Showing posts with label 1959. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1959. Show all posts

Friday, August 14, 2026

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself.

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   



Friday, May 1, 2026

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma


 

Saturday, April 11, 2026

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Partha Sarthy, gnoring Court's 3-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb?

In Dhan Jee Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices R. Mahadevan and A. Amanullah delivered a 21-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law....The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law." The judgement was authored by Justice Mahadevan. The impugned 5-page long order dated order dated November 22, 2024 in Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ vs. The State of Bihar (2024) was authored by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Partha Sarthy. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-4/2016.  

Justice Prasad had authored the High Court's order. His reasoning appears defensible in the light of the decision in Union of India v. KA Najeeb AIR 2021 SC 712, 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on February 1, 2021. The relevant part of para 18 of the judgement reads:

“... at the commencement of proceedings, courts are expected to appreciate the legislative position against grant of bail but the rigours of such provision melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence…”
The decision in Najeeb's case “lays down the constitutional approach arising from Article 21, whereas Watali (supra) explains the statutory approach arising out of Section 4-3(D)(5) of UAPA (para 21 of Mohamad Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC Online Del 4623. In its decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, delivered by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2019.
  
The judgement by Justice Mahadevan reads: "A perusal of the record indicates that the prosecution case is founded on ocular evidence, which has been duly appreciated and accepted by the trial Court. Without considering the same in a proper perspective, the High Court erred in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 and released him on bail. 19. The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. 20. It is further evident that the High Court has embarked upon a selective consideration of certain aspects of the prosecution case, which in substance amounts to a premature reappreciation of evidence. Such an approach is directly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Om Prakash Sahni (supra). 21. As held in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (supra), undue weight cannot be accorded to the period of incarceration or the pendency of the appeal in isolation, particularly where the conviction is founded on credible evidence. 22. The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. 23. Additionally, material has been placed to indicate that Respondent No. 2 has allegedly attempted to intimidate the appellant by issuing threats and initiating false cases. The explanation offered on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that such allegations are motivated, does not inspire confidence of this Court, particularly at this interlocutory stage. 24. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the nature of the evidence as accepted by the trial Court, the absence of any apparent infirmity in the judgment of conviction, and the settled legal position governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, warrants interference by this Court." 
 
Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V.R. Krishnaiyer and N.L. Untwalia in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 held:"The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court." Justice Mahadevan's judgement has taken note of  

Justice Mahadevan relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Court held that suspension of sentence in serious offences must not be granted as a matter of routine, and that the appellate court must apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the findings recorded by the trial Court. The relevant paragraphs are: “6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said Court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.….9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while passing the impugned order." Notably, Justice Mahadevan's judgement does not refer to the subsequent decision of 2021 in Najeeb's case.  

It is crystal clear from the decision in Najeeb's case that the settled position of law is that the restriction on grant of bail will hold at the initial stages, but as time progresses the statutory restrictions, which “draw this justification on the premise that trial in such cases would be concluded expeditiously” gets diluted. It has been underlined by the Bombay High Court in Vinay Vivek Aranha vs. Union of India and another, (BA 2641/2021).

Significantly, a judgement delivered in ignorance of a relevant statutory position is deemed to be per incuriam. In para 183 of the Supreme Court's decision in AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602) held that a decision set aside would “demand the decision of its precedent value. In para 41 of its decision in State of UP and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139) cited from page no. 153 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. that a decision passes sub-silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present in its mind. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 682), it held that the “Supreme Court may not be said to declare the law on these subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind.

The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the appellant/informant challenging the judgment and order dated November 22, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1180 of 2018, whereby, the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal, had suspended the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Respondent No. 2, Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ and released him on bail. The prosecution case was that on the basis of the written information (fardbayan) of the appellant /informant, namely Dhan Jee Pandey, Buxar P. S. case dated January 4, 2016 was registered under Sections 302, 307, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against Respondent No. 2 and other accused persons. It was alleged that on January 4, 2016 at about 04.15 p.m., the appellant, along with his elder brother (deceased), Ramashankar Pandey @ Jhamman Pandey, was proceeding towards his village on a motorcycle. On the way, they stopped at a betel shop located at the village chatti. At that time, the appellant’s father-in-law, Mukteshwar Mishra, also arrived and engaged in conversation with the appellant at a short distance from the shop. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 along with other accused persons reached the spot and began abusing the deceased. Immediately thereafter, two accused persons, namely Shiv Jee Pandey and Ghanshyam Pandey, caught hold of the deceased, while the others took out firearms. Shiv Jee Pandey then fired a gunshot at the head of the deceased, causing fatal injuries. The other accused persons also fired at the appellant, who narrowly escaped. Thereafter, all the accused fled the scene on motorcycles. The deceased succumbed to the injuries and died on the spot.

