Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Soni Shrivastava hearing amendment to Section 27 of Bihar Municipal Act through Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025

In Ghnshyam Bhrosh Pandit & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's  Division Bench of Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava heard the writ petition which was filed for quashing Act Nos. 3, 4, and 5 of the Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025 dated October 3, 2025. The ordinance was promulgated to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. 

By way of Act No. 3, an amendment has been carried out in sub-section (3) of Section 21, whereby the existing provision has been substituted with a new sub-section (3). Similarly, Act No. 4 introduces an amendment to sub-section (3) of Section 23, substituting it with a newly inserted provision. By Act No. 5, Section 27 has been amended and a new sub-section (3) has been inserted after sub-section (2). 

Upon perusal of the Ordinance, it appeared to the Court that the Governor of Bihar, being satisfied that circumstances existed warranting the exercise of powers conferred under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, promulgated the said Ordinance to amend the Bihar Municipal Act, as the Legislature was not in session at the relevant time. 

In its order dated June 18, 2026 From the records of the case, vide order dated April 7, 2026, it was inter alia ordered that upon perusal of the Ordinance. The counsel for the State Election Commission had then sought time to obtain instructions regarding the present status of the Ordinance. The counsel submitted that now the Act has been enforced and there are several other writ petitions which are challenging the amendment to the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. He submitted that all the matters may be tagged together. The matter is listed for July 16, 2026. The Bench directed, "7. In the interregnum, steps be taken."

Notably, in Ashish Kumar Sinha vs. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat 3472, as Chief Justice of Patna High Court, Justice Sanjay Karol led Division Bench held that Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 as unconstitutional to the effect of amendments carried out in Sections 36, 37, 38 and 41 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2021 ran contrary to Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 are unconstitutional.

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Partha Sarthy, gnoring Court's 3-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb?

In Dhan Jee Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices R. Mahadevan and A. Amanullah delivered a 21-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law....The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law." The judgement was authored by Justice Mahadevan. The impugned 5-page long order dated order dated November 22, 2024 in Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ vs. The State of Bihar (2024) was authored by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Partha Sarthy. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-4/2016.  

Justice Prasad had authored the High Court's order. His reasoning appears defensible in the light of the decision in Union of India v. KA Najeeb AIR 2021 SC 712, 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on February 1, 2021. The relevant part of para 18 of the judgement reads:

“... at the commencement of proceedings, courts are expected to appreciate the legislative position against grant of bail but the rigours of such provision melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence…”

The decision in Najeeb's case “lays down the constitutional approach arising from Article 21, whereas Watali (supra) explains the statutory approach arising out of Section 4-3(D)(5) of UAPA” (para 21 of Mohamad Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC Online Del 4623. In its decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, delivered by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2019.

  

The judgement by Justice Mahadevan reads: "A perusal of the record indicates that the prosecution case is founded on ocular evidence, which has been duly appreciated and accepted by the trial Court. Without considering the same in a proper perspective, the High Court erred in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 and released him on bail. 19. The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. 20. It is further evident that the High Court has embarked upon a selective consideration of certain aspects of the prosecution case, which in substance amounts to a premature reappreciation of evidence. Such an approach is directly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Om Prakash Sahni (supra). 21. As held in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (supra), undue weight cannot be accorded to the period of incarceration or the pendency of the appeal in isolation, particularly where the conviction is founded on credible evidence. 22. The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. 23. Additionally, material has been placed to indicate that Respondent No. 2 has allegedly attempted to intimidate the appellant by issuing threats and initiating false cases. The explanation offered on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that such allegations are motivated, does not inspire confidence of this Court, particularly at this interlocutory stage. 24. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the nature of the evidence as accepted by the trial Court, the absence of any apparent infirmity in the judgment of conviction, and the settled legal position governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, warrants interference by this Court." 

 

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V.R. Krishnaiyer and N.L. Untwalia in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 held:"The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court." Justice Mahadevan's judgement has taken note of  

Justice Mahadevan relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Court held that suspension of sentence in serious offences must not be granted as a matter of routine, and that the appellate court must apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the findings recorded by the trial Court. The relevant paragraphs are: “6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said Court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.….9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while passing the impugned order." Notably, Justice Mahadevan's judgement does not refer to the subsequent decision of 2021 in Najeeb's case.  

