Patna High Court's Division Bench upholds verdict by 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna City, records its deep appreciation for research assistance rendered by Aditya Shekhar, Ribhava Raj, the Legal Researchers in a murder case from 2017

In Ravi Kumar @ Singhrwa @ Singhara vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 40-page long judgement dated September 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"9. Conclusion and Operative Order (i) We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, examined the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, and applied the settled legal principles discussed above. (ii) The medical evidence of PW-1 Dr. Mukesh Kumar, supported by the post-mortem report (Ext. 1), conclusively establishes that the deceased Krishna Prasad @ Pahalwan died a homicidal death as a result of a firearm injury sustained on the back of the chest. The occurrence of a fatal shooting is, therefore, not in doubt. (iii) The principal question for determination is whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who fired the fatal shot. (iv) On a comprehensive and independent appraisal of the evidence, we find that PW-2 Prem Kumar is a natural witness whose presence at the shop of the deceased is fully explained. He has given a consistent account of having seen the appellant armed with a pistol, the deceased attempting to flee, the appellant opening fire, and the bullet hitting the deceased on the back. His evidence finds material corroboration from the testimony of PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti, who reached the place of occurrence immediately on hearing the sound of firing. PW-5 has specifically deposed that he saw the appellant running away from the spot within a few minutes of the incident. This circumstance is proximate in time and lends assurance to the version of PW-2. (v) The oral dying declarations attributed to the deceased and deposed to by PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 are consistent in material particulars in naming the appellant as the assailant. Although these witnesses are related or closely associated with the deceased, their evidence on this aspect has withstood cross-examination and finds support from the overall circumstances of the case. The medical evidence corroborates the nature and location of the injury. The motive suggested by the prosecution, namely the outstanding loan and the prior threat, provides an additional link in the chain. (vi) The discrepancies regarding the exact date and time of the occurrence, the non-recovery of the weapon and the projectile, and certain omissions in the investigation, though pointed out with some force, do not go to the root of the prosecution case. They are not sufficient to discard the reliable ocular account and the consistent oral dying declarations. The confessional statement recorded by the Investigating Officer has been kept out of consideration in view of the bar contained in Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. (vii) Having regard to the cumulative effect of the evidence of PW-2, the corroborative circumstances spoken to by PW-3 and PW-5, the consistent oral dying declarations, and the medical evidence, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial court do not warrant interference by this Court. (viii) In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. (ix) The judgment of conviction, dated 29.06.2018 and the order of sentence, dated 05.07.2018 passed by the learned 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna City, in Sessions Trial No. 40 of 2018 arising out of Agamkuan P.S. Case No. 396 of 2017 are affirmed. The appellant Ravi Kumar @ Singharwa shall serve the sentence awarded by the trial court...."

It concluded: "(xi) Before parting with the judgment, this court places on record its deep appreciation for the research and assistance rendered by Mr. Aditya Shekhar and Mr. Ribhava Raj, Legal Researchers attached with this court." S. K. Lal was the senior counsel on behalf of the appellants who was assisted by advocates Madhaw Prasad Yadav, Arvind Kumar and Pramod Kumar. Anil Kumar was the counsel for the informant and Shashi Bala Verma was the APP. 

The criminal appeal was preferred by the sole appellant Ravi Kumar @ Singharwa against the judgment of conviction dated June 29, 2018 and the order of sentence dated July 5, 2018 passed by the 6th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Patna City, in Sessions Trial of 2018 arising out of Agamkuan P.S. Case of 2017, whereby and whereunder the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

By the impugned order of sentence, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of 20,000 for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of 2,000 for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. The appellant was arrested during investigation and has remained in custody since then. After commitment of the case to the Court of Session, charge under Section 302 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act was framed against him on March 5, 2018. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Upon conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted and sentenced him. The appeal had challenged the judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 

The case of the prosecution emerged from the fardbeyan of the informant Annu Gupta (PW-6), wife
of the deceased, is that the deceased Krishna Prasad @ Pahalwan was running a snack shop under the name and style of “Maa Sheetla Sweet” in front of Sheetla Temple since the year 1996. The brother of the informant, namely Prem Kumar (PW-2), was also associated with the said shop. The appellant Ravi
Kumar @ Singharwa had worked in the said shop as a maker of singhara and litti for about ten years but had left the job a few days prior to the occurrence. On 25.08.2017 at about 7:00 p.m., the
deceased, after closing his work for the day, went to Tulsi
Mandi adjacent to the railway line near Sheetla Mandir for
getting himself shaved. While returning, he met the appellant.
On noticing something in the pocket of the appellant, the
deceased searched the same and found a pistol. The deceased
questioned the appellant as to why he was carrying a pistol
and stated that he would inform the appellant’s mother. The
appellant became enraged.
(iv) Thereafter, the deceased returned to his shop,
consumed bhunja, and after some time started proceeding
towards his house. When he had barely covered a short
distance of about fifty yards from the shop, the appellant, who
was sitting there armed with a pistol, pointed the same
towards the head of the deceased and opened fire. The
deceased pushed the appellant and attempted to flee; however,
the bullet hit him on the back and he fell down at the spot. The
appellant managed to escape from the place of occurrence.
(v) On hearing the sound of the gunshot, several
persons including the staff of the shop assembled there. The
injured was shifted to Rajeshwar Hospital for treatment. The
informant and her son were informed and they reached the
hospital. According to the prosecution, the deceased, while
undergoing treatment and while still conscious, disclosed that
it was the appellant who had shot him. It is further the case of
the prosecution that the appellant and his father had taken a
substantial amount by way of loan from the deceased and,
whenever the deceased demanded repayment, the appellant
used to threaten to kill him. The occurrence is alleged to have
been committed at the behest of the father of the appellant.
(vi) On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant
recorded at the hospital, Agamkuan P.S. Case No. 396 of 2017
was registered under Sections 341, 324, 307, 504/34 of the
Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. During the
course of treatment, the injured succumbed to his injuries after
about two days. Upon completion of investigation, the
Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act
only against the present appellant. Cognizance was taken and
the case was committed to the Court of Session, culminating
in the trial that has given rise to the present appeal.
3. Trial Court Findings
(i) The learned trial court, upon appreciation of the
evidence adduced during the trial, recorded the following
material findings:
(a) The prosecution examined seven witnesses in
all. PW-1 Dr. Mukesh Kumar is the Autopsy Surgeon who
conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of
the deceased on 27.08.2017 and proved the post-mortem
report (Ext. 1). PW-2 Prem Kumar (brother of the informant
and associated with the shop of the deceased), PW-3 Dilip
Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti were examined as
witnesses to the occurrence. PW-4 Anchit Raj is the son of the
deceased and PW-6 Annu Gupta is the informant and wife of
the deceased. PW-7 Suchit Kumar is the Investigating Officer
of the case.
(b) On behalf of the defence, one witness (DW-1
Kashi Nath Chandravansi) was examined and certain
documents relating to a prior criminal case against the
deceased were marked as exhibits.
(c) The learned trial court held that PW-2 Prem
Kumar is an eye-witness to the occurrence. According to the
trial court, this witness had seen the appellant threatening the
deceased with a pistol, the deceased attempting to flee, the
appellant opening fire, the bullet hitting the deceased on the
back, and the deceased falling down. The trial court further
held that PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti
reached the place of occurrence immediately on hearing the
sound of firing; PW-5 specifically claimed to have seen the
appellant running away from the spot. The evidence of these
witnesses was found to be consistent and reliable.
(d) The learned trial court placed significant
reliance on the oral dying declarations alleged to have been
made by the deceased. It held that the deceased, while still
conscious, had disclosed to PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 that
it was the appellant Ravi Kumar @ Singharwa who had shot
him. These statements were held to be relevant and admissible
under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and
were found to be consistent and free from doubt.
(e) The medical evidence of PW-1 was held to
corroborate the prosecution version. The post-mortem report
disclosed an ante-mortem firearm entry wound on the left side
of the back of the chest with blackening and tattooing, and the
cause of death was opined to be haemorrhage and shock due
to the chest injury caused by a firearm.
(f) The trial court accepted the motive suggested by
the prosecution, namely that the appellant and his father had
taken a substantial loan from the deceased and that the
appellant had earlier threatened the deceased with death when
repayment was demanded.
(g) As regards the discrepancy in the date of
occurrence (some witnesses having stated the month as
October instead of August), the learned trial court observed
that witnesses cannot be expected to possess a photographic
memory and that the said discrepancy stood clarified by the
fardbeyan and the endorsement thereon, both of which clearly
mentioned the date as 25/26.08.2017. The discrepancy was
therefore held to be minor and immaterial.
(h) The trial court further referred to the
confessional statement of the appellant (Ext. 6) recorded by
the Investigating Officer. The defence evidence seeking to
establish the criminal antecedents of the deceased was held to
be irrelevant to the determination of the guilt of the appellant
in the present case.
(i) On the basis of the above findings, the learned
trial court concluded that the prosecution had successfully
proved the charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, and accordingly convicted and
sentenced him as noted earlier.
4. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
(i) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence on several grounds.
(ii) It was firstly submitted that the learned trial
court committed a serious error in recording a finding of guilt
against the appellant when none of the prosecution witnesses
can be said to be reliable eye-witnesses to the actual
occurrence. Learned counsel contended that a careful reading
of the evidence of PW-2 Prem Kumar, PW-3 Dilip Kumar
Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti would show that their presence
at the precise moment of firing is either unnatural or not free
from doubt. It was argued that the evidence of these witnesses,
even if accepted at face value, is largely in the nature of post-
occurrence testimony and that the trial court erred in treating
PW-2 as a wholly reliable eye-witness.
(iii) It was next submitted that the evidence of PW-4
Anchit Raj and PW-6 Annu Gupta (the informant) is purely
hearsay in character insofar as the actual act of firing is
concerned. Learned counsel urged that these witnesses were
admittedly not present at the place of occurrence and reached
the hospital only after receiving information. Their testimony,
therefore, could not have been used to establish the identity of
the assailant except to the limited extent of the alleged oral
dying declarations.
(iv) Strong reliance was placed on the contention
that the alleged oral dying declarations do not satisfy the
requirements of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. It was argued that the statements attributed to the
deceased were made only to highly interested witnesses (wife,
son, brother-in-law and a close associate), that there is no
contemporaneous record of such statements, and that the
prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased was in a
fit state of mind and body at the time of making the alleged
declarations. Learned counsel submitted that the trial court
mechanically applied Section 32(1) without subjecting the
alleged dying declarations to the close scrutiny required by
law.
(v) It was further contended that the medical
evidence of PW-1, while establishing a homicidal death by
firearm, does not corroborate the precise manner and genesis
of the occurrence as projected by the prosecution witnesses.
The non-recovery of the weapon of offence and the bullet was
also highlighted as a significant lacuna.
(vi) Learned counsel pointed out material
discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, particularly with
regard to the date of the occurrence (some witnesses having
deposed the month as October instead of August), the exact
time, the sequence of events, and the presence of various
persons at the spot. It was submitted that these discrepancies,
when viewed cumulatively, go to the root of the matter and
render the prosecution version unreliable.
(vii) Attention was also invited to the fact that the
confessional statement of the appellant (Ext. 6) recorded by
the Investigating Officer is hit by Section 25 of the Indian
Evidence Act and could not have been relied upon even for
limited purposes. The investigation was described as defective
on account of non-examination of independent witnesses,
delayed recording of statements, and failure to collect material
scientific evidence.
(viii) It was lastly submitted that the appellant is a
first offender, that the evidence on record does not establish
the charges beyond reasonable doubt, and that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence are liable to be
set aside. In the alternative, a prayer was made for suspension
of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of the
appeal.

