Condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant the State, delay is owing to administrative difficulties would be impermissible: Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Kumar Mainsh

In The Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railway, Hazipur Bihar & Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Pvt. Ltd. through its Authorized representative Sri Arjun Rajput (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Kumar Manish delivered a 13-page long judgement, dated June 25, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered opinion that the learned District Judge is correct in taking a view that the miscellaneous arbitration application preferred by the present appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. In view of the clear mandate of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the learned Court could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of three months. Thus, no illegality or infirmity may be found in the impugned order. 16. This appeal fails." The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad.  

The judgement was delivered upon hearing a commercial appeal which had been preferred seeking setting aside of the order dated August 17, 2023 passed by the District Judge, Patna in a Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case  (Union of India through the General Manager, East Central Railways, Hazipur, Bihar and Anr. vs. M/s. Oberoi Thermit Private Limited) whereby and whereunder the District Judge had dismissed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the Act of 1996’ as amended upto date) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed on behalf of the petitioners-respondents for setting aside the arbitral award dated December 14, 2021 passed by a sole Arbitrator in a Arbitration Case of 2019 which arose out of Request Case of 2019. 

The application was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the arbitral award was rejected on the ground of the same being hopelessly barred by limitation. The Sheristedar’s report was that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the application. 

An application seeking condonation of delay was filed. It was pointed out to the trail court that due to the COVID period delay was caused in preparation of the draft and its approval. It was submitted that after taking approval and sanction from the competent authority of the Railways, the matter was sent to Railway Lawyers for drafting the challenge petition in May, 2022 and the department was waiting for the final drafting of the petition. It was also stated that the counsel for the East Central Railways was delisted from its panel by the order of Ministry of Law and Justice and thereafter the deponent assigned the work to one of the learned Standing Government Counsel after approval of the same from the competent authority. It was finally submitted that the Supreme Court had also given a direction to condone the delay, if any, and after March 1, 2022, there was a delay of only 89 days in filing of the present application.

The District Judge had taken note of report of Sheristedar which showed that there was a delay of 222 days in filing of the present case. The Court had also taken note of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and held that the delay of 222 days in filing of the case cannot be condoned. 

The counsel for the appellants argued before the High Court that the District Judge, Patna had not considered the order passed by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court during the COVID period in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 in which the period between March 15, 2020 and February 28, 2022 had been excluded in reckoning of the period of limitation. It was submitted that the trail court had merely considered the Sheristedar’s report and based on that the impugned order was passed. The impugned order suffers from non-consideration of the materials, therefore, it was liable to be set aside.

The counsel for the respondent submitted that on a bare perusal of the impugned order it was evident that the District Judge had duly considered the scope and ambit of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. So far as Sheristedar’s report is concerned, there was no contest that the appeal was filed on October 22, 2022 for setting aside of the arbitral award delivered on December 14, 2021. It was submitted that if the overall period is computed, the Sheristedar’s report was correct. So far as the COVID period was concerned, no doubt the District Judge had not specifically taken note of the said report in the impugned order but that would not make any change in the opinion of the court and the same would be totally irrelevant so far as the present case is concerned. Even if the period between December 14, 2021 and February 28, 2022 was excluded in reckoning the period of limitation, the fact remains that the application under Section 34(1) was preferred after eight months. The District Judge could not have condoned the delay of more than 30 days from the date of expiry of the period of limitation i.e. three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award by the party making the application.

Justice Prasad observed:"The facts are not in dispute. The arbitral award has been delivered on 14.12.2021. It is not the case of the appellant that the Award was served on the appellant on any other date. Thus, the period of limitation of three months for filing of an application under Section 34(1) of the Act of 1996 would have expired on 14th March, 2022. By virtue of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 03 of 2020 the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 were liable to be excluded. In this case, the last date for filing of the application under subsection (1) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was due to expire on 14th March, 2022. The period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are liable to be excluded for the purpose of filing of the application.  10. The application was not filed within a period of three months even if the period between 14th December, 2021 and 15th March, 2022 are excluded, still on showing sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the prescribed period of limitation, the appellant would have got a condonation of another thirty days. Unfortunately, the appellant being such a big organisation having battery of lawyers, law officers and the senior officers dealing with the matter did not take care of the period of limitation and the mandatory nature of subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. They have to blame themselves for this gross negligence on their part in not attending their matter within time. 

