Justice Partha Sarthy disposed writ application against Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019

In Guleshwar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Bihar Land Reforms, Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy passed a 4-page long judgment dated August 4, 2025 disposed the writ application. This judgement was authored by Justice Partha Sarthy.  

The petitioner had filed the application for the following relief(s):
(i) For issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quash the abatement order dated May 28, 2019 and the Respondents authority to declaring ultra virus Bihar Act 6, 2019 by which amendment has been brought in Section 16 sub section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 Amendment Act, 2019.
(ii) For direction to the Respondent Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Jamui to proceed with the proceeding of 4 of 2017-18 and considering the same not affected by amendment of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Amendment Act, 2019.

The case of the petitioner was that a registered sale deed bearing no.187 dated January 8, 2018 was executed with respect to the land in question by Meera Devi, Saroj Mandal and Niranjan Mandal, the respondent nos.7 to 9 respectively in favour of Pramila Devi @ Sabiya Devi, the respondent no.10. The petitioner being a boundary raiyat of the land in question filed an application under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 for a direction to the respondent no.10 to transfer the land in his favour. The case was registered as Ceiling Case No.4 of 2018 in the Court of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Jamui. During pendency of the this application, the Government of Bihar came out with the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 whereby section 16(3) of the Act was repealed. As a result, by order dated May 28, 2019, the D.C.L.R., Jamui was closed the Ceiling Case no.4 of 2018 as having abated. As a consequence, the petitioner filed the application in the High Court for quashing the order of D.C.L.R., to declare the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019 as ultra vires and to direct the D.C.L.R., Jamui to proceed with the Ceiling Case no.4 of 2017-18. 

The petitioner's case was that the validity of the Amendment Act, 2019 along with that of the Amendment Act, 2016 came for consideration and a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudhakar Jha & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [2023 (6) BLJ 397] which upheld the same vide its judgment dated October 13, 2023. The question of validity of the Amendment Act, 2019 was raised in the application having already been upheld in the case of Sudhakar Jha & Ors., nothing remains to be adjudicated and the instant application be also decided in similar terms. 

Justice Parta Sarthy observed: "7. As already directed in the order dated 28.5.2019, it shall be open to the petitioner/pre-emptor to withdraw the amount deposited by him in terms of section 16 of the Act in accordance with law." 

As part of the same Division Bench, Justice Sarthy had passed a similar judgement dated August 21, 2024 in Narendra Kumar @ Sanjeev Kr. Sinha vs. he State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Dept. of Revenue, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024). He also observed: "in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punyadeo Sharma & Ors. vs. Kamla Devi & Ors. [2022 (1) BLJ 434 (SC)] it held that all cases or proceedings which may be pending before any authority or Court including the High Court stood abated and the amount deposited shall be refunded in the manner as provided under section 16(4) of the Act."

Narendra Kumar @ Sanjeev Kr. Sinha, the petitioner had filed the writ application for the following reliefs :-“1. A. A writ in the nature of MANDAMUS or other appropriate writ/s, order/s, Respondents for the following:-i. To hold the provisions of the the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land (Amendment) Act, 2019 repealing sub-section 3 of Section 16 of the Act and adding now Sub-section 4(i)(ii) to be ultra-vires of the Constitution and in alternative to hold the amendment to be prospective in application and the same not to affect concluded orders/proceeding.
ii. To direct the private Respondents to execute Sale Deeds with respect to land bearing Khata No. 179 Plot No. 1221 admeasuring 28 decimal situated at village Mohamadpur gram panchayat Block Asthama P.S.-Asthama, District- Nalanda as covered by the Sale Deeds executed in favour of the Respondent No. 7 and 8 admeasuring 14 decimals situated at village Sherpur, falling within Mohammadpur Gram Panchayat at Asthama Block.
iii. To direct the Respondents to resort to the provisions of compulsory registration by concerned officials who are competent to execute the Sale Deed.
iv. To hold the Petitioner to be entitled to execution of the sale deed.

B. A writ in the nature of CERTIORARI or any other appropriate writ/s, order/s, direction quashing the following:-i. The order dated November 5, 2018 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Biharsharif in Land Celling Case No. 02/1983-84 rejecting the application filed by the Petitioner for execution of the Sale Deed.
ii. The order dated September 3, 2019 issued by the Additional Collector, Nalanda in Land Ceiling Appeal Case No. 04/2018 rejecting the appeal, filed by the Petitioner and terminating entire proceeding in view of the repeal of the provision contained in Section 16(3) of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Lard) Act, 1961.

