Supreme Court confirms Md. Kai Ansari is a juvenile, but faces trial for voyeurism and stalking

In Md. Kaif Ansari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order dated July 29, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"the order declaring the petitioner as juvenile stands, we confirm the interim order dated 15th October, 2025 of this Court. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms."  The order was uploaded on July 31, 2026. The earlier order had recorded that on the date of the alleged incident, the petitioner was a juvenile and in support thereof, he has placed on record the birth certificate and mark-sheet of the petitioner. The order stated: "In case such a plea is taken before the Court concerned, appropriate steps shall be taken for examination of that issue." It granted bail to the petitioner. 

The order was passed upon hearing the Special Leave Petition which questioned the correctness of the 3-page long order dated August 8, 2025 passed by Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court. Justice Roy had rejected the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner in connection with FIR/P.S. Case No.175 of 2022 dated May 11, 2022 registered at Police Station Simri Bakhtiyarpur, District Saharsa, Bihar for the offences under Sections 354 (C),354 (D), 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  The senior counsel for the petitioner drew attention of the court towards the order dated  July 14, 2026 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Saharsa, Bihar declaring the petitioner to be a juvenile. It was submitted that it was a fit case where the interim protection already granted by the Supreme Court should continue. The necessary bail bonds have been furnished in terms of the court’s order dated October 15, 2025.  

Notably, Justice Roy had modified the paragraph 2 of his order dated August 8, 2025 on August 21, 2025  because inadvertently, instead of anticipatory bail it was recorded as regular bail. 

The prosecution story is that the informant alleged that blackmailing her daughter, the petitioner tried to make physical relationship and also created photos, videos and later allegation is that it was transferred to one of the petitioner’s neighbor, Tanvir which resulted into her life becoming miserable for the victim girl. The panchayati took place but failed and as the accused person threatened them of dire consequences, if any criminal case is lodged, left with no alternative, the FIR. 

Justice Roy had recorded: "4. In this case, earlier the co-ordinate Bench and later this Bench tried to mediate but the flip flop continued between both the petitioner and the victim lady relating to tying the nuptial knots." The senior counsel had submitted that allegation of rape was not there, attempt had been alleged. She had alleged that video was made viral but there is nothing of that sort of that was available on record and in that background, the petitioner deserved the relief.  The counsel for the informant on the other hand had opposed the prayer for bail submitting that a young girl who is a college going student, her obscene videos were made viral as a result whereof she stopped moving out of the home, her image was tarnished in the eyes of the society and all this is attributed to the petitioner.

Kaif is charged under Section 354C under IPC which deals with voyeurism. Any man who watches, captures the image of a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or disseminates such image shall be punished on first conviction with either description for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation to this section as provided under the Act is as follows-For the purpose of this section, “private act” includes an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably expected to provide privacy and where the victim’s genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory: or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public. Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or any act, but not to their dissemination to the third persons and where such image or act is disseminated, such dissemination shall be considered an offence under this section. This section makes a man liable if he intentionally watches or captures the picture of a woman doing private acts, which are to be performed in the utmost privacy and the woman believes that she is not observed by anyone.  If a woman gives her consent to capture her image or allows to do any act, but not with the purpose that it will be exposed to a third person and if the person shares the picture or spreads it on a wide scale, his act will amount to the offence under the purview of this section and shall be liable to punishment. The offence committed under this section is a cognizable offence and bailable at the time of first conviction. However, if the offender repeats the offence, the nature of the offence is cognizable and non-bailable at the time of second conviction. In both the cases, the offence is triable by any Magistrate having the jurisdiction of the matter. He is also charged under Section 354 D which deals with the offence of stalking. 

Supreme Court reverses judgement of remand passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya in a case from Munger

In Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K Vinod Chandran delivered a 30-page long judgement dated May 12, 2026, wherein, it reversed 9-page long judgement of remand dated July 4, 2025 passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. 

Justice Chandran observed: "35. The prosecution has failed to establish the constant demands of dowry, a bitter matrimony or any other circumstance which could lead to a conclusion that the family of the husband or the husband alone had instigated or perpetrated the crime of dowry death or subjected her to cruelty leading to the death. Sadly, the prosecution has completely failed to bring forth the nature of the burn injuries suffered by the victim, which could have, on analysis by a forensic expert, garnered an expert opinion as to whether it was a homicide, a case of fatal self-harm or as argued by the defence, purely accidental. We have to emphasise in this context the absence of the postmortem and unsatisfactory explanation offered on that count. 36. The case set up by the defence of the husband having declined the entreaties of the family of the wife to marry her sister assumes relevance, especially in the context of the delayed FIR registered at the home town of the deceased while her marital home, where the incident occurred was at Mirzapur and she succumbed at a hospital in Allahabad. The defence evidence led, also indicate a happy marriage and a caring husband; which has not been controverted effectively by the prosecution in cross examination. In the circumstances of the valid defence evidence, we could also rely on the dying declaration, exculpating the accused, as a corroborative piece of evidence, making believable the version of accidental burn injuries. 37. The defence evidence was given a complete go by without any valid reasons, despite the substantive testimonies and credible documents produced, remaining uncontroverted. The prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the attendant circumstances coupled with the defence evidence brings forth a probable hypothesis of innocence. The trial courts would do well to bestow equal attention to the defence evidence as that bestowed on the prosecution evidence. There is no cause to approach the defence evidence with distrust, suspicion or even scepticism."

He pointed out that "The accused is not obliged to prove his/her innocence and if a reasonable doubt is raised either from the unsatisfactory evidence led by the prosecution or from the evidence led by the defence its benefit should inure to the accused; which is the reasonable hypothesis of innocence as laid down" in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116. 