It is crystal clear from the decision in Najeeb's case that the settled position of law is that the restriction on grant of bail will hold at the initial stages, but as time progresses the statutory restrictions, which “draw this justification on the premise that trial in such cases would be concluded expeditiously” gets diluted. It has been underlined by the Bombay High Court in Vinay Vivek Aranha vs. Union of India and another, (BA 2641/2021).

Significantly, a judgement delivered in ignorance of a relevant statutory position is deemed to be per incuriam. In para 183 of the Supreme Court's decision in AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602) held that a decision set aside would “demand the decision of its precedent value”. In para 41 of its decision in State of UP and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139) cited from page no. 153 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. that a “decision passes sub-silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present in its mind”. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 682), it held that the “Supreme Court may not be said to declare the law on these subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind”.

The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the appellant/informant challenging the judgment and order dated November 22, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1180 of 2018, whereby, the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal, had suspended the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Respondent No. 2, Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ and released him on bail. The prosecution case was that on the basis of the written information (fardbayan) of the appellant /informant, namely Dhan Jee Pandey, Buxar P. S. case dated January 4, 2016 was registered under Sections 302, 307, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against Respondent No. 2 and other accused persons. It was alleged that on January 4, 2016 at about 04.15 p.m., the appellant, along with his elder brother (deceased), Ramashankar Pandey @ Jhamman Pandey, was proceeding towards his village on a motorcycle. On the way, they stopped at a betel shop located at the village chatti. At that time, the appellant’s father-in-law, Mukteshwar Mishra, also arrived and engaged in conversation with the appellant at a short distance from the shop. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 along with other accused persons reached the spot and began abusing the deceased. Immediately thereafter, two accused persons, namely Shiv Jee Pandey and Ghanshyam Pandey, caught hold of the deceased, while the others took out firearms. Shiv Jee Pandey then fired a gunshot at the head of the deceased, causing fatal injuries. The other accused persons also fired at the appellant, who narrowly escaped. Thereafter, all the accused fled the scene on motorcycles. The deceased succumbed to the injuries and died on the spot.

Upon hearing the interlocutory application, the appellant Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ wherein he had renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal, in his order, Justice Prasad had concluded: "....we are of the opinion that in the kind of the allegations against the appellant and the materials in which he has been convicted showing that he along with other had caught hold of the deceased, the allegation being general in nature and he has already spent six years seven months in incarceration but the appeal has not been listed for hearing, we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail, during pendency of the appeal, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.D.J.-II-cum-Special Judge, Excise Court, Buxar in connection with Sessions Trial No.265 of 2016 arising out of Buxar (I) P.S. Case No.4 of 2016. 10. The fine, if any, imposed as a part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 11. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only prima- facie and tentative for the purpose of suspension of sentence and bail only which would not cause prejudice to the either parties."

 

While rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion, the Justice Prasad of High Court in his order dated January 21, 2020 had observed that the Court was not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. But at the subsequent stage, the the Couryt became inclined because the appellant had already remained in incarceration for over six years seven months and since the rejection of his prayer for bail more than 4½ years had gone past but the appeal had not yet been listed for hearing. 

 

The Supreme Court's Justice Mahadevan "emphasised that reasons must be recorded in writing, reflecting due consideration of relevant factors, and that orders granting suspension of sentence should not be passed mechanically." 

 

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SLP (Crl.) 5416/2024, Supreme Court in its decision dated August 28, 2024 upheld the principle laid down in Balchand of bail being the rule and jail being the exception--- through which it can be deduced that in cases of arrest by ED as well, the natural bail principle is to follow. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in a PMLA matter in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022). Notably, the decision in the case of Prem Prakash relied upon a decision by three justices in Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1964 SC 828 but failed to mention that after the decision in the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal came the Constitution Bench's decision in Badku Joti Savant AIR 1966 SC 1746.

