Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for two convicts

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Justice Jitendra Kumar sets aside judgement by Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur

In Braj Kishore Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 15-page long judgement dated September 11, 2025 upon hearing the appeal against the impugned judgment dated October 6, 2010 and the order of sentence dated October 7, 2010, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1 in Sessions Trial No. 790 of 2009 in a case from Musahari, Muzaffarpur. The trail court had found the Appellants guilty under Sections 452, 324, 326 and Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs.5,000/- each under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.2,000/- each under Section 452 of the IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The prosecution's case arose out of a case from July 29, 2008 against four persons, including the appellants and co-convict, Ram Sanjeevan Singh. The FIR was lodged on the basis of the fardbeyan of the victim, namely, Meera Devi by Sub-Inspector B.K. Sharma on July 29, 2008 at 9:15 hrs. at Dr. Rajesh Kumar’s Clinic, Muzaffarpur. The prosecution case, as per the fardbeyan, was that on the date of the alleged occurrence i.e on July 27, 2008, only the Informant and her seven years old minor daughter, Nishu Kumari were at her home and the other family members, like her husband and son were away from the village. On July 27, 2008, at 9 O’ clock in the evening, she was sleeping alone and her minor daughter was sleeping on adjoining bed and when she was on the verge of sleeping, all of a sudden she felt the arrival of Brajesh Kishore Sharma like a dream and he was sitting on her chest putting his knees on her. His wife, Vibha Devi, was also standing beside her head and pressing her neck and mouth. Ram Sanjeevan Singh was also standing beside her, carrying a knife in his hand. Shashi Bhushan Sharma was also carrying knife. She started struggling for life (chatpatane lagi). On exhortation of Vibha Devi, Sanjeevan and Shashi Bhushan Sharma, Ram Sanjeevan Singh attacked her with his knife, injuring the left side of her stomach and blood started oozing out. Considering her dead, all the accused persons slowly left her room and fled away. It was the further case of the Informant that after the occurrence, she somehow came out of her house in unconscious condition raising halla and crying chor chor. But nobody came instantly to her rescue. When she was struggling for life at the door, her Gotini, Rangila Sharma, (the wife of her brother-in-law) came at her door after half an hour and helped her. She also informed all the concerned by mobile No. 9470307783. She also claimed that all the accused persons are co-villagers and committed the occurrence on account of previous litigation going on between her husband and the accused Brajesh Kishore Sharma, in the Courts of Ranchi and Muzaffarpur.

During the Trial 12 witnesses were examined on behalf of the Prosecution, namely: (i) P.W.1- Sarita Devi, who is Nanad of the Informant, (ii) P.W.2- Smt. Rangila Sharma, who is the Gotini of the Informant, (iii) P.W.3- Mukesh Kumar, who is a co-villager of the informant, (iv) P.W.4- Kamni Devi, who is the Sister of the Informant, (v) P.W.5- Rishikesh Kumar, who is the son of the Informant, (vi) P.W.6- Arun Kumar Sharma @ Chaitanya Sharma, who is a co-villager of the informant, (vii) P.W.7- Nishu Rani, who is 7 year old daughter of the Informant, (viii) P.W.8-Girish Kumar Sharma, who is the husband of the Informant, (ix) P.W.9- Meera Devi, who is the Informant herself, (x) P.W.10- Dr. Rajesh Kumar, who conducted medico-legal examination of the victim, (xi) P.W.11- Surendra Mandal, who is the second I.O of the case and (xii) P.W.12- Vinay Kumar Sharma, who was the S.H.O. and the first I.O of the case.

The prosecution brought on record the nine documentary evidence: (i) Ext.1- Signature of Girish Kumar Sharma, (P.W.8) as a witness on the fardbeyan, (ii) Ext.2- Signature of Girish Kumar Sharma (P.W.8) on the seizure list, (iii) Ext.2/1- Signature of Girish Kumar Sharma (P.W.8) on the seizure list, (iv) Ext.3-Signature of Meera Devi, Informant (P.W.9) on the seizure list, (v) Ext.4- Injury Report of the victim, (vi) Ext.5- Fardbeyan, (vii) Ext.6- Endorsement and signature of Surendra Mandal (P.W.11) on the fardebayan, (viii) Ext.7 and (ix) Ext.8 are Seizure lists.

