Showing posts with label 1961. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1961. Show all posts

Saturday, October 24, 2026

Revision application before Additional Collector against order in appeal passed by DCLR, order passed by Additional Collector in revision can be challenged before Bihar Land Tribunal

The revision before the Additional Collector against the order in appeal passed by the DCLR can be filed under Section 12 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Rules, 2012. Section 12 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Rules, 2012 reads:-"12. Revision.(1) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, may file an application for revision in the Court of Collector/ Additional Collector of the District concerned within thirty (30) days from the date of the order. (2) The Collector/ Additional Collector concerned may condone the delay in filing of the application for revision provided he is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons for the delay. (3) As soon as the application for revision is filed, the Collector/ Additional Collector shall call for the case-record from the Land Reforms Deputy Collector concerned. or the Circle Officer concerned in whose custody the case-record lies. (4) The Collector/Additional Collector shall issue notice to all parties concerned with the case, directing them to appear either in person or through their authorized representatives on the date, time and place fixed for the hearing of the case. (5) In case any of the parties does not appear even after a reasonable opportunity to appear and being heard has been given, the Collector/Additional Collector may dispose off the case ex-parte on the basis of the available records. (6) The time limit for the disposal of the mutation revision application shall be of thirty (30) working days from the date of the filing of such application. (7) After the disposal of the mutation revision application, the Collector/ Additional Collector shall return the case- record to the Circle Officer concerned for implementation of his order. (8) On receipt of the Case-record, the Circle Officer shall issue correction slip in the manner as provided in rule-9. (9) On receipt of the correction slip, the Karmachari shall alter the entries in the revenue records concerned in the manner as provided in rule-10." 

An appeal-Mutation Appeal-can be filed before the Collector against the order passed by the Additional Collector in Mutation Revision Case.  The appeal is filed before the Collector under Section 7 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Act, 2011 read with Rule 14 of the Bihar Land Mutation Rules, 2012. The Collector cannot exercise the power of appeal against an order of revision. The Collector does not have the power to entertain an appeal against the order of the Additional Collector passed in Revision under Section 12 of the Bihar Land Land Mutation Rules, 2012. The order passed by the Additional Collector in revision can be challenged before the Bihar Land Tribunal (BLT) constituted under under Chapter XIII of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 

BLT is constituted to address the land related issues of raiyats of state. Disputes relating to land pending before different forums in the State of Bihar are huge in number and the present machinery including Civil Court is over burdened because of pendency of huge number of disputes relating to land. Right, title and possession over land is regulated under various land laws operating in the State of Bihar. The different forums under different land laws have been provided for adjudication of disputes. The State government is faced with complexities arising out of the multiplicity of adjudicating machinery and delay in the settlement of disputes. The State government strives to ensure speedy disposal of disputes under various land laws. In the absence of a common adjudicatory body, the people of the State are faced with undue hardship in getting their grievances redressed. 

The Constitution of India has conferred jurisdiction under Article 323B on appropriate legislature, to provide for adjudication or trial by Tribunals, by law, of any dispute, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws. In larger public interest and in the interest of the people of the State, it is deemed expedient to create a consolidated forum for adjudication of all disputes appertaining to land in the State of Bihar. With a view to provide a common and uniform forum for adjudication of disputes, it is necessary to create a Tribunal at the highest level in the hierarchy.

The Tribunal has the power to entertain any application against the final order passed by the Appropriate Authorities under the Acts/Manuals, mentioned below, within 90 days of such an order provided no other forum of appeal or revision against the order passed is provided in that Act/ Manuals:
The function of this department includes

    The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961
    The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950
    The Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885
    The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act,1956
    The Bihar Tenants' Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973
    The Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954
    The Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act, 1947
    The Bihar Government Estates Manual, 1953
    The Bihar Settlement Manual.
    Bihar Land Disputes Resolution Act,2009
    Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act ,2001
    Bihar Land Mutation Act,2011

 

Friday, September 11, 2026

Section 147A of Income Tax Act is unconstitutional: Punjab & Haryana High Court

In Jyoti Sareen vs. Union of India & Ors. (2026), Punjab & Haryana High Court's Division Bench of Justics Deepak Sibal and Rupinderjit Chahal delivered a 97-page long judgement dated September 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded that the newly inserted Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional. The judgment is reserved on September 8, 2026. The judgement was authored by Justice Sibal. 

A large number of f petitioners approached the High Court seeking therein to declare Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961to be ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 265 of the Indian Constitution. After the grant of declaration as above, the petitioners pray for quashing the notices issued to them under Section 148 of the Act by their respective jurisdictional Assessing Officers (AOs). The petitioners submitted that even if Section 147A of the Act is held to have been legally promulgated by the legislature, the impugned notices, issued under Section 148 of the Act, were liable to be set aside because the petitioners’ respective jurisdictional AOs, who issued the impugned notices, were not chosen randomly through automated allocation which violates Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme dated March 29, 2022 framed thereunder. 

The petitioner is an Advocate practicing in the High Court. She is an Income Tax Assessee and her PAN number is APRPS8105E. The petitioner being a professional is earning income under the head “Business and Profession”. For the Assessment Year 2020-21, the petitioner filed her Income Tax Return on September 30, 2020. The petitioner’s return was processed. Thereafter, an intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act was received by her. On March 28, 2024, the petitioner received a message on her registered mobile number informing her that some proceedings had been initiated against her by the Income Tax Authorities and in this regard she was advised to go on to the Income Tax Business Application Portal. On doing so, the petitioner found that a notice dated March 15, 2024, under Section 148 of the Act, had been issued to her by her jurisdiction AO. As per the said notice the petitioner’s jurisdictional AO had received information that on March 14, 2022 a search had been conducted under Section 132 of the Act in the case of the petitioner or in the case of a person in respect of which the petitioner was assessable. To reassess her income, for the assessment year 2020-21, the petitioner was asked to file a return in the prescribed form. As per the said notice, the same had been issued after obtaining prior approval from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Chandigarh-I but the petitioner claims that no such approval was provided to her. Through the notice dated March 15, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Act, the petitioner was not informed the reasons as to why such proceedings had been initiated against her. According to the petitioner, since no proceedings under Section 132 of the Act had been conducted on any of her premises, she was also ignorant as to who was the person on whose premises search proceedings under Section 132 of the Act had been conducted leading to the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act to her. On June 28, 2024 the petitioner received an intimation informing her that proceedings against her shall be conducted in a faceless manner. The petitioner challenged the notice dated March 15, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Act, through filing of a petition before this Court being CWP-15791-2024 which petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court through judgment dated July 19, 2024 primarily for the reason that the impugned notice issued by the petitioner’s jurisdictional AO violated Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022. The reliance placed upon by the respondent authorities on an office memorandum and other internal communications to justify issuance of the impugned notice by the petitioner’s jurisdictional AO was rejected in the light of the clear mandate under Section 151A read with Section 144B of the Act. To arrive at its afore conclusion, the High Court Court agreed with and relied upon the law laid down, in similar facts, by the Telangana High Court in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy vs. Income-tax Officer and others, 2023 SCC OnLine TS 4476, the Bombay High Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax & others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1249 and the Gauhati High Court in Ram Narayan Sah vs. Union of India and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Gau 1424. 

The judgment of the High Court dated July 19, 2024 was challenged by the respondents before the Supreme Court through filing of Special Leave Petition (C) No.000950-2025. However, while the afore Special Leave Petition, along with other Special Leave Petitions, was pending before the Supreme Court, through the Finance Bill, 2026, Section 147A of the Act was promulgated w.e.f. April 1, 2021. Section 147A started with a non-obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court or in Section 151A or in any scheme framed under Section 151A, for the removal of doubts, it was clarified through Section 147A that the Assessing Officer, for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A, shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the
National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in sub- section (3) of section 144B.

In the light of the introduction of Section 147A of the Act, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment(s) impugned before it and remitted the matters to the respective jurisdictional High Courts for fresh consideration. The assessees were granted liberty to amend their writ petitions, if so advised, within four weeks from the date of uploading of the order of the Supreme Court dated April 10, 2026 so as to enable them to lay challenge to Section 147A of the Act. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy, including the validity, scope, effect, retrospectivity or applicability of the amended provision and that all such questions were left open to be decided by the respective jurisdictional High Courts. The High Courts were requested to decide the matters preferably by September 30, 2026 and in the meanwhile interim stay of further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the notice impugned by the assessees was granted. However, such grant of interim stay was subject to further terms and conditions, if any, to be imposed by the respective jurisdictional High Courts. Operative part of the order of the Supreme Court dated April 10, 2026 reads as follows: -
“21. It appears to us that the assessees would be entitled to challenge the amending provisions as elaborated upon heretofore, for which it would only be appropriate to relegate them to the jurisdictional High Courts. All contentions raised before us, as well as any other grounds available to them to question the impugned notices, may be urged before the High Courts instead.
22. Since the High Courts have primarily quashed the reassessment notices on the ground that the JAOs lacked competence to initiate such proceedings, and the very foundation of that view now stands altered by the amending legislation, the impugned judgments in favour of the assessees are set aside on this limited ground. The matters areaaccordingly remitted to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration. Ordered accordingly. 
23. The assessees are granted liberty to amend their writ petitions, if so advised, within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of uploading of this order, so as to enable them to lay challenge to Section 147A of the IT Act, as introduced by Act No. 4 of 2026, or to any other connected or consequential provision.
24. Similarly, the Appellant-Revenue shall be at liberty to file their written submissions and affidavits before the jurisdictional High Courts within a period of three (3) weeks thereafter.
25. No additional time shall be granted to the parties beyond what has been granted above.
26. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy, including the validity, scope, effect, retrospectively or applicability of the amended provisions, and all such questions are left open to be decided by the High Courts.
27. Finally, during the pendency of the writ petitions before the High Courts, there shall be an interim stay of further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the High Courts.
28. The High Courts are requested to decide the matters preferably by 30.09.2026. Learned counsel for the parties undertake to extend full cooperation to the High Courts in this regard. No adjournments may be
granted by the High Courts on mere asking of the parties.
29. The Registry shall forthwith transmit a copy of this order to the Registrars General of the concerned High Courts.
30. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.”

