Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Supreme Court upholds 2017 judgement by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Mohit Kumar Shah affirming judgement by Trial Court in a 43 year old case from Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur

In Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh & Ors vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh delivered a 13-page long judgement dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"28. We are satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offences charged against the appellants. The concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 29. The brutality of the incident, in which five persons belonging to the same family lost their lives and several others including women and children sustained serious injuries, shocks the judicial conscience. The Courts below have rightly observed that the case leaves no room for misplaced sympathy or leniency. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. 31. Consequently, the appeals stand dismissed. 32. The surviving accused persons, except those who have been granted the benefit of juvenility by this Court or Courts below, are directed to surrender forthwith before the Trial Court concerned and serve the remaining part of their sentence. Their bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled." 

The High Court's 142-page long judgement dated August 3, 2017 was delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Mohit Kumar Shah. It was authored by Justice Kumar. 

The High Court's order dated recorded hat Vidya Nand Rai son of Bhujawan Rai,  Ramadhar Rai, son of Subudh Lal Rai and Rama Nand Rai, son of Mahendra Rai were juvenile on the date of occurrence. Justice Kumar's judgement remitted their cases to the Juvenile Justice Board for imposing appropriate fine to be paid to the family of the victim. The trial court's sentence in respect of these three appellants was set aside. Their current fate is not known. 

Referring to the judgement authored by Justice Kumar, Supreme Court observed: “The High Court has meticulously summarised the role of each accused person and identified those who ignited the straw, those who set the house on fire, those who chased the fleeing victims and those who inflicted fatal blows upon the deceased persons”. All the appellants were residents of village Jamalpur Kodai, Police Station Gaighat, District Muzaffarpur and they were convicted by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur on June 5, 1989 in Sessions Trial No. 21 of 1985 and 127 of 1985. 

Supreme Court asserted: "20. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced and upon perusal of the entire material on record, we find no merit in the appeals. 21. The High Court’s assessment of the evidence is detailed and reasoned.....23. The findings recorded by the High Court clearly establish that the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly, were armed with deadly weapons and acted in furtherance of their common object of setting the house ablaze and causing death of members of the family of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. 24. Once the common object of the unlawful assembly stands established, every member thereof becomes vicariously liable for acts committed in prosecution of such common object. The liability contemplated under Section 149 IPC squarely stands attracted in the facts of the present case." 

 With regard to Jagannath Ravidas, "both the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently found that he had actively facilitated the commission of the offence by disarming the victims at a crucial stage and thereby emboldening the mob. We find no reason to take a different view."

The court dismissed the appeals filed by Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh and others, the convicts had challenged the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld their conviction and life imprisonment awarded by the trial court. The incident occurred on the day of Holi in March 1983 in a village in Muzaffarpur district. A mob of at least 58 persons, armed with deadly weapons, surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, set it on fire and brutally killed five persons while injuring several others, including women and children. The court noted that the evidence clearly established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, were armed with lethal weapons, and acted in furtherance of their common object to set the house ablaze and cause the deaths. Once the common object is proved, every member becomes vicariously liable for the acts committed. The accused actively participated at different stages — surrounding the house, setting it on fire, chasing the victims, and assaulting them. Several appellants had died during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court, leading to abatement of their cases. It directed the surviving convicts — except those who received the benefit of juvenility — to surrender immediately before the trial court and serve the remaining part of their sentences.

The High Court had affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants in connection with a gruesome incident of mass violence which took place on March 29, 1983 in village Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur. 

The incident was reported to the police, leading to registration of Gaighat P.S. Case of 1983. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheets were laid and the accused persons were sent up for trial. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 436, 302/149, 324/34, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The accused Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, was separately charged under Sections 302/109, 436/109, 379/109, 324/109 and 323/109 IPC on the allegation that he had actively abetted the commission of the offences.