Upon hearing the interlocutory application, the appellant Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ wherein he had renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal, in his order, Justice Prasad had concluded: "....we are of the opinion that in the kind of the allegations against the appellant and the materials in which he has been convicted showing that he along with other had caught hold of the deceased, the allegation being general in nature and he has already spent six years seven months in incarceration but the appeal has not been listed for hearing, we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail, during pendency of the appeal, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.D.J.-II-cum-Special Judge, Excise Court, Buxar in connection with Sessions Trial No.265 of 2016 arising out of Buxar (I) P.S. Case No.4 of 2016. 10. The fine, if any, imposed as a part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 11. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only prima- facie and tentative for the purpose of suspension of sentence and bail only which would not cause prejudice to the either parties."
 
While rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion, the Justice Prasad of High Court in his order dated January 21, 2020 had observed that the Court was not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. But at the subsequent stage, the the Couryt became inclined because the appellant had already remained in incarceration for over six years seven months and since the rejection of his prayer for bail more than 4½ years had gone past but the appeal had not yet been listed for hearing. 
 
The Supreme Court's Justice Mahadevan "emphasised that reasons must be recorded in writing, reflecting due consideration of relevant factors, and that orders granting suspension of sentence should not be passed mechanically." 
 
In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SLP (Crl.) 5416/2024, Supreme Court in its decision dated August 28, 2024 upheld the principle laid down in Balchand of bail being the rule and jail being the exception--- through which it can be deduced that in cases of arrest by ED as well, the natural bail principle is to follow. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in a PMLA matter in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022)Notably, the decision in the case of Prem Prakash relied upon a decision by three justices in Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1964 SC 828 but failed to mention that after the decision in the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal came the Constitution Bench's decision in Badku Joti Savant AIR 1966 SC 1746.
 

 

Saturday, March 7, 2026

Rohtas Industries Limited (In Liquidation), the petitioner has 214 Advocates, Official Liquidator, the respondent has 179 Advocates

"After 1984, no officer of the company or the provisional liquidator had an authority to enter the properties of the company in liquidation...." 

 -Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, Patna High Court in his judgement dated October 14, 2022

Rohtas Industries Limited (In Liquidation) vs. Official Liquidator (2026) Company Petition No. 3 of 1984 is listed before Court No. 213 of Justice Alok Kumar Sinha on March 9, 2026 for orders at Serial No. 94. 

Earlier, Justice Harish Kumar had passed a 3-page long order dated January 30, 2026. It reads: "The learned Official Liquidator has filed the present O.L.R. No. 7 of 2026, bringing on record the valuation report of six lots of free hold landed properties situated at different Mauza at Dehri (Rohtas) of the company under liquidation, duly prepared by the empanelled valuer. The description of the property and the value as per the valuation report have been duly mentioned in paragraph no. 4 of the present O.L.R. 2. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court direct the Official Liquidator to publish the sale notice in the daily newspaper, one edition of English and another in a Hindi newspaper having wide circulation in the State of Bihar fixing 20.02.2026 as a date for opening the sealed tender before this Court. 3. The Official Liquidator further prays to allow him to pay the professional fee of the valuer for a sum of Rs. 87,855/-. 4. In view of the afore-noted prayer led by learned Official Liquidator, permission is hereby accorded to ensure the payment of professional fees of the valuer, however, after proper verification. 5. The present O.L.R. No. 7 of 2026 stands disposed off."

