Supreme Court asks Registry to circulate its judgment on "limitation period" to all High Courts

''261....we deem  it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law." 

-Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (2025), September 12, 2025

In Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered a 170-page long judgment, wherein, it held that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the delay must be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. The judgement was authored by Justice Pardiwala. It held this in a civil appeal filed against the judgment by the Karnataka High Court, which had condoned the delay of 3966 days in preferring the Second Appeal against the First Appellate Court’s Judgment. In conclusion, it directed: "Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts."

Supreme Court observed, “… as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days.” 

The judgment observed that the power that the court exercises in condoning the delay, is not for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation and this is because, during the prescribed period of limitation, the litigant is entitled, as a matter of right, to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, and the courts cannot object or refuse to admit the same. 

The facts of the case is that a parcel of land was originally owned and possessed by the appellant’s father and after his demise, some disputes arose between the legal heirs including the appellant and another person namely C. Patil, which led to the institution of the Partition Suit in 1971. During the pendency of the said suit, Patil purportedly donated 4 acres out of the land which was the subject matter of the suit to the Government of Karnataka. Pursuant to that Karnataka Housing Board/KHB, the respondent housing corporation sometime in the year 1979 took over the possession of the land for the purpose of establishing a housing colony. In 1989, a compromise decree was passed in the suit whereby the appellant became the absolute owner of the land. However, since the possession of the land was not reverted to the appellant, one another suit was instituted and this time against the respondent, praying for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land.  

Notably, the first appellate court had allowed the appellant’s appeal and decreed the suit in his favour. However, it declined to grant relief of possession in view of the fact that substantial construction had already been undertaken on the land by the respondent, and thus, instead directed the grant of compensation to the Appellant. Since no action was taken by the respondent in accordance with decree, the Appellant initiated execution proceedings in 2011. 

Later, a second appeal was preferred in 2017 along with an application for condonation of delay of 3966 days, which was allowed by the High Court. The appellant was before the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court noted, “As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 

The court said that in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd (1962), the fixation that “within such period” covers only the period from the last day of limitation till the actual date of filing, does not appear to be supported either by the bare text of the provision or by the mere omission of an express contextual concomitant, in the form of any parameters to avert to any inaction, negligence or lack of diligence of a litigant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that could be suggestive of the legislative intent to avoid applicability of such parameters for the condonation of delay thereunder. “… it is clear that the period which is being effectively extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause” that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has to be shown for the duration covered by the expression “within such period”, nowhere does the provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “sufficient cause” is demonstrated”. 

The court explained that while the expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with the manner in which the Court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period which the Court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative. 

The court observed that the delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence and in certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour and supported by material. It added that conversely, an unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to indulgence. 

The Court recorded: “The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the cause. The law are independent and diverse factors. Hence the extent of delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay”. 

The court remarked that while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not in empty form and this ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants. “However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny”. 

The court also noted that the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with? 

The court said that the appellate court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a finding based on its likes or dislikes and the true test is to see, if it had been up to the Appellate Court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were fulfilled or not. “If the ingredients of the provision is found to not have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the order of the court below”. 

The court was of the view that the delay cannot be condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering and such by no stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act. 

The judgement reads" “The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order”. 

The court observed that the High Court committed an error in condoning a delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the first appellate court. 

The judgement also observed:“We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause." 

But in the present case, the court was ''not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court”. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s Judgment, imposed an additional cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the respondent, and directed the registry to circulate one copy each of the judgment to all the High Courts.

Supreme Court records "no one has put in appearance for State of Bihar" in Priyanka Kumari & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025)

In Priyanka Kumari & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Justices Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan passed a 2-page long order dated July 22, 2025, wherein it recorded:"The matter was taken up twice but no one has put in appearance for State of Bihar....Let the date of hearing of the present petitions be notified to the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar." Now the matter is listed for hearing on August  12, 2025. The case arose out of 9-page long judgment dated April 11, 2019 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Amreshwar Pratap Sahi and Justice Anjana Mishra. The judgement was authored by Justice Sahi which affirmed 20 page long judgement dated February 22, 2018 by Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay who had relied on Supreme Court's "principle of useless formality theory in the matter of compliance of natural justice". 