The prosecution case disclosed that the genesis of the occurrence lay in an earlier dispute relating to a pumping set and refusal by the prosecution side to withdraw a criminal case concerning the alleged loot of a khesari crop. On the date of occurrence, which coincided with the festival of Holi, a large mob armed with deadly weapons including lathi, bhala, garasa and farsa surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. At the relevant time Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, one of the deceased, was attempting to defend the inmates of the house with his licensed gun and revolver. The prosecution had alleged that Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, arrived at the place of occurrence, forcibly seized the licensed firearm and revolver from the deceased, displayed the same before the mob and thereby emboldened the assailants to proceed with the attack. Immediately thereafter, the mob allegedly set the house ablaze. The family members who attempted to flee from the burning house towards the southern field were chased and mercilessly assaulted by the members of the unlawful assembly.  The investigation disclosed that Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, Braj Bhushan Choudhary, Dr. Indranand Mishra, Lalan @ Ravi Bhushan Choudhary, and Anil Kumar Jha, died as a result of ante-mortem injuries sustained during the occurrence. The injured persons included Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, Mani Kumari, Uma Devi, Maheshwari Devi, Satyendra Jha, Saraswati Devi, Urmila Devi, Murti Devi, Ram Chandra Mahto, Abinash Choudhary, Dauli (child), Arvind Kumar, Usha Mishra, Rita Devi, Punam Kumari, Doyal Mona, Ajay Kumar Choudhary, Munish Kumar and others, many of whom had sustained grievous injuries. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 46 witnesses including numerous injured eyewitnesses. The defence examined 13 witnesses. 

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Patna High Court delivered 5 judgements on Dec. 20, Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha restores 36 year old initial judgement of Trial Court, sets aside subsequent order, passed on High Court's order

Patna High Court delivered five judgements on December 20, 202 in Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, Ashok Singh vs. State of Bihar, Brij Kumar Pandey & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, Binod Sah vs. State of Bihar and Mainuddin Mian vs. State of Bihar.

In Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of the High Court delivered a 37-page long judgement in a 41 year old P.S. case, wherein, he concluded:"38. The impugned judgment of conviction dated  19.02.2004 and order of sentence dated 20.02.2004 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in Sessions Case No.58 of 1986 arising out of Barhiya P.S. Case No.161 of 1984, G.R. No.759 of 1984 is, hereby, set aside. 39. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. Appellants are acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Since all above-named appellants/accused are on bail, they are discharged from their liabilities of bail bonds. Sureties stand discharged. 40. Fine, if any, paid be returned to the appellants/accused henceforth."

The appeal was preferred by the appellants-convict under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) challenging the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 19, 2004 and order of sentence dated February 20, 2004 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in a Sessions case of 1986 which arose out of Barhiya P.S. case of 1984, G.R. of 1984, whereby the trial court had convicted all the appellants under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The appellants namely, Ram Sabad Paswan (since died), Rambhajju Paswan and Anuj Pawan @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs.3,000/- to each for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 

The appellant Ram Balak Paswan, Dasrath Paswan, Anuj @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died), Chunni Paswan and Bundi Ram were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 149 of the IPC, whereas all the appellants were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 148 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 147 of the IPC. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The case of prosecution, as per fardbeyan of informant namely, Ramprit Pawan (PW-4), recorded by Mr. Sohan Sah, Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station was that while informant was coming to his house after taking bath from the well of Thakurbari on October 8, 1984 at about 6.30 A.M., all the appellants-accused variously armed with lathi, bhala, gadasa and firearms were cutting the bamboos standing on the land which is situated towards east of the house of the informant. The informant Ramprit Pawan forbade them from cutting the same as proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC was pending between the parties with regard to the land on which bamboo clumps were grown. On objection, the appellants-accused became infuriated and appellant Dasrath Pawan ordered his associates to kill the informant, on which, the appellant-accused Ram Sabad Paswan (since died) fired from his country-made pistol, which hit to the informant in his back and front. The appellant Rambhajju Paswan also fired by his
country-made pistol, which hit to his right hand and shoulder as a result of which, the informant became unconscious and fell down on the ground. After some time, when he regained himself in hospital and he came to know that the accused jointly assaulted his brother Akshay Lal Paswan with garasa and lathi. The informant and his brother came to hospital for medical treatment at 10 A.M. on the same day. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station forwarded the fardbeyan to Barahiya Police Station for institution of a case. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Officer-in-charge, Barahiya Police Station lodged a case against the appellants-accused. 