In this case also Justice Sarthy recalled that the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019, besides other amendments, repealing section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 was the subject matter of challenge in the case of Sudhakar Jha & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [2024 (3) PLJR 403 (DB)] wherein a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the challenge to its constitutional validity. He concluded:"...this case arising out of an application under section 16(3) of the Act stands abated. It shall be open to the petitioner to withdraw the amount deposited by him in terms of section 16 of the Act in accordance with law. 4. The application stands disposed of as having abated."

Justice Madhuresh Prasad's judgement on constitutionality of "retrospective rule" is under challenge in Supreme Court since October 2023

In Abhay Kumar Patel & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) which is being heard along with Uttam Kumar & Ors. vs The State of Bihar & Ors. in the Supreme Court. The former was registered on October 3, 2023 challenging the 31-page long judgement dated by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Madhuresh Prasad and Chakradhari Sharan Singh. The judgment was authored by Justice Prasad. The latter was registered on March 24, 2025. Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed an order dated August 7, 2025 with reference to Uttam Kumar's SLP saying, 'There appears to be no urgency.'  Earlier, April 1, 2025, the Court had issued notice in this case and tagged it with the petition of Abhay Kumar Patel & Ors.

On August 13, 2025, the bench passed an order after the petitions were  called on in the Mentioning List, saying "The matter may not be deleted from the List of 19th August, 2025" before a 3-judge bench of Justices Maheshwari, Joymalya Bagchi and and Bishnoi So far the case has been listed on 15 occasions since October 19, 2023. 

The petitioners had failed to get relief from the High Court. The petitioners were applicants in response to four advertisement Nos. 01 of 2019, 02 of 2019, both dated March 8, 2019, and advertisement Nos. 03 of 2019 and 04 of 2019, both dated September 13, 2019, issued by the BPSC inviting applications for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil, Mechanical and Electrical) in the different departments under the Government of Bihar. They participated in the selection process, which was conducted, as per Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment Rules, 2019 (Recruitment Rules, 2019). It was the petitioners’ case that at the time of advertisement the Rule did not prescribe any relaxation of minimum age criteria; or for grant of any weightage/ preference for previous work experience as contractual employees. The written examinations were conducted by the BPSC on different dates for applicants under the four advertisements. The merit lists dated June 15, 2022, June 22, 2022 and July 19, 2022, were published for all the four advertisements, wherein, the writ petitioners were declared successful. Thereafter, they were called for document verification by the respondent-Commission and the petitioners' document were verified.

The petitioners were compelled to approach the High Court because of the issuance of a notification dated November 9, 2022, by the nodal department (Road Construction Department), whereby and whereunder an Amendment was made in Rule 8 and a new Clause; Rule 8 (5) granting weightage and preference to persons working on contractual basis, was added to the Recruitment Rules, 2019 with effect from the date of coming into force of the Rules; i.e., March 6, 2019. They had assailed the notification dated November November 9, 2022, bearing No. 5565 (S) whereby and whereunder, the Recruitment Rules, 2019 were amended with effect from March 6, 2029, i.e., the date of coming into force of the Recruitment Rules, 2019.  The senior counsel for the petitioners had assailed the validity of the amendment to the Recruitment
Rules, 2019 under impugned notification dated November 9, 2022, submitted that the amendment with retrospective effect was unsustainable.The original Rule or the advertisements, in response to which, the petitioners have applied did not contain any provision for grant of any kind of weightage/preference to those working on contract basis. When the petitioners made their applications, there was no such clause giving any kind of weightage/ preference. They have already participated in the selection process and provisional select lists dated 15.06.2022, 22.06.2022 & 19.07.2022, wherein, the petitioners names figured. After qualifying in the written tests, their documents were also been verified. The impugned notification issued thereafter amounted to changing the Rules of recruitment process after valid rights have been created in the petitioners' favour. Such change in the Rules, after provisional select list, was impermissible.

