Supreme Court dismisses Bihar State's appeal, upholds judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri led Division Bench setting aside Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's order

In The State of Bihar vs. Surendra Prasad Singh (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sandeep Mehta and Joymalya Bagchi dismissed Bihar government's appeal by its 2-page long order dated June 27, 2025 against the 6-page long judgement dated July 23, 2024 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Alok Kumar Pandey. The judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri led Division Bench had rejected Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's order dated August 29, 2019 in Surendra Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2019) which was supported by the state government. The order of Director, Secondary Education, Bihar was found untenable. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "The High Court quashed the order of penalty imposed on the respondent on the ground that the inquiry proceedings suffered from lacuna and infirmities. We find from the material placed on record that the State did not examine a single witness in support of the charges. Thus, the issue involved is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570. The Division Bench, while quashing the order of punishment has given liberty to the State to hold a fresh inquiry as per law. Thus, we are of the firm opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. The Special Leave Petition, being bereft of merit, is dismissed."

The High Court's Division Bench judgement was authored by Justice Bajanthri. It records that the appellant was appointed as a Assistant teacher on November 25, 1979 in a privately managed school which was taken over by the Government on October 2, 1980. The official respondents racked up the issue of alleged production of fake and forged certificates by the appellant for selection and appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher. Thereafter, charge memo was issued on December 4, 2014 and it was concluded in imposition of penalty of dismissal from service on June 30, 2015, after almost 35-36 years. 

The appellant's counsel vehemently contented that alleged fake and forged certificates were not produced before the inquiry authority. It was required to be marked and proved in the manner known to the law to the extent that author of those certificates were required to be examined and appellant was entitled for cross-examination of such of those authors of the certificates. Thereafter, inquiry officer was required to come to the conclusion that it was fake and forged certificates. The aforementioned infirmity is forthcoming in the departmental inquiry and the same has not been appreciated by the disciplinary authority as well as single judge. 

Allowing the L.P.A., Justice Bajatnthri concluded:"Taking note of the aforementioned submission, it is a serious lacunae to the extent that official respondents have opened their eyes after more than two decades in respect of alleged fake and forged certificates stated to have been produced by the appellant in the year 1979. That apart while holding the departmental inquiry those alleged fake and forge certificates have not been produced as exhibits and further author of those certificates have not been cited as a witnesses and adducing their evidence, examination and further providing cross-examination opportunity to the appellant. These lacunae have not been apprised by the disciplinary authority and so also by the learned single judge. Further, it is to be noticed that appellant was working from 25.11.1979 as a teacher for about one year in the private school. Thereafter, the school was taken over on 02.10.1980. The official respondents should have verified the certificates of the appellant in the year 1980 as and when the school was taken over alongwith the staff. On the other hand, they slept over the matter."

High Court's Division Bench judgement reads: "The concerned respondents are hereby directed to regulate the intervening period from the date of dismissal i.e., 30.06.2015 till reinstatement and extend all service and monetary benefits including grant of annual increments from time to time and further MACP/ACP, if any, revision of pay, during the intervening period, if any. In this regard, pay fixation chart shall be prepared and proceed to calculate arrears of pay and disburse the same in favour of the appellant within a period of four months from today." 

It added: "Reserving liberty to the official respondents to proceed with fresh inquiry in the event of appellant has played fraud in the selection and appointment to the post of Assistant teacher in the year 1979. In this regard, inquiry shall be initiated afresh and completed within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order. If the inquiry is not completed within the time limit stipulated, in that event, the appellant shall not be subjected to further disciplinary proceeding in respect of alleged fake and forged certificates stated to have been produced by the appellant, for the reasons that from the year 1979, Appellant is working as Assistant Teacher." 

The High Court's Division Bench observed: "Learned counsel for the official respondents contentions are not tenable for the reasons that there is a legal lacunae in not proving the alleged fake and forged certificates. Accordingly, the appellant has made out a case so as to interfere with the order of dismissal dated 30.06.2015 read with the order of the learned single judge 29.08.2019. Both the orders are set aside."  It implies that the order of dismissal passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Bihar and Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's order were set aside. Justice Singh had concluded that "the impugned action of the respondents does not require any interference." The respondents were: Director, Secondary Education, Bihar, Regional Deputy Director, Secondary Education Munger, District Magistrate, Jamui, District Programme Officer, Jamui, District Education Officer, Jamui and Block Education Officer, Block Barhat, Jamui. Justice Singh's order did not pay heed to the Supreme Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570.

 

In Roop Singh's case, the Court observed:"10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left." It concluded;"Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 

 

The Court recalled Court's decision in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88, wherein the Court held:"....Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." Justice Singh seems to have shifted the burden of proof.