Justice Chandran observed: "A valid defence plea, substantiated through testimonies of independent witnesses and documents, as in this case, tested alongside the sketchy evidence led on behalf of the prosecution ought to have raised the judicial antenna of caution especially when the standard of proof is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt." It has been held in Swaran Singh vs. State of Punjab (1957) 1 SCR 953 in travelling from ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’ the whole of the distance should be paved with ‘legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence’.

In the penultimate paragraph, the judgement reads: "38. Before leaving the matter, we are constrained to notice the clear travesty of justice which has occurred in the above case, putting on the dock seventeen persons for reason only of having marital ties with the victim who, in all probability, sustained burn injuries in an accidental fire at her matrimonial home. The High Court also should have bestowed better care in disposing of a criminal appeal from a conviction for an offence alleged to have been committed a quarter century back. The casual approach is evident from the remand order made for reason only of lack of opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses, which testimonies were inconsequential and the impugned order of the Sessions Court having considered only those witnesses led in the trial of the accused, appellant herein." It concluded: "39. We allow the appeal and acquit the appellant/accused reversing the order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court and the order of remand passed by the High Court. We had released the accused on bail, which if carried out, the bail bonds shall stand cancelled. It goes without saying that if the accused is still in custody, he shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case." 

Granting leave, the Justice Chandran observed:" Leave granted. 2. A serious procedural deviation, resulting in a graver travesty of justice is alleged; of two trials, from two final reports on the same First Information Report, having been proceeded with against seventeen persons leading to conviction of only one of them in the second trial, despite the further investigation having unearthed no evidence against the fifteen accused. The appellant, the hapless husband of a woman who succumbed to burn injuries in her matrimonial home, has been in the dock for a quarter of a century on the accusation of marital cruelty and dowry death. The prosecution is also blamed of having failed to bring in material evidence; adduced by the defense, which the investigators ought to have detected before the charge sheet was filed. 3. The two cases were clubbed together after considerable evidence was led in both separately. Later, after further evidence was adduced jointly, they were de-tagged and adjudicated individually. In the first case the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, the two accused arrayed, were acquitted. Fourteen family members of the husband were acquitted in the second case wherein the husband alone stood convicted. The impugned order remanded the matter to the trial court on the premise of the convicted accused not being present when the witnesses were examined in the other case, before clubbing. The appeal is filed by the sole accused who stood convicted." 

Justice Malviya's order indicated that before clubbing, in the instant case PW1 to PW6 were examined and after clubbing, PW13 to PW15 and DW1 to DW5 were examined. The trial court had also recorded that the oral testimonies of only those witnesses examined in the presence of the accused in this case would be evaluated to come to a just decision; scrupulously done avoiding any prejudice to the accused. PW1 to PW6 examined herein are respectively PWs 1, 11, 3, 2, 12 & 4 in the first case; the first two, associates of the family, then a cousin, two brothers and the father of the deceased. PW13 proved the sanction order and PW14 &15 testifying in the joint trial were another brother of the deceased and the Investigating Officer (I.O) respectively. PW5 to PW10 examined in the first case were not even cross-examined by the two accused and their testimonies were completely eschewed even in the first case, the order of acquittal in which was produced. 

In his order, Justice Malviya had concluded:"10. It is settled principle of law that all evidence taken in a trial or other proceedings is recorded in the presence of the accused. This principle is fundamental to fair trial as it allows that accused to hear the evidence, observe the demeanor of witnesses, and instruct their legal counsel accordingly. Essentially it guarantee accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and to ensure transparency and to allow the accused to understand the case against him and present their defence effectively. Legally, both the cases cannot be disposed off together, so, separate trial is required to be concluded after examining the remaining witnesses within six months in accordance with law. 11. The learned trial court, before clubbing both the sessions trial vide order dated 05.03.2009, should have considered the aforesaid exigency and that being so, the amalgamation happens to be contrary to the spirit of law. Consequent thereupon, the judgment impugned has been passed on the basis of illegal procedure so followed by the learned Trial court and ultimately, leading to illegality which is being found incurable and consequently, it leads to a failure of justice. Hence, the same happens to be against the spirit of law, whereupon, is set aside judgment accordingly conviction and sentence is set aside. 12. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court to proceed with the trial independently right from the stage after examination of PW-6. Learned trial court is directed to complete the trial within six months but, with a caution that there should be proper presence of the witnesses. The appellant is on bail, hence he is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within ten days of the receipt of copy of this judgment by the Trial Court and their bail bonds stand cancelled. Further, Superintendent of Police, Munger is directed to procure attendance of all the witnesses so that, the trial be concluded at an earliest. Learned Trial Court is directed to grant bail to the current appellant after surrendering before the Trial Court within stipulated time. If the appellant did not surrender within stipulated time then the Trial Court is directed to take coercive steps against him." Now the Supreme Court has reversed the judgement of remand by Justice Malviya.  

The case in question arose from an incident of the year 2000. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a remand at this stage would only prolong the matter. The counsel for the accused agreed to a  consideration on merits by the Court at the expense of losing one appellate forum, i.e., the High Court, to which the State Counsel also did not object. Therefore, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the matter on its merits. 

The allegation arose from an incident where the wife of the appellant was first taken to the District Hospital, Mirzapur from her marital home on April 13, 2000 allegedly with 40% burns sustained and then re-admitted to a private nursing home, at Allahabad, where the poor lady succumbed a few days later. The Court wondered as to whether the it was accidental, as contended by the husband and the in-laws or whether it was self-inflicted or induced, the causation being the cruelty which arose from incessant dowry demands, is the moot question arising. The victim died on May 2, 2000 and an FIR was registered at the Kotwali Police Station, Munger, which is situated the parental home of the deceased, on June 1, 2000. It arrayed the husband and his brother; the other family members was the father-in-law and the mother-in-law. 