It was also submitted that the policy, guidelines and procedure contained in resolution dated January 22, 2021 was issued by the General Administration Department, much after issuance of the four advertisements, in response to which, the petitioners applied. Prior to this date, there was no such policy. Even, this policy provided for grant of weightage/ preference during regular employment against only those posts, on which post, the contractual employee had worked. The grant of weightage/preference in regular appointment process, to all contractual employees irrespective of the post on which they have worked on contract basis, as per impugned notification dated November 9, 2022, therefore, was clearly unsustainable. It was pointed out that the persons working on contract basis, form a class unto themselves. The petitioners were not contractual employees, and form a distinct class. Both were, thus, unequals. The impugned notification, therefore, is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as these two distinct classes were treated at par in the matter of recruitment, which was wholly impermissible. The Amendment was also assailed by submitting that Rule- 12 of the Recruitment Rules, 2019 and Appendix- 1, to the Rule regarding allocation of marks was not amended. In its unamended existing form, it contained a method of allocation of marks, which cannot be reconciled with sub-Rule- 2 of the impugned notification, which deals with grant of additional marks in lieu of weightage for work experience. The prescription for grant of marks for preference/ weightage to contractual employees was unworkable. In support of his contention, the senior counsel contended that the Amendment could not be permitted to have retrospective effect has referred to decisions of the Supreme Court in Jayam and Company vs. Assistant Commissioner and Anr. reported in (2016) 16 SCC 125 and Chairman, Railway Boards and Ors. vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623. In support of his submission, he relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Meena and Ors. Versus State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 484 and Moti Ram Deka vs. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, reported in AIR 1964 SC 600. He submitted that the Authorities issued the impugned notification in exercise of power of delegated legislation under the proviso to Article 309 to the Constitution of India, which cannot be invoked to bring about an amendment to the Rule with retrospective effect. The impugned notification, is unsustainable in the eyes of law, and also causing grave prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore it was fit to be quashed. 

The Advocate General submitted that since the State Government was making recruitment on contract basis for some time throughout the establishment, a policy decision was taken to give weightage to all contractual employees during regular recruitment process. This policy was recognizing the services offered by persons working on contractual basis in the State Government, who had been appointed through a legal process. It was not to be extended to illegal appointees, daily wagers or those serving through outsource agent/s. As per the resolution dated July 18, 2007, bearing Memo No. 2401 issued by the General Administration Department only those contractual employees who were appointed against sanctioned post, possessed the requisite qualifications for the post, duly advertised and whose recruitment was made through a selection/ screening committee through proper recruitment process were considered eligible for grant of weightage/preference. It also required the contractual appointment to be by the Competent Authority and after following the principles and roster for reservation. Since the Recruitment Rules, 2019 had overlooked the existing policy, the impugned Amendment notification dated November 9, 2022 was necessitated. It was only rational that the Amendment was made effective from the date of framing of the Rule. 

The Advocate General relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Karunesh Kumar and Ors. (2022 SCC Online SC 1706), the full bench decision of the High Court, in the case of Krishna Pratap Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in 2017 (3) PLJR 642, decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Ors. vs. Mishri Lal and Ors. reported in (2011) 14 SCC 739. He concluded that grant of weightage or age relaxation was only in furtherance of a policy pre existing the issuance of the advertisements in question in the year 2019. The Amendment was not retrospective, rather it has been made effective from the date of coming into force of the recruitment Rules, 2019. The petitioners cannot claim any prejudice, as no right has accrued in their favour in the process of selection. In fact, if the persons, who have rendered services in the State Government on contractual basis after having been appointed in accordance with law, after due advertisement against sanctioned post and by the Competent Authority etc., were to be left out in the process of regular appointment, the same would be opposed to the expected conduct of the State as a model employer. The Court should, therefore, not interfere in the impugned notification. 