 

 

Gaya trial Court failed to ascribe reasons for imposing maximum punishment: Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Awadh Singh & Anr vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 17-page long judgement dated February 27, 2026, wherein, he observed that "trial Court had failed to ascribe any reasons for imposing the maximum punishment as permissible under the statute."  

The appeal was filed under section 374(2) read with section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.11.2003 passed by the7th Additional Session Judge, Gaya, in connection with Sessions Trial No.75 of 1999, whereby the appellants Awadh Singh and Naro Singh @ Narendra Singh (since deceased) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellant- Awadh Singh was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under section 27 of the Arms Act. Both the sentences, imposed upon the appellants were directed to run concurrently. Whereas, appellant- Birju Singh was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under section 325 of the I.P.C. No separate sentence was imposed upon the convicted-appellants under section 149 of the I.P.C. 

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal, (2018) 18 SCC 535 Justice Kumar concluded:"it is abundantly clear that the trial court must impose appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and commensurate sentence upon the convict. In the present case, though the trial court had convicted the appellants but no specific, separate and cogent reasons have been assigned for imposing the maximum punishment. From the perusal of the injuries sustained on the informant, it is clear that the appellant Naro Singh @ Narendra Singh had inflicted Garasa blow to the informant causing grievous injuries. Pertinently, the aforesaid appellant has already died during the pendency of this appeal. Further, the appellant-Birju Singh had inflicted lathi blow causing simple injuries and the appellant-Awadh Singh had fired upon the informant but the same did not hit the informant. Moreover, it appears from the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya, that both the surving appellants are in their advanced age approaching approximately 80 years and they are in a senile condition. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts and in the interest of justice, this Court deems it appropriate to sustain the judgment of conviction but modify the impugned order of sentence. Accordingly, this Court modifies the impugned order of sentence to the period already undergone by the appellants and further imposes a fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) each on the appellants herein, which shall be paid to the informant or his surviving legal heirs and in default of payment of fine, the appellants herein shall undergo simple imprisonment of one month." 

The judgement reads: "26. The present order shall be communicated to the concerned trial court for necessary execution. 27. The records reveal that the appellants herein are on bail, therefore, the bail bonds of the appellants shall stand cancelled after the execution of the modified sentence. The trial court is directed to ensure the recovery of the fine imposed from the appellants herein and pay the same to the informant or his surviving legal heirs. 28. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed with the modification in the impugned order of sentence, as indicated above."

The High Court drew on Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal, (2018) 18 SCC 535 which held as under:-
“10. Currently, India does not have structured sentencing guidelines that have been issued either by the legislature or the judiciary. However, the courts have framed certain guidelines in the matter of imposition of sentence. A Judge has wide discretion in awarding the sentence within the statutory limits. Since in many offences only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offences the minimum punishment is prescribed, each Judge exercises his discretion accordingly. There cannot, therefore, be any uniformity. However, this Court has repeatedly held that the courts will have to take into account certain principles while exercising their discretion in sentencing, such as proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation. In a proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess the seriousness of an offence in order to determine the commensurate punishment for the offender. The seriousness of an offence depends, apart
from other things, also upon its harmfulness. 11. This Court in Soman v. State of Kerala (2013) 11 SCC 382 observed thus: (SCC p. 393, para 27) “27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various different rationales — most prominent amongst proportionality and deterrence. 27.2. The question of consequences of criminal action can be relevant from both a proportionality and deterrence standpoint. 27.3.Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence must be  commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of the offence. 27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of the offence is the consequences resulting from it. 27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properly attributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable. In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, the chances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturer but the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likely risks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to the consumer might not be directly intended, some aggravated culpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievous hurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor."

Supreme Court recalled that the similar verdict was delivered in Alister Anthony Pareira vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 wherein it is observed thus: (SCC p. 674, para 84) “84. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances. 13. From the aforementioned observations, it is clear that the principle governing the imposition of punishment will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the sentence should be appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances have to be borne in mind while imposing the sentence. The court cannot afford to be casual while imposing the sentence, inasmuch as both the crime and the criminal are equally important in the sentencing process. The courts must see that the public does not lose confidence in the judicial system. Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice system and may lead to a state where the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and resorts to private vengeance.”