In terms of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court through its order dated April 10, 2026, the petitioner amended her original petition to include therein the challenge to the newly introduced Section 147A of the Act.

The counsels who appeared on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the Bombay High Court through its judgments in Hexaware Technologies Ltd.’s case (supra) and Kairos Properties Pvt. Ltd.vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2571, the Punjab and Haryan High Court through its judgments pronounced in Jatinder Singh Bhangu & another vs. Union of India & others, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 9337 and Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India and others, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 9677, the Telangana High Court in Kankanala Ravindra Reddy’s case (supra) and the Gauhati High Court in Ram Narayan Sah’s case (supra), after analyzing the provisions of the Act, categorically held that in the light of Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022, notices under Section 148 of the Act could only be issued by a Faceless Assessment Officer; without amending Section 151A of the Act and/or the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022 and thus without curing the defect pointed out by the constitutional courts through the afore referred judgments, through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A, the legislature could not nullify the effect of the judgments delivered by the constitutional courts; promulgation of Section 147A of the Act by the legislature, without amending Section 151A and Section 130 of the Act and/or the schemes framed thereunder is a glaring example of legislative outreach and breach of separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary which the Indian Constitution clearly seeks to maintain; simply because Section 147A of the Act begins with a non-obstante clause, it cannot nullify the effect of law laid down by the constitutional courts; Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022, which still exists in the Act, clearly provides that notices under Section 148 of the Act are required to be issued randomly through automated allocation and in a faceless manner and in the light of such clear mandate of law the “clarification” sought to be made through the introduction of Section 147A of the Act is in direct conflict with such substantive provisions within the same Act. 

It was submitted that Section 147A of the Act is also in conflict with Section 130 of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated 28.03.2022 as per which all the functions and duties by Income Tax authorities are required to be done through the faceless regime in terms of Section 144B of the Act; as per the memorandum attached to the Finance Bill, 2026 through which Section 147A of the Act was introduced, Section 147A was promulgated by the legislature to achieve certainty and clarity as also to avoid litigation but introduction of Section 147A of the Act has resulted in everything to the contrary.

It was also submitted that since there were divergent views expressed by different High Courts as to whether notices under Section 148 of the Act could be issued by the assessees’ jurisdictional AOs, there were cross Special Leave Petitions, filed by the respective aggrieved parties, pending before the Supreme Court at the time when Section 147A was introduced. In  the light of these facts, the revenue should have invited an opinion of the Supreme Court which would have granted a final closure to this issue rather than retrospective enactment of Section 147A which has resulted in breeding of litigation across the length and breadth of this country before different High Courts and which litigation is not likely to end with judgment(s) to be rendered by the jurisdictional High Court(s); partial implementation of the faceless regime at the assessment/ reassessment stage defeats the entire purpose behind introduction of the faceless regime; even the timing of introduction of Section 147A of the Act by the legislature when the issue as to whether an assessee’s jurisdictional AO could issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act was pending adjudication before the Supreme Court was not appropriate because by doing so the respondents have literally stalled an opinion by the Supreme Court which in the afore facts was highly desirable and that Section 147A of the Act is also arbitrary because it artificially bifurcates the different stages of assessment especially when proceedings under Sections 148 and 147 of the Act are statutorily required to be an integral part of the same process. 

The submissions made by the counsels for the petitioner(s) was that even if the High Court does not find favour with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner(s) with regard to the challenge to the vires of Section 147A of the Act still the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the Act are liable to be set aside as they have not been issued by AOs chosen randomly by way of automated allocation in terms of Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated March 29, 2022. In support of their submissions, reliance was placed by counsel of the petitioners on the following judgments: -

1. NHPC Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh Secretary and others, (2023) 17 SCC 1
2. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara Vs. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and another, (1970) 1 SCC 509
3. State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala and another, (2014) 12 SCC 696
4. S.R. Bhagwat and others Vs. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16 
5. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Private Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1
6. S.T. Sadiq Vs. State of Kerala and others, (2015) 4 SCC 400
7. Tata Motors Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2004) 5 SCC 783
8. State of Karnataka and others Vs. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association and others, (2018) 6 SCC 363
9. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (1986), 3 SCC 461
10.M/s Hiralal Rattanlal Vs. State of U.P. and another, (1973) 1 SCC 216

The judgement of the Punjab & Haryana High Court  reads:"....Through and even after the retrospective enactment of Section 147A, Section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder continue to exist on the statute book and without any amendment. Thus, the primary basis on which the constitutional courts had held that notices issued under Section 148 of the Act could not have been issued by the assessees’ jurisdictional AOs has not been removed through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A. Without amending Section 151A of the Act or the scheme framed thereunder, the “clarification” made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A that Assessing Officers for the purpose of issuance of notices under Section 148 of the Act mean and shall always deemed to have meant to be Assessing Officers other than the faceless AOs is in defiance of and in conflict with the law laid down by the constitutional courts. Through such “clarification”, the legislature visibly seeks to substitute its opinion over and above the findings returned by the constitutional courts which is legally impermissible. Section 147A is also clearly found to be in direct conflict with Section 151A, read with the scheme framed thereunder, all of which provisions simultaneously exist in the same statute. In the absence of any amendment to Section 151A and/or the scheme framed thereunder, simply because Section 147A begins with a non-obstante clause, would not make its retrospective enactment pass the test of a constitutionally enacted validation law. Rather, by the retrospective enactment of Section 147A, in the manner in which it has been done, the legislature has clearly trenched upon judicial power and through the introduction of Section 147A the legislature directly seeks to upset findings returned through judgments of several constitutional courts. The attempt by the legislature is clearly to circumvent unfavourable judicial decisions. Even today, if a matter is listed before the constitutional courts which rendered the afore verdicts as to who is the competent Assessing Officer to issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act, there would be no change in the rendering of the above referred verdicts because such verdicts were primarily based on Section 151A and the scheme framed thereunder dated 29.03.2022 which provision and the scheme still continue to exist on the statute book as they existed at the time when the judgments of the constitutional courts were rendered. In the light of the considered and categoric findings returned by the constitutional courts after carefully analyzing Section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder that only a faceless AO can issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act, the “clarification” which is in clear defiance of and contrary to the afore findings, made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A of the Act would be of no help to the respondents." 

The judgement added:"The “clarification” made through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A was that an Assessing Officer, for the purpose of issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act, meant and was always deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the faceless AO. Such “clarification” was in conflict with the findings returned by as many as nine constitutional courts of this country to the effect that as per Section 151A of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder only a faceless AO could issue a notice under Section 148 of the Act. Section 151A and/or the scheme framed thereunder continue to exist on the statute book simultaneously with Section 147A. Therefore, introduction of Section 147A of the Act did not bring any clarity or certainty. It only added to the confusion. The other purpose behind enactment of Section 147A of the Act was to avoid litigation but such enactment became the breeding ground of litigation as thousands of petitions on the issue in question are pending in at least in eight different High Courts across the length and breadth of this country and that such litigation is also not likely to end before the respective High Courts because the parties aggrieved by the judgment of the respective jurisdictional High Courts would likely take up the matter before the Supreme Court. If it is a judgment of the Supreme Court which is ultimately going to give a quietus to the entire matter then rather than, for the afore “objects”, retrospectively enacting Section 147A, it was desirable for the respondents to
have invited an early opinion of the Supreme Court at the time when cross petitions were pending before the Supreme Court, filed by the respective parties aggrieved by the divergent views expressed by different jurisdictional High Courts as that would have finally put a lid on this issue
. 63. In the light of the afore discussion, we have no hesitation to declare Section 147A of the Act to be unconstitutional. "

The High Court concluded: "79. In the light of the above discussion, after holding Section 147A of the Act to be unconstitutional and directing it to be struck down, we further order setting aside of the notices issued to the petitioner(s) under Section 148 of the Act because such notices have not been issued through the process of randomized allocation of assessing officers and in a faceless manner as is mandated under Section 151A of the Act read with the scheme framed thereunder dated 29.03.2022." 

Notably, Section 147 A provision was introduced retrospectively to clarify the role of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) in reassessment proceedings. Section 147A was inserted with retrospective effect from April 1, 2021. It provides that, for the purposes of reassessment provisions, the expression “Assessing Officer” would mean an Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the assessee.

The amendment in the Act was in reaction to the JAO-FAO controversy. It arose after the introduction of the faceless assessment framework in 2021. The dispute centred on whether reassessment notices and orders could be validly issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers or whether such proceedings were required to be undertaken through the National Faceless Assessment Centre. The adverse High Court order was appealed in the Supreme Court. While the batch of appeals was pending, Parliament had introduced Section 147A with retrospective effect, seeking to clarify the statutory position and validate reassessment action undertaken by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers.

Tuesday, August 25, 2026

Bar Council of India (BCI) Chairman has appointed family members and relatives in the BCI without any advertisement: Y.R. Sada­s­iva Reddy, co-chairman, BCI

In a six-page let­ter dated August 22 by senior advoc­ate Y.R. Sada­s­iva Reddy, co-chairman, BCI has made sev­eral alleg­a­tions con­cern­ing the cre­ation of BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST, the trans­fer of around ₹150 crore from BCI funds to the trust has been made. He made allegation regarding demands for con­tri­bu­tions from law col­leges as “con­tri­bu­tions” to the PEARL-FIRST trust, and the hand­ling of funds gen­er­ated through the All-India Bar Exam­in­a­tion (AIBE). The insti­tu­tional con­tro­versy sur­round­ing the cre­ation of BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST and alleg­a­tions that the ori­ginal BCI Trust was rendered defunct. He alleged that the audit reports of the PEARL-FIRST trust has never been placed before a meet­ing of the BCI since the trust’s incep­tion in 2020. The ori­ginal BCI Trust wan cre­ated in 1974. It was allowed to fall into dis­use dur­ing his ten­ure and was replaced by BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST, whose trust­ees, he alleged, were chosen by him.