With regard to Item (II) :- O.L.R. No. 8/2026, the order reads:"6. The learned Official Liquidator has filed the present O.L.R. No. 8 of 2026, bringing on record the valuation report of nine lots of free hold landed properties situated at different different Mauza at Rohtas of the company under liquidation, duly prepared by the empanelled valuer. The description of the property and the value as per the valuation report have been duly mentioned in paragraph no. 4 of the present O.L.R.. 7. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court direct the Official Liquidator to publish the sale notice in the daily newspaper, one edition of English and another in a Hindi newspaper having wide circulation in the State of Bihar fixing 20.02.2026 as a date for opening the sealed tender before this Court. 8. The Official Liquidator further prays to allow him to pay the professional fee for a sum of Rs. 1,74,000/- out of the funds of the company liquidation. 9. In view of the afore-noted prayer, led by learned Official Liquidator, permission is hereby accorded to ensure the payment of professional fees of the valuer, however, after proper verification. 10. The present O.L.R. No. 8 of 2026 stands disposed off. 

With reference to Item (III) :- I.A. No. 368/2025 with O.L.R. Nos 110/2025 and 4/2026, the order reads:"11. The interlocutory application bearing I.A. No. 368/2025 with O.L.R. Nos. 110/2025 and 4/2026 have come up for consideration before this Court. 12. Having heard the parties, let the matter be placed on 06.02.2026."

In Rohtas Industries Limited (In Liquidation) vs. Official Liquidator (2026), Justice Harish Kumar had passed a 2-page long order dated January 9, 2026, wherein, with reference to O.L.R. No. 1/2026 (Tender Matter), he recorded: "The Official Liquidator Report No. 01 of 2026 has come up for consideration. 2. It is apprised to this Court that in compliance with the order of this Court sale notice in respect of the captioned landed properties in five lots have been published on 17.12.2025 in the daily newspaper i.e. Hindustan Times (English) and Prabhat Khabar (Hindi) circulated in the State of Bihar fixing the reserved prices and corresponding EMD mentioned therein, however in response to the aforesaid sale notice, not a single tender form has been sold. 3. Having considered the report submitted by the Official Liquidator, he is directed to sent a fresh proposal for sale of the land in question, preferably within a period of four weeks. 4. The O.L.R. No. 1 of 2026 stands disposed."

Notably, High Court's previous order dated December 16, 2002 records that Alok Agrawal, the Official Liquidator submitted that the company petition was filed on May 23, 1984 but High Court's website shows the date of filing and registration as February 1, 1984. Although the case was filed in 1984, the case proceedings history begins its record from Justice J.N.Singh's "carry forward" order dated July July 11, 2013. Not only that though the case was filed in 1984, the first order at Serial No, 353 by Justice V.N. Sinha available on Court's website is dated May 15, 2008. It reads:"In I.A.No. 1964 of 2008 Official Liquidator has filed reply to I.A.No.1964 of 2008 filed by the Kolkata Port Trust which is taken on record and as prayed for on behalf of Kolkata Port Trust put up after summer vacation so that in the meanwhile notice be served on the Inland Road Service at the address indicated in Paragraph-15 of the Interlocutory Application as they are said to be in possession of the premises in question which belongs to Kolkata Port Trust and was leased out to the Company-in-Liquidation in the year 1992 for which requisite etc. both under ordinary process as also registered cover be filed within one week. In I.A.No. 2631 of 2008 The Dry Woods could not be removed by the purchaser on account of orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Let Official Liquidator file reply to the petition of the purchaser of the Dry Woods for return of his deposit kept at Flag-746."

Earlier, Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma of the High Court had delivered a 37-page long judgement dated October 14, 2022. to "dispose of the various I.A.’s as numbered above preferred before this Court from time to time with similar prayer mainly to allow selling to the applicants, the quarters owned by the company and are presently occupied by the applicants."

Notably, disposal of the assets of a company liquidation is governed by the provisions of the Companies Act 1956. Section 456 deals with "Custody of company’s properties" It reads:-(1) Where a winding up order has been made or where a provisional liquidator has been appointed, the liquidator [or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be,] shall take into his custody or under his control, all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled.
[(1A) For the purpose of enabling the liquidator or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be, to take into his custody or under his control, any property, effects or actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled, the liquidator or the provisional liquidator, as the case may be, may by writing request the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction such property, effects or actionable claims or any books of account or other documents of the company may be found, to take possession thereof, and the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate may thereupon after such notice as he may think fit to give to any party, take possession of such property, effects, actionable claims, books of account or other documents and deliver possession thereof to the liquidator or the provisional liquidator.
[(1B0 For the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1A), the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate may take or cause to be taken such steps and use or cause to be used such force as may in his opinion be necessary.]
(2) All the property and effects of the company shall be deemed to be in the custody of the court as from the date of the order for the winding up of the company."