5. Submissions on behalf of the State
(i) Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing
on behalf of the State supported the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence and submitted that the appeal
is devoid of merit.
(ii) It was contended that the learned trial court has
correctly appreciated the evidence on record and has recorded
concurrent findings of fact which do not warrant interference
in appellate jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that PW-2
Prem Kumar is a natural and reliable eye-witness to the
occurrence. His presence at the shop of the deceased, with
whom he was associated in business, is fully explained.
According to the State, this witness has given a consistent
account of having seen the appellant armed with a pistol, the
deceased attempting to flee, the appellant opening fire, and the
bullet hitting the deceased on the back.
(iii) It was further submitted that the evidence of
PW-2 finds material corroboration from the testimony of PW-
3 Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti. Both these
witnesses reached the place of occurrence immediately on
hearing the sound of firing. PW-5 has specifically deposed
that he saw the appellant running away from the spot. Their
presence is natural as they were associated with the shop of
the deceased, and their evidence lends assurance to the
version of the eye-witness.
(iv) Strong reliance was placed on the multiple oral
dying declarations made by the deceased. Learned Additional
Public Prosecutor submitted that the deceased, while still
conscious and soon after sustaining the injury, clearly named
the appellant as the assailant before PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and
PW-6. These statements, being consistent and made at the
earliest opportunity, fully satisfy the requirements of Section
32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and constitute
relevant and reliable evidence pointing to the guilt of the
appellant.
(v) The medical evidence of PW-1 was described as
fully corroborative of the ocular account. The post-mortem
report establishes an ante-mortem firearm entry wound on the
back of the chest with blackening and tattooing, which is
consistent with the prosecution version that the deceased was
shot from behind while trying to escape.
(vi) As regards the discrepancy in the month of the
occurrence (August/October), it was submitted that the same
is minor and stands clarified by the contemporaneous
documents, namely the fardbeyan and the endorsement
thereon. Such discrepancies are natural and do not go to the
root of the prosecution case.
(vii) Learned counsel for the State further submitted
that the motive of the occurrence, i.e., the outstanding loan
and the prior threat held out by the appellant, stands
established through the evidence of the informant and other
witnesses. The non-recovery of the weapon, though a lacuna,
is not fatal in the face of reliable ocular and dying-declaration
evidence. The confessional statement recorded by the
Investigating Officer was referred to only as a supporting
circumstance.
(viii) It was lastly contended that the prosecution
has proved the charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court has assigned
cogent reasons for convicting the appellant, and the impugned
judgment does not suffer from any perversity or infirmity
warranting interference by this Court. The appeal, it was
prayed, deserves to be dismissed. 

6. Points for Determination
On the basis of the rival submissions advanced on
behalf of the parties and upon perusal of the impugned
judgment and the evidence available on record, the following
points arise for determination in the present appeal:
(i) Whether the prosecution has been able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, Ravi Kumar @
Singharwa, intentionally caused the death of the deceased
Krishna Prasad @ Pahalwan by firing at him with a firearm on
25.08.2017?
(ii) Whether the oral statements attributed to the
deceased, alleged to have been made shortly after the
occurrence and naming the appellant as the assailant,
constitute reliable and admissible dying declarations under
Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and whether
they inspire confidence?
(iii) Whether the evidence of PW-2 Prem Kumar
(claimed to be an eye-witness) and the evidence of PW-3
Dilip Kumar Gupta and PW-5 Sudhir Kamti (immediate post-
occurrence witnesses) is natural, consistent, reliable and
sufficient to establish the complicity of the appellant?

7. Analysis of Evidence
(i) The prosecution has examined seven witnesses.
PW-1 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem; PW-2,
PW-3 and PW-5 are witnesses concerning the occurrence and
its immediate aftermath; PW-4 and PW-6 speak principally
about what was allegedly disclosed by the deceased; and PW-
7 is the Investigating Officer. The defence has examined one
witness, DW-1.
(ii) The evidence, therefore, has to be considered in
its proper compartments. The medical evidence establishes the
nature and cause of death; the question of identity of the
assailant rests upon the ocular and surrounding circumstances;
and the alleged statements made by the deceased require
separate consideration under Section 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.

