Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Patna High Court failed to inquire into 42 years of delay in determining basis of compensation for land acquisition by Bihar Govt: Supreme Court

On May 13, 2024, the Supreme Court expressed its disappointment over the approach of the Patna High Court in the case Dharnidhar Mishra Vs. of State Bihar. The Court asked why the Appellant was not compensated for forty-two years after acquiring his land. Supreme Court's division bench of  Justices J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Mishra has sent the case back to the High Court for reconsideration. It was filed on May 4, 2023 and registered on May 13, 2024. Meanwhile, Dharnidhar Mishra is dead.

Supreme Court concluded: "The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. Letters Patent Appeal No 997 of 2019 is restored to its original file. The High Court shall hear both the sides and pass an appropriate order in accordance with what has been observed by this Court in this order. We request the High Court to decide the matter within a period of two months from today." 

The Court allowed the application for substitution to bring on record the legal heirs of the first petitioner. Originally, there were two petitioners in the case, namely,  Dharnidhar Mishra and Sushil Kumar Mishra from Hanuman Nagar, Bharbari, Rosera, Samastipur. The legal hers are:Panchwati Devi, Saroj Devi,  Indira Kumari, Ranjana Devi and  Kanchan Devi. 

The Court observed: "There are many issues arising in this litigation and the High Court should have taken little pains to ask the State why it made the appellant run from pillar to post. It is sad to note that the appellant passed away fighting for his right to receive compensation. Now the legal heirs of the appellant are pursuing this litigation."

 

This appeal arose from a order passed by Patna High Court dated February 7, 2023 by which the Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal by asking the appellant herein to file an appropriate application before the concerned authority for disbursement of the value of the land assessed at Rs 4,68,099.

In the year 1976, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued for the purpose of construction of State Highway as notified by the State of Bihar. The land owned by the appellant herein was included in Section 4 notification referred to above. Sometime in 1977, the land of the appellant was acquired. However, it is the case of the appellant that not a single penny was paid to him towards compensation.

The appellant preferred an appropriate application addressed to the State Government immediately after his land came to be acquired and possession was taken over in the year 1977 for payment of compensation. It is the case of the appellant that State did not even pass any award of compensation and kept the matter in limbo. Years passed by and the appellant kept on requesting the authorities to pass an appropriate award and pay the amount towards compensation.

As the respondents did not pay heed to the say of the appellant, he was left with no other option but to file a writ petition in the High Court of Patna. The writ petition was heard by a Single Judge and by order dated July 19, 2019 rejected the same only on the count that the petition had been filed after a period of forty-two years of the acquisition. While dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge also observed that the appellant had failed to submit any paper or notification in connection with acquisition of his land for the purpose of payment of compensation.

Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting his writ petition, the appellant went in appeal. The appeal came to be disposed of by a Division Bench of the High Court.

Dharnidhar Jha, the senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the State conceded to the fact that the land of the appellant had been acquired and was put to use for the purpose the same was acquired. He would submit that if the State thought fit to acquire the land of his client, then it was obligatory on the part of the State to pass an appropriate award determining the amount towards compensation. He would submit that it is not the case that the appellant herein was lethargic in asserting his rights, but rather kept on requesting the authorities concerned to determine the amount towards compensation and pay the same. 

 

On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. He submitted that it is not in dispute that the land of the appellant was acquired for a public purpose, but at the same time, it was the duty of the appellant to pursue the matter further for the purpose of getting appropriate compensation determined in accordance with law.

Having heard the counsels appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order.

The Court noted that Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court thought fit to reject the writ petition only on the ground of delay and in appeal, the appellate court disposed of the appeal asking the appellant herein to file an application before the concerned authority for disbursement of the amount of compensation. 

 

Supreme Court's order takes notice of two things: First, the High Court in its impugned order has stated that the appellant herein has been informed about the value of the land assessed at Rs 4,68,099. It reads: "We fail to understand on what basis this figure has been arrived at; at what point of time this amount came to be assessed; and the basis for the assessment of such amount. Secondly, the order of the High Court could be said to be a non-speaking order." It records that the counsel appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that "it was an order obtained with the consent of the parties, yet there is nothing to indicate that any consent was given by the appellant herein to pass such an order."

