Patna High Court disposes intra court appeal filed by Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd., the publisher of The Times of India against Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna

Judgement reveals that a case can be filed against the Presiding Officer of a Court 

In M/s. Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd., (Patna Establishment) vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna (2026), Patna High Court's Justices Sudhir Singh and Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 3-page long judgement dated September 29 2026, wherein, it concluded:.”5. In view of the fact that the review application is pending consideration before the learned Single Judge and the issues involved therein, may have a bearing on the present appeal, we are of the view that it would not be appropriate to proceed with the present intra court appeal at this stage. 6. Accordingly, the present intra court appeal stands disposed of with liberty to the appellant to challenge the order that may be passed in Civil Review No. 257 of 2024, as well as any consequential order(s), if so advised. 7. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of." The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. 

The intra court appeal was preferred against the order dated February 9, 2024 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 9511 of 2008, which was filed and registered on June 27, 2008. So far the civil writ has been heard by 13 different judges during November 12, 2013-October 8, 2025. 

In course of hearing, the High Court noted that Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Harendra Pratap Singh and Sharad Ranjan Prasad, have preferred Civil Review No. 257 of 2024 before the Single Judge. In the review application, the Single Judge passed following order dated March 26, 2025:-

“The petitioner in the present CWJC has filed the application seeking review of the judgment passed by this Court on 09.02.2024. 2. The petitioner in the review application has filed an O.A. 1820 of 2012 before the Principal Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi. Herein it is stated that the petitioner was working as a Hindi Senior Journalist with the Nav Bharat Times (NBT) and thereafter in the audio/visual medium with Doordarshan and All India Radio and for a year with Dainik Jagran. Having regard to the fact that the issue in the present writ petition is to whether the petitioner is entitled for any payment of back wages for the period 20.03.1995 till 09.06.1999 i.e. date of retrenchment till the date of employment. It is necessary that the petitioner shall file an affidavit along with the requisite documents showing his employment with Nav Bharat Times (NBT), Doordarshan, All India Radio and Dainik Jagran by way of a supplementary affidavit. 3. The Supplementary Affidavit shall contain the details of the employment and the number of dates that the petitioner has worked with each group. 4. Post this matter on 29.04.2025."

Patna High Court's points out defect in writ petition by Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh, a recognized but unincoporated association

The term "body corporate" or “corporation” includes a company incorporated outside India, but does not include—(i) a co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies; and (ii) any other body corporate (not being a company as defined in the Companies Act 2013), which the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf.

-Section 2(11), The Companies Act, 2013

In Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), the registry of Patna High Court has cited a Rule to raise an objection which reads:”All the members of Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh/petitioner may be made party accordingly, court fee and w.s may be filed.”W.S refers to Welfare Stamp. In his order dated September 21, 2026, Justice Anshuman granted two weeks’ time "to remove the defect as pointed out by the Office or to take steps to contest the defect, failing which the present writ application stands rejected without further reference to a Bench. 3. As such, put up this case on 06/10/2026 under appropriate heading." The Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh is a recognised association under Bihar Sarkari Sevak (Seva Sanghon Ko Manyata) Niyamawali, 1960 framed by a notification dated July 20, 1960. The Bihar Sarkari Sevak (Seva Sanghon Ko Manyata) Niyamawali, 1960 or Bihar Government Servants (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1960 deal merely with the recognition of service associations. The State of Bihar had issued the notification in purported exercise of its power conferred upon it under Article-309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 4 of the said Rules lays down condition for recognition of service association and Rule 5 lays down the conditions subject to which the recognition is granted. It is patent that a legal proceeding can be maintained only by an individual or other body which is recognised as a legal person. 

It is apparent that Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh is not an incorporated body but it relies on the fact that it has been ‘recognised’ by the State Government according to the Bihar Government Servants (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1960 made in exercise of powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution "Recognition, however, gives an employees' association only a status in its relationship and dealings with the employer i.e the Government. It has nothing to do with the representation of its members in a litigation before a Court of law." In Director General Ordnance Factories Employees' Association vs. Union of India & Or.s (1986) AIR 1969 CAL 149, Calcutta High Court observed:"9. In the case of a body incorporated by law, the corporate body acquires a legal personality of itself and is as such entitled to maintain legal proceedings. But an unincorporated association has no legal personality and it is nothing but an aggregation of its members who can only bring legal proceedings in their individual capacity. Even when all of them are affected by an official act, they can challenge that only if all the members loin in the proceedings by name; the association, in such a case, cannot maintain an application under Article 220 or other legal proceeding, in its own name, as has been established by a number of decisions (Indian Sugar Mills Assocn. v. Secy. to Govt. U. P. Labour Dept. (FB); General Secy. Eastern Zone Insurance Employees' Assocn. v. Zonal Manager. Eastern Zone Life Insurance Corporation and even registration under the Societies Registration Act cannot confer this right. (Bangalore District Hotel Owners' Association v. District Magistrate, Bangalore, AIR 1951 Mys 14). 10. To the foregoing general rule, certain exceptions have been introduced by the provisions of certain special statutes, e.g.,--(i) A registered union is made a body corporate by Section 13 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, and is empowered to sue and be sued in its own name. (ii) Under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an association of workmen has a right to raise industrial disputes and to represent the workmen throughout the proceedings (Ramprasad v. Chairman. Industrial Tribunal, Patna ) and can thus move against an award under the Act (W. B. P. W. Union v. A. U. P. Works, Private Ltd. ). (iii) Under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, even an unincorporated association can make a representation in the matter of grant of a permit and can pursue that right in a proceeding under Article 226 (Sabitri Motor Service v. Asansol Bus Assocn (SB))."

It added:"15. Even where an association is permitted by law to bring a legal proceeding, it can bring an application under Article 226 only when its rights as a collective body as distinguished from the aggregate rights of its members are affected by the act challenged in the proceedings (Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India. ; Govt. Press Employees' Assocn. v. Govt. of Mysore, AIR 1962 Mys 25; Barrackpore Bus Syndicate v. Serajuddin , e.g., where it is already a party to the impugned order, as in)." But if the collective existence or interests of the association as such is affected, an association is permitted by law to bring a legal proceeding, it can bring an application under Article 226.

In S.P Gupta vs. Union of India, as reported in 1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149, Supreme Court has held that poverty, helplessness and disability or social or economic disadvantaged position was considered a sufficient ground for maintaining the writ petition by persons other than aggrieved. The following criteria are to be kept in mind for the locus standi in such type of cases:—

(a) That the members of the said association should have sufficient strength so as to come in the category of a large section of public,

(b) That the members should be identifiable,

(c) That the members must be of the category of poor/illiterate/helpless or disabled.

(d) That the individual members must not be capable of filing a writ petition.

(e) That the entire body of the members must authorize the association to protect their legal rights:

(f) That such an association must have its own constitution, and

(g) That there must be authority to file a writ petition on behalf of all the members.

It is not clear as to whether Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh has the authority to file this writ petition on behalf of its Members and in absence of such resolution. If there is no  authority to file a writ petition on behalf of all the members, the petitioner has no locus standi to file this writ petition. The fact about registration of the petitioner has also not been stated in this writ petition and, therefore, this writ petition is not tenable in law. The mere fact of its recognition under Bihar Government Servants (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1960 does not make Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh, a legal person. It has been held by the Allahabad High Court in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, as reported in AIR 1984 All 46 (FB). At paragraph 20, it reads: “20. To summarise, the position appears to be that an association of persons, registered or unregistered, can file a petition under Article 226 for enforcement of the rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights—(1) In case members of such an association are themselves unable to approach the Court by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position “little Indians”. (2) In case of a public injury leading to public interest litigation provided the association has some concern deeper than that of a wayfarer or a busybody i.e it has a special interest in the subject-matter. (3) Where the rules or regulations of the association specifically authorize it to take legal proceedings on behalf of its members, so that any order passed by the Court in such proceedings will be binding on the members.15. It has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in the case of The R.S.E.B Accountants v. The Rajasthan State Electricity, decided on 30th June, 1995, as reported in 1995 (3) WLC 1 (Full Bench), that if all the conditions of clauses (a) to (g), as referred to above in the earlier paragraphs, are fulfilled, then only the unregistered Association can file a writ petition, otherwise such Association cannot file a writ petition, alleging breach of fundamental rights, as the Association by itself has no fundamental right of its own.