The text of the letter is as under: 

To,

Shri Manan Kumar Mishra,
Senior Advocate,
Chairman, Bar Council of India,
21, Rouse Avenue Institutional Area,
Near Bal Bhavan, New Delhi 110 002.

Sub: Demand for your immediate resignation from the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, and for an independent enquiry into the matters set out herein - regarding.

Sir,

I address this communication to you not as an adversary, but as an elected Member of the Bar Council of India, presently holding the office of Co- Chairman, and as a member of this profession for over three decades. I do so with considerable anguish, and only after long reflection, having satisfied myself that silence on my part would amount to a dereliction of the trust reposed in me by the advocates of this country.

The Bar Council of India is not the personal estate of any individual. It is a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, holding funds contributed by lakhs of advocates and exercising regulatory power over the entry of every young person into this profession. Every rupee it holds is held in trust. Every power it exercises is a power conferred by Parliament for the benefit of the Bar, and not for the benefit of the person who happens to occupy the Chair. 

It is my considered view, formed on the basis of what I have myself witnessed in the meetings of this Council, that under your Chairmanship the Council has drifted very far from that standard. I therefore call upon you, in the plainest terms, to tender your resignation from the office of Chairman of the Bar Council of India forthwith. My reasons are set out below.

GROUNDS ON WHICH YOUR RESIGNATION IS DEMANDED

I. Appointments to the establishment of the Council made without any transparent process of recruitment
Through the whole of my tenure as a Member of this Council, I proceeded on the assumption that appointments to the establishment of the Bar Council of India were made after due advertisement, due scrutiny of qualifications, and due observance of the norms binding upon a statutory body. I never had occasion to question it, because I never imagined it could be otherwise. On examining the list of persons presently employed by the Council, together with their particulars, I find a pattern that no responsible Member can overlook. A striking proportion of the staff are persons connected to you personally, several of them being members of, or related to, your own family. I am unable to find, in any record placed before this Council, a single advertisement, a single selection committee proceeding, or a single comparative merit list justifying these appointments.

II. The rendering defunct of the Bar Council of India Trust and the diversion of Council funds to a newly created trust
The Bar Council of India Trust was an institution of standing. It was the body through which this Council discharged its historic contribution to legal education in this country, including the founding of the National Law School of India at Bengaluru. That Trust was, over a period, allowed to fall into disuse. It did not become defunct by accident.
In its place, a new trust styled "BCI Trust PEARL First" came to be registered on 17.09.2020, with trustees of your choosing. Thereafter, a resolution was moved in this Council for the transfer of a sum of the order of Rs. 150 crores of the funds of the Bar Council of India to that newly created trust. I placed my opposition to that resolution on record at the time, as did certain other Members. Our objection was overridden. The transfer went through. Distinguished persons, including sitting and former Judges, were thereafter associated with the trust, lending it a respectability that the manner of its creation does not deserve.

The funds of the Bar Council of India are the contributions of ordinary advocates, most of them in the district courts, most of them struggling. I know of no provision of the Advocates Act, 1961 which permits the corpus of a statutory regulator to be transferred to a private trust registered by its own Chairman. None of the members of the Bar Council have ever seen a copy of the Trust Deed.

III. Contributions demanded from law colleges seeking approval or renewal of approval
Persistent and credible complaints have reached me, from more than one State, that managements of new law colleges approaching the Bar Council of India for approval, and managements of existing colleges approaching it for renewal, are being required to make "contributions" to the said trust, in amounts ranging from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore. If this is correct and I have received nothing from your office to indicate that it is not it is a matter of the utmost gravity. The power of approval and renewal under the Advocates Act and the Rules of Legal Education is a regulatory power. It is not a licence to raise funds. A regulator that receives money from the entity it regulates, in temporal proximity to the decision it must take on that entity, has destroyed the very foundation of its own authority. The consequence is visible in the state of legal education in this country: colleges that ought never to have been approved continue year after year, and thousands of young persons are sold a degree that equips them for nothing.

IV. Key positions in institutions run by the Council held by persons of your own family

The same pattern extends to the educational institution or institutions established and run under the aegis of the Council and the said trust. Persons occupying key administrative positions there are, once again, drawn from your family. The purpose for which such an institution was established was never explained to this Council in any meaningful terms, nor was any feasibility study, budget or governance structure ever placed before us for deliberation.

I may add that the very propriety of the Bar Council of India simultaneously regulating law colleges and operating one of its own has now been questioned before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. That such a question should arise at all is a measure of how far institutional propriety has been allowed to erode.

V. The direction issued against the graduating batch of NALSAR University of Law, without any material being placed before the Council 

On 13.08.2026, a communication was issued from your office directing the State Bar Councils not to enrol, until further orders, the graduating batch. of 2026 of the NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. It was accompanied by observations questioning the fitness of those students to enter this. profession. The occasion was a representation by some students of that University concerning the invitation extended to a distinguished guest for their convocation that is to say, the expression of an opinion.

That direction was issued without the material being placed before the Bar Council of India, without the Council deliberating upon it, and without any resolution of this Council authorising it. I was not consulted. To the best of my knowledge, the Council as a body was not consulted. The direction was withdrawn within hours in the face of nationwide condemnation. It was described by the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association as illegal and disproportionate. It drew the disapproval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself. On 15.08.2026 you issued a letter expressing regret. The expression of regret, though belated, is not the point. The point is that the office of Chairman was used to threaten an entire graduating batch of law students - young men and women with no power and no voice - with exclusion from the profession, as a reprisal for having held an opinion. The right of a citizen to express a view is not forfeited on admission to a law school. A body that exists to defend the independence of the Bar cannot itself punish independence of thought. That single act, in my respectful but firm view, has done more damage to the standing of this Council than anything else in its history, and it is by itself sufficient ground for you to demit office.

VI. Encouragement of factionalism within the State Bar Councils 

It has been a consistent feature of your tenure that factions are created and sustained within the State Bar Councils, that one group is favoured over another, and that orders are thereafter caused to be passed from the Bar Council of India in aid of the favoured group. Orders of this nature. have issued from time to time, frequently without notice to the affected side and without the matter being placed before the Council for deliberation.

The State Bar Councils are autonomous statutory bodies. They are not to be governed through patronage. Many of them have been paralysed by disputes that would never have survived a week had they not been sustained from Delhi.
 

VII. Continuance in the office of Chairman for more than a decade 

The office of Chairman of the Bar Council of India is an elected office with a term of two years. That term reflects a deliberate legislative and institutional choice: that the office should rotate, that no individual should become identified with the institution, and that the Council should be periodically renewed. 

You have held that office continuously since 2012, and were returned for a further consecutive term in 2025. This is without precedent. When elections to the office fall due, the arrangements are so managed that the outcome is a foregone conclusion. An elected office that has one occupant for fourteen years has ceased, in any real sense, to be an elected office.

VIII. The confidence of the Bar has been lost

The matter is no longer confined to this Council. Advocates have assembled in protest outside the office of the Bar Council of India itself, demanding your resignation and pointing to the absence of the most elementary welfare measures for the Bar an Advocates Protection Act, insurance cover, transparent inspection of law colleges. Young advocates, who have the most to gain from a functioning Council and the most to lose from a captured one, have led those protests. Members of the Bar in your own State and your own district have joined in seeking your departure. The Student Bar Councils of the National Law Universities have publicly declined to share a platform with the Chairman of the Bar Council of India. When the regulator of a profession is publicly repudiated by the profession it regulates, by the students it is meant to nurture, and by the courts before which it appears, the question of its Chairman's continuance is no longer a matter of personal preference. It is a question of institutional survival.

DEMAND

In the premises aforesaid, I call upon you:
(a) to tender your resignation from the office of Chairman, Bar Council of India, forthwith, and in any event within fifteen (15) days of receipt of this letter;
(b) to convene, in the meanwhile, a Special Meeting of the Bar Council of India for consideration of each of the matters set out above, with the relevant records placed before every Member in advance;
(c) to cause a special audit of the accounts of the Bar Council of India and of BCI Trust PEARL - First, from the date of its registration to date, to be conducted by an independent firm empanelled with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, and to cause the report to be circulated to every Member and published;
(d) to direct that, with immediate effect, no contribution, donation or payment of any description shall be received from any law college, university or management by the Council or by any trust or body connected with it; and
(e) to place on the website of the Council the complete staff position referred to in Ground I above.

I hold no personal animosity towards you. I have served alongside you on this Council for a decade. It is precisely because I have watched this institution from within for that period that I am able to say, with a clear conscience, that it will not recover while you remain in the Chair. There are able persons in this Council capable of restoring it. Standing down now, of your own accord, is the one course still open to you that would be to your credit. 

The Bar of this country deserves better than what it is presently receiving from its own Council. I ask you to allow it that opportunity.

Yours faithfully,
(Y. R. SADASIVA REDDY), 
Senior Advocate, Member and Co-Chairman Bar Council of India 

 

Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms(CJAR) questions Manan Kumar Mishra's self appointment as a lifetime trustee of BCI Trust Pearl-First Trust

The Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms (CJAR) has issued a statement dated August 22, 2026 has questioned the role of Manan Kumar Mishra as Chairman of the Bar Council of India (BCI). CJAR statement reads: "It is also known that Mr. Mishra has set up a Trust under the BCI (BCI Trust Pearl-First Trust) of which he has made himself a lifetime trustee by name. This Trust took over the funds of an earlier trust set up by the BCI (Bar Council of India Trust). This taking over of the funds as well as their utilization is being enquired into by the CBI." 

