"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court appoints Justice Gita Mittal, as a Mediator to bring about settlement between IPS officers, Pushkar Anand, Nirmala Kumari and "non-matching of horoscope"

In ABC vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated November 4, 2025, wherein it concluded:'' we appoint Hon’ble Justice Gita Mittal, Former Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court to act as a Mediator so as to bring about some settlement between the parties. The parties shall get in touch with the learned Mediator and work out the necessary modalities for the purpose of mediation. The fees of the learned Mediator and other modalities shall be fixed in consultation with the parties. It shall be open for the learned Mediator to talk to the parties either in person or through video conferencing. We firmly believe that it will be in the interest of the parties to put an end to this long drawn litigation....37. We are of the view that since the parties are to sit, talk and reach to an amicable settlement, the settlement should be as a whole. In other words, what we want to convey is that the settlement should be comprehensive. 8. List after receipt of the mediation report.''

The Court's order recorded that the petitioner before it, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The respondent No.2, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the District Superintendent of Police. Since both were posted at one station and were unmarried, they came close and developed intimacy for each other. However, later the relations went sour. This led to registration of a First Information Report for the offences alleged therein at the instance of the petitioner.

The Court observed: ''2. We take notice of the fact that the criminal proceedings ultimately came to be quashed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna vide the impugned judgment and dated 18th September, 2024. It is this order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings which has been made subject matter of challenge before us in the present Special Leave Petition.''

The Supreme Court noticed the fact that a coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court had suggested that the parties should amicably resolve the disputes. Almost 11 years have passed by. During the interregnum, the respondent No.2 got married and is now a father of two children. The petitioner remains a spinster. The order reads: ''Whatever might have happened in the past, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we believe that this legal battle with each other is not going to be in the interest of the parties. 24. We are informed that the petitioner is also now of a rank of Superintendent of Police. Both have a long service ahead. In pursuance of what fell from this Court earlier, the parties did try to talk but with no positive outcome.''  

Earlier, in Pushkar Anand vs. The State of Bihar & Nirmala Kumari, Sub Divisional Police Officer, Bhabua (2025), Kaimur Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh delivered a 19-page long judgement dated September  18, 2024. 

It recollected that petitioner had moved this Court for quashing F.I.R. of Mahila Police Station case of 2014 vide Cr. Misc. No. 17457/2016 but during its pendency, order taking cognizance for the offence punishable under sections 376(C),  354(B), 506 and 509 of Indian Panel Code, was passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kaimur at Bhabhua. Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2019 was filed in the said case (Cr. Misc. No. 17457/2016) challenging cognizance order, but Cr.Mis.No. 17457/2016 was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 17.10.2019. The petition in the High Court was directed against order dated 01.04.2019, passed in connection with Mahila Police Station Case No. 47 of 2014, by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM), Kaimur at Bhabhua in connection with Mahila P.S. case of 2014, by which cognizance has been taken for the offences punishable under sections 376(C), 354(B), 506, 509 I.P.C. against the petitioner as well as for a direction to the court below not to proceed further after passing of the aforesaid order taking cognizance during the pendency of the present application before the High Court. 

The prosecution case giving rise to the case was that the informant/ opposite party no.2 is the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Bhabhua. It was alleged by her that only two days after her joining to the post of SDPO, Bhabua, on July 21, 2014 the petitioner who was Superintendent of Police, Kaimur at Bhabua started extending a friendly hand towards the informant through Facebook and WhatsApp messages. Since, the informant was posted as Sub- divisional Police Officer, Bhabhua, she developed a firm belief that the petitioner was seriously interested in marriage with her and she started talking to her family members. It was also alleged that since the petitioner started frequenting her residence, she gradually developed a close relationship with him and, thereafter, they also came into physical contact. After sometime, informant was also asked by the mother of the petitioner to convey her date and time of her birth so that chances of matching of horoscope could be explored before solemnizing the marriage. It was during this period that the petitioner and the informant developed physical relations with each other and the intimacy continued till the day, when the petitioner refused proposal of marriage stating that the horoscope did not tally and she was having "Mangla-mangli Dosh". It was further alleged by the informant that on the pretext of marriage, the petitioner tortured her mentally and physically and when he threatened to spoil her career as a police officer in his official capacity, she lodged the present case. After institution of FIR, police completed investigation and submitted charge sheet dated November 30, 2018 for offences punishable under sections 376(C), 354A, 506 and 509 of the IPC against the petitioner only. Charge sheet was not submitted against father and mother of the petitioner as the allegation was found patently false and nothing could be found against them.

The counsel for the petitioner, while placing the facts of the case, denied the accusations made by opposite party no.2 against the petitioner. He submitted that the case was lodged by opposite party no.2 only as a vendetta to the petitioner's action in taking up disciplinary proceedings against the opposite party no.2. FIR was lodged on December 29, 2014 and just prior thereto on December 27, 2014, the petitioner as a Superintendent of Police, Kaimur at Bhabua had initiated disciplinary proceeding against her vide Letter No. 402 dated December 27, 2014. Consequently, faced with such a situation, she lodged the present case making malicious and baseless allegations against the petitioner with the sole intention of not only tarnishing his reputation, but also to ruin his career as an IPS Officer. During course of investigation, on January 2, 2015 opposite party no.2 was placed before a Medical Board and was examined at Sadar Hospital, Bhabua after taking her consent. Medical Board, after due examination of the informant, submitted its report in which allegation of sexual contact was not substantiated against the petitioner.  Meanwhile, petitioner preferred pre-arrest bail petition before the High Court vide Cr.Misc. No. 20.5.2016 in which the Court, while granting interim protection to the petitioner, directed the medical examination of opposite party no.2 to be conducted by a Board of female gynecologists, nominated by the Principal or Principal In-charge/Superintendent/In-charge Superintendent, Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna. The High Court's judgement records: "It is worthwhile to state that earlier, opposite party no.2 had expressed some reservations with respect to the Medical Board which had submitted its report, saying that the medical report was neither clear nor distinct and was thus wholly false. However, this time opposite party no.2 did not appear before the Medical Board and declined to face any further medical examination (annexure 4), rather she filed an affidavit dated 7.9.2016 to the effect that she was asked to appear before the Medical Board by this Court without taking her consent for the same. She further averred that report and other materials collected during investigations are already on record, hence no further medical examination is required at this stage for deciding the pre-arrest bail petition. This Court, having no option, relied on the medical examination report and other materials collected on the record, confirmed the interim bail to the petitioner vide order dated 8.9.2016." 