The Court perused the FIR and also the charge sheets in both the cases received from the trial court. The FIR was registered on a complaint dated May 15, 2000 by the father, filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Munger, one under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. FIR No.272 of 2000 dated June 1, 2000 resulted first, in Final Report No.625 of 2000 dated October 31, 2000 leading to Sessions Case No.592 of 2001 and then, Final Report No.215 of 2005 dated May 31, 2005 which led to the instant case numbered as Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006.

The complaint spoke of the marriage and the continued demand of dowry of Rs.50,000/- despite sufficient gifts having been given by the bride’s family and the frequent complaints made by the deceased when she came to her parental home. Even during the pregnancy of the victim, she is said to have been harassed which resulted in the childbirth occurring in the parental home of the mother. The misdeeds continued even after the son was born and there was also an allegation of forced abortion, eventually leading to the death at the marital home. It was also alleged that since the marital family was very influential the entire incident was hushed up. In addition to the husband, his relatives, including immediate in-laws, were arrayed only for reason of the marital home having housed a joint family.

In the Final Report of October 31, 2000 after a brief narration of the complaint of constant demands of dowry pursuant to the marriage of the daughter of the complainant with Brijesh Kumar, it was categorically stated that on investigation, the allegation of offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 appeared to be true. It was noticed that the father-in-law and mother-in-law were in judicial custody and that the Superintendent of Police (S.P) had directed charge-sheet to be filed against the said accused considering the investigation against them as completed and directed investigation against the other 15 persons in the FIR to be continued. The charge-sheet first filed against the two accused gave rise to Sessions Case No.592/2001, which ended in acquittal of both the accused by judgment dated 17.12.2012. On the very same day, judgment dated December 17, 2012 was passed in Sessions Case No.504/2006 wherein the first accused alone was convicted, and the other 14 accused acquitted. Sessions Case No.504 of 2006 arose from a final report filed by a different I.O after further investigation finding no further evidence against the 15 accused remaining.

Issue arose of the trial court having taken cognizance based on a closure report filed by the I.O finding no evidence against the 15 persons who were not charged at the first instance; urged, placing reliance on Mariam Fasihuddin vs. State by Adugodi Police Station 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 and two trials having been proceeded with on the very same allegation of dowry death of the wife of the appellant. The first charge sheet filed; despite finding the offences made out against all the 17, charged only the two who were in judicial custody on the directions of the S.P who also directed further investigation against the others; such directions being clearly impermissible. The second final report stated that no evidence was found available on the record against all the others and there was no cause to raise a supplementary charge against the 15 accused, by another officer who was not examined before the trial court.

Justice Chandran observed: " 10. We are quite conscious of Section 158 of the CrPC which provides that a report be sent to the Magistrate through a superior officer of police, if the State Government by general or special order so directs. Apposite would be reference to Section 173 (3) which provides in such circumstances that the report should be submitted through that superior officer to the Magistrate and pending orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of the police station to make further investigation. Pertinently, the facts of the present case reveal that the report itself was filed by the officer-in-charge of the police station which makes it clear that there was no special or general order passed by the State Government under Section 158. Further, pertinent is the fact that the FIR was registered on the complaint forwarded under Section 156(3) on the directions of the CJM. The order of the S.P hence was clearly without any authority." 

He noted that the decision in Mariam Fasihuddin case frowned upon a supplementary charge sheet filed without any new material unearthed by the investigating agency; wherein the further investigation directed
was with respect to the dropping of two offences under the IPC. However, here the first charge sheet finds material against the other accused also which makes it imperative that we dwell upon the primacy of the Court which takes cognizance.

In H.N. Rishbud vs. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934, the Court was concerned with an investigation carried out under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, which could have been carried out only with the order of a Magistrate. It was held that investigation is the first step, followed by cognizance and then the trial itself. But an invalid investigation does not nullify the cognizance or the trial based thereon, since a defect or illegality in investigation has no bearing on the cognizance taken or the trial. Though a police report under Section 190 of the CrPC is the material on which cognizance is taken, a valid or legal police report is not the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken on a police report vitiated by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the trial cannot be set aside merely on that ground, unless the illegality in the investigation is shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice as provided under Section 537 of the CrPC of 1898 (Section 465 of CrPC of 1973). Finding also that the invalidity of an investigation is not to be completely ignored by the court during trial, it was held that if the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the court at a sufficiently early stage, the court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.

In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107, the Court emphasized the prerogative of the I.O while carrying out an investigation into an offence reported, as juxtaposed with the powers of the jurisdictional court in taking cognizance. The Judges dealt with Sections 154 to 176 of the CrPC of 1898 under the heading ‘Information to the Police and their powers to investigate’ together with Section 190, relating to the jurisdiction of the criminal court in inquiries and trials; which are almost in pari materia with CrPC of 1973. Finding very elaborate provisions made for securing an investigation into a reported offence, without causing any harassment to the accused and at the same time completion without unnecessary or undue delay, it was held that the manner and method of conducting the investigation are left entirely to the police and the Magistrate has no power to interfere with the same. After investigation, if the officer finds no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying forwarding the accused to the Magistrate, Section 169 provides that the accused shall be released on his executing a bond to appear before the Magistrate. 

