Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, grants anticipatory bail due to compromise between informant, and appellant

In Shayam Mishra @ Shayam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page order dated August 25, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 5-page long order dated June 25, 2026 by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court in a case from Badhurupiya, Sugauli, East Champaran. Supreme Court's order reads: "5) Inasmuch as this case involves a complaint at the behest of the informant and a counter complaint at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and grant anticipatory bail to the appellant. 6) In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40755 of 2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court." 

The appellant is implicated as an accused in connection with F.I.R. No.480 of 2021 registered at P.S.: Sugauli, District: East Champaran, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 384, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC. He was aggrieved by the rejection of the anticipatory bail applications by the Trial Court and the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court. The Court was informed that "the matter has been resolved between the appellant and the informant, via compromise."

Prior to this, in his order Justice Jha had recorded the submission by the A.P.P. for the State, while opposing the prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner, wherein, it was submitted that considering all available materials, the prayer of first anticipatory bail of the petitioner was rejected and, therefore, there is no occasion to reconsider this second prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner without having any changed circumstances, which would amount to review of earlier order passed by learned coordinate Bench of this Court, which is not permissible under law. It was also submitted by the A.P.P. that the offence, as alleged, is not compoundable in nature and, therefore, compromise is of no bearing. 

Justice Jha had concluded: "8. In view of aforesaid factual submission and by taking note of the fact as prima facie on the basis of subsequent compromise for non-compoundable offence, the earlier rejection order, which was passed by one of the learned coordinate Bench of this Court, cannot be reviewed by this Court, accordingly, on second consideration also, prayer of anticipatory bail of the  petitioner stands rejected."

The High Court's order recorded that it was the second prayer of anticipatory bail, after rejection of his first anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated February 9, 2023 of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Cr. Misc. No. 2413 of 2023 dated February 9, 2023, wherein considering all available materials, as petitioner was specifically alleged to cause stab wound due to which the injured sustained grievous injury, his prayer of anticipatory bail was rejected. At the time of the rejection of the first anticipatory bail rejection, there was no compromise between the parties. 

The second anticipatory bail petition was preferred on the sole ground that now this matter was compromised between the parties. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the occurrence was free-fight in nature and petitioner’s side had also received injury during the occurrence. It was also submitted that now the petitioner was selected in Group ‘D’ service of Indian Railway, therefore, in view of compromise, sending the petitioner to jail would not serve any purpose of justice. 

In support of his submission, the counsel had relied upon para 22 of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. Para-22 of the judgment reads:- “22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:-“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. 
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against
each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

Supreme Court's order vindicates the position of petitioner's the counsel Prateek Tandon and the persuasive value of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. It is apparent that Supreme Court has rejected the submission made by Nand Kishore Prasad, APP which is recorded in the order by Justice Jha. Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by APP's reasoning. 

Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra sets aside orders by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur, underlines criminal breach of trust and cheating have different ingredients

In Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 17-page long judgement dated July 31, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated March 5, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in G.R. No. 739 of 2016 which arose out of V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 and the subsequent order dated September 10, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in Trial No. 1019 of 2018/G.R. No. 739 of 2016. The judgement reads:"Consequently, the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom, stands quashed. 21. Both the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are, accordingly, allowed." Justice Mishra observed:"19. In the considered opinion of this Court, even if the allegations contained in the F.I.R are accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the petitioner. The dispute, at its core, is essentially contractual and civil in nature, which has been sought to be given the colour of a criminal prosecution."  

Justice Mishra relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Race Club (1940) & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690 wherein, it has distinguished between criminal breach of trust and cheating.  “36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients...."

The trial court had taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the petitioner, and the discharge application preferred by the petitioner was rejected. 

Justice Mishra recorded that in this case, neither entrustment of property nor dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction was discernible from the allegations made in the F.I.R. The dispute, arose out of an alleged breach of contractual obligations relating to sale of a motor vehicle and does not disclose the commission of either offence. A plain reading of the First Information Report did not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 503 and 504 Indian Penal Code. Except for a bald allegation of abuse and threat, there is no material to indicate intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace as required under Section 504 Indian Penal Code, nor are the allegations sufficient to constitute criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 503 Indian Penal Code punishable under Section 506 Indian Penal Code. The case fell squarely within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute any offence and where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or exerting pressure." 

