Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Jitendra Kumar in a case from Guagaon, Kachna, Katihar, grants regular bail

In Chulka @ Aslam vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli has passed a 3-page long order dated August 31, 2026, wherein, it reversed the 3-page long order dated January 21 2026 by Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court. The petitioner calls in question the correctness of the order by the High Court. By the said order, the petitioner was denied the benefit of bail in connection with FIR/Case No.41/2025. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that this was a case where there is a cross case also. The State in its counter affidavit did not dispute the cross case, which has also resulted in chargesheet and only cognizance was awaited. The petitioner has already undergone about one year imprisonment and the trial is likely to take some time to conclude. Supreme Court's order reads: "6. Having considered the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 7. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court in connection with the aforesaid FIR for the offence mentioned hereinabove." The Special Leave Petition was disposed of.  

The High Court had heard the case along with the  case of Md. Haider vs. The State of Bihar (2026).  As per allegation, nine accused persons including the petitioners came over the land of the informant armed with lathi, danda and iron rod and started beating the father of the informant, who subsequently died. The specific allegation against the petitioners is that they have beaten the victim by iron rod, resulting into the serious injury into the head which resulted into his death. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted before the High Court that the petitioners are innocent and have falsely been implicated in this case. It was also submitted that as per the allegation, both the petitioners were assaulted the deceased with iron rod, but as per the post-mortem report, there is only one lacerated wound on the occipital region of the deceased and one swelling on the shoulder and bruise on thigh which could not be caused by assault by iron rod. He also submitted that not only charge-sheet was submitted, but also charge was framed in this case.It was also submitted that the petitioner No. 1/Md. Haider and petitioner No. 2/Chulka @ Aslam was languishing in jail since August 25, 2025 and July 30, 2025, respectively. It was also stated that the petitioners had no criminal antecedent. APP for the State had opposed the prayer of the petitioners for bail. He submitted that
there is direct allegation of assault by the petitioners by iron rod which resulted into the death of the deceased and hence, they do not deserve the privilege of regular bail. 

Justice Kumar had concluded:"9. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, particularly the direct allegation of causing injury on the head which resulted into the death of the victim, I am not persuaded to enlarge the petitioners on regular bail and accordingly, it is rejected. 10. However, learned Trial Court is directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same within a year, failing which the petitioners have liberty to renew their prayer for regular bail."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, grants anticipatory bail due to compromise between informant, and appellant

In Shayam Mishra @ Shayam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page order dated August 25, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 5-page long order dated June 25, 2026 by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court in a case from Badhurupiya, Sugauli, East Champaran. Supreme Court's order reads: "5) Inasmuch as this case involves a complaint at the behest of the informant and a counter complaint at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and grant anticipatory bail to the appellant. 6) In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40755 of 2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court." 

The appellant is implicated as an accused in connection with F.I.R. No.480 of 2021 registered at P.S.: Sugauli, District: East Champaran, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 384, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC. He was aggrieved by the rejection of the anticipatory bail applications by the Trial Court and the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court. The Court was informed that "the matter has been resolved between the appellant and the informant, via compromise."

Prior to this, in his order Justice Jha had recorded the submission by the A.P.P. for the State, while opposing the prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner, wherein, it was submitted that considering all available materials, the prayer of first anticipatory bail of the petitioner was rejected and, therefore, there is no occasion to reconsider this second prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner without having any changed circumstances, which would amount to review of earlier order passed by learned coordinate Bench of this Court, which is not permissible under law. It was also submitted by the A.P.P. that the offence, as alleged, is not compoundable in nature and, therefore, compromise is of no bearing. 

Justice Jha had concluded: "8. In view of aforesaid factual submission and by taking note of the fact as prima facie on the basis of subsequent compromise for non-compoundable offence, the earlier rejection order, which was passed by one of the learned coordinate Bench of this Court, cannot be reviewed by this Court, accordingly, on second consideration also, prayer of anticipatory bail of the  petitioner stands rejected."

The High Court's order recorded that it was the second prayer of anticipatory bail, after rejection of his first anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated February 9, 2023 of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Cr. Misc. No. 2413 of 2023 dated February 9, 2023, wherein considering all available materials, as petitioner was specifically alleged to cause stab wound due to which the injured sustained grievous injury, his prayer of anticipatory bail was rejected. At the time of the rejection of the first anticipatory bail rejection, there was no compromise between the parties. 

The second anticipatory bail petition was preferred on the sole ground that now this matter was compromised between the parties. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the occurrence was free-fight in nature and petitioner’s side had also received injury during the occurrence. It was also submitted that now the petitioner was selected in Group ‘D’ service of Indian Railway, therefore, in view of compromise, sending the petitioner to jail would not serve any purpose of justice. 

In support of his submission, the counsel had relied upon para 22 of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. Para-22 of the judgment reads:- “22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:-“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. 
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against
each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

Supreme Court's order vindicates the position of petitioner's the counsel Prateek Tandon and the persuasive value of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. It is apparent that Supreme Court has rejected the submission made by Nand Kishore Prasad, APP which is recorded in the order by Justice Jha. Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by APP's reasoning. 

