Justice Bibek Chaudhuri sets aside judgment of conviction by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Sasaram, Rohtas in a murder case of 2001

In Janardan Singh @ Janardan Singh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 20-page long judgement dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"64. ....the points for determination are answered in following words:(i) The prosecution has not been able to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. (ii) The identity and participation of the appellants have not been established by reliable and cogent evidence. (iii) The conviction of the appellants with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable. (iv) The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 65. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. 66. The judgment of conviction, dated 06.07.2018 and the order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 80 of 2003 are set aside. 67. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 68. The appellants are on bail. They are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds." Justices Chaudhuri authored the judgement. 

These appeals arose out of the judgment of conviction, dated July 6, 2018 and the order of sentence, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Sasaram, Rohtas, in a Sessions Trial of 2003, which arose out of Karakat P.S. Case of 2001. The Criminal Appeal by Janardan Singh @ Janardan Singh Yadav also arose out of the same judgment.

The prosecution case, as disclosed in the fardbeyan of the informant Keshav Singh, is that on 18.11.2001, the informant along with several other persons was travelling in a jeep. When the vehicle reached near Belwai, it was allegedly intercepted by a group of about fifteen persons, who were said to be armed with firearms. 5. It is alleged that the said persons surrounded the jeep and, upon identifying the occupants, opened indiscriminate fire. As a result of the firing, the driver of the jeep, Raju Pandey, along with other occupants, sustained fatal injuries. Some persons also received injuries. 6. In the fardbeyan, several accused persons, including the appellants, were named as participants in the occurrence. The allegation against them is that they acted in concert and took part in the firing upon the occupants of the jeep. On the basis of the fardbeyan, Karakat P.S. Case was instituted under Sections 302, 307 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After registration of the case, investigation was taken up and, upon completion thereof, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and was registered as a Sessions Trial of 2003. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The accused persons denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 11. In course of trial, the prosecution examined a number of witnesses in support of its case. The prosecution relied mainly upon the testimony of the informant and other alleged eye-witnesses, including those who claimed to have sustained injuries in the occurrence. 12. It appears from the record that some of the witnesses did not support the prosecution case in its entirety and were declared hostile. The statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they denied the allegations and asserted that they have been falsely implicated.

The judgement recorded that "certain witnesses connected with the investigation and medical examination
were not examined during the course of trial." The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had succeeded in proving the occurrence and the participation of the accused persons therein. The Trial Court placed reliance upon the evidence of the eye-witnesses and held that the accused persons had acted in furtherance of their common intention. Accordingly, the accused persons were convicted under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Upon conviction, they were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, along with other sentences. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "55. Mere presence in a group, without clear evidence of participation and shared intention, is not sufficient to attract liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the absence of clear and cogent evidence establishing common intention, the application of Section 34 IPC becomes unsustainable. 56. Upon a cumulative assessment of the evidence on record, this Court finds that while the occurrence of firing resulting in death and injuries stands established, the participation of the appellants has not been proved with the degree of certainty required in criminal law. 57. The evidence against the appellants is general in nature, lacks specific attribution of roles, and suffers from inconsistencies and deficiencies. The presence of hostile witnesses and the non-examination of material witnesses further weaken the prosecution case. 58. In such circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellants. 59. It is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and if two views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted, as held in paragraph no. 25 of Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgement in case of Kali Ram v. State of  Himachal Pradesh, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 808...." 

It reads; 25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm
conclusion or so timid that is is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us  recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 227 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 886] a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures." 

The judgement reads:"60. The prosecution has succeeded in proving the occurrence, but has failed to prove the role of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. 61. On perusal of the evidence on record, we find that during the trail only 09 witnesses were examined. Out of them, two injured witnesses supported the prosecution case in course of their evidence. PW-1, Vinod Singh only identified Jaj Yadav; PW-2, Rajendra Singh identified accused Vinod Yadav and Bali Yadav. Thus, all the assailants were not identified by the witnesses. Informant was not examined during trial. The Medical Officer, who conducted postmortem of the deceased was also not examined. Therefore, the cause of death of the deceased has not been established. The I.O. of this case was also not examined. 62. In the absence of their evidence, it would be highly risky to affirm conviction of the accused persons on the basis of evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, specially because it is established that there was political and caste related rivalry between the accused persons and the witnesses and the deceased. 63. No explanation has been furnished by the prosecution for withholding such a material witness. The non-examination of such a material witness assumes significance and casts a serious doubt on the prosecution case, particularly when the case rests primarily on ocular evidence.