Section 457 reads: "(1) Powers of liquidator- (c) to sell the immovable and movable property and actionable claims of the company by public auction or private contract, with power to transfer such property to any person or body corporate, or to sell the same in parcels."

Section 477 reads: "Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc.-(6) If, on his examination, any such officer or person admits that he has in his possession any property belonging to the company, the court may order him to deliver to the provisional liquidator or, as the case may be, the liquidator, that property or any part thereof, at such time, in such manner and on such terms as to the court may seem just.

Section 531 reads: Fraudulent preference.-(1) Any transfer of property, movable or immovable, delivery of goods, payment, execution or other act relating to property made, taken or done by or against a company within six months before the commencement of its winding up which, had it been made, taken or done by or against an individual within three months before the presentation of an insolvency petition on which he is adjudged insolvent, would be deemed in his insolvency a fraudulent preference, shall in the event of the company being wound up, be deemed a fraudulent preference of its creditors and be invalid accordingly: Provided that, in relation to things made, taken or done before the commencement of this Act, this sub-section shall have effect with the substitution, for the reference to six months, of a reference to three months.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the presentation of a petition for winding up in the case of a winding up by or subject to the supervision of the court, and the passing of a resolution for winding up in the case of a voluntary winding up, shall be deemed to correspond to the act of insolvency in the case of an individual

Section 531A reads: "Avoidance of voluntary transfer.-Any transfer of property movable or immovable, or any delivery of goods, made by a company, not being a transfer or delivery made in the ordinary course of its business or in favour of a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration, if made within a period of one year before the presentation of a petition for winding up by or subject to the supervision of the court or the passing of a resolution for voluntary winding up of the company, shall be void against the liquidator.] 

As per rule, the company court rules 1959 also provide under Rule 273 as under:
“ SALES BY THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATORS
R.273. Procedure of sale – Every sale shall be held by the Official Liquidator, or, if the Judge shall so direct, by an agent or an auctioneer approved by the Court, and subject to such terms and conditions, if any, as may be approved by the Court. All sales shall be made by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders or in such manners as the Judge may direct.” 

Justice Sharma concluded: "16. Keeping in view aforesaid provisions, this Court is of firm view that the only method and manner in which the properties of the company can be disposed of are by way of auction. 

Prior to this judgement, Justice R.S. Garg of the High Court had passed an order dated December 16, 2004, wherein it recorded that Indequip Leasing & Finance Ltd. sought review and stay of operation of prior orders dated August 27, 1999, May 12, 2000 and August 25, 2000, and a declaration that the applicant company was the lawful tenant of the property known as "Sahu Jain Court". The company petition against the company was filed on May 23, 1984 and the lease in favour of Indequip was created on July 28, 1984. The company was been put under liquidation and an Official Liquidator was been appointed. Indequip Leasing & Finance Ltd claimed tenant status and argued it could not be evicted by the Official Liquidator; the Court had directed the tenant to make an offer to purchase the property. Time was given on multiple occasions including November 8, 2004 for the tenant to make an offer, but the tenant did not do so. 

The Court examined: 1. Whether a lease created in favour of a tenant after the filing of a company petition (here, lease dated 28.7.1984 when petition was filed 23.5.1984) is valid against the Official Liquidator and the Company Court. 2. Whether a person in possession of property of a company can resist eviction by the Official Liquidator or require eviction proceedings to be pursued in ordinary courts (e.g., rent control courts). 3.Whether the Court should review or stay its earlier orders (dated 27.8.1999, 12.5.2000 and 25.8.2000) declare the applicant not entitled to continued possession and 4. Whether the legal position of the Official Liquidator is analogous to that of a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and what consequences follows from that analogy.

Alok Agrawal, the Official Liquidator submitted that because the company petition was filed on 23.5.1984, any action taken by the management after institution of the petition would not be saved. The two Supreme Court judgments relied upon by the tenant were said to be distinguishable on facts and inapplicable to the present case. It was argued that tenancy should not be allowed to continue because the purpose of company winding up/dissolution is to convert assets into cash for distribution, and continued tenancy would reduce marketability and sale value of the property. The Official Liquidator contended that the tenant's application was not maintainable and that the reliefs claimed cannot be granted. 

