Judgements in cases from Araria which were sets aside by Supreme Court or Patna High Court

January 2026: In Md. Anwar @ Anwar vs. The State of Bihar and Rahmina Praween (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgment dated January 6, 026, wherein, he set aside the judgment/order dated March 4, 2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge (Children Court) Araria and order dated January 13, 2025 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Araria rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for bail in connection with J.J.B. Case No.117 of 2024, which arose out of Araria Mahila PS Case No. 44 of 2024 for the offences under  Section 341, 376, 313, 417/34 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 

Justice Jha concluded: "I am of the considered opinion that the child in conflict with law could be released on bail and accordingly petitioner/CICL be released on bail..."14.Accordingly, the Judgment/Order dated  04.03.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge (Children Court) Araria and order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Araria are set aside and hence, the present revision petition stands allowed."

The case leading to the institution of the petition was that Rahmina Praween, the opposite party no. 2  lodged a case vide Araria Mahila P.S. Case No. 44 of 2024 with allegation that the while she was alone in  her house, this petitioner forced upon her by gagging her mouth  and later on gave her allurement of marriage. By giving this  inducement of marriage, he kept on committing rape with her. When she became pregnant, the petitioner gave her some medication and her pregnancy was aborted by taking her to a  doctor. The petitioner refused to marry the opposite party no. 2 and in panchayati the petitioner and his family members refused to solemnize marriage with the opposite party no. 2. The petitioner/child in conflict with law (CICL) was taken  in custody on October 17, 2024. The CICL moved before the Juvenile Justice Board, Araria for grant of bail but his prayer was rejected and his petition for bail was dismissed vide order dated January 13, 2025. The CICL preferred an appeal which also came to be dismissed vide order dated March 4, 2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum Special Judge (Children's Court) Araria. The CICL approached the High Court impugning the two orders. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was falsely implicated in this case due to ill motive of the victim. The petitioner was declared juvenile vide order dated  October 30, 2024 by the JJB Araria and the age of the petitioner was 12 years 06 months and 21 days on the date of occurrence and had got no criminal antecedent. The age of the victim is about 18 years. The counsel further submitted that the orders of the Courts below are bad in the eye of law as well as on facts. The Courts have not considered the false implication of the CICL and the fact that he was deprived of care and protection of his family by placing him in custody. There was no possibility of petitioner doing any harm to the victim or any of the witnesses. The Social Investigation Report and social background report did not make out any case to keep the CICL in custody. It was only mentioned that there was lack of discipline in the house and father of the CICL was a labourer. It was also mentioned that the CICL had studied up to Class V only. His friends were also illiterate. There was no chance of CICL falling in bad company and his family members did not have any criminal antecedent. Therefore, the petitioner ought to be released on bail after setting aside the impugned orders as both the Courts below passed erroneous orders.

Taking note of the provisions under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, Justice Jha  observed that it is clear that "a CICL could be denied bail only on the ground that on release, the said child would come in contact with criminal elements and there was danger to the moral, physical and psychological well being of the CICL or would defeat the ends of justice. If these grounds are not present, the bail could no be denied to a CICL."

Justice Jha drew on the relevant portion of Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which provides for the guiding principles of care and protection of children like (i) Principle of presumption of innocence: Any child shall be presumed to be an innocent of any mala fide or criminal intent up to the age of eighteen years, (ii) Principle of dignity and worth: All human beings shall be treated with equal dignity and rights, (iii) Principle of participation: Every child shall have a right to be heard and to participate in all processes and decisions affecting his interest and the childs views shall be taken into consideration with due regard to the age and maturity of the child, (iv) Principle of best interest: All decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential, (v) Principle of family responsibility: The primary responsibility of care, nurture and protection of the child shall be that of the biological family or adoptive or foster parents, as the case may be, (vi) Principle of safety: All measures shall be taken to ensure that the child is safe and is not subjected to any harm, abuse or maltreatment while in contact with the care and protection system, and thereafter....,(viii) Principle of non-stigmatising semantics: Adversarial or accusatory words are not to be used in the processes pertaining to a child....,(xii) Principle of institutionalisation as a measure of last resort: A child shall be placed in institutional care as a step of last resort after making a reasonable inquiry and (xiii) Principle of repatriation and restoration: Every child in the juvenile justice system shall have the right to be reunited with his family at the earliest and to be restored to the same socio-economic and cultural status that he was in, before coming under the purview of this Act, unless such restoration and repatriation is not in his best interest..."

Justice Jha observed: "10. Cumulative reading of these two provisions show the CICL could be released on bail unless the fact comes on record that there was chance of such child coming in contact with a known criminal or enlarging such child on bail might endanger his moral, physical or psychological well being. Further the courts being parens patriae are supposed to look into for protection of best interest of the child. All such steps are to be taken by the Courts for reformation and rehabilitation of a child in conflict with law.11. In the facts of the present case, no doubt the alleged offence is very serious but the bail to a child in conflict with law could be denied only under specific circumstances as mentioned hereinbefore. Otherwise the bail is a rule and jail is an exception in case of CICL as well. The CICL has remained in custody since 17.10.2024 and now his parents are ready and willing to take care of him and to protect his best interest so that he does not fall in bad company or get involved in any other offence." 

Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna who is an amicus curiae in the special laws/courts matter said, "The High Court frequently intervenes whenever it finds that Araria's trial courts adopt hardline approaches toward juvenile offenders, overriding statutory reform principles contrary to law settled by the Supreme Court."

February 12, 2026: In Ankit Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarthna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court and granted leave granted. The appellant had challenged the order dated July 1, 2025 passed by Justice Singh. Apprehending arrest in connection with F.I.R. No. 5140075250013/2025 registered at Women Police Station, District–Araria for the offence punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 69, 352, 351(3), 351(2), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the appellant preferred an application before the High Court seeking anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Justice Singh had rejected the application for anticipatory bail. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the allegations as against the appellant are not true; however, investigation as against him is on and he has cooperated with the investigation; that the Supreme Court by order dated July 21, 2025 had granted interim protection to the appellant herein. The order was made absolute by setting aside the impugned order and allowing the appeal. Supreme Court observed:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 482 BNSS. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set-aside the order passed by the High Court. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail...."