Justice Mishra also concluded: "Continuation of the criminal proceeding, in the facts of the present case, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and would warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court."

The prosecution case was that Anil Kumar Chaudhary, the opposite party No.2 (informant), being the registered owner of a Bolero Pick-up Van bearing Registration No. BR-09M-4666, alleged that on August 1, 2016 the petitioner had approached him with a proposal to purchase the said vehicle. The sale consideration was settled at Rs.4,21,000/-, whereupon the petitioner allegedly issued a cheque of Rs.2,50,000/- towards part payment and agreed to pay the remaining Rs.1,71,000/- within two weeks, whereafter possession of the vehicle was delivered to him. It is further alleged that when the cheque was presented for encashment on September 30, 2016, the same was dishonoured. Thereafter, on October 5, 2016, when O.P. No.2 approached the petitioner demanding either payment of the amount or return of the vehicle, the petitioner allegedly abused and threatened him with dire consequences and refused either to return the vehicle or to make payment, further stating that he would dispose of the vehicle as scrap. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, a written report was submitted by O.P. No.2 before the SHO, Vidyapatinagar Police Station, Samastipur, pursuant to which F.I.R bearing V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 was registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In Lalan Kumar v. The State of Bihar (Cr.Misc No. 37503 of 2023), the High Court has held that prosecution under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act can only be initiated by filing complaint. It was also submitted that no statutory demand notice, as mandated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was ever issued and, therefore, the very institution of criminal proceedings under the said provision is legally unsustainable. He further submitted that the Magistrate  mechanically took cognizance without due application of judicial mind and that the subsequent rejection of the discharge application also suffers from the same infirmity. It is, thus, submitted that both the impugned orders dated 05.03.2018 and 10.09.2018 be quashed along with the entire criminal proceeding.
 

Supreme Court reverses bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in SC/ST Act case from Nawada

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay, issued notice returnable on August 24. The order reads: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail in connection with Excl. Spl. SC/St Case No. 37/22 arising out of complaint case no. 37/2022 pending before Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Nawadah, Bihar, subject to their executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each, with one or more sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. However, the Petitioners are directed to cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so. List again on 24th August, 2026." 

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachu Das (supra), appellants’ prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail is rejected and this appeal stands dismissed. " 

In this case reliance was placed upon the decision dated February 3, 2014 by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471, wherein, the Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi considered the offence under Section 3(1), as well as the bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and, it concluded: "Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 

The Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State and counsel for Ram Binita Devi, the complainant/Respondent No. 2 submitted before the High Court that the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellants is not maintainable, as cognizance had already been taken by the trial court for the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 

The appeal in the Patna High Court was filed for setting aside order dated September 25, 2024 passed by the Special Judge, Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (POA) Act, Nawada in A.B.P. No. 2442 of 2024, which arose out of a complaint case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504, 506, 354B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, whereby the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants was rejected. Now the order by the trial court and by Justice Singh of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court. 

 

 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes criminal proceedings under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, holds prosecution to be a “counterblast”

In Ankit Kumar Sharma vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated May 16, 2026, wherein, he quashed criminal proceedings under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and IPC provisions, holding that the prosecution appeared to be a “counterblast” to an earlier dowry harassment complaint filed by one of the accused against her husband and in-laws. 

Justice Sinha concluded:"24. It is well settled principle that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment and private vendetta. The High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.... The learned Special Court has taken cognizance without appreciating the attending circumstances, and in mechanical manner. 27. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion and the attending circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that a vexatious, frivolous and malicious complaint has been instituted against the appellants with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance which is a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the wife/appellant no. 4 against her husband at Jaipur. The FIR was lodged by the domestic help/caretaker of the husband of appellant no. 4 and the same is in abuse of the process of Court to harass the appellants and the learned Special Court has taken cognizance without due application of judicial mind. Allowing the prosecution to continue will result in miscarriage of justice to the appellants. 28. In the result, the order taking cognizance dated 27.09.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Saran at Chapra and the entire prosecution arising out of Garhka P.S.Case No. 298 of 2020 against the appellants is hereby quashed."

Justice Sinha drew on the analytical framework laid down by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of UP (2025) SCC Online SC 1947, becomes highly relevant. The court delineated four steps to determine the veracity of a prayer gor quashing under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which are as follows:-

Step 1. Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

Step 2. Whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges leveled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

Step 3. Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant, and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

Step 4. Whether proceedings with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court and would not serve the ends of justice?