A. Medical Evidence (PW-1)
(i) PW-1 Dr. Mukesh Kumar conducted the post-
mortem examination on the body of Krishna Prasad @
Pahalwan on 27.08.2017 and proved the post-mortem report
(Ext. 1). The external examination disclosed an ante-mortem
firearm entry wound measuring ¼" × ¼" over the left side of
the back of the chest, one inch away from the mid-line at the
level of the fifth thoracic vertebra, with inverted margins and
surrounded by blackening and tattooing over an area of 8" ×
7". There were also surgical stitched wounds. On dissection,
the chest cavity contained about 500 ml of blood and blood
clots. The projectile had pierced the fifth thoracic vertebra and
the apical area of the right lung. No metallic object was
recovered from the body. The doctor opined that the cause of
death was haemorrhage and shock due to the chest injury and
that Injury No. 1 was caused by a firearm. The time since
death was estimated at 6 to 18 hours.
(ii) The medical evidence thus establishes that the
deceased sustained a fatal firearm injury from behind and that
the death was homicidal in nature. It lends medical support to
the prosecution version that the deceased had been shot in the
back.
(iii) At the same time, the evidence of PW-1 has
definite limits. The doctor does not identify the assailant. The
non-recovery of the projectile is also part of the medical
record. Consequently, while PW-1 establishes the nature and
cause of death, the identity of the person who fired the shot
has to be determined from the remaining evidence.
PW-2 Prem Kumar
(i) PW-2 Prem Kumar is an important witness
because he claims to have been present at the time of the
occurrence. According to him, on 25.08.2017 at about 8:00
p.m., while he was at the shop, the deceased proceeded ahead
and, after covering about 50 steps, the appellant Ravi @
Singharwa took out a pistol, threatened him and fired. The
deceased sustained injury on the back, fell down, and was
thereafter taken for treatment. PW-2 has identified the accused in Court.
(ii) The importance of PW-2’s evidence lies in the
fact that, unlike PW-4 and PW-6, he does not derive his
knowledge of the identity of the assailant solely from a
statement allegedly made by the deceased at the hospital. His
account is presented as direct observation of the occurrence
itself. He has further stated that the deceased, while being
taken to the hospital, was still conscious and was naming the
person who had shot him. At the same time, he does not claim
personal knowledge of the alleged monetary transaction or of
the precise conversation which allegedly took place between
the deceased and the accused before the firing.
(iii) His evidence has to be tested for naturalness of
presence, consistency with the evidence of PW-3 and PW-5,
consistency with the medical evidence, and consistency with
the earliest version recorded during investigation. The
material question is whether his account of the actual firing
withstands scrutiny when read as a whole.
PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta
(i) PW-3 Dilip Kumar Gupta states that he was a
friend of the deceased and had accompanied him for shaving.
After returning to the shop, the deceased started for home.
PW-3 thereafter heard the sound of firing, went to the spot
along with others, and found the deceased lying on the ground
with a firearm injury on the back. He participated in taking the
injured to the hospital and has deposed that the deceased
disclosed the name of the appellant as the assailant.
(ii) PW-3 is not an eye-witness to the actual act of
firing. His direct observation begins from the point when he
heard the gunshot and reached the place of occurrence. The
portion of his testimony relating to the identity of the assailant
is based on the statement attributed to the deceased and must
therefore be evaluated under Section 32(1) of the Evidence
Act.
PW-4 Anchit Raj
PW-4 Anchit Raj, the son of the deceased, has
candidly admitted that he was not present at the place of
occurrence. He received information from PW-2, went to the
hospital, and has deposed that his father, while conscious, told
him that Ravi had shot him. His evidence is relevant only as a
recipient of the alleged oral dying declaration and cannot be
treated as ocular evidence of the firing.
PW-5 Sudhir Kamti
(i) PW-5 Sudhir Kamti states that he was at the shop
when he heard the sound of firing. He reached the spot within
about 2-3 minutes, saw the deceased lying injured, and saw
the appellant running away from the place. He also helped in
taking the injured to the hospital.
(ii) PW-5 does not claim to have seen the actual
firing. His evidence is circumstantial in nature: he heard the
shot, reached the spot almost immediately, found the deceased
injured, and saw the appellant fleeing. The circumstance of
the accused being seen running away shortly after the firing is
relevant and proximate in time, but it cannot by itself be
equated with proof of the act of firing. His evidence can
consequently provide corroborative circumstances, but the
fact of fleeing cannot by itself be equated with proof of the
actual firing.
PW-6 Annu Gupta (Informant)
(i) PW-6 Annu Gupta, the wife of the deceased and
the informant, has stated that on the night of the incident, she
received information from her brother (PW-2) and went to the
hospital with her son. According to her, the deceased was
conscious and told her that Ravi had shot him. She has,
however, clearly admitted in cross-examination that neither
she nor her son had witnessed the occurrence.
(ii) Her evidence regarding the identity of the
assailant is therefore dependent on the alleged oral dying
declaration. The trial court noticed that she had at one place
stated the date of occurrence as 25.10.2017 instead of
25.08.2017. While the contemporaneous documents such as
fardbeyan and endorsement consistently mention August
2017, the discrepancy remains a relevant factor to be weighed
while assessing the overall reliability of the prosecution
version.
PW-7 Investigating Officer
(i) PW-7 Suchit Kumar has proved the formal steps
of investigation, the fardbeyan, endorsements, charge-sheet
and other documents. His cross-examination, however, brings
out several omissions: non-recovery of the weapon and the
projectile, non-examination of independent public witnesses,
and certain deficiencies in the recording of statements.
(ii) These lapses assume significance because the
identity of the assailant is the central issue. An investigation is
not to be discarded for every omission, yet omissions that
could have provided objective corroboration or contradiction
cannot be ignored.
(iii) The confessional statement of the appellant
(Ext. 6) recorded by the Investigating Officer when the
appellant was apprehended in a different case is hit by Section
25 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be used as
substantive evidence against him.

Defence Evidence
DW-1 has proved documents (bail bond relating to
an earlier Alaganj Police Station case and connected
signatures/documents) relating to a prior criminal case against
the deceased. Even if the deceased had criminal antecedents,
that circumstance does not, by itself, constitute a defence to
the present charge or establish that the appellant was not the
assailant. The defence evidence does not point to any
alternative assailant or offer any substantive explanation for
the fatal firearm injury.
Statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
(i) The appellant was examined under Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All the material
incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution
evidence were put to him. The appellant denied the allegations
and the incriminating circumstances. He did not offer any
specific explanation or alternative version of the occurrence,
nor did he lead any substantive evidence in defence beyond
the formal evidence of DW-1 regarding the antecedents of the
deceased.
(ii) It is well settled that the statement of an accused
recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not substantive
evidence. It can be taken into consideration only to the limited
extent of explaining the circumstances appearing against him
or for the purpose of appreciating the truth or otherwise of the
prosecution version. The burden of proving the guilt of the
accused never shifts to the accused and remains always on the
prosecution.
(iii) In Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, reported in (2019) 13 SCC 289, the Supreme Court emphasised that the object of Section 313 is to afford the accused an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him, and that a false explanation or a false plea may, in appropriate cases, be
considered as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. However, the Court cautioned that the absence of a satisfactory explanation cannot by itself fill up the gaps in the prosecution evidence or relieve the prosecution of its primary burden.  

Alleged Oral Dying Declarations

(i) The prosecution relies upon oral statements
attributed to the deceased and made to PW-2, PW-3, PW-4
and PW-6, naming the appellant as the person who shot him.
There is no dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate. The
evidentiary value of these oral statements depends on whether
they are found to be voluntary, consistent, and made while the
deceased was in a fit condition.
(ii) It must also be kept in mind that PW-3, PW-4
and PW-6 (and to some extent PW-2) are recounting what
they claim the deceased told them. Their evidence on the point
of identity derives from the same source. While consistent oral
dying declarations can lend assurance, they cannot be treated
as multiple independent eye-witness accounts.
 