 

  

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sunil Dutta Mishra bench sets aside order by Special Judge, NIA, Patna after Supreme Court remittd the case back to the High Court

In Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani vs. The Union of India through National Investigation Agency, New Delhi (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 30-page long judgement dated October 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"38. In the present case, the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the ground(s) for arrest/detention have been furnished in writing. Even as time was granted to the respondent, no document showing service of grounds of arrest in writing has been placed before this Court. 39. We have further found from the transit remand order dated 13.09.2024 passed by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate, that before the learned magistrate Bihar police produced the Case- diary (C.D. File) and a remand petition but there is nothing to indicate that the copy of the C.D. File and the remand application was served on the appellant two hours before his production before the learned magistrate. Therefore, in this case the prejudice caused to the accused is evident. The learned Magistrate didn’t satisfy himself with the compliance of Article 22 of the constitution of India read with section 50 Cr.P.C. [Now section 47 & 48 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (In short ‘BNSS’)]. Perhaps, in absence of the service of grounds of arrest the accused- appellant couldn’t file an application for bail immediately before the learned CJM at Budgam, and before the learned special judge NIA at Patna. 40. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the appellant has made out a case for interference. His arrest cannot be sustained. 41. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment/order of the learned trial court and direct that the appellant shall be released from custody, giving him the benefit of the ratio in the case Mihir Rajesh Shah (supra). The appellant shall be released on bail forthwith, subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the learned trial court. The learned trial court may impose such other conditions as may deem fit and proper to secure the attendance of the appellant in course of trial. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside. 42. It will be open to the learned trial court to secure presence of the appellant in course of trial, if occasion so arises, by issuing coercive order(s) in accordance with law. 43. This appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated herein-above."

The Criminal Appeal was preferred under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.2. The appellant was aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated July 15, 2025 (in Proceeding No. III) passed by Special Judge, NIA, Patna rejecting his prayer for regular bail in Special Case No. 10 of 2024, which arose out of Banjariya P.S. Case No. 229 of 2024 dated 05.09.2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 317(5), 318(4), 61(2), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 111, 178, 179, 180, 181, 3/5 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The prosecution case is based on the self- statement of ASI Indrajeet Paswan recorded on September 5, 2024 at 18.15 hrs at NH-28A near Kharwa Pool, Banjaria, District-East Champaran, Motihari. In his self-statement, the informant has stated that on 05.09.2024 at about 5:30 hours in the evening, he along with other police personnel proceeded for patrolling and vehicle checking. When they reached near Shankar Dhaba, they got secret information that that from Jhakiya village three persons on one without number plate red coloured motorcycle are coming towards Khandwa Pool. One of the three persons have beard who was wearing blue colour T-shirt and black coloured pant and was carrying black coloured backpack in front of his stomach as also he is the person who was driving the motorcycle. Second person was wearing Khaki coloured Fullshirt and Blue coloured Jeans pant and third person was wearing white coloured T-shirt with lining and Black coloured Jeans Pant. All of them were carrying fake Indian notes. On this information, the informant has informed the senior officials and with the Shashtra Bal personnels, they proceeded towards Khandwa Pool where they found one red motorcycle with above description and three persons on it was coming. On seeing police personnel, they tried to flee away, but police personnel chased them and nabbed all three persons. Seeing this action of the police, nearby people gathered there. Thereafter, police asked their names. They told their names as (1) Md. Nazar Saddam, (2) Md. Waris and (3) Md. Jakir Hussain. The informant requested the people who have assembled there to become witness to the production-cum-seizure list to which all of them refused by saying that these accused persons are outsiders, if we become witness, anything bad can happen to us. Thereafter, two of the raiding team members, namely, Sukhram Bharti and Aditya Kumar were made witnesses to the production-cum-seizure list. Police asked for papers of the motorcycle from Md. Nazar Saddam but he could not produce any papers. The Engine number and chasis number of the motorcycle was worn out. It seems that the motorcycle was stolen one. On search of black coloured backpack, some clothes and hundred notes of 500 Rupees (total 50,000/-) two Aadhar Cards of Md. Nazar Saddam of different addresses was found. On search of his pant, hundred notes of 500 Rupees (total 50,000/-) was found. On search of Md. Waris, from his pant’s pocket, eighty notes of Rs. 500/- and from his shirt’s pocket twenty notes of Rs. 500/- (total Rs.50,000/-) was found. And on search of Md. Jakir Hussain, sixty notes or Rs.500/- from his pant’s pocket and thirty notes of Rs.500/- from his shirt’s pocket (total 45,000/-) was found. Altogether from all the three persons, three hundred ninety (390) fake notes total of Rs.1,95,000/- was found. On further interrogation, they disclosed that they used to carry these fake Indian currency from Pakistan via Nepal through one Rajesh Sahni. They used to transport these fake notes via Delhi to Sarfaraj @ Muzaffar Ahamd resident of Jammu Kashmir. They disclosed that they have done this many times earlier also. In the presence of two witnesses named above, seizure list was prepared, on these three accused persons have
put their signature. The informant alleged that from the above facts, it is clear that these three accused persons in conspiracy with other named accused persons were trying to use fake Indian notes in the market.

The investigation of the case was handed over to the NIA vide order dated December 10, 2024 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Before handing over the investigation to the NIA, the Bihar Police had already completed the investigation of the case and submitted a charge-sheet vide Charge-sheet No. 310 of 2024 dated October 24, 2024 against four accused persons, namely, Mohammad Waris, Mohammad Nazar Saddam, Mohammad Zakir Hussain and Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (the present appellant).

The appellant was arrayed accused number 4 in the charge-sheet. The seized mobile phone as allegedly revealed contained various PDF files of counterfeit currency notes, incriminating voice clips, photographs of suspected persons along with their contact details as well as incriminating chats related to the procurement and supply of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN). His connections with the co-accused have been highlighted in the charge-sheet filed by the NIA.