Justice Kumar observed:"21. Pertinently, the informant was cultivating the land which was given to him lawfully by a competent court, as on the date of occurrence. Therefore, the very presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence with deadly weapons and having caused grievous injuries on the informant clearly establishes the ingredients of section 324 of the I.P.C. 22. In view of the above, this Court does not find any error in the impugned judgment of conviction and therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction."

Justice Ansul modifies order of sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in an attempt to murder case from Nawada

In Bijali Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated February 3, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"16. Having carefully considered the witnesses', testimony and the medical evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the appellant's conviction. 17. However, the matter arises out of a land dispute and the Appellant is facing prosecution for last about eighteen years. Therefore, taking a holistic view to meet the ends of justice to be served upon the appellant, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence."

This appeal was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated December 8, 2010 and December 14, 2010 respectively passed by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in a case which arose out of Akbarpur P.S. Case of 2008, whereby the Trial Court had convicted the appellant and sentenced under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code with R.I. for one year, under Section 307/34 IPC with R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- (in default of payment of fine he will further go R.I. of six months) and under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs. 5,000/.

As per fardbeyan, the prosecution case is that an informant, namely, Rambalak Yadav (P.W.-6) on the night of July 7, 2008 in when he was sleeping at Verandah alongwith his son Indradeo Prasad (P.W. 1) at about 11.30. P.M. he heard a sound of crying to shoot upon which he awakened and saw in the light of lantern that his villagers Dinesh Chaudhary and Bijali Chaudhary were standing armed with pistol with intention to kill him and they opened fire twice out of which one bullet was shot at left side neck and second shot did not hit him. Thereafter, they sought for rescue and on hearing the shouting his wife, Sugiya Devi and other neigbours Sarjug Mahto, Sanjay Mahto, Rambachan Yadav and others came there and they saw the accused persons fleeing in light of torch, thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. 

After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-sheet on December 31, 2008 under Sections 447, 324, 307/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant before the learned Trial Court. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant framed the charges under Sections 324 and 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 

Justice Ansul observed: "12. It appears from perusal of record that altogether eight witnesses have been examined during trial. P.W.-1, Indradeo Prasad, who is son of the informant has deposed that the accused persons fired indiscriminately and one bullet hit on the neck of his father and the other was misfired. P.W.-2, Ram Sugia Devi, who is the wife of the informant has stated that the accused persons had shot fire to her husband, Rambalak Yadav when he was sleeping at Verandah along with his son and he sustained injury. P.W.-3, Sanjay Yadav has stated that the accused persons have shot fire causing injury to the informant and her wife was rushing out from the house. P.W-4, Ganesh Yadav has stated that on hearing the sound of firing he went to Dalan of Rambalak Yadav where he saw gun-shot injury on his neck. P.W-5, Sanjay Mahto has stated that he had not seen the occurrence and came at the place of occurrence after hearing sound of firing and found the informant in injured condition. P.W. 6, Rambalak Yadav is the informant of the case and has supported the case as narrated in the fardbeyan. P.W. 7, Narendra Sharma who is the Doctor of the case and has stated that he was posted at Sadar Hospital, Nawadah and on 08.07.2008 at 2.10 A.M. he examined the informant, Rambalak Yadav and found 1/2 CM circular wound on the right side of the neck and injury was caused by firearm and, thereafter, he referred the informant to PMCH in serious condition. P.W. 8, Dhananjay Jha, the Investigating Officer has investigated the case and he proved the fardbeyan of the informant. 13. It also appears that there is an admitted land dispute between the parties. This casts shadow of doubt on the prosecution version. 14. In context of evidence of P.W. 3, the presence of the wife of the informant P.W. 2 Sugiya Devi appears to be doubtful. She claimed to be eye-witness of the occurrence while P.W. 3 stated that he rushed from his house after shot fire at a distance of half kilometer away and he saw the wife of the informant rushing towards the place of occurrence. 15. There is also no clarity as to who fired upon the injured the injured exactly." 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Md. Kasim vs State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated February 19, 2026, wherein, it set aside order dated March 19, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. Patna High Court  has dismissed the appellant’s prayer for bail in anticipation of arrest. 