The Court relied on Section 456 of the Companies Act to state that where a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator appointed, the liquidator shall take into his custody or control all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the company is or appears to be entitled. The Court observed that the property in possession of the tenant is undisputedly the company's property.

The Court considered Section 457(1)(c) which authorizes the liquidator, with the sanction of the Court, to sell immovable and movable property of the company by auction or private contract and to do other necessary acts for winding up

The Court referred to Section 477(6), which permits the Court to order any person who admits possession of company property to deliver it to the (provisional) liquidator on such terms as the Court deems just. The Court treated statements on oath filed by officers/employees as equivalent to examination and concluded that the Company Court may require persons in possession to vacate and deliver possession to the Official Liquidator.

The Court examined Section 531A which provides that transfers of property by a company made within one year before presentation of a winding up petition (except in the ordinary course of business or to purchasers in good faith for value) are void against the liquidator. Because the company petition was filed on 23.5.1984 and the lease was created on 28.7.1984 (after filing), the Court held that the lease transfer is void against the liquidator.

The Court also relied on Section 531 (fraudulent preference doctrine) to explain that transfers within six months before winding up may be deemed fraudulent preference and invalid in winding up. The Court analogized company actions to insolvency and concluded that the lease granted after institution of the petition could not be saved.

The Court distinguished the cited precedents from Smt. Nirmala R. Bafna vs. Khandesh Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. ((1992) 2 SCC 322 : AIR 1993 SC 1380) and Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal Krishnan [(1996) 11 SCC 376] the issue was sub-lease by a tenant-company to a third party (requiring rent-control court examination), whereas here the company is the owner; and in Anthony C. Leo the analogy between Official Liquidator. 

The Court emphasized the policy objective of winding up proceedings: to convert company assets into cash for distribution; continued occupation by tenants adversely affects marketability and sale value. The tenant was been given opportunities and failed to make an offer to purchase the property at market value, and because the lease was created after the petition and is void against the liquidator, the Court found no ground to review or recall the earlier orders. 

The Court rejected the tenant's prayers for review or declaration of lawful tenancy. The Court ordered Indequip Leasing & Finance Ltd. to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the property to the Official Liquidator or his representative on or before 15 January 15, 2005. 

The Official Liquidator had submitted that the Company Petition was filed in the High Court on May 23, 1984 and as such any action taken by the management subsequent to the institution of the company petition would not be saved. It was also submitted that the two judgments on which strong reliance was placed are distinguishable on facts and would not apply to the present case. It was submitted that the tenancy cannot be continued because the endeavour of a Company Judge/Company Court in the company proceedings is either to revive the company or to dissolve the company. In case of dessolution of the company, all assets, moveable or immovable are to be converted into cash and the cash was to be distributed in accordance with law. According to him it was also a notoriously known fact that if the property occupied by the tenant was sold in the market it does not fetch its real market value because a person who proposes to spend a good fortune would not purchase a litigation the property being in possession of the tenant. 

Justice Garg observed: "20. The two judgments cited by the learned counsel for the tenant are distinguishable on facts and in fact do not apply to the facts of the present case.....24. It is hereby directed that on or before 15th January, 2005 the tenant Indequip Leasing and Finance Ltd. shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the property possessed by him to the Official Liquidator or his representative. In case of any default on his part, the Official Liquidator or his representative may make a complaint to the District Magistrate/Local administration, Dehradun for putting them in possession of the property. 25. It is further directed that the District Magistrate/Local Administration/Local Police, Dehradun after receiving a copy of this order along with an application of the Official Liquidator shall be obliged to observe this order in its true spirit." 

The Court also heard Flag-642 has been filed by one Jalaluddin Chaudhary of Kairana, District Muzaffar Nagar (UP) who stated that he wanted to purchase the property known as “Sahu Jain Court” for a sum of Rs. 7 lacs only. Justice Garg had concluded: "In the opinion of this Court this offer cannot be accepted. It is to be recorded that the total area of the property is more than one acre and there is a big building situate on it along with outhouses. I rejected the application at Flag-642 with direction that in future as and when the property in question is proposed to be sold the offerer may make his offer in accordance with law."