Justice Sinha observed: "If the answer to all the steps is in affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.22. In the present matter, it appears that respondent no. 2 has been set up by the husband and mother-in-law of appellant no. 4 to lodge the present FIR in order to take revenge for lodging FIR at Jaipur by appellant no. 4 against her husband and his family members. The informant has admitted in the FIR that she is domestic help/caretaker of the house of Late father of the husband of appellant no. 4. 23. The motive for instituting the FIR against the appellants appears to be at the behest of landlords/masters of the respondent no. 2, i.e., Manish Kumar and Meera Devi, in whose house the respondent no. 2 resides and work for profit. If attending circumstances, emerging from the record of the case, is taken into account and the FIR is read with due care and circumspection, this Court comes to the conclusion that the criminal prosecution has been lodged in order to wreck vengeance on appellant no. 4 and her entire family for instituting a case under Section 498A of the I.P.C against the masters/landlord of respondent no. 2, including the husband of appellant no. 4. The FIR is a counterblast and tool to harass the appellants by way of launching false and malicious prosecution."

The prosecution case, as per the FIR lodged by the informant, namely Kalawati Devi, was that she resides in the house of late Ramji Singh and she was a caretaker of his garmland and house. In June 2019, Manish Kumar, son of late Ramji Singh, was married with Shalini Sharma/appellant no. 4.

Ankit Sharma and Abhinesh Sharma appellant nos. 1 and 3, who are brothers of Shalini Sharma/appellant no.4, visited the house of late Ramji Singh and abused her, addressing her with her caste name and threatened to throw her belongings out of the house. It was alleged that on June 29, 2020, appellants, along with two unknown persons, arrived in a car from their village Baikuntpur, Vaishali. Upon arrival, Shailendra Sharma and Abhinesh Sharma started hurling caste-based abuses and threatened the informant to vacate the house. The informant requested for some time to make alternative arrangements and upon hearing this, appellant nos. 1 to 3 dragged the informant by her hair out on to the road, assaulted her and tore her saree in order to outrage her modesty. When the informant's husband intervened to save her, he was also assaulted by the appellants. The local people gathered at the spot after hearing noise. In the meanwhile, appellant no. 1 took out pistol, pointed it at the informant’s forehead and threatened her to vacate the house failing which she would face dire consequences.

Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]. 

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court appoints Justice Gita Mittal, as a Mediator to bring about settlement between IPS officers, Pushkar Anand, Nirmala Kumari and "non-matching of horoscope"

In ABC vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated November 4, 2025, wherein it concluded:'' we appoint Hon’ble Justice Gita Mittal, Former Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court to act as a Mediator so as to bring about some settlement between the parties. The parties shall get in touch with the learned Mediator and work out the necessary modalities for the purpose of mediation. The fees of the learned Mediator and other modalities shall be fixed in consultation with the parties. It shall be open for the learned Mediator to talk to the parties either in person or through video conferencing. We firmly believe that it will be in the interest of the parties to put an end to this long drawn litigation....37. We are of the view that since the parties are to sit, talk and reach to an amicable settlement, the settlement should be as a whole. In other words, what we want to convey is that the settlement should be comprehensive. 8. List after receipt of the mediation report.''

The Court's order recorded that the petitioner before it, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The respondent No.2, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the District Superintendent of Police. Since both were posted at one station and were unmarried, they came close and developed intimacy for each other. However, later the relations went sour. This led to registration of a First Information Report for the offences alleged therein at the instance of the petitioner.

The Court observed: ''2. We take notice of the fact that the criminal proceedings ultimately came to be quashed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna vide the impugned judgment and dated 18th September, 2024. It is this order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings which has been made subject matter of challenge before us in the present Special Leave Petition.''

The Supreme Court noticed the fact that a coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court had suggested that the parties should amicably resolve the disputes. Almost 11 years have passed by. During the interregnum, the respondent No.2 got married and is now a father of two children. The petitioner remains a spinster. The order reads: ''Whatever might have happened in the past, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we believe that this legal battle with each other is not going to be in the interest of the parties. 24. We are informed that the petitioner is also now of a rank of Superintendent of Police. Both have a long service ahead. In pursuance of what fell from this Court earlier, the parties did try to talk but with no positive outcome.''  