CJAR has drawn public’s attention towards the fact that "Mr Mishra’s continuing as Chairman, BCI is irregular and raises serious questions. The Advocates Act, 1961 provides for a two-year term for the BCI Chairman. A proviso to Section 4(3) permits a sitting member to continue in office “until his successor is elected” — a provision that has, in practice, been used to entrench Mr. Mishra in office indefinitely rather than facilitate periodic rotation, as Parliament intended. This has enabled the concentration of power in a single office-bearer for over a decade and is an indictment of the BCI’s failure to reform itself from within." The statement reads: "CJAR reiterates that when an office-bearer who exercises regulatory power, threatens the careers of law graduates for exercising their right to protest and free expression, he has clearly demonstrated unfitness to continue holding that office, irrespective of a subsequent withdrawal of his statement." CJAR's statement has pointed out that BCI's chairman is known for issuing unilateral orders "misusing the letter head of the BCI without even calling a meeting of the Bar Council as he did in this NALSAR case. The latest letter only confirms that Mr Mishra is unfit to hold this office. CJAR notes that the BCI exists to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and legal education — not to serve as a permanent political perch. An independent legal profession, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted, is one of the best guarantees of constitutional rights. The continuing presence of Mr Mishra as the BCI Chairman has seriously damaged the independence of the Bar. In light of all the above, CJAR calls upon the legal fraternity, State Bar Councils, and the Supreme Court to ensure that accountability, rotation, and due process are restored to the BCI without further delay by first removing Mr. Mishra from the position of Chairman and ensuring that there is a free and fair selection of the next Chairperson." 

CJAR’s Demands
1. Immediate resignation of Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra as Chairman, BCI.
2. An inquiry into Mr. Mishra's questionable actions during his tenure including the formation and misuse of the Trust, opaque and non-transparent decision making and orders, etc.
3. Enactment of a binding two-term (or time-bound) limit on the office of BCI Chairman and Vice-Chairman.
4. A transparent, rotational mechanism for BCI leadership across States.
5. Full public disclosure of BCI’s finances and disciplinary record during Mr. Mishra’s tenure.
6. Institutional safeguards to prevent any future office-bearer from unilaterally penalising students or advocates without due process.


Thursday, August 13, 2026

Supreme Court Bar Association condemns BCI's arbitrary decision to withhold enrolment of NALSAR University Law Graduates, BCI modifies, withdraws its order

In a letter dated August 13, 2026 addressed to Chairman, Bar Council of India (BCI), President, Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has expressed its strongest condemnation regarding the decision taken by the BCI directing that, "Till further orders, no student of NALSAR University of Law, who has obtained the Law Degree in the year 2026, shall be enrolled by any State Bar Council as an Advocate." Subsequent to SCBA's letter, BCI modified its order dated August 13, 2026. All the three letters were issued on August 13, 2026. Now the Chairman, BCI has issued a statement dated August 14, 2026 stating that he has withdrawn the order unconditionally. 
 
It all began with a campaign started by around 450 out of NALSAR’s 1,400 students against invitation to Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant to their convocation. The campaign followed oral remarks made by the CJI last month while hearing a petition alleging police excesses during the national examination leak scam related protests, wherein, he reportedly remarked, “Please don’t waste our time. We don’t have time to watch these videos” of students and youth being beaten by Delhi Police, Rapid Action Force (RAF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and unidentified ununiformed persons during the seven-week long successful protest at at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi. 

Meanwhile, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), the party behind the resignation of education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan in wake of national examination leak scam, issued a detailed statement. It said, BCI's interim directive against NALSAR University of Law graduates "grossly disproportionate, deeply troubling, and prima facie indefensible". Responding to BCI's circular, Saurav Das of CJP said: "Alarming! Mr. Manan Mishra, HANDS OFF our students! How dare you pass such a grossly illegal order? Reveal your law degree to the world now because a lawyer can’t get the law this wrong! Students of NALSAR have displayed democratic dissent against a person they in their own wisdom thought was unfit to give them their hard-earned degrees. Who are you to intervene? Your accountability needs to be talked about too. Tell us why as the statutory regulator (BCI) responsible for supervising State Bar Councils you permitted elected bodies to continue BEYOND their terms until the Supreme Court intervened? Who were these people that were favoured as a result of this? Tell us now.  And why and how have you been holding the post of Chairman since 2012 to now till 2030? Do tell us about your track record. Tell us why did you illegally intervene in the 2026 Chhattisgarh State Bar Council, as stated by the High Court there? Law students and advocates in Delhi and across the country will rise up in protest against you and in support of the students of NALSAR if you don’t WITHDRAW this disgusting notification IMMEDIATELY and apologise for your conduct. Your conduct and tenure as the BCI Chairman (while being BJP RS MP) needs to be accounted for." 

Abhijeet Dipke of CJP observed: "What if all legal cockroaches come together?" Das added: "Much needed. The Bar Council of India needs to be looked into. Manan Mishra has been its Chairman since 2012. What has he done? Needs to be accounted for. All legal cockroaches, your task is cut out. Let’s fix BCI’s accountability. Let’s fix Mishra’s accountability." 

CJP's statement reads:"The Bar Council of India’s decision to halt the enrolment of NALSAR’s 2026 graduating students as advocates, reportedly because they opposed Chief Justice of India Surya Kant being invited as Chief Guest, is grossly disproportionate, deeply troubling, and prima facie indefensible. Students cannot be collectively penalised for expressing dissent over a ceremonial invitation. The Cockroach Janta Party condemns this order. If Chairman Manan Kumar Mishra does not withdraw this order immediately, then all law students, advocates, senior lawyers, and well-meaning young cockroaches will protest outside Bar Council’s office and Mishra’s official residence, and their respective states. @MishraManan01’s accountability will be fixed." Mishra responded: "Council has already withdrawn that letter." Das reacted:"Mr. Mishra, the order has NOT been fully withdrawn. The part which seeks names of the students and orders for an “inquiry” against them for their peaceful dissent still stands, as per your own new letter. IMMEDIATELY withdraw that entire letter. No student at NALSAR should face any inquiry or witch hunt for their democratic dissent against the Chief Justice of India. You are no one to threaten this. Stay within the four corners of your official duties and stop threatening the students with “inquiry”. Withdraw the letter in full and guarantee NO ACTION against our brilliant law students of NALSAR. The call for protest outside the BCI and Mr. Mishra’s official residence STANDS until this demand is fulfilled." After CJP's threat of protest against him, BCI chairman communicated to CJP that he has modified the order  

CJP was not satisfied with the modification of the BCI's order, it demanded complete withdrawal of BCI's order. Responding to CJP's demand on August 14, 2026, Mishra wrote:"After considering the representations and reactions of Senior Advocates, learned members of the Bar, law students and public spirited citizens, and being satisfied that the 2026 batch of NALSAR, Hyderabad, had no role in any disturbance or movement, the Bar Council of India has decided to close the proceedings altogether. No further action is required @NALSAR_Official. I wish the students the very best for their careers. A word of wisdom: we take immense pride in our legal institutions, and the day you enrol, you become vanguards. Voice your opinions freely, but with respect and institutional decorum. The highest judicial office is our collective pride. Dissent is welcome in a democracy; public ridicule of constitutional institutions is often counterproductive.  Official communication to follow." Das reacted: "It’s done, bro. Another major victory for the youth! But the quest for accountability will continue."

In a letter addressed to the chairman, BCI, Advocate N. Manoj Kumar, a member of both the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Kerala, has objected to the blanket prohibition against the entire 2026 batch which is, "manifestly arbitrary".  

Former Advocate-General of Telangana and senior advocate K Ramakrishna Reddy stated that the BCI had no jurisdiction to direct State Bar Councils against enrolling NALSAR graduates who completed their courses in 2026. Describing the original direction as “manifestly arbitrary” and “without jurisdiction”, he said the BCI’s powers under the Advocates Act primarily concerned professional standards, ethics and conduct.

SCBA's letter stated:"This unprecedented and wholly arbitrary direction is, in my view, illegal, disproportionate and fundamentally unsustainable. It amounts to an attempt to intimidate law students for exercising their fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Universities are meant to be campuses of free thought and fearless debate. Students cannot be threatened with denial of their right to enter the legal profession merely because they have expressed disagreement with a constitutional authority. Such an approach is fundamentally antithetical to the very values that a law university is expected to nurture....The directive also seriously affects the graduates' fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to practise a profession of their choice. A blanket and indefinite restriction of this nature cannot meet the requirements of legality, reasonableness or proportionality. The BCI, as the apex regulatory body of the legal profession, has a greater responsibility to uphold the rule of law and constitutional values. It cannot itself resort to collective punishment or use the professional future of young graduates as a means of institutional discipline. As members of the legal fraternity, it is our collective duty to nurture, support, and welcome the next generation of lawyers, rather than creating arbitrary institutional barriers that stall their careers before they even begin." The letter of SCBA's President concluded:"I therefore urge the Bar Council of India to immediately withdraw this wholly unjustified directive and permit the 2026 NALSAR graduates to seek enrolment without any hindrance and in accordance with law."

The Bar Council of India held its elections on April 15, 2012. BCI had unanimously elected Manan Kumar Mishra as the Chairman of BCI on April 17, 2012. In 2014, after his term expired, BCI Member from Rajasthan Biri Singh Sinsinwar was elected the Chairman. But Sinsinwar resigned from the post after few months. Mishra was again re-elected as Chairman. At present, he is serving his seventh term.

Mohua Moita, the parliamentarian wrote: "BCI has NO women imagine." BCI is a highly unrepresentative body but the plea for SC/ST representation in state bar councils was not entertained last year by a bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh. 

Earlier, in an animated exchange of words between Advocate on Record Kumud Lata Dass and Mishra in the Court of Chief Justice of India, she had stated that to the BCI Chairman "You're virtually a permanent Chairman...."