Date and Time Discrepancies
The documentary record and the majority of the
evidence place the occurrence on 25.08.2017. The reference to
25.10.2017 by the informant (and at places by PW-4 and the
IO) has been treated by the trial court as an error of
recollection. There is also a minor variation in the exact time
(approximately 7:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.). These discrepancies
have to be evaluated in the light of the overall consistency of
the prosecution case rather than in isolation.
Synthesis
(i) The medical evidence establishes that the
deceased died as a result of a firearm injury sustained on the
back. The occurrence of a fatal shooting is therefore not in
doubt.
(ii) The prosecution seeks to connect the appellant
with the act of firing primarily through:
(a) the direct account of PW-2;
(b) the immediate post-occurrence evidence of PW-
3 and PW-5 (including the circumstance of the appellant being
seen fleeing);
(c) the oral dying declarations alleged to have been
made to PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6; and
(d) the surrounding circumstances, including
motive.
(iii) The principal aspects that require careful
judicial scrutiny are: the reliability and naturalness of PW-2’s
presence and version; the weight to be attached to the oral
dying declarations made to interested witnesses; the
corroborative value of PW-5’s evidence of fleeing; the effect
of non-recovery of the weapon and projectile; the
investigative omissions; and the cumulative impact of the
discrepancies regarding date and time.
(iv) The trial court accepted the prosecution
evidence, treated the date discrepancy as immaterial, relied
upon the ocular account, the oral dying declarations and the
medical evidence, and held that the charges stood proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Whether that conclusion is
sustainable on a proper appraisal of the evidence is the
question that now falls for determination by this Court.

8. Legal Principles to be Applied

Before proceeding to the final evaluation of the evidence, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal
principles that govern the determination of the present appeal. 

Appreciation of evidence of related and interested witnesses

(i) It is well settled that the evidence of a related or
interested witness is not to be discarded merely on the ground
of relationship or interest. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki,
reported in (1981) 2 SCC 752, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that a related witness is not necessarily an interested
witness and that the evidence of such a witness cannot be
rejected on the mere ground of relationship. The real test is
whether the evidence is credible and trustworthy. The relevant
paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“7. As mentioned above the
High Court has declined to rely on the
evidence of PW 1 on two grounds: (1) she
was a “highly interested” witness
because she “is the wife of the deceased”,
and (2) there were discrepancies in her
evidence. With respect, in our opinion,
both the grounds are invalid. For, in the
circumstances of the case, she was the
only and most natural witness; she was
the only person present in the hut with the
deceased at the time of the occurrence,
and the only person who saw the
occurrence. True, it is, she is the wife of
the deceased; but she cannot be called an
“interested” witness. She is related to the
deceased. “Related” is not equivalent to
“interested”. A witness may be called
“interested” only when he or she derives
some benefit from the result of a
litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or
in seeing an accused person punished. A
witness who is a natural one and is the
only possible eyewitness in the
circumstances of a case cannot be said to
be “interested”. In the instant case PW 1
had no interest in protecting the real
culprit, and falsely implicating the
respondents.”
(ii) The evidence of a related witness should be
scrutinised with care, but if it is found reliable after such
scrutiny, it can form the basis of conviction. The same
principle has been consistently followed in later decisions,
including Raju v. State of T.N., (2012) 12 SCC 701.
 

Oral dying declarations
(i) A statement made by a person as to the cause of
his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction
which resulted in his death is relevant under Section 32(1) of
the Evidence Act.
(ii) In the classic decision of Khushal Rao v. State
of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958 SC 22, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can form the sole
basis of conviction if it is found to be voluntary and reliable.
No particular form is prescribed, and an oral dying declaration
is admissible.
(iii) The guiding principles were further elaborated
in Paniben v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 474.
The Court must be satisfied that:
(a) the declarant was in a fit state of mind;
(b) the statement was voluntary and not the result of
tutoring or prompting;
(c) it is consistent in material particulars; and
(d) it inspires confidence.
(iv) For the sake of elaboration, the relevant
paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“18. Though a dying
declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
worthwhile to note that the accused has
no power of cross-examination. Such a
power is essential for eliciting the truth as
an obligation of oath could be. This is the
reason the Court also insists that the
dying declaration should be of such a
nature as to inspire full confidence of the
Court in its correctness. The Court has to
be on guard that the statement of deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring,
prompting or a product of imagination.
The Court must be further satisfied that
the deceased was in a fit state of mind
after a clear opportunity to observe and
identify the assailants. Once the Court is
satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
conviction without any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as
an absolute rule of law that the dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated. The
rule requiring corroboration is merely a
rule of prudence. This Court has laid
down in several judgments the principles
governing dying declaration, which could
be summed up as under:
(i) There is neither rule of law
nor of prudence that dying declaration
cannot be acted upon without
corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376 : (1976) 2 SCR 764] )
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that
the dying declaration is true and
voluntary it can base conviction on it,
without corroboration. (State of U.P. v.Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552 :1985 SCC (Cri) 127 : AIR 1985 SC 416] ;Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169 : AIR 1983
SC 164] ).
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must
ensure that the declaration is not the 
result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination. The deceased had
opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make
the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 473 : AIR 1976 SC 1994] ).
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon
without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264 :1974 SCC (Cri) 426] )
(v) Where the deceased was
unconscious and could never make any
dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 645 : AIR 1982 SC 1021] )
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the
basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654 : 1981SCC (Cri) 581] )
(vii) Merely because a dying
declaration does not contain the details as
to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455 :1981 SCC (Cri) 364 : AIR 1981 SC 617])
(viii) Equally, merely because it
is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded. On the contrary, the shortness
of the statement itself guarantees truth.
(Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 519 : AIR 1979 SC 1505] )
(ix) Normally the court in order
to satisfy itself whether the deceased was
in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration look up to the medical
opinion. But where the eyewitness has
said that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make this dying
declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. (Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp SCC 152 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 342 : AIR 1988 SC 912] )
(x) Where the prosecution
version differs from the version as given in
the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390 : 1989SCC (Cri) 585 : AIR 1989 SC 1519] )”
(v) In cases of oral dying declarations, greater caution is required. In State of M.P. v. Ramjan Khan, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3070, the Hon’ble Supreme Court flagging
case-specific infirmities, such as uncorroborated, omitted
from FIR/Section 161 CrPC statement, interested witness etc.
emphasised that when an oral dying declaration is made
before close relatives or interested persons and is not recorded
contemporaneously, the Court must examine it with closer
scrutiny. The relevant paragraph of the sid judgment is
reproduced below:
17. Through the evidence of
PW8, the mother of the deceased, who is
also the informant, the prosecution has
attempted to establish the existence of an
oral dying declaration. It is to be noted
that dying declaration itself is not a
strong piece of evidence and therefore,
when it is verbal and that too, allegedly
made to a close relative (in this case
allegedly to the mother), evidence of
mother about the oral dying declaration
was to be treated with care and caution.
To show that the trial Court dealt with the
same without due care and caution self-
evident from paragraph 32 of the
judgment of the Trial Court, which reads
thus:-
“32. During the arguments, ld.
Counsel for the accused argued that
complainant Sitara Bi has stated in her
court statement that when she reached at
well, at that time, her son Naseem Khan
told her that all the three accused Ramjan
Khan, Musab Khan and Habib Khan have
caused his murder after beating him with
sickle, axe and lathi. Though, this fact is
not written in the police statement Exh.
D-3 of Sitara Bi that when he reached, at
that time, accused Naseem had told her to
be beaten by accused persons, even
thereafter, I don't find it proper to give it's
benefit to the accused persons because I
don't find any reason to disbelieve the
statement, which has been given by her
before the court.”
(vi) Consistency among multiple witnesses
recounting the same oral declaration may lend assurance, but
such consistency cannot be treated as independent
corroboration of the same quality as that of an unrelated eye-
witness.