Justice Chaudhary relied on paragraph no. 156 of Supreme Court's decision in Masalti vs. State of U.P. reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30, wherein, it cautioned that in cases involving a large number of accused, conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of general and omnibus allegations without specific evidence of individual participation. Paragraph 15 reads: “15. Then it is urged that the evidence given by the witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and since no specific part is assigned to all the assailants, that evidence should not have been accepted. This criticism again is not well-founded. Where a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of the assailants. Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault."

Supreme Court upholds judgement of conviction by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi, Samarendra Pratap Singh in a murder case

In Adalat Yadav etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K Singh delivered a 18-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it dismissed the appeals. The appellant-convicts before the Court were the father and son, namely Adalat Yadav and Anirudh Yadav. This appeals of 2019 were filed by Adalat Yadav, and Anirudh Yadav. Both challenging the 56-page long common judgment by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Samarendra Pratap Singh dated February 4, 2017 passed in Girdhari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2017), whereby the Division Bench had confirmed finding of conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai1 in terms of judgment dated November 22, 2011 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2019 sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 149 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also a fine of Rs.10,000/. These convicts were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years under Sections 307, 149 of the I.P.C. read with Section 120B of the I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.5000/. Apart from this, they were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Trivedi. 

On December 4, 2008 while Sunil Yadav @ Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-5/complainant) was homebound from the Begusarai Court along with his brother Ram Sharan Yadav (deceased), certain persons including two appellants/convicts surrounded them upon reaching the grocery store run by one Suresh Mahto. A-1 hurled abuses at them and stated that despite repeated directions/clear warnings given to them by Girdhari Yadav (who was also an accused before the High Court), against giving depositions in the murder case on one Mahesh Paswan, the deceased had refused to heed. He then fired his pistol, hitting the deceased on his head, making him fall to his death, instantly. A-2 had fired upon the deceased and, thereafter, other members of the group also opened fired on the complainant as also one Ganesh and Baidyanath Yadav, who were walking alongside the deceased and the complainant. The bullet fired by one Shivji Yadav, hit the complainant on his leg. A written complaint was lodged about the incident on the same day, resulting in registration of FIR Number 222/08 at Police Station Balia. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheets were filed in March 2009. The Trial Court convicted a total of 4 persons including the appellant-convicts while acquitting one Ram Balak Yadav. A perusal of the Trial Court judgment reveals that such a finding was arrived at upon a cumulative assessment of the testimonies of all the witnesses. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Partha Sarthy, gnoring Court's 3-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb?

In Dhan Jee Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices R. Mahadevan and A. Amanullah delivered a 21-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law....The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law." The judgement was authored by Justice Mahadevan. The impugned 5-page long order dated order dated November 22, 2024 in Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ vs. The State of Bihar (2024) was authored by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Partha Sarthy. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-4/2016.  

Justice Prasad had authored the High Court's order. His reasoning appears defensible in the light of the decision in Union of India v. KA Najeeb AIR 2021 SC 712, 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on February 1, 2021. The relevant part of para 18 of the judgement reads:

“... at the commencement of proceedings, courts are expected to appreciate the legislative position against grant of bail but the rigours of such provision melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence…”

The decision in Najeeb's case “lays down the constitutional approach arising from Article 21, whereas Watali (supra) explains the statutory approach arising out of Section 4-3(D)(5) of UAPA” (para 21 of Mohamad Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC Online Del 4623. In its decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, delivered by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2019.

  

The judgement by Justice Mahadevan reads: "A perusal of the record indicates that the prosecution case is founded on ocular evidence, which has been duly appreciated and accepted by the trial Court. Without considering the same in a proper perspective, the High Court erred in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 and released him on bail. 19. The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. 20. It is further evident that the High Court has embarked upon a selective consideration of certain aspects of the prosecution case, which in substance amounts to a premature reappreciation of evidence. Such an approach is directly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Om Prakash Sahni (supra). 21. As held in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (supra), undue weight cannot be accorded to the period of incarceration or the pendency of the appeal in isolation, particularly where the conviction is founded on credible evidence. 22. The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. 23. Additionally, material has been placed to indicate that Respondent No. 2 has allegedly attempted to intimidate the appellant by issuing threats and initiating false cases. The explanation offered on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that such allegations are motivated, does not inspire confidence of this Court, particularly at this interlocutory stage. 24. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the nature of the evidence as accepted by the trial Court, the absence of any apparent infirmity in the judgment of conviction, and the settled legal position governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, warrants interference by this Court." 