The case diary showed that when the Investigating Officer asked opposite party no.2 to give certain clarifications and also to hand over her mobile phone to send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory for certification and for verification of electronic messages, sent or received either on WhatsApp or through SMS referred to in the FIR, she refused to give the same and told the IO of the case to consult her after 05.05.2016, for reasons best known to her. The counsel contended that in view of the provisions of law, without such certification, such electronic messages cannot be considered to be authentic and could not be used as an evidence against the petitioner.

It was also submitted by the counsel of the petitioner that since the petitioner had taken administrative action against the informant and reported the matter to the Additional Director General, Police Headquarters vide Memo dated December 27, 2014, the informant in counter blast lodged the FIR against the petitioner. The counsel submitted that it can be concluded that facts of the case do not corroborate the prosecution case against the petitioner and in such condition, continuance of criminal proceeding would be abuse of process of court.

The counsel for the petitioner, formulated two issues for the consideration of the Court−
(I). Whether the offence of rape in terms of section 376 (c) IPC as alleged in the FIR is made out and;
(II). Whether there is a misconception of fact in terms of section 90 of the IPC which vitiates consent in the present case or whether there is merely a breach of promise to marry simplicitor.

The counsel for the petitioner addressed the first issue. He placed averments made in the FIR as well as the medical report of opposite party no.2 and the affidavit filed by her, flatly refusing to undergo any further medical examination, to buttress and substantiate his contention that there was no physical relation between the petitioner and informant at all. The entire edifice of prosecution case falls apart, which indisputably shows the prosecution of the petitioner.

The counsel submitted that if the allegation levelled in the FIR assuming to be true, while not admitting, then it must be borne in mind that if there was, at all, physical relation between the parties, it was purely a consensual kind because the petitioner has never resiled from his commitment to get married, rather due to circumstances beyond control of the parties, marriage could not be solemnized on account of mis-match of the Janampatrika (Janam-kundli, horoscope). It was very much evident from the FIR that informant herself informed about good behaviour and habits of the petitioner to her family members. The date of birth and Kundli of the informant was given to the petitioner’s mother for matching of Kundli and since things were moving in right direction and relation was supposed to culminate in marriage, the two got intimate but when informant’s family asked about fixing date of marriage, the same was refused by the petitioner’s family on the ground of non-matching of horoscope. In the society, matching of Janampatrika/horoscope was vital social obligation for solemnizing marriage.

He averred that if at all there was any relationship between the parties it was purely consensual. He also submitted that the consent with respect to section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. This understanding of consent has also been set out in Explanation II of section 375 of IPC. 

The counsel submitted that there was a clearcut distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which was made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. He pointed out that where the promise to marry was false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the act. 

1In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana (2013 7 SCC 675), Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharastra & anr. (Cr. Appeal No.1165 of 2019 order dated 21.08.2019) and Sonu@ Subhash Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr. (Cr. Appeal No. 233 of 2021 order dated 01.03.2021).

He also drew attention of the Court to paragraph 9 of the judgment delivered by Supreme Court in case of Sonu (supra) which is reproduced herein under:
“9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), while dealing with a similar situation, the principles of law which must govern a situation like the present were enunciated in the following observations:
"Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it..."
10. Further, the Court has observed:
"To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

The counsel submitted that the contents of the FIR as well as the medical evidence left no doubt that, on the basis of the allegations as they stand, three important features emerge:
(i) The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature;
(ii) The parties were in the relationship for about a period of 5 months; and
(iii) Subsequently, the marriage couldn't be solemnised on account of mis-match of their horoscope which
was the circumstance beyond the control of the petitioner, leading to the lodging of the present FIR.

It was also the case of the petitioner that in the entire FIR, there was no allegation that the petitioner ever committed act of criminal intimidation attracting offence punishable under section 506 of the IPC. Similarly, there was no allegation against the petitioner of insulting the modesty of opposite party no.2 or uttering any words, making any sound or gesture or exhibited any object or intruded upon the privacy of opposite party no.2 which was an offence punishable under section 509 of the IPC. 

The counsel submitted that no case under sections 506 and 509 of the IPC was made out against the petitioner.  Thus, the punctilious analysis of the entire gamut of factual-medical evidence left no doubt with respect to the falsity and concoctedness of the allegations which unflinchingly pointed towards to the malicious prosecution of the petitioner.  He submitted that the Investigating Officer of the case, in a hurry and hasty manner, without completing the investigation on all the points, submitted charge sheet relying upon few paragraphs of the case diary and even these paragraphs are accepted, then also, no case is made out against the petitioner. More so, court did not apply its judicial mind at all before passing order of cognizance alleged U/ss 376(C), 354(B), 506, 509 I.P.C. As such, allegation of inducement and commission of rape was not made out against the petitioner and in such circumstance, High Court can exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice.

The counsel for the State and the counsel for the informant/ opposite party no.2 opposed the prayer of the petitioner. The latter submitted that apart from filing the FIR, opposite party no.2 also made a complaint before the department upon which, in the light of direction of the Supreme Court for prevention of women from sexual abuse at the work place, the matter was taken up by the Internal Enquiry Committee headed by Inspector General of Police constituted under "The Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Place (Prevention, Prohibition and redressal) Act, 2013" and who enquired the matter in detail. During course of enquiry, statements of several witnesses were recorded by the committee and after detailed enquiry the Committee found the allegation made by opposite party no.2 to be true and hence recommended for initiation of departmental action against the petitioner. This fact would be evident from enquiry report which was communicated to the O.P no.2 on June 16, 2015. 

The counsel for opposite party no.2 alleged that from perusal of enquiry report, it would be evident that petitioner not only committed sexual abuse with the opposite party no.2 but also played with the sentiment of so many girls on the pretext of marriage and such fact would be evident from an affidavit submitted before the Committee by one Richa Mishra. That apart, during course of investigation, the Investigating officer recorded statement of the concerned persons. Their statements showed that the petitioner, misusing his official position, made physical relation with the opposite party no.2 on the pretext of marriage deceitfully. After investigation, I.O submitted charge sheet against the petitioner under section 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C and thereafter considering the material collected by the IO in course of the investigation including the material available in the enquiry report of the Internal Enquiry Committee, the S.D.J.M, Kaimur at Bhabhua opined that more than prima facie material is available against the petitioner and consequently he was pleased to take cognizance of the offence punishable under section 376 (c), 354(B),506,509 of the Indian Penal Code. 

On going through the impugned cognizance order, it would transpire that the S.D.J.M thoroughly perused the material submitted by the IO through his Police report and referred to the case diary in the cognizance order and thus cognizance order. From perusal of the FIR, it was reflected that there was sufficient material on record against the petitioner and it cannot be said that prima facie no case was made out against this petitioner. 