Justice Upadhyay drew on para 17 of the judgment of the Court in the case of Canara Bank vs. V.K.Awasthy: (2005) 6 SCC 321 which reads: “17. What is known as `useless formality theory' has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1999] 6 SCC 237. It was observed as under: 22. "Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused  even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of `real substance' or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., [1971] 2 All ER 1278, HL (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University, [1971] 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, [1980] 2 All ER 368, CA and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates. Court, ex p. Fannaran, (1996) 8 Admn. LR 351, 358) See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be `demonstrable beyond doubt. that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, CA has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant, (1959) NZLR 1014 however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is `real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice.' On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40: [1963] 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees, [1969] 2 All ER 274 stating that there are always `open and shut cases. and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the `useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that `convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms' More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the `useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article `Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the `useless formality theory. has been made much earlier in `Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a `real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their `discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, [1996] 3 SCC 364 and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., [1996] 5 SCC 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. 23.We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the `useless formality theory' and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us,`admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."

The appellants had questioned the correctness of the dismissal judgment of the Single Judge dated 22nd February, 2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6827 of 2016 before the High Court's Division Bench in their appeal. The Single Judge had declined the claim of the appellants and their effort to save their employment on the strength of a degree awarded by the University of Technology and Science, Chhattisgarh.

The Single Judge relied on Supreme Court's decision in the case of Prof. Yashpal and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 420 which had arrived at the conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to the academic benefits of the said University which has been declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Court and therefore their employment on the basis of any degree by the University was rightly terminated.

The counsel for the appellants had urged that the very same judgment in para 64 and 65 indicated that the students’ career instead of being jeopardized should be revisited by the State Government in order to extend any benefit of affiliation or otherwise in order to sustain the career of such students who had been admitted in such Institutions. He submitted that this was a University created under an Act of the State Legislature, namely, Section 5 of the Chhatisgarh Viniyaman) Adhiniyam 2002 and therefore its existence cannot be doubted. The contention was that so far as the appellants were concerned, the legality of the establishment of the University or otherwise cannot be attributed to them for the purpose of virtually recalling the degrees already conferred on them by such University, inasmuch as, they had bona fidely pursued their studies and were awarded degrees which in the present case are degrees relating to Library Science on the basis whereof they were granted employment. It was their employment which was terminated on the ground of their degrees being invalid. It  was submitted that the declaration of law by the Supreme Court itself extended protection and issued directions to the State of Chhattisgarh for protecting the interest of students and their career. The contention, was that the appellants stand on a better footing, inasmuch as, they are students who had already been awarded degrees by the time the University was declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Apex Court. Consequently, any form of default on the part of the appellants who have pursued their academic career in this University cannot be a cause for recall of the employment which the appellants had been offered on the basis of a degree which otherwise was valid when it was granted. 

The Single Judge had recorded the findings and concluded that even assuming for the sake of arguments that the termination orders emanated without following any procedure of law and were in violation of principles of natural justice, relegating the matter back to the authorities for a decision afresh would be a useless formality, inasmuch as, on the admitted facts the degree on the basis of which the appellants had obtained employment was invalid and consequently all the appellants holding a degree, which was a nullity, cannot claim continuance in employment on the strength thereof. 

The counsel for the appellants had urged that the aspect with regard to any protection being given to such students who had already obtained degrees does not appear to have been negated by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Prof. Yashpal (supra) nor has the State Government of Chhatisgarh denied any such benefit. It is also submitted that even the learned Single Judge has not considered this aspect and, therefore, in the above background the termination of the employment of the appellants without following the due procedure of law cannot be justified. 

The counsel for the State of Bihar, had contended that an employment extended to the appellants on the basis of an academic degree which is a nullity cannot be sustained and any continuance thereof would be contrary to law. He submitted that it is in this background that the action was taken by the authorities and after having verified the status of the Institution the letter of the Deputy Director (Education) dated 19th May, 2009 was issued informing the authorities to take appropriate action in relation to the engagement of the appellants as well as such other similarly situate employees who had obtained degrees from such Institutions. 