 

Supreme Court's order observes: "The first thing that the High Court should have enquired with the State is as to why in the year 1977 itself, that is the year in which the land came to be acquired, the award for compensation was not passed. The High Court should have enquired why it took forty-two years for the State to determine the figure of Rs 4,68,099. The High Court should also have asked the State the basis of the determination of the amount towards compensation. It is a well settled position of law that after the award towards compensation is passed, if the owner of the land is not satisfied with the quantum, he can even file an appeal for the enhancement of the same. The High Court proceeded on the footing that the amount of Rs 4,68,099 has been assessed and it is now for the appellant to file an appropriate application and get the amount disbursed in his favour. We are not convinced but rather disappointed with the approach of the High Court while disposing of the appeal."

 

The Court underlined that "In 1976, when the land of the appellant came to be acquired the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen ofhis property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300- A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1]

 

The Court drew on its decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627, this Court held that: “6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of“eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

The Court drew on its decision in N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy reported in (2008) 15 SCC 517, this Court held that: “21.If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

The Court recalled that in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court recognised the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and  jurists.”(Emphasis supplied) 

 

In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596, this Court held as follows: “48. … In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 

 

The Court drew on its decision in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension. 

 

The Court observed: "We regret to state that the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not deem fit even to enquire with the State whether just and fair compensation was paid to the appellant or not. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition only on the ground of delay. As held by this court in Vidya Devi v. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569, delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. As held by this Court, it would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice."

 

The Court relied on its decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152. The Court observed that in a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 

 

In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows:“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there area few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” (Emphasis supplied)

 

Prior to this, in Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, the Patna High Court Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had passed a judgement July 19, 2019. It reads: "The petitioners are seeking quashing of an order dated 08.01.2019, passed in Misc. Case No. 02 of 2019 by the Collector, Samastipur, whereby the petitioners’ claim for compensation against acquisition of their land has been rejected. It is the petitioners’ case that the land, in question, was acquired in L.A. Case No. 07 of 1976. After 42 years of the said acquisition, the petitioners appear to have filed their application before the Collector. The Collector has noted that the petitioners did not submit any paper or notification in connection with acquisition of their land for payment of compensation. I do not find any justification on record coming forth to explain the delay of 42 years. This writ application appears to be misconceived and is accordingly dismissed."

A Letters Patent Appeal was filed in this very case. A division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Satyavrat Verma passed a judgement on February 7, 2023. The judgement reads: "In view of the categorical stand of the State that the land of the appellants had been consumed and that the State is ready to compensate the appellants, nothing remains in this appeal to be decided.  The appellants have been informed about the value of the land has been assessed at Rs.4,68,099/-. All that the appellants have to do is to file an application before the concerned authority as to how the amount shall be apportioned between him and his son. It is expected that the decision in that regard by the State authority shall be taken without any delay as already the matter has become five decades old. The appeal stands disposed of."

The penultimate para of the Supreme Court's order reads: "we are of the view that we should set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remit the matter for fresh consideration." The court found both the orders of the High Court to be unjust. 

 

Ensure compliance with Police Manual to deal with missing arms and cartridges: Chief Justice Vinod Chandran

In pursuance of public interest, Rohit Kumar, the petitioner, a practicing advocate sought an audit as well as physical verification of the arms and ammunition as well as records of arsenal and armoury kept with the Bihar Police, including the Bihar Military Police, which are situated at District Headquarters (Police Line) and the Headquarters of Bihar Military Police. 

The petitioner had filed CWJC No.11642 of 2021 in the Patna High Court. The petitioner had prayed for setting up of a Special Team by the Patna High Court to investigate cases registered under Samsatipur and Siwan Mufassil Police Stations in relation to missing of huge cache of ammunition.