The counsel submitted that the Supreme Court's decision in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 6 SCC 2014 SCC 466, held that while the High Court had the power to quash FIRs, it should be cautious in cases involving serious offenses like rape. The court emphasized that the gravity of the offense must be taken into account. Hence, no interference is required by this court at this stage.

Thr High Court observed: "20. In this case, there is specific and direct allegation against the petitioner that on the allurement of marriage, the petitioner committed rape on opposite party no.2. No sooner the FIR dated 29.12.2014 was lodged, opposite party no.2 was examined by the Medical Board at Sadar Hospital, Bhabua on 2.1.2015 after taking her consent. Medical report opines that Fourchette found intact and membrane too was found intact. Meanwhile, opposite party no.2 raised finger on the Medical report, whereupon, this Court while hearing anticipatory bail petition of the petitioner vide order dated 20.5.2016, directed for another medical examination of opposite party no.2 to be conducted by a Board of female gynecologists, nominated by the Principal or Principal In-charge/Superintendent/In-charge Superintendent, Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna. But this time, opposite party no.2 did not turn up for her medical examination, rather she filed and affidavit dated 7.9.2016 stating that when the earlier medical report is already on the on record, hence no further medical examination is required at this stage. 21. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that opposite party no.2 was in relationship with the petitioner for quite sometime. It is also admitted that when the relationship started, both parties were major and opposite party no.2 had willingly been staying with the petitioner and established physical relation. Now, if the relationship is not working out for the reasons beyond control of the parties, it cannot be a ground for lodging a case against the petitioner for offence punishable under section 376 of the IPC. Hence, initiation of criminal proceeding by the informant against the petitioner is wholly unwarranted.''

Justice Singh relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra). 

Justice Singh found substance in the submission of counsel for the petitioner that the proposal of marriage of opposite party no.2 was refused by the petitioner because of the reason which was not in control of the petitioner. Opposite party no.2 has herself mentioned in the FIR that petitioner’s parents asked opposite party no.2 to provide the information regarding time, date and place of her birth to match the Janampatrika/horoscope for solemnization of marriage and when the Janampatrika/horoscope mismatched, then only proposal of marriage was refused by the petitioner side. 

Justice relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013 7 SCC 675) in which it was held that ‘there may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not alway amount to misconception of fact.’ 

Supreme Court in Sonu @Subhash Kumar held that the Court can consider the application for quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., if there was no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. In the case in hand, it appeared from the contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of petitioner to marry opposite party no.2 which gave rise to the registration of the FIR.

Justice Singh observed: "The Court cannot brush aside the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that no proper investigation of the case was done. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that when the Investigating Officer asked opposite party no.2 to give certain clarifications and also to hand over her mobile phone to send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory for certification and for verification of electronic messages, sent or received either on WhatsApp or through SMS referred to in the FIR, she refused to give the same and told the IO of the case to consult her after 05.05.2016, for reasons best known to her. There is substance in the submission of learned counsel that in view of the provisions of law, without such certification, such electronic messages cannot be considered to be authentic and could not be used as an evidence against the petitioner as alleged in the FIR. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh [2013] 14 S.C.R. 713 has emphasized the importance of proper investigation in cases of serious offenses, particularly against women." 

The High Court referred to the Supreme Court in a number of decisions that (1) where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. It was also been held that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding was maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the same cannot make out a case against the accused. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of Supreme Court, rendered in case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604.

Will reliance "matching of horoscope" constitute a valid scientific ground for decision making?

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh takes oath as judge of Patna High Court

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh administers the oath of office to Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh. He was transferred to Patna High Court on October 30, 2025. The President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India had issued an order of transfer on October 14, 2025 from Allahabad High Court to Patna High Court. Some 11 judges from Allahabad High Court accompanied him to witness his oath taking ceremony. The notification dated October 14, 2025 in this regard was issued by Jagannath Srinivasaan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The notification reads:''In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judge, Allahabad High Court, to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.' Justice Singh enrolled as an Advocate on May 9, 1993 in Bar Council, U.P. and practiced in the Allahabad High Court. He was appointed as Additional Judge on November 22,2018 in the Allahabad High Court. He took oath as Permanent Judge on November 20, 2020. He will retire on January 20, 2031.

Justice Singh reached Patna after the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court on October 17, 2025. 

In Dhanajay Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), Justice Singh delivered a 35-page long order dated April 27, 2024, upon hearing the prayer made to stay the operation and effect of the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 of the appellants and to enlarge them on bail during pendency of the criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court, he concluded:''the prayer for stay of operation and effect of judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of appellant No.1 is refused and is hereby rejected. 42. Since prayer for stay of impugned judgment of conviction with regard to appellant No.2 (who is not a political person or government servant) has not been pressed during argument, therefore, his case has not been dealt with in this regard.'' 

Coincidentally, his transfer order has been issued in  the aftermath of his order against Dhananjay Singh. This order's mentioning in the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court underlines its significance. Is it similar to the transfer of Justice (Dr.) S. Muralidhar from Delhi High Court?  

This order was passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application (For Suspension of Sentence) under Section 389 (1) Cr.P.C. The appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellants-Dhananjay Singh and Santosh Vikram Singh against the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-IV/Special Judge, MP/MLA, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 109 of 2020 (State Vs. Dhananjay Singh and another) which arose out of Case Crime No. 142 of 2020, Police Station Line Bazar, District Jaunpur, convicting and sentencing the appellants as under :-
(a) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 364 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment.
(b) Five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence under Section 386 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, three months' additional imprisonment.
(c) One year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, one month's additional imprisonment.
(d) Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, forty five days’ additional imprisonment.
(e) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Justice Singh noted that at present ten cases are still pending against Dhananjay Singh, the appellant No. 1. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584, wherein the Court held that “though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the code, its exercise should be limited to very exception Cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the court has a duty to look at all aspect including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.”

Justice referred to Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, wherein the accused was convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of Prevention of corruption Act. He filed an appeal before the High Court, which has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non-suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service. On appeal, the Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that the High Court had mechanically passed the order by suspending the conviction and the discretion ought not to have been exercise by the High Court by passing such an order suspending the conviction.

He drew on Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan, (2003)12 SCC 432, which had relied on the decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 to reiterate that only in exceptional cases, the Court should exercise the power of stay of conviction.

Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, it was observed: “Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is that requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspect and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.''

He recollected paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ravi Kant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673, wherein the Court held that “it deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case.”