The same view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Parents Teachers Association v. Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, as reported in AIR 2001 Raj 35. 

This objection of the registry of the Patna High Court appears to be contrary to the observations of Supreme Court’s 3-Judge Bench of V.R. Krishnaiyer, R.S. Pathak and O. Chinnappa Reddy in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railways) vs Union of India & Ors. 1981 AIR 298. Justice Krishnaiyer observed: “Our current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation', and 'representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions.” 

But this view and the earlier view taken by various courts in India that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name; and that Section 6 of the  Societies Registration Act was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued in the name of the president, secretary, etc.. 

It has been held in Shanti Sarup vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163;  Khiri Ram Gupta & Anr. vs. Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114, Satyavart Sidhantalankar vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; Nabadwip Bhajan Asram vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality: AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409 that societies were legal persons does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case, AIR 1962 SC 458, Illachi Devi case,  AIR 2003 SC 3397, and Tata vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi vs. The State, AIR 1962 SC 458, it is held that the registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.  

In Illachi Devi vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397, it is held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company. 

In n Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2023-3 SCC 1, the Court referred to its decision in Illachi Devi vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India (2003) 8 SCC 413, and "applied the plain meaning rule and held that said expression would not include a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as a society even after registration does not become distinct from its members and does not become a separate legal person like a company."

In Illachi Devi vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India, AIR2003 SC 3397, the Court held: i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20) ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21, iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22), iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26). It has been held that a society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. The registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. It has been held in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. and Tata vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943. The common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members. 

Notably, a the writ petition, filed by the Judicial Officers' Association, Goa, was dismissed by Panaji Bench of Bombay High Court, as reported in (1996) 2 Mah LR 94 : (1997) 4 Bom CR 372 (The Goa Judicial Officers Association v. State of Goa), on the ground that it was not tenable at law, because the Members of the Association were capable of approaching the Court and while dismissing the said writ petition. At paragraph 27,29 and 30, it reads:“27. The Senior counsel Mr. Kakodkar, who is appearing for the High Court, has contended that a writ petition on behalf of petitioner Association is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because the petitioner is not the person aggrieved. In other words, he submits that the petitioner cannot identify itself with the grievances of its members. He has contended that even if the petitioner is a Corporate Body registered under the Societies Act, the petitioner cannot maintain a petition under Article 226 for and on behalf of its members. He has cited several decisions of different High Courts: (Madhav Janardan v. Shrinivas Narayan Naik) 14, AIR 1962 Mysore 26, (Director General Ordinance Factories Employees' Association v. Union of India and Director General Ordinance Factories) 15, AIR 1969 Cal 149, (Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj, Bombay) 16, AIR 1946 Bom 516 and (Chanranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India) 17, AIR 1951 SC 41. We find considerable force in his arguments. A juristic person can maintain an action only when it is aggrieved or when its rights are infringed or violated by the action of an Authority. Here the grievance highlighted is that of the members and that grievance is that by the impugned Rules, the promotional avenues available to members of the petitioner's Association under the existing Rules have been taken away and, therefore, their chances of promotion have been in jeopardy. As we have already seen, that chance of promotion is not a right at all and, therefore, the members of the Association cannot have a legal right to maintain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Apart from that, the petitioner, as an Association of the Judicial Officers, cannot identify itself with the grievances of its members. The grievances of the members and the Association are distinct. This elementary principle has been stated by Salmond in ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’. 12th Edition, at page 67, which reads thus:—“It is essential to recognise clearly that in neither of these forms of incorporation is the legal person identical with any single human being. A company is in law something different from its shareholders or members. The property of the company is not in law the property of the shareholders. The debts and liabilities of the company are not attributed in law to its members. The company may become insolvent, while its members remain rich. Contracts may be made between the company and a shareholder, as if between two persons entirely distinct from each other. The shareholders may become so reduced in number that there is only one of them left; but he and the company will be distinct persons for all that." 

It added: "In the case of (The Bangalore District Hotel Owners' Association v. The District Magistrate, Bangalore) 18, AIR 1951 Mys 14, the Bangalore District Hotel Owners' Association filed an application before Mysore High Court against the District Magistrate, Bangalore and the Government of Mysore to cancel the order of the District Magistrate, Bangalore, notified in the Mysore Gazette on 10-11-1949, directing that all hotels, restaurants, milk bars and coffee clubs in the villages of the Bangalore District except those as are licensed by the Amildar of the Taluka under the Village Panchayat Act should be closed immediately. The hotel owners of Bangalore formed an Association and the said Association is said to have been registered under the Mysore Societies Registration Act, 1904. That Association challenged the validity of the Notification issued by the District Magistrate, Bangalore. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in the aforesaid decision in paragraph 5 of the judgment, held as follows:—“Mr. Venkataranga Iyengar contends that the Association is a corporate body and that it can therefore make such application to the Court in its own name. Under Section 7, Societies Registration Act, it is provided that a society which is registered under that Act may sue or be sued in its own name and for that purpose it may have a corporate existence of its own. And if there was any action or order by which the fundamental rights of the Association as such, say for example, under Article 19(b) or (c) or its rights of property or franchise were affected or jeopardised, it may be that such an application may be maintainable. But that is quite a different thing from saying that for some personal and individual grievance of some of its members the Association can agitate and apply for such extraordinary and discretionary writs which are clearly meant to prevent the taking away or abridging the fundamental rights conferred on individual citizens by Part III of the Constitution. Although no specific cases appear to have arisen on this aspect of the matter after the Constitution of India came into force we have some earlier rulings which are useful in deciding the matter”. 

The Court noted that considering various decisions of the High Courts and Supreme Court on the subject, the Calcutta High Court in Sand Carrier's Owners' Union vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta and others 19, AIR 1990 Cal 176, has held that the Company has no locus standi for the grievances of the petitioner. It held:—“Unincorporated associations are not legal persons and as such, writ petitions are not maintainable. An association could be formed to protect the interest of consumers, tenants or other groups with the common interest but such group cannot move writ application. No aspect of the representative law has been changing more rapidly than the law governing standing and the standing barrier has been substantially lowered in recent years, but on the basis of the law relating to standing as in England or in America as also in India, it can be held without any difficulty that the writ petition at the instance of an association is not maintainable where the association itself is not affected by any order. The members of such association may be affected by common order and may have common grievance, but for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the members, writ petition at the instance of such association is not maintainable. The door of the writ Court could be made open at the instance of persons or authorities under the aforesaid four categories and to hold that every Tom, Dick and Harry can move the writ application would render the standing requirement meaningless and would introduce a procedure which is not judicially recognised”. In this writ petition, the petitioner association of Judicial Officers of Goa. has not highlighted any grievance of its own, it has put up a grievance of its members. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior counsel Shri Kakodkar the petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner. Existence of a right of the petitioner is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 by this Court. The petitioner, even if it is a registered Association cannot identify itself with the grievance of its members and maintain a writ petition unless a statute provides for such a right as has been done by Trade Union Act Motor Vehicles Act. Industrial Disputes Act etc. Therefore, we have no hesitation to uphold the contention of Mr. Kakodkar that this petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner." 

Given the fact that Bihar Rajya Panchayat Sachiv Sangh is a recognised association under The Bihar Sarkari Sevak (Seva Sanghon Ko Manyata) Niyamawali, 1960 or Bihar Government Servants (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1960 which deals merely with the recognition of service associations, not with incorporation, it cannot file a writ as a legal person unless all the members are impleaded.  

 

Justice Nani Tagia sets aside termination order by District Magistrate, Buxar based on a photograph published in Dainik Bhaskar, show cause by District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar

Can a photograph in Dainik Bhaskar or any newspaper reveal whether or not someone is drunk?  