It was the case of the appellant that he was innocent, had not committed any offence and that the appellant was not arrested on the spot and nothing incriminating was recovered from his conscious possession. It was submitted that whatever counterfeit Indian currencies were recovered, were recovered from the possession of the persons arrested from the spot, one of whom is accused number 1. The appellant had interactions through Social media platform and by virtue of this interaction, they had developed a business relation. The appellant claimed that he was running a business of poultry farm at his local place and was exploring the idea of selling fruit through e-commerce platform, and in that process he came in contact with Nazar Saddam (A1) who was running an e-commerce business with the name of Zamad Online Shopping and Service Private Limited. In connection with the investment in the business in the e-commerce company of Zamad the appellant started investing his money from time to time. The story of transferring money for procuring ‘FICN’ was completely false and without any corroborative legal evidence. The appellant had taken a specific ground in paragraph ‘27’ of his memorandum of appeal that the appellant was arrested in complete violation of the law as the appellant was not served with the grounds of arrest, which would make his arrest completely illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law. It was lalso submitted that the charges under Sections 16, 18, and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act (UAPA) would not be attracted in the present case. The prerequisites for inviting applicability of these Sections is that there must be a terrorist act as defined under Section 15 of the UA(P) Act. It was submitted that in this case the appellant has neither produced, nor smuggled, or circulated the high quality counterfeit Indian currency or coin or any material. The counsel for the appellant submitted that in the present case although trial is going on, till date only 3 out of 91 witnesses had been examined. The trial was not likely to be concluded in near future within a stipulated period. 

It was submitted that earlier the High Court had occasion to consider the prayer of the appellant for bail. The High Court had refused to enlarge the appellant on vide order dated February 24, 2026. The Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1478 of 2025 preferred by theappellant was dismissed. 

Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, the appellant had preferred Criminal Appeal No. 3238 of 2026 (SLP (Crl) No. 8196 of 2026) before the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court, having gone through the order of the High Court, noticed that the issue pertaining to the non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest to the appellant, though raised, had not been considered by the High Court. For this reason, without going into the merit of the case, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remitted it to the High Court to consider the said issue while deciding the bail application of the appellant.

In this background, the appeal was once again taken up for consideration on September 17, 2026. On that date, the High Court passed the following order:-“Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Additional Solicitor General assisted by Mr. Arvind Kumar learned counsel for the N.I.A. 2. This appeal has been taken up for consideration in view of the remand made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 15.07.2026 in SLP (CRL.) No. 8196 of 2026. It is noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court having gone through the impugned order found that one of the submissions made on behalf of the accused-appellant was that the written ground of the arrest memo was not furnished to the accused-appellant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that this ground was not considered by the High Court.

In his submissions, Md. Tahir, counsel for the appellant has placed before the High Court, judgments of the Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in (2025) 5 SCC 799, Ahmed Mansoor & Ors. vs. State Rep. By Assistant Commissioner of Police & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2650 and Dr. Rajinder Ranjan vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 802. It was submitted that all these recent judgments of the Supreme Court have taken note of the judgment rendered in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500 in which the Supreme Court has taken a view that the ground of arrest in writing, it should effectively serve the intended purpose as envisaged under the Constitution of India and the ground of arrest must be made available within two hours minimum interval before the production of the accused before the learned Magistrate. It is submitted that non-compliance with this direction would be in the teeth of the arrestee's constitutional right under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

The appellant's counsel had also submitted that in the remand requisition submitted before the Court seeking transition, there was no mention of furnishing of written grounds of arrest.

When the appeal was taken up for consideration, the ASG representing the NIA categorically stated that no written grounds of arrest seems to have been furnished to the appellant. 

Justice Prasad recorded that the counsel for the appellant solely focused on his submissions with regard to
non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest, therefore, the High Court is not going into any other aspect of the matter at this stage.

In the case of Vihaan Kumar, the Supreme Court concluded: “26. Therefore, we conclude: 26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1); 26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved; 26.3. When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the investigating officer/agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1); 26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge-sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of charge-sheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1); 26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and 26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.”

Justice Prsad observed:"...it turns out that mere communication of the grounds in a language not understood by the person arrested does not fulfil the constitutional mandate under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The failure to supply such grounds in a language understood by the arrestee renders the  constitutional safeguards illusory and infringes the personal liberty of the person as guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The objective of the constitutional mandate is to place the person in a position to comprehend the basis of the allegations levelled against him and it can only be realised when the grounds are furnished in a language understood by the person, thereby enabling him to exercise his rights effectively. 52. From the catena of decisions discussed above, the legal position which emerges is that the constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not a mere procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights. The intent and purpose of the constitutional mandate is to prepare the arrested person to defend himself. If the provisions of Article 22(1) are read in a restrictive manner, its intended purpose of securing personal liberty would not be achieved rather curtailed and put to disuse.”

In the penultimate paragraphs of the judgement, Justice Prasad concluded:" (i) The constitutional mandate and the statutory mandate as contained under Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of the CrPC leave no room for doubt that it would be necessary for the investigating agency/arresting authority, that a copy of the written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. This has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576:
(ii) If the arrest memo is simply a proforma indicating that the grounds of arrest has been conveyed, it would not be a compliance with the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) and Dr. Rajindra Rajan (supra): and
(iii) Templates of the arrest memo containing the statement to the effect that the arresting officer explained the grounds of arrest to the accused before the arrest, is no compliance with the mandate of Article 22 of the constitution of India read with section 50 and 50A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Now Sections 47 and 48 of the BNSS); and
(iv) The judgment in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with a clear finding that the arrest memos and remand orders reflected that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. In such circumstance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that no material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the present case, the facts are entirely different, therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Darshan’s case (supra) is to be read as explained in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) in paragraph ‘8’ of the judgment. 37. In terms of paragraph ‘66.3’ of the judgment in the case of Mihir Rajesh Sah (supra), the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case, at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee for remand before the Magistrate.