This is not the solitary case in which such inordinate delay has taken place. It is for the Railways to set their house in order and the means and ways by which it is to be taken care of or the responsibilities are to be fixed are in the domain of Railways." 

Sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 reads: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).(2) …...(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

Justice Prasad relied on the two judgments of theSupreme Court on this issue. In Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 2 SCC 455, the Supreme Court has held that condonation of delay beyond a period of limitation, even when applicant is the State and delay is owing to the administrative difficulties would be impermissible and in such cases, there would be no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It reads: “11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the extension of the prescribed period for any appeal or application subject to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to an application challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This has been settled by this Court in its decision in  Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein it held as follows : (SCC pp. 474-75, paras 12 &14) “12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of of interpretation would justify such a result. 

The history and scheme of the 1996 Act supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with the “exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide” in a court without jurisdiction, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions. The question whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been answered by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169. 

Supreme Court observed:“23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the 1996 Act, this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 ofthe 1996 Act, more particularly where no provision is to be found in the 1996 Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the 1996 Act would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside an arbitral award.”

Justice Prasad observed: "14. The position of law is well settled with respect to the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. By applying the facts of the present case to the well-settled position of law, we need to assess whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in condoning the delay for filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.”

In Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470, the Supreme Court has held that the application challenging the award filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would not be an application “in accordance with” subsection (3) as required under Section 34(1).

Justice Prasad concluded: 13. This Court has discussed both the judgments with the learned counsel for the appellant. Even as we have noticed that in its application under Section ‘5’ of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed before the learned District Judge, the appellant took a plea that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed for condonation of delay, if any, we are of the view that the blanket plea taken by the appellant before the learned District Judge has no basis to stand."

Period for limitation would be counted from the date of grant of probate: Patna High Court

In Gupteshwar Prasad vs. Dina Nath Prasad (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anshuman as part of the Division Bench along with Justice Bibek Chaudhary delivered a 29-page long judgment dated December 18, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable on application for issuance Probate/Letters of Administration and application for revocation of Probate/Letters of Administration. An application for issuance of probate/letters of administration under Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not create any absolute bar; rather it confers a continuous right, which may be exercised at any time after the death of the deceased as long as right to do so survives. But, Article 137 creates a situation wherein a delay beyond three years after death of the deceased give rise to suspicion, and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. But such delay must be explained in accordance with the provisions laid down in Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. But, on the other hand, application for cancellation or revocation for grant of probate/letters of administration shall create absolute bar if the concerned party does not approach the court of law within the period of limitation, and the period of limitation shall be counted from the date of grant of probate due to the reason that the grant of probate by a competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate or Will is granted, such probate is good with respect to parties to the proceeding as well as for the whole world. The reference is hereby answered. 15. After answering the reference it shall be appropriate for this Court to direct the office to place all the first appeals before appropriate Bench for consideration on merit." 

Justice Dr. Anshuman relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lynette Fernandes vs. Gertie Mathias, (2018) 1 SCC 271 ::2018 (1) BLJ 92 (SC), wherein it dealt with the precise issue of the period of limitation applicable for an application for cancellation of a probate or letters of administration. This court held as follows:
"One must keep in mind that the grant of probate by a Competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceedings, but against the world. If the probate is granted, the same operates from the date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of limitation Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceedings for revocation of probate. In this matter, as mentioned supra, the Appellant was a minor at the time of grant of probate. She attained majority on 09.09.1965. She got married on 27.10.1965. In our considered opinion, three years limitation as prescribed Under Article 137 runs from the date of the Appellant attaining the age of majority i.e. three years from 09.09.1965. The Appellant did not choose to initiate any proceedings till the year 25.01.1996 i.e., a good 31 years after she attained majority. No explanation worthy of acceptance has been offered by the Appellant to show as to why she did not approach the Court of law within the period of limitation. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the Appellant failed to produce any evidence to prove that the Will was a result of fraud or undue influence. The same Will has remained unchallenged until the date of filing of application for revocation. No acceptable explanation is offered for such a huge delay of 31 years in approaching the Court for cancellation or revocation of grant of probate.