On the other hand, if sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds are found to make out an offence, then the accused has to be forwarded to the Magistrate under Section 170 if the offence is bailable or otherwise released on bond requiring his appearance before the Magistrate. However, be it invocation of Section 169 or Section 170 the police officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under Section 173, either a closure report; finding no offence made out or a charge sheet; with material allegations based on valid evidence leading to the offence. It was categorically held relying on King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 71 IA 203, 212 that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping, leaving each to exercise its own functions, subject only to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case. When the jurisdictional court has no right to interfere less said the better about the interference made by a superior officer, herein the S.P, especially when the I.O forms an opinion that a case for trial is made out.

It was categorically held that the formation of opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is exclusively with the officer in charge of the investigation. If a closure report is filed; finding no case made out, it is not open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge sheet. It was also clarified that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless since the Magistrate is competent to proceed to take cognizance of the offence, on the materials revealed in the investigation, under Section 190 which imports a judicial discretion on the Magistrate to receive such report under Section 173. The Magistrate, hence, is not bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is no case to place the accused on trial as it is always open to take a contrary view on the facts disclosed in the report.

In Ram Naresh Prasad vs. State of Jharkhand (2009) 11 SCC 299 held that when the police file a report, colloquially termed a ‘closure report’; finding no sustainable case made out, the Court cannot direct a charge sheet to be filed, but could always take cognizance on the basis of the material in the report or direct further investigation. H.S. Bains v. State (U.T. of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631 & Ramswaroop Soni vs.State of M.P. (2020) 18 SCC 327 reiterated that when a closure report is filed finding no offence made out, the Court has three options; (i) to accept the same and close the proceedings or (ii) take cognizance of the matter on the materials in the report or (iii) direct further investigation. It is thus open to the Magistrate on submission of a closure report to look into the material facts disclosed in the report and form an opinion as to whether it constitutes an offence and take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b). To buttress this position, Abhinandan Jha3 made reference to Section 169 of the Code which provides that even if the police officer finds on investigation that there is no reasonable ground or sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial, the officer while releasing the accused has to take a bond for appearance before the Magistrate, if required. The primacy of the Court to take cognizance or deny it is the law discernible from the very provisions of the CrPC. 

 In the instant case the first charge sheet was filed only against the two accused and investigation was continued against the other 15 accused arrayed in the FIR, on instructions of the S.P, which should have been left to the Court taking cognizance, especially when the charge sheet found a trial enabled against all the accused. On submission of the first charge sheet and if there is felt a need for further investigation, ideally it should have been done with the orders of the Court and the commencement of trial ought to have awaited the completion of such investigation. But the cognizance taken by the Court against the fifteen accused, on the basis of the subsequent final report cannot be faulted since though the report on further investigation found no fresh material, the first report found the offence made out against all the accused, which was also before Court when the closure report was considered.

There could be claimed an irregularity but there is no illegality, miscarriage of justice or prejudice caused to the accused since split trials, in the same offence is not unheard of, which we will now deal with. Useful reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Banwari v. State of U.P.1962 SCC OnLine SC 98, wherein the two accused were convicted under charges of Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Magistrate committed three cases to the Sessions Court two with respect to the two murders and the other for attempt to murder, all by gunshot injuries. The Sessions Court modified the charges and consolidated the three cases, permitting evidence to be adduced in the first case and relied on that evidence in the other two cases. The incidents occurred in quick succession and this Court held that though Section 235 is not applicable, joint trial was justified under Sections 234 & 239 of the Code. When separate commitments are made of distinct offences not coming within the exception to Section 233, they cannot be tried at one trial. But, if there are separate commitment orders; (i) of persons who could be tried together or (ii) of the same person for offences which could be tried together, the accused could still be tried at one trial. Persons accused of committing a particular offence or offences jointly or in the course of the same transaction are not put up for trial at the same time, oftener than ever for reason of some being not available. When they are later made available and subsequently committed, the Sessions Judge is not bound to have two separate trials, one with respect to each commitment, if the trial in the first instance has not commenced.

A committal order just gives the Sessions Court cognizance over the trial of the persons committed and is not the basis of the cognizance taken for trial. If there is no prejudice to the accused, multiple committal orders can be consolidated to try the accused at one trial, provided it is justified under Sections 233 to 239 of the CrPC of 1898 (Sections 218 to 223 of the CrPC of 1973). It was held that ‘…the validity of a joint trial before the Sessions Judge is dependent on the fact whether the provisions of the Code justify one joint trial or not’ (para 25). The above discussion makes it crystal clear that the opinion in the final report filed is not decisive of the cognizance and the committal order/s is/are not determinative of whether the trial is single/separate/joint; which is at the exclusive discretion of the Court.

Herein, though triable together, before the report of further investigation was filed, the first trial commenced. Despite the futile exercise of a joint trial in between, the cases were separated before final adjudication. The relevant witnesses led on behalf of the prosecution and the defence were identical and no prejudice is caused to the accused, which persuades us to consider the matter on its merits.

Supreme Court observed: "21. It is distressing that no postmortem was conducted of the deceased who died in the hospital at Allahabad nor is any wound certificate produced. A person who sustained serious burn injuries having been admitted to the hospital, intimation would have gone to the jurisdictional police station; both at Mirzapur and Allahabad but not produced or even enquired into. It is also pertinent that the witnesses examined to prove the allegations are the friend of the father of the deceased (PW1), the father-in-law of one of the brothers of the deceased (PW2), her brothers (PWs 3 to 5 & 14) and her father (PW6). The testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses indicate that though the incident occurred on 13.04.2000 they were informed only on 21.04.2000; effectively controverted in the defense evidence.