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail order by Patna High Court

In Yuvraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 4-page long order dated September 7, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the opinion that the petitioner can be released on anticipatory bail...." It recorded that the petitioner was not apprehended from the place of occurrence, that the petitioner has no criminal antecedents. The order reads: "3. We note that the petitioner was not named in the FIR, and was implicated in the offence on the basis of a confession made by one of the co- accused, specifically one of the Directors of Urmila Education and Services Pvt. Ltd. 4. We further note that the co-accused had been released on regular bail by this Court on 13.07.2026, considering the aspect that all the offences are Magistrate triable, and that the entire case is based on documentary evidence." 

The petitioner was denied anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated April 30, 2026 by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court in connection with FIR No. 5117063251028/2025 registered at Jakkanpur Police Station, District Patna for the offence punishable under Sections 318(4), 303(2), 338, 336(3), and 340(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.The allegation was that of conducting a fraudulent recruitment drive to Patna Metro, through the creation of a fake website on which the fraudulent recruitment was advertised. The recruitment was conducted by Urmila Education and Services Pvt. Ltd., the Directors of which are also arrayed as accused. 

As per the prosecution case, some criminals were caught holding interview on behalf of one Urmial Education and Service and Pvt. Ltd. It was found that it was a company promising private jobs and was involved in cheating. It emerged during investigation that the petitioner, Akhilesh Yadav and others had made a plan for cheating unemployed candidates and therefore they gave an advertisement in the name of Patna Metro and Urmila Education and Service Pvt. Ltd. and started collecting money and holding the interview. The bail application of similarly situated co-accused namely, Akhilesh Kumar @ Akhilesh Yadav @ Akhilesh Kumar Yadav had been dismissed by Justice Kumar's 2-page long order dated March 16, 2026. Unlike the Supreme Court, Justice Kumar was not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner and had dismissed the application.
 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra in a case of kidnapping, abduction for marriage from Shivrajpur, Nautan, West Champaran

In Ranjit Patel vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed 6-page long order dated August 20, 2026, wherein, it set aside the  order dated March 13, 20266 passed by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court. Te Supreme Court concluded:"Having regard to the above, without expressing any opinion on merits of the case, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail at this stage, pending trial. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order passed by the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 8. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) is exculpatory in nature and indicates that the relationship between the appellant and the victim was based on consent. Further, though the allegation is that victim is minor, her Aadhar Card entry reflects that she is an adult. Even otherwise, the age certificate which has been relied upon by the prosecution would reveal that she is well above 17 years. In such circumstances, it is submitted, whether the victim is of the age of consent or not would be determined in trial and, therefore, the appellant who has no previous criminal antecedents is entitled to be released on bail. The counsel for the respondent could not dispute that in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the victim had disclosed a relationship based on consent. 

Earlier, in Ranjit Patel vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order dated March 13, 2026, wherein, he had concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, nature of accusation and the gravity of the offence, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. The prayer is rejected. The trial Court is directed to expedite the Trial."

The petitioner had approached the High Court for bail in connection with Nautan P.S. Case No. 340 of 2025, instituted for the offences punishable under Sections 137(2), 87, 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Sections 137(2), 87, and 3(5) outline criminal charges related to kidnapping, abduction, and joint liability for acts done with a common intention. 

The prosecution case is that the petitioner kidnapped informant’s minor daughter with an intention to marry her. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and has falsely been implicated in the present case. Charge-sheet has been submitted in this case. He also submitted that there was love affair in between the petitioner and the victim. It was submitted that she went with the petitioner on her own will and solemnized marriage with him in Nepal. It was also submitted that the medical report of the victim does not support the prosecution case. The petitioner is in custody since July 14, 2025 and has got no criminal antecedent. The APP for the State and the counsel for the informant had opposed the prayer for grant of bail to the petitioner. It was submitted that the victim is a minor girl and there is specific allegation against the petitioner of enticing away the victim for the purpose of marriage. Hence,
the petitioner did not deserve the privilege of bail. 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's order, grants regular bail

In Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi passed an order dated August 14, 2026, wherein, it reversed the order dated April 20, 2026 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court, and granted regular bail. Even according to the prosecution there was no recovery of weapon from the appellant. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "Hence, we are of the considered view that the Appellant is entitled for bail, released on regular bail. The appeal is allowed and the Impugned Order is hereby set aside. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be deemed fit and appropriate by the jurisdictional Court."

The appellant was arraigned as an accused in a FIR of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(1), 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He approached the Supreme Court for being enlarged on regular bail after his prayer made before the Trial Court and the High Court was negatived.

Supreme Court's order recorded that from the submissions of the advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the counter affidavit, it "emerged from the records that the allegation made in the complaint is the effect that appellant and co-accused had arrived at the informant’s house with firearms and lathis and it was alleged that appellant fired at the informant namely Binod Kumar causing a gunshot injury in left eye."

The counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the FIR is counter blast to the attack initiated by the informant side and in this regard, an FIR has been registered in FIR No.298 of 2025 by the appellant’s family alleging that the informant side had attacked with sticks and Binod Kumar had fired from country made pistol 6 to 7 times. Hence, the appellant sought for grant of regular bail. The advocates appearing for the parties, it emerged from the records that co-accused (had already been enlarged on bail). Although there was a specific allegation of firing against the appellant, the fact remains that, as per the averments made in the complaint that other co-accused also had carried the firearms.  

Earlier, in Manish Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated April 20, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has fired and injured the victim, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." The petitioner had approached the High Court for bail in connection with a Koilwar P.S. Case No. 297/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 190, 191(2), 191(3), 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352, 351(2), 351(3) of B.N.S. and Section 27 of Arms Act. 

Section 190: Every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of a common object. 

Section 191(2): Rioting (using force or violence as an unlawful assembly of 5 or more people), punishable with up to 2 years imprisonment, a fine, or both. 

Section 191(3): Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon, punishable with up to 5 years imprisonment, a fine, or both.