In paragraph-17 of the said judgment it has been held that the petition for revocation of letters of
administration was time barred. Upon bare reading of the above mentioned discussion of all the decisions, particularly, three Judges Bench, it transpires to us that the following types of petitions are filed under the Succession Act, particularly, relating to issuance of probate/letters of administration:
I. Application for issuance of probate;
II. Application for issuance of letters of administration;
III. Application for revocation of probate;
IV. Application for revocation of letter of administration;

Dr. Anshuman observed:"14. So far as the right to apply for probate accrues on the date of death of testator, the application for grant of probate or letters of administration is not an application in law, but is an application for grant of probate or letters of administration for the Court’s permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trusty. It is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed. So far as the restriction casted in the judgment of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) and Krishna Kumar Sharma (supra), it is only to the extent that Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall not create any absolute bar on an application for grant of probate or letters of administration; rather it is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after death of the deceased as long as the right to do so survives. Delay beyond three years after death of the deceased would create suspicion, and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. Such delay must be explained but cannot be equated with an absolute bar of limitation and once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. But Hon’ble three Judges Bench in Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat (supra) creates absolute bar in filing of an application for cancellation or revocation for grant of probate. If the concerned party does not approach the court of law within the period of limitation, then, according to law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petition for revocation of letters of administration would be time barred and period for limitation would be counted from the date of grant of probate, as the grant of probate by a competent Court operates as a judgment in rem. Once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceeding but also against the world at large and if probate is granted, the same operates from the date of grant of probate for the purpose of limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceeding for revocation of probate as held in Lynette Fernandes (supra)." 

Notably, the First Appeal was filed in 2001 against the Judgment and decree dated June 22, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Gopalganj, in a Title Suit of 1987. First Appeal was filed against the judgment and decree dated June 22, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Gopalganj, in Probate Case of 1997 and First Appeal of 2003 was filed against the judgment and decree dated May 28, 2003 passed in the Title Suit of 1992, which arose out of Probate case of 1990 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Buxar, by which the suit was allowed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by granting probate to the defendant-appellant. 

Consequent thereupon, the matter relating to date of reckoning, needs authoritative adjudication in consonance with the event of accrual of cause of action and found plausible in view of Section 211(2) as well as 213 of the Act and for that question was formulated in a 27-page long order dated February 27, 2020 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi, the Single Bench. The formulated question reads:“What would be meaning of accrual of cause of action for the purpose of reckoning the period in the background of intricacies having been referred hereinabove in the context of principle laid down by the Apex Court as referred hereinabove relating to applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 relating to a petition for probate/letter of administration?”.

The question which was framed and the matter was placed before the Division Bench after taking permission of the Chief Justice, these appeals came before the Division Bench for answering those questions of reference, which was acknowledged in order by the Division  Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman dated November 17, 2025 that is to say applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as well as relating to the starting point of applicability in a petition for probate/letters of administration under Indian Succession Act. This order was authored by Justice Chaudhary, who noted that Justice Trivedi, the Single Bench had referred the matter on the question of applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act relating to the starting point of applicability in a petition for probate/letters of administration under Indian Succession Act. 

The First Appeal was filed and registered in the High Court on August 30, 2001.  

Supreme Court asks Registry to circulate its judgment on "limitation period" to all High Courts

''261....we deem  it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." 

-Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (2025), September 12, 2025

In Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered a 170-page long judgment, wherein, it held that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the delay must be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. The judgement was authored by Justice Pardiwala. It held this in a civil appeal filed against the judgment by the Karnataka High Court, which had condoned the delay of 3966 days in preferring the Second Appeal against the First Appellate Court’s Judgment. In conclusion, it directed: "Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts."

Supreme Court observed, “… as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days.” 

The judgment observed that the power that the court exercises in condoning the delay, is not for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation and this is because, during the prescribed period of limitation, the litigant is entitled, as a matter of right, to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, and the courts cannot object or refuse to admit the same. 

The facts of the case is that a parcel of land was originally owned and possessed by the appellant’s father and after his demise, some disputes arose between the legal heirs including the appellant and another person namely C. Patil, which led to the institution of the Partition Suit in 1971. During the pendency of the said suit, Patil purportedly donated 4 acres out of the land which was the subject matter of the suit to the Government of Karnataka. Pursuant to that Karnataka Housing Board/KHB, the respondent housing corporation sometime in the year 1979 took over the possession of the land for the purpose of establishing a housing colony. In 1989, a compromise decree was passed in the suit whereby the appellant became the absolute owner of the land. However, since the possession of the land was not reverted to the appellant, one another suit was instituted and this time against the respondent, praying for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land.  

