Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in a theft and IT Act case from Gopalganj

In Sharvan Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha delivereda 8-page long judgment dated July 20, 2026, wherein, he set aside order by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj. justice Jha concluded: "10....it is clear that only on the basis of evidences as surfaced during any inquiry or trial of an offence, a summon can be issued to any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. 11. In the present case, summon was not issued against petitioner on the basis of evidences surfaced during the trial. None of the prosecution witnesses have said anything incriminating during the trial against this petitioner, rather petitioner himself examined as PW-7. Interestingly, on the basis of petition of accused only, otherwise having all opportunity to examine himself on oath under section 315 of the Cr.P.C., this petitioner was summoned as an accused through impugned order, which is a perverse finding contrary to the settled position of law. 12. In view of aforesaid and by taking legal report of Hon’ble Apex Court in Neeraj Kumar’ case (supra), the impugned order dated 13.07.2018 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with T.R. No. 1640/2018 arising out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015, is hereby quashed and set-aside qua petitioner. 13. Accordingly, this quashing petition stands allowed." The respondent no.2 was Surendra Nath Pandey. 

The judgement was passed upon hearing the petition filed for quashing the impugned order dated July 13, 2018 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gopalganj in connection with Tr. No. 1640/18 which arose out of Hathua P.S. Case No. 106 of 2015 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the Information Technology Act, whereby and whereunder on application of accused Rahul Kumar Jha, lC.J.M. issued summon against the petitioner to face the trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The prosecution case was that as per FIR, informant alleged that Rs. 11,00,000/- was withdrawn in between April 30, 2015 to June 22, 2015 by the IRCTC from his Bank Account of State Bank of India, Hathua Branch. It was alleged that informant was a retired teacher and when he came to the Bank and verify his account, then, he came to know that fraud which was committed with his account. On the basis of written report, a First Information Report was lodged with Hathua Police Station. After lodging the FIR, police started investigation and submitted charge-sheet only against co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences punishable under Sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and section 66(C) of the I.T. Act and investigation was kept pending to verify the I.P. address and on other points. Thereafter, trial court took cognizance only against accused Rahul Kumar Jha for the offences under sections 420 & 379 of the I.P.C. and Section 66(C) of the I.T. Act.

The petitioner 's counsel submitted that after taking cognizance the trial of the case begins with Tr. No. 1640/18 before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj, where altogether seven (7) prosecution witnesses were examined and out of seven prosecution witnesses, this petitioner was also examined as PW-7 on 03.04.2018. It was pointed out that none of the prosecution witnesses, PW-1 to PW-6 named this petitioner qua his any involvement with the crime in question during the trial and the petitioner was examined as prosecution witness No.7, for the reason that he was the distributor of Cable Internet Connection through his company namely, M/s ANI Network Pvt. Ltd. to co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha, who alleged to misappropriate the amount of Rs. 11 Lakhs from the account of the informant for purchasing railway tickets and, thereafter, transferring the amount to his own account after cancellation of purchased railway tickets. It was submitted that co-accused Rahul Kumar Jha was not examined before the learned trial court in view of section 315 of the Cr.P.C., rather he made one application before the court of learned CJM, Gopalganj on 03.04.2018, stating therein that this petitioner may be summoned as an accused,which was allowed by the impugned order dated July 13, 2018. 

The counsel also relied upon ‘Para 7’ of the legal report of Supreme Court in Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639, which reads as under for better appreciation of the legal position in connection with issuance of summon under section 319 Cr.P.C. :-“7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite.
7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [(2014) 3 SCC 92] extensively discussed the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is
extracted hereunder: “90. … all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been
involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
xxx
106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. …

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110. In Lal Suraj [Lal Suraj v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844], a two-Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been chargesheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 CrPC. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram [Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh, (2006) 10 SCC 192 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 532 : AIR 2006 SC 1892], wherein it was held that a person, though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. …. …… ……”

Sections 420, 406 IPC cannot travel together, Police, courts failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or violation of contractual terms: Supreme Court