Justice Ritesh Kumar's first judgement set aside order by Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, directs its communication to Registrar, VKS University, Ara

In Kumar Patel vs. The State of Bihar through the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ritesh Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgement dated February 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"14. In my considered opinion, the petitioner has already suffered for the lapses on his part, which he has not been able to explain, but since for those lapses he has already suffered and punishment was inflicted upon him, which he accepted and the period of punishment has already come to an end. Therefore, the order impugned contained in Memo No. 7305 dated 13.09.2022 deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. Since the grounds mentioned therein are not sustainable. The respondent no. 2, i.e., the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna, is directed to consider the application of the petitioner for grant of voluntary retirement afresh, considering the fact that the order of punishment looses its effect on 18.07.2022 and the petitioner has already suffered a lot for his lapses. The decision must be taken within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order and the same shall be communicated to the petitioner at his present place of posting through the Registrar, VKS University, Ara. 15. It is expected that while taking the decision, the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Government of Bihar, Patna, will take into consideration the fact that the petitioner has already suffered for his lapses and that any further punishment would result in further severe consequences for him. The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, should take a sympathetic view in the matter, while passing the order. 16. With the aforementioned observations and directions, the writ petition shall stand disposed of." It is the first judgement authored by Justice Kumar after joining as the judge of the High Court on January 8, 2026. 

The six other respondents were: 2. The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, 3. The Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Hajipur, Anchal, Hajipur, Vaishali, 4. The Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited, Through the Managing Director, Patna, 5. The Managing Director, Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited, Patna, 6. Bihar Public Service Commission Through the Chairman, Patna and 7. The Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, Patna.

The writ petition was filed for quashing the letter dated May 27, 2022 issued under the signature of respondent cooperative Societies Bihar Patna by which the application of the petitioner for voluntary retirement was rejected. It also sought quashing the letter dated September 13, 2022 issued under the signature of respondent cooperative Societies Bihar, Patna by which the application of the petitioner for voluntary retirement was rejected. The petitioner prayed for quashing the letter dated September 13, 2022 issued under the signature of respondent cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna by which the petitioner was directed to file show cause with respect to three allegations when the relation of master and servant between the petitioner and the respondent State ceased to exist after a period of 90 days from the date of submission of his application dated May 25, 2017 for voluntary retirement. During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner sought stay on further proceedings pursuant to the letter dated September 13, 2022. 

Sanjeev Kumar Mishra, the senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Cooperative Extension Officer on February 26, 1997 on the recommendation of the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) and was sent on deputation to the Rural Development Department in the year 2010, where he was posted as Block Development Officer, Lauria. Subsequently, the services of the petitioner was placed at the disposal of the State Food Corporation, where he was posted as Assistant Manager. 

An advertisement was published by the BPSC vide advertisement No. 56 of 2014 for appointment on 290 posts of Assistant Professor in the faculty of Psychology in different Universities in the State of Bihar. Subsequently, vide office order contained in Memo No. 2663 dated February 25, 2016, the services of the
petitioner was repatriated to his parent department. It was submitted by the senior counsel that a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner under Rule 17(2) of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. The charges against the petitioner were that while working as District Manager, State Food Corporation, Bhojpur, Ara, he was involved in lapses in performance of duty, illegal storage and black marketing of subsidized rice. In the meantime the petitioner applied for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor and was called for interview, which was scheduled to be held between November 29, 2016 to December 1, 2016. The petitioner filed an application before the competent authority on November 11, 2016, seeking grant of one day leave to enable him to appear in the interview for the post of Assistant Professor, but no decision was taken on the application submitted by the petitioner on November 11, 2016. The petitioner, however, appeared in the interview and was declared successful. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor, Psychology, on the recommendation of the BPSC and was allotted Veer Kunwar Singh University, Ara, by the Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Patna. Subsequently, vide notification dated June 1, 2017, issued under the signature of the Registrar, Veer Kunwar Singh University, Ara, the petitioner was posted in SVP, College, Bhabhua, under Veer Kunwar Singh University, Ara. On May 18, 2017, the petitioner submitted a representation before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna with a request to expedite the departmental proceeding, which was initiated vide order dated June 2, 2016. The petitioner gave an application for voluntary retirement from the services of the State Food Corporation on June 13, 2017 and joined S.V.P. College, Bhabhua on June 14, 2017. By the Memo dated July 19, 2019, issued under the signature of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna, the petitioner was inflicted with the punishment of Censure and stoppage of three increments with non-cumulative effect, which was accepted by the petitioner as no appeal was filed against the said order of punishment dated July 19, 2019. The petitioner was discharging his duties at S.V.P. College, Bhabhua, but all of a sudden, vide Letter dated May 27, 2022, issued under the signature of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna, addressed to the petitioner, his application for voluntary retirement was rejected. The petitioner filed a representation on July 25, 2022 before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna, stating therein that since the order of punishment had lost its force w.e.f. July 18, 2022, therefore, his application for voluntary retirement may again be considered sympathetically. 

A show-cause notice dated September 13, 2022 was issued to the petitioner under the signature of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna wherein the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation through the competent authority within 15 days on the three charges. On the representation filed by the petitioner on July 25, 2022, the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna again passed an order contained in Memo dated September 13, 2022 wherein it was contended that the petitioner had applied for grant of voluntary retirement on September 13, and without waiting for the approval of the competent authority he proceeded to join SVP College, Bhojpur, Ara, on June 14, 2017, therefore he did not work on the post of the Cooperative Extension Officer from the period July 19, 2019 to July 18, 2022 i.e. the date during which the punishment order was subsisting, therefore, despite end of the period for which the punishment order was in effect, the punishment was not implemented. The application for voluntary retirement was again rejected. It was submitted by the senior counsel for the petitioner that the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna, on the one hand, asked for an explanation by issuing a show-cause notice to the petitioner vide Memo dated September 13, 2022, but on the other hand, prior to issuance of the show-cause, on the same day vide Letter dated September 13, 2022, rejected the application for voluntary retirement of the petitioner on the grounds mentioned in the said letter. 

A counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 2, contended that the petitioner, without approval of the competent authority, applied for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor, since his application was not submitted through the proper channel. It was contended that the petitioner, even before appearing in the interview, did not obtain any permission from his parent department, i.e., Cooperative Societies. Further, the petitioner submitted his application for VRS on June 13, 2017 and without waiting for approval, proceeded to join the post on June 14, 2017. He again submitted his application for VRS on August 5, 2019, but in the meantime, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner for alleged misconduct while he was posted as District Manager at Ara, which culminated in the award of punishment of Censure and stoppage of three increments with non-cumulative effect. It was submitted that opinion was sought from the General Administration Department and the Finance Department on the issue with regard to grant of VRS, wherein the General Administration Department opined that during the intervening period of punishment, permission for VRS cannot be granted. It was contended that upon finality of the departmental proceeding, which resulted in punishment of Censure and stoppage of three increments, the application for VRS was rejected, but in view of the advice of the General Administration Department that since the petitioner, without obtaining NOC from the Department joined services in VKS University, Ara, the said act amounts to an act of indiscipline and as such, a show-cause notice dated dated September 13, 2022 was issued. 

Justice Kumar recorded in his judgement that it is apparent that admittedly the petitioner did not submit his application for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor through the proper channel. Further, the petitioner had submitted an application on November 11, 2016 for grant of permission to appear in the interview which was to be held from November 29, 2016 to December 1, 2016, but the respondent authorities did not bother to take any decision on the same. Further, it is also an admitted fact that the petitioner gave his application for voluntary retirement on June 13, 2017, but despite waiting for its approval from the competent authority, proceeded to join S.V.P. College, Bhabhua on the next day, i.e., June 14, 2017. The petitioner was inflicted with the punishment of Censure and stoppage of three increments with non-cumulative effect, which he did not choose to challenge. But the same lost its effect on July 18, 2022.

"Trust the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar can to create a dispute when there exists none":Patna High Court

 "The other problem is that the State's capacity to litigate can outmatch even the richest conglomerate. If the state loses a case, at any level, it will appeal, and keep doing that till the Supreme Court. It could be an increment of 100 Rs given to a mali in a government department or a pension of 300 Rs to a widow of the deceased government servant. Everything has to be appealed. And if the private individual succeeds there is no guarantee that the government will accept and comply with the court order."

-Dr S Muralidhar, Senior Advocate and former High Court Chief Justice in his 28th DS Borker Memorial Lecture on the Vision of India 2047

"Trust the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar to create a dispute when there exists none. The situation in hand is a classic example of the State in its Finance Department litigating at its lowest level. The response of the Finance Department, Government of Bihar to the issues raised herein, in fact, borders on contempt for the Finance Department thinks that it is above law and has a right to maintain an opinion which is in conflict with the judicial verdicts."

-Justice Jyoti Saran in Binit Kumar & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2017) in August 21, 2017, Patna High Court  

The State of Bihar is not amenable to any settlement in this matter and the learned counsel for the State prays to list the matter before regular Court. 2. Let the matter be listed before regular Court on the date already fixed i.e., 18.09.2026.

-Supreme Court's order dated August 23, 2026 in The State of Bihar vs. Biresh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2026) which is tagged with SLP No. 4912/2024 before Supreme Court' Special Lok Adalat [Samadhan Samaroh)

Principal Secretary, Finance Department, Bihar "has the audacity to term the judgment of the Division Bench" of Patna High Court in The State of Bihar vs. Ram Janam Jha & Ors L.P.A. No. 206 of 2014, as "per incuriam" 

In The State of Bihar vs. Biresh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanatha and Arun Palli passed an order dated August 3, 2026, which reads: "5. Till further orders, status quo as on 09.03.2026 shall be maintained insofar as the pay and emoluments received by the respondents are concerned. 6. In the absence of the stay of the impugned judgment by this Court, the State cannot reduce the pay. 7. We are told that pursuant to the judgment, the parity in pay was granted to the correspondence clerks along with the accounts clerks in terms of pay. Only by order/letter of 10.03.2026 issued by petitioners, the State has reduced the pay. 8. We direct that the State will restore the status quo as it obtained on 09.03.2026. 9. Needless to say that these directions are subject to final outcome of the matter."Navaniti Prasad Singh, is the senior counsel for the applicants, who are respondents in the main matter. The State of Bihar has challenged the final judgment dated September 19, 2023 in LPA No.766/2019 (Biresh Kumar Singh case) and LPA No.762/2019 (Sanjay Kumar's case) passed by the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court issued notice on June 27, 2024. 

By its 2-page long order dated February 16, 2024, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal stayed the proceedings of the Contempt Petition MJC No.2663 of 2019 Bihar State Road And Building Construction Employees Union Gope Group & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. pending before the Patna High Court. 