Non-recovery of the weapon of offence and the projectile

(i) It is equally well settled that non-recovery of the weapon of offence or the bullet is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case if the ocular evidence or the dying declaration is found to be reliable and receives corroboration from medical evidence. In Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2021) 7 SCC 188, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the absence of the weapon does not ipso facto demolish the prosecution version when the other evidence is trustworthy. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that
as per the ballistic report the bullet found
does not match with the firearm/gun
recovered and therefore the use of gun as
alleged is doubtful and therefore benefit
of doubt must be given to the accused is
concerned, the aforesaid cannot be
accepted. At the most, it can be said that
the gun recovered by the police from the
accused may not have been used for
killing and therefore the recovery of the
actual weapon used for killing can be
ignored and it is to be treated as if there
is no recovery at all. For convicting an
accused recovery of the weapon used in
commission of offence is not a sine qua
non. PW 1 and PW 2, as observed
hereinabove, are reliable and trustworthy
eyewitnesses to the incident and they have
specifically stated that A-1 Rakesh fired
from the gun and the deceased sustained
injury. The injury by the gun has been
established and proved from the medical
evidence and the deposition of Dr
Santosh Kumar, PW 5. Injury 1 is by
gunshot. Therefore, it is not possible to
reject the credible ocular evidence of PW
1 and PW 2 — eyewitnesses who
witnessed the shooting. It has no bearing
on credibility of deposition of PW 1 and
PW 2 that A-1 shot deceased with a gun,
particularly as it is corroborated by
bullet in the body and also stands
corroborated by the testimony of PW 2
and PW 5. Therefore, merely because the
ballistic report shows that the bullet
recovered does not match with the gun
recovered, it is not possible to reject the
credible and reliable deposition of PW 1
and PW 2.”
(ii) At the same time, the non-recovery remains a relevant circumstance, particularly when the identity of the assailant is seriously disputed and scientific evidence could have provided objective support.

Scope of interference in an appeal against conviction 

In an appeal against conviction, the appellate court exercises the same power as the trial court to review the evidence, subject to the well-known limitations attending the appreciation of oral evidence. It is under a duty to re-appreciate and re-examine the entire evidence on record, and is not confined to interfering only where the trial court's findings are perverse. Its jurisdiction to reverse a finding of conviction is co-extensive with the trial court’s original jurisdiction to render it. This principle has been reiterated in several decisions, including State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735, the relevant paragraph of which is reproduced below: 

“5.2. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it was dealing with the first appeal against the order of conviction passed by the learned trial court. Being the first appellate court, the High Court was required to reappreciate the entire evidence on record and also the reasoning given by the learned trial court while convicting the accused. Non-reappreciation of the evidence on record may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the accused. Being the first appellate court, the High Court ought to have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record without any limitation, which might be there while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court.”

Supreme Court detects error in judgement of 2015 authored by Justice Anjana Prakash, acquits accused in murder of Braj Bhushan Singh from Arara, Adapur, East Champaran in 2001

In Dhrub Singh Etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran delivered a 14-page long judgement dated September 1, 2016, wherein, it detected error in the 20-page long judgement dated December 9, 2015 by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra. It concluded:"The High Court egregiously erred in looking at a complaint against the I.O not produced in the trial, to find the evidence led to be clinching insofar as the culpability of the accused. A faulty  investigation cannot inure to the benefit of the accused, but when there is no reliable evidence, merely because the I.O was recalcitrant or a complaint of collusion was raised against him, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused. There is complete lack of evidence in the present case and the testimonies, as we observed, do not inspire confidence. 12. We, hence, acquit the accused and direct that they be released forthwith if any of the appellants are in custody, if not required in any other case, and if they were released on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. 13.The Appeals stand allowed.” The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

Dhrub Singh, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C., 2 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a fine of Rs.3000/ by judgment dated November 29, 2010 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in a Sessions Trial of 2002. 15. Justice Prakash had concluded: "15. On looking into the records of the case, we find that soon after the occurrence a protest petition had been filed against the Investigating Officer that he was making a collusive investigation which explains as to why he did not record the statements of independent witnesses nor send the blood stained earth for chemical examination, nor seize the blood stained clothes on the person of the deceased or the witnesses. In such circumstances, the argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the manner of occurrence or the presence of the witnesses for the aforesaid reason has to be rejected. As for the manner of occurrence, we find that the consistent evidence is that all the witnesses were walking behind each other and suddenly the accused persons sprang upon them and shot at the deceased from the back, on account of which he fell down on his face. From their evidence the fact that they did not hear any accused before the firing or even during the firing is well explained since from the manner narrated it appears that the occurrence had not taken place within minutes. In such circumstances, when Pappu Singh was not being seen before firing at the deceased from the back and the rest firing at the witnesses to scatter them off or even to kill them is well plausible. Also the fact that scratches were found on the face of the deceased further corroborates the prosecution case that after the firing from the back the deceased had fallen on his face. As for the injuries being oval or circular has no meaning in the present case since it is most natural that a person’s hand would shake and not be completely stable while firing is made within a split of second especially when the target is moving. The doctor no doubt stated in his cross examination that when he said that the occurrence had taken place within 36 hours he had meant that it could be within 24 to 36 hours, is not acceptable by the Court. Once he has stated in his examination-in-chief that it was within 36 hours it certainly means that it was within 36 hours and such minute timing of death so precisely could not be given by him especially when he has mentioned that rigor mortis was present. 16. As for alternative argument of considering the case of non-assailants, even while we are inclined to disbelieve the prosecution case in so far as the Appellant Chunnu Singh having ordered Appellant Pappu Singh to fire is concerned, but fact remains that all the accused variously armed had come together and fired which makes out a case of accused having common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased. In such circumstances, we find no merit in such submission. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same is dismissed."

The case of the prosecution according to the Informant Kundan Kumar (P.W.7), son of the deceased, was that on April 19, 2001 at about 2.30 p.m. he left home along with the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh, their Sepoy Chandeshwar Singh, co-villager Bhagirath Thakur and cousin Nilesh Kumar Sharma for their agricultural farm. When they were in the middle of Arara village and Laxmipur School at about 03.30 p.m. suddenly 7-8 persons came, who were identified as Chunnu Singh, Pappu Singh, out of which Chunnu Singh told Pappu Singh to fire at the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh and he did so on taking position from the back, on account of which his father fell down. At that very moment Appellant Dhrub Singh fired at him but he was somehow saved. They all started running but Brajesh Singh ordered that everyone should be killed else they would go to the police, at which Appellants Dharmendra singh @ Tarzan and Dharmendra Singh started firing but their shots did not hit them. They noticed a patrolling party approaching, at which the accused started fleeing, saying that the deceased had been killed which needed to be reported to Madan Singh that the work had been accomplished. They then took the deceased to Dunkan Hospital, Raxaul but the doctor declared him dead. The dead body of his father was brought home. The motive for the occurrence was that the daughter of Major Harendra Singh had been kidnapped on 29.8.2000 by his co-villager Ramesh Singh. The past Mukhiya Madan Mohan Singh, Dharmendra Singh son of Madan Mohan Singh, Chunnu Singh, Dharmendra Singh @ Tarzan, Subhash Singh, Sanjeet Singh, Manoj Singh, Arvind Singh, Brajesh Singh had come to his village and proposed to his father that he was a reputed person and he should try to use his influence for recovering the girl. His father had made enquiry but it was found that Ramesh Singh had fled away with the girl, on account of which the girl was not recovered. Madan Mohan Singh had felt insulted on account of the inability of the Appellant and had started instigating others that the deceased had played with the reputation of their villagers. On September 12, 2000 Adapur a P.S. case had been instituted in regard to the case aforesaid. His brother Sanju Dubey (P.W.5) was also sought to be implicated in the case but final report was submitted in his regard. Then in another case, namely, Adapur P.S. case of 2000, once again his name was given but final report was submitted. His cousin brother Satyendra Dubey was a candidate for Mukhiya election and there was every chance of his winning which had caused apprehension in the mind of Madan Mohan Singh, the previous Mukhiya, Arera, who had got the deceased killed. 

Supreme Court's judgement reads:“11. We are unable to find the prosecution having established the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As we noticed, the eye-witness testimony does not inspire confidence and there are no recoveries made or seizures effected as would have been done in a proper investigation. The case is not of a faulty investigation but of no investigation having been carried out. Even the inquest was carried out before the FIS was recorded; making it pre-meditated." 

