Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Justice Purnendu Singh affirms judgement of conviction under Section 323 by Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur

In Sukhari Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2026) which was heard along with Mahipat Ram vs, The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 19-page long judgement dated April 30, 026, wherein, he concluded:"25. I find that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the judgment passed by the Apex Court in case of Sivamani (supra) and in view of the aforesaid discussion of factual and legal aspects, it emerges that the alleged occurrence took place in a sudden manner on account of prior enmity between the parties and without any clear premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the accused persons. The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances, and the medical evidence, particularly the testimony of P.W.4 –Dr. Vinod Kumar Kashyap, indicate that although the informant sustained a head injury opined to be grievous in nature, the same has been attributed to a hard and blunt substance and the doctor has also admitted the possibility of such injury being caused by a fall on a hard surface, thereby creating doubt regarding the manner of assault. In the backdrop of inconsistent testimonies of the material witnesses, lack of reliable independent corroboration, and infirmities in investigation, tfhe evidence on record does not conclusively establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Rather, the materials on record, at best, indicate an act of causing hurt by use of a blunt object, and thus,....this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the conviction, if any, can be sustained only for a lesser offence in accordance with law. The learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellants under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly in view of the injury reports showing injuries caused by hard and blunt substance." 

To sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 9 of its judgement in Sivamani vs. State, reported in, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1581,  has held: “ 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.  Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.”

Before delivering the verdict, Justice Singh examined the case to find out whether the impugned judgment warrants interference by this Court on the charge levelled against the accused/appellants under Sections 307/34 and 323 of IPC. 

Justice Sing observed: "....taking an overall view, the Impugned judgment dated 17-01-2012 and order of sentence dated 21-01-2012 passed in S.T. No. 118/13 of 2003/07 (arising out of Durgawati P.S. Case No. 15/2003) is varied only to the extent that the conviction of the appellants stands modified to that under Sections 323 of the IPC. 27. However, so far as, the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellants, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. It is directed that if the appellants have already undergone the modified sentence, they shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellants are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds, if any." 

Section 323 reads:"Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

The appellants preferred the criminal appeals against the judgment dated January 17, 2012 and order of sentence dated January 21, 2012 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2013 which arose out of Durgawati P.S. Case 2003 by1st Additional Sessions Judge, Kaimur at Bhabua, whereby, the trial court convicted the appellants under Section 307/34 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years (for section 307 of IPC) and further these three appellants were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 years (for section 323 of IPC). The appellants assailed the impugned judgment primarily on the ground that the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in its proper perspective and has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants.

Sections 307 reads:"Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

The case of the prosecution, was that on February 12, 2003 at about 21:30 hours, the informant, Chhabilal Ram, was returning to his house from Durgawati Bazaar. When he reached near a well situated close to the house of Khobhari Ram in village Khaminaura, the accused persons, namely Rajendra Ram, Dularchand Ram, Sukhari Ram and Mahipat Ram, allegedly surrounded him and, on account of previous enmity, formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted him. It was also alleged that during the course of the assault, accused Mahipat Ram dealt a lathi blow on the head of the informant, causing injury as a result of which he fell down and raised alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, nearby persons reached the place of occurrence, whereupon the accused persons fled away. Thereafter, the injured was taken for treatment by his nephew, Om Prakash Ram. 

During the trial, the prosecution examined altogether eight witnesses and relied upon documents exhibited during the course of trial. 

Justice Singh observed: "19. It is well settled that an attempt to commit murder must be clearly distinguished from a mere intention to commit the offence or from acts that amount only to preparation for its commission. The law recognizes that the existence of a guilty intention alone is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. There must be something more than planning or arranging the means to commit the crime. Therefore, in order to secure a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution must prove the presence of a definite intention or knowledge to cause death, accompanied by some overt act that directly moves towards the execution of that intention. In other words, the accused must not only possess the intention to commit murder but must also perform an act that clearly demonstrates the commencement of the offence."