In Bihar State Road And Building Construction Employees Union Gope Group & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. MJC No.2663 of 2019, Justice Mohit Kumar Shah of the High Court passed a 2-page long order dated January 25, 2024, wherein, the order reads:"1. Though the learned counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that the order of this Court dated 27.02.2019, passed in CWJC No.13644 of 2016 and other analogous cases has been challenged by filing an appeal bearing LPA No.764 of 2019 and other analogous cases, however, the learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the same has stood dismissed by a judgment dated 19.09.2023, passed by a learned Division Bench of this Court. 2. In such view of the matter, the learned counsel for the opposite parties seeks and is granted four weeks’ time for complying with the aforesaid order dated 27.02.2019, failing which it is submitted that the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna shall be present in the Court so that contempt proceeding can be initiated against him for creating hindrance in the administration of justice. 3. List this case on 29th February, 2024." On March 20, 2024, the contempt case was listed before Justice Rajiv Roy. Upon hearing  I.A. No. 01 of 2024, Justice Roy passed a 4-page long order March 20, 2024. The order reads:"2. Pursuant to the last order passed by the co-ordinate bench, an Interlocutory Application No. 01 of 2024 has been preferred by the Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna with a prayer which read as follows:-“(i) exemption of his personal appearance in the Court as directed by the Hon’ble in the present contempt petition in the order dated 25.01.2024; (ii) for adjourning the present contempt application for consideration after disposal of SLP (C) No. 3335 of 2024 (The State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Biresh Kumar Singh and Ors.) and analogous matters by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” It added: "3. Learned State Counsel has taken this Court to paragraph- 6 which read as follows:- “ That it is respectfully stated and submitted that the State Government thereafter filed special leave petition in the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Diary No. 4071/2024 in L.P.A. No. 764 of 2019. The said S.L.P. was taken up for adjudication on 16.02.2024 by Hon’ble Supreme Court along with SLP (C ) No. 3335 of 2024 (filed in L.P.A. No. 766 of 2019) and analogous cases and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to issue notice to the respondents and has been pleased to stay the further proceedings of the M.J.C. No. 2663 of 2019 pending before this Hon’ble Court.” 4. In view of the aforesaid facts, both the prayers of I.A. No. 01 of 2024 stands allowed. 5. I.A. No. 01 of 2024 stands disposed of. M.J.C. No. 2663 of 2019 Let the matter come up after the disposal of SLP (C) No. 3335 of 2024."   

In The State Of Bihar vs. Lachhaman Kumar & Ors. (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 25-page long judgement dated September 19, 2023, wherein, it concluded:"....we are surprised that an appeal is filed for the purpose of denying pay parity to persons identically situated.....13. We hence reject the appeals leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs." Referring to the Letter No. 3A-2-V.P.-09/2016-5838/V of the Finance Department of Government of Bihar dated June 22, 2022, the High Court stated that it "indicates a complete, absolute and wholesome identity between the Accounts Clerks and the Correspondence Clerks." 

The appeals filed by the State of Bihar challenged the 14-page long judgement dated February 27, 2019 by Justice Madhuresh Prasad, the Single Judge, which has allowed the writ petitions granting parity of pay to Correspondence Clerks as is available to the Accounts Clerks; both appointed on compassionate grounds. The Single Judge had relied on a 50-page long judgment by Justice Jyoti Saran dated August 21, 2017 of a Co-ordinate Bench in Binit Kumar & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2017) and analogous cases. The Single Judge, in the cited decision, had relied on a Patna High Court's Division Bench's 3-page long judgment dated August 24, 2016 in The State of Bihar vs. Ram Janam Jha & Ors L.P.A. No. 206 of 2014, which was authored by Justice Hemant Gupta. Justice Gupta led Division bench had concluded:"We find that once the distinction between the Junior and Senior Accounts Clerk has been done away with and that all Accounts Clerks have been granted pay scale as that of Senior Accounts Clerk, therefore, all accounts clerks, whether appointed on compassionate ground or otherwise are entitled to same pay scale i.e., pay scale meant for the Senior Accounts Clerk."

The Government Advocate Sarvesh Kumar Singh (AAG-13) had argued that the Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks are persons existing in different cadres for which different pay-scales are applicable. It was also contended that the qualifications for appointment in the two posts are different; the Correspondence Clerks were required to possess Matriculation with typing while the Accounts Clerks are required to possess Matriculation with Mathematics. He specifically referred to an extract of the recommendation of the Pay Fixation Committee to point out that the pay fixation was made specifically reckoning the fact that originally Mathematics was not an essential subject in Matriculation. He also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in S.C. Chandra & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 279 to contend that there is no complete and wholesale identity between the two posts and even if they are doing identical work, they cannot be granted equal pay unless there is such complete and wholesale identity established. 

Senior Counsel Sanjay Singh and Chitranjan Sinha and counsel Shri Subodh Kumar Jha and Abhinav Srivastava argued for the respondents who were the writ-petitioners. It was pointed out that there could have been no Matriculation without Mathematics as is presently understood and as would be applicable to the Matriculation qualification obtained by all the respondents. The decision in Binit Kumar's case squarely applies. There was severe criticism of the Finance Department by the Single Judge in the aforesaid judgment for having taken a skewed view of the binding precedent in Ram Janam Jha. It was also pointed out that discrimination was meted out only on account of the source of appointment being from families of employees who died in harness; which identity gets effaced as soon as they get appointed to the post. Reliance was also placed on the decision taken by the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar dated June 22, 2022.