Supreme Court's judgement recorded that it was a case of murder in broad day light presumably on an election day which had led to the conviction of the six accused, five of whom approached the Supreme Court in these appeals. The 1st accused served his term and was released on remission. The prosecution case was that the deceased along with four others, a son, an employee, a nephew and a villager was proceeding to his fields, when the accused ambushed the party, started indiscriminate firing with exhortation made to kill all and the deceased was shot in the back. The victim succumbed to the gun shot injury and the persons who accompanied him started running away when a patrol car came with a  Magistrate, presumably roaming around on the election day, when the accused too ran away. The victim was taken to the hospital where he was declared dead. The prosecution went to trial with nine witnesses.

Justice Chandran observed: "The I.Os testimony goes contrary to what the Government Advocate argued, of the victims having gone on a ridge. PW9 specifically speaks of the place of occurrence being a lane which led from Madanpur Distributary Canal towards Arara on the east; a clear pathway made for pedestrians. It is also stated by the I.O that on both sides of the pathway there were fields, which were ploughed recently. Though a sketch of the place of occurrence was prepared, the blood stained earth seized from the place was not sent for testing in a laboratory. He spoke of a tension in the area due to the kidnapping of a girl and also spoke of naxalite movement in the area. The I.O also did not seize the clothes of the deceased or the clothes worn by the witnesses, who, allegedly carried the body to the hospital, in the petrol car. The High Court noticed that though the I.Os attention was drawn to the previous
statement of the witnesses, the cross examination was long, winding and utterly undecipherable. 9. The High Court having narrated the prosecution case and the testimonies of the witnesses, looked into the records of the case and found a complaint against the I.O accusing him of having made a collusive investigation. We cannot but notice that no such complaint was elicited from any of the eyewitnesses and in any event this does not explain the shoddy investigation carried out by the I.O. However, the High Court relying on the complaint made against the I.O found that this is the reason for not recording the statements of the independent witnesses, the blood stained earth being not sent for chemical examination and the failure to seize the blood stained clothes of the deceased and the witnesses. Observing that the investigation was collusive, reliance was placed on the testimony of the witnesses, terming it as ‘consistent evidence’ to accept their version, to convict the accused. The expert evidence on the possibility of the deceased being shot in a sitting position was brushed aside with the conjecture that a shooting hand would shake and when the target is moving, the shape of the injuries are not relevant. The High Court peremptorily came to the finding that the accused armed with a variety of weapons, ambushed the victim and fired indiscriminately causing the death of one person thus proving the common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased, based only on the eye-witness testimony. 10. We cannot but observe that the motive projected is sticky to say the least. The expert medical opinion was against the eye- witness testimony on how the incident occurred. There was no recovery of weapons nor were any cartridges seized from the scene of occurrence; especially when the eye-witnesses spoke of indiscriminate shooting. The eyewitnesses also spoke of five of them walking in a straight line with the deceased leading from the front. The clear case was that the accused came from the back and shot at the deceased on the back. Very unlikely, when the party led by the deceased was walking in a straight line and the ambush as also the firing came from the back. The expert evidence that there was an indication from the nature of the wound, that victim was sitting and that the firing was made from close quarters persuades us to disbelieve the eye-witness testimony. The eyewitnesses were all close to the deceased and admittedly there was a tension in the locality between the group led by the father of A1 in the adjacent village and that led by the deceased; which could have prompted the eyewitnesses to frame the accused. The motive projected of the sister of A3 having been kidnapped by a villager of the deceased cannot be believed since there is no connection established between the boy, who is said to have kidnapped the girl and the deceased. The eyewitnesses were all related witnesses and their presence could have been established by their clothes, which would have been blood-stained if they carried the victim in the patrol car to the hospital. Their presence is doubtful and they had a running dispute with the accused, coupled with the non-examination of independent witnesses puts the prosecution case under a cloud and makes it highly doubtful."

 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's order, grants regular bail

In Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi passed an order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it reversed the order dated April 20, 2026 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court, and granted regular bail. Even according to the prosecution there was no recovery of weapon from the appellant. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "Hence, we are of the considered view that the Appellant is entitled for bail, released on regular bail. The appeal is allowed and the Impugned Order is hereby set aside. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be deemed fit and appropriate by the jurisdictional Court."

The appellant was arraigned as an accused in a FIR of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(1), 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He approached the Supreme Court for being enlarged on regular bail after his prayer made before the Trial Court and the High Court was negatived.

Supreme Court's order recorded that from the submissions of the advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the counter affidavit, it "emerged from the records that the allegation made in the complaint is the effect that appellant and co-accused had arrived at the informant’s house with firearms and lathis and it was alleged that appellant fired at the informant namely Binod Kumar causing a gunshot injury in left eye."

The counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the FIR is counter blast to the attack initiated by the informant side and in this regard, an FIR has been registered in FIR No.298 of 2025 by the appellant’s family alleging that the informant side had attacked with sticks and Binod Kumar had fired from country made pistol 6 to 7 times. Hence, the appellant sought for grant of regular bail. The advocates appearing for the parties, it emerged from the records that co-accused (had already been enlarged on bail). Although there was a specific allegation of firing against the appellant, the fact remains that, as per the averments made in the complaint that other co-accused also had carried the firearms.  

Earlier, in Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated April 20, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has fired and injured the victim, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." The petitioner had approached the High Court for bail in connection with a Koilwar P.S. Case No. 297/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 190, 191(2), 191(3), 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3) of B.N.S. and Section 27 of Arms Act. 

Section 190: Every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of a common object. 

Section 191(2): Rioting (using force or violence as an unlawful assembly of 5 or more people), punishable with up to 2 years imprisonment, a fine, or both. 

Section 191(3): Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon, punishable with up to 5 years imprisonment, a fine, or both.

Section 126(2): Punishment for wrongful restraint (voluntarily obstructing someone to prevent them from moving in a direction they have a right to go).

Section 115(2): Voluntarily causing hurt (physical assault/marpit), punishable with up to 1 year imprisonment, a fine up to ₹10,000, or both.

Section 109: Punishment for abetment if the act abetted is committed and no explicit provision is made for its punishment.

Section 352: Punishment for assault or use of criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation.

Section 351(2) and (3): Criminal intimidation; sub-section (3) applies if the threat involves causing death, grievous hurt, or destruction of property, carrying a higher imprisonment term (up to 7 years)

Section 27 of the Indian Arms Act of 1959: sets the penalties for using arms and ammunition illegally. The severity of the punishment depends on whether standard or prohibited weapons are involved and if the illegal use results in loss of life.

As per the prosecution case, petitioner is a accused of firing upon the victim and causing fire arm injury in the thigh. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that petitioner was falsely implicated in the case. It was also submitted that the injury was not on the vital part of the body of the victim. He submitted that he was no criminal antecedent in which he was on bail and he was in custody since December 29, 2025. The petitioner is the son of Baliram Rai, a resident of Chhotaka Chanda, Koilwar, Bhojpur. Now Supreme Court has granted bail to the petitioner. 

.

Supreme Court to pronounce its verdict on the judgment passed by Justice Anjana Prakash led Division Bench in a murder case from Arara, Adapur, East Champaran

A criminal appeal, Dhrub Singh vs. The State of Bihar was filed in the Supreme Court on April 16, 2016 was filed against the judgment authored by Justice Anjana Prakash of Patna High Court as part of a Division Bench. It was registered on August 14, 2017. Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan heard the matter on January 23, 2025 and passed a 3-page long order. The arguments were concluded on August 21, 2026 and the order was reserved. The counsels appearing for the parties to file their respective written submissions by August 22, 2026.