PW1 says that the information was passed on to PW6 on April 22, 2000 and he along with PW6 went to see the victim at the hospital on April 22, 2000. PW2 deposed that his son-in-law i.e. PW14, the brother of the deceased went to the hospital at Allahabad on 26.04.2000 and met the victim. PW14 however deposed that on April 22, 2000 he saw his sister, completely burned, at Allahabad and on April 30, 2000 his father returned to Munger for arranging money for the treatment of his sister. It is also the testimony of the brothers and the father of the deceased that on May 2, 2000 when the victim died, a hasty cremation was conducted, to avoid a postmortem. It is very unlikely that having reached the hospital long before the death, the family members of the victim would have abandoned the victim in the company of her in-laws against whom allegations are raised of dowry demands. What is more disturbing is that the I.O has not attempted to bring out what transpired after the victim sustained the burns especially since the incident occurred at Mirzapur, where she was first admitted to the District Hospital and then later taken to a hospital at Allahabad where she succumbed after a few days’ hospitalization. The explanation of the relatives of the deceased is only that the accused are very influential in Allahabad which however does not
prevent an I.O from inquiring in the neighboring State while carrying out an investigation, bringing to light the facts as they existed.

All the witnesses confined themselves with a bland refrain about the demand of a dowry of Rs.50,000/- commenced from the date of marriage till her death. Admittedly, a son was born to the couple in the meanwhile, and the son was kept with the father after the death of the mother. 

PW15 was the I.O who does not speak anything worthwhile as to the investigation carried out. His deposition, as found from the impugned order marks the FIR and describes the marital home of the deceased and records that there is no incident reported at the  police station at Mirzapur where the marital home is situated. The statement of the doctor at the hospital at Allahabad in which the victim was treated is said to have been recorded but the said person was not summoned as a witness for the prosecution. It was also stated that on enquiries made at the police station having jurisdiction over the location in which the hospital is located, he was informed that a statement of the victim was recorded before the Magistrate. It is further deposed that it was not produced since it was not provided; clearly a lackadaisical approach. What assumes significance is that the I.O. categorically deposes that but for the family members of the complainant, none in the neighborhood came forward to speak of an acrimonious marriage, quite relevant in the context of the defense set up by the accused.

Supreme Court's judgement reads:" 28. We would, for the moment, not reckon the dying declaration which absolves the accused in toto. It is trite that a dying declaration though delicate, is a crucial piece of evidence if found to be trustworthy from the overall circumstances, enabling a conviction on that basis alone. However, when the dying declaration is exculpatory in nature, then necessarily the entire evidence would have to be analysed and if the other circumstances form a complete chain, the exculpatory statement of the deceased will have to be treated with some circumspection or at times eschewed completely.' 

In the present case, from the evidence at least it is clear that when the dying declaration was recorded, the deceased was admitted to the hospital and looked after by her husband and in-laws. The statements made in the above circumstances, presumably when the injured victim was looked after entirely by the accused will have to be treated with some circumspection and hence, we do not place any reliance on the same, at this point. 

The Court noted that it cannot but opine that the testimonies were in the nature of a soulless reiteration of a demand of Rs.50,000/-, having been made right from the inception of the marital life till the death occurred. The defense produced certificates of investments made in the joint names of the husband and the wife; far exceeding the demand alleged. DW1, the accused himself mounted the box to speak of an idyllic marriage and narrated the incident, the medical certificate indicating that his left hand was also scorched in the episode, while trying to save his wife. The accused also testified of informing his father-in-law on April 14, .2000 at 9:18 am through telephone, the call receipt evidencing the same. He had also sent telegrams on the same day at 08:35 am. The Kisan Vikas Patra and National Saving Certificates taken out in the joint name of himself and his wife, as also the LIC policy in his name, with his wife as the nominee were produced. The documents relating to the treatment of the deceased and the receipts with respect to the expenses incurred. The prescriptions during the treatment were also exhibited, belying the very contention of PW6 having returned to his village to arrange finance for his daughter’s treatment. 

The Court recorded that the trial court found that the entire documents from the hospital were not produced and it is not clear as to what medicines were administered to the patient, which in fact ought to have been procured and produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was rejected on the ground that the same was not forwarded through the jurisdictional CJM, the same having been received at the trial court, as directly forwarded from the office of the ADM. The efficacy of the dying declaration was further doubted since DW5 had not recorded it in the question-and-answer form. As to the demand of dowry, the trial court relied on the testimony of the witnesses regarding the demand made of Rs.50,000/- from 1995 till 1999. It was found that the time when the victim was taken to the hospital is 1:00 am on 14.04.2000 and there is discrepancy between the time of incident and the time claimed by the defense.

It also noted that the enquiries carried out at the police station having jurisdiction over the hospital, where the death occurred, clearly indicates a dying declaration having been made which was not produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and the doctor of the hospital, in which the victim was admitted, certified her fitness to make such a declaration. There is no hard and fast rule that a dying declaration should be in the question-and-answer form. The dying declaration, even if not reckoned to absolve the husband and the family members, at least raises a reasonable doubt regarding their culpability coupled with the other circumstances. The family of the victim reached the hospital long before her death and it is very unlikely that they left their child alone when they were arranging money for her treatment. 