In Binit Kumar & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2017), Justice Jyoti Saran observed:"In what could have been disposed of by the Finance Department of the Government of Bihar as well as the Controlling Authorities of the petitioners herein, in the light of the issues settled by the Division Bench of this Court rendered in LPA No.206 of 2014 (The State of Bihar Vs. Ram Janam Jha and others) and despite the fact that the State has lost its challenge up to the Supreme Court to the issue so settled by the Division Bench yet the arrogance of the State in its Finance Department is reflective from the response where the deponent Under Secretary, Finance Department on the authorization of the Principal Secretary, Finance Department, has the audacity to term the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Ram Janam Jha (supra), per incuriam, without having the least of the knowledge what the term means and whether he has the jurisdiction and authority to opine as such. It is this brazen response of the State in its Finance Department which has necessitated a discussion on the issue which otherwise could have been well disposed of by two line order in the light of the opinion already expressed by the Division Bench in the case of Ram Janam Jha (supra) inasmuch as the relief so prayed stands covered by the said opinion." It is recorded in the 50-page long judgement dated August 21, 2017 by Justice Saran that Siya Ram Shahi had led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners and Ashok Kumar Dubey, Assisting Counsel to Additional Advocate General No.11 had led the argument for the State in reference to the counter affidavit filed in CWJC No.9921 of 2017. Ravi Mittal was the principal secretary, finance, Bihar during May 2015-2018. 

Chief Justice Vinod Chandran headed Division bench looked at the history of the litigation, to observe that "The admitted facts are that the respondents herein were appointed on compassionate ground and were continuing as Correspondence Clerks. The petitioners in Binit Kumar were also persons who were appointed on compassionate ground, but as Accounts Clerks. There is absolutely nothing to substantiate the contention now raised by the State that there were different qualifications prescribed for Accounts Clerks and Correspondence Clerks." The Bench underlined that "Annexure-1, pointed out from the Interlocutory Application of the respondent State, supports the claim raised by the writ-petitioners, the respondents herein." 

The petitioners, as was the case of Accounts Clerks, were appointed in the pay-scale of Rs. 3050-4590/-, which scale was upgraded by a resolution of the Finance Department dated March 25, 2015; which stood cancelled in the light of a subsequent Advisory dated July 11, 2016 issued by the Finance Department. The reasoning in the Advisory cancelling the grant of higher scale of pay was in so far as the upgradation in scale not being applicable to those appointed on compassionate grounds. The Single Judge in the cited judgment of Binit Kumar referred to the unification of posts and merger of cadre made in the clerical cadre of the Government employees. The Junior Accounts Clerk and the Senior Accounts Clerk posts were unified and the post was designated as an Accounts Clerk. Likewise, the Lower Division Clerk and the Upper Division Clerk were also unified to be designated as Clerk in the year 1980-81. When such unification was made, the Senior Accounts Clerk had a pay-scale of Rs. 260-408/- while the unified post of Clerk had a pay-scale of Rs. 284-372/-. Again, a decision was taken to unify the accounts clerical cadre as well as normal clerical cadre which was later, in the year 2000, de-merged. It is this process of merger and de-merger that led to a chain of litigations on the anomaly arising in the fixation of pay. 

The judgement recorded that the Finance Department of State Government came out with a resolution dated March 25, 2015 referring to another letter dated September 28, 1999 from the very same department which classified the appointments in the Accounts Clerical Cadre in two categories; those appointed between May 1, 1980 to September 27, 1999 and the other after September 28, 1999. Admittedly, the Accounts Clerks who had challenged the cancellation of the upgradation was appointed after September 28, 1999 and so are the respondents herein who are the Correspondence Clerks. Referring to the resolution of 2015, it was held that the persons appointed to the Accounts Clerical Cadre, whether they be appointed initially as a Junior Accounts Clerk, Lower Division Accounts Clerk or a Lower Division Clerk (Accounts), would be entitled to the same scale of pay i.e. Rs. 4000-6000/- with effect from December 31, 2005 and to the scale in Pay Band-1 with Grade Pay of Rs. 2400/- with effect from January 1, 2006. It was categorically found by the Single Judge in Binit Kumar that when earlier an attempt was made by the State Government in its Finance Department to deny the scale admissible to similarly placed Clerks in the Accounts Cadre; the litigation initiated, resulted in the decision of the Division Bench in Ram Janam Jha. It was categorically held by the Division Bench that: “Once the distinction between the Junior and Senior Accounts Clerk has been done away with and all Accounts Clerks have been granted pay scale as that of Senior Accounts Clerk, then all Accounts Clerks, whether appointed on compassionate ground or otherwise, are entitled to the same pay-scale i.e., pay-sale meant for the Senior Accounts Clerks’(sic). It is the very same proposition which is urged by the respondents herein to enable identical pay-scales to be granted to them, thus ensuring pay parity between the Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks.