In this case three appellants have prayed for bail pending the final disposal of their respective criminal appeals which are pending for final hearing before the Court. They were convicted for the offence of murder and their appeals by before the High Court also failed. Supreme Court took notice of the fact that in all eight accused were put to trial. One of the co-accused died during the pendency of the trial. The main accused who is said to have fired had already undergone the sentence of life imprisonment and was released. Out of six convicts, three were ordered to be released on bail by this Court vide orders dated August 10, 2022, December 5, 2022 and July 17, 2023 respectively. The order reads: "7. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are inclined to consider the plea of the three appellants before us for bail. 8. They have also undergone almost 9 years of sentence so far. Out of the three appellants, two of the appellants have undergone almost 9 years of sentence so far, whereas the third appellant has undergone 8 years & 5 months of sentence. 9. All the applications for bail stand allowed. 10. The appellants(convicts) are ordered to be released on bail subject to the same terms and conditions as imposed in the orders passed by this Court at the time of releasing the other co-accused on bail."

In Dhrub Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra delivered a 20-page long judgment dated December 9, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"16. As for alternative argument of considering the case of non-assailants, even while we are inclined to disbelieve the prosecution case in so far as the Appellant Chunnu Singh having ordered Appellant Pappu Singh to fire is concerned, but fact remains that all the accused variously armed had come together and fired which makes out a case of accused having common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased. In such circumstances, we find no merit in such submission. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same is dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

The appellant Pappu Singh was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 I.P.C., 2 years R.I. under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act and also fine of Rs.3000. 

The appellant Dhrub Singh and Appellant Dharmender Singh @ Tarzan Singh @ Tarzan and appellant Dharmendra Singh were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C., 2 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years rigorous imprisonmentunder Section 27 of the Arms Act with a fine of Rs.3000/. The appellant Chunnu Singh @ Subhash Chandra Singh @ Subhash Chander Singh and appellants Brajesh Singh and Subhash Singh were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 I.P.C. and one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147 I.P.C. by judgment dated 29.11.2010 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in a Sessions Trial of 2002.

The case of the prosecution according to the Informant Kundan Kumar (P.W.7), son of the deceased, was that on April 19, 2001 at about 2.30 p.m. he left home along with the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh, their Sepoy Chandeshwar Singh, co-villager Bhagirath Thakur and cousin Nilesh Kumar Sharma for their agricultural farm. When they were in the middle of Arara village and Laxmipur School at about 03.30 p.m. suddenly 7-8 persons came, who were identified as Chunnu Singh, Pappu Singh, out of which Chunnu Singh told Pappu Singh to fire at the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh and he did so on taking position from the back, on account of which his father fell down. Just then Appellant Dhrub Singh fired at him but he was somehow saved. They all started running but Brajesh Singh ordered that everyone should be killed else they would go to the police, at which Appellants Dharmendra singh @ Tarzan and Dharmendra Singh started firing but their shots did not hit them. They noticed a patrolling party approaching, at which the accused started fleeing, saying that the deceased had been killed which needed to be reported to Madan Singh that the work had been accomplished. They then took the deceased to Dunkan Hospital, Raxaul but the doctor declared him dead. The dead body of his father was brought home. The motive for the occurrence was that the daughter of Major Harendra Singh had been kidnapped on August 29, 2000 by his co-villager Ramesh Singh. The past Mukhiya Madan Mohan Singh, Dharmendra Singh son of Madan Mohan Singh, Chunnu Singh, Dharmendra Singh @ Tarzan, Subhash Singh, Sanjeet Singh, Manoj Singh, Arvind Singh, Brajesh Singh had come to his village and proposed to his father that he was a reputed person and he should try to use his influence for recovering the girl. His father had made enquiry but it was found that Ramesh Singh had fled away with the girl, on account of which the girl was not recovered. Madan Mohan Singh had felt insulted on account of the inability of the Appellant and had started instigating others that the deceased had played with the reputation of their villagers. On September 12, 2000 Adapur P.S. case was instituted in regard to the case aforesaid. His brother Sanju Dubey (P.W.5) was also sought to be implicated in the case but final report was submitted in his regard. Then in another case, namely, Adapur P.S. case of 2000, once again his name was given but final report was submitted. His cousin brother Satyendra Dubey was a candidate for Mukhiya election and there was every chance of his winning which had caused apprehension in the mind of Madan Mohan Singh, the previous Mukhiya, Arera, who had got the deceased killed. This information was given in the presence of Nilesh Kumar (P.W.2) and Hridesh Dubey (P.W.3) at 06.45 p.m. at home. 

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the manner of occurrence has not been proved by the prosecution on account of various factors, one of which is that important witnesses, such as, patrolling party and the Doctor at Dunkan Hospital have not been examined. P.W.2 and P.W.7 have stated that they did not see anyone while they were walking behind each other during or after the occurrence and hence their depiction of the manner of occurrence is not proved. Further independent witnesses, even by way of hearsay, have not been examined and only interested witnesses, who are somehow related with the deceased, have been produced by the prosecution. The Investigating Officer has committed various lapses including not establishing the place of occurrence and the inquest report and the map prepared by him are contrary to each other. He also did not find any holes in the clothes which the deceased was wearing nor blood on him. He did not produce the blood stained earth nor did he seize the clothes on the person of the deceased and the witnesses, who are said to have carried the deceased to the patrolling party, nor did he send the same. In fact, neither the Informant nor P.W.1 was present at the place of occurrence as is evident from the evidence of P.W.6. Even though it is a case of direct evidence, since the prosecution has brought forth motive for the occurrence they were duty bound to conclusively prove the same. The prosecution case suffers on this count as well. The Doctor’s evidence also further disproves the prosecution case inasmuch as the injuries found on the deceased appear to have been caused while a person would be in a supine position and the time of occurrence in his opinion being about 36 hours before the examination does not match with the prosecution case. The further submission is that the deceased’s own agnates had a grudge with the deceased and there is every possibility of him having been killed by them. In the alternative, the argument is also that there is specific allegation of firing against Appellant Pappu Singh on the orders of Chunnu Singh but no overt act is alleged with regard to the rest of the accused persons and hence they deserve to be acquitted. 

In her judgement, Justice Prakash had observed: "15. On looking into the records of the case, we find that soon after the occurrence a protest petition had been filed against the Investigating Officer that he was making a collusive investigation which explains as to why he did not record the statements of independent witnesses nor send the blood stained earth for chemical examination, nor seize the blood stained clothes on the person of the deceased or the witnesses. In such circumstances, the argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the manner of occurrence or the presence of the witnesses for the aforesaid reason has to be rejected. As for the manner of occurrence, we find that the consistent evidence is that all the witnesses were walking behind each other and suddenly the accused persons sprang upon them and shot at the deceased from the back, on account of which he fell down on his face. From their evidence the fact that they did not hear any accused before the firing or even during the firing is well explained since from the manner narrated it appears that the occurrence had not taken place within minutes. In such circumstances, when Pappu Singh was not being seen before firing at the deceased from the back and the rest firing at the witnesses to scatter them off or even to kill them is well plausible. Also the fact that scratches were found on the face of the deceased further corroborates the prosecution case that after the firing from the back the deceased had fallen on his face. As for the injuries being oval or circular has no meaning in the present case since it is most natural that a person’s hand would shake and not be completely stable while firing is made within a split of second especially when the target is moving. The doctor no doubt stated in his cross examination that when he said that the occurrence had taken place within 36 hours he had meant that it could be within 24 to 36 hours, is not acceptable by the Court. Once he has stated in his examination-in-chief that it was within 36 hours it certainly means that it was within 36 hours and such minute timing of death so precisely could not be given by him especially when he has mentioned that rigor mortis was present."

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in Devnath Rai murder case from Maner

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 5-page long order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"The order passed by the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 8. The appellant shall be released on bail....".  The High Court's order was passed by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra. Supreme Court recorded:" 4. In this case, it appears that Vinay was an injured witness. His statement was not recorded at the time when the petition was filed and therefore, hearing on this petition was deferred to enable the Trial Court to record the statement of Vinay. 5. We have been informed that the statement of Vinay has been recorded in the trial and he has not identified the appellant as one of the participants in the incident....7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed." Notably, Shiv Kumari Devi, the informant, the wife of Late Devnath Rai, the victim who has allegedly been killed has not been made a party. She has not been able to rope any advocate to represent her in the Supreme Court. 