After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellants-accused. The Jurisdictional Magistrate on the basis of materials collected during investigation, took cognizance of the offence and after compliance of Section 207 of the CrPC, committed the case to the court of sessions for trial and disposal in view of Section 209 of CrPC. 7. The Trial Court on the basis of materials as collected during the course of investigation explained charges to the appellants/accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, to which, they denied and pleaded ‘not guilty’ and claimed for trial. 8. To substantiate its case, the prosecution had examined altogether seven witnesses. 

Justice Jha noted: "12. It is pertinent to mention that the learned trial court initially acquitted the appellants/accused but, the informant being aggrieved with aforesaid judgment, preferred Criminal Revision No.523 of 1989 before this Court and in exercise of power under Section 401(3) of the CrPC, the High Court has set aside the judgment and remanded back to the learned trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7 to its correct extent. After hearing both sides, the learned trial court has convicted above-named appellants/accused and sentenced them in the manner indicated above." 

It is evident, the High Court had set aside the acquittal of the appellants/accused after hearing a criminal revision petition filed in 1989 and remanded back to the trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7. In compliance of the High Court's order, the trial court re-heared the case and convicted the appellants who were acquitted earlier. The name of the judge who had set aside the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court is not in public domain.

Being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants/accused/convicts preferred to appeal in the High Court. 

Justice Jha observed: "31. It appears that the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC of accused/appellants has been recorded by learned trial court in very cryptic and mechanical manner and same is not acceptable under law in view of legal ratio as settled through Sukhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab [(2014) 10 SCC 270]". In Sukhjit Singh's case Supreme Court has held: “10. On a studied scrutiny of the questions put under Section 313 CrPC in entirety, we find that no incriminating material has been brought to the notice of the accused while putting questions. Mr Talwar has submitted that the requirement as engrafted under Section 313 CrPC is not an empty formality. To buttress the aforesaid submission, he has drawn inspiration from the authority in Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar [(2009) 6 SCC 595 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 92]. Relying upon the same, he would contend that when the incriminating materials have not been put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC it tantamounts to serious lapse on the part of the trial court making the conviction vitiated in law. 11. In this context, we may profitably refer to a four-Judge Bench decision in Tara Singh v. State [1951 SCC 903 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491] wherein, Bose, J. explaining the significance of the faithful and fair compliance with Section 342 of the Code as it stood then, opined thus: (AIR pp. 445-46, para 30) “30. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the committal court and ask whether the statement is correct. A question of that kind is misleading. It may mean either that the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there is some mistake or misunderstanding despite the accurate recording. In the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. I do not suggest that every error or omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice.”

Justice Jha relied on the decision in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933], wherein Justice Bose speaking for a three-Judge Bench highlighted the importance of recording of the statement of the accused under the Code expressed thus: (AIR pp. 469-70, para 8) “8. Now the statements of an accused person recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342, Criminal Procedure Code are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial. It has to be remembered that in this country an accused person is not allowed to enter the box and speak on oath in his own defence. This may operate for the protection of the accused in some cases but experience elsewhere has shown that it can also be a powerful and impressive weapon of defence in the hands of an innocent man. The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box.” 

Justice Jha underlined that this principle has been reiterated in Ajay Singh vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 371] in following terms: (SCC pp. 347-48, para 14)  “14. The word ‘generally’ in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of
the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give.”