In Rajesh Kumar Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Nani Tagia delivered a 19-page long judgement wherein, he drew on two decision of the Supreme Court to conclude:"....it appears to be the law that when an employee, even if such an employee is temporary one, is sought to be terminated on a charge of bribery-which is punitive-it becomes necessary to hold an enquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law. Even in the case of minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say in the matter and if the charges are factual and are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be held. That is for the reason that adherence to the principle of natural justice cannot be dispensed with in such circumstances. 34. In view of the legal position and the finding recorded hereinabove, the impugned order dated 13.07.2019, terminating the petitioner’s contractual service from the post of Executive Assistant, Mid-Day Meal Scheme Offv bice, Buxar, without holding an enquiry with regard to the allegations made against the petitioner, cannot be sustained in law. 35. Accordingly, the impugned Office Order No. 40/2019-20, dated 13.07.2019 (Annexure-9), issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, terminating the petitioner’s contractual service from the post of Executive Assistant, Mid-Day Meal Scheme Officer, Buxar and the show cause notice dated 01.07.2019 (Annexure –6) issued to the petitioner by the District Programme Office, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar are hereby set aside and quashed. 36. The respondents are directed to re-instate the petitioner in service forthwith with all the consequential benefits."  

The writ application was filed by the petitioner challenging the Office Order issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, whereby the petitioner’s contractual service on the post of Executive Assistant, Mid-Day Meal Scheme Office, Buxar was terminated. The show cause notice issued to the petitioner by the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar was also challenged. The petitioner, vide a order dated October 30, 2012 was appointed on the post of Executive Assistant in the District Mid-Day Meal Scheme Office, Buxar on contract basis by the District Magistrate, Buxar. While the petitioner was working as such, a show cause notice dated July 1, 2019 was issued to him along with two other persons, namely, Manoj Kumar Singh and Sudehi Rai (both contractors), by the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar, wherein, it was stated that on June 30, 2019, Buxar edition of Dainik Bhaskar featured a photograph of the petitioner consuming alcohol in a vehicle along with two contractors and some unidentified persons. The following day, i.e. on July 1, 2019, the same newspaper published the petitioner’s name regarding the alleged alcohol consumption. In the show cause notice, it was also stated that the District Magistrate, Buxar, had taken cognizance of the matter, noting that the Bihar Government has strictly prohibited the sale and consumption of alcohol and consuming alcohol in the State is an offence. As such, the petitioner was directed to submit a clarification within 24 hours of receiving the notice. Subsequently, an FIR being Muffasil P.S. Case No. 181 of 2019 was also lodged under Section 37(C) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2018 against the petitioner and others. Pursuant to the show cause notice issued by the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar, the petitioner submitted his reply on July 6, 2019, to the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day-Meal Scheme, Buxar. In his response, the petitioner denied the allegation of consumption of alcohol stating that the allegation levelled against him is false and the news item was published in the newspaper due to the prevailing rural politics. 

The District Magistrate, Buxar, finding the reply submitted by the petitioner unsatisfactory, terminated the contractual service of the petitioner vide the impugned order dated July 13, 2019 with immediate effect by holding that as the consumption of alcohol is prohibited and is considered an offence in the State of Bihar, consumption of alcohol by the petitioner signifies his indiscipline. 

The petitioner, thereafter, submitted an application dated December 18, 2019 before the District Magistrate, Buxar with a prayer to allow him to rejoin the service contending that in the FIR being Muffasil P.S. Case No. 181 of 2019 registered against him under Section 37(C) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2018, the Investigating Officer has submitted a final report stating that there is no evidence against the petitioner suggesting commission of the alleged offence. 

Did Dainik Bhaskar report about the Investigating Officer's final report when its report turned to be fake? Did the editor of the newspaper seek an explanation from its Buxar based reporter? High Court ought to have sought an explanation from the newspaper in question?

The application of the petitioner was forwarded by the Deputy Collector, Establishment, Buxar to the District Programme Officer, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Buxar, seeking a report for further action to be taken in the matter. In response to the Deputy Collector’s letter dated March 14, 2020, the District Programme Officer, vide letter dated June 10, 2020, confirmed the final report submitted by the police in Muffasil P.S. Case No. 181 of 2019 and also apprised that no other person has been appointed to the post previously held by the petitioner. Since the petitioner did not receive any favorable response regarding his reinstatement despite the submission of the aforementioned application and the ensuing inter-departmental communications, he filed the writ petition challenging the impugned termination order dated July 13, 2019, issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned termination order was issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, solely on the basis of a photograph published in the Dainik Bhaskar newspaper dated June 30, 2019, allegedly showing the petitioner consuming alcohol. It is further submitted that the respondent authorities summarily terminated the petitioner’s contractual services without conducting any departmental enquiry, despite the petitioner’s categorical denial of the allegations in his show-cause reply. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the respondent authorities acted in a most unfair manner, violating the principles of natural justice and denying the petitioner an opportunity of a hearing to defend himself. Therefore, the impugned order of termination issued by the District Magistrate, Buxar, cannot withstand the legal scrutiny of this Court and is liable to be set aside and quashed. 

The counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of the High Court, which is as follows:-
(i) Sur Enamel And Stamping Works Ltd. Versus Workmen reported in 1963 SCC Online SC 97.
(ii) O.K. Bhardwaj Versus Union of India & Ors. reported in (2001) 9 Supreme Court Cases 180.
(iii) Hari Ram Maurya Versus Union of India & Ors. reported in (2006) 9 Supreme Court Cases 167.
(iv) Amit Kumar versus The State of Bihar & Ors. (CWJC No.5537 of 2020).

Dainik Bhaskar fails Breath Analyser Test reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025, I.O. of the case passes the test 

The District Programme Officer, Mid Day Meal Scheme, Buxar issued a letter dated July 1, 2019 asking the petitioner along with two others to clarify within 24 hours of the receipt of the letter regarding the photograph featured in the Dainik Bhaskar newspaper dated June 30, 2019 of the petitioner and others consuming alcohol. It also stated that the name of the petitioner was again published in the same newspaper on July 1, 2019 alleging consumption of alcohol by the petitioner  to exploit the petitioner due to the prevailing rural politics. 

Justice Tagia recorded: "The impugned order of termination has been passed thereafter on the basis of aforenoted two letters. It, thus, is evident from the impugned order of termination itself that no enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and the petitioner’s service has been terminated only on the basis of aforenoted two letters dated 01.07.2019 and 08.07.2019, respectively. 27. Since the petitioner was a contractual employee, no specific service rules regulating the disciplinary proceeding against him appears to be in vogue. What, therefore, arises for determination by this Court is whether, in the absence of any specific service rules prescribing the enquiry to be conducted against the petitioner (a contractual employee), a formal enquiry should have been held before the impugned termination order was issued?"

Justice Tagia referred to two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court which was cited by counsel for the
petitioner in this regard and, 

In paragraph 3 of the Supreme Court's decision in Hari Ram Maurya vs Union of India & Ors. reported in (2006) 9 SCC 167, it has been held: “3. From the order of termination Annexure P-7, it appears that the same refers to the show-cause notice dated 20-8-2002 which is to be found at Annexure P-5. It is stated therein that the appellant demanded kickback with a view to help the complainant to get a favourable order in the pension matter. That being so, there was a clear charge of bribery levelled against the appellant. No doubt, the appellant was a temporary employee, but if he is sought to be removed on the ground that he was guilty of the charge of bribery, it becomes necessary for the respondent Union of India to hold an inquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law. In this case, admittedly, no inquiry was conducted, and that is obvious even from Annexure P-7, the letter described as disengagement of casual labour. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as also the order of termination Annexure P-7 dated 30-09-2002. This, however, will not prevent the respondents from taking action in accordance with law.” 

In the case of Hari Ram Maurya, where the appellant, who was a temporary employee, was terminated on a charge of bribery without holding an inquiry, it has been held that if the employee is sought to be removed on the ground that he was guilty of the charge of bribery, it becomes necessary to hold an inquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law, even if the employee was a “temporary employee”.

In paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of the decision in the Supreme Court in O.K. Bhardwaj vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2001) 9 SCC 180, it has been held: “2. The High Court has recorded its opinion on two questions: (i) that the punishment imposing stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect is not a major penalty but a minor penalty; (ii) in the case of minor penalties, “it is not necessary to give opportunity to the employee to give explanation and it is also not necessary to hear him before awarding the penalty”: a detailed departmental enquiry is also not contemplating in a case in which minor penalty is to be awarded. 3. While we agree with the first proposition of the High Court having regard to the rule position which expressly says that “withholding increments of pay with or without cumulative effect” is a minor penalty, we find it not possible to agree with the second proposition. Even in the case of a minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the charges against him. Moreover, if the charges are factual and if they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for. This is the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot be dispensed with.” 

In O.K. Bhardwaj's case, the Court has held that even in the case of a minor penalty, an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the charges against him and if the charges are factual and if they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for, which is the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot be dispensed with.

Although no Breath Analyser Test, Blood and Urine Test done on the petitioner to ascertain the veracity of the fake news published by Dainik Bhaskar and although the I.O. found no evidence of alleged offence, Justice Tagia added: "37. The respondents, however, shall be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner by strictly following the due process of law, if so advised. 38. The writ petition is allowed in above terms and the same stands disposed of."  

Dainik Bhaskar was one of the newspapers which had published a similar news about an advocate of the Patna High Court, the advocate has filed a case against it and others who reported without ascertaining the results of the Breath Analyser Test, Blood and Urine Test? 

Also read: Legal reporting in Bihar fails Breath analyser test, reveals ignorance about Legal Metrology (General) Sixth Amendment Rules, 2025

Patna High Court's Division Bench upholds judgement of 2023 by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, petitioner's counsels disregarded Full Bench judgment based on Supreme Court's judgement

In Rajeev Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Health Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 6-page long judgement dated September 22, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....The conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted. 8. We are of the view that the appeal apart from being without merit is also barred by delay of 771 days. The appeal is dismissed both on merits and on delay." The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Rao. This is his 9th judgement as Chief Justice Patna High Court. The Division Bench recorded that he writ petition before the learned Single Judge was second round of litigation by the petitioner. He had earlier approached the High Court in CWJC No. 4156 of 2019, which was disposed on August 8, 2019. 

 In his 5-page long impeccable judgement dated May 3, 2023, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad had concluded:"This writ application has no merit. It is dismissed accordingly." 

Justice Prasad had recorded that the "counsel for the petitioner is aware of the Hon’ble Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Niraj Kumar Mallick & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar and Anr. reported in 2018 (2) PLJR 951 wherein this Court has considered the government circular/guidelines with regard to the appointment on compassionate ground in a case where the other sibling of the applicant is gainfully employed." This is because drawing on Supreme Court's judgement, he noted that the writ Court has to be conscious of the judicial pronouncements of the Court wherein it has been repeatedly held that a Court has no power to ignore a provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. In Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar 1994 AIR 2148 has held:“the Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law, however hard the case may be, it should never be done”

Upholding Justice Prasad's judgement, Chief Justice Rao observed:"5. A perusal of the conclusion drawn by the Full Bench, it is clear that pursuant to a public policy inasmuch as where any of the dependents of the deceased Government servant is gainfully employed, no other dependent would be entitled to get the benefit of the compassionate appointment. 6. A reference is also made that the Government has come out with a policy that the dependent who is gainfully employed and living separately from other dependents cannot be a reason to provide appointment. That is, irrespective of that whether employed one lives together or separately, the other dependents would not get the benefit of compassion. 7. If the above being the position and there is no denial to the fact that the eldest son of the deceased employee i.e., the sibling of the petitioner is employed in Andhra Bank, the said policy will come into play. The conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted."  

Bihar Government complies with Supreme Court's directions, Principal District and Sessions Judge made head of Board of Visitors of jails in place of DM

All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.

-Article 13(1), The Constitution of India 

The word untouchable is an epitome of their ills and sufferings. Not only has untouchability arrested the growth of their personality but also it comes in the way of their material well-being. It has also deprived them of certain civil rights….The untouchable is not even a citizen. 

-Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, “Evidence Before the Southborough Committee”, in Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 256

 Caste System is not merely division of labour. It is also a division of labourers. Civilized society undoubtedly needs division of labour. But in no civilized society is division of labour accompanied by this unnatural division of labourers into water-tight compartments. Caste System is not merely a division of labourers which is quite different from division of labour—it is an hierarchy in which the divisions of labourers are graded one above the other.

-“Annihilation of Caste” in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 47 

Ahead of the upcoming hearing of the Supreme Court on November 3, 2026, on September 23, 2026, the Bihar Cabinet approved amendments to Rule 743 of the Bihar Prison Manual, 2012, in compliance with the Supreme Court''s orders of July 30 and September 10, 2026, in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s).-10/2024, Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons In India. 

The Supreme Court's 6-page long order dated September 10, 2026 reads: "3. We give one last opportunity to place on record a comprehensive report explaining in what manner our order dated 30.07.2026 has been complied with. We make it clear that by the next date of hearing, we want a report indicating that all the States/Union Territories district-wise have constituted the Board of Visitors headed by the Principal District Judge."  

In compliance with a Supreme Court's order regarding the appointment of official and non-official visitors for all prisons, the State Government has amended the rules of the Bihar Prison Manual. The term "District Magistrate," which previously appeared in the regulations concerning the prison system and visitor arrangements, has been replaced with "District and Sessions Judge." A Board of Visitors will now be constituted, and under the new rules, it will be headed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge.

The unamended Rule 743 of Bihar Prison Manual reads: "Rule 743 Board of visitors.—The official and non-official visitors to all the prisons in the district shall constitute a Board of Visitors, of which the District Magistrate shall be the ex-officio chairperson. Official and non-official visitors shall jointly visit the prisons in the district atleast once in each quarter."  

The head of the Board of Visitors of jails will now be the Principal District Judge. A major change has been made in the administration of Bihar’s jails. The inspection by Board of Visitors’ team has been made mandatory to inspect the district jails at least once every three months. Now, it will be compulsory to visit and inspect the jails in the districts. During the inspection, the Board of Visitors of the jail will assess the arrangements on the jail campus, cleanliness, food, security, and the inmates. The command will not remain with the DM. The legal and basic facilities available to the inmates will be reviewed directly at the level of the judicial Principal District and Sessions Judge. 

This is being done in compliance with Supreme Court's directions in para 225-227 of the judgement dated October 3, 204 in Sukanya Shantha vs. Union of India & Ors. (2024) which reads:"225 Apart from this, a Board of Visitors is constituted, as per the Model Prison Manual 2016, at a district level. The Board comprises of: “29.03 The Board of Visitors shall comprise the following official members:
a) The District Judge at the District level, or the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate exercising Jurisdiction, at Sub-Division level
b) The District Magistrate, at the District level or Sub-Divisional officer at Sub- Divisional level
c) District Superintendent of Police
d) The Chief Medical Officer of the Health Department, at the District level or the Sub-Divisional Medical Officer at Sub-Division level
e) The Executive Engineer, PWD at the District level, or Assistant Engineer PWD at Sub-Divisional level
f) The District Education Officer dealing with literacy programmes.
g) District Social Welfare Officer
h) District Employment Officer
i) District Agricultural Officer
j) District Industrial Officer

The Board shall make at least one visit per quarter and for this purpose, presence of three members and the chairman shall constitute quorum.  