Saurav Das wrote:" Manan Mishra needs to go. Enough of him since 2012. All kinds of illegalities have been committed under his chairmanship. Our lawyers deserve better. Time’s up for Manan bro." Nagendra Sharma, a writer-advocate wrote:"It is also a case of huge conflict of interest. He runs a law university  in Goa through a trust set up by BCI and is setting up one more such university in Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh.  It is a clear attempt to undermine and diminish highly reputed and public funded NALSAR and to create space in South for his universities that charge over rs 10 lakh per annum per student." Das asked Mishra:"Very, very serious questions raised. @MishraManan01, is this true? Is this not misuse of the powers of your office? You’ve been the Chairman since 2012. Is this what you have been doing? Do no other lawyers exist? Legal Cockroaches, find out more about this and fix accountability!" He added:"The kind of horror stories that are coming out about Manan Kumar Mishra should lead to his resignation with immediate effect. This is what would’ve happened in a functional democracy. Cockroaches are here to make a functional democracy. Mr. Mishra, time’s up!" Das pointed out:"Friends, Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra’s Bar Council of India spent 14 CRORES on meetings and conferences in just one year. Today, he had to withdraw a portion of his outrageous order on NALSAR students within 1 hour. So where and how is this 14 crores being spent? 12 crores was also spent on travel and accommodation. But what has been the result? If Mr. Mishra is capable of issuing such a draconian order against young students, then what welfare has he been doing for young lawyers and law schools? He’s been in the position since 2012 and will be till 2030. Time’s up, Mr. Mishra! #LegalCockroachesUnite and hold him accountable." 

Gazette notification states that BCI spent Rs 180.25 crore on legal education in 2024-25 in its audited financial statement. It shows an increase from Rs 46 crore spent on legal education in the previous financial year. The total income of the BCI for 2024-25 stands at Rs 234.49 crore, compared to Rs 250.32 crore in the previous year. Inspection fees remain the primary source of revenue. It contributed over Rs 130 crore. The collection from examination fees from the All India Bar Examination (AIBE) amounted to Rs 36.96 crore, lower than Rs 50.19 crore collected from two editions in the previous year. The BCI's expenditure, apart from legal education, includes Rs 14.22 crore on its activities and meetings, Rs 10.27 crore on employee benefits, and Rs 3.41 crore on establishment and other expenses. The statement reveals that examination-related expenses are recorded at Rs 2.52 crore. The financial statement shows that the surplus for the year declined to Rs 23.42 crore from RS 173.50 crore in 2023-24. It attributes this change to higher expenditure during the year. The BCI’s total assets increased to Rs 815.83 crore from Rs 752.55 crore in the previous year. Notably, investments accounts for a substantial portion, with over RS 733 crore held primarily in fixed deposits with scheduled banks. The receipts from law colleges under legal education regularisation fees rose to Rs 9.08 crore, compared to Rs 3.16 crore in the previous year. The enrolment and other fees contributed Rs 18.81 crore, while interest income amounted to Rs 44.55 crore. 

Similar audited financial statements of State Bar Councils including Bihar State Bar Council should be notified in the Gazette at the earliest.   

The BCI draws its mandate from the Advocates Act, 1961 to lay down “standards of professional conduct and etiquette,” safeguarding “the rights, privileges and interests of advocates,” and specifying standards for legal education “in consultation with the universities in India imparting such education” to the state bar councils. It is responsible for recognising universities “whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an advocate.” But BCI has proposed to empower itself to conduct nationwide entrance examinations for law degree admissions under the Draft Advocates (Amendment) Bill, 2026. This draft bill also suggests raising the advocate's enrolment fee from ₹750 to ₹22,500, a massive 30%  increase. The Draft Bill gives the BCI authority to conduct entrance tests and define minimum eligibility qualifications for entry into law degree courses. The proposed Bill does not have provision for it's audit by Comptroller Auditor General. It's provision to legitimize it's election tribunal structure to deal with disputes concerning elections under the Advocates Act, 1961 is highly questionable because the election tribunal is structurally, a subordinate body under the chairman of BCI. BCI does not trust Election Commission of India like independent body to deal with election petitions under the law. 

On September 29, 2018, BCI publicly urged CJI Dipak Misra not to accept any post-retirement assignment from the govt, saying it was necessary to protect the “independence & integrity of the judiciary.” 

It's press release reads: "There is a public perception that independence of judges falls under stress and strain during the last part of the tenure of most of our Judges when the possibility of post retirement assignments and jobs by the Governments becomes a living possibility. When a Judge accepts any assignment after his retirement, fingers are raised about the bona fides of such assignment. The case of Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam, former Chief Justice of India who was appointed as a Governor of Kerala after retirement as CJI, had generated much reaction. Such post- retirement assignments, for good or no reason, put a question mark on the fair discharge of judicial functions by the Judge in question during the concluding part of his tenure. This is a very grey area in which Bar expects that retiring Judges should not accept any appointments after retirement, at least for a cooling period of two years from the date of their retirement. Recently, a Joint Meeting of Bar Council of India with the representatives of State Bar Councils and High Court Bar Associations, the Co-ordination Committee of Bar Associations of Delhi, NCR has passed the most emphatic resolution in this regard.The Indian Bar has requested the High Court and Supreme Court Judges not to accept any assignment after their retirement at least for two years. In that meeting, the representatives also expressed their anguish over the role of a Judge of Supreme Court, who passed some orders with sole intent to shut the mouth of the Bar. The Hon'ble Judge had gone to the extent of issuing directions to the Law Commission to suggest amendments in Advocates' Act for demolishing the democratic structure of Bar bodies. And the Law Commission, as expected, made its suggestions destroying the independence of the Bar. (Though due to strong protest by the Lawyers, the Government did not accept the recommendations). The same Judge passed another impractical order restraining the Lawyers from giving a call of abstention, boycott or strikes even for a single day (in any eventuality). This order is in violation of a constitution Bench Judgment of apex court."

But when former CJI Ranjan Gogoi was nominated to the Rajya Sabha, the BCI issued a release dated March 18, 2020 welcoming it as a “bridge between the Legislature & Judiciary” and called the criticism of the appointment “unwarranted & premature.” Isn't this a case where someone is guilty of applying double standards in his speech? Aren't such people commonly called a hypocrite, two-faced, or equivocator because they use different rules, values, or judgments for different people or situations? 

Earlier,  on March 3, 2017, the Supreme Court had stayed the operation of a circular issued in September 2016 by the BCI, that imposed age limits on people enrolling for law degree programmes in the country. The circular barred anyone above the age of 20 from entering five-year programmes, and anyone above 30 from entering three-year programmes (with relaxations for students from communities entitled to reservations). The court’s decision came as a relief to those who had been affected by the rule, which has a tumultuous history.
 
 
 
 
 
 

Thursday, July 16, 2026

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh, "in a complaint case, there ought not to have arisen any apprehension of the appellant being apprehended by the police..."

In Mukesh Pandit vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 6-page long order dated July 13, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "we are constrained to hold that in a Complaint Case, there ought not to have arisen any apprehension of the appellant being apprehended by the police because police has got no role to play in the adjudication of a complaint case, barring the circumstances enumerated supra. 8. That being the position, we set aside the impugned order dated 03.11.2025 and direct that the appellant shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No.747C of 2022, subject to the appellant co-operating with the proceedings of the Complaint Case. 9. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed." 

The appellant had preferred the Criminal Appeal against the impugned order dated 03.11.2025 passed by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of Patna High Court, rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. It was stated that appellant apprehended his arrest in connection with Complaint Case No.747C of 2022 registered under Sections 498A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. On the ground that appellant was declared as a proclaimed offender, the prayer for anticipatory bail was turned down by the High Court. From the Record of Proceedings before the Supreme Court, it found that appellant had assailed the order whereby he was declared as a proclaimed offender before the High Court. By the order dated April 24, 2026, the High Court had set aside the order declaring the appellant as a proclaimed offender. 

The Supreme Court referred to its decision  in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. [Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 16221/2025], wherein, it  considered the prayer for anticipatory bail in the context of a complaint case under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973and held as under:“7. We have noticed that there is a serious problem in two States, viz. the State of Bihar and State of Jharkhand, respectively. We fail to understand that in a private complaint how does the Police involve itself or is concerned, in any manner. What was the basis for the accused to express apprehension that the police would arrest them. 8. In a private complaint when cognizance is taken and process is issued all that the Court would do is to issue summons. We have explained many times  n the past the purport of Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.PC.”) The Section 87 of the Cr.PC. reads thus:- “87. Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.—A Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to issue a summons for the appearance of any person, issue, after recording its reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest— (a) if, either before the issue of such summons, or after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court sees reason to believe that he has absconded or will not obey the summons; or (b) if at such time he fails to appear and the summons is proved to have been duly served in time to admit of his appearing in accordance therewith and no reasonable excuse is offered for such failure.” 9. Section 87 empowers the Court to issue warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons. However, this power has to be exercised only in two contingencies as explained by the provision itself, i.e, (a) and (b), referred to above, respectively. 10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons 11. We may give one another simple illustration. Take a case wherein on a private complaint, the magistrate deems fit to take cognizance under Section 200 of the Cr.PC. but postpones the issue of process till the conclusion of the magisterial inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. If a magistrate orders a Police inquiry under Section 202 and asks the police to give a report, then whether in the course of such inquiry, the police can arrest the accused. The answer is an emphatic “NO”, Police has no powers to arrest even during the course of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.PC.” 

The Special Leave to Appeal arose out of impugned 4-page long final order dated November 3, 2025 in CRLM No. 41404/2025 passed by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of the Patna High Court.

Sunday, May 24, 2026

Journalism of “innocent fraud”: The great decline of legal journalism in Bihar-Part 1

"I have learned that to be right and useful, one must accept a continuing divergence between approved belief - what I have elsewhere called conventional wisdom - and the reality. And in the end, not surprisingly, it is the reality that counts.......... It is my conclusion that reality is more obscured by social or habitual preference and personal or group pecuniary advantage in economics and politics than in any other subject.

How can fraud be innocent? How can innocence be fraudulent? The answer is of no slight significance, for innocent, lawful fraud has an undoubted role in private life and public discourse. However, by neither those so believing nor those so guiding is there spoken recognition of that fact. There is, to emphasize, no sense of guilt or responsibility. Some of this fraud derives from traditional economics and its teaching and some from the ritual views of economic life. These can strongly support individual and group interest, particularly, as might be expected, that of the more fortunate, articulate and politically prominent in the larger community, and can achieve the respectability and authority of everyday knowledge. This is not the contrivance of any individual or group but represents the natural, even righteous view of what best serves personal or larger interest.