In Rohtas Industries Ltd. (In Liquidation) vs. Official Liquidator Comp Pet/3/1984 Comp Petition, the total number of counsels for the Rohtas Industries Ltd (In Liquidation) includes 214 counsels, their names are listed below:   

1. Arun Kumar

2. Suraj Samdarshi

3. Ramanuj Tiwary

4. Manoj Kumar Jha

5. Ajay Kumar Singh

6. S. De

7. Janardan Singh

8. Anil Kumar Sinha

9. Deepak Kumar

10. Vipin Kumar

11. Ravi Shankar Prasad

12. Rajesh Kumar Singh

13. Prabhat Kumar Singh

14. Abhay Kumar Singh

15. Navin Sinha

16. Anjani Kumar Sharan

17. Shivendra Kumar Roy

18. Ajit Kumar

19. P.K.Shahi

20. Surendra Kishore Thakur

21. Sunil Kumar Singh

22. Satyendra Kumar

23. Bhatnagar

24. Rita Kumari

25. Rudra Deo

26. Kr.Sinha

27. Anirudh Kumar Singh

28. Suraj Samdarshi

29. Rajesh Kr.Singh

30. Sanjay Kumar

31. Singh.-1

32. Mr.Ajay

33. Madhu Prasun

34. Vikash Kumar

35. Ashok Kumar Singh

36. Sheela Sharma

37. Manoj Madhav

38. Parmatma Singh

39. Bachan Jee Ojha

40. Ajay Kumar Mathur

41. Dudhnath Singh

42. Radha Mohan Pandey

43. Piyush Mathur

44. Arun Kumar No. 1

45. Raghwendra

46. Sharan Pandey

47. Binod Bihari Singh

48. Manoj Kumar

49. Prem Sheela Panddey

50. S.M.Ashraf

51. Laxami Nr.Das

52. Gautam Kejriwal

53. Ramakant Yadav

54. Barmeshwar Tiwary

55. Ranjit Sahay

56. Alok Kumar

57. Ramod Kumar Dubey

58. Om Prakash Srivastav

59. Ajay Kumar Mathur

60. Varun Kumar

61. Shantanu Kumar

62. Binay Bihari Sharan

63. Arjun Kumar

64. Narendra Kumar

65. Prakash

66. Chandra Agrawal

67. Anil Kumar

68. R.K.Sharma

69. Ashok Kr.Dubey

70. Umar Chandra Shekhar

71. Sanjay Singh

72. Arun Kumar

73. Veena Rani Prasad

74. Rajiv Ranjan Singh

75. Jitendra Kumar Roy

76. Amar Prakash

77. Akash Chaturvedi

78. Chandra Has Mishra

79. Dhanendra Chaubey

80. Ram Akwal Singh

81. Ambuj Nayan Choubey

82. Abhay Kumar Singh-1

83. C.M.Saxena

84. Jai Prakash Singh

85. Parashuram Singh

86. Arti Singh

87. Sushil Chandra Keshari

88. Binay Kumar

89. Lakshmi Kant Tiwary

90. Gopal Prasad

91. Gupta

92. S.S.Sundaram

93. Satish Chandra Jha-3

94. Rakesh Bihari Singh

95. Anshuman Singh

96. S.D.Sanjay

97. Santosh Kumar Verma

98. Shekhar

99. Harshvardhan

100. Akhilesh Kumar

101. Arvind Kumar

102. Nand Lal Kumar Singh

103. Sumant Kumar Singh

104. Siya Ram Shahi

105. Awadhesh Kumar

106. Mishra

107. Rakesh

108. Narayansingh

109. Sheela Sharma