Chief Justice Chandran observed that the decision in S.C. Chandra's case "was in the context of parity in salary claimed by School Teachers with Clerks working under the Government of Jharkhand or BCCL; in which context it was found that there is no complete and wholesale identity between the two groups. It was declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that merely because the nature of work is the same, irrespective of educational qualification, mode of appointment, experience and other relevant factors, the principle of ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ cannot apply. We do not find any application of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the present case." Government counsel cited an irrelevant judgement. He added: "9. Admittedly, the Correspondence Clerks, the writ-petitioners in the present case and the Accounts Clerks who were the petitioners in Binit Kumar, were appointed on compassionate grounds. The State has not produced anything to establish that in granting appointment on compassionate ground the dependents were classified on the basis of their qualification and thus given appointments to the posts of Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks, based on their different qualifications. We would, for argument’s sake, reckon the submission of the learned AAG-13 that as far as Accounts Clerks are concerned, there was an insistence for Matriculation with Mathematics. As was rightly pointed out by the respondents, Matriculation without Mathematics, at least for the past few decades, is not known to have existed. Even Annexure-1 speaks of ‘originally’, Mathematics being not an essential subject in Matriculation; but does not refer to the period when such Matriculation was in vogue. Having thus said, it has to be emphasized that there is nothing produced to substantiate that there were different qualifications applicable to Correspondence Clerks and Accounts Clerks. It has also to be pertinently noticed that when appointments are made on compassionate grounds, especially to a cadre, there cannot be any discrimination by appointing certain persons to a post with lower scale of pay and others to a post with higher scale of pay; which would have been possible only if there is a requirement of a higher qualification for the post which carries a higher pay-scale."  

The judgement reads: "We are conscious of the fact that as of now the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that appointments on compassionate grounds can only be to the lowest cadre; but the practice was otherwise, earlier. The contention of the State of two different essential qualifications being applicable, is not established and hence fails. 10. We have to emphasize and reiterate that once the dependents are appointed on compassionate grounds in a post where there is also regular recruitment; there can be no discrimination in so far as pay-scale applicable, from those regularly appointed."

 

Two poems: “Decline” by T.B.P. Owen, and “Wake Up, Comrades” by Gautam Chattopadhyaya

Two poems: “Decline” by T.B.P. Owen, and “Wake Up, Comrades” by Gautam Chattopadhyaya published in No Pasaran: They Shall Not Pass, an anti-Fascist bulletin, Volume I, edited by Manoranjan Majumdar and Prodyat Mukherjee,  July 25, 1942. The poems reflect the period’s strong anti-Fascist sentiment and call for collective resistance against oppression. 

Source: Home, Political, I, 1943, Fn. No. 12/I/ KW II/ 1943.

Bombay Bar Association disapproves of the conduct of Manan Kumar Mishra as Chairman, BCI, seeks his resignation

In a statement dated August 18, 2020, Bombay Bar Association has strongly disapproved the conduct of Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman, Bar Council of India.  The text of statement is as under: 

STATEMENT TO CONDEMN ACTIONS OF MR. MANAN KUMAR MISHRA, CHAIRMAN, BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA [Approved at the Meeting of the "Standing Committee of the Bombay Bar Association" (Bombay Bar Association) held on 17 and 18 August 2026 through video conferencing] 

The Bombay Bar Association has taken note of the unilateral action of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman, Bar Council of India, regarding issuance of letter dated 13 August 2026 bearing no. BCI:D:5449/2026. By this letter, Vice-Chancellor, NALSAR was directed to submit a report and the State Bar Councils were directed not to enroll students of NALSAR, who are passing out in the batch of 2026. This communication was modified by another communication bearing no. BCI:D:5450/2026, also dated 13 August 2026 whereby the action proposed against the students of the said law college was dropped but the direction to NALSAR to carry out inquiry was retained. The communication bearing no. BCI:D:5450/2026 records that it is issued with approval of the Council. In a tweet by Mr. Mishra issued at 00:37 hrs on 14 August 2026, it was stated by Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra that "Bar Council of India has decided to close the proceedings altogether. No further action is required @NALSAR_Official."

The Bombay Bar Association notes that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is seized of the matter arising from the unfortunate events, which have arisen on account of actions of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra and the matter is now sub-judice. Meanwhile, Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra has issued a letter dated 15 August 2026 which is in the nature of an apology.

The Bombay Bar Association stands by the decision of the Bar Council of India, to close the proceedings altogether, as a step in the right direction and a step which restores the faith in the institution of the Bar Council of India, in whom we continue to repose our faith.

The Standing Committee has at its meetings held on 17 and 18 August 2026 deliberated the aforesaid developments which have taken place from 13 August 2026 to 15 August 2026 and it is expedient to record the following: 

A) The office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, is undoubtedly an important position. Higher the position, greater the responsibility. The contents of the communication dated 13 August 2026 (BCI:D:5449/2026) issued by Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman of Bar Council of India, were a direct attempt by the Learned Chairman to cause grave prejudice to the professional careers of students of NALSAR (Passing out batch of 2026). Such communication was uncalled for and reflects that the Learned Chairman took an extreme step against the students, without regard to the principles governing the right to protest and freedom of speech and expression. A large section of the students were condemned unheard. The issuance of the said communication by Mr. Mishra, is an abuse by him of the office of the Chairman, Bar Council of India. 

B) It is a matter of deepest anguish that Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, Senior Advocate, has while occupying the post as Chairman of the Bar Council of India, indulged in issuing Orders and directions against the law students of NALSAR (Passing out batch of 2026), which do not fall within the purview of the Bar Council of India. Such actions of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, are strongly condemned. We remain thankful to the Bar Council of India, for having reversed the order dated 13 August 2026, passed by Mr. Mishra against the law students. 