Most progenitors of what I hear intend to identify as innocent fraud are not deliberately in its service. They are unaware of how their views are shaped."

-Excerpts from Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith’ The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth For Our Time (2004) 

“An advocate shall not be a full-time salaried employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or concern, so long as he continues to practise, and shall, on taking up any such employment, intimate the fact to the Bar Council on whose roll his name appears and shall thereupon cease to practise as an advocate so long as he continues in such employment. Nothing in this rule shall apply to a Law Officer of the Central Government of a State or of any Public Corporation or body constituted by statute who is entitled to be enrolled under the rules of his State Bar Council made under Section 28 (2) (d) read with Section 24 (1) (e) of the Act despite his being a full time salaried employee. Law Officer for the purpose of these Rules means a person who is so designated by the terms of his appointment and who, by the said terms, is required to act and/or plead in Courts on behalf of his employer.”

-Rule 49, Bar Council of India Rules under Advocates Act, 1961 on Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette

Conflict-of-interest ridden landscape of of legal journalism in the State is stinking because it has become rotten in its core with no possibility of sunlight disinfecting their incestuous relationship with the bar, executive, legislative and judicial institutions. Several factors have contributed to the erosion of journalistic ethics, including conflict-of-interest ridden assignments, sycophancy, financial pressures, naked affiliation with political parties and complicity with Jeffrey Edward Epstein like characters. Such journalists have entered into a Faustian bargain and appear to be decadent child of the Mephistopheles. Most of these journalists have not studied journalism and act in colossal ignorance of the ethics of journalism and the 5W and 1H framework of the elements of news data, comprising of Who? (character) What? (plot) When? (time) Where? (location) Why? (motivation or causation), How? (narrative). Journalists who practice journalism of “innocent fraud” cannot become worthy of emulation by young journalists. In order to hide the identity of the journalists, who also happen to be advocates, most of the news reports about courts are authored by anonymous, and non-transparent journalists. If their veils are pierced, the conflict-of-interest ridden clandestine operation and questionable journalistic practices will come to light. They seem to be mortally afraid of sunlight.          

The Supreme Court in Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa 1996 AIR 1708, in para 20 observed: "legal profession requires full time attention and would not countenance an Advocate riding two horses or more at a time." In complete disregard of the settled law, a large number of legal reporters in the State of Bihar are riding two horses by practicing as an advocates as well as journalists to win illegitimate favours from bar, executive, legislative and judicial institutions.  

In Mohd. Kamran vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2024), Supreme Court’s Division Bench asked the State Bar Council as well as the Bar Council of India ascertain whether the rules of professional ethics permit a practicing Advocate to simultaneously work as a journalist. It issued noticde to notice to the Bar Council of India as well as Bar Council of State of Uttar Pradesh. In its order dated December  16, 2024, the Court passed an order which reads: We have perused the response of the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council, for the reasons stated, has taken a stand that it is not permissible for an Advocate to do full time journalism. Now, the petitioner has filed an affidavit dated 13th December, 2024 giving an undertaking in terms of paragraph 11 stating that the petitioner will not engage himself in the field of journalism either full time or part time and he will continue to practice as an Advocate. Today, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in presence of the petitioner has accepted the correctness of the stand taken by the Bar Council of India.” The counsel appearing behalf of the Bar Council of India (BCI) made it clear that such dual roles are not allowed. Referring to the conflicting roles of advocates and journalists, the BCI submitted: “Lordship, they cannot practice law while also being accredited journalists”.  

The case had arisen out of the judgment dated March 12, 2024 passed by the Allahabad High Court, which had arisen from summoning order dated  order dated January 10, 2024 by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III (MP/ MLA), Lucknow in Dr. Mohd. Kamran vs. Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh (2024). The High Court had recorded in its order that the complainant was enrolled on the rolls of Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and regularly appeared as an Advocate before the High Court as well as before the District and Sessions Court, Central Administrative Tribunal and was also a member of Oudh Bar Association, Lucknow. It was claimed that and in the light of Rule 51 of Bar Council of India, he was also having the status of a freelance journalist and was engaged in the profession for about 25 years. The High Court had set aside the summing order. Supreme Court did not find any ground to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. But recorded the submission of the BCI which referred to Rule 49 of the BCI Rules, prohibiting advocates from taking full-time jobs with individuals, businesses, government agencies, or other entities. If an advocate becomes employed, they must inform the Bar Council and stop practicing law during their employment. The Supreme Court had asked "How can a member of the Bar claim to be both a journalist and an Advocate? This is highly unprofessional."

Disregarding the directions of the Court and the Rule 49 of the BCI, the advocates across the State of Bihar are practicing as legal reporters as well.

Decline in coverage of courts, paid news, threat to open justice

A significant sections of the legal journalists in Bihar have willy-nilly become participants and players in questionable practices that contribute to the growing use of money power which undermines democratic processes and norms–while hypocritically feigning to occupy a high moral ground.

The 47th report on the “Issues Related to Paid News” by India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology reviewed the genesis of “Paid News‟, existing mechanism/guidelines/codes/norms/organisations/legislations in this regard and measures required to tackle the malpractice. It recorded that a large number of journalists maintain deafening silence on this malpractice. Press Council of India (PCI) informed the Committee that over last six decades ‘Paid News’ have changed its form ranging from accepting gifts on various occasions, going on a sponsored tours, to other benefits and direct payment of money. The parliamentary report found that the decline in independence of the journalists/reporters was due to the emergence of contract system of employment as the system has the affect of reducing their status to mere marketing agents. The Committee felt perturbed at the pathetic working conditions of the significant part of the media personnel while strongly disapproving the tendency of the media houses to hire and fire the journalists. Among the legal journalists, it is increasingly apparent that they are dependent on undue favours from the bar, executive, legislative and judicial institutions to continue in their dual role as journalist and advocate although riding two horses is impermissible in law.  

It germane to take note of the report of the Justice Select Committee of UK’s parliament which has highlighted the impact of reduced court reporting on the public’s understanding of how justice works, from understanding sentencing guidelines to the long-established and respected principle of open justice–‘justice must be done, and seen to be done.’ The committee has made a case for the ‘re-establishment of a courts’ inspectorate’ to help identify ‘wider issues’ within the justice system, ignored by journalists. The decline in coverage of courts has undermined democratic process. It has adverse impact on ‘open justice’.

In Bihar, the legal journalists report only about few cases heard by few out of the 37 judges in Patna High Court. Their selection of news about ongoing court cases and final judgments and orders is arbitrary. In general, in most of the cases, these journalists either do not seem to have any news sense  about why a particular case is news worthy or the newspaper editors do not provide them adequate space because justice related stories are not a priority or news worthy for them. The judgments and orders by most of the judges are not reported or not deemed news worthy for some inexplicable reason. They report only about the advocates and judges who are personally known to them. In general, they do not report when judgments and orders by single judges are either reversed or upheld by a 2-judge bench or by 3-judge full bench or when the High Court judgments are set aside or upheld by the Supreme Court. The UK’s Justice Committee has observed: “the less aware the public is of the rule of law and the less informed they are as to whether the administration of justice is functioning as it should.” This observation is relevant for court reporting in Bihar as well. Digital media has attempted to fill the gap in court reporting left by the decline by newspapers without success. The loss of public understanding of how justice is applied creates a rupture in citizens sense of reality.

A content analysis of judgments delivered by the High Court and its orders can provide a ‘snapshots’ of the deteriorating state of court reporting in Bihar. Take the case of the number of news reports about 254 judgments and 4012 orders by the 2-judge bench headed by outgoing Chief Justice of the High Court during his tenure during January 7, 2026-May 13, 2026. The news papers did not report about almost all of them. The content analysis will also reveal that the legal journalists do not report about Reportable Judgments by the High Court in diverse areas of law. They do not inform their readers about the rate of judgments delivered by each judge, the rate of judgments upheld by 2-judge bench and the Supreme Court and the rate of judgments and orders by the High Court which get appealed in the Supreme Court. They do not report about the number judgments and orders deemed news worthy in a year.The rigorous reporting of some of the judgments by digital legal journalists exposes the lackadaisical approach of legal journalists who do reporting for newspapers.

A careful scrutiny will reveal out of 254 judgments by the bench headed by outgoing Chief Justice of the High Court, only minuscule number cases were actually attended by journalists and very few were reported. A number of newspapers have not covered several benches of the High Court for several years. It is also a fact that the exorbitant costs of court transcripts is a barrier for undertaking rigorous reporting of the court proceedings. There is a compelling need to ensure that court transcripts and the full text of the petitions are more accessible to the journalists and the public because sunlight is the best disinfectant.

As per information available on the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), as on March 25, 2026, the number of cases pending for more than 3 years in the lower courts of Bihar are 24,93,657, which are approximately 67% of the total pending cases in Bihar i.e. 37,11,288. Out of every 100 new cases, only 55 are being cleared.

As of May 15, 2026, there are 36 lakh pending cases in the courts in all the districts of Bihar. For example, in Patna and  Bhojpur,  4,60,750 cases and 1,07,645 cases are waiting.

The pendency of cases in courts arose due to several factors besides availability of adequate number of judges and judicial officers. These factors include complexity of the facts involved, nature of evidence, co-operation of stakeholders, viz., bar, investigation agencies, witness and litigants, besides the availability of physical infrastructure, supporting court staff, etc.The legal journalists reporting for newspapers in Bihar have failed to report about these factors.

As per the information available on the Nyaya Vikas Portal 2.0, as on March 25, 2026, there were 364 vacant posts of judges in the subordinate courts of Bihar out of the total sanctioned strength of 2025 which is about 17.9% while at the national level 4,887 posts are vacant out of the total sanctioned strength of 25,902 posts which is 18.86%. In its 120th report (1987), the Law Commission of India recommended that the State should increase the present ratio from 10.5 Judges per million of Indian population to at least 50 Judges per million of Indian population. In Imtiyaz Ahmed vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2012), the Supreme Court had asked the Law Commission of India to evolve a method for scientific assessment of the number of additional courts required to clear the backlog of cases. In 245th Report (2014), the Law Commission observed that filing of cases per capita varies substantially across geographical units as filings are associated with economic and social conditions of the population. As such the Law Commission did not consider the judge population ratio to be a scientific criterion for determining the adequacy of the judge strength in the country. The Law Commission found the “Rate of Disposal” method i.e. to calculate the number of additional judges required to clear the backlog of cases as well as to ensure that new backlog is not created to be more pragmatic and useful.