In Rikhab Birani vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench  passed a 15-page long judgement dated April 16, 2025 observed that "The chargesheet in the present case is bereft of particulars and details required and mandated in terms of Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It merely reproduces the contents of the FIR which makes reference to the payments made as well as the allegation that in the revenue records, the godown in question was recorded in the name of Rakesh Birani, the son of the appellant, Rikhab Birani. It is noted that the appellant, Rikhab Birani, informed the complainant that Rakesh Birani had expired. The complainant had then requested refund of money, etc. However, the FIR does not state the material and evidence available and collected during the course of the investigation to establish the offences under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504 and 506 of the IPC. Clearly, the ingredients of the aforesaid are not established and made out. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the impugned judgment/order and allow the present appeal quashing the FIR and the resultant proceedings, including the chargesheet."

The judgement reads:"We clarify that the present appeal only deals with the question of criminal offence. We have not commented or made any observations on the civil rights of complainant-respondent No.2. We are also constrained to impose costs of ₹50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) on the State of Uttar Pradesh as, in spite of repeated judgments/orders of this Court, we are being flooded with cases of civil wrongs being made the subject matter of criminal proceedings by filing chargesheets, etc. These costs will be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh...."

The Court observed:"We are constrained to pass this detailed speaking order, as it is noticed that, notwithstanding the law clearly laid down by this Court on the difference between a breach of contract and the criminal offence of cheating, we are continuously flooded with cases where the police register an FIR, conduct investigation and even file chargesheet(s) in undeserving cases. During the last couple of months, a number of judgments/orders have been pronounced by this Court, especially in cases arising from the State of Uttar Pradesh, deprecating the stance of the police as well as the courts in failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard to and violation of contractual terms; and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which are quite different and requires mens rea at the time when the contract is entered into itself to not abide by the terms thereof."

In V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.(2009) 3 SCC 78, the Court observed that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of contract. 

Similar judgements have been delivered in S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960  Hari Prasad Chamaria vs. Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, AIR 1998 SC 128. 

Supreme Court finds second anticipatory bail petition maintainable, reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

 

In Digvijay Narayan vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 4-page long order dated May 4, 2025, wherein, it reversed the order dated February 9, 2026 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. While issuing notice on April 7, 2026, by way of interim relief, the Supreme Court had issued direction for not taking coercive steps subject to cooperation in the investigation. 

The Court's order reads:"....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail....we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the Station House Officer of the concerned police station." 

Justice Singh's order had dismissed the second anticipatory bail petition as not maintainable, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in of G.R. Ananda Babu vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 176.  The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a FIR dated November 29, 2024 registered at Police Station Industrial Area, District Vaishali, for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Justice Singh's order dated August 27, 2025 with respect to the first anticipatory bail application had rejected it. It recorded the prosecution case, wherein, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with other accused persons, had fraudulently mutated the land of informant in the name of others on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. The counsel of petitioner had submitted that petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. the petitioner was falsely implicated in this case merely because at the relevant time, the petitioner was posted as Revenue Clerk. The order had noted that the petitioner had two criminal antecedents. The order reads: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, nature of accusation and criminal antecedents of the petitioner, the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner is rejected."

Supreme Court's order has directed the petitioner to join the investigation as and when required and co-operate in the same abiding all the conditions as specified under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C./Section 482 of BNSS.

Supreme Court sets aside onerous condition imposed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma while granting anticipatory bail

In Vinay Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N. K Singh passed a 4-page long order dated March 25, 2026, wherein it concluded: "5. The appeal lies in a narrow compass. While granting anticipatory bail to the appellant, a condition has been imposed by the High Court vide the impugned order to the effect that the appellant shall pay a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- to the informant. Alleging the said condition to be onerous as the High Court has not considered it in the proper prospective, the present appeal is filed. 6. We find force in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. When the condition imposed while granting anticipatory bail is onerous, the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law, especially, when we are dealing with a case pertaining to the liberty of a person. 7. In such view of the matter, the impugned condition with respect to the payment of a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- stands set aside and the appeal is allowed, accordingly." The Court allowed the appeal after condoning the delay in case from Siwan pertaining to offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860..