After closure of the prosecution evidence, the appellants were examined under Section 313 Cr.PC confronting them with incriminating circumstances which came in the prosecution evidence, so as to afford them opportunity to explain those circumstances. During this examination, they admitted that they had heard the evidence of prosecution witnesses against them. But they did not explain any circumstance, though they claimed that the prosecution evidence is false and they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. The Court noted that no witness was examined on behalf of the accused persons in their defence, nor was any document brought on record in defence.  

The Court found that "after appreciating the evidence on record and considering the submissions of the parties, passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, whereby the appellants and one co-accused were found guilty and sentenced and hence, the present appeal was filed." 

The Court noted that the Appellant No.1,died during Pendency of the appeal. The appellant/Braj Kishore Sharma died but his son, Shashi Bhushan Sharma, who was already co-appellant, continued the appeal on behalf of his father.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentencepassed by Trial Court was not sustainable in the eye of law or on facts. The Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record and erroneously passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that the earliest version of the prosecution case as disclosed by the seven year old Nishu Rani (daughter of the Informant/Victim) was withheld by the prosecution. The Investigating Officers of the case, Vinay Kumar Sharma and Surendra Mandal clearly admitted that after six hours of the occurrence on July 27, 2008, the statement of Nishu Rani, was recorded. Even Nishu Rani admitted in her deposition that her statement was recorded in the night of 27-28, July 2008 and it was also admitted by the I.O., Vinay Kumar Sharma, (P.W.12) that the statement of Nishu Rani was handed over to the next I.O., Surendra Mandal, (P.W.11) at the time of handing over the charge of investigation to him. It is however admitted by the I.O., Surendra Mandal (P.W.-11) that the said statement of Nishu Rani was not on record. He also submitted that the suppression/withholding of the first version of the prosecution case was deliberate on the part of the prosecution for the reason that in the initial version of the prosecution, no accused/Appellants were named in the statement, because they were not aware who assaulted the victim. This ignorance about the names of the real culprits also gets reflected from the attending circumstances. 

As per the prosecution case, after occurrence, when Rangila Sharma (P.W.-2)/Gotini of the Informant, reached the house of the victim, she informed all the family members including the husband and sister of the Informant/Victim about the occurrence. But as per the evidence of such persons, who got information from (P.W.-2) about the occurrence, they were not informed about the names of the culprits. They were simply informed that the victim had got injured and they should come immediately.

The counsel for the Appellants brought to the notice of the High Court that the FIR was not lodged on the basis of the first version of the prosecution case. As per Nishu Rani, her statement was recorded in the night of the occurrence itself. But on the basis of that statement, no FIR was lodged. After two days of the occurrence, when the husband of the victim/informant came to his house, the victim gave her fardebayan to the police in the presence of her husband after consultation and deliberation with her family members and falsely implicated the appellants on account of the previous enmity between the Informant’s family members and the accused persons. It was only Mukesh Kumar (P.W.3), who deposed in his examination-in-chief that when he reached the house of the victim/informant on her crying, he came to know on inquiry from the Informant/Victim that the accused/Appellants had assaulted the Informant. But the I.O., Surendra Mandal, (P.W.-11) clearly deposed in his cross-examination that Mukesh Kumar (P.W.-3) had not stated in his statement under Section 161 Cr.PC that he had enquired from Meera Devi and she had disclosed the names of the appellants as assailants. He also submitted that only the Informant/Meera Devi (P.W.-9) and Nishu Rani (P.W.-7) are eye witnesses and undisputedly other private witnesses were only hearsay witnesses. He further submitted that P.W.-7/Nishu Rani was seven years old at the time of the occurrence and at the time of her examination, she was nine years old. But before her examination as a prosecution witness, her competency test to depose, as required under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, was not conducted. Hence, for want of such competency, the evidence of Nishu Rani has no evidentiary value.

The appellant's counsel submitted that the victim/Informant (P.W.-9) was also not reliable in view of the fact that her fardbeyan was recorded after two days after consultation and deliberation with her husband and other family members and there was strong motive of the Informant to falsely implicate the Appellants on account of admitted previous enmity. He further submitted that some unknown persons, for reasons not known to the Appellants, committed the alleged occurrence, but on account of previous enmity, the Appellants were falsely implicated by the Informant.