Justice Jha pointed that "32. From perusal of record, it appears that the Investigating Officer of this case has not been examined during the trial. In this context, it would be apt to reproduce relevant paragraph of the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Munna Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), which are as under:-.“38. First, statement of PW-3 under section 161, Cr. P.C. was recorded nearly 24 days after the incident. Since the Investigating Officer did not enter the witness box, the appellants did not have the occasion to cross-examine him and thereby elicit the reason for such delay. Consequently, the
delay in recording the statement of PW-3 in course of investigation, is not referred to and, therefore,
remains unjustified. The possibility of PW-3, being fixed up as an eye-witness later during the process
of investigation, cannot be totally ruled out”.

Justice Jha noted that though PW 4 was said to have reached the place of occurrence at 1.30 p.m. on 5-9-1985 and recovered a bullet in the blood oozing out from the injury at the hip of the dead body, no effort worthy of consideration appears to have been made to seize the weapons by which the murderous attack was launched. It is true that mere failure/neglect to effect seizure of the weapon(s) cannot be the sole reason for discarding the prosecution case but the same assumes importance on the face of the oral
testimony of the so-called eyewitnesses i.e. PW 2 and PW 3, not being found by this Court to be wholly reliable. The missing links could have been provided by the investigating officer who, again, did not enter the witness box. Whether or not non-examination of a witness has caused prejudice to the defence is essentially a question of fact and an inference is required to be drawn having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. The reason why the investigating officer could not depose as a witness, as told by PW 4, is that he had been sent for training. It was not shown that the investigating officer under no circumstances could have left the course for recording of his deposition in the trial court. 

Justice Jha observed: "It is worthy of being noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court considered the issue of non-examination of the investigating officer. In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the investigating officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. 33. It appears that the witness examined during trial are interested and related witnesses." 

He drew on paragraph No. 32 and 33 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through Nandlal vs. State of Chattisgarh (supra), which are as under:-“32. Undisputedly, the present case rests on the evidence of interested witnesses. No doubt that two of them are injured witnesses. This Court, in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [1957 SCC OnLine SC 13], has observed thus: “11. … Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.”

Justice Jha referred to paragraph no. 4 and 5 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shamsher Singh (supra), which are as under:- “4. On an appeal preferred by the accused-respondent, the aforesaid conviction has been set aside and he has been acquitted for the offence under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but has been convicted for the offence under Section 326 IPC and sentenced with imprisonment already undergone. 5. The High Court in acquitting the accused-respondent held that for an offence under Section 307 IPC, the court was obliged to see if the act was done with the intention or knowledge so as to cause death and since the facts do not prove such intention or knowledge on part of the accused-respondent, there cannot be an offence for attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC. It also observed that the intention has to be gathered from the entire circumstances of the case such as nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, severity of the blow or hurt, the part of the body where the injury was inflicted and so on and not merely from the end result”.

Justice Jha record4ed: "35. Taking note of aforesaid available evidence as surfaced during trial, it is an admitted position that occurrence was free fight in nature, where both parties received injuries. The case of appellant for same set of occurrence lodged by appellant side prior to this case. Police upon investigation submitted final form against appellants. Injuries of appellants, which was also of gunshot could not explain by prosecutions. I.O. of this case could not examined during trial, which also appears fatal for prosecution. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 deposed to arrived after actual occurrence. Allegation of firing appears general and omnibus out of testimony of PW-4, whereas same was stated in specified manner in FIR. PW-4 deposed that only two accused persons were carrying country-made pistol, whereas he was silent about Anuj Paswan (since died). All such unanswered events creates a doubt qua occurrence, which creates a serious doubts, the benefit of which must be extended to accused/appellants. 36. In view of aforesaid testimony of witnesses, who are related to informant (PW-4) cannot be wholly reliable as they appears interested witnesses in view of Nandlal’s case (supra). 37. Statement of appellants/accused also appears recorded in very cryptic and mechanical manner in view of Section 313 of the CrPC....." 