Earlier, in Pushkar Anand vs. The State of Bihar & Nirmala Kumari, Sub Divisional Police Officer, Bhabua (2025), Kaimur Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh delivered a 19-page long judgement dated September  18, 2024. 

It recollected that petitioner had moved this Court for quashing F.I.R. of Mahila Police Station case of 2014 vide Cr. Misc. No. 17457/2016 but during its pendency, order taking cognizance for the offence punishable under sections 376(C),  354(B), 506 and 509 of Indian Panel Code, was passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kaimur at Bhabhua. Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2019 was filed in the said case (Cr. Misc. No. 17457/2016) challenging cognizance order, but Cr.Mis.No. 17457/2016 was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 17.10.2019. The petition in the High Court was directed against order dated 01.04.2019, passed in connection with Mahila Police Station Case No. 47 of 2014, by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM), Kaimur at Bhabhua in connection with Mahila P.S. case of 2014, by which cognizance has been taken for the offences punishable under sections 376(C), 354(B), 506, 509 I.P.C. against the petitioner as well as for a direction to the court below not to proceed further after passing of the aforesaid order taking cognizance during the pendency of the present application before the High Court. 

The prosecution case giving rise to the case was that the informant/ opposite party no.2 is the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Bhabhua. It was alleged by her that only two days after her joining to the post of SDPO, Bhabua, on July 21, 2014 the petitioner who was Superintendent of Police, Kaimur at Bhabua started extending a friendly hand towards the informant through Facebook and WhatsApp messages. Since, the informant was posted as Sub- divisional Police Officer, Bhabhua, she developed a firm belief that the petitioner was seriously interested in marriage with her and she started talking to her family members. It was also alleged that since the petitioner started frequenting her residence, she gradually developed a close relationship with him and, thereafter, they also came into physical contact. After sometime, informant was also asked by the mother of the petitioner to convey her date and time of her birth so that chances of matching of horoscope could be explored before solemnizing the marriage. It was during this period that the petitioner and the informant developed physical relations with each other and the intimacy continued till the day, when the petitioner refused proposal of marriage stating that the horoscope did not tally and she was having "Mangla-mangli Dosh". It was further alleged by the informant that on the pretext of marriage, the petitioner tortured her mentally and physically and when he threatened to spoil her career as a police officer in his official capacity, she lodged the present case. After institution of FIR, police completed investigation and submitted charge sheet dated November 30, 2018 for offences punishable under sections 376(C), 354A, 506 and 509 of the IPC against the petitioner only. Charge sheet was not submitted against father and mother of the petitioner as the allegation was found patently false and nothing could be found against them.

The counsel for the petitioner, while placing the facts of the case, denied the accusations made by opposite party no.2 against the petitioner. He submitted that the case was lodged by opposite party no.2 only as a vendetta to the petitioner's action in taking up disciplinary proceedings against the opposite party no.2. FIR was lodged on December 29, 2014 and just prior thereto on December 27, 2014, the petitioner as a Superintendent of Police, Kaimur at Bhabua had initiated disciplinary proceeding against her vide Letter No. 402 dated December 27, 2014. Consequently, faced with such a situation, she lodged the present case making malicious and baseless allegations against the petitioner with the sole intention of not only tarnishing his reputation, but also to ruin his career as an IPS Officer. During course of investigation, on January 2, 2015 opposite party no.2 was placed before a Medical Board and was examined at Sadar Hospital, Bhabua after taking her consent. Medical Board, after due examination of the informant, submitted its report in which allegation of sexual contact was not substantiated against the petitioner.  Meanwhile, petitioner preferred pre-arrest bail petition before the High Court vide Cr.Misc. No. 20.5.2016 in which the Court, while granting interim protection to the petitioner, directed the medical examination of opposite party no.2 to be conducted by a Board of female gynecologists, nominated by the Principal or Principal In-charge/Superintendent/In-charge Superintendent, Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna. The High Court's judgement records: "It is worthwhile to state that earlier, opposite party no.2 had expressed some reservations with respect to the Medical Board which had submitted its report, saying that the medical report was neither clear nor distinct and was thus wholly false. However, this time opposite party no.2 did not appear before the Medical Board and declined to face any further medical examination (annexure 4), rather she filed an affidavit dated 7.9.2016 to the effect that she was asked to appear before the Medical Board by this Court without taking her consent for the same. She further averred that report and other materials collected during investigations are already on record, hence no further medical examination is required at this stage for deciding the pre-arrest bail petition. This Court, having no option, relied on the medical examination report and other materials collected on the record, confirmed the interim bail to the petitioner vide order dated 8.9.2016." 