29.04 The Board of Visitors shall also comprise the following Non-Official Members:-
a) Three Members of the Legislative Assembly of the state of which one should be a woman.
b) A nominee of the State Human Rights Commission
c) Two social workers of the District/Sub-Division; one of them shall be a woman having an interest in the administration of prisons and welfare of prisoners.
29.05 The District Judge shall be the Chairman of the Board of visitors at District level and the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate shall be the Chairman at Sub-Division level. The Non-official visitors after their appointment must be sensitised and trained about their duties, roles and responsibilities.”
226 The duties of the Board have been provided as follows:
“29.22 All Visitors, official and non-official, at every visit shall:
(a) examine the cooked food;
(b) inspect the barracks, wards, work-sheds and other buildings of the prison generally;
(c) ascertain whether considerations of health, cleanliness and security are attended to, whether proper management and discipline is maintained in every respect and whether any prisoner is illegally detained, or is detained for undue length of time while awaiting trial;
(d) examine prison registers and records, except secret records and records pertaining to accounts;
(e) hear and attend to all representation and petitions made by or on behalf of the prisoners;
(f) direct, if deemed advisable, that any such representation or petition be forwarded to the Government;
(g) suggest new avenues for improvement in correctional work.”
The comments of the Board of Visitors are recorded in the visitors’ book of the prison and are forwarded to the Inspector General (IG) of Prisons. Any action on the comments is at the discretion of the IG Prisons. 
227 The Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 also envisages inspection of prisons, including by a Board of Visitors headed by the district judge/additional district judge/sub-divisional judicial magistrate.311 It also includes the provision for “free legal aid to the prisoners in accordance with the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987” and the relevant standard operating procedure."

In its order dated July 30, 2026, the Court had directed all the State Governments/Union Territories to ensure that Board of Visitors is constituted district – wise headed by the Principal District Judge of that particular District, within a period of four weeks from today. Board of Visitors shall be constituted accordingly without fail. Any laxity in this regard will be viewed strictly. 

Supreme Court's 7-page long order dated July 30, 2026 reads: "1. Dr. S. Muralidhar, the learned Amicus has placed on record a detailed Status Report. 2. In the Status Report, the learned Amicus has provided the background of the entire litigation, more particularly the various directions issued by this Court in its decision titled “Sukanya Shantha vs. Union of India and Others”, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 535. 3. The report talks about compliance of various directions issued by this Court in the Judgment, referred to above, including the clarificatory Order passed by this Court dated 7th November, 2024. 4. We have looked into the entire report. One copy of the Status Report has been provided to all other learned Counsel appearing in this litigation. 5. However, in the course of today's hearing, learned Amicus laid much stress on para 25 of his status report." Para 25 is titled 'Information Awaited Para 25 reads:The Amicus is awaiting further written responses from several States/UTs in respect of:-
"a. The method of collection and transmission of caste-data to NCRB;
b. Deletion of caste columns in all the registers and forms in prisons;
c. Outsourcing of cleaning work;
d. Status of compliance with the guidelines in the judgments in Arnesh Kumar and Amanatullah Khan;
e. Notifications constituting BoVs district wise;
f. Status of new Acts/Rules/Manuals that are proposed by several States/UTs;
g. Status of amendments to offending provisions in the Acts/Rules/Manuals.”

Dr. Muralidhar, the Amicus informed the Court that the State of Assam, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the State of Meghalaya, and the Union Territory of Chandigarh have evolved a methodology insofar as collection and transmission of caste data is concerned. According to him, the same methodology may be adopted by other States/UTs for the purpose of procuring the necessary information. According to him, as on date, none of the States/Union Territories have constituted Board of Visitors District-wise. According to him, it is very much important and necessary for each State/UT to constitute Board of Visitors in each of the Districts where are sub-jails. This has to be done under the Model Prison Manual, 2016, more particularly, Clause 29.01 read with 29.03 respectively including the State Prison Manual respectively. 

The Court's order reads: "10. We direct all the State Governments/Union Territories to ensure that Board of Visitors is constituted district – wise headed by the Principal District Judge of that particular District, within a period of four weeks from today. Board of Visitors shall be constituted accordingly without fail. Any laxity in this regard will be viewed strictly....We also direct all the States/Union Territories to provide us the status of amendments to the offending provisions in the Acts/Rules/Manuals as pointed out by the learned Amicus in his Status Report within a period of four weeks from today. 13. Registry shall forward one copy each of this Order to the Principal Secretary (Home) of all the States/Lieutenant Governors of Union Territories. The necessary Report as regards the aforesaid shall be forwarded by the respective States/Union Territories by 3-9-2026. Once all the necessary information is received, the Registry shall provide one copy each to the learned Amicus at the earliest."

In Sukanya Shantha vs. Union of India & Ors. (2024), the 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court  delivered a 148-page long judgement dated October 3, 2024, wherein, referring to the discriminatory provisions in the prison manuals in the States, it concluded:...the impugned provisions are declared unconstitutional for being violative of Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 of the Constitution. All States and Union Territories are directed to revise their Prison Manuals/Rules in accordance with this judgment within a period of three months; (ii) The Union government is directed to make necessary changes, as highlighted in this judgment, to address caste-based discrimination in the Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023 within a period of three months; (iii) References to “habitual offenders” in the prison manuals/Model Prison Manual shall be in accordance with the definition provided in the habitual offender legislation enacted by the respective State legislatures, subject to any constitutional challenge against such legislation in the future. All other references or definitions of “habitual offenders” in the impugned prison manuals/rules are declared unconstitutional. In case, there is no habitual offender legislation in the State, the Union and the State governments are directed to make necessary changes in the manuals/rules in line with this judgment, within a period of three months; (iv) The “caste” column and any references to caste in undertrial and/or convicts’ prisoners’ registers inside the prisons shall be deleted; (v) The Police is directed to follow the guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) and Amanatullah Khan v. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi (2024) to ensure that members of Denotified Tribes are not subjected to arbitrary arrest;(vi) This Court takes suo motu cognizance of the discrimination inside prisons on any ground such as caste, gender, disability, and shall list the case from now onwards as In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India." The Court will hearing In Re: Discrimination Inside Prisons in India case on November 3, 2026. 

Also read: Supreme Court all set to end persisting caste based discrimination in the prisons 

Summons issued by a Court under Sections 63 or 71 of BNSS, 2023, and a notice issued by an Investigating Agency under Section 35 of BNSS are different: Supreme Court

In Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. 2025 INSC 909, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N. K. Singh delivered a 21-page long judgement dated July 16, 2025, wherein, it has held that summons under Section 71 of the BNSS, 2023, has no immediate bearing on the liberty of an individual in case of its non-compliance. However, a notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 could have an immediate bearing on the liberty of the individual in case of its non-compliance, as laid down under Section 35(6) of the BNSS, 2023.  A summons issued by a Court under Sections 63 or 71 of the BNSS, 2023, and a notice issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 travel on different footings and cannot be equated with each other. A summons issued by a Court is a judicial act, whereas a notice issued by the Investigating Agency is an executive act. Hence, the procedure prescribed for a judicial act cannot be read into the procedure prescribed for an executive act.

The judgement reads: "41.The usage of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency, has only been provided for effecting the procedure under Sections 94 and 193 of the BNSS, 2023. 42. Section 94 deals with issuance of summons, in an electronic form, to produce a document. Section 193 deals with the usage of electronic communication for forwarding the report to a Magistrate, upon completion of the investigation, or to inform the progress of the investigation to the informant or victim. None of these procedures have any bearing on the liberty of an individual. 43. Hence, when viewed from any lens, we are unable to convince ourselves that electronic communication is a valid mode of service of notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, since its conscious omission is a clear manifestation of the legislative intent. Introducing a procedure into Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023, that has not been specifically provided for by the Legislature, would be violative of its intent."

Supreme Court concluded: "We further wish to take note of the fact that the BNSS, 2023 does not entirely preclude the use of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency. The Legislature has envisioned the use of electronic communication, during the course of investigation, and upon completion of investigation by the Investigating Agency, specifically provided for under Sections 94(1) and 193(3) of the BNSS, 2023 respectively. 

Section 94(1) of the BNSS, 2023 reads: “94. Summons to produce document or other thing-(1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document, electronic communication, including communication devices, which is likely to contain digital evidence or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Sanhita by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons or such officer may, by a written order, either in physical form or in electronic form, require the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order.” 

