In HDFC Bank vs. The State of Bihar, Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan quashed and set aside the judgment and order dated June 8, 2022 passed by Justice Partha Sarthy, the Single Bench of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement dated October 22, 2024 reads: "We are of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant-bank would cause undue hardship to the appellant-bank." Besides the State of Bihar, there were four respondents namely, DGP, Patna, SP, Patna, the Officer In Charge and Priyanka Sharma, Deputy Director of Income Tax (INV).
The Court also quashed and set aside the First Information Report being Case No. 549 of 2021 registered at Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna on November 22, 2021, against certain officials of the appellant-bank working at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna for the offences punishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. Notably, a written complaint to the SHO, Gandhi Maidan Police Station seeking to register an FIR against Sunita Khemka and the concerned bank officials on the ground that the order dated October 5, 2021 had been violated owing to the unlawful operation of the locker of Sunita Khemka.
On October 5, 2021, an order under Section 132(3) of the Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961 was served upon the Branch Manager of the appellant-bank at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna by the concerned Authorized Officer, thereby directing the said branch of the appellant-bank to stop the operation of any bank lockers, bank accounts and fixed deposits standing in the names of Sunil Khemka (HUF), Sunita Khemka and Shivani Khemka, among several other individuals and entities, with immediate effect. It was further clarified that contravention of the order would render the Branch Manager liable under Section 275A of the IT Act and the same would result in penal action. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant-bank stopped the operation of the bank accounts, bank lockers and fixed deposits of the individuals/entities mentioned in the order. Further, on 7th October,2021, the appellant-bank blocked the bank accounts of the income-tax assesses named in the order and also sealed the bank locker bearing No. 462 belonging to Smt. Sunita Khemka.
Later, on November 1, 2021, Priyanka Sharma, Deputy Director of Income Tax (INV), the respondent No. 5 had issued an order to the Branch Manager of the appellant-bank directing the appellant-bank to revoke the restraint put on the bank accounts of Sunita Khemka and three other persons, in view of the restraining order dated October 5, 2021 passed under Section 132(3) of the IT Act. Accordingly, the said persons, including Sunita Khemka, were to be allowed to operate their bank accounts. The said order was received by the concerned Branch Manager of the appellant-bank on November 8, 2021 at 4:00 p.m. However, on November 2, 2021 at 11:24 a.m., an email was sent to the Branch Manager which contained the same order. Thereafter, on November 9, 2021, the concerned branch of the appellant-bank allowed Sunita Khemka to operate her bank locker bearing No. 462 and proper entries recording the operation of the locker were made in the bank’s records. After that on November 20, 2021, Respondent No. 5 conducted a search and seizure operation at the aforementioned bank locker in the concerned branch of the appellant-bank wherein it was found that Sunita Khemka had operated her bank locker with the assistance of the concerned officers of the appellant-bank. This was validated by the entry made in the bank’s records and the CCTV footage of the bank.
As a result, the concerned officials of the aforementioned branch of the appellant-bank were found to have breached the restraining order dated October 5, 2021. On November 20, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued summons under Section 131(1A) of the IT Act to Abha Sinha-Branch Manager, Abhishek Kumar-Branch Operation Manager and Deepak Kumar-Teller Authoriser being the concerned officials of the appellant-bank. These officials attended the office of Respondent No. 5 and their statements were recorded wherein Abha Sinha and Abhishek Kumar stated that there had been an inadvertent error on the part of the bank officials and they had misinterpreted the order dated November 1, 2021. Since the said order pertained to the bank accounts of the concerned individuals including Sunita Khemka, the bank officials had misread the order to understand /assume that the revocation of the restraint extended to the bank lockers as well. Having misunderstood the order, the bank officials under a bona fide assumption that bank locker had been released as well, allowed Sunita Khemka to operate the same. The statement of Sunita Khemka was also recorded wherein she stated that her accountant Surendra Prasad, after speaking with Deepak Kumar, had informed her that the restraint on the aforementioned bank locker had been revoked and she could operate the said locker. This was specifically denied by Deepak Kumar in his statement. Dissatisfied with the said explanations, Respondent No. 5 submitted a written complaint to the SHO, Gandhi Maidan Police Station seeking to register an FIR against Sunita Khemka and the concerned bank officials on the ground that the order dated October 5, 2021 had been violated owing to the unlawful operation of the aforementioned locker.
On the basis of the complaint, an FIR was registered against Sunita Khemka and the staff of the appellant-bank on November 22, 2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 207, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the IPC. HDFC bank preferred a Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case to invoke the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the quashing of the FIR. The High Court had dismissed the writ petition finding it to be devoid of merit.
The Supreme Court's judgement reads:"In the present case, the FIR does not show that the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception. For bringing out the offence under the ambit of Section 420 IPC, the FIR must disclose the following ingredients: (a) That the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception; (b) That the said inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; and (c) That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement."
It observed: "The appellant-bank is a juristic person and as such, a question of mens rea does not arise. However, even reading the FIR and the complaint at their face value, there is nothing to show that the appellant-bank or its staff members had dishonestly induced someone deceived to deliver any property to any person, and that the mens rea existed at the time of such inducement. As such, the ingredients to attract the offence under Section 420 IPC would not be available."
With regard to the provisions of Section 409 of IPC, the following ingredients will have to be made out:
(a) That there has been any entrustment with the property, or with any dominion over property on a person in the capacity of a public servant or banker, etc.; (b) That the said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property.
For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have to be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated it, or converted it to his own use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property.
The Court noted that "In the present case, there is not even an allegation of entrustment of the property which the appellant-bank has misappropriated or converted for its own use to the detriment of the respondent No.5. As such, the provisions of Section 406 and 409 IPC would also not be applicable." It also noted that "since there was no entrustment of any property with the appellant-bank, the ingredients of Section 462 IPC are also not applicable."
The Court observed that "since the offences under Section 206, 217 and 201 of the IPC requires mens rea, the ingredients of the said Sections also would not be available against the appellant-bank. The FIR/complaint also does not show that the appellant-bank and its officers acted with any common intention or intentionally cooperated in the commission of any alleged offences. As such, the provisions of section 34, 37 and 120B of the IPC would also not be applicable."
The Court relied on the observations made in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others (1992). It observed: “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the
Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
In Bhajan Lal's case, the Supreme Court said: "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”
Notably, High Court too had referred to the decision in the Bhajan Lal case. Drawing on Court's decision in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar [(1985)2 SCC 370], the High Court had noted that while exercising its power to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se. It has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. It had also relied on the decision in the case of State of Kerala v O.C. Kuttan [(1999)2 SCC 251], wherein the Supreme Court held that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings was to be exercised very sparingly and the Court was not to embark upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. It recalled the judgment in Superintendent of Police, CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh [(2003) 6 SCC 175] wherein the Supreme Court has held that the first information report is not an encyclopedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. What was significant was that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. It also took note of in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others (judgment dated 13.4.2021 in Criminal Appeal no. 330 of 2021) wherein the Supreme Court held that it cannot thwart an investigation into a cognizable offences which is the statutory right and duty of the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court also cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint and quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception which is exercised sparingly with circumspection.
In the HDFC case, unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court observed: "We find that the present case would squarely fall within categories (2) and (3) of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and others (supra)." It stopped continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant-bank.