Justice Singh also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 787, wherein the petitioner Sanjay Dutt was charged under various sections of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act. He was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 read with Sections 25(IA) and 25(IB) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, he was granted bail on February 28, 2007. Thereafter, he had filed application under Section 389 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. In the petition, it was mentioned that he belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and that the petitioner is now desirous of contesting election of the House of People from Lucknow Parliament Constituency and in view of Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, he has incurred disqualification from contesting the election for becoming a member of either House of Parliament. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner be suspended to enable him to contest the election. The Court declined his prayer and held that “Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) ) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. xxxxxxx “ In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner, In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. “

In the penultimate paragraph of his order, Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's decision in Shyam Narain Pandey V. State of U.P. (2012) SCC 384. The Court observed: “ In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant , the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed etc and his rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” The appellant Shyam Narain Pandey was a Principal of an institution, who was inter alia, convicted for murder. 

He also referred to Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384, wherein the Court held: “Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.”

Relying on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Singh observed:''40. It is often seen that after conviction of a person who was or is Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament, used to take a general plea for stay of operation and effect of his conviction that he wants to contest election and in case the judgment of his conviction is not stayed, he will be deprived of his right to contest the election which will result in irreparable loss and injury to him, but this Court feels that each and every case has to be decided on its own merit as well as considering all the surrounding circumstances and other attending factors including gravity of offences, nature of previous criminal history etc. No uniform and straight-jacket formula can be laid down for stay of conviction in all the cases. The parameter and legal position for stay of execution of sentence/bail and stay of conviction are different. Now it is the need of hour to have purity in politics, therefore for staying the judgment of conviction, the Courts should exercise its discretionary power sparingly with caution in a rare and appropriate cases. The purpose sought to be achieved by enacting disqualification on conviction for certain offences is to prevent person with criminal background from entering into politics and governance. Persons with criminal background pollute the process of election as they have no reservation from indulging in criminality to win an election. When persons having long criminal history turn into elected representatives and become law maker, they pose a serious threat to the functioning of a democratic system. The very future of our democracy gets imperilled when such offenders masquerade as leaders making a travesty of the entire system. The increasing trend of criminalisation of politics is dangerous and has steadily been eating into the vitals of our democratic polity along with growing corruption of a humongous nature. Considering the facts of this case that the appellant No.1 has secured acquittal in 28 criminal cases due to reasons that witnesses turned hostile as pointed out on behalf of the State, which has not been controverted on behalf of the accused-appellant No.1 and that there is no dispute that at present, 10 criminal cases (as noted in Chart-B) are still pending against him, I do not find any good ground, special reason or exceptional case to stay the operation and effect of impugned judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of the appellant No.1-Dhananjay Singh.'

While at Allahabad High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous bail application, in August 2021, in UP since there was no practice of recording the statement of victim of sexual offenses  by audio video means despite amendment made in the year 2009 in section 161 of CrP.C., Justice Singh issued directions to the state’s director general of police and principal secretary (Home) to issue guidelines to all SSPs on compliance with statutory provisions provided in first and second provisos to CrPC Section 161(3) within two months. He observed  that “in majority of cases”, provisions of CrPC Section 161(3), which make it mandatory for police to have rape or molestation victims’ statements recorded by a woman officer and through audio-video recording, are not being followed. The two provisions under the said CrPC section say that a statement may also be recorded by audio video electronics means and that in cases of rape and molestation, it should be recorded by a woman police officer.

In a criminal appeal he found that the handwritten reports are difficult to be correctly read. Justice Singh' order dated August 30, 2022 directed that all the postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued. During the postmortem examination there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for the purpose. After the order, all the postmodern and injury reports are being typed throughout the state of UP which is not only beneficial to the advocates but also to the general public.

 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh's pre-arrest bail rejection order

In Md. Faizi Ahmad vs. 1 . The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta of the Supreme Court passed a 3-page long order dated October 3, 2025, wherein, it condoned the delay and issued notice. The order  reads: ''By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioner be released on bail...In the meantime, the petitioner will file additional documents placing of record the details of antecedents.'' The case arose out of impugned order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court dated April 30, 2025

In Md. Faizi Ahmad vs. 1 . The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justice Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 30, 2025, wherein, he concluded:''Considering the nature of accusation , criminal antecedents and gravity of offence, prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is rejected.'' The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under section 420, 406, 120 ( B ), 323 , 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal code. 

According to the  prosecution case, pursuant to agreement made between the parties for sale of land, it was alleged that Rs. 18 lacs 21 thousand was given to petitioner in cash and through bank in the name of accused persons and thereafter petitioner refused to execute the sale deed or to return the alleged amount. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner is quite innocent and has not committed any offence as alleged. It was also submitted that complainant and accused persons were distant relatives and the entire complaint case was false and concocted. The petitioner had nothing to do with the alleged incident and there was no specific allegation against him. The dispute was purely civil in nature. 

The counsel for the State opposed the prayer for bail and there is specific allegation against the petitioner that the petitioner had received Rs. 18 lacs 21 thousand through cash and in bank account and petitioner had got seven criminal antecedents. The case arose out of a P.S. case of 2021 from a Nawadah complaint case.  

Supreme Court recalls order of non-bailable warrant, directs release of Supan Rai, an from the judicial custody

In Baleshwari Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated October 10, 2025. The Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) was filed on September 21, 2024, registered on October 4, 2024 and verified on October 6, 2024. The Court recalled the order of non-bailable warrant and directed release of Supan Rai, the Respondent No. 2 from the judicial custody who is an accused for the offence/s punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(1) (r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Supreme Court's list of order, judgements and record of proceedings reveals that the Court passed orders on October 10, 2025, September 26, 2025, September 10, 2025, July 31, 2025, May 23, 025, April 28, 2025, March 28, 2025, March 25, 2025, February 21, 2025, February 17, 2025, February 4, 2025, January 2, 2025 and October 15, 2024. The Court's record of the I.A.s and SLPs mention the order dated April 18, 2024 passed in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors but the same is not there Court's list of order, judgements and record of proceedings.  

On January 2, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed an order reads:'' 2. Let bailable warrant of Rs.25,000/- be issued against the respondent no.2 for remaining present before this Court on 04.02.2025, either personally or through an Advocate. 3. The bailable warrant be executed through the SHO of the concerned Police Station.'' It recorded: ''Nobody appears for the respondent no.2 though duly served.'' 

On February 4, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order which reads: ''1. None has filed appearance on behalf of the respondent No.2, though the bailable warrant issued by the Court vide the order dated 02.01.2025 has been served. 2. Hence, let the non-bailable warrant be issued against the respondent No.2, to be executed through the SHO of the Police
Station concerned. 3. List on 21.02.2025.''