Section 193(3) of the BNSS, 2023 reads: “193. Report of a Police Officer on the completion of investigation-***(3)(i) As soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward, including through electronic communication to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form as the State Government may, by rules provide, stating—
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether the accused has been released on his bond or bail bond;
(g) whether the accused has been forwarded in custody under Section 190;
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under Sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70 or Section 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023;
(i) the sequence of custody in case of electronic device;
(ii) the police officer shall, within a period of ninety days, inform the progress of the investigation by any means including through electronic communication to the informant or the victim;
(iii) the officer shall also communicate, in such manner as the State Government may, by rules, provide, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.”
 

28 paragraphs out of 34 paragraphs of Judgement by Allahabad High Court granting relief to Akriti Chaudhary, a law graduate kept intact by Supreme Court, but why has High Court's verdict been removed from Court's website

In Medha Roopam vs. Akriti Chaudhary & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Satish Chandra Sharma and N. K. Singh passed a 8-page long order dated September 23, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"8. After hearing learned Senior Counsels for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that till the matter is heard on merits, the operation of paras nos. 27 to 33 of the impugned judgment including award of costs and strictures against the petitioner shall remain stayed. 9. List the matter on 07.10.2026." The Supreme Court's order implies that out of 34 paragraphs of the judgement by Allahabad High Court's Division Bench of Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev except these 6 concluding paragraphs are intact. 

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi of Live Law who broke the story about how Medha Roopam's matter was allotted to the bench that doesn't have the roster for preventive detention matter has disclosed that Akriti Chaudhary had infact earlier approached the Supreme Court to quash his detention which was before Justice B. V. Nagarathna. 

But why has the judgement by the High Court in Akriti Chaudhary (Detenue) vs. Union Of India & 4 Ors. (2026) HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. 960 of 2026 removed from the website of the High Court? The same is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/17opqogrvX_T4L4K1S0zNAHTDbwaguWWK/view?usp=drive_link 

Earlier, in Akriti Chaudhary (Detenue) vs. Union Of India & 4 Ors. (2026) HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. 960 of 2026, Allahabad High Court's Division Bench delivered a 15-page long judgement dated September 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"31.In this case, the conduct of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar who passed the impugned order, is worthy of derision. In a case where the police report against the Petitioner were only allegations without there being any credible material against her, the District Magistrate was expected to be vigilant and examine the record threadbare to determine if there was any material in support of the allegations and even thereafter, assess whether the oppressive provisions of the NSA were warranted against the Petitioner and how the general law of the land was inadequate against a female student activist without any previous criminal record, agitating for the rights of labourers and where the material on record did not disclose that she had in any way incited violence, reveals that the District Magistrate desired to set an example out of the Petitioner and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of the labourers. The District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar is guilty of violating her oath of allegiance, making this a fit case for the imposition of compensation to the petitioner.” It allowed the petition. Justice Sreedharan authored the judgement. In 2021, the High Court, quashed 94 out of 120 NSA detention orders it reviewed, citing procedural lapses and arbitrariness. It is apparently an unjust law. Notably, it seems the judgement has vanished from the website of the Allahabad High Court.  NSA refers to National Security Act (NSA), 1980. 

Justice Sreedharan observed:"The continued incarceration of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA is violative of her rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The order of detention along with the grounds of detention, being devoid of any material warranting the incarceration of the Petitioner under the NSA and the impugned order having been passed without application of mind, are quashed. The Petitioner shall be forthwith set at liberty, if not wanted in any other case. 26. The petitioner has prayed for a compensation of Rs. 50 lacs." 

He added:"27. As regards the compensation, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that her detention and continued incarceration under the NSA, was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and the State has acted in excess of its authority. To this, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the petitioner has not suffered any extra detention other than that of one single day on 12.04.2026, as she was arrested in Case Crime No. 163 of 2026, and is in judicial custody in that case in which the bail application has been rejected. Therefore, learned counsel for the State has submitted that even if this order of NSA is struck down and set aside, the petitioner would continue to remain incarcerated till she secures bail in the criminal matters."

The judgement recorded:"32. The contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the illegal detention of the Petitioner if any, was only for a day (11.04.2026) as she was arrested in Crime No. 163/2026 on 12.04.2026 and has remained in judicial custody ever since and she would continue to remain incarcerated even after the quash of her detention by this Court till she receives bail in all the cases registered against her. In other words, the Ld. Counsel for the State has submitted that the incarceration of the Petitioner under the NSA has merged with her period of detention in judicial custody. This Court finds force in the submission put forth by the learned counsel for the State. 33. Undoubtedly, even if the order in this particular case is quashed, the petitioner would still remain in jail as an under trial till she secures bail in all the criminal cases registered against her. As the period of detention merges with the period of judicial custody, the amount as prayed for by the petitioner, need not be considered in its entirety. However, on account of the casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the State through the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, which has violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner, this Court considers it sufficient to grant ₹5 lakhs as compensation to the petitioner. This Court also directs that the said amount must be recovered from the salary of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, who has passed this order of detention without application of mind and from all such other officers who may have been responsible, right down to the SHO of the Police Station, who had prepared the initial report warranting the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA. The displeasure of this Court against the conduct of the District Magistrate concerned and all such other officers of the police who were involved in preparing the dossier against the petition, be noted in their service records."

The petitioner is Akriti Chaudhary, who was arrested in Case Crime No. 163 of 2026, on April 12, 2026, where she was named as an accused, inter alia, of having committed offence under Sections 191(1), 191(2), 115(2), 121(1), 125(a), 351(3) and 352 of BNSS and Section 7 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932. Subsequently, she was detained under the National Security Act (NSA).

The genesis of the case commences from April 11, 2026, when during the month of April this year, there was widespread agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh by labourers, who were aggrieved by the payment of low salary, without any increase for several years, working for twelve hours at a stretch, and salaries being anything between ₹10-15,000 which was inadequate to lead a dignified and wholesome life on account of rising prices. Workers, numbering in thousands, came out into the streets near the industrial establishment and allegedly indulged in acts of vandalism and arson, destroyed the facades and glass panes of the factories and also set ablaze vehicles, including police vehicles. In the entire incident, the petitioner is alleged to be the agent provocateur, on account of whose actions and dissemination of information, the riots commenced from April 13, 2026. 

The petitioner's counsel submitted that the entire proceedings against the petitioner was an attempt to stifle freedom of speech and expression and even if the entire allegations against her is accepted without exception, there was no ground, much less sufficient grounds for having proceeded against the petitioner under the provisions of NSA. It was the case of the Petitioner that she was arrested at 5.30 pm on April 11, 2026 from Botanical Garden Metro Station which is situated in NOIDA, and locked up first in Sector-39 Police Station at 7.30 pm, and then she was locked up in various police stations during the night without any information being given by the police to petitioner's friends or family. On April 12, 2026, at around 1.00 pm, one of the petitioner's friends received a call from Sector-142 Police Station, informing her that the petitioner would be produced before Executive Magistrate at Sector 14A Police Station, where a lawyer representing the petitioner was informed that the petitioner was already produced and sent to jail under the orders of the Executive Magistrate under Section 126/135/170 of BNSS. Thus, it was the case of the Petitioner that she was never given an opportunity to sign a bond for good conduct.

The State submitted that the petitioner and her associates, between 6th, 7th and 8th of April, 2026 commenced the agitation and incitement to violence by the labourers from Manesar in Haryana, and thereafter, she and her associates shifted their focus towards NOIDA and hatched a conspiracy, allegedly in a library on how the violence against the State and its entities should be executed. It was also the undisputed case of the State that she was taken into custody on April 12, 2026, as much it was undisputed by the State that the violence commenced only from 13.04.2026. Therefore, the only inescapable inference that can be drawn is that the petitioner was in custody of the Law Enforcement Agencies from April 12, 2026, while the violence erupted from April 13, 2026. 