 

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V.R. Krishnaiyer and N.L. Untwalia in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 held:"The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court." Justice Mahadevan's judgement has taken note of  

Justice Mahadevan relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Court held that suspension of sentence in serious offences must not be granted as a matter of routine, and that the appellate court must apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the findings recorded by the trial Court. The relevant paragraphs are: “6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said Court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.….9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while passing the impugned order." Notably, Justice Mahadevan's judgement does not refer to the subsequent decision of 2021 in Najeeb's case.  

It is crystal clear from the decision in Najeeb's case that the settled position of law is that the restriction on grant of bail will hold at the initial stages, but as time progresses the statutory restrictions, which “draw this justification on the premise that trial in such cases would be concluded expeditiously” gets diluted. It has been underlined by the Bombay High Court in Vinay Vivek Aranha vs. Union of India and another, (BA 2641/2021).

Significantly, a judgement delivered in ignorance of a relevant statutory position is deemed to be per incuriam. In para 183 of the Supreme Court's decision in AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602) held that a decision set aside would “demand the decision of its precedent value”. In para 41 of its decision in State of UP and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139) cited from page no. 153 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. that a “decision passes sub-silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present in its mind”. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 682), it held that the “Supreme Court may not be said to declare the law on these subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind”.

The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the appellant/informant challenging the judgment and order dated November 22, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1180 of 2018, whereby, the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal, had suspended the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Respondent No. 2, Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ and released him on bail. The prosecution case was that on the basis of the written information (fardbayan) of the appellant /informant, namely Dhan Jee Pandey, Buxar P. S. case dated January 4, 2016 was registered under Sections 302, 307, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against Respondent No. 2 and other accused persons. It was alleged that on January 4, 2016 at about 04.15 p.m., the appellant, along with his elder brother (deceased), Ramashankar Pandey @ Jhamman Pandey, was proceeding towards his village on a motorcycle. On the way, they stopped at a betel shop located at the village chatti. At that time, the appellant’s father-in-law, Mukteshwar Mishra, also arrived and engaged in conversation with the appellant at a short distance from the shop. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 along with other accused persons reached the spot and began abusing the deceased. Immediately thereafter, two accused persons, namely Shiv Jee Pandey and Ghanshyam Pandey, caught hold of the deceased, while the others took out firearms. Shiv Jee Pandey then fired a gunshot at the head of the deceased, causing fatal injuries. The other accused persons also fired at the appellant, who narrowly escaped. Thereafter, all the accused fled the scene on motorcycles. The deceased succumbed to the injuries and died on the spot.

Upon hearing the interlocutory application, the appellant Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ wherein he had renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal, in his order, Justice Prasad had concluded: "....we are of the opinion that in the kind of the allegations against the appellant and the materials in which he has been convicted showing that he along with other had caught hold of the deceased, the allegation being general in nature and he has already spent six years seven months in incarceration but the appeal has not been listed for hearing, we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail, during pendency of the appeal, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.D.J.-II-cum-Special Judge, Excise Court, Buxar in connection with Sessions Trial No.265 of 2016 arising out of Buxar (I) P.S. Case No.4 of 2016. 10. The fine, if any, imposed as a part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 11. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only prima- facie and tentative for the purpose of suspension of sentence and bail only which would not cause prejudice to the either parties."

 

While rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion, the Justice Prasad of High Court in his order dated January 21, 2020 had observed that the Court was not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. But at the subsequent stage, the the Couryt became inclined because the appellant had already remained in incarceration for over six years seven months and since the rejection of his prayer for bail more than 4½ years had gone past but the appeal had not yet been listed for hearing. 

 

The Supreme Court's Justice Mahadevan "emphasised that reasons must be recorded in writing, reflecting due consideration of relevant factors, and that orders granting suspension of sentence should not be passed mechanically." 

