special Executive Magistrate (SEM), New Delhi District, New Delhi, under Sections 126 and 130 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 to show cause as to why the Petitioner be not required to execute a personal bond in the sum of Rs.10,000/- each with one surety in the like amount of Rs.10,000/- under Section 135(3) of the BNSS for keeping peace for a period of enquiry.
The impugned notice reads:-“NOTICE UNDER SECTION 126/130 BNSS Whereas it has been made to appear to me by a credible information received from SHO/B.K. Road, New Delhi through SI Vaishali Tushir that you, Neha Bora D/o Hoshiyar Singh R/o H. No. 25, Meena Bagh, Maulana Azad Road, Delhi, created nuisance by shouting loudly in protest at round about Mandi House and you have already been involved in repeated protest related activity in and around Jantar Mantra, New Delhi, despite prohibitory orders 163 BNSS. You instigated people to participate in unauthorized demonstration at Central Park, Connaught Place which is not a designated protest site and also hoist the national flag without obtaining valid permission. There is every likelihood of apprehension of breach of public peace and tranquility within the jurisdiction of this court. That you are likely to commit a breach of peace or to do a wrongful act which may probably converted in a breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility within the local limits and jurisdiction of this court. You may take law in your hands and likely to do a wrongful act which may cause breach of peace and public tranquility in the area. I am satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings against you u/s 126/169 BNSS. I, MAHESH KUMAR MEENA, Special Executive Magistrate, New Delhi, Distt. New Delhi hereby requires you to attend in person (or with a duly authorized agent) in my court on 19.10.2026 at 2.00 P.M to show cause as to why you may not be required to execute a Personal Bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- each with one surety in the like amount of Rs. 10,000/- U/S 135 (3) BNSS for keeping peace for a period of enquiry.”
"It is a truism that the penal law of a country will tend to change according to the view of the wielders of its politica' power. Accordingly change of governments or change in the views of the self-same Government will be reflected both in the recognition of an act as an offence and in the severity of the punishment for the same offence." This relationship is noted by Abul Hasanat, Crime and Criminal Justice (1939), pp. 323-4. The relative conception of crime has been dealt with in S.S. Glueck's Crime and Justice (1936). When the views held by one Government and its successor differ fundamentally a corresponding change can be expected in the law of crimes and in the administration of criminal laws. Such a fundamental change took place between 1773 and 1861 in India. For the first few years of its administration the East India Company did not interfere with the criminal law of the country and although in 1772, during the administration of Warren Hastings, the Company for the first time interfered, and although henceforth till 1861, from time to time, the British Government altered the law, yet up to 1862, when the Indian Penal Code came into operation, the previous law was in force.
With regard to "Good Behaviour Bond", it may recalled that in 1818, the power of the Court of Circuit to require security for good behaviour, and in default, to detain in jail, was restricted to persons who might have been acquitted on a "specific charge", but who would appear to be of notoriously bad or dangerous character from the evidence on the proceedings. In this respect, the power of the Magistrate and that of the courts of circuit was normally limited to one year and three years respectively, although in the case of a prisoner being found to be a robber, or of dangerous character, the Court of Circuit was declared competent to order confinement 'indefinitely', in default of security. In the latter case, however, the court was to examine the position again after 3 years, and was to release the prisoner, if considered safe. Next year, this provision was extended to other notorious robbers, of whatever denomination, being of desperate or dangerous character, whom it would be unsafe to set at liberty without substantial security for their future good behaviour,