110. Jitendra Kumar Roy

111. Shivendra Kumar Roy

112. Itendra Kumar Roy

113. Shivendra Kumar Roy

114. Rita Kumari

115. Sheela Sharma

116. Sheela Sharma

117. Jitendra Kumar Roy

118. Shivendra Kumar Roy

119. Prabhat Kumar Singh

120. Anirudh Kumar Singh

121. Shivendra Kumar Roy

122. Jitendra Prasad Singh

123. Dhirendra Singh

124. Surendra Singh

125. Bibhakar Tiwary

126. Vivek Kumar Singh

127. Anirudh Kumar Singh

128. Prabhat Kumar Singh

129. Amrendra

130. Narayan Rai

131. Sanjay Kumar

132. Akshay Lal Pandit

133. Rajesh Kumar

134. Priya Gupta

135. Mohit Agarwal

136. Sanjay Singh

137. Vinod Kumar

138. Mukul Sinha

139. Rajesh Kumar

140. Binod Bihari Singh

141. Amrendra

142. Narayan Rai

143. Amrendra

144. Narayan Rai

145. Aishwarya Riti

146. Sanjay Singh

147. Praveen Kumar

148. Madhu Prasun

149. Mintoo Kumari

150. Amrendra Narayan Rai

151. Jai Prakash Singh

152. Arti Kumari

153. Sheela Rani

154. Rakesh

155. Narayan Singh

156. Rakesh

157. Narayansingh

158. Sweta

159. Rajesh Kumar Singh

160. Binod Bihari Singh

161. Kumar Saurav

162. Vaibhava Veer Shanker

163. Nawnit Kumar

164. Tiwary

165. Rajesh Kumar

166. Brajesh Tiwary

167. Vaibhava Veer Shanker

168. Alok Kumar Jha

169. Atal Bihari Pandey

170. Brisketu Sharan Pandey

171. Abhishek Kumar

172. Madan Kumar

173. Akshat Agrawal

174. Mohit Agarwal

175. Rahul Kumar Jai Prakash Singh

176. Brisketu Sharan Pandey

177. Madan Kumar

178. Abhishek Kumar

179. Brisketu Sharan Pandey

180. Abhishek Kumar

181. Madan Kumar

182. Brisketu Sharan Pandey

183. Abhishek Kumar

184. Madan Kumar

185. Gautam Kumar Kejriwal

186. Birendra Kumar Singh

187. Prakash Chandra Agrawal

188. Brisketu Sharan Pandey

189. Abhishek Kumar

190. Madan Kumar

191. Rakesh

192. Narayansingh

193. Alok Kumar Jha

194. Gautam Kumar Kejriwal

195. Sunil Kumar Pathak

196. Deepali Singh

197. Alka Singh

198. Arun Kumar No. 1

199. Sumeet Kumar Singh

200. Alka Singh

201. Mukund Kumar

202. Mukund Kumar

203. Mukund Kumar

204. Aditya Raman

205. Avinash Shekhar

206. Simran Kumari

207. Rajeev Kumar

208. Varun Krishna Singh

209. Kanaya Kumar

210. Ajay Kumar

211. Ashok Kumar

212. Kanaya Kumar

213. Rajesh Kumar Singh

214. Arun Kumar Verma

In Rohtas Industries Ltd. (In Liquidation) vs. Official Liquidator Comp Pet/3/1984 Comp Petition, the total number of counsels for the respondent includes 179 counsels, namely:

1. Sheela Sharma

2. AAG6

3. J.N.P. Sinha

4. M. K. Jha

5. Rani Kumari @ Rani Singh

6. Binod Kr.Singh

7. P.C. Jaiswal

8. Ram Niwas Prasad

9. A.P.Jittu (Sc.2)

10. Dhirendra Singh

11. Sourendra Pandey

12. Anant Kr.Bhaskar

13. Manish Jha

14. Kaushalendra Kumar

15. Singh

16. Sheo Narayan Singh

17. Jitendra Prasad Singh

18. Ajit Kumar

19. Subhro Sanyal

20. Kaushal Kumar

21. Awadhesh Kumar Sinha

22. R.A.Singh

23. Narendra Kumar

24. Prabhakar Nath Rai

25. Ajeet Kumar

26. Avinash Kumar

27. Ashutosh Ranjan

28. Pandey

29. Shiv Narayan Singh

30. K.P.Yadav

31. Nirmal Kumar Tripathi

32. Lakshmi Kant Tiwary

33. Chandra Has Mishra

34. S.D. Sanjay

35. Akash Chaturvedi

36. Alok Kumar Agrawal

37. Shivendra Kumar Roy

38. Shivendra Kumar Roy

39. Binod Bihari Sinha

40. Kapil Deo Pandey

41. Randhir Singh

42. Vijeshwar Prasad

43. Suresh Kumar

44. Dhirendra Singh

45. Kumar Manish (Sc-21)

46. Mr.Ajay

47. Ashutosh Ranjan

48. Pandey

49. Dhananjay Kumar Singh

50. Vikash Kumar

51. Shyam Krishna Sahay

52. Mohit Kumar

53. Rakesh Narayan Singh

54. Arti Singh

55. P.R. Mishra

56. G.P.Ray (Aag.3)

57. Himanshu Goswami

58. Smt. Asha Verma

59. M. N. Parbat

60. Santosh Kumar Verma

61. Gaurav Govind

62. Sri Prakash Singh

63. Sanjay Kumar Upadhyay

64. A. K. Tripathi

65. C. M. Saxena

66. S.B.P.Sinha

67. Barmeshwar Tiwary

68. Navniti Pd. Singh

69. G.P. Jaiswal

70. Birendra Kr. Sinha

71. Amrendra Kr. Sinha

72. Abhay Kumar Roy

73. Shailendra Kumar

74. Roy Shivaji Nath

75. V.K. Singh

76. Ram Krishna Prasad

77. Aliullah

78. Ravi Shankar Prasad

79. P.S. Singh

80. Rajesh Kr.Singh

81. Kinkar Kumar

82. Rajendra Kumar Giri

83. R.S.Pradhan

84. M. K. Dubey

85. Binay Kumar

86. S. P. Tripathi

87. Udit Narayan Singh

88. Sushanta Kr.Das

89. Amit Srivastav

90. Mr.Ajay

91. A. K. Lal

92. Anjani Kumar Mishra

93. Bipin Dutta Pathak

94. Shivaji Singh

95. Manoj Madhav

96. Anant Vijay Singh

97. Sandip Singh

98. Rajesh Kumar Singh

99. Sanjay Pd.(Ac To Aag6)

100. Kaushlendra Kumar

101. Sinha

102. Avinash Kumar

103. Rashid Izhar

104. Shantanu Kumar

105. Ashok Priyadarshi

106. Partha Sarthy (Ga4)

107. Ramashankar Pd

108. Sumitra

109. Umesh Pd. Singh

110. Jitendra Kumar Roy

111. Vishweshwar Nath

112. Mishra

113. Sheela Sharma

114. Arvind Kumar

115. Partha Sarthy (Ga4)

116. K.N.P. Singh

117. Rajendra Kumar

118. Shivendra Kumar Roy

119. Surj Bansh Roy

120. `Ipudaman Pd. Singh

121. N.V.Tiwary

122. Harendra Prasad Singh-

123. 1

124. Ratan Pd. Sinha

125. Jagdish Prasad

126. Subbro Sanyal

127. Binod Bihari Sinha

128. Akash Chaturvedi

129. A.K.Agrawal

130. S.C. Dubey

131. Y.V. Giri,Mr.D.N.Pandey

132. Gautam Bose (Aag8)

133. Amit Srivastava

134. S.D Sanjay

135. Anjani Kumar (Aag10)

136. Ram Chandra Singh

137. Manish Jha

138. Jitendra Kumar Roy

139. Shivendra Kumar Roy

140. Uday Bhan Singh

141. Ajeet Kumar (Ga9)

142. Braj Kishore Pd.

143. Ajit Ranjan Kumar

144. Ajit Ranjan Kumar

145. Anurag Saurav

146. Abhinav Alok

147. Priyajeet Pandey

148. Lakmesh Marvind

149. Alka Panday

150. Shambhu Sharan Singh

151. Kumar Praveen

152. Rajesh Kumar Singh

153. Anuj Kumar

154. Rajiv Kumar Singh

155. Yash Singh

156. Praveen Kumar

157. Suraj Samdarshi

158. Avinash Shekhar

159. Diwanshi Rohatgi

160. Rabindra Kumar

161. Priyadarshi

162. Apurv Harsh

163. Manu Tripurari

164. Sujit Kumar

165. Gyanendra Kumar Singh

166. Navneet Prabhakar

167. Sanjay Kumar Sinha

168. Pankaj Kumar Sinha

169. Shadwal Harsh

170. Gautam Kumar Kejriwal

171. Arun Kumar

172. Raj Vardhan Singh

173. Alok Kumar

174. Kumar Ravish

175. Gautam Kumar Yadav

176. Tafazzul Ahmad

177. Prashant Kumar

178. Nishant Kumar

179. Sanjiv Kumar