The case diary showed that when the Investigating Officer asked opposite party no.2 to give certain clarifications and also to hand over her mobile phone to send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory for certification and for verification of electronic messages, sent or received either on WhatsApp or through SMS referred to in the FIR, she refused to give the same and told the IO of the case to consult her after 05.05.2016, for reasons best known to her. The counsel contended that in view of the provisions of law, without such certification, such electronic messages cannot be considered to be authentic and could not be used as an evidence against the petitioner.

It was also submitted by the counsel of the petitioner that since the petitioner had taken administrative action against the informant and reported the matter to the Additional Director General, Police Headquarters vide Memo dated December 27, 2014, the informant in counter blast lodged the FIR against the petitioner. The counsel submitted that it can be concluded that facts of the case do not corroborate the prosecution case against the petitioner and in such condition, continuance of criminal proceeding would be abuse of process of court.

The counsel for the petitioner, formulated two issues for the consideration of the Court−
(I). Whether the offence of rape in terms of section 376 (c) IPC as alleged in the FIR is made out and;
(II). Whether there is a misconception of fact in terms of section 90 of the IPC which vitiates consent in the present case or whether there is merely a breach of promise to marry simplicitor.

The counsel for the petitioner addressed the first issue. He placed averments made in the FIR as well as the medical report of opposite party no.2 and the affidavit filed by her, flatly refusing to undergo any further medical examination, to buttress and substantiate his contention that there was no physical relation between the petitioner and informant at all. The entire edifice of prosecution case falls apart, which indisputably shows the prosecution of the petitioner.

The counsel submitted that if the allegation levelled in the FIR assuming to be true, while not admitting, then it must be borne in mind that if there was, at all, physical relation between the parties, it was purely a consensual kind because the petitioner has never resiled from his commitment to get married, rather due to circumstances beyond control of the parties, marriage could not be solemnized on account of mis-match of the Janampatrika (Janam-kundli, horoscope). It was very much evident from the FIR that informant herself informed about good behaviour and habits of the petitioner to her family members. The date of birth and Kundli of the informant was given to the petitioner’s mother for matching of Kundli and since things were moving in right direction and relation was supposed to culminate in marriage, the two got intimate but when informant’s family asked about fixing date of marriage, the same was refused by the petitioner’s family on the ground of non-matching of horoscope. In the society, matching of Janampatrika/horoscope was vital social obligation for solemnizing marriage.

He averred that if at all there was any relationship between the parties it was purely consensual. He also submitted that the consent with respect to section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. This understanding of consent has also been set out in Explanation II of section 375 of IPC. 

The counsel submitted that there was a clearcut distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which was made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. He pointed out that where the promise to marry was false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the act. 

1In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana (2013 7 SCC 675), Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharastra & anr. (Cr. Appeal No.1165 of 2019 order dated 21.08.2019) and Sonu@ Subhash Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr. (Cr. Appeal No. 233 of 2021 order dated 01.03.2021).

He also drew attention of the Court to paragraph 9 of the judgment delivered by Supreme Court in case of Sonu (supra) which is reproduced herein under:
“9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), while dealing with a similar situation, the principles of law which must govern a situation like the present were enunciated in the following observations:
"Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it..."
10. Further, the Court has observed:
"To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

The counsel submitted that the contents of the FIR as well as the medical evidence left no doubt that, on the basis of the allegations as they stand, three important features emerge:
(i) The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature;
(ii) The parties were in the relationship for about a period of 5 months; and
(iii) Subsequently, the marriage couldn't be solemnised on account of mis-match of their horoscope which
was the circumstance beyond the control of the petitioner, leading to the lodging of the present FIR.

It was also the case of the petitioner that in the entire FIR, there was no allegation that the petitioner ever committed act of criminal intimidation attracting offence punishable under section 506 of the IPC. Similarly, there was no allegation against the petitioner of insulting the modesty of opposite party no.2 or uttering any words, making any sound or gesture or exhibited any object or intruded upon the privacy of opposite party no.2 which was an offence punishable under section 509 of the IPC. 