 

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SLP (Crl.) 5416/2024, Supreme Court in its decision dated August 28, 2024 upheld the principle laid down in Balchand of bail being the rule and jail being the exception--- through which it can be deduced that in cases of arrest by ED as well, the natural bail principle is to follow. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in a PMLA matter in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022). Notably, the decision in the case of Prem Prakash relied upon a decision by three justices in Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1964 SC 828 but failed to mention that after the decision in the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal came the Constitution Bench's decision in Badku Joti Savant AIR 1966 SC 1746.

 

 

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Chandra Shekhar Jha set aside the judgment by Fast Track Court-I, Samastipur, in a murder case

In Amit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Chandra Shekhar Jha delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 1, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgment of conviction dated January 10, 2019 and order of sentence dated January  15, 2019 passed by the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-I, Samastipur, in a Session Trial of 2017. By the impugned judgment, the sole appellant, Amit Kumar, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.10,000. The High Court acquitted the appellant of all charges. The judgement was authored by Justice Chaudhuri. The trial court had acquitted co-accused Babita Devi, Juhi Kumari, Rahul Kumar and Raushan Kumar of all charges, including Sections 302, 307 and 120B IPC. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the fardbayan of the informant Sunil Kumar Rairecorded on June 14, 2017 at 7:00 AM, was that on June 13, 2017 at about 12:00 noon, while the informant was at his medicine shop, he heard commotion and rushed home. He found his 15-year-old daughter, Anshu Kumari @ Akanksha Kumari, lying in the courtyard of his uncle Ashok Rai’s house with her mouth and hands tied, body on fire. Neighbours extinguished the fire. The deceased allegedly told the informant that her hands, mouth and legs were tied, kerosene was sprinkled and she was set on fire. She repeatedly pleaded to save her two brothers as the assailants had threatened to burn them too. While being taken to hospital, she allegedly repeated the threat and the phrase “Juhi, your work is done”. At Paramount Care Hospital, Patna, on repeated querying in the ICU, she allegedly named only the appellant Amit Kumar (described as Juhi’s friend) as the perpetrator. She died during treatment in the intervening night of June 13, 2017 and June 14, 2017. Motive was alleged to be enmity arising from the elopement/kidnapping of Juhi Kumari (daughter of neighbour Sanjay Rai) in which the appellant and his family were involved; the informant had supported Sanjay Rai, leading to threats from the appellant. FIR was registered under Sections 341, 342, 307, 302 and 34 IPC. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and four others
under Sections 448, 342, 302 and 120B IPC.

The appellant and co-accused pleaded total innocence under Section 313 Cr.P.C., claiming false implication due to family enmity and long incarceration. The defence examined no witnesses but relied on contradictions in the prosecution evidence, the post-mortem report  and the admissions of the Investigating Officer. The entire prosecution case rested solely on oral dying declarations alleged to have been made by the deceased to various witnesses. There is no written dying declaration, no statement recorded by a Magistrate, and no independent corroboration. The trial court primarily relied upon the statements attributed to PW-1, PW-2, PW-12, PW-13 and PW-14 to hold that the deceased was conscious and capable of speaking and that her “final” naming of only the appellant in the ICU was reliable. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as sixteen witnesses. Of these, one witness (PW-3) was an independent witness, having no relation to either party. Four witnesses (PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, and PW-8) were declared
hostile; they too are unrelated to the parties and are neighbours. Nine witnesses (PW-4, PW-9, PW-10, PW-11, PW-13, PW-12, PW-1, PW-2, and PW-14) support the prosecution’s version that the deceased had named the perpetrators. PW-15 is the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem examination, while PW-16 is the Investigating Officer of the case. 

PW-3 (Rohit Kumar Sharma), a villager who reached the spot immediately, and who was an independent witness categorically stated that when he arrived, the deceased was burning and “she was not speaking”. The independent witnesse, who had no reason to favour the appellant, uniformly contradict the prosecution’s claim that the deceased was making coherent, detailed dying declarations at the scene. His evidence assumes great significance because oral dying declarations attributed by interested family members require the strongest corroboration when independent witness who reached the spot contemporaneously state that the deceased was silent or incoherent. 

The High Court observed" "A careful scrutiny of the entire evidence, however, reveals irreconcilable material contradictions, medical impossibility and perverse appreciation." 