In August 2014, the Supreme Court asked the National Court Management System Committee (NCMS Committee) to examine the recommendations made by the Law Commission and to furnish its recommendations in this regard. NCMS Committee submitted its report to the Supreme Court in March, 2016. The report observed that in the long term, the judge strength of the subordinate courts will have to be assessed by a scientific method to determine the total number of “Judicial Hours” required for disposing of the case load of each court. In the interim, the Committee has proposed a “weighted” disposal approach i.e. disposal weighted by the nature and complexity of cases in local conditions.

As per the direction of the Supreme Court in its order dated January 2, 2017, the Department of Justice had forwarded a copy of interim report of the NCMS Committee to all the State Governments and High Courts to enable them to take follow up action to determine the required strength of district and subordinate judiciary. The judge-to-population ratio in the District and subordinate courts of Bihar is 19.45.

The Supreme Court by its order passed in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) vs U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors. (2007) provided timelines, which was required to be followed by the States and the respective High Courts for recruitment of judges in District and Subordinate Courts but the same has not been adhered to in Bihar. Most legal journalists have remained silent about it.  

Colossal failure: Non-reporting about deficiency in judicial infrastructure   

The construction work of buildings for advocates in all 38 districts and 101 sub-divisions remains incomplete. They are crying for adequate budgetary allocation in each budget for repair of old buildings, construction of new buildings, provision of library, electronic equipment, separate toilets for male and female advocates, witnesses in all district civil courts and sub-divisional courts.

In Ramakant Sharma vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), High Court's Infrastructure Bench comprising Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Mohit Kumar Shah passed an order dated May 14, 2026, wherein it recorded that Thiyagarajan S.M., the District Magistrate, Patna informed the Court that for construction of lawyers’ hall, digital computer room and toilet complex, a piece and parcel of land has been identified within the civil court premises at Barh. After joint inspection of the same by the officers of the Government and the Principal District Judge, Patna, the land has been found suitable. He has informed that no objection letter is to be received from the Principal District Judge, Patna, whereafter further progress shall be made. It has been further informed that for Patna City (Patna) also, a suitable piece of land has been identified and today itself, there will be a meeting with the Principal District Judge, Patna with whom after discussion, further steps shall be taken towards the construction of lawyers’ hall and other related amenities." The Court's order reads:"We expect that the District Magistrate, Patna shall take keen interest in the matter and with his efforts, the construction work of lawyers’ hall at Barh as well as Patna City should start at the earliest. All concerned stake holders, including the Secretary, Department of Building Construction, and the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of Bihar must co-operate in the matter." The order also noted that out of ten districts it was examining, in nine districts the land for construction of lawyers’ hall and related amenities are still not available. Regarding Gaya Ji, it was stated that a government land has been identified and a lay out plan has been demanded from the Chief Architect, Building Construction Department.

On May 15, 2026, the Court recorded that regarding construction of lawyers’ hall and other amenities at Kahalgaon, Dr. Nawal Kishor Choudhary, the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur has assured the Court he will find out suitable piece of land in consultation with the Principal District Judge, Bhagalpur and other stakeholders. The Court directed the District Magistrate and the Principal District Judge, Bhagalpur to sit together with all the stakeholders, identify the land and send an appropriate proposal to the Law Department within one month from May 15 and let a report in this regard be submitted to this Court by June 22, 2026.

Sahila, the District Magistrate, Buxar informed the court that she has found a suitable place for construction of lawyers’ hall and other amenities as required, in consultation with the Principal District Judge, Buxar. The proposal is yet to be sent to the Law Department. The Court's order reads: "We expect that the District Magistrate and the Principal District Judge, Buxar both shall sit together within a period of one week from May 15, 2026 and take an appropriate decision with regard to the suitability of the land for construction of lawyers’ hall and other amenities. A proposal in this regard be sent to the Law Department within one month from today. A report be submitted to this Court by 22nd June, 2026.”

Navin Kumar, the District Magistrate, Khagaria informed the court that the lawyers’ hall is to be constructed in place of the existing old lawyers’ hall after demolition. Earlier, a proposal was sent but the Chief Architect, Building Construction Department was of the opinion that the land was not suitable but according to the District Magistrate, Khagaria, this land is very much suitable and he would send a fresh measurement of the land to the Executive Engineer, Khagaria Division. The High Court had also called upon the District Magistrate, Khagaria to discuss the matter with the local Bar Associations in presence of the Principal District Judge, Khagaria so that the old lawyers’ hall may be demolished without any hindrance and construction of a new lawyers’ hall with all amenities may proceed.

Ravi Parkash, the District Magistrate, Nawada informed that earlier correspondences were made with BSRTC and the Transport Department to make available some portion of the land belonging to BSRTC which is adjacent to the Civil Court Premises of Nawada but that could not bear fruit. The Court had requested the District Magistrate, Nawada to discuss the matter with the MD, BSRTC in this regard. If the land is lying idle and for last 3 years, no work has been done over that land by the BSRTC, the BSRTC may be requested to part with certain portion of the land in order to provide some expansion to the Civil Court Premises. The Court directed that let a comprehensive report in this regard be submitted to this Court after holding a discussion with MD,  BSRTC within one month from May 15, 2026. In the meantime, the suitability of the land for the Civil Court Campus at Patna-Ranchi Road NH-20 be also considered and a decision may be taken in this regard by the stakeholders. A suitable decision be taken at the District Level Infrastructure Committee of the District Court, Nawada.

In Based on the order dated 21.08.2019 passed in Cr. Misc. 28530 of 2019 Bihar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026). the High Court's Infrastructure Bench comprising Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Mohit Kumar Shah passed a detailed order dated May 15, 2026 directing DMs and the concerned Secretaries of the State government to ensure construction of courts in the districts at the earliest after recording their submissions.

Tanai Sultania, District Magistrate, Bhojpur informed the Court that "presently no government land is available in the vicinity of the Civil Court, Ara for construction of Excise Court. The District Magistrate has assured this Court that a suitable piece of land measuring 10 acres has been identified for construction of a new civil court campus. A suitability report with regard to the said land has been provided. He has submitted that construction of civil court campus will take some substantial time. For the present, he proposes to construct Excise Court nearby the civil court campus, if required by acquiring private raiyati land or by taking a suitable building premises on hire basis." The order recorded that the District Magistrate, Bhojpur has assured the Court that he will advertise for expression of interest shortly within a week." Although more than one week has passed, the legal journalists of the newspapers are yet to report as to whether the promised expression of interest has been advertised.

Vinod Duhan, the District Magistrate, Araria informed the Court that for construction of Excise Court in Araria, "38 decimals of government land has been identified. A letter has been written to the Water Resources Department to give ‘no objection’ so that steps for transfer of the land in favour of the Court be taken. He has submitted that reminder has also been sent to the Water Resources Department in this regard." The Court directed the Secretary, Water Resources Department "to immediately take appropriate decision to issue ‘no objection’ for the purpose of transfer of the land so that the construction of Excise Court may start in Araria. It is recorded only for understanding of the stake holders that it is an obligation of the State to provide Exclusive Excise Court as per the mandate under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. Let such decision be taken within two weeks. On receipt of ‘no objection certificate’, further steps shall be taken to construct the court building."

So far the legal journalists not reported as to why Secretary, Water Resources Department has not issued ‘no objection’ for the purpose of transfer of the land so that the construction of Excise Court may start in Araria. Is it not dereliction of duty?

Abhilasha Sharma, the District Magistrate, Aurangabad informed the Court that "40 decimals of suitable land has been found for construction of Excise Court building within the premises of the Civil Court, Aurangabad. She has further informed this Court that by tomorrow, new proposal will be sent to the Law Department for further steps." The Court's order reads: "Let the proposal be sent to the Law Department to do the needful whereafter the Law Department shall process the file with all other stake holders and proceed towards construction of Excise Court building. Let a report in this regard be submitted to this Court by the Law Department before the next date of listing" on 25th of June, 2026.

Shrikant Shastree, the District Magistrate, Begusarai informed the Court that "search for suitable land for construction of premises is on and a committee has been constituted for this purpose and very soon a suitable piece of land for the civil court is likely to be identified. As regards, Excise Court building, he has informed that for the present, he is not able to trace the suitable piece of land as it is a township and there is dense population." The court recorded: "Perhaps suitable place is not available but the District Magistrate has assured that he will go for hiring a suitable building nearby the civil court premises for running the Excise Court. He prays for a month’s time to go for advertisement etc. for hiring suitable building." The Court allowed one month to do that and directed that a report in this regard be submitted to this Court showing compliance after a month.

Taranjot Singh, the District Magistrate, Bettiah informed that "a suitable piece of land for construction of Excise Court building has been identified but the said land belongs to Bettiah Estate. To proceed further with the said land, he has to make certain compliances with the Rules for that purpose. He is preparing the proposal and the same will be sent to the Law Department." The Court recorded that "The Secretary, Law Department, Government of Bihar is present online. He has assured the Court to go through the entire matter and take suitable steps towards making the things clear for construction of Excise building at Bettiah." The Court directed that "a comprehensive report be filed before this Court within a month by the Law Secretary."

Dr. Nawal Kishor Choudhary, the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur informed the Court that "the work of Excise Court building is likely to be finished within a month. He has assured that when the building would be made functional, all encroachments in and around the campus shall be removed." The  Court sought an updated report in this regard within six weeks from May 15, 2026.