The Court noted:" 34. Neither was a postmortem conducted nor was there an immediate FIR registered, at least in the hometown of the victim. The exact time when the fire occurred is discernible only from the statement in the dying declaration that it was around 10:45 pm. The time stated could only be an approximation and there would have been some time taken in arranging a transport and taking her to the hospital, first to the District Hospital at Mirzapur where the Doctor deposes, the victim was brought at 1 am. There was no attempt by the prosecution to bring forth the distance between the marital house of the deceased and the hospital. The victim was transferred to a higher medical center at Allahabad on the very same day for better treatment; all of which was carried out by the husband, as is indicated from the documents produced. The oral evidence led by the prosecution fails to prove the case set up of a demand of dowry or the animosity the husband is alleged to have been harboring against the wife. The hollow statement made of demand of dowry echoed listlessly by the witnesses; all relatives of the victim, raise not a grain of doubt but a sea of suspicion regarding the entire story set up.

Supreme Court finds second anticipatory bail petition maintainable, reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

 

In Digvijay Narayan vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 4-page long order dated May 4, 2025, wherein, it reversed the order dated February 9, 2026 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. While issuing notice on April 7, 2026, by way of interim relief, the Supreme Court had issued direction for not taking coercive steps subject to cooperation in the investigation. 

The Court's order reads:"....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail....we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the Station House Officer of the concerned police station." 

Justice Singh's order had dismissed the second anticipatory bail petition as not maintainable, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in of G.R. Ananda Babu vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 176.  The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a FIR dated November 29, 2024 registered at Police Station Industrial Area, District Vaishali, for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Justice Singh's order dated August 27, 2025 with respect to the first anticipatory bail application had rejected it. It recorded the prosecution case, wherein, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with other accused persons, had fraudulently mutated the land of informant in the name of others on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. The counsel of petitioner had submitted that petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. the petitioner was falsely implicated in this case merely because at the relevant time, the petitioner was posted as Revenue Clerk. The order had noted that the petitioner had two criminal antecedents. The order reads: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, nature of accusation and criminal antecedents of the petitioner, the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner is rejected."

Supreme Court's order has directed the petitioner to join the investigation as and when required and co-operate in the same abiding all the conditions as specified under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C./Section 482 of BNSS.

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Supreme Court upholds judgement of conviction by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi, Samarendra Pratap Singh in a murder case

In Adalat Yadav etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K Singh delivered a 18-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it dismissed the appeals. The appellant-convicts before the Court were the father and son, namely Adalat Yadav and Anirudh Yadav. This appeals of 2019 were filed by Adalat Yadav, and Anirudh Yadav. Both challenging the 56-page long common judgment by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Samarendra Pratap Singh dated February 4, 2017 passed in Girdhari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2017), whereby the Division Bench had confirmed finding of conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai1 in terms of judgment dated November 22, 2011 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2019 sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 149 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also a fine of Rs.10,000/. These convicts were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years under Sections 307, 149 of the I.P.C. read with Section 120B of the I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.5000/. Apart from this, they were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Trivedi. 

On December 4, 2008 while Sunil Yadav @ Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-5/complainant) was homebound from the Begusarai Court along with his brother Ram Sharan Yadav (deceased), certain persons including two appellants/convicts surrounded them upon reaching the grocery store run by one Suresh Mahto. A-1 hurled abuses at them and stated that despite repeated directions/clear warnings given to them by Girdhari Yadav (who was also an accused before the High Court), against giving depositions in the murder case on one Mahesh Paswan, the deceased had refused to heed. He then fired his pistol, hitting the deceased on his head, making him fall to his death, instantly. A-2 had fired upon the deceased and, thereafter, other members of the group also opened fired on the complainant as also one Ganesh and Baidyanath Yadav, who were walking alongside the deceased and the complainant. The bullet fired by one Shivji Yadav, hit the complainant on his leg. A written complaint was lodged about the incident on the same day, resulting in registration of FIR Number 222/08 at Police Station Balia. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheets were filed in March 2009. The Trial Court convicted a total of 4 persons including the appellant-convicts while acquitting one Ram Balak Yadav. A perusal of the Trial Court judgment reveals that such a finding was arrived at upon a cumulative assessment of the testimonies of all the witnesses. 

Marriage between Manish Kumar and Ruchi Sinha stands dissolved: Supreme Court

In Manish Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 11-page long order dated April 8, 2026, wherein it recorded that the terms of the settlement have been acknowledged . The complainant-wife (Ruchi Sinha) submitted that she does not want to continue with any of the cases filed, either civil  or criminal, and want divorce by mutual consent since the amount as referred to in the settlement agreement has been received by her. The appellant-Manish Kumar also agreed to by the terms of the settlement and submitted that in view of those terms, all criminal and civil cases pending between the parties may be quashed/disposed of and decree of divorce by mutual consent may be ordered.

The judgement reads: "In view of the above, we are inclined to accept the settlement agreement and to dispose of this criminal appeal and I. A. No. 94649 of 2026 with the following directions: (a) As submitted, the appellant-husband has paid Rs.4,00,000/-(Rupees Four Lakhs) as agreed to in the settlement agreement, the receipt whereof is acknowledged by the complainant/respondent No.2- wife towards full and final settlement of all her claims including alimony, stridhan, dowry articles, maintenance
(past, present, future). (b) All criminal and civil cases as mentioned in the settlement agreement be treated as quashed/ disposed of and be consigned to the record. (c) Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed, the bail bonds of the appellant shall stand discharged. (d) Accepting the terms of the settlement and as consented to by the parties, on their request, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we grant decree of divorce by mutual consent. Consequently, the marriage between the appellant-husband(Manish Kumar) and respondent No.2-wife (Ruchi Sinha) shall stand dissolved. By an outcome of the dissolution of marriage, the parties are set free to lead their lives separately as per their own will. 8) The settlement agreement be treated as part of this Order."