In his 5-page long order dated Jnaury 23, 2025, Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma had concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and petitioner has clean antecedent, let the petitioner, above named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the court below within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000 (Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan in connection with Mairwa P.S. Case No.03 of 2023, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure/Section 482(2) of BNSS,2023 and with other following conditions:-(I) At the time of furnishing bail bond, the petitioner shall deposit Rs.1,50,000/-(Rs.One Lac Fifty Thousand) by way of demand draft in favour of the informant and the learned Trial Court is directed to hand over the said demand  draft to the informant or his representative and petitioner shall pay rest amount of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rs. One Lac Ten Thousand) to the informant in the month of February, 2025. If the petitioner fails to pay the rest amount within the aforesaid period, the informant shall be at liberty to move before the learned court below for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner. (II) Petitioner shall co-operate in the trial and shall be properly represented on each and every date fixed by the Court and shall remain physically present as directed by the Court and on his/her absence on two consecutive dates without sufficient reason, his/her bail bond shall be cancelled by the Court below. (III) If the petitioner tampers with the evidence or the witnesses, in that case, the prosecution will be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail. (IV) And, further condition that the court below shall verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner and in case at any stage, it is found that the petitioner has concealed his/her criminal antecedent, the court below shall take step for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner. However, the acceptance of bail bonds in terms of the above-mentioned order shall not be delayed for purpose of or in the name of verification." 

Now Supreme Court has set aside the onerous condition imposed by Justice Verma.    

Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey in a NDPS case involving recovery of 1.025 kg charas from co-accused

In Manish Yadav vs.The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi passed a 4-page order dated November 20, 2025, wherein, it allowed the appeal. The order reads: "The order passed by the High Court rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant in connection with Case No. 820 of 2023 is set aside. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case."

The criminal appeal had arisen from an order dated May 15, 2025 passed by Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court which had rejected the regular bail prayer of the appellant in connection with a NDPS case at P.S. Motihari Town, East Champaran.

The appellant's counsel submitted that nothing incriminating was recovered from the appellant and his complicity came to light only on the basis of confessional statement of the co-accused. It was submitted that he was also been implicated in one similar case wherein he was released on bail. The counsel for the respondent opposed the bail prayer but could not demonstrate as to whether anything incriminating was recovered from the appellant.

Supreme Court observed: "6. In such circumstances, having regard to the nature of allegations qua the appellant, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to allow this appeal and direct release of the appellant on bail pending trial." 

In Manish Yadav vs.The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Pandey of High Court had passed a 2-page long order dated May 15, 2025, wherein, he refused the bail considering the facts and circumstances as well as the gravity of the allegation, saying, "I do not think it to be a fit case for bail, which is hereby rejected."

The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking regular bail for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 465, 483/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 8/20(b)(ii)(c), 25, 29 of the NDPS Act. It was alleged that 1.025 kg of charas was recovered from the possession of co-accused Avinash Yadav @ Abu Yadav. During interrogation, he disclosed the name of the petitioner as his associate, who was the pillion rider and managed to flee away. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that that the petitioner is innocent and falsely been implicated in this case. He also further submitted that his name figured in confessional statement of co-accused Avinash Yadav @ Abu Yadav, who was arrested at the spot and from his possession 1.025 kg of charas was recovered. The petitioner was under custody since August 8, 2024. The APP for the State had opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioner was also accompanying co-accused Avinash Yadav @ Abu Yadav from whose possession, the alleged contraband in commercial quantity was recovered. The petitioner had a criminal antecedent of similar nature. 

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Soni Shrivastava, grants bail

In Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi passed a 2-page long order dated September 17, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"it is provided that if the petitioner appears before the concerned Magistrate within three weeks from today and submits bail bonds, to the satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate, he shall be released on bail." It has issued notice, returnable on November 12, 2025. 

Before the Supreme Court, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that in respect of executing sale deed in favour of his wife by acting on a power of attorney executed by complainant’s husband when he was no more alive. The petitioner was not aware about the death of complainant’s husband. Moreover, the sale deed was executed in part performance of an earlier agreement between the parties.

In Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justice Soni Shrivastava of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated June 18, 2025, wherein, she concluded:"by his fraudulent act, the petitioner no.1 has kept a widow running from pillar to post for her land and hence for such offence, the petitioner no.1 who has executed the sale deed does not deserve the benefit of anticipatory bail and the application is rejected with respect to petitioner no.1 Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar." 

The petitioners including Sayed Badi Asghar @Syed Badie Asghar had approached the High Court apprehend their arrest in connection with Patna Complaint Case no. 4634C of 2022 registered under sections 420, 409, 418, 423, 467, 468, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case of the prosecution was that husband of the opposite party no.2/complainant Attorney in favour of petitioner no.1 Sayed Badi Asgar for selling his lands. It was alleged that despite the fact that husband of the opposite party no.2/complainant had died and yet based on the Power of Attorney, Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar, the petitioner no.1 executed sale deed in respect of land in question in favour of his wife Sheema Nezami (petitioner no.2) and one Salma Khatoon. It was submitted that husband of opposite party no.2/complainant had made a deed of agreement with petitioner no.1 for the sale of land and subsequently, a Power of Attorney had been executed in favour of petitioner no.1 for the sale of property. The petitioner no.1 had already paid the full consideration amount in the account of husband of opposite party no.2/complainant and her son. He also submitted on their behalf that the case was purely of civil nature and the opposite party/complainant has alternative civil remedies which are being pursued by the complainant by filing a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 191 of 2022. The petitioners have no criminal antecedent and undertake to co-operate in the case/trial.

The counsel for opposite party no.2/complainant submitted that a fraud has been committed by the petitioners as petitioner no. 1 was fraudulently executed sale deed with respect to the land in question in favour of his own wife who was petitioner no.2 and one Salma Khatoon even after having knowledge of the fact that husband of opposite party no.2/complainat who had executed a Power of Attorney in favor of petitioner no.1 had already died and hence, no action could be taken on the said Power of Attorney. It was submitted that deed of agreement which was mentioned in the petition was already cancelled. 

Notably, the application for grant of anticipatory bail of the co-accused Yusuf Abdullah was already rejected by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court vide order dated September 18, 2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 41877 of 2023. 

Justice Shrivastava had observed: ''It appears that the instant case is kept pending for a long time on the ground that the petitioners would approach the opposite party no.2/complainant and get the matter settled.'' 

Supreme Court modifies conditional order of bail delivered by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh because dispute is civil in nature

 

In Prince Raj vs. The State of Bihar and Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta modified order of Single judge Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court dated September 20, 2022 to set aside the condition of deposit. The second respondent was Rajeev Kumar. 

The case is related to police station Jakkanpur, Patna. Rajeev Kumar, the petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 420, 406, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. By filing supplementary affidavit dated September 16, 2022, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner is ready to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 85 lacs to the informant in next 15 months in installments. The petitioner stated that amount claimed by the informant in the First Information Report is also the subject matter of title suit no. 211 of 2021. The counsel for the informant had submitted that payment made by the petitioner may not prejudice case of the informant. Considering the undertaking of the petitioner given in the supplementary allowed. In the event of arrest/surrender within six week, the High Court had enlarged the petitioner on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate I cum Sub-Judge I, Patna in Jakkanpur Police Station Case No. 367 of 2021, subject to the conditions laid down under section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure along with following conditions:
Receipt of payment of Rs. 5 lacs to the informant would be furnished by the petitioner at the time of processing of bail bond.
Rest amount of Rs. 80 lacs would be paid by the petitioner in next 15 months in installments.

The High Court made it clear that if the petitioner violates the conditions of the bail order, the court below shall cancel his bail bonds.

The Supreme Court's 3-page long order dated May 7, 2025 reads:"we are, prima facie, of the view that the dispute is civil in nature and, as such, the High Court has rightly granted protection to respondent no.2. 6. Since the appellant himself has expressed that the condition of deposit is prejudicing his right, we accordingly set aside the condition of deposit. However, the relief of interim protection granted by the High Court to respondent no.2 shall remain as it is. The impugned order passed by the High Court stands modified to the above extent."

The grievance of the appellant was that the High Court having directed respondent no.2 to make the deposit is in effect prejudicing the right of the appellant in a suit for specific performance pending before the Civil Court.