Section 126(2): Punishment for wrongful restraint (voluntarily obstructing someone to prevent them from moving in a direction they have a right to go).

Section 115(2): Voluntarily causing hurt (physical assault/marpit), punishable with up to 1 year imprisonment, a fine up to ₹10,000, or both.

Section 109: Punishment for abetment if the act abetted is committed and no explicit provision is made for its punishment.

Section 352: Punishment for assault or use of criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation.

Section 351(2) and (3): Criminal intimidation; sub-section (3) applies if the threat involves causing death, grievous hurt, or destruction of property, carrying a higher imprisonment term (up to 7 years)

Section 27 of the Indian Arms Act of 1959: sets the penalties for using arms and ammunition illegally. The severity of the punishment depends on whether standard or prohibited weapons are involved and if the illegal use results in loss of life.

As per the prosecution case, petitioner is a accused of firing upon the victim and causing fire arm injury in the thigh. The petitioner's counsel had submitted that petitioner was falsely implicated in the case. It was also submitted that the injury was not on the vital part of the body of the victim. He submitted that he was no criminal antecedent in which he was on bail and he was in custody since December 29, 2025. The petitioner is the son of Baliram Rai, a resident of Chhotaka Chanda, Koilwar, Bhojpur. Now Supreme Court has granted bail to the petitioner. 

.

Supreme Court sets aside regular bail rejection order by Justice Partha Sarthy in a rape case from Mohaniya, Kaimur, Bhabua

In Jokhan @ Jokhan Sant @ Dharmkant Sant vs. The State of Bihar Justice & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 4-page long order dated August 13, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order of Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court. The order reads:"...we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail at this stage. 9. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. 10. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case." 

The appeal arose from the order dated January 21, 2026 rejecting the regular bail prayer of the appellant in connection with P.S. Mohaniya, Kaimur, Bhabua. According to the prosecution case, the victim was found on the terrace of Ramakant’s house. Ramakant is the father of the appellant. The victim complained to her mother that she became unconscious because some scented handkerchief was put on her face by the appellant and, thereafter, she does not remember as to what happened. 

The order records: "5. It is not in dispute that her medical examination was conducted promptly and the medical report found no injury and no signs of recent sexual intercourse. Even to the Doctor, she had not reported any incident of sexual intercourse or sexual assault on her. 6. The submission on behalf of the appellant is that he has been falsely implicated; there is no medical report to corroborate the allegations which were leveled as an afterthought; and they never appeared in the First Information Report or in the statement of the victim made to the Doctor. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the appellant, who has no previous criminal antecedents and has suffered incarceration for a period exceeding one year, is entitled to be released on bail at this stage." The counsel for the State-respondent opposed the prayer for bail but could not dispute that there was no specific allegation of sexual assault in the First Information Report and there is no corroboration of the aforesaid allegation in the medical examination report. 

Earlier, in Jokhan @ Jokhan Sant @ Dharmkant Sant vs. The State of Bihar & Anr (2025), Justice Partha Sarthy had passed a 2-page long order dated January 21, 2026, wherein, he had concluded:"6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the material that has transpired in course of investigation specially the contents of the statement of the victim recorded under section 183 B.N.S.S., the Court is not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail and the application is rejected. 7. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to renew his prayer for bail after six months or on framing of charge, whichever is later."

The petitioner had approached the High Court for grant of regular bail in connection with Mohaniya P.S. Case no. 676 of 2025 registered under sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 64 and 62 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner was accused of having assaulting and outraging the modesty of the minor daughter of the informant as a result of which she fell unconscious and regained consciousness after three to four hours in the hospital. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the case as a result of differences between the parties who are next door neighbours. The petitioner has no criminal antecedent and he is in custody since August 5, 2025. Referring to the order of the trial Court, it was submitted that even as per the medical report, there is no finding of rape. The application for bail is opposed by APP for the State who submitted that the petitioner was named in the FIR and there is direct allegation against him. Even in her statement under section 183 B.N.S.S., the victim had given a detailed description of the assault etc by the petitioner.

Section 126 of the BNS defines and penalizes the offense of wrongful restraint, which occurs when someone voluntarily stops a person from moving in a direction they have a legal right to go. It replaces Section 341 of the IPC. 

Section 115 of BNS deals with voluntarily causing hurt. It replaces the old Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

 Section 76 of the BNS deals with the offense of assaulting or using criminal force against a woman with the intent to disrobe her or force her to be naked.

Section 64 of BNS has replaced Section 376 of the IPC to define the punishment for rape, mandating at least 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, potentially extending to life imprisonment, and a fine. Section 62 of BNS provides for punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.

High Court cannot impose civil suit-related conditions while granting anticipatory bail: Supreme Court

In Nehru Irulandi vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. V. Vishwanathan delivered judgment dated May 27, 2026, wherein, it set aside order dated February 24, 2026 by Madras High Court's condition restraining accused from interfering with disputed property, holding that criminal courts cannot effectively grant relief pending in a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail cannot amount to granting relief that is yet to be decided by a civil court.

It set aside the condition prohibiting the appellants from interfering with the disputed property until the civil suit was decided. It clarified that all other conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail would continue to remain in force.

It observed that if the complainant, as plaintiff in the civil suit, apprehends breach of peace or interference with the suit property, he is free to seek appropriate relief before the civil court or any other appropriate forum in accordance with law.

The case arose from an FIR registered at Perunazhi Police Station, Madurai, for offences under Sections 189(2), 329(3), 324(4), 115(2) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. While granting anticipatory bail to the appellants and other co-accused, the high court had directed them not to interfere with the disputed property until the conclusion of a civil suit filed by the complainant.

Responding to the question: can a High Court impose civil suit-related conditions while granting anticipatory bail, the Supreme Court answered in the negative. It held that such a condition effectively amounted to granting relief in the civil suit itself. The Court observed that the appellants were defendants in a civil suit filed by the complainant seeking a permanent injunction. It factored in the fact that the appellant's claim that he had purchased the suit property.