The counsel for the appellants had urged that the said document indicated the name of the University which was not a correct name, and even otherwise there is an indication that the University is closed from 2005. It was submitted that the closure of the University was on account of the judgment of the Supreme Court and such a closure, therefore, does not eclipse or abrogate the degree obtained by the appellants from the University when it was in existence prior to that. Consequently, the said directions issued by the Deputy Director (Education) would not be applicable in a retrospective manner so as to take away any impact of a valid degree which otherwise was capable of being acknowledged as it had been conferred by the University that was created under a Statute. The University, therefore, was empowered to confer such a degree and consequently, the letter of the Deputy Director (Education) dated 19th May, 2009 does not take away the effect or nullify the effect of a degree already awarded by the University.

The High Court's Division Bench observed: "9. We have considered the entire arguments before us and we find that the Apex Court judgment in the case of Prof. Yashpal (supra) derecognises such Universities by declaring the provisions of the Act under which the University was established to be ultra vires. The birth of the University, therefore, having taken under Statute which was declared to be ultra vires, therefore, cannot allow the acknowledgment of a degree granted by such a University to be valid which has been declared to be non-existent. In our opinion, it would be paradoxical to recognize a degree of a University that has been declared to be non-existent on account of an invalid law under which the University itself was created. If the creation of the University itself was unlawful, then any degree conferred by such a University cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of a lawful employment. 10. We, therefore, do not find any error in the conclusion ultimately drawn by the learned Single Judge in declining to entertain the writ petition for grant of any such benefit. 11. There is, however, one argument which deserves mention, namely, the Apex Court in the judgment of Prof. Yashpal (supra) did not specifically declare any such degrees already conferred to be a nullity. To that extent, the appellants could have raised their grievances before the State of Chhattisgarh for extending such benefits, but in the present case what we find that neither the University Grants Commission nor the State of Chhattisgarh have been made party respondents on the basis whereof any such determination can be attempted by this Court in order to gather as to whether the appellants would be entitled to any such benefit or not. There is no indication in any of the documents filed that the State of Chhattisgarh had taken any steps for recognition of such degrees which virtually by operation of law and the declaration of law by the Supreme Court stood lapsed without there being any further action for reviving or acknowledging them as to be surviving for the purpose of any employment under the State."

The Division Bench of the High Court had concluded: "....we are unable to further probe on the issue so raised by the appellants with regard to the validity or otherwise of their degree and we leave it open to the appellants to claim any such benefit, if permissible in law, inasmuch as, the question of recognition of such a degree would not be open to be examined by us in view of what has been stated hereinabove. 13. The appeal, therefore, is accordingly consigned to records with the said observations." 

 

 

Positive exercise of discretion for condonation of delay should not be normally disturbed by superior court: Supreme Court

In Principal Secretary Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Punam Kumari Sharma & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Khatim Reza condoned the delay in filing the memo of appeal in positive exercise of discretion in his judgement dated January 20, 2025. Punam Kumari Sharma from Muzaffarpur filed a Special Leave of Appeal (Civil) on February 14, 2025 in the Supreme Court. It was registered on February 27. The case was last listed on March 7, 2025 before Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and and Prashant Kumar Mishra. It is likely to be listed on April 8, 2024.

In his order, Justice Reza has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123, wherein it has been held as follows:-"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court." The other three appellants in the case are: Engineer in Chief Road Construction Department, Superintending Engineer Road Construction Department, Muzaffarpur and Executive Engineer Road Construction Department, Muzaffarpur. The two other respondents are: State of Bihar through District Collector, Muzaffapur and the Circle Officer, Kanti, Muzaffarpur. The case was filed and registered in the High Court on November 27, 2018.  

The following cases were relied upon by the counsels during the course of hearing in the High Court:

In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) decided on April 8, 2024 wherein in paragraph no. 26, the Supreme Court has held that “On a harmonious consideration of the provision of law and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:-

(i). Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii). A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii). The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;  

(iv). In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; 

(v). Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;  

(vi). Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii). Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii). Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

In Ajay Dabra vs. Pyare Ram reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 92, Supreme Court has held as follows:-"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: 'The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the 'sufficient cause' which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature.'  Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party."

In Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, Supreme Court has held that “even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute.” 

In Municipal Council Ahmed Nagar & anr. vs. Shah Haidar Beg & Ors. reported in 2000 (2) SCC 48, the Supreme Court observed: "The real test for the sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the appellant so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the appellants have moved the writ court, the rights of third party have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” 

 Also read: Patna High Court's Division Bench sets aside judgement of High Court's Single Judge Bench on law of limitation on delay