The counsel for the State and for the informant defended the impugned judgment and order of sentence. They submitted hat the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the appellants were appropriately sentenced. They also submitted that the case was proved by the Informant and her daughter, Nishu Rani, who were the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The prosecution case was also supported by the seizure lists and the injury report. The counsel for the Informant also submitted that the informant/victim was entitled to get compensation under the Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014, because she was clearly found to be victim in the case, because she had suffered grievous injury on account of the offence committed by the culprits.

Justice Kumar observed: ''From perusal of the evidence on record, I find that altogether twelve prosecution witnesses have been examined and only the Informant (P.W.-9) and her minor daughter, Nishu Rani (P.W.-7) are eye-witnesses and all other private witnesses are hearsay witnesses. Moreover, out the total nine private witnesses, one is the Informant herself and six other witnesses are her close family members including her husband, son, daughter, sister, Nanad and Gotini. Other two private witnesses are co-villagers. I further find that (P.W.-12) was the S.H.O. and the first I.O. of the case. I further find that this witness has deposed that just after six hours of the occurrence, he had recorded the statement of Nishu Rani/the seven years old daughter of the Informant/Victim. Such evidence of P.W.-12 is also supported by the deposition of Nishu Rani herself (P.W.-7), who has clearly deposed that her statement was recorded in the night of the occurrence at 3:00 am. Such evidence is also supported by the second I.O., Surendra Mandal (P.W.-11). But it is also admitted by P.W.-11 that the said statement of Nishu Rani is not on record.
24. As such, I find that the first version of the prosecution case has been withheld by the prosecution. Previous enmity between the Informant and the Appellants is also admitted in the fardbeyan of the Informant herself when the Informant has stated in her fardbeyan that the occurrence had taken place on account of litigation going on between her husband and Braj Kishore Sharma. I also find, as per the evidence on record that P.W.-2 is the first person to reach the place of occurrence on the cry of the Informant/victim and she informed about the occurrence to the husband and sister of the Informant/victim, but the husband, Girish Kumar Sharma (P.W.-8), and sister, Kamini Devi (P.W.-4) has clearly deposed that she was only informed that the Informant was injured by knife. The names of the culprits were not stated to them. Had the Informant or her daughter been knowing the names of the culprits, they must have disclosed them to the husband of the victim and other close family members of the Informant. As such, serious doubt is created in the prosecution case against the Appellants, particularly, in the background of admitted previous enmity between the husband of the Informant and the accused/Appellants and strong motive on the part of the Informant to falsely implicate the appellants. All the Appellants were previously known to the Informant and her family and had they been involved in the alleged occurrence, their names must have been disclosed since the beginning itself, but their names were not immediately disclosed to anybody. In fact, (P.W.-4), the sister of the Informant has clearly deposed in her examination-in-chief that she got information about the occurrence in the next morning of the occurrence that her sister/Informant has been grievously injured by someone by knife. Only one witness, (P.W.-3)/ Mukesh Kumar has deposed that when he reached the house of the Informant, the Informant disclosed to him the name of the Appellants as culprits of the occurrence. But as per the I.O., Surendra Mandal/(P.W.-11), Mukesh Kumar/P.W.-3 had not given such statement to him under Section 161 Cr.PC during investigation."

Justice Kumar concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find that there is serious doubt about the involvement of the accused/Appellants in the occurrence which led to the grevious injury to the informant/victim (Meera Devi). Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the Appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. It would be travesty of justice to uphold the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence against the appellants. 26. Hence, the appeal is allowed setting aside the impugned judgment and order of sentence, acquitting the appellants of all the charges, giving them benefit of doubt. 27. The Appellants are already on bail. Hence, they are discharged from the liability of their bail bonds."