The judgement reads: "Prima facie, it appears that the case of the appellant, namely, Nehru Irulandi as one of the defendants is that he has purchased the suit property. Be that as it may, the Suit is of the year 2019. The plaintiff has not prayed for any injunction pending the Suit".

Supreme Court recorded that although an application seeking interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been filed, it had not yet been taken up for hearing by the civil court.

The judgement reads:"We are of the view that while granting anticipatory bail, high court should not have imposed a condition which tantamount to granting of some relief in the suit itself, which otherwise the civil court has not granted."

The Division Bench held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction in a criminal matter, could not impose a condition that effectively granted a relief which the civil court itself had not granted.

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra

In Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 2-page long order dated May 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"5. We are informed that out of nine accused persons, all the four lady accused have been released on bail. The High Court initially had protected the petitioner from any coercive steps being taken against him. 6. In the overall view of the matter, particularly the genesis of the occurrence and the fact that they all are  neighbors, we are persuaded to exercise our discretion in favor of the petitioner. 7. We order that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the FIR, referred to above, he shall be released on bail by the IO subject to terms and conditions that he may deem fit to impose. 8. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter furnish fresh bonds to the Trial Court." Prior to that the allowed the exemption applications.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court through SLP after being denied anticipatory bail by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra of the Patna High Court in connection with the First Information Report of 2025 registered with Singhaul Police Station,  Begusarai for the offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2) and 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 respectively.

Supreme Court took "notice of the fact that in the FIR, nine persons have been named as accused. Out of nine, four are ladies." It observed: "4. It is evident on plain reading of the FIR, the other materials on record and also the impugned Order passed by the High Court that the accused persons and the prosecution witnesses are neighbors. On the date of the incident, they picked up a fight which ultimately led to an assault. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused persons attempted to commit murder. Whether it is a case of attempt to commit murder or not will be looked into by the Trial Court in the course of trial."

In his order dated February 11, 2026, Justice Mishra had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail. As per prosecution case, on the alleged date of occurrence, the named accused persons including petitioner came to the house of informant Aarti Kumari and started beating her and her husband. The petitioner was alleged to have assaulted the informant’s husband with iron rod on back of his head due to which he fell down and thereafter all the accused persons assaulted him with bricks and stone as a result of which the husband of informant sustained injuries. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to dirty village politics. The informant and the petitioner were agnates. The petitioner had clean antecedent. A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner by contending that there was direct allegation of assault to the husband of informant on his head with iron rod against the petitioner causing head injury. He further submitted that the injury report showed that the injury caused to the injured was found to be grievous in nature. Therefore, the petitioner did not deserve anticipatory bail. In such a backdrop, Justice Mishra was not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 

Supreme Court grants pre-arrest bail, Justice Ansul of Patna High Court had rejected anticipatory bail application

In Babita Devi @ Babita Kumari vs.The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and S.V.N. Bhatti passed a 2-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, concluded:"Till the next date of hearing, in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No.58/2026 registered with Bharahi/Bharrahi Police Station, District Madhepura, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 352 and 351(2) & (3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, subject to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer....6. However, we also make it clear that being the dispute between the mother-in-law on the one side and son and daughter-in-law on the other side, an attempt should be made to amicably resolve the matter." The matter will be called again on May 25, 2026. 

The Court observed: "2. Considering that the dispute is within the family where the complainant is the mother-in-law and the accused persons are son and daughter-in-law, we are inclined to consider the matter."

Prior to this in Navin Kumar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of the Patna High Court had heard the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner who had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in Bharrahi P.S. Case. The petitioner no. 2 was Babita Devi @ Babita Kumari 2. The mother had alleged that the son had manipulated signatures of parties and had got the land registered in his wife’s name. In his order dated April 22, 2026, Justice Ansul had observed:"4. Considering such inhuman conduct of the petitioners, this Court is not inclined to grant the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners. 5. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail is rejected."

Supreme Court reverses bail rejection order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a gold chain snatching case

In Mukesh Tiwari @ Mukesh Pandey vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V Viswanathan and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it reversed the 2-page long order dated February 23, 2026 by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. Supreme Court concluded: "6. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, especially the fact that the petitioner is in custody for 10 months in a case where the maximum sentence is 3 years, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. 7. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to be enlarged on bail, if not required in any other case, subject to terms and conditions that the Trial Court may think fit to impose. 8. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms."

The Special Leave Petition questioned the correctness of the order of the High Court. The petitioner is facing trial for offence under Section 304 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 202. Snatching is a cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable offence.

Section 304 (1) of BNS 2023 defines snatching as a distinct form of theft. For an act to qualify as “Snatching,” it must encompass all elements of theft, including dishonest intention, lack of consent, and the movement of the property. Section 304 (2) provides that “whoever commits snatching, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine”.

If the offence is penalized under Section 304(2) according to Section 283(2) of the BNSS, the magistrate may choose to hold a summary trial. The offence has been made triable by any magistrate. 

FIR registration under Sections 173 of BNSS, the procedure begins when the complainant goes to the police station to file an FIR under Section 173. Property seizure under Sections 106-107: During the investigation, the police may seize any property associated with the crime vide Section 106. It also requires the seized property to be presented to the Magistrate. Section 107 (7), (8) lays down the procedure for the attachment, forfeiture or restoration of such property to the victim. Investigation (Sections 173-196): A new provision in BNSS has been added vide Section 173(3) wherein on receipt of information relating to a cognizable offence, the officer-in-charge of the police station may with prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (i) Conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within 14 days, or (ii) proceed with investigation when there exists a prima facie case. The procedure for investigation is given under Section 176. 

There is provision for charge Sheet under Section 193. If there is adequate evidence following an inquiry, a charge sheet is submitted under Section 193. Framing of Charges under Section 251): Section 251 provides the framework for the start of the trial. BNSS states that charges must be framed within 60 days of the initial charge hearing. Trial under Sections 248-260: The witnesses are examined, cross-examined, and re-examined as the trial moves along. Under Section 248, the Public Prosecutor will lead the trial. 