The appellant had assailed the order dated October 16, 2023 passed by the High Court rejecting his application for grant of anticipatory bail. The appellant had preferred the appeal seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 106 of 2022 dated August 25, 2022 for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, registered at Police Station Mahila, Sub-Division Sadar, District Patna, Bihar. Vide order dated August 28, 2025, at the request made by the counsel for the parties, the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre. In mediation, the parties have settled their differences and disputes amicably and settlement agreement dated February 27, 2026 has been entered into which is received vide communication dated March 10, 2026 from the Mediation Centre. The parties had also filed Interlocutory Application No. 94649 of 2026 seeking dissolution of marriage in view of the said settlement.

The terms of the settlement as decided are as under:

“1. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: The Parties have mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage. They jointly pray before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent by exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, thereby dissolving the marriage solemnized between them.
ALIMONY / MAINTENANCE (FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT): The Second Party/Husband has agreed to pay a total sum of 4,00,000/-(Rupees four Lakhs Only) to the First Party/Wife as a full and final settlement against all the claims of First Party/Wife, including but not limited to past, present, and future maintenance, alimony, stridhan, dowry articles, and any other claims whatsoever arising out of the matrimonial relationship.

MODE AND TIME OF PAYMENT: The aforesaid amount of 4,00,000/- (Rupees four Lakhs Only) shall be paid by the Second Party/Husband to the First Party/Wife drawn in the name of " RUCHI SINHA" by way of account payee cheque bearing Cheque No. "000024" dated January 27, 2026. The said account payee cheque shall be handed over to the First Party/Wife after she will execute/sign the present agreement. The agreement shall be considered complete and binding upon the parties after the parties shall execute this agreement and the money shall be credited in the bank account of First party/Wife. If the cheque shall be dishonored then the agreement shall become null and void.

WITHDRAWAL/QUASHING OF PENDING LITIGATION: The Parties jointly pray before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to quash the followings things by mutual consent by exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, these are:- (1) to quash the FIR bearing FIR No. 106/2022 registered at Mahila P.S., District-Patna under section 498A /506/34 IPC and u/s 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, (2) to quash the chargesheet u/s 498A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the Second party/Husband and his three relatives who are named in the FIR namely Kamla Devi Verma (the mother of Second Party/Husband), Poonam Kumari(the elder sister of Second Party/Husband) and Mithlesh Kumar (the husband of elder sister of Second party/Husband), (3) to quash the cognizance order and entire case pending before the Court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patna who took cognizance u/s 498 A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition against the Second party/Husband and his above three stated relatives. 

The Parties mutually agree that the case pending before the Hon'ble FAMILY COURTS, Patna Bihar and other courts of India alongwith all cases, complaints, and proceedings (civil and criminal) filed by them against each other and/or their family members and relatives, if any, shall be withdrawn, compounded, or quashed. The Parties undertake to fully cooperate with each other and file necessary joint applications, petitions, and affidavits and make requisite statements before the concerned courts/authorities for the purpose of withdrawing/quashing all the cases.

NO FUTURE CLAIMS OR LITIGATION: The Parties solemnly undertake that upon the complete execution of the terms of this Agreement, they shall have no further claims or demands of any nature whatsoever against each other or their respective family members, relatives, heirs, and assigns, relating, to their marriage. They further undertake not to initiate any civil or criminal proceedings against each other or their family members in the future with respect to this matrimonial alliance.

6. RETURN OF BELONGINGS: The Parties confirm that there are no pending claims against each other regarding any movables. immovables, jewelry, stridhan, dowry articles, or personal belongings, and all such issues have been amicably resolved.

7. MUTUAL UNDERTAKING OF NON-INTERFERENCE: Both Parties undertake not to interfere in
the personal, social or professional life of the other Party in any manner whatsoever. They shall not communicate witheach other through any medium (electronic or otherwise) and shall not make any defamatory or derogatory statements against each other or their families.

8. MUTUAL RELEASE OF LEGAL CLAIMS, LIABILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER: Both the parties hereby agreed and acknowledged that they shall not, at any point and anywhere, initiate or pursue any legal claim, demand, or action against each other, and that neither shall hold any liability towards the other. Each party shall be free to submit, at their own discretion, the documents pertaining to their divorce or decree before the authority concerned, if any, in order to maintain proper record and to avoid any future complications or misunderstandings among them with respect to this matrimonial alliance.

9. VOLUNTARY AND BINDING AGREEMENT: The parties declare that they have entered into this Settlement Agreement after fully understanding its terms and implications. They confirm that this agreement is the result of then-own free will and consent and is not vitiated by any coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties, their legal heirs, executors, and assigns.

10. VOLUNTARILY CHANGE THE NAME OF MANISH KUMAR AS HER HUSBAND BY THE FIRST PARTY-The first party/Wife shall change all her documents where she has mentioned her husband name as Manish Kumar like Aadhar card, Voter Id, PAN card, Bank details, ration cards, passports, driving licence, etc.

11. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between the Parties and supersedes all prior discussions and agreements. No modification of this Agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by both Parties.

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Partha Sarthy, gnoring Court's 3-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb?

In Dhan Jee Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices R. Mahadevan and A. Amanullah delivered a 21-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law....The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law." The judgement was authored by Justice Mahadevan. The impugned 5-page long order dated order dated November 22, 2024 in Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ vs. The State of Bihar (2024) was authored by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Partha Sarthy. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-4/2016.  

Justice Prasad had authored the High Court's order. His reasoning appears defensible in the light of the decision in Union of India v. KA Najeeb AIR 2021 SC 712, 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on February 1, 2021. The relevant part of para 18 of the judgement reads:

“... at the commencement of proceedings, courts are expected to appreciate the legislative position against grant of bail but the rigours of such provision melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence…”

The decision in Najeeb's case “lays down the constitutional approach arising from Article 21, whereas Watali (supra) explains the statutory approach arising out of Section 4-3(D)(5) of UAPA” (para 21 of Mohamad Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC Online Del 4623. In its decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, delivered by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2019.