The counsel for the State has read out from the relevant portion of the order of the District Magistrate, which is elaborate and runs into several pages, wherein at page-40 of the counter affidavit  filed by the State, the main charge against the petitioner is reproduced herein as "पुलिस इतनी बड़ी संख्या में गिरफ़्तारी शांतिपूर्ण बैठे लोगों को शांति से बैठे लोगों को डरा रही है ये पुलिस है जो गैर कानूनी कायर्वाही कर रही है इसिलए जो लोग इस वीिडयो को देख सुन रहे है वो पुलिस  गैर कानूनी गैर वाजिब हरकतों को रोकने के लिए मजदूरों के दमन को रोकने के लिए बड़ी संख्या में पहुंचे।" (The police are arresting people who are sitting peacefully and are intimidating them; it is the police who are engaging in illegal actions. Therefore, those watching and listening to this video should arrive in large numbers to put a stop to the police's unlawful and unjust conduct and to halt the suppression of the workers.)

The judgement reads:" Even if these lines are taken to be the gospel truth, there is no incitement for violence, at the most and at its worst, it is only calling for people to gather to protect the rights of the labourers and stand with them in solidarity against the unlawful and excessive use of the authority by the police. This conversation had allegedly taken place between the petitioner and another co-accused." It was also submitted by the State that the WhatsApp chats between the petitioner and her associates, revealed that the petitioner allegedly told her associates that the police has gathered in large numbers in order to arrest those who are agitating peacefully and are scaring them by misusing their authority and therefore, anyone who can see and read this message should come in large numbers to prevent the unlawful actions of the police and to stand in support of the labourers who are being exploited. 

The judgement recorded that "10. There were several FIR's after Crime No. 163 of 2026, in which the Petitioner, though not initially named in the FIR as an accused, has also been inserted as an accused subsequently. In Case Crime No. 163 of 2026, the chargesheet has been filed against the Petitioner before the appropriate court, in which cognizance has been taken and the bail application of the petitioner has also been dismissed. The grounds of detention are given in page nos. 39 to 47 of the counter affidavit, which this Court has gone through. The introductory paragraph of the grounds of detention has already been stated hereinabove as to how the petitioner is stated to have entered into a conspiracy on 6th, 7th and 8th of April, 2026 in order to foment violence by the labourers in Manesar, Haryana and how in the library of one Yogesh Swamy, the Petitioner along with her other associates had hatched the conspiracy for both Manesar and NOIDA under the guise of the labour unrest.

The first ground related to April 12, 2026 on which date the Petitioner was arrested and produced before the Magistrate for remand and how at her indication, her mobile phone was recovered on April 25, 2026 (thirteen days after her arrest) from which the WhatsApp chats have allegedly been extracted.

The second ground, related to April 10, 2026, where the allegation against the petitioner was that in order to make the impending agitation by the labourers violent, she met her associates and created groups over WhatsApp and thereafter, the violence erupted from April 13, 2026 on account of the conspiracy hatched by the petitioner and her associates. Paragraph-3 relates to the commencement of violence on April 13, 2026 and how on April 11, 2026, the petitioner along with her co-conspirators at about 9.00 am in the morning gathered at Hosiery Complex, N.S.E.Z., Phase-2, Gautam Buddha Nagar along with 300-400 workers, tried to prevent labourers going for their work. The date on which this is supposed to have happened is April 13, 2026 pursuant to the alleged conspiracy which was stated to have been hatched on April 11, 2026. After which she was arrested on April 12, 2026, though it is the consistent case of the Petitioner that she was arrested by the police on April 11, 2026.

The judgment summarized the grounds of detention against the Petitioner, all the acts of violence commenced from April 13, 2026 onwards which led to widespread loss of public and private property and had taken place after the petitioner was in custody. The crux of the State's case for keeping the petitioner under detention is that all the violence that had taken place during the agitation, though had taken place after the arrest of the petitioner, are attributable to her on account of conspiracy that was hatched by her before her arrest on April 12, 2026 and if not for the same, the violence would never had taken place.

The petitioner is about 24 years old, a graduate in History from Daulat Ram College, who went on to do her M.A. in History from Delhi University and is currently a student of First Year Law at the Law Faculty at Delhi University and has no previous criminal antecedents at all (this has been admitted to by the State also).

The counsel for the respondent State submitted the WhatsApp chats that had taken place between the petitioner and her associates to justify the grounds of detention and the order of detention. It was also mentioned that it was trite law that to place a person in detention under the NSA, it was not required that the person must be arraigned as an accused in a catena of criminal cases and that the same may be given effect to on the mere apprehension of disturbance of public order by such person or a singular act which is harmful for the security of the State.

The counsel for the State placed before the High Court the notice that had allegedly been issued under Section 130 of the BNSS before Akriti Chaudhary, the law student of Delhi University was taken into custody. The notice was issued on April 12, 2026, whereby bond for good behaviour was fixed at Rs. 50,000/- and thereafter, allegedly on the grounds of the petitioner refusing to furnish the bail bond to keep good behaviour for six months, was taken into custody on the basis of the General Diary Entry No. 37 dated April 12, 2026 at 10.56 am by the District Unit (Commissionerate Gautam Buddha Nagar). The arrest is said to have been made at 10.20 am on April 12, 2026. The notice under Section 130 was also given to the petitioner on April 12, 2026. It purportedly bears the signatures of the Petitioner along with two others, showing that it was received by them. However, no time has been mentioned in the said notice under Section 130. It is also necessary to mention here that the G.D. number 37 on the basis of which she was arrested finds its mention in the notice under section 130 of the BNSS. The same is not written by hand but is printed.

In his judgement, Justice Sreedharan recorded that "17. My learned brother on the bench Justice Achal Sachdev, pointed out that the General Diary Entry No. 37 was generated at 10.20 am on 12.04.2026 and the mention of the G.D number in the notice under Section 130 goes to reveal that the notice was prepared after the arrest of the petitioner for, had the same been prepared before the arrest of the Petitioner, the G.D. number would not have been mentioned on the notice u/s. 130 BNSS. Mentioning the G.D. number in the notice under Section 130 of the BNSS reveals that the Petitioner was already arrested and the procedure of giving a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS was ex post facto the arrest and nothing more than a sham. I agree with the view of brother Justice Achal Sachdev that the notice u/s. 130 of the BNSS was prepared after the arrest of the Petitioner and that is the reason why the time of issuance is not mentioned in the notice and its omission is deliberate. Answer was sought from the Ld. Counsel for the state with regard to visible fabrication in the record for which no answer is forthcoming from the Ld. Counsel for the State.

With regard to the arrest of the Petitioner, the judgement recorded, "the contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the petitioner was arrested on 12.04.2026, while the Petitioner's side insists that she was taken into custody on 11.04.2026 from 5.30 pm onwards, which is denied by learned counsel for the State." 

Justice Sreedharan observed: "In order to assess which of the two versions is correct, this Court examined the extracts from the WhatsApp conversation between the petitioner and one of her associates produced and relied upon by the State. On page no. 1, is the conversation between one Priyambada, an associate of the Petitioner, messaging the petitioner. The date of the message is 11.04.2026 at 17:56 hrs, to which there is no reply from the petitioner. Then, there were two messages at 17:57 hrs, one at 17.58 hrs, next at 18:14 hrs, 18:35 hrs, 18:56 hrs, 19:11 hrs and a missed call at 19.31 hrs. None of these messages and the call have been answered by the petitioner."

The counsel for the State drew the attention of the High Court to page no. 2 of the WhatsApp chats, which shows again the messaging between the petitioner and Priyambada, which shows a video clip of the gathering sent by the petitioner to Priyambada at 13:41 hrs of 11.04.2026, which was replied with an emoji by Priyambada at 13:50 hrs, and thereafter, Priyambada messaged at 13:56 hrs, which is replied by the petitioner at 14:03 hrs.  

Taking note of the submission by the State, the High Court inferred: "Thus, the messages at page-1 which is of 11th April, 2026 from 17:56 hrs onwards sent to the petitioner- Akriti Chaudhary by her associate Priyambada have not been answered by the petitioner. The only probable reason was that the mobile was not with the Petitioner or that she was in a situation that she could not reply to the messages from Priyambada which probabilise as true, the version put forth by the Petitioner that she was in the custody of the State from 5.30 pm of 11.04.2026 while her formal arrest was shown from 12.04.2026 and concomitantly, falsifies the contention of the State that the Petitioner was in the custody of the State only from 12.04.2026.