Under Section 249, prosecution will begin. Under Section 250, there is provision for discharge. Under Section 251, there is a provision for framing of charges. Under Section 252,there is a provision for plea of guilty and conviction. Under Section 253, the date of the prosecution's evidence is fixed. Under Section 254, there is provision for prosecution-related evidence. Section 255 has provision for acquittal. Sections 258-260 has provisions for judgment. The court renders a decision based on the evidence that was put out in the trial. 

Snatching is one of the new offences that has been introduced in the BNS, one of the three new criminal laws. The rising incidents of chain snatching, and mobile phone snatching, which contain sensitive data, financial information, and passwords necessitated the addition of a section to punish the same. Theft is considered “snatching” if, with the intent to commit theft, the offender suddenly, quickly, or forcibly seizes, secures, grabs, or takes away any movable property from any person or their possession. Theft was formerly specified under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), however, snatching was not specifically listed as a distinct crime. 

In the High Court, Justice Kumar's order noted that it was the second attempt on behalf of the petitioner for grant of bail in connection with Doriganj P.S. Case of 2025 registered for the offence under Section 304 of the BNS. Earlier, the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected vide order dated September 17, 2025. The second bail application was preferred by the petitioner within six months of its earlier rejection. The High Court had observed:" 4. In the opinion of this Court, this application is premature as successive bail applications cannot be entertained by this Court within few months of earlier rejection. 5. Accordingly, this application is dismissed with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- which shall be deposited by the petitioner in the Patna High Court, Legal Services Authority within two weeks from today." 

On the earlier occasion, Justice Kumar's order had recorded that as per the prosecution case, unknown criminals were found involved in snatching the gold chain from the neck of the wife of the informant. The motorcycle of the snatchers was recovered from the place of the occurrence which belongs to the petitioner. The petitioner is in custody since June 12, 2025 and had two criminal antecedents. His earlier, order had concluded:"5. Considering the allegation levelled against the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. 6. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected."

Unlike Justice Kumar, Supreme Court's Division Bench was persuaded by the submission of the counsel for the petitioner to grant bail. It was submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 10 months imprisonment and that the maximum punishment is 3 years. The offence was also a Magistrate triable offence. 

Supreme Court set aside order by Justice Rajiv Roy, grants anticipatory bail

In  Maksud Alam & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh And Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh passed a 5-page long order dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....the impugned order stands set aside and the appellants are granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Trial Court. The appeal stands allowed, accordingly. The appellants shall appear before the Investigating Officer on 5th May, 2026 at 11.00 a.m. If they do not appear on the said day, anticipatory bail granted to the appellants by this Court shall stand cancelled automatically."

The impugned order refers to the 3-page long order dated January 15, 2026 by Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court.  

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with Amnour P.S. Case No. 220 of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 115(2), 126(2), 109(1), 303(2), 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, lodged by the informant Ankita Raj. The informant had alleged that after treatment of her child, as they were returning on their vehicle, the wedding procession of Siraj Ansari was going on. As they have blocked the road, request was made whereafter the accused side armed variously assaulted causing injuries. The husband and the informant was taken to the Primary Health Centre, Garkha, Saran at Chapra and the allegation is that thereafter Ehsan Ali threatened the informant and others with dire consequences after their release on bail. This led to the F.I.R.

The counsel for the petitioner had taken Justice Royto Court to an order passed by a coordinate Bench of the High Court in Najrul Miyan and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar disposed of on December 24, 2025 to show that similar situated persons were extended relief. 

Supreme Court observed: "The antecedent in which the appellants are allegedly involved, pertain to an occurrence in respect of which a complaint was also given on behalf of the appellants. The appellants have, in fact, joined the investigation and their custodial interrogation is not required." It has reversed the order by Justice Roy. 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's bail denying order

In Amit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 7-page long order dated February 13, 2026 reversing the order dated October 17, 2025 by Justices Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The appellant had approached the Supreme Court against order of rejection of regular bail by the High Court and to seek bail. Justices Maheshwari and Chandurkar concluded:"....we direct to release the petitioner on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court." 

Supreme Court noted that "....the maximum sentence as prescribed for the offence is up to three years and the petitioner has already served about eight months, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for regular bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 registered for the offence under Sections 304(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner is accused of chain snatching. The face of the petitioner was captured in the CCTV footage and the informant had identified the petitioner as one of the accused. The petitioner was in custody since April 5, 2025 and had 13 criminal antecedents. 

Justice Kumar had observed: "5. Considering the gravity of the offence and the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected."

Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra quashes cognizance order by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai

Patna High Court delivered three judgements on January 19, 2026 in Manju Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Arun Kumar Choudhary @ Arun Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar and Ravi Singh vs. The State of Bihar. 

In Manju Devi & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra delivered a 10-page long judgement, wherein, he concluded:"21. This Court is conscious of the settled principle that criminal proceedings ought not to be quashed at the threshold in a routine manner. However, where the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence, the prosecution is founded on legally untenable grounds, and continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law, interference by this Court becomes not only permissible but imperative. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order of cognizance suffers from non-application of mind and that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would result in grave miscarriage of justice. 23. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. "

The application was filed for quashing the order dated January 3, 2025 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai in a Complaint Case of 2024 whereby and whereunder th Judicial Magistrate First Class, Begusarai took cognizance and issued process for facing trial against the petitioners and others for the offences under sections 85, 115(2), 118(1), 191(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The prosecution case was that the complainant solemnized marriage with the co-accused, Sumit Kumar, in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals at the Kali Temple, Begusarai. It was alleged that despite being fully aware that the complainant was a divorced woman belonging to a different caste and having a minor son from her previous marriage, the co-accused Sumit Kumar voluntarily entered into the matrimonial alliance. After the marriage, the complainant was kept in a rented accommodation. Subsequently, it was alleged that the co-accused Sumit Kumar, along with the other accused persons, subjected the complainant to cruelty, including caste-based abuse and physical assault. It was also alleged that Shivam Kumar, the petitioner no. 2 made an attempt to press the complainant’s neck with an intention to cause her harm.