With regard to the compensation to the victim, Justice Kumar observed," 28. Though the appellants have been acquitted of the charge, it is well proved as per the evidence on record that the informant/Meera Devi was grievously injured by a sharp edged weapon during the occurrence. Hence, she is victim of this case
and entitled to get compensation as per Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 as made under Section 357A Cr.PC. 29. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to Sunil Kumar Jha Vs. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine PAT 960, delivered by a Division of this Court of which I was a part, wherein subject of compensation to the victims has been dealt with in great detail adverting to relevant statutory provisions and case laws, holding as follows:-
“105. It clearly emerges from the aforesaid statutory provisions and case laws that the Court conducting a criminal trial is duty bound to pass reasoned order, on the conclusion of the trial, regarding compensation to victims as per Section 357 and Section 357 A Cr.PC, irrespective of conviction, acquittal or discharge. Such order has to be passed by the Trial Court even when the victim has not filed an application for compensation. In such order, the Court is required to give finding whether the alleged offence has been committed or not, and if committed who is victim of the committed offence, and if there is any victim in terms of Section 2 (wa) Cr.PC, whether victim is entitled to compensation under Section 357 and Section
357 A Cr.PC and if yes, how much and from whom.
106. The Appellate and Revisional Court are equally duty bound to pass such order regarding compensation to the victims in their final judgments even if the appeals/revisions have been filed by a party other than the victim, only condition being that appeal or revision or any other proceeding arising out of the crime is pending before the Court.
107. Moreover, victims are entitled to benefits under State Victim Compensation Scheme made under Section 357A Cr.PC even when the concerned offence has been committed prior to the scheme coming into force if the trial, appeal or revision are pending on or after the scheme came into force.
108. In case of conviction of the Accused, compensation payable to the victim may be imposed upon the convict as per his paying capacity either by way of fine or otherwise under Section 357 Cr.PC and if the compensation directed to be paid under Section 357 Cr.PC is not sufficient to rehabilitate the victim, the Court is empowered to recommend the Legal Services Authority to pay the compensation to the victim from the State fund created under Victim Compensation Scheme made under Section 357A Cr.PC. In case of acquittal of the Accused-Appellant, the Court is duty bound to resort to Section 357A Cr.PC to recommend Legal Services Authorities to pay compensation to the victim as per Victim Compensation Scheme of the State as made under Section 357A Cr.PC.”

Justice Kumar concluded: ''I recommend Bihar State Legal Services Authority to pay compensation to the victim/Meera Devi as per Bihar Victim Compensation Scheme, 2014 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order. 31. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary of Bihar State Legal Services Authority, for information and needful.

Supreme Court grants interim bail to a murder accused, against Patna High Court's grant of conditional bail

Supreme Court's bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Augustine George Masih granted interim bail on July 12, 2024 after hearing an appeal against a Patna High Court's order dated April 19, 2024 granting conditional bail in Jitendra Paswan Vs State of Bihar (2024). The order of Justice Dr. Anshuman of the High Court stated that the murder accused be released on bail after six months. The appeal against the High Court's order was filed on June 26, 2024 and registered on July 5, 2024. It was verified on July 6, 2024. 

The High Court's order reads: "let the petitioner Jitendra Paswan in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 7478 of 2024 be released on bail, but after six month from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of ACJM-XIV, Gopalganj in connection with Vijaipur P.S. Case No. 265 of 2021, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with other following conditions:
(i) One of the bailors should be the family member of the petitioners who shall provide an official document to show his bona fide;
(ii) the petitioners shall appear on each and every date before the Trial Court and failure to do so for two consecutive dates without plausible reason will entail cancellation of his bail bonds by the Trial Court itself;
(iii) the petitioners shall appear before the concerned police station every month for one year to mark attendance;
(iv) the petitioners shall in no way try to induce or promise or threaten the witnesses or tamper with the evidence, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds; and
(v) the petitioners shall desist from committing any criminal offence again, failing which the State shall be at liberty to take steps for cancellation of the bail bonds." 

The High Court has recorded the submission of the Jitendra Paswan wherein he has submitted that he is innocent and has committed no offence. As per the FIR, he is only an order giver and there is no specific allegation against him. Moreover, the accusation has been levelled in the background of the land dispute. The petitioner is in custody since 26.09.2023 and is accused in 11 more criminal cases, but in all the cases, he has been granted bail

While granting the interim bail, the Supreme Court observed: "This is extremely strange. Some courts are granting bail for 6 months or 1 year and this is new trend now. It is like that I am granting you bail but I will release you after 6 months.". The next date of hearing is September 2, the State is supposed to file its reply before that.