On February 17, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench passed an order in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2332/2025 which arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 13, 2024 in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 3487/2024 passed by the Patna High Court in Baleshwari Devi vs. The State of Bihar  and Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 2353/2025 which arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 13, 2024 in CRASJ No. 3698/2024 passed by the Patna High Court. It issued notice and tagged both the petitions with SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024.    

On February 21, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 13924/2024. It reads: ''The learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the non-bailable warrant could not be executed as the respondent no.2 is not found at the given address. He seeks more time to get the whereabouts of the respondent no.2 to serve the non-bailable warrant.'' In Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2332/2025 and other connected matters, its order reads:''As per the office report, notice could not be issued to the respondents as the counsel for the petitioner(s) has not filed spare copies. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) shall do the needful in that regard. However, liberty is sought on his behalf to serve the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-State. Liberty, as sought for, is granted. Learned counsel for the respondent-State seeks time to file vakalatnama and counter affidavit.'' The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated August 22, 2024 in CRLA(SJ) No. 3192/2024 passed by the Patna High Court. 

On March 25, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order which reads: ''1. The matter has been taken up on oral mentioning being done by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 – State, though not listed today on the board. 2. According to him, pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 21.02.2025, the respondent No.2 – accused has been arrested and has been brought to this Court. 3. Let the respondent No.2 be taken into judicial custody of the concerned jurisdictional Court. 4. The SLP be listed in normal course.'' The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated August 22, 2024 in CRLA(SJ) No. 3192/2024. 

On March 28, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed an order which reads:'' 1. Let the notice be issued to the respondents. 2. Additionally, liberty is granted to serve notice upon the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar. 3. Tag alongwith SLP (Crl.) No.13924 of 2024.'' 

On April 28, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order, which reads: "1. It appears that pursuant to the non bailable warrant issued by this Court, respondent no.2 in SLP(Crl.) No. 13924/2024 was arrested and now, he is in judicial custody. 2. It appears that respondent nos.2 and 3 in SLP(Crl) No. 4153/2025 and respondent no.2 in rest of the matters, are not served. 3. Let fresh notice be issued to the unserved respondents, to be served through the concerned SHO, returnable after three weeks."

On May 23, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order in SLP (Crl.) Diary No(s). 2135/2025. The order reads: "Delay condoned. 2. Application for exemption from filing Official Translation is allowed. 3. Issue notice. 4. Tag with SLP (Crl.) No. 13924 of 2024."  The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 20, 2024 in CRASJ No. 3726/2024 passed by the Patna High Court.

On July 31, 2025, Supreme Court's Record of Proceedings states that ''Respondent no.1 is duly represented. Despite service being complete, none has entered appearance for respondent no.2. Let the matter be processed for listing before the Hon’ble Court, as per rules. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any'' in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 and 8371/2025. 

The order in SLP(Crl.) Nos.2353, 2358 and 2332/2025 reads:'' Respondent no.1 is duly represented. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any. Service report with regard to respondent no.2 from concerned S.H.O has not been received. Issue reminder. List again on 10.09.2025.'' In SLP(Crl.) No.4153/2025, the order reads: ''Respondent no.1 is duly represented. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any. Service report with regard to respondent nos.2 and 3 from concerned S.H.O has not been received. Issue reminder.''

On September 10, 2025 also the Supreme Court had passed an order.  

After Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh passed a 3-page long order dated August 22, 2024 in Supan Rai vs. The State of Bihar Patna & Anr. (2025). Justice Singh had set aside the impugned order dated June 24, 2024 passed by the Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in a P.S. case of 2024 against the appellant. The criminal appeal was allowed and the appellant, was directed to be enlarged on bail. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. The Respondent No.2 is Baleshwari Devi, wife of Harbans Ram, resident of Maksudpur, Ward No. 03, Shahpur, Patna. The criminal appeal was filed before the Single Judge of the High Court on July 4, 2024. It was registered on July 10, 2024. 

The Supreme Court recorded: ''It is a case where the petitioner being the complainant has come forward to file this instant petition. Even as per the case of the prosecution, a group of 18 persons came and attacked the deceased and several other persons were injured. Admittedly, only one gun was used at the time of the incident. The main accused is stated to have been absconding.'' It observed: ''Taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, coupled with the fact that no specific overt act is attributed against respondent No.2, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file an application for cancellation of bail, if the subsequent development warrants the same. Accordingly, the order of non-bailable warrant issued to the respondent No.2, stands recalled, and he is directed to be released from the judicial custody, as per the terms and conditions already imposed upon him by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition stands disposed of in above terms.''   

Justice Singh of the High Court had passed the order after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 24, 2024 passed by the Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur, Patna P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(1) (r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

According to the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to ulterior motive. He also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellants. There is no specific allegation of firing against the appellant. The appellant had no criminal antecedent as stated in the bail petition. 

The counsel for Baleshwari Devi, the respondent no. 2 as well as Special Public Prosecutor for the State was opposed the bail petition of the appellant in the High Court. 

Justice Singh had concluded: "6. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail...." 

Notably, Supreme Court too has directed the release of Supan Rai ''from the judicial custody in terms and conditions already imposed upon him by the High Court'' but it granted liberty to Baleshwari Devi saying, "However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file an application for cancellation of bail, if the subsequent development warrants the same." The order dated October 10, 2025 concluded: ''The Special Leave Petition stands disposed of in above terms. Accordingly, IA No. 245017/2025 also stands disposed of.'' It is noteworthy that SLP(Crl.) No. 013924/2024 was heard along with Interlocutory Application No.(s) 231152/2024, 231153/2024, 231155/2024, 281558/2024 with SLP (Criminal) No.(s) 2332/2025, 2353/2025 and 2358/2025.

From the Archives:A Memorandum No. 641/2025 dated February 19, 2025 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna with reference to Office Memorandum No. 441/Vi.Co. Dated 202/2025 (sic) SLP(Crl.) 13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. on the subject ''Regarding compliance of the order dated 18.04.24(sic) passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court New Delhi in PS Shahpur Case No.147/24'' from SHO Police Station, Shahpur, Patna is in public domain. It reads: ''Sir, With reference to the above mentioned subject, it is to be respectfully apprised that in the light of the points mentioned in the order dated 18.04.24 (sic) passed in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors. by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, New Delhi, in PS Shahpur Case No.147/24, a non-bailable warrant NBW has been  received for arresting accused Supan Rai son of late Jodha Rai resident of Maksudpur, Ward No.03, Police Station Shahpur, District Patna and producing him before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.'' 