It relied on t he decision in  State of Punjab vs. Jagir Singh ((1974) 3 SCC 227: 1973 SCC (Cri) 886) a criminal that is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "32. The prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The multiple oral dying declarations are materially inconsistent on the most vital aspect of the identity of the perpetrator. The post-mortem evidence of asphyxia with carbon soot in the trachea and 90% burns renders coherent speech improbable. There is no eye-witness, no independent corroboration, and the investigation is perfunctory. The trial court’s appreciation is selective and perverse. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 33. The appeal is allowed."

The High Court drew on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22, laid down guidelines for reliability and expressly noted situations where corroboration becomes necessary as a matter of prudence:
16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made ; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence an has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it-; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.
17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing. the statement by cross-examination. But once, the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that the particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case."

Justicr Chaudhuri observed: "19. From plain reading of the evidence of the witnesses who are close relatives of the deceased, we find inherent contradictions, wilful exaggeration and unnatural tendency of development of so-called dying declaration rendering it highly suspicious. 20. In this context, while Paniben v. State of Gujarat, 1992 (2) SCC 474, remains a leading authority for the proposition that a dying declaration is not a weak piece of evidence and requires no corroboration if found reliable, the present case stands on an entirely different footing, as the alleged dying declaration is shrouded in serious doubt and fails to inspire confidence." 

In Paniben v. State of Gujarat, the Court observed: "18. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under:
(1) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. ((1976) 3 SCC 104 1976 SCC (Cri) 376: (1976) 2 SCR 764])
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav ((1985) 1 SCC 552 1985 SCC (Cri) 127: AIR 1985 SC 416]: Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211: 1983 SCC (Cri) 169: AIR 1983 SC 164]).
(II) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not
the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor ((1976) 3 SCC 618: 1976 SCC (Cri) 473: AIR 1976 SC 1994]).
(IV) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264: 1974 SCC (Cr) 426))
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25: 1981 SCC (Cri) 645: AIR 1982 SC 1021])
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath
v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654: 1981 SCC (Cri) 581])
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu (1980 Supp SCC 455: 1981 SCC (Cri) 364: AIR 1981 SC 617])
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769: 1979 SCC (Cri) 519: AIR 1979 SC 1505])
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nonhau Ram v. State of M.P [1988 Supp SCC 152: 1988 SCC (Cri) 342: AIR 1988 SC 912])
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said
declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v.Madan Mohan ((1989) 3 SCC 390: 1989 SCC (Cri) 585: AIR 1989 SC 1519]

Justice Chauduri recollected that the Supreme Court in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684, has directly addressed multiple declarations and the requirement of consistency in material particulars

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for two convicts

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, grants bail in a rape-murder case

In Dheeraj Jha @ Dheeraj Kumar @ Raghav vs. The State of Bihar, Supreme Court's Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 5-page long order dated March 25, 2026 setting aside the order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court noted that upon completion of investigation the appellant was chargesheeted only for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and not other offences. The appellant was the superior of the deceased. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 of the IPC were not made out and in any case, the deceased committed suicide pursuant to an alleged extra-marital affair with the appellant. Considering the aforesaid submissions made, we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant, particularly, by taking note of the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant and the facts governing the case. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court. 

In his 3-page long order dated December 1, 2025, Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh rejected the prayer of the petitioner who sought bail in a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 328, 376D and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per prosecution case, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with another co-accused, namely Dheeraj Jha, committed rape with the wife of informant and thereafter, administered her poison due to which, during course of treatment, she died. The senior counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. Informant was not an eye witness of the occurrence. As a matter of fact, wife of informant and the petitioner used to work at the same Office and on the alleged date and time of occurrence, wife of informant was getting unconscious and therefore, this petitioner, along with co-accused Dheeraj Jha, took her to a hospital and her husband was also informed. Moreover, charge-sheet had already been submitted and petitioner was in custody since November 19, 2024. The petitioner had got no criminal antecedents. A.P.P. for the State and
learned counsel for the informant had submitted that petitioner was named in the F.I.R. with specific accusation that he, along with another accused person, committed rape with the victim and administered her poison. On the way to hospital, the victim herself narrated the whole incident to the informant. Justice Singh had concluded: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, specific and direct nature of accusation and gravity of offence, the prayer for grant bail of to the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, considering the fact that the petitioner is in custody since 19.11.2024, the learned trial court is directed to
expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Trial court records withheld in Bihar, Supreme Court takes note of "incurable injustice" in a murder case, sets aside judgements by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Sanjay Sah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 10-page long order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained. The High Court was also in error in overlooking this crucial aspect and in confirming the conviction and sentences visited upon the appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and also the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated 25.01.2007 registered with Police Station–Adapur, District–East Champaran, Bihar) Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 shall stand restored on the file of the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, to enable fresh examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code strictly in accordance with the legal parameters applicable thereto. As we are informed that the appellants were on bail, prior to their conviction and sentencing, they would be entitled to the same relief pending the fresh exercise to be undertaken by the trial court. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed in the aforestated terms. The appellants shall be released on bail on such appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the trial court, pending the exercise to be undertaken by the trial court pursuant to this order. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The Appellant no. 2 was Awadhesh Kumar Gupta @Awadhesh Sah. The private Respondents were: Ram Sevak Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and  Srilal Sah. The tagged matters included Ram Sevak Sah vs. The State of Bihar and Mahanth Sah vs. The State of Bihar.