Justice Prasad observed that "grant of weightage/ preference under the impugned Amendment notification is in furtherance of a policy of the year 2018, which is pre existing the issuance of advertisements in-question." He also found that no right was accrued in favour of the petitioners in the process of selection. They had merely participated in the process, which process has not attained finality in favour of the petitioners. The policy for grant of weightage/ preference was founded on relevant and genuine consideration recognising services rendered by persons in the  contractual establishment. The policy of weightage/ preference was  made applicable to such contractual employees whose appointments were made in accordance with law, after due advertisement and following the reservation policy and roster etc., by a competent selection committee. If the services rendered by such persons for years in the contractual establishment was to be ignored altogether, the same may possibly be considered as being opposed to the concept of State as a model employer. "The genuineness and bona fides of the policy for granting weightage/ preference, therefore, in the opinion of this Court cannot be doubted in any way. 22. This Court would also observe that the weightage/preference granted under the impugned Amendment notification, while giving advantage to the contractual employees, in proportion to the number of years served in the contractual employment, does not altogether exclude others from the selection process. The weightage/ preference is limited to maximum 25 marks on a scale of 100, based on 5 marks for each year, for maximum of 5 years. Whether such weightage would result in a person being selected over and above another, who has never served in the contractual employment, would still depend upon the marks obtained by the contractual employee, with reference to his performance for the remaining 75 marks out of 100. The policy, therefore, does not exclude the element of competition. The advantage, therefore, has a rational basis, recognising the services rendered by persons working in the contractual establishment who form a separate and distinct class, from the others, who have never served in the Government. This is for the simple reason that they have put in years of service in the contractual employment, which the State is, in the opinion of this Court justified in recognising." 

The Court observed: "Another relevant consideration is that the State would only benefit from the experience and expertise gained by those who have already served for years in the contractual establishment. This expertise is an additional attribute possessed by those working on contractual basis, which the petitioners do not possess. The grant of weightage therefore cannot be said to be discriminatory. 23. The beneficiaries have also entered the contractual establishment after due compliance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as a result of a process of selection with due advertisement, following the principles and roster for reservation and by a competent selection committee after fulfillment of requisite qualifications. The policy for granting weightage/ preference, therefore, in our opinion does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever."

Justice Prasad examined as to whether the Amendment notification can have retrospective effect, or not. The Court considered the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Nagraj & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. reported in 1985 1 SCC 523. He observed that the Court's decision in State of Uttar Pradesh versus Karunesh Kumar and Ors. (2022 SCC Online SC 1706), full bench decision of the High Court, in Krishna Pratap Singh versus State of Bihar reported in 2017 (3) PLJR 642, CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Ors. versus Mishri Lal and Ors. reported in (2011) 14 SCC 739. relied upon by the Advocate General "also support the State action of retrospective insertion of Rule 8 (5) by the Amendment notification." 

He observed that in the light of these pronouncements of the Supreme  Court, "the impugned Amendment notification, can very well be having retrospective operation since power to legislate includes the power to legislate with retrospectivity; as long as it does not take away substantial vested rights, and the retrospective application is explicit from the Rule. The Rules in-question was framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, and in the instant case are also in exercise of legislative powers under the Constitution of India; and not Rule making power under any Statute."  The Court has held "retrospective operation of such Rules, as in the instant case to be permissible." Justice Prasad opined that "The decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court relied upon by the learned Advocate General merits favourable consideration in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 27. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, no doubt contain binding expressions on legal principles, but for the above noted reasons, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case."

Justice Prasad concluded: "32. Thus, in our opinion, submission of the learned Advocate General that Rule 2 of the Amendment notification does not militate against Rule 12 of the Amendment notification, is correct. 33. No case is made out for interfering with the impugned notification dated 09.11.2022, whereby Rule 8 (5) have been added to Recruitment Rules 2019, with effect from the date of coming into force of the said Rules; 06.03.2019. 34. The writ petition is, thus, devoid of merit and the same is accordingly, dismissed."

The petitioners had also relied on the following decisions but to no avail:

    1. I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal Revenue Officer, (1996) 6 SCC 634 

    2. State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77 

    3. Punjab State Coop. Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. v. Coop. Societies, (2022) 4 SCC 363 Patna High Court CWJC No.644 of 2023 dt. 27-08-2024 13/37 

    4. G. Sadasivan Nair v. Cochin University of Science & Technology, (2022) 4 SCC 404 

    5. Dr. Punam Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors. in C.W.J.C. No. 3697 of 2020 dated January 19, 2024

It may be recalled that Supreme Court has held that amendment could not be permitted to have retrospective effect. It has been held in Jayam and Company vs. Assistant Commissioner and Anr. reported in (2016) 16 SCC 125 and Chairman, Railway Boards and Ors. vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623.