  

The judgement by Justice Mahadevan reads: "A perusal of the record indicates that the prosecution case is founded on ocular evidence, which has been duly appreciated and accepted by the trial Court. Without considering the same in a proper perspective, the High Court erred in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 and released him on bail. 19. The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. 20. It is further evident that the High Court has embarked upon a selective consideration of certain aspects of the prosecution case, which in substance amounts to a premature reappreciation of evidence. Such an approach is directly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Om Prakash Sahni (supra). 21. As held in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (supra), undue weight cannot be accorded to the period of incarceration or the pendency of the appeal in isolation, particularly where the conviction is founded on credible evidence. 22. The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. 23. Additionally, material has been placed to indicate that Respondent No. 2 has allegedly attempted to intimidate the appellant by issuing threats and initiating false cases. The explanation offered on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that such allegations are motivated, does not inspire confidence of this Court, particularly at this interlocutory stage. 24. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the nature of the evidence as accepted by the trial Court, the absence of any apparent infirmity in the judgment of conviction, and the settled legal position governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, warrants interference by this Court." 

 

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V.R. Krishnaiyer and N.L. Untwalia in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 held:"The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court." Justice Mahadevan's judgement has taken note of  

Justice Mahadevan relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Court held that suspension of sentence in serious offences must not be granted as a matter of routine, and that the appellate court must apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the findings recorded by the trial Court. The relevant paragraphs are: “6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said Court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.….9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while passing the impugned order." Notably, Justice Mahadevan's judgement does not refer to the subsequent decision of 2021 in Najeeb's case.  

It is crystal clear from the decision in Najeeb's case that the settled position of law is that the restriction on grant of bail will hold at the initial stages, but as time progresses the statutory restrictions, which “draw this justification on the premise that trial in such cases would be concluded expeditiously” gets diluted. It has been underlined by the Bombay High Court in Vinay Vivek Aranha vs. Union of India and another, (BA 2641/2021).

Significantly, a judgement delivered in ignorance of a relevant statutory position is deemed to be per incuriam. In para 183 of the Supreme Court's decision in AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602) held that a decision set aside would “demand the decision of its precedent value”. In para 41 of its decision in State of UP and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139) cited from page no. 153 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. that a “decision passes sub-silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present in its mind”. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 682), it held that the “Supreme Court may not be said to declare the law on these subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind”.

The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the appellant/informant challenging the judgment and order dated November 22, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1180 of 2018, whereby, the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal, had suspended the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Respondent No. 2, Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ and released him on bail. The prosecution case was that on the basis of the written information (fardbayan) of the appellant /informant, namely Dhan Jee Pandey, Buxar P. S. case dated January 4, 2016 was registered under Sections 302, 307, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against Respondent No. 2 and other accused persons. It was alleged that on January 4, 2016 at about 04.15 p.m., the appellant, along with his elder brother (deceased), Ramashankar Pandey @ Jhamman Pandey, was proceeding towards his village on a motorcycle. On the way, they stopped at a betel shop located at the village chatti. At that time, the appellant’s father-in-law, Mukteshwar Mishra, also arrived and engaged in conversation with the appellant at a short distance from the shop. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 along with other accused persons reached the spot and began abusing the deceased. Immediately thereafter, two accused persons, namely Shiv Jee Pandey and Ghanshyam Pandey, caught hold of the deceased, while the others took out firearms. Shiv Jee Pandey then fired a gunshot at the head of the deceased, causing fatal injuries. The other accused persons also fired at the appellant, who narrowly escaped. Thereafter, all the accused fled the scene on motorcycles. The deceased succumbed to the injuries and died on the spot.

Upon hearing the interlocutory application, the appellant Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ wherein he had renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal, in his order, Justice Prasad had concluded: "....we are of the opinion that in the kind of the allegations against the appellant and the materials in which he has been convicted showing that he along with other had caught hold of the deceased, the allegation being general in nature and he has already spent six years seven months in incarceration but the appeal has not been listed for hearing, we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail, during pendency of the appeal, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.D.J.-II-cum-Special Judge, Excise Court, Buxar in connection with Sessions Trial No.265 of 2016 arising out of Buxar (I) P.S. Case No.4 of 2016. 10. The fine, if any, imposed as a part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 11. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only prima- facie and tentative for the purpose of suspension of sentence and bail only which would not cause prejudice to the either parties."

 

While rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion, the Justice Prasad of High Court in his order dated January 21, 2020 had observed that the Court was not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. But at the subsequent stage, the the Couryt became inclined because the appellant had already remained in incarceration for over six years seven months and since the rejection of his prayer for bail more than 4½ years had gone past but the appeal had not yet been listed for hearing. 

 

The Supreme Court's Justice Mahadevan "emphasised that reasons must be recorded in writing, reflecting due consideration of relevant factors, and that orders granting suspension of sentence should not be passed mechanically." 

 

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SLP (Crl.) 5416/2024, Supreme Court in its decision dated August 28, 2024 upheld the principle laid down in Balchand of bail being the rule and jail being the exception--- through which it can be deduced that in cases of arrest by ED as well, the natural bail principle is to follow. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in a PMLA matter in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022). Notably, the decision in the case of Prem Prakash relied upon a decision by three justices in Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1964 SC 828 but failed to mention that after the decision in the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal came the Constitution Bench's decision in Badku Joti Savant AIR 1966 SC 1746.