The appellant figured as an accused in Complaint Case of 2016 dated 22nd November, 2016 under Sections 504, 406, 420, 384, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120-B/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Supreme Court observed;"6. We are conscious that process has been initiated for declaring the appellant as a proclaimed offender owing to the fact that he was absconding for quite some time; however, we are of the considered opinion that interest of justice would be sufficiently served if the appellant is directed to appear before the trial magistrate on each and every date, unless exempted. Ordered accordingly. 7. In such view of the matter, the appeal is accepted and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. 8. It is directed that in the event of the appellant being arrested, he shall be released on bail on terms and conditions to be imposed by the trial court. 9. Needless to observe, the appellant shall not, directly or indirectly, by making inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing such facts to the court. Also, it is made clear that unless exempted, the appellant shall appear in person before the trial magistrate on each and every day. If there be any breach, the protection granted hereby shall cease to operate."

Justice Singh's order rejected the petition for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is dismissed as not maintainable. It had recorded the State's counsel that "petitioner has been declared absconder and process of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. has been initiated against him to ensure his appearance in the Court as such petitioner is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail (Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 730, State of MP v. Pradeep Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 17)

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Supreme Court sets aside Patna High Court's order passed without considering charge-sheet etc

In Naveen Kumar Sah vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 6-page long order dated January 19, 2026, wherein, it concluded: ".....we are of the view that since the High Court was not apprised of the charge-sheet submitted after investigation, and the impugned order came to be passed without considering the charge-sheet and the materials collected in support thereof, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and the matter requires reconsideration by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.07.2025 is set aside. The writ petition of the petitioner (respondent no.7 herein), namely, Criminal Writ Case No.531 of 2024, shall stand restored on the file of the High Court to be dealt with afresh in accordance with law. 8. We clarify that parties shall bring on record of the High Court the charge-sheet and the materials submitted in support thereof. 9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order in Bijay Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar. Naveen Kumar Sah was the Respondent No. 7 in the High Court.

The Court granted leave and allowed the appeal. The appeal impugned judgment and order of the Patna High Court of Judicature at Patna dated July 14, 2025 by which the High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, quashed the first information report (FIR) under Sections 341, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (Arms Act).

The submission of the counsel for the appellant (complainant) was that prior to the date the order of the High Court was passed, the Investigating Agency had already submitted a charge-sheet indicting the accused of offences punishable, inter alia, under Sections 188, 290, 341, 323, 504 of the IPC; Section 26(1) of the Arms Act and Section 67 of I.T. Act, 2000. It was submitted that the High Court failed to consider the charge-sheet and the materials collected in support thereof before exercising its writ jurisdiction to quash the FIR.

In Mamta Shailesh Chandra vs. State of  Uttarakhand and others1 it was held that even if charge sheet had been filed, the Court could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the FIR, charge-sheet and other documents. Likewise, in Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.2, this Court held:

“19. No doubt, a petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of a police report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC, but when a police report has been submitted, particularly when there is no stay on investigation, the Court must apply its mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report before taking a call whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed or not. ..”

Justice Kumar had concluded:". It appears that the land of the petitioner was forcibly being used as informant and others as the informant has not been able to show any order of any authority declaring the land of the petitioner as aam rasta (common passage). If the land of the petitioner was being used as aam rasta (common passage) by the informant and others forcibly then the petitioner has a right of private defence and he has not exceeded that right. 8. In view of the above, I am of the view that the present F.I.R. is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, this criminal writ application is allowed and the F.I.R. vide Mojahidpur P.S. Case No.246 of 2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed." 

Supreme Court observed that the counsel for respondent no.7, though could not dispute that charge-sheet was submitted before the impugned order was passed, submitted that the allegations were false and malicious. Moreover, there was a dispute regarding a passage which the accused claims to be his own. Otherwise also, the allegations were only regarding a shot being fired in air. As the shot was allegedly fired from a weapon licensed to the accused, no offence was committed by the accused.

It noted:"Be that as it may, as it has been brought on record that before the date of the order of the High Court, a charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Agency, the same ought to have been brought to the notice of the High Court."