 

SHO Police Station, Shahpur, Patna wrote: ''When I conducted continuous raids for the arrest of the above accused, it was found that he does not reside at home. After collecting information, it was found that he lives somewhere else due to fear of arrest, yet I am conducting raids at various places for his arrest. As soon as he is arrested, he will be produced before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted for information.''

 

Death Reference case under POCSO Act decided in 2022 by Patna High Court's Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ashwani Kumar Singh reaches Supreme Court

F.I.R was registered in 2018 with Phulwarisharif Mahila Station under sections 376, 376(b), 120(B), 504, 506, 354(D) IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of POCSO Act 

In ZZZ vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. etc. (2025), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard a Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) which arose out of the impugned final judgment and order dated October 19, 2022 in Death Reference No. 3/2021, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 218/2021 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 285/2021 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ashwani Kumar Singh. The two other respondents in the Supreme Court are: Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania and Abhishek Kumar. The Court had condoned the delay and issued notice by its order dated July 14, 2025. It came up before Supreme Court's Registrar Ms. Sujata Singh on September 15, 2025. 

The High Court's 48-page long judgement dated October 19, 2022 in The State of Bihar vs. Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania (2022) was authored by Justice Prasad. It was heard and decided along with Abhishek Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2022).

Justice Prasad had concluded: "73. To this Court, it appears that this case cannot be equated with the cases where there is kidnapping, rape and murder of victim. It has been submitted that in the case of Pappu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2022(2) BLJ 231(SC) which was case of rape and murder of a child sentence of death was commuted to life imprisonment. 74. Considering the aforesaid submissions and materials on the record, this Court while sustaining the conviction of the appellant-Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania converts it from 376 (DB) IPC to Section 376 IPC. Accordingly his sentence is modified and he is awarded rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) for the offence under Section 376 IPC. His conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is also upheld, however, in view of Section 42 of the POCSO Act no separate sentence is awarded for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He is further sentenced under Section 506 IPC for two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only). All the sentences shall run concurrently. 75. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 are, thus, allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.76. In consequence thereof Death Reference No. 3 of 2021 made by the learned trial court under Section 366 Cr.P.C. is rejected."

The appellants in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Patna in Special POCSO Case No. 186 of 2018 (arising out of Mahila P.S. Case No. 136 of 2018 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376 (b), 504, 506, 354(D), 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 6, 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The trial court had convicted them for the offences under Sections 376(DB) IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act read with Section 120(B) IPC. As far as appellant Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021 was concerned, he was also convicted under Sections 506 IPC. The appellant Arvind Kumar @ Raj Singhania was awarded capital punishment / death penalty for the offence under Section 376(DB) under Section 6 of POCSO Act and a fine of Rs. 01 lakh. He was sentenced rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 05 thousand under Section 506 IPC. After awarding the death penalty the trial court made a reference under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the High Court for confirmation of the death penalty. The reference has been registered as Death Reference Case No. 03 of 2021 and the same is under consideration together with the two appeals. The appellant Abhishek Kumar in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021 was awarded a term of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50 thousand for the offence under Section 376(DB) read with Section 120(B) of the IPC. 

A first information report was registered on September 19, .2018 with Phulwarisharif Mahila Station giving rise to P.S. Case No. 136 of 2018 under sections 376, 376(b), 120(B), 504, 506, 354(D) IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of POCSO Act. The informant was mother of the victim girl. It was alleged in the written complaint that the victim ‘X’ aged about 11 years was a student of New Central Public School, Phulwarisharif. She was studying in Class V for about one year. The School Principal Arvind Kumar (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 218 of 2021) sexually exploited the victim girl and by making her video, under threat that the same will be made viral, he was blackmailing her. It was alleged that in this act one teacher of the school namely, Abhishek Kumar aged about 26 years (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 285 of 2021) was also helped the principal. The informant alleged that there was a bed room of the principal adjacent to the class room and in the name of checking of writing, the victim girl was being taken to the said room where she was exploited. The victim girl, disclosed that her principal called her on the pretext of checking of writing through Abhishek and then he indulged in wrong act. This led to stoppage of menstruation of the victim. She had a bout of vomiting which led to a suspicion in the mind of of her mother. She got her pregnancy tested wherein the pregnancy was confirmed. The alleged act were done under threat of a knife.  

Supreme Court upholds order by Justice Soni Shrivastava refusing grant of anticipatory bail

In Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated August 25, 2025 in the case related to a scam in the University and the alleged financial defraud by all the petitioners. . It reads:”It is also a fact that the special leave petitions preferred by Mr. Jitendra Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.7000/2025 @ D.No.22186/2025), Mr. Manoj Gupta(SLP (Crl.) No. 7168/2025 @ D.No. 24324/2025), Dr. Ashok Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.8245/2025 @ D.No.27267/2025) and Mr. Sunil Agarwal(SLP (Crl.) No.8215/2025 @ D.No.27269 of 2025) asking pre-arrest bail have been rejected by this Court. 2) Considering all these aspects, we are not inclined to grant anticipatory bail as prayed for. Accordingly, the special leave petitions stand rejected….3) However, the officers are at liberty to take recourse as permissible.” The special leave to appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated April 17, 2025 in Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Spl. Vigilance Unit, Patna, Bihar passed by the Patna High Court. 

In Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Spl. Vigilance Unit, Patna, Bihar (2025), in her 7-page long order dated April 17, 2025, Justice Soni Srivastava of Patna High Court had concluded:”…it appears that there is strong allegation of conspiracy as against the present petitioner showing his involvement and also considering the fact that similarly situated co-accused persons have already been denied the anticipatory bail by co-ordinate benches of this Court vide order dated 13.02.2025 passed in Cr.Misc. No. 74836 of 2024, Vide order dated 08.04.2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 32493 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 22548 of 2024, Cr. Misc No. 33718 of 2024, Cr. Misc No. 31143 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 32191 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 32719 of 2024 and Cr. Misc. No. 83228 of 2024 and also considering the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Devinder Kumar Bansal (Supra), I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner and his prayer for bail is hereby, rejected. 12. This application stands dismissed.” 