Although Supreme Court had directed the Registry to requisition the trial court records, being of the opinion that the aforestated judgments warranted interference, the Court records that "trial court records have not yet been received. Instead of awaiting receipt of the records, we deem it appropriate to resort to the alternative that is available to us, that is, to remit the matter to the trial court instead of undertaking adjudication of these appeals on merit." On January 21, 2026, the Court had ordered: "Registry shall requisition the trial court records at the earliest and undertake translation of documents in vernacular, if any. E-copies of the trial court records, once received, shall be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties." 

Earlier, on  September 2, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Kumar and Alok Aradhe had passed an order which recorded that the counsel for the State of Bihar had sought "some time to examine whether there was a separate examination by the trial Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, and if so, file a copy thereof. Registry may also call for the record of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if any, from the trial Court/High Court." In its order dated November 12, 2025, the Court recorded that Azmat Hayat Amanullah, counsel for the State of Bihar was present in the Court. "The learned counsel states that it would not be necessary to file a counter affidavit in this matter."

These appeals arose out of the 56-page long judgment dated March 6, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Nani Tagia in Ram Sevak Shah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), and 58-page long judgement in Laxman Sah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), confirming the conviction and the sentences visited upon the appellants, vide judgments dated August 27, 2016 and September 2, 2016, passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated January 25, 2007 registered with Police Station – Adapur, District – East Champaran, Bihar). The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment along with payment of fines. Both the High Court's judgements of the Division Bench were authored by Justice Shah. In the former Sanjay Sah, Awadhesh Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and Srilal Sah were the appellants besides Ram Sevak Shah. In the latter Inar Sah, Vijay Sah Son, Ajay Sah, Mahanth Sah and Ramekbal Sah were the appellants besides Laxman Sah.   

In the penultimate paragraph of his judgement in both Ram Sevak Shah case and Laxman Sah case, Justice Shah had concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence, which has been brought on record to prove the allegations levelled against the appellants beyond pale of any reasonable doubt as well as considering the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence of the prosecution, which has not been discredited during the course of cross-examination coupled with the postmortem report and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we find that there is no reason to create any doubt in our minds. We have examined the materials available on record and do not find any apparent error in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, hence, the same does not require any interference." 

The order reads: "We find from the material placed on record by the learned counsel for the appellants that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731, was brief to the point of being cryptic and was limited to just three questions. The first question was as to whether the accused had heard the statement of the witnesses. The second question was as follows:- “There is an allegation against you that on 24th February 2007 at 06.30 A.M., in village Harpur, police station Harpur, district East 1 For short “the Code”Champaran, you along with other accused for the fulfillment of a common purpose, killed Shivnath Shah, brother of Suresh Prasad, the complainant in this Case, by hitting with sticks, what do you have to say in this regard?” The third question was as to whether the accused had something to say in his defence. The aforestated three questions were posed to one of the accused/appellants, namely, Mahanth Sah. However, the same format was adopted for examination of the remaining accused. This is not in dispute. Needless to state, the aforestated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again." 

The Court referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of the Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused. 

The Court recollected its earlier decision by a 3-Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra”(1973) 2 SCC 793, wherein the in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was observed that great care is expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused. 

 

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