C) The issuance of an apology by Mr. Mishra on 15 August 2026 is clearly belated and nothing but an attempt to merely assuage the situation, when by his conduct, Mr. Mishra has failed to uphold the dignity of the legal profession, constitutional freedoms and the principles of fairness and natural justice, while occupying the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India. The apology sought to be tendered by Mr. Mishra, however, cannot be considered as an expression of true remorse, since he continues to hold the position as Chairman despite his conduct, when in the fitness of things, he ought to have already resigned.

Venkatesh Dhond Vice-President 

Nitin Thakker President

Naushad Engineer Honorary Secretary 

Bar Council of India (BCI) Chairman has appointed family members and relatives in the BCI without any advertisement: Y.R. Sada­s­iva Reddy, co-chairman, BCI

In a six-page let­ter dated August 22 by senior advoc­ate Y.R. Sada­s­iva Reddy, co-chairman, BCI has made sev­eral alleg­a­tions con­cern­ing the cre­ation of BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST, the trans­fer of around ₹150 crore from BCI funds to the trust has been made. He made allegation regarding demands for con­tri­bu­tions from law col­leges as “con­tri­bu­tions” to the PEARL-FIRST trust, and the hand­ling of funds gen­er­ated through the All-India Bar Exam­in­a­tion (AIBE). The insti­tu­tional con­tro­versy sur­round­ing the cre­ation of BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST and alleg­a­tions that the ori­ginal BCI Trust was rendered defunct. He alleged that the audit reports of the PEARL-FIRST trust has never been placed before a meet­ing of the BCI since the trust’s incep­tion in 2020. The ori­ginal BCI Trust wan cre­ated in 1974. It was allowed to fall into dis­use dur­ing his ten­ure and was replaced by BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST, whose trust­ees, he alleged, were chosen by him.

The text of the letter is as under: 

To,

Shri Manan Kumar Mishra,
Senior Advocate,
Chairman, Bar Council of India,
21, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area,
Near Bal Bhavan, New Delhi 110 002.

Sub: Demand for your immediate resignation from the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, and for an independent enquiry into the matters set out herein - regarding.

Sir,

I address this communication to you not as an adversary, but as an elected Member of the Bar Council of India, presently holding the office of Co- Chairman, and as a member of this profession for over three decades. I do so with considerable anguish, and only after long reflection, having satisfied myself that silence on my part would amount to a dereliction of the trust reposed in me by the advocates of this country.

The Bar Council of India is not the personal estate of any individual. It is a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, holding funds contributed by lakhs of advocates and exercising regulatory power over the entry of every young person into this profession. Every rupee it holds is held in trust. Every power it exercises is a power conferred by Parliament for the benefit of the Bar, and not for the benefit of the person who happens to occupy the Chair. 

It is my considered view, formed on the basis of what I have myself witnessed in the meetings of this Council, that under your Chairmanship the Council has drifted very far from that standard. I therefore call upon you, in the plainest terms, to tender your resignation from the office of Chairman of the Bar Council of India forthwith. My reasons are set out below.

GROUNDS ON WHICH YOUR RESIGNATION IS DEMANDED

I. Appointments to the establishment of the Council made without any transparent process of recruitment
Through the whole of my tenure as a Member of this Council, I proceeded on the assumption that appointments to the establishment of the Bar Council of India were made after due advertisement, due scrutiny of qualifications, and due observance of the norms binding upon a statutory body. I never had occasion to question it, because I never imagined it could be otherwise. On examining the list of persons presently employed by the Council, together with their particulars, I find a pattern that no responsible Member can overlook. A striking proportion of the staff are persons connected to you personally, several of them being members of, or related to, your own family. I am unable to find, in any record placed before this Council, a single advertisement, a single selection committee proceeding, or a single comparative merit list justifying these appointments.

II. The rendering defunct of the Bar Council of India Trust and the diversion of Council funds to a newly created trust
The Bar Council of India Trust was an institution of standing. It was the body through which this Council discharged its historic contribution to legal education in this country, including the founding of the National Law School of India at Bengaluru. That Trust was, over a period, allowed to fall into disuse. It did not become defunct by accident.
In its place, a new trust styled "BCI Trust PEARL First" came to be registered on 17.09.2020, with trustees of your choosing. Thereafter, a resolution was moved in this Council for the transfer of a sum of the order of Rs. 150 crores of the funds of the Bar Council of India to that newly created trust. I placed my opposition to that resolution on record at the time, as did certain other Members. Our objection was overridden. The transfer went through. Distinguished persons, including sitting and former Judges, were thereafter associated with the trust, lending it a respectability that the manner of its creation does not deserve.

The funds of the Bar Council of India are the contributions of ordinary advocates, most of them in the district courts, most of them struggling. I know of no provision of the Advocates Act, 1961 which permits the corpus of a statutory regulator to be transferred to a private trust registered by its own Chairman. None of the members of the Bar Council have ever seen a copy of the Trust Deed.

III. Contributions demanded from law colleges seeking approval or renewal of approval
Persistent and credible complaints have reached me, from more than one State, that managements of new law colleges approaching the Bar Council of India for approval, and managements of existing colleges approaching it for renewal, are being required to make "contributions" to the said trust, in amounts ranging from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore. If this is correct and I have received nothing from your office to indicate that it is not it is a matter of the utmost gravity. The power of approval and renewal under the Advocates Act and the Rules of Legal Education is a regulatory power. It is not a licence to raise funds. A regulator that receives money from the entity it regulates, in temporal proximity to the decision it must take on that entity, has destroyed the very foundation of its own authority. The consequence is visible in the state of legal education in this country: colleges that ought never to have been approved continue year after year, and thousands of young persons are sold a degree that equips them for nothing.