The  counsel for the petitioners submitted that the criminal proceeding was a gross abuse of the process of law and were liable to be quashed at the threshold because the complaint was founded on vague, omnibus and generalized allegations without attributing any specific overt act of cruelty to the petitioners. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta & Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported at (2010 7 SCC 667, wherein the Court had cautioned against the tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes on the basis of sweeping and exaggerated allegations.

The counsel for the petitioners also relief upon decision in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana & Anr.,reported at (2025) 3 SCC, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal prosecution in matrimonial disputes cannot be sustained in the absence of specific allegations and material particulars showing active involvement of the accused persons. It was held that continuation of such proceedings amounts to misuse of criminal law.

The counsel for the petitioners relied upon Rajesh Sharma & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. , reported at (2018) 10 SCC 472, wherein the  Supreme Court recognized the rampant misuse of Section 498A IPC and emphasized the need for judicial scrutiny before subjecting the relatives of the husband to criminal prosecution, particularly when allegations were bald and unsubstantiated.

The counsel also submitted that the very foundation of the prosecution was unsustainable, as the complainant was already married to another person and no decree of divorce was placed on record. Consequently, the alleged marriage with co-accused Sumit Kumar was void-ab initio. 

The counsel relied upon Dolly Rani vs. Manish Kumar Chanchal, reported at (2025) 2 SCC 587, wherein, the Supreme Court laid down the essential ingredients of a valid marriage and held that in the absence of a legally valid subsisting marriage, prosecution for matrimonial offences is not maintainable.

Therefore, it was submitted that in the absence of a valid marriage, specific allegations of cruelty, or any material indicating harassment by the petitioners, the essential ingredients of Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 were not made out. Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would therefore result in grave miscarriage of justice and deserves to be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

The counsel for the state supported the impugned order taking cognizance that the Court below after considering all the materials against the petitioners took cognizance. 

The High Court noted that the "jurisdiction invoked under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is undoubtedly extraordinary in nature; however, it is equally well settled that such jurisdiction must be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. On a plain reading of the complaint and the statements recorded during enquiry, this Court finds that the allegations levelled against the petitioners, who are relatives of the husband, are largely vague, omnibus, and generalized in nature. Except for a broad narrative alleging harassment, the complaint does not attribute any specific role, overt act, or distinct instance of cruelty to any of the petitioners. The absence of material particulars assumes significance, particularly in matrimonial disputes where the tendency to implicate the entire family has been judicially noticed and deprecated."

In Preeti Gupta and Another v. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2010) 7 SCC 667, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a similar fact situation, expressed serious concern over the growing misuse of matrimonial provisions by roping in distant and uninvolved relatives on the basis of exaggerated and sweeping allegations.

The Court held that criminal law should not be permitted to be used as a weapon of harassment and that courts must be cautious and circumspect while dealing with such complaints.

Applying the ratio of the Supreme Court's judgment, the High Court found that "the allegations in the present case lack the requisite specificity to justify continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners."

Justice Mishra observed:"A further crucial and undisputed aspect of the case is the categorical admission of the complainant that she had been residing separately from the petitioners for nearly three years and had never shared a household with them. This admission strikes at the very root of the allegation of cruelty. Cruelty, in the context of matrimonial offences, presupposes a degree of proximity, interaction, or cohabitation that enables harassment or ill-treatment. In the absence of any shared residence or meaningful interaction, the allegation of cruelty by the in-laws becomes inherently improbable. The admitted factual position, therefore, does not disclose any circumstance giving rise to cruelty attributable to the petitioners."

The only allegation with some degree of specificity was against petitioner no. 2, namely, Shivam Kumar, alleging an attempt to press the neck of the complainant. However, this allegation was conspicuously unsupported by any medical evidence or contemporaneous record. No injury report, hospital document, or independent corroboration was produced. More importantly, this allegation did not find mention in the initial complaint and surfaced for the first time during the enquiry through a witness statement. Such an improvement, in the absence of supporting material, renders the allegation doubtful and insufficient to sustain criminal prosecution.

Justice Mishra observed:"15. This Court also finds substantial merit in the submission that the very foundation of the prosecution is legally unsustainable. It is an admitted position that the complainant was previously married and has a minor child from the said marriage. No decree of divorce dissolving the earlier marriage has been placed on record. In the absence of dissolution of the subsisting marriage, the alleged subsequent marriage with accused Sumit Kumar is void-ab-initio in the eyes of law." He referred to Supreme Court's decision in Dolly Rani vs.Manish Kumar Chanchal, (2025) 2 SCC 587, had categorically held that the existence of a legally valid and subsisting marriage was a sine qua non for invoking matrimonial offences. The Court clarified that where the marriage itself is void or legally nonexistent, the very basis for prosecution under matrimonial provisions collapses. 

In this case, the absence of a valid marriage strikes at the root of the prosecution.

Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023 requires the coexistence of two essential ingredients: first, a legally valid marital relationship; and second, cruelty arising out of such relationship. 

Justice Mishra wrote:"This Court finds that neither of these ingredients is satisfied in the present case."

In Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana & Anr, (2025) 3 SCC, the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal prosecution in matrimonial disputes cannot be permitted to continue where allegations are general, unsupported by material evidence, and disclose no active involvement of the accused. The Court emphasized that criminal law should not be used as a tool of pressure or harassment.

Justice Mishra recollected that in Rajesh Sharma & Ors vs.State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2018) 10 SCC 472, the Supreme Court acknowledged the rampant misuse of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and underscored the duty of courts to prevent unnecessary prosecution of relatives of the husband, particularly when allegations are bald and unsubstantiated.

He noted that the case squarely falls within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1)SCC 335. The matter clearly attracts the illustrative categories carved out therein, particularly where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offence and are manifestly attended with mala fide and abuse of the process of law. Continuation of the prosecution, in such circumstances, would serve no legitimate purpose.