Justice Srivastava referred to Supreme Court’s paragraphs 23-26 of the decision in Devinder Kumar Bansal vs. The State of Punjab (Special Leave to Appeal (CRL). No.3247 of 2025) reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291. It reads:  “23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations, which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of the public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 24. If liberty is to be denied to an accused to ensure corruption free society, then the Courts should not hesitate in denying such liberty. Where overwhelming considerations in the nature of aforesaid require denial of anticipatory bail, it has to be denied. It is altogether a different thing to say that once the investigation is over and charge sheet is filed, the Court may consider to grant regular bail to a public servant- accused of indulging in corruption. 25. Avarice is a common frailty of mankind and Robert Walpole's famous pronouncement that all men have their price, notwithstanding the un-savoury cynicism that it suggests, is not very far from truth. As far back as more than two centuries ago, it was Burke who cautioned: "Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot last long". In more recent years, Romain Rolland lamented that France fell. because there was corruption without indignation. Corruption has, in it, very dangerous potentialities. Corruption, a word of wide connotation has, in respect of almost all the spheres of our day to day life, all the world over, the limited meaning of allowing decisions and actions to be influenced not by the rights or wrongs of a case but by the prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations. 26. If even a fraction of what was the vox pupuli about the magnitude of corruption to be true, then it would not be far removed from the truth, that it is the rampant corruption indulged in with impunity by highly placed persons that has led to economic unrest in this country. If one is asked to name one sole factor that effectively arrested the progress of our society to prosperity, undeniably it is corruption. If the society in a developing country faces a menace greater than even the one from the hired assassins to its law and order; then that is from the corrupt elements at the higher echelons of the Government and of the political parties.” 

The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Special Case No. 48 of 2021 arising out of Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) P.S. Case No. 02 of 2021 registered under sections 109, 120B, 201, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471,506 of the Indian Penal Code as well as sections 13(2) r/w 13 (1) (b) r/w 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act. As per the FIR, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, while working as the Vice Chancellor, Magadh University, Bodh Gaya hatched a criminal conspiracy with the assistance of Finance Officer, Veer Kunwar Singh University, the Registrar, Patliputra University private firms namely, Ms Poorva Graphics & M/s XLICT software Pvt. Ltd and other unknown accused persons and fraudulently and dishonestly cheated the Government to the extent of Rs. 20 crores during the year 2019-21 in the matter of purchase of various items related to the use of University during examination and otherwise, it is alleged that ignoring the advice of the competent officer, the accused persons raised bill to the extent of Rs. 20 crores from Magadh University and Veer Kunwar Singh University without assessing the requirement and violating the tender procedure and justification of rates etc. The Finance Officer, Veer Kunwar Singh University and Registrar Patliputra University cleared all the fraudulent bills of the private firms. The petitioner, who was officiating as the Finance Officer of Patliputra University, was deputed to Magadh University as Finance Officer by the order of the Chancellor/Governor of Bihar where he served in the capacity of Finance Officer from April 15, 2021 to July 4, 2021. The allegation against the petitioner was that he connived with the main accused, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the then Vice Chancellor and other accused persons to clear the fraudulent bills of accused nos. 3 and 4. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted before the High Court that from bare perusal of the First Information Report, it can be inferred at the outset that the petitioner is not named in the FIR and his name has surfaced during the investigation and the charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner on 20.03.2023. It has been further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. It was further submitted that being the Finance Officer, the petitioner is bound to act in accordance with the orders of the Vice Chancellor. Section 16 of the Act also reflects that the Finance Officer has no role in making any financial decisions for the University, rather he holds a formal role as a co-signatory upon the payment of cheques. It has been further submitted that the petitioner had lodged complaints with secretary, Governor Secretariat about the mishaps of the University long before the initiation of the present case. Annexure-4 to the present application has been brought on record to substantiate the said submission. 

The Special Public Prosecutor for the Vigilance (SVU) opposed the prayer for bail and has drawn the attention of this Court to the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the SVU. It has been stated in paragraphs-10, 13 and 14 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner was in connivance with the prime accused and other accused persons. There was a fraud in supply made by the accused nos. 2 and 3 and knowing these facts the Examination Controller and the petitioner signed the cheques. Hence, the petitioner is a part of criminal conspiracy due to which huge amount of Government of Bihar was misappropriated. The counsel for the Special P.P. for the SVU hence, submits that a huge loss has been caused to the state exchequer and the petitioner is part of the said conspiracy. The attention of the Court has also been drawn to the fact that the anticipatory bail application of several similarly situated accused persons have already been rejected by the High Court. In support of their contentions, the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments in Santosh So Dwarkadas Fafat vs. State of Maharastra (2017) 9 SCC 714, Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676, Aman Preet Singh vs. CBI through Director 2021 SCC Online SC 941,  Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI & Anr. Reported as (2021) 10 SCC 773 and Mahdoom Bava vs. CBI reported as 2023 SCC OnLine SC 299. 

Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhyan passed a 3-page long order dated July 24, 2025, wherein it set aside the 3-page long order dated September 12, 2024 by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of Patna High Court who had rejected the bail prayer.

The appellant's counsel contended that this was a case based on circumstantial evidence. Even the cause of death as per the autopsy report was not clear. He pointed out that it has been admitted that the body was found in river water, therefore, possibility of death on account of drowning cannot be ruled out given the fact that the autopsy report showed that lungs were found filled with water. It was submitted that the appellant has suffered incarceration of over a period exceeding one year and there was no likelihood that the appellant would misuse the liberty of bail during the course of trial. The counsel for the State could not dispute that as per the autopsy report, the cause of death is not ascertainable. 

Supreme Court's order reads:"6. Having regard to the facts of the case as also the contents of the autopsy report brought on record, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we are of the view that the appellant has made out a case for release on bail during pendency of the trial on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order rejecting the bail prayer is set aside." It ordered that the appellant be released on bail.

Patna High Court had heard an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated April 23, 2024 and modification order dated June 12, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Special Case No. 392 of 2023 which arose out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 dated August 23, 2023 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 364, 365, 506, 302, 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

As per the prosecution case, It is alleged that the informant's grandson along with one Ganesh Kumar went to take bath in the Ganga River and she made suspicion that the appellant and the co-accused persons kidnapped her grandson with intent to kill and Pawan Kumar escaped.

The counsel for the appellant had submitted before the High Court that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to land dispute. He submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that no specific caste name was called by the appellant hence no case was made out under section of the SC/ST Act. There is nothing except suspicion. It was also alleged that the said occurrence took place at 7:30 AM on 23.08.2023 and the postmortem of deceased commenced on March 24, 2023 at 8:00 PM in which no ante-mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased. The dead body was decomposed and rigor mortis was absent which indicated that the death of the deceased had taken place much before the alleged time of occurrence. The appellant had three criminal antecedents. The appellant was in custody since February 16, 2024.  The counsel for the informant and the Special Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the anticipatory bail petition of the appellant. It was stated that the eyewitness Pawan Kumar had made specific allegation against the petitioner and the co-accused persons. It was further stated that the accused persons were pressurizing the deceased to withdraw the case bearing Salimpur P.S. Case No. 166 of 2023 dated July 25, 2023 which was filed by the deceased against the co-accused persons and as the deceased did not compromise, he was brutally assaulted and thrown in the river.