IV. Key positions in institutions run by the Council held by persons of your own family

The same pattern extends to the educational institution or institutions established and run under the aegis of the Council and the said trust. Persons occupying key administrative positions there are, once again, drawn from your family. The purpose for which such an institution was established was never explained to this Council in any meaningful terms, nor was any feasibility study, budget or governance structure ever placed before us for deliberation.

I may add that the very propriety of the Bar Council of India simultaneously regulating law colleges and operating one of its own has now been questioned before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. That such a question should arise at all is a measure of how far institutional propriety has been allowed to erode.

V. The direction issued against the graduating batch of NALSAR University of Law, without any material being placed before the Council 

On 13.08.2026, a communication was issued from your office directing the State Bar Councils not to enrol, until further orders, the graduating batch. of 2026 of the NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. It was accompanied by observations questioning the fitness of those students to enter this. profession. The occasion was a representation by some students of that University concerning the invitation extended to a distinguished guest for their convocation that is to say, the expression of an opinion.

That direction was issued without the material being placed before the Bar Council of India, without the Council deliberating upon it, and without any resolution of this Council authorising it. I was not consulted. To the best of my knowledge, the Council as a body was not consulted. The direction was withdrawn within hours in the face of nationwide condemnation. It was described by the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association as illegal and disproportionate. It drew the disapproval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself. On 15.08.2026 you issued a letter expressing regret. The expression of regret, though belated, is not the point. The point is that the office of Chairman was used to threaten an entire graduating batch of law students - young men and women with no power and no voice - with exclusion from the profession, as a reprisal for having held an opinion. The right of a citizen to express a view is not forfeited on admission to a law school. A body that exists to defend the independence of the Bar cannot itself punish independence of thought. That single act, in my respectful but firm view, has done more damage to the standing of this Council than anything else in its history, and it is by itself sufficient ground for you to demit office.

VI. Encouragement of factionalism within the State Bar Councils 

It has been a consistent feature of your tenure that factions are created and sustained within the State Bar Councils, that one group is favoured over another, and that orders are thereafter caused to be passed from the Bar Council of India in aid of the favoured group. Orders of this nature. have issued from time to time, frequently without notice to the affected side and without the matter being placed before the Council for deliberation.

The State Bar Councils are autonomous statutory bodies. They are not to be governed through patronage. Many of them have been paralysed by disputes that would never have survived a week had they not been sustained from Delhi.
 

VII. Continuance in the office of Chairman for more than a decade 

The office of Chairman of the Bar Council of India is an elected office with a term of two years. That term reflects a deliberate legislative and institutional choice: that the office should rotate, that no individual should become identified with the institution, and that the Council should be periodically renewed. 

You have held that office continuously since 2012, and were returned for a further consecutive term in 2025. This is without precedent. When elections to the office fall due, the arrangements are so managed that the outcome is a foregone conclusion. An elected office that has one occupant for fourteen years has ceased, in any real sense, to be an elected office.

VIII. The confidence of the Bar has been lost

The matter is no longer confined to this Council. Advocates have assembled in protest outside the office of the Bar Council of India itself, demanding your resignation and pointing to the absence of the most elementary welfare measures for the Bar an Advocates Protection Act, insurance cover, transparent inspection of law colleges. Young advocates, who have the most to gain from a functioning Council and the most to lose from a captured one, have led those protests. Members of the Bar in your own State and your own district have joined in seeking your departure. The Student Bar Councils of the National Law Universities have publicly declined to share a platform with the Chairman of the Bar Council of India. When the regulator of a profession is publicly repudiated by the profession it regulates, by the students it is meant to nurture, and by the courts before which it appears, the question of its Chairman's continuance is no longer a matter of personal preference. It is a question of institutional survival.

DEMAND

In the premises aforesaid, I call upon you:
(a) to tender your resignation from the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, forthwith, and in any event within fifteen (15) days of receipt of this letter;
(b) to convene, in the meanwhile, a Special Meeting of the Bar Council of India for consideration of each of the matters set out above, with the relevant records placed before every Member in advance;
(c) to cause a special audit of the accounts of the Bar Council of India and of BCI Trust PEARL - First, from the date of its registration to date, to be conducted by an independent firm empanelled with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, and to cause the report to be circulated to every Member and published;
(d) to direct that, with immediate effect, no contribution, donation or payment of any description shall be received from any law college, university or management by the Council or by any trust or body connected with it; and
(e) to place on the website of the Council the complete staff position referred to in Ground I above.

I hold no personal animosity towards you. I have served alongside you on this Council for a decade. It is precisely because I have watched this institution from within for that period that I am able to say, with a clear conscience, that it will not recover while you remain in the Chair. There are able persons in this Council capable of restoring it. Standing down now, of your own accord, is the one course still open to you that would be to your credit. 

The Bar of this country deserves better than what it is presently receiving from its own Council. I ask you to allow it that opportunity.

Yours faithfully,
(Y. R. SADASIVA REDDY), 
Senior Advocate, Member and Co-Chairman Bar Council of India