Sahila, the District Magistrate, Buxar informed that construction work of the Excise Court is complete but to make it functional certain requirements like generator set, furniture and other amenities are required to be installed. She informed that sanction has been sought for in this regard from the Building Construction Department and the same is pending at the level of Chief Engineer of the Department. The Court's order recorded that Rajesh Kumar Singh, the Additional Secretary, Building Construction Department was present in the Court who has assured that "he would place the matter to the notice of the Chief Engineer and will get it done within a period of 15 days from today whereafter the same will be sent to the Law Department for sanction. He has assured that he will get the demand approved and the same will be sent to the Law Department for sanction." The Court directed the Chief Engineer of the Department to send the approval immediately to the Law Department and the Law Department, in turn, will do the needful granting sanction at the earliest opportunity. We expect that Excise Court be made functional within a month from May 15, 2026.

Vaibhava Srivastava, the District Magistrate, Chapra informed that "a suitable piece of land for construction of the Excise Court has already been identified. The estimate is under preparation at the level of Building Construction Department." The Court's order recorded  that the Additional Secretary, Building Construction Department submitted that within a week, estimates shall be prepared and the same shall be sent to the Law Department for administrative approval." The Court directed the Building Construction Department to prepare the estimate/proposal and send to the Law Department for administrative approval. The Law Department shall do the needful expeditiously and inform this Court within one month from May 15, 2026.

Pawan Kumar Sinha, the District Magistrate, Gopalganj informed that "a suitable piece of land has been identified for construction of Excise Court building and within 15 days from today, he will get all the formalities done at various levels and a proposal in this regard shall be sent to the Law Department." The Court directed that it should be done at the earliest. The Law Department shall take up this matter immediately after receipt of the proposal. Progress made in this regard be informed to this Court within a month.

Sanjay Kumar, A.D.M, Vaishali at Hajipur informed that "a suitable piece of land admeasuring 15 acres for construction of civil court campus at Hajipur has been identified. A proposal for acquisition of land is being prepared and the same will be sent to the Law Department within a period of 15 days" from May 15, 2026. The Court also informed that "for construction of Excise Court building also a suitable piece of land has been identified and a proposal in this regard is being sent to the Law Department within 15 days." The Court took the statement on record and directed that "On receipt of the proposal, the Law Department shall act suitably and will do the needful at the earliest opportunity. Compliance report be sent to this Court within three weeks."

Regarding Excise Court building at Jamui, the Additional Secretary, Building Construction Department informed the Court that even as the work order was issued on July 24, 2024, there was some delay in start of the work due to encroachment. Now, the work has started and it is likely to be finished by end of this year. The Court directed the Department to continue with the ongoing construction work and try to complete it as early as possible. Let a report in this regard be submitted to this Court with the progress made in the construction work after two months.

Alankrita Pandey, the District Magistrate, Jehanabad was directed to inform the Court as to when the Excise Court building is going to be handed over to the Court. If there is any requirement to make it functional, the same be brought to the notice of the Building Construction Department at the earliest and on receipt of such requirement the Building Construction Department will do the needful to facilitate the early opening of the Excise Court building. Compliance report be sent to this Court within a month.

Vishal Raj, the District Magistrate, Kishanganj informed that "a suitable piece of land for construction of Excise Court has already been identified. He has stated that a proposal has been sent to the Law Department in August, 2024." The Court directed that the Law Secretary, Government of Bihar should take note of it.

Anand Sharma, the District Magistrate, Madhubani has informed that "a suitable piece of land has been identified and a proposal in this regard has been sent to the Law Department today itself vide Memo No.1281 dated 15.05.2026. As soon as the Law Department grants its approval to the said piece of land, the matter shall be referred to the Building Construction Department for further action." The Court's order reads: "We call for an updated report from the Law Department and the Building Construction Department in this regard before the next date of listing" on June 25, 026.

Subrat Kumar Sen, the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur informed that "at Muzaffarpur, no suitable piece of land has been made available for construction of Excise Court Building." The Court's order reads: "The District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur is directed to look into the matter and take expeditious steps in consultation with the Principal District Judge, Muzaffarpur to find out a suitable piece of land and inform this Court on the next date of listing. Information in this regard be sent to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur by the learned Standing Counsel-11 for the State."

Kundan Kumar, the District Magistrate, Nalanda informed that "18 acres of land has been identified for civil court campus in Biharsharif. The Excise Court will also come within the civil court campus." The District Magistrate, Nalanda agreed for the present that he will go for finding out a suitable building/accommodation from where Excise Court may be run. The Court's order reads: "We grant him a month’s time to come out with advertisement for a suitable building on hire basis for running the Excise Court. Let a report in this regard be submitted by 22nd of June, 2026."

Ravi Parkash, the District Magistrate, Nawada informed that "a suitable piece of land has been identified and a proposal has already been sent to the Law Department in December, 2025. The Secretary, Law Department has informed this Court that the matter is presently pending at the end of the Principal District Judge, Nawada with regard to the suitability of the land." The Court directed the Principal District Judge, Nawada to take appropriate view of the matter and inform the Law Secretary preferably within a period of two weeks from may 15, 2026.

Udita Singh, the District Magistrate, Sasaram informed that "a suitable piece of land has been identified. The land belongs to the Water Resources Department, therefore she is making communication with that department for obtaining ‘no objection’." The Court's order reads: "We expect that communication shall be made immediately without losing further time and the Water Resources Department shall issue ‘no objection’ for construction of the Excise Court at the earliest. A comprehensive report in this regard be submitted to this Court by 22nd June, 2026."

Pratibha Rani, the District Magistrate, Sheohar informed that "a suitable piece of land for construction of Excise Court building has been identified and proposal with regard to the same has been sent to the Law Department through the Principal District Judge, Sheohar." The Court directed the Secretary, Law Department to look into the matter and do the needful towards further progress of the construction of Excise Court at Sheohar. A comprehensive report be submitted in this regard to this Court by 22nd of June, 2026.

Vivek Ranjan Maitrey, the District Magistrate, Siwan informed that "about 35 acres of land has been identified for construction of civil court campus and proposal for acquisition of land has been sent to the Law Department on 10th April, 2026." The Court directed that the Law Department should do the needful and expedite the process for acquisition. So far as Excise Court building is concerned, it has been agreed in course of interaction that the District Magistrate, Siwan shall go for hiring a suitable building/accommodation from where Excise Court may be run. For this purpose, he will come up with expression of interest at the earliest opportunity. We call for a report in this regard by 22nd of June, 2026.

Shekhar Anand, the District Magistrate, Sheikhpura informed that "construction work of Excise Court is going on. The work could start with some delay only because work order was issued by the Building Construction Department recently in the year 2026." He has informed that the building would be completed by February, 2027. The Court directed "the District Magistrate, Sheikhpura and the Secretary, Building Construction Department to ensure completion of the building at the earliest preferably by the end of this year. There is already significant delay in start of the work. An updated report showing progress in construction be submitted to this Court by 27th July, 2026.

The Court also directed the Registrar General, Patna High Court "to call for a report from all the Principal District Judges of the Districts across the State with regard to the updated position of the construction of the Excise Court building and submit a report to this Court.

The legal journalists of state failed to seize the opportunity of reporting the state of infrastructural deficiency in almost all the districts of Bihar. The editors of these newspaper ought to seek a written explanation for such glaring failure on the part of the legal reporters who cover High Court. The submission of DMs in the Court and the coincidence use of similar language "land has been identified for construction of civil court" by most of the DMs is curious and remains newsworthy.

These glaring facts and data make the situation ripe for rigorous reporting of courts but legal journalists of the newspapers have failed to sense news in the dire situation about lack of human power and infrastructure for judges, advocates and litigants. Constitution of India promises “complete justice” to citizens but paucity of basic judicial infrastructure and human power delivers incomplete justice.  

Made-to-Order News

Financial constraints have led to practices such as "chequebook journalism," where some journalists accept payments for stories, quid pro quo assignments and gifts compromising objectivity. "Brown envelope journalism" is prevalent, with some reporters allegedly accepting cash due to low salaries, undermining the credibility of an independent press. The brown envelope is non-transparent. They are practicing embedded journalism.   

By now it has emerged that “Paid News” is not about corruption of individual rogue journalists, it is about internalizing the abnormal as normal, immoral as moral and decline in journalistic practice as natural and innocent. Most legal journalists in Bihar do not report adequately about it due myriad constraints.

In Dr. Ranganathan Rajya Pustakalaya Samiti & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench  of Chief Justice Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar delivered an elaborate order on May 15, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"In the eyes of the law, a vacant librarian post, especially in a University is not merely an administrative oversight; it is seen as a functional breakdown in the "administration of justice" and the "academic health" of an institution. The vacancy of a librarian is not an administrative choice but a failure of the State's duty to provide the necessary infrastructure for education and justice. In the absence of a Librarian, physical collection of books deteriorate without proper preservation protocols, reference services remain absent, institutional subscriptions to journals and databases are not procured, managed, or optimised, and no systematic weeding or collection takes place.. The order was authored by the outgoing chief justice who is retiring on June 4, 2026. The case will now be heard by the next chief justice. The High Court's order dated March 25, 2026 revealed that the post of 289 librarian in various higher educational institutions in the State of Bihar have remained unfilled since 1990. .A copy of the datasheet was furnished to P.K Shahi the Advocate General, who sought some time to obtain instruction. Advocate General sought adjournment on April 30, 2026 and prayed for a short adjournment on May 6, 2026 to ensure filing of a supplementary counter affidavit bringing on record necessary facts. The case was filed on December 17, 2020 and registered on January 23, 2021. Significantly, five chief justices, namely, Justices Sanjay Karol, K. Vinod Chandran, Vipul Manubhai Pancholi, P.B. Bajanthri and now Sahoo heard the case since June 2021 but the posts of the librarians have not been filled up. Almost all the legal journalists failed to report about it.  

It is evident that advocates are not trained to be journalists. They suffer from poverty of journalistic imagination. It is high time they desist from riding two horses and doing great disservice to both the professions and to the cause of journalism and justice.     

Dr. Gopal Krishna

(The author is a practicing advocate and a researcher of philosophy, mass communication and law. He is an ex-Fellow, Berlin-based International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC).)

Source: Jan Media Journal