The Supreme Court laid down the litmus test for determination of nature of offence in Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the Court needs to decide the pivotal question of existence of intention with care and caution. The following factors needs to be examined:
"(i) nature of the weapon used;
(ii)whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;
(iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight;
(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;
(viii)whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation;
(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner;
(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows."

The Supreme Court grappled with a similar question in the case of Joseph vs. State of Kerala, reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 165. The relevant paragraph reads: “3. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the intention to cause the injury which was found sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of the nature was not established. In support of this submission he relied on the circumstances namely that the whole incident took place because of a trivial incident which resulted in a quarrel and that the weapon used was only a lathi and in the circumstances it cannot be said that the accused intended to cause the death by inflicting that particular injury which objectively was proved by the medical evidence to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In other words he submits that clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC is not attracted in this case. We find considerable force in the submission. The weapon used is not a deadly weapon as rightly contended by the learned counsel. The whole occurrence was a result of a trivial incident and in those circumstances the accused dealt two blows on the head with a lathi, therefore, it cannot be stated that he intended to cause the injury which is sufficient (sic). At the most it can be said that by inflicting such injuries he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to five years' RI.”

In the case of Jugatram vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 520, Supreme Court drew on its judgment in Joseph case. 

Drawing on these judgements, Justice Singh observed: "24. Admittedly, from the prosecution case itself, it transpires that the alleged occurrence arose out of previous enmity between the parties and is stated to have taken place suddenly at night, without any clear evidence of premeditation or prior meeting of minds, the incident having occurred in the course of a sudden confrontation. Further, the prosecution evidence suffers from material infirmities..." 

Justice Purnedu Singh partly affirms judgment of conviction by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in a Sessions Trial

In Luta Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnedu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 14-page long judgment dated April 22, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....The nature of the incident, the surrounding circumstances and the medical evidence indicating only simple injuries do not establish the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death so as to attract the provisions of Section 307 IPC. Rather, the materials on record demonstrate that the act of the appellant falls within the ambit of voluntarily causing hurt by a dangerous weapon. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence in convicting the appellant under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and also keeping in mind that the injury reports of both the injured persons are found to be simple incised injuries, caused by a sharp cutting weapon."

Justice Singh added:" 24. Accordingly, this Court finds that the impugned judgment of conviction dated 30.03.2012 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in Sessions Trial No. 377 of 2007 (arising out of Sono P.S. Case No. 93 of 2006, G.R. No. 1311/2006 dated 05.10.2006, whereby, the appellant has been convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, does not warrant interference so far as the finding of conviction is concerned." 

The judgment reads:....so far as the sentence is concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone by the appellant, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. To that extent, the appeal stands allowed. It is directed that if the appellant has already undergone the modified sentence, he shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in connection with any other case. The appellant is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds, if any. 26. Accordingly, the present appeal stands partly allowed."

The appeal was filed under Section 374(2) and 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated March 30, 2012 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Jamui in a Sessions Trial of 2007 (arising out of Sono P.S. Case of 2006, whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years.

Sections 307 of IPC is as under:-

“ 307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.—[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death].

Section 324 of IPC reads:"Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

In absence of any corroboration of oral evidence of the other prosecution interested and injured witness, whose evidence itself reflects the existence of a land dispute between the parties, suggesting possibility of exaggeration. The medical evidence shows that the injuries are simple in nature, not supporting the allegation of intention to commit murder, moreover, the informant has not been examined, there is no independent witness, and there is unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, all of which cumulatively cast serious doubt on the prosecution version and clearly demonstrate absence of intention to cause death, rendering the charge under Section 307 IPC unsustainable.

Justice Singh relief on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in case of Sivamani (Supra). 

The background of the occurrence was that the calf of the appellant was found grazing the crop of the informant which was objected by the informant and the on account of a trivial issue it escalated into a sudden quarrel between the parties without any premeditation or prior meeting of minds of the appellant.