Earlier, in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Mishra of Patna High Court had passed a 3-page long order dated July 7, 2025, wherein, he had refused to grant bail in a murder case. He had concluded:"6 Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the nature and gravity of the offence as alleged against the petitioner as also taking into account the materials available in the case diary, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the prayer for bail of the petitioner, above named, is rejected with a direction to the court below to expedite the trial and conclude the same expeditiously." The petitioner had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 from Maner  instituted for the offences under Sections 140(1), 109, 61(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Shiv Kumari Devi was not made a party in the case in the High Court. She was not able to rope any advocate to represent her in the High Court to represent her.

As per prosecution case, the accusation against the accused persons including the petitioner is to have killed the Informant’s husband and disappeared his dead body. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and had committed no offence as alleged against him and has falsely been implicated in the present case merely on the basis of suspicion. The petitioner has not committed any offence as alleged in the F.I.R. The informant is not the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that there was delay of one day in lodging the F.I.R. that too without there being any plausible explanation for the same, which created doubt in the veracity of the prosecution case. It was submitted that nothing incriminating was recovered from the conscious/physical possession of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no direct or specific allegation of any overt act against the petitioner rather the same is general and omnibus in nature. The petitioner had two criminal antecedents and is languishing in judicial custody since December 3, 2024 without any rhymes or reason.The A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioner. He had stated that the in this case, the injured Vinay Kumar was the eye-witness to the alleged occurrence who have supported the prosecution case. The petitioner, in his confessional statement, had also confessed his guilt. The petitioner  was named in the F.I.R. and, hence, he did not deserve bail. 

Shivkumari Devi is a permanent resident of Lodipur Jeevarakhand Tola, Vyapur Police Station, Maner, Patna. She informed the Maner Police that the incident occurred when her husband Devnath Rai and his friend Vinay Kumar, s/o Murari Rai of Lodipur had gone to Om Sai brick kiln to smoke at around 10 pm on August 5, 2024. At that time, a notorious criminal who is currently lodged in Beur Jail—1. Sagar Rai (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Lodipur Ganga Tola) and 2. Umashankar Yadav alias Shankar Kumar (son of the late Chandeshwar Rai; resident of Lodipur, currently residing at R.P.S. Mor, Bailey Road, Rupaspur Police Station)—conspired to recruit other notorious criminals into their fold. These recruits are: 3. Dharmendra Kumar (son of Kashi Rai; resident of Ganga Tola, Lodipur Bagicha), 4. Lalu Kumar (Dharmendra’s nephew; son of Buddhadev Rai; resident of Chakiya Tola, Chhitnava), and 5. Daroga Rai (son of the late Manik Rai; resident of Lodipur Buddha Tola). 6. Dhora Rai (son of Phudi Rai, alias Pahalban Singh; resident of Vyapur, Purvi Gali) and 7. Munna Rai (son of an unknown person; resident of Bhaggu Tola, Vyapur)—all belonging to the Maner Police Station area, District Patna—suddenly arrived by boat at the Om Sai Brick Kiln, where my husband and his friend, Vinay Kumar, were already present. All the assailants began firing with various weapons they were carrying, with the intent to kill. As a result, her husband and his friend, Vinay, were shot in the leg; Vinay Kumar then ran into the bushes to save his life. After being shot, her husband fled and hid inside the office of the Om Sai Brick Kiln. Inside the office, my husband and a staff member of the kiln—Mohan Rai (son of Shri Sukan Rai, resident of Lodipur, Maner Police Station, Patna)—locked the door from within. Then, all the named perpetrators approached the office while firing indiscriminately and began shooting at the door. Some of the perpetrators climbed onto the roof of the office and started removing the roof tiles. Mohan Rai, one of the named accused, was ordered to open the door; he complied, and then—acting in concert with the other accused—he joined them in murdering my husband. Subsequently, all these perpetrators disposed of my husband's body. Her husband's friend, Vinay Kumar, witnessed the entire incident while hiding in the bushes. Therefore, she request the SHO, Maner P.S. to please take necessary legal action against all the named eight accused persons. Manoj Kumar is the I.O.  of the case. 

Her compliant was registered on August 6, 2024. It reads:"सेवा में थानाध्यक्ष महोदय, मनेर थाना पटना। विषयः. मेरे पति देवनाथ राय के हत्या कर लाश गायब करने के संबंध में आवेदन। महाशय, विनम्रपुर्वक निवेदन के साथ कहना है कि मैं शिवकुमारी देवी पति देवनाथ राय सा० लोदीपुर जीवराखंड टोला पा० व्यापुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना कि स्थायी निवासी हूँ। मेरे पति देवनाथ राय एवं मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार पिता श्री मुरारी राय सा० लोदीपुर दोनो मिलकर दिनांक 05.08.024 को समय लगभग 10:00 बजे रात्रि में ओम साई ईंट भट्ठा पर धुमने गये हुए थे। उसी समय एक कुख्यात जो वेउर जेल में बंद है 1. सागर राय पिता काशी राय सा० लोदीपुर गंगा टोला एवं 2. उमाशंकर यादव उर्फ शंकर कुमार पिता स्व० चंदेश्वर राय सा० लोदीपुर वर्तमान पता R.P.S मोड़ बेली रोड थाना रूपसपुर इन दोनो साजिश करके कुछ कुख्यात अपराधियो को अपने मेल मे लाकर अपराधि का नाम 3. धर्मेन्द्र कुमार पिता काशी राय सा० गंगा टोला लोदीपुर बगीचा 4. लालु कुमार (धर्मेन्द्र के भगिना) पिता बुद्वदेव राय सा० चकिया टोला छितनावा 5. दरोगा राय पिता स्व0 मानिक राय सा० लोदीपुर बुद्वाटोला 6.ढोरा राय पिता फुदी राय उर्फ पहलबान सिंह सा० व्यापुर पुर्वी गली 7. मुन्ना राय पिता नामालुम सा० भग्गु टोला व्यापुर सभी थाना मनेर जिला पटना ने नाव से एकाएक ओम साई ईट भट्ठा पर पहुँचा जहा पहले से मेरे पति एवं उनके दोस्त विनय कुमार बैठे हुए थें। सभी अपराधी अपने अपने हाथ मे लिये कई तरह के हथियार से जान मारने कि नियत से फायरिंग करना शुरू कर दिया । जिससे मेरे पति एंव पति के दोस्त विनय को पैर में गोली लगी तब मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार जान बचाने के लिए झाड़ी में जाकर छिप गया। और मेरे पति गोली लगने के बाद ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के ऑफिस मे भागकर छिप गया। ऑफिस के अंदर मेरे पति के साथ ओम साई ईट भट्ठा के स्टॉफ 8. मोहन राय पिता श्री सुकन राय सा० लोदीपुर थाना मनेर जिला पटना दोनो ईंट भटठा के ऑफिस के अंदर दरवाज बंद कर लिया। तब सभी नामित अपराधी अंधाधुंध फायरिंग करते हुए ऑफिस के पास आकर दरवाजा पर गोली चलाने लगा। ओर कुछ अपराधी ऑफिस उपर चढ़कर खपड़ा हटाने लगा।नामित अभियुक्त मोहन राय को दरवाजा खोलने को कहा गया। जिसपर मोहन राय ने दरवाज खोल दिया जिसपर सभी उक्त अभियुक्त के साथ मोहन राय भी मिलकर मेरे पति कि हत्या कर दिया। और उक्त सभी अपराधी मिलकर मेरे पति के शव को ठिकाने लगा दिया। जिस घटना को घटित होते मेरे पति के दोस्त विनय कुमार ने झाड़ी से छुपकर देखा। अतः श्रीमान् से प्रार्थना है कि सभी नामजद 08 अभियुक्तो के विरूद्ध आवाश्यक कानुनी करवाई करने कि कृपा कि जाय। इसके लिए में श्रीमान् कि सदा आभारी रहूंगी। आपकी विश्वासी (शिवकुमारी देवी)". 

Will Shiv Kumar Devi, wife of Devnath Rai get justice? Isn't it a case where a habeas corpus petition should be filed in the High Court? 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.