Notably, the first appellate court had allowed the appellant’s appeal and decreed the suit in his favour. However, it declined to grant relief of possession in view of the fact that substantial construction had already been undertaken on the land by the respondent, and thus, instead directed the grant of compensation to the Appellant. Since no action was taken by the respondent in accordance with decree, the Appellant initiated execution proceedings in 2011. 

Later, a second appeal was preferred in 2017 along with an application for condonation of delay of 3966 days, which was allowed by the High Court. The appellant was before the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court noted, “As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 

The court said that in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd (1962), the fixation that “within such period” covers only the period from the last day of limitation till the actual date of filing, does not appear to be supported either by the bare text of the provision or by the mere omission of an express contextual concomitant, in the form of any parameters to avert to any inaction, negligence or lack of diligence of a litigant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that could be suggestive of the legislative intent to avoid applicability of such parameters for the condonation of delay thereunder. “… it is clear that the period which is being effectively extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause” that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has to be shown for the duration covered by the expression “within such period”, nowhere does the provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “sufficient cause” is demonstrated”. 

The court explained that while the expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with the manner in which the Court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period which the Court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative. 

The court observed that the delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence and in certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour and supported by material. It added that conversely, an unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to indulgence. 

The Court recorded: “The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the cause. The law are independent and diverse factors. Hence the extent of delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay”. 

The court remarked that while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not in empty form and this ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants. “However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny”. 

The court also noted that the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with? 

The court said that the appellate court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a finding based on its likes or dislikes and the true test is to see, if it had been up to the Appellate Court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were fulfilled or not. “If the ingredients of the provision is found to not have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the order of the court below”. 

The court was of the view that the delay cannot be condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering and such by no stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act. 

The judgement reads" “The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order”. 

The court observed that the High Court committed an error in condoning a delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the first appellate court. 

The judgement also observed:“We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause." 

But in the present case, the court was ''not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court”. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s Judgment, imposed an additional cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the respondent, and directed the registry to circulate one copy each of the judgment to all the High Courts.

Positive exercise of discretion for condonation of delay should not be normally disturbed by superior court: Supreme Court

In Principal Secretary Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Punam Kumari Sharma & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Khatim Reza condoned the delay in filing the memo of appeal in positive exercise of discretion in his judgement dated January 20, 2025. Punam Kumari Sharma from Muzaffarpur filed a Special Leave of Appeal (Civil) on February 14, 2025 in the Supreme Court. It was registered on February 27. The case was last listed on March 7, 2025 before Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and and Prashant Kumar Mishra. It is likely to be listed on April 8, 2024.

In his order, Justice Reza has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123, wherein it has been held as follows:-"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court." The other three appellants in the case are: Engineer in Chief Road Construction Department, Superintending Engineer Road Construction Department, Muzaffarpur and Executive Engineer Road Construction Department, Muzaffarpur. The two other respondents are: State of Bihar through District Collector, Muzaffapur and the Circle Officer, Kanti, Muzaffarpur. The case was filed and registered in the High Court on November 27, 2018.  

The following cases were relied upon by the counsels during the course of hearing in the High Court:

In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) decided on April 8, 2024 wherein in paragraph no. 26, the Supreme Court has held that “On a harmonious consideration of the provision of law and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:-

(i). Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii). A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii). The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;  

(iv). In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; 

(v). Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;  

(vi). Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii). Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii). Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

In Ajay Dabra vs. Pyare Ram reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 92, Supreme Court has held as follows:-"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: 'The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the 'sufficient cause' which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.'  Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party."

In Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, Supreme Court has held that “even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute.” 

In Municipal Council Ahmed Nagar & anr. vs. Shah Haidar Beg & Ors. reported in 2000 (2) SCC 48, the Supreme Court observed: "The real test for the sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the appellant so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the appellants have moved the writ court, the rights of third party have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” 

 Also read: Patna High Court's Division Bench sets aside judgement of High Court's Single Judge Bench on law of limitation on delay