The High Court repeatedly asked the counsel for the State to point out from the WhatsApp chats and the video recordings as to which one of them incited people or disclosed a conspiracy inciting people to indulge in acts of rioting, arson and destruction of public and private property? It observed: "The counsel for the State could not show a single message from the WhatsApp chats between the Petitioner and her associates or any video clip which would reveal any incitement from the Petitioner, either evidently or by necessary implication, which would disclose that it was the involvement of the Petitioner and the conspiracy hatched by her that resulted in the violence which erupted from April 13, 2026, much after the Petitioner was taken into custody by the State on 11.04.2026 (as held by this Court). Even otherwise, the undisputed case of the State is also that the violence erupted after the Petitioner was taken to custody by the police."

The judgement observed: "21. The video images relied upon by the State show a large number of people having gathered, which include men and women in traditional rural clothing, all standing near a lamp posts and one video image of a person who seems to be addressing the public. None of these videos disclose that the crowd is agitated or armed with lathi, stones or any such articles, which may be used in an act of violence, but appear to be exercising their constitutional right and freedom of speech and agitating their demands for higher pay and humane working hours."

The High Court observed:"22. Any detention under the NSA is an exception. It is not a substitute to ensure that a person who may receive bail on account of merits of his case, is still detained in custody under a concocted reasoning by the State. The elaborate grounds of detention of the District Magistrate are repetitive, speculative and are only opinion based without referring to a shred of evidence/material in support of sustaining those opinions. The grounds of detention must traverse beyond mere allegations and opinion. Allegations which raise a subjective opinion in the mind of the District Magistrate must be supported with reference to material for the formation of such opinion, else the same would be arbitrary. It must be understood that the exercise of such a discretion which directly violates a person's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be exercised lightly on the basis of surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions. It is the exercise of an extraordinary authority which results in the summary incarceration of a citizen merely on the opinion of the detaining authority which must be such that where a constitution court examining the grounds of detention is also satisfied that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate, crosses the threshold of mere surmises and conjectures and was justly based upon the material on record and not detaining the detenue under the stringent provisions of the NSA would in all probability than not, result in the public order being disturbed or would result in an act by the detenue which is deleterious to national security. The absence of such material would render the grounds of detention and the order of detention unjustified, deserving to be set aside."

The judgment pointed out that the material on record showed that at the petitioner, the law student had called for citizens in support of the labourers and to agitate for their rights. "There is no material to reflect that such agitation will have to be violent or challenging the authority of the State. The freedom of speech and expression extends to coming out on the streets and agitating a cause, and gathering peacefully without arms or without threat to the public order. However, the State must also realize that a peaceful agitation where people collect without arms or ammunitions, can still be scuttled by mischievous elements, who may be sent by parties, who are interested in ensuring that such an agitation is broken and also where such elements may indulge in acts of violence, which thereafter gets attributed to the entire group which is patently unjust. Preventing people from gathering in public spaces or agitating their rights on the grounds of assumed breach of peace, would be throwing the baby out of the bath water. If such a view is taken by the State and approved of by the Courts, it would lead to a cessation of the collective expression of opinion in public spaces. The Constitution protects such a right and the same cannot be trifled with merely on the subjective opinion of the State. The State must also realize that it has a strong and powerful police force, which must be trained in ensuring public order in such large gatherings and also resort to videography of the gathering and the manner in which it is conducted, so that accountability may be affixed, in the event of an outbreak of violence."

Justice Sreedharan recorded that the relationship between the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) on the one hand and the citizens of Uttar Pradesh whom they serve on the other, define the existence of the rule of law or its absence, as the case may be. There must also be a realisation that with great powers come great responsibility and an expected introspection on the part of the bureaucracy as to whether such powers be resorted to, and to what extent. "Else, in the words coined by Rudyard Kipling (spoken publicly by Stanley Baldwin) that 'power without responsibility – the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages, will ring true whenever the power is exercised by the bureaucracy in a cavalier manner, devoid of human sensitivity resulting in deleterious consequences for the citizen."

Justice Sreedharan observed that the IAS and IPS should realise that their loyalty is towards the Constitution and not the political executive, and the honesty and impartiality are towards the people whom they serve while bearing in mind at all times that they are the servants who serve the people, the masters in a democracy. In the bureaucracy and the police, when they act in a manner which is harmonious with their oath of allegiance, the citizens are thankful but "every time they ignore that solemn oath and act contrary to it, the people of the State of Uttar Pradesh would view them as an oppressive vestige of the British Empire arousing angst and hatred towards them creating an environment of civil unrest and this Court, while correcting their excesses and/or illegalities, especially those that impinge upon the civil liberties of the citizens without adequate cause or due process (inhering in the procedure established by law), may pass harsh orders to compensate the citizen so wronged, besides recording their despotic conduct. Else, it shan't be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia."

The 17-page long order sheet is available here. It records the genesis of the case which commenced from April 11, 2026, when during the month of April 2026 year. There was widespread agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar by labourers, who were aggrieved by the payment of low salary, without any increase for several years, working for twelve hours at a stretch, and salaries being anything between ₹10-15,000 which was inadequate to lead a dignified and wholesome life on account of rising prices. Workers, numbering in thousands, came out into the streets near the industrial establishment and allegedly indulged in acts of vandalism and arson, destroyed the facades and glass panes of the factories and also set ablaze vehicles, including police vehicles. In the entire incident, the petitioner was/is alleged to be the agent provocateur, on account of whose actions and dissemination of information, the riots commenced from April 13, 2026. The facts recorded in the judgment indicate that the entire proceedings against the petitioner was an attempt to stifle freedom of speech and expression. There was no ground, much less sufficient grounds for having proceeded against the petitioner under the provisions of NSA. 

The National Security Act (NSA) 1980, one of three counter -terror laws was enacted on December 27, 1980 after the notoriety of Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971 came to light during 21 months of the Emergency (1975-1977), which was deployed to silence opposition parties. Entry 9 of List I (the Union List) and Entry 3 of List III (the Concurrent List) empower the Central Government and State Governments, respectively, to frame laws concerning preventive detention. This preventive detention provision which has survived under Article 22 (3) of the Constitution of India, is a colonial residue of special laws introduced by the British monarch's East India Company in 1784 under which numerous freedom fighters were incarcerated. Post independence, it remained alive through the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 till 1969. It was replaced by MISA Act, 1971, which was repealed in 1978.  The successor of MISA is no better. The constitutionality of the NSA was challenged in the case of A.K. Roy vs. Union of India 1982 SCR (2) 272 on the ground that it is a draconian law that places arbitrary and excessive powers in the hands of the executive and was violative of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. But Section 3 (1) and Section 3(2) of the NSA was not struck down on grounds of uncertainty and vagueness by the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. It majority judgment reads: "We must therefore, held, regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board." 

The specter of colonial law which impacted the judicial outcome in A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 that upheld preventive detention within a compartmentalised reading of fundamental rights loomed large over the decision in the A.K. Roy's case. It ought o have factored in the decision in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 because certain provisions of the NSA are not just, reasonable and fair.

Under Section 3 of NSA, the Central Government or the State Governments can order the detention of a person in order to prevent him from adversely affecting the security of India, defence of India, India’s relations with foreign nations, the maintenance of public order, or the supply of essential supplies. NSA permits central and state governments, and in specified circumstances, the DMs and Commissioners of Police, to detain a person for up to 12 months if the DM is satisfied that the person's activities are prejudicial to national security, public order, or the maintenance of essential services. Section 4 provides that the detention order can be executed at any place throughout the territory of India. Under Section 8, the grounds of detention have to be communicated to the detained person as soon as possible. Such communication must preferably be made within a maximum period of 5 days and, in exceptional cases, within a maximum period of 15 days.  

Also read: Protest against economic injustice by workers in UP: Mentioning General Diary Entry Number in notice under Section 130 of BNSS ex post facto arrest of Akriti Chaudhary, the law student, turns procedure into a sham