The counsel submitted that no case under sections 506 and 509 of the IPC was made out against the petitioner.  Thus, the punctilious analysis of the entire gamut of factual-medical evidence left no doubt with respect to the falsity and concoctedness of the allegations which unflinchingly pointed towards to the malicious prosecution of the petitioner.  He submitted that the Investigating Officer of the case, in a hurry and hasty manner, without completing the investigation on all the points, submitted charge sheet relying upon few paragraphs of the case diary and even these paragraphs are accepted, then also, no case is made out against the petitioner. More so, court did not apply its judicial mind at all before passing order of cognizance alleged U/ss 376(C), 354(B), 506, 509 I.P.C. As such, allegation of inducement and commission of rape was not made out against the petitioner and in such circumstance, High Court can exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice.

The counsel for the State and the counsel for the informant/ opposite party no.2 opposed the prayer of the petitioner. The latter submitted that apart from filing the FIR, opposite party no.2 also made a complaint before the department upon which, in the light of direction of the Supreme Court for prevention of women from sexual abuse at the work place, the matter was taken up by the Internal Enquiry Committee headed by Inspector General of Police constituted under "The Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Place (Prevention, Prohibition and redressal) Act, 2013" and who enquired the matter in detail. During course of enquiry, statements of several witnesses were recorded by the committee and after detailed enquiry the Committee found the allegation made by opposite party no.2 to be true and hence recommended for initiation of departmental action against the petitioner. This fact would be evident from enquiry report which was communicated to the O.P no.2 on June 16, 2015. 

The counsel for opposite party no.2 alleged that from perusal of enquiry report, it would be evident that petitioner not only committed sexual abuse with the opposite party no.2 but also played with the sentiment of so many girls on the pretext of marriage and such fact would be evident from an affidavit submitted before the Committee by one Richa Mishra. That apart, during course of investigation, the Investigating officer recorded statement of the concerned persons. Their statements showed that the petitioner, misusing his official position, made physical relation with the opposite party no.2 on the pretext of marriage deceitfully. After investigation, I.O submitted charge sheet against the petitioner under section 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C and thereafter considering the material collected by the IO in course of the investigation including the material available in the enquiry report of the Internal Enquiry Committee, the S.D.J.M, Kaimur at Bhabhua opined that more than prima facie material is available against the petitioner and consequently he was pleased to take cognizance of the offence punishable under section 376 (c), 354(B),506,509 of the Indian Penal Code. 

On going through the impugned cognizance order, it would transpire that the S.D.J.M thoroughly perused the material submitted by the IO through his Police report and referred to the case diary in the cognizance order and thus cognizance order. From perusal of the FIR, it was reflected that there was sufficient material on record against the petitioner and it cannot be said that prima facie no case was made out against this petitioner. 

The counsel submitted that the Supreme Court's decision in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 6 SCC 2014 SCC 466, held that while the High Court had the power to quash FIRs, it should be cautious in cases involving serious offenses like rape. The court emphasized that the gravity of the offense must be taken into account. Hence, no interference is required by this court at this stage.

Thr High Court observed: "20. In this case, there is specific and direct allegation against the petitioner that on the allurement of marriage, the petitioner committed rape on opposite party no.2. No sooner the FIR dated 29.12.2014 was lodged, opposite party no.2 was examined by the Medical Board at Sadar Hospital, Bhabua on 2.1.2015 after taking her consent. Medical report opines that Fourchette found intact and membrane too was found intact. Meanwhile, opposite party no.2 raised finger on the Medical report, whereupon, this Court while hearing anticipatory bail petition of the petitioner vide order dated 20.5.2016, directed for another medical examination of opposite party no.2 to be conducted by a Board of female gynecologists, nominated by the Principal or Principal In-charge/Superintendent/In-charge Superintendent, Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna. But this time, opposite party no.2 did not turn up for her medical examination, rather she filed and affidavit dated 7.9.2016 stating that when the earlier medical report is already on the on record, hence no further medical examination is required at this stage. 21. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that opposite party no.2 was in relationship with the petitioner for quite sometime. It is also admitted that when the relationship started, both parties were major and opposite party no.2 had willingly been staying with the petitioner and established physical relation. Now, if the relationship is not working out for the reasons beyond control of the parties, it cannot be a ground for lodging a case against the petitioner for offence punishable under section 376 of the IPC. Hence, initiation of criminal proceeding by the informant against the petitioner is wholly unwarranted.''