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Justice Chandra Prakash Singh's order concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as the specific and heinous nature of allegation against the appellant, I am not inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 23.04.2024 and modification order dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (PoA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Spl. Case No. 392 of 2023 arising out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 and accordingly, the prayer for bail of the appellant is rejected." The respondent no. 2 was Bachchi Devi.  

It is noteworthy that although Justice Singh's order rejecting bail has been set aside, the Supreme Court has recorded in its order that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.  

Supreme Court modifies conditional order of bail delivered by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh because dispute is civil in nature

 

In Prince Raj vs. The State of Bihar and Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta modified order of Single judge Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court dated September 20, 2022 to set aside the condition of deposit. The second respondent was Rajeev Kumar. 

The case is related to police station Jakkanpur, Patna. Rajeev Kumar, the petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 420, 406, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. By filing supplementary affidavit dated September 16, 2022, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner is ready to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 85 lacs to the informant in next 15 months in installments. The petitioner stated that amount claimed by the informant in the First Information Report is also the subject matter of title suit no. 211 of 2021. The counsel for the informant had submitted that payment made by the petitioner may not prejudice case of the informant. Considering the undertaking of the petitioner given in the supplementary allowed. In the event of arrest/surrender within six week, the High Court had enlarged the petitioner on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate I cum Sub-Judge I, Patna in Jakkanpur Police Station Case No. 367 of 2021, subject to the conditions laid down under section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure along with following conditions:
Receipt of payment of Rs. 5 lacs to the informant would be furnished by the petitioner at the time of processing of bail bond.
Rest amount of Rs. 80 lacs would be paid by the petitioner in next 15 months in installments.

The High Court made it clear that if the petitioner violates the conditions of the bail order, the court below shall cancel his bail bonds.

The Supreme Court's 3-page long order dated May 7, 2025 reads:"we are, prima facie, of the view that the dispute is civil in nature and, as such, the High Court has rightly granted protection to respondent no.2. 6. Since the appellant himself has expressed that the condition of deposit is prejudicing his right, we accordingly set aside the condition of deposit. However, the relief of interim protection granted by the High Court to respondent no.2 shall remain as it is. The impugned order passed by the High Court stands modified to the above extent."

The grievance of the appellant was that the High Court having directed respondent no.2 to make the deposit is in effect prejudicing the right of the appellant in a suit for specific performance pending before the Civil Court. 

Supreme Court dismisses husband's special leave petition, orders transfer of fixed deposit of Rs.1,00,000/ with interest to account of wife

In Ram Kishore Singh @Ram Kishore vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar passed an order on April 30, 2025. It reads:"In the instant special leave petition, notice was issued on 02.04.2024 only with respect to mediation subject to payment of cost of Rs.1,00,000/- which is lying with the Registry of this Court in Fixed Deposit. 2) Later, the matter was referred to mediation on 24.01.2025. As per the report received from the Supreme Court Mediation Centre, the mediation remained unsuccessful. 3) After hearing learned counsel for the parties and due to the fact that limited notice was issued for mediation which remained unsuccessful, we are not inclined to entertain the present special leave petition. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed. ....4) On supplying the account details of the complainant-respondent No.2 within three days to the Registry, the amount lying in the fixed deposit along with interest, if any, shall be transmitted in her account". The order was passed after the receipt of the mediation report. The respondent no. 2 is Raushani Kumari, a resident of Chandmari, Motihari and the wife of the petitioner.

This case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated February 13, 2024 passed by Justice Patna High Court which had arisen out of police case in 2022 in Mahila Thana, East Champaran. The application before the High Court was filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing order dated July 19, 2022 passed by SDJM, Sadar Motihari, East Champaran whereby he had taken cognizance under sections 498(A), 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner in connection with Mahila P.S. Case pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Sadar Motihari, East Champaran.

The prosecution case, was that the wife of the petitioner had filed the case, alleging that on November 30, 2013, her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner, and her father gave her ornaments worth Rs. 2,50,000/-, clothes and furniture, and cash of Rs. 10–12 lakh. After marriage, she had gone to her matrimonial house, and after 4-5 days of hearing about the cheating of her husband on another girl, at the instigation of her in-laws, her husband started demanding a four-wheeler. On this issue, her husband (the petitioner), Harikant Singh (the father-in-law), Kunti Devi, Shyam Kishore Singh (Devar), and Kanhaiya Kishore Singh (Devar) started torturing her; for that, they abused her and threatened to kill her. Her husband tried to kill her with his licensed revolver. After acknowledging the same, her parents tried to pacify the matter. In the meantime, from wedlock, six-year-old Om Kumar (son) and a one-year-old daughter (Ananya) were born, but they did not stop torturing. In the year 2020, her husband went to Patna to leave her and their children. He did not want to talk and provide expenses. He always used to talk about another marriage. In 2021, he ousted her, taking all her belongings. After settlement, she went to Sasural at Muzaffarpur, but on January 12, 2022, they ousted her and always threatened to kill her and her family members. Her husband is a police personnel, and he was posted at the District Head Quarter Motihari, C.I.D. Department. The petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the husband of Opposite Party No. 2, and no such occurrence, as alleged in F.I.R., has ever taken place. The petitioner has never committed any torture or demanded any dowry from OP No. 2. It is next submitted that the marriage is about more than 11 years old, and out of wedlock, two children were born who are presently aged about 8 years and 2 and a half years. It is also asserted and submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is not aggrieved by his wife but is aggrieved further submits that the petitioner has been implicated in more than three cases by the Opposite party No. 2. He submitted that the petitioner was ready and willing to keep Opposite Party No. 2, as his wife, with honour and dignity. The counsel of the Opposite party No. 2 submitted that there was specific allegation against this petitioner that he, along with other co-accused persons, not only assaulted the Opposite party No. 2 but also abused her on several occasions for non-fulfillment of the demand of dowry and lastly, in the year 2018 also, the petitioner demanded dowry, and on refusal, the petitioner threatened the opposite party No. 2 on the point of pistol. Therefore, it was prayed on
behalf of opposite party no. 2 that the petitioner should be put on trial. 

The High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had concluded: "Considering the rival submissions of the parties and materials available on record, the Court is of the opinion that there is direct and specific allegation against this petitioner of committing torture, assault, and abuse to opposite party No. 2. As such, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the order impugned which warrants any interference by this Court." The petition was dismissed.