The petitioner relied on the report of the Accountant General (Audit) about missing of arms and cartridges from the arsenal of Darbhanga Police Line in February 2019. He had alleged that the police officials themselves are responsible for missing of arms and ammunition, which find their way to the hands of extremists/miscreants/criminals. The Superintendent of Police(E), CID, Bihar, Patna has filed a counter affidavit. It is stated that in pursuance to the order of the Court dated August 2, 2021, details of the progress of the investigation in the referred crimes were called for. 

The order records that with respect to the Samastipur Muffasil Police Station case, 10 persons, who were from the police force itself, were arraigned as accused and on investigation, it was found that 7 of them were involved in the incident. The Investigating Officer has also requested for issuance of arrest warrant against the accused persons. 

With respect to the Siwan Mufassil Police Station case, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against two Sub-Inspectors and a Constable and punishment has been inflicted on them. 

With respect to the Konch Police Station case, 18 police personnel were arraigned as accused and Charge Sheet No. 50 of 2019 dated March 9, 2019 had been submitted in the court against five of them. It was also stated that further investigation is going on against some other named persons also. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga had reported vide Annexure-D that there was no case of missing arms’ cache reported in the District Police Lines.

In the counter affidavit, it was also pointed out from Police Manual (Vol-1) that an annual report of arms, ammunition, equipment and stores, as on 31st March previous year, is to be submitted to the Assistant Inspector General in Police Manual Form No. 169 on the 1st of May by all districts. The certification to be made in the said form is to the effect that the articles are duly accounted for and the balance corrected, with any variation also to be indicated. Strict compliance of the Police Manual Rule is directed through Memo No. 1991 dated 16.08.2021, communicated to all the Range I.G./D.I.G./S.S.Ps and S.Ps. of Bihar. As of now, it is submitted that there is regular compliance of the Police Manual insofar as the certification to be submitted on the close of year. 

Police Manual Rule Nos. 1096, 1097 and 1098 containing detailed procedure for inspection of arms and ammunition, is also specifically referred to. The responsibility to carry out such inspection has been conferred on the Range DIG/IG and the Arms and Ammunition Inspection Team from the Police Headquarters, Patna would also be carried out. As of now, in every district, officers and men from Armory Cadre have been posted to ensure proper upkeep and maintenance of arms and ammunition. Annexure-F is the detailed report submitted by the Dy.S.P. (Armoury), Central Arms Workshop and Stores, Patna for the last five years, which inspection was carried out by the Central Arms Inspection Team. 

A supplementary counter affidavit was filed pursuant to the orders of High Court dated October 5, 2021 regarding the present status of verification of the arms and ammunition and also the investigation in cases. 

In the Samastipur Mufassil Police Station case, departmental proceedings were initiated against many named accused police officials and four have been dismissed from service after they were found guilty in the disciplinary proceedings. 

As far as the Siwan Police Station case, it was found that 35 round cartridges were allotted to a police constable and the same were robbed from him, which has also been written off from the district records. A similar article of theft having been revealed in the investigation, has also been placed on record. One pistol, which was found missing, was also deposited in the armory by the allottee, afterwards. The reports of the Superintendents of Police, Samastipur, Siwan and Gaya are produced as Annexure- A, B and C in the supplementary affidavit.

The Court observed that "We are of the opinion that the department has been cautioned on the subject matter sought to be agitated before this Court in the above writ petition in the nature of Public Interest Litigation. We see that the Police Manual also has sufficient precautionary measures to ensure the proper up keep of the armouries and enable periodic inspection of the same. Sufficient progress has also been made in the cases registered in Samastipur, Siwan and Gaya Police Stations."

The Court did not set up any Special Team to investigate cases registered under Samsatipur and Siwan Mufassil Police Stations in relation to missing of huge cache of ammunition, as per the prayer of the petitioner. The Court concluded that "We are of the opinion that the writ petition can now been disposed of directing the Department and its officials to ensure due compliance of the Police Manual." The bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Madhuresh Prasad decided the case on April 18, 2023. The order was authored by the Chief Justice.