Justice Singh relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra). 

Justice Singh found substance in the submission of counsel for the petitioner that the proposal of marriage of opposite party no.2 was refused by the petitioner because of the reason which was not in control of the petitioner. Opposite party no.2 has herself mentioned in the FIR that petitioner’s parents asked opposite party no.2 to provide the information regarding time, date and place of her birth to match the Janampatrika/horoscope for solemnization of marriage and when the Janampatrika/horoscope mismatched, then only proposal of marriage was refused by the petitioner side. 

Justice relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013 7 SCC 675) in which it was held that ‘there may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not alway amount to misconception of fact.’ 

Supreme Court in Sonu @Subhash Kumar held that the Court can consider the application for quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., if there was no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. In the case in hand, it appeared from the contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of petitioner to marry opposite party no.2 which gave rise to the registration of the FIR.

Justice Singh observed: "The Court cannot brush aside the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that no proper investigation of the case was done. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that when the Investigating Officer asked opposite party no.2 to give certain clarifications and also to hand over her mobile phone to send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory for certification and for verification of electronic messages, sent or received either on WhatsApp or through SMS referred to in the FIR, she refused to give the same and told the IO of the case to consult her after 05.05.2016, for reasons best known to her. There is substance in the submission of learned counsel that in view of the provisions of law, without such certification, such electronic messages cannot be considered to be authentic and could not be used as an evidence against the petitioner as alleged in the FIR. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh [2013] 14 S.C.R. 713 has emphasized the importance of proper investigation in cases of serious offenses, particularly against women." 

The High Court referred to the Supreme Court in a number of decisions that (1) where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. It was also been held that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding was maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the same cannot make out a case against the accused. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of Supreme Court, rendered in case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604.

Will reliance "matching of horoscope" constitute a valid scientific ground for decision making?

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh takes oath as judge of Patna High Court

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh administers the oath of office to Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh. He was transferred to Patna High Court on October 30, 2025. The President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India had issued an order of transfer on October 14, 2025 from Allahabad High Court to Patna High Court. Some 11 judges from Allahabad High Court accompanied him to witness his oath taking ceremony. The notification dated October 14, 2025 in this regard was issued by Jagannath Srinivasaan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The notification reads:''In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judge, Allahabad High Court, to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.' Justice Singh enrolled as an Advocate on May 9, 1993 in Bar Council, U.P. and practiced in the Allahabad High Court. He was appointed as Additional Judge on November 22,2018 in the Allahabad High Court. He took oath as Permanent Judge on November 20, 2020. He will retire on January 20, 2031.

Justice Singh reached Patna after the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court on October 17, 2025. 

In Dhanajay Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), Justice Singh delivered a 35-page long order dated April 27, 2024, upon hearing the prayer made to stay the operation and effect of the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 of the appellants and to enlarge them on bail during pendency of the criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court, he concluded:''the prayer for stay of operation and effect of judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of appellant No.1 is refused and is hereby rejected. 42. Since prayer for stay of impugned judgment of conviction with regard to appellant No.2 (who is not a political person or government servant) has not been pressed during argument, therefore, his case has not been dealt with in this regard.'' 

Coincidentally, his transfer order has been issued in  the aftermath of his order against Dhananjay Singh. This order's mentioning in the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court underlines its significance. Is it similar to the transfer of Justice (Dr.) S. Muralidhar from Delhi High Court?  

This order was passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application (For Suspension of Sentence) under Section 389 (1) Cr.P.C. The appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellants-Dhananjay Singh and Santosh Vikram Singh against the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-IV/Special Judge, MP/MLA, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 109 of 2020 (State Vs. Dhananjay Singh and another) which arose out of Case Crime No. 142 of 2020, Police Station Line Bazar, District Jaunpur, convicting and sentencing the appellants as under :-
(a) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 364 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment.
(b) Five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence under Section 386 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, three months' additional imprisonment.
(c) One year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, one month's additional imprisonment.
(d) Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, forty five days’ additional imprisonment.
(e) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Justice Singh noted that at present ten cases are still pending against Dhananjay Singh, the appellant No. 1. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584, wherein the Court held that “though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the code, its exercise should be limited to very exception Cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the court has a duty to look at all aspect including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.”