The judgement  concluded that the present appeal against appellant Nos. 2, 4 and 5 stands abated. "Now, this appeal survives against above-named four appellants only."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

Shashi Kant Ojha, Additional Sessions Judge I, Gaya convicts 5 persons for attempt to murder and murder in May 2020

Shashi Kant Ojha, Additional Sessions Judge I, Gaya delivered a judgement on October 9, 2025 and passed the sentencing order on October 14, 2025. The judgment was reserved on September 25, 2025. The judgement convicted Rakesh Kumar, Anil Yadav, Rambalak Yadav, Raj Kumar Verma and Sanjeev Kumar for committing offence of attempt to murder and murder by using illegal fire arms punishable under section U/s 147, 148, 307/149, 302/149, 341/149, 326/149, 506 and 504 of the I.P.C. and under section 27/35 of Arms Act. The incident took place on May 6, 2020. The F.IR. was lodged on the same day. The date of charge-sheet was August 6, 2020. The charges were framed on September 24, 2021. The date of commencement evidence was October 23, 2021. The date of statement was May 27, 2024.   

At the outset, all together six accused persons were facing trials namely 1. Rakesh Kumar, 2. Anil Yadav, 3. Rambalak Yadav, 4. Raj Kumar Verma, 5. Sanjeev Kumar and 6. Vimlesh Yadav.  

But in the course of trial case record of accused Vimlesh Kumar was split up vide order dated July 19, 2022 as Sessions Triai No. 307/2022 and thereafter only five accused persons namely 1. Rakesh Kumar, 2. Anil Yadav, 3. Rambalak Yadav, 4. Raj Kumar Verma and 5. Sanjeev Kumar  faced trial. 

The case of prosecution as per written application of informant Abhiram Sharma stating therein that on May 6, 2020 at about 12:00 O'clock in the noon, he was sitting at his shop in the village Sinduari. 

In the mean time villagers Uday Sharma Kaushik, S/o- Baikunth Sharma, Girjesh Sharma Kaushik, S/o- Vamdeo Singh, Srinath Kumar, S/o-Brajesh Kumar Kaushik, Birenra Kumar, S/o- Late Jagdish Singh came at his cement shop for purchasing goods and he was selling goods to them in sequence. 

In the mean while co-villager Rakesh Yadav, Vimlesh Yadav, Anil Yadav, Rambalak Yadav, Raj Kumar Verma and Sanjeev Kumar came out from their house having armed with rifal and started abusing. Rakesh Yadav ordered to kill them by saying they are Bhumihar

All accused persons started firing. Rakesh Yadav fired upon Uday Sharma Kaushik, which hit on his head. Vimlesh Yadav fired upon Girjesh Sharma Kaushik, which hit his stomach and due to that he fled down. Anil Yadav fired upon Girjesh Sharma, which hit his chest. Raj Kumar Verma shot fire upon Srinath, which hit his stomach, due to which he fled down. Rambalak Yadav shot fire upon Birendra Kumar, which hit his leg. Sanjeev Kumar ran away towards the informant and started firing, anyhow he fled towards village making noise. There were other persons also present with the Sanjeev Kumar. He claimed to identify after seeing them. 

On hearing his noise villagers came at the place of occurrence and after seeing the villagers all accused persons fled away giving threat to kill them by saying deprive the village of Bhumihar. The villagers took injured person to Hospital but injured Uday Sharma Kaushik died on the way and injured Girjesh Sharma Kaushik, Srinath Sharma and Virendra Kumar brought to Jai Prakash Hospital, Gaya but for the better treatment they were referred to Patna Medical College Hospital, Patna but Girjesh Sharma Kaushik died on the way of Patna. The main reason of this incident was that a quarrel took place near Bank at Konch in between Manjeet Yadav, S/o- Ajay Yadav and a boy of Bhumihar and due to which this occurrence took place. 

Supreme Court extends time by six months for disposal of trial at Khagaria Court's request

In Anuj Yadav Devi vs. The State Of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and N. K. Singh passed an order dated August 8, 2025. It reads:'A letter has been received from Additional Sessions Judge – II, Khagaria, Bihar forwarded by High Court of Patna, requesting therein to extend the time for six months to dispose of the trial. As prayed for, the time for disposal of the trial is extended by six months. The Miscellaneous Application stands allowed.' The case was taken up by Courts Motion. 