Justice referred to Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, wherein the accused was convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of Prevention of corruption Act. He filed an appeal before the High Court, which has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non-suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service. On appeal, the Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that the High Court had mechanically passed the order by suspending the conviction and the discretion ought not to have been exercise by the High Court by passing such an order suspending the conviction.

He drew on Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan, (2003)12 SCC 432, which had relied on the decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 to reiterate that only in exceptional cases, the Court should exercise the power of stay of conviction.

Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, it was observed: “Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is that requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspect and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.''

He recollected paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ravi Kant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673, wherein the Court held that “it deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case.”

Justice Singh also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 787, wherein the petitioner Sanjay Dutt was charged under various sections of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act. He was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 read with Sections 25(IA) and 25(IB) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, he was granted bail on February 28, 2007. Thereafter, he had filed application under Section 389 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. In the petition, it was mentioned that he belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and that the petitioner is now desirous of contesting election of the House of People from Lucknow Parliament Constituency and in view of Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, he has incurred disqualification from contesting the election for becoming a member of either House of Parliament. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner be suspended to enable him to contest the election. The Court declined his prayer and held that “Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) ) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. xxxxxxx “ In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner, In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. “

In the penultimate paragraph of his order, Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's decision in Shyam Narain Pandey V. State of U.P. (2012) SCC 384. The Court observed: “ In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant , the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed etc and his rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” The appellant Shyam Narain Pandey was a Principal of an institution, who was inter alia, convicted for murder. 

He also referred to Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384, wherein the Court held: “Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.”

Relying on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Singh observed:''40. It is often seen that after conviction of a person who was or is Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament, used to take a general plea for stay of operation and effect of his conviction that he wants to contest election and in case the judgment of his conviction is not stayed, he will be deprived of his right to contest the election which will result in irreparable loss and injury to him, but this Court feels that each and every case has to be decided on its own merit as well as considering all the surrounding circumstances and other attending factors including gravity of offences, nature of previous criminal history etc. No uniform and straight-jacket formula can be laid down for stay of conviction in all the cases. The parameter and legal position for stay of execution of sentence/bail and stay of conviction are different. Now it is the need of hour to have purity in politics, therefore for staying the judgment of conviction, the Courts should exercise its discretionary power sparingly with caution in a rare and appropriate cases. The purpose sought to be achieved by enacting disqualification on conviction for certain offences is to prevent person with criminal background from entering into politics and governance. Persons with criminal background pollute the process of election as they have no reservation from indulging in criminality to win an election. When persons having long criminal history turn into elected representatives and become law maker, they pose a serious threat to the functioning of a democratic system. The very future of our democracy gets imperilled when such offenders masquerade as leaders making a travesty of the entire system. The increasing trend of criminalisation of politics is dangerous and has steadily been eating into the vitals of our democratic polity along with growing corruption of a humongous nature. Considering the facts of this case that the appellant No.1 has secured acquittal in 28 criminal cases due to reasons that witnesses turned hostile as pointed out on behalf of the State, which has not been controverted on behalf of the accused-appellant No.1 and that there is no dispute that at present, 10 criminal cases (as noted in Chart-B) are still pending against him, I do not find any good ground, special reason or exceptional case to stay the operation and effect of impugned judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of the appellant No.1-Dhananjay Singh.'

While at Allahabad High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous bail application, in August 2021, in UP since there was no practice of recording the statement of victim of sexual offenses  by audio video means despite amendment made in the year 2009 in section 161 of CrP.C., Justice Singh issued directions to the state’s director general of police and principal secretary (Home) to issue guidelines to all SSPs on compliance with statutory provisions provided in first and second provisos to CrPC Section 161(3) within two months. He observed  that “in majority of cases”, provisions of CrPC Section 161(3), which make it mandatory for police to have rape or molestation victims’ statements recorded by a woman officer and through audio-video recording, are not being followed. The two provisions under the said CrPC section say that a statement may also be recorded by audio video electronics means and that in cases of rape and molestation, it should be recorded by a woman police officer.

In a criminal appeal he found that the handwritten reports are difficult to be correctly read. Justice Singh' order dated August 30, 2022 directed that all the postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued. During the postmortem examination there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for the purpose. After the order, all the postmodern and injury reports are being typed throughout the state of UP which is not only beneficial to the advocates but also to the general public.