Prior to this in its order dated December 13, 2024, Court's Division Bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Aravind Kumar had passed an order which reads: 'We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, taking into consideration the fact that the trial has already begun, we request the Trial court to expedite the hearing and conclude the same within a period of six months from today. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.' This SLP arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated December 8, 2023 passed by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah of Patna High Court.

In Anuj Yadav Devi vs. The State Of Bihar (2023), Justice Shah had passed a 3-page long order dated December 8, 2023. The order reads: 'The present petition is by way of second attempt at the behest of the petitioner for grant of regular bail in connection with Khagaria (Mufassil) P.S. Case No.206 of 2018, registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 448 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act, inasmuch as the earlier prayer of the petitioner for grant of bail was rejected by this Court by an order dated 17.01.2023, passed in Cr.Misc.No. 60192 of 2022.' The case of the prosecution, was that on April 4, 2018 at about 5 pm, the petitioner and other co-accused persons had arrived at the house of the informant, snatched ornaments and had taken away the mare and had also asked the informant to pay a sum of Rs.2 lakh for release of the mare. For the aforesaid incident, an FIR against the accused persons had been lodged by the mother of the informant on April 6, 2018. Again, on April 7, 2018, at about 6 am, while the brother of the petitioner was returning after attending the call of nature, the petitioner and other co-accused persons armed with rifle surrounded the brother of the informant and as far as the petitioner is concerned, he had fired with a rifle on the right eye of the brother of the informant resulting in his instantaneous death on the spot, whereafter other accused persons had also engaged in overt act. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was languishing in custody since May 12, 2022, but there was no progress in the ongoing trial, hence a sympathetic view be taken for the purposes of grant of regular bail to the petitioner.

Justice Shah's order reads: 'considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and taking into account the materials available on record this Court finds that not only the petitioner is the main assailant, who had fired gunshots on the brother of the informant, resulting in his instantaneous death, but there is also no change in the circumstances so as to warrant reconsideration of the prayer of the petitioner for grant of regular bail, thus I do not find any merit in the present petition, hence the same stands dismissed.' 

Supreme Court grants interim bail to a murder accused, against Patna High Court's grant of conditional bail

Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Augustine George Masih granted interim bail on July 12, 2024 after hearing an appeal against a Patna High Court's order dated April 19, 2024 granting conditional bail in Jitendra Paswan Vs State of Bihar (2024). The order of Justice Dr. Anshuman of the High Court stated that the murder accused be released on bail after six months. The appeal against the High Court's order was filed on June 26, 2024 and registered on July 5, 2024. It was verified on July 6, 2024. 

The High Court's order reads: "let the petitioner Jitendra Paswan in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 7478 of 2024 be released on bail, but after six month from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of ACJM-XIV, Gopalganj in connection with Vijaipur P.S. Case No. 265 of 2021, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with other following conditions:
(i) One of the bailors should be the family member of the petitioners who shall provide an official document to show his bona fide;
(ii) the petitioners shall appear on each and every date before the Trial Court and failure to do so for two consecutive dates without plausible reason will entail cancellation of his bail bonds by the Trial Court itself;
(iii) the petitioners shall appear before the concerned police station every month for one year to mark attendance;
(iv) the petitioners shall in no way try to induce or promise or threaten the witnesses or tamper with the evidence, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds; and
(v) the petitioners shall desist from committing any criminal offence again, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds." 

The High Court has recorded the submission of the Jitendra Paswan wherein he has submitted that he is innocent and has committed no offence. As per the FIR, he is only an order giver and there is no specific allegation against him. Moreover, the accusation has been levelled in the background of the land dispute. The petitioner is in custody since 26.09.2023 and is accused in 11 more criminal cases, but in all the cases, he has been granted bail

While granting the interim bail, the Supreme Court observed: "This is extremely strange. Some courts are granting bail for 6 months or 1 year and this is new trend now. It is like that I am granting you bail but I will release you after 6 months.". The next date of hearing is September 2, the State is supposed to file its reply before that.