In the former, the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of Section 19(10) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. After having analysed the legal principles and the statutory provisions the Supreme Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 19(20) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, held in paragraph 12 as under:-

"12. It is a trite law that whenever concession is given by statute or notification, etc. the conditions thereof are to be strictly complied with in order to avail such concession. Thus, it is not the right of the "dealers" to get the benefit of ITC but it is a concession granted by virtue of Section 19. As a fortiori, conditions specified in Section 10 must be fulfilled. In that hue, we find that Section 10 makes original tax invoice relevant for the purpose of claiming tax. Therefore, under the scheme of the VAT Act, it is not permissible for the dealers to argue that the price as indicated in the tax invoice should not have been taken into consideration but the net purchase price after discount is to be the basis. If we were dealing with any other aspect dehors the issue of ITC as per Section 19 of the VAT Act, possibly the arguments of Mr Bagaria would have assumed some relevance. But, keeping in view the scope of the issue, such a plea is not admissible having regard to the plain language of sections of the VAT Act, read along Patna High Court CWJC No. 9108 of 2021 dt.08-09-2023 with other provisions of the said Act as referred to above."

In the latter, the appeals and special leave petitions were heard against the decision of the Full Bench and those other Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Some of these matters were placed before a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court on March 28,1995 on which date the following order was passed. 

"Two questions arise in the present case, viz., (i) what is the concept of vested or accrued rights so far as the Government servant is concerned and (ii) whether vested or accrued rights can be taken away with retrospective effect by rules made under the proviso to Article 309 or by an Act made under that Article, and which of them and to what extent. We find that the Constitution Bench decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185, B.S. Vadera v. Union of India, [1968] 3 SCR 5741 and State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & Ors., [1983] 2 SCR 287 have been sought to be explained by two three Judges Bench decision in Ex-Capt. K.C. Arora & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1985] 3 SCR 6231 and K. Negaraj & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. & Ors., [1985] 1 SCC 5231 in addition to the two-Judges Bench decision in P.D. Aggarwal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors, [1987] 3 SCC 6221 and K. Naryana & Ors. Etc. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. Etc., [1993] Supp. 1 SCC 441. Prima facie, these explanations go counter to the ratio of the said Constitution Bench decisions. It is not possible for us sitting as three Judges Bench to resolve the said conflict. It has, therefore, become necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We accordingly refer these appeals to a Bench of five learned Judges." It was in this backdrop, that these matters came up before the 5-Judge Constitution Bench of Chief Justice J.S. Verma,  M.M. Punchhi, S.C. Agrawal Dr. A.S. Anand and S.P. Bharucha.  

The Constitution Bench concluded:"The Full Bench of the Tribunal has, in our opinion, rightly taken the view that the amendments that were made in Rule 2544 by the impugned notifications dated december 5, 1988, to the extent the said amendments have been given retrospective effect so as to reduce the maximum limit from 75% to 45% in respect of the period from January 1, 1973 to March 31, 1979 and reduce it to 55% in respect of the period from April 1, 1979, are unreasonable and arbitrary and are violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution...." 

In Mahashottam Jha vs. The State Of Bihar and Ors. (2024), Patna High Court's Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy referred to the judgement of the Constitution Bench in its judgement dated August 22, 2024 with approval. The High Court upheld the vested rights to pension on superannuation. It was heard with four other writ petitions. All the petitions by the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna (L.N Mishra Institute) had challenged the sustainability of the amendment to the rules regulating service conditions brought out by notification dated December 19, 2017. By this notification the benefit of pension as per the Old Pension Scheme, as applicable to the Government employees, which was made applicable to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the L.N Mishra Institute by the Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development  and Social Change Institute Service Condition Rules, 2017 (Rules of 2017) was amended and modified to one under the Provident Fund Scheme. The petitioners, all of whom were the employees of the L.N Mishra Institute prior to September 1, 2005 had claimed that the notification cannot take away their vested rights to pension on superannuation, brought in by the Rules of 2017. The High Court drew on the settled position of law that the rule applicable in matters of determination of pension is that which exists at the time of retirement. The Supreme Court was unable to find any legal basis in the action of the respondent University of selectively allowing the benefit of Rule 25(a). The law, as recognised by this Court in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1971) 2 SCC 330 : AIR 1971 SC 1409 and State of A.P. v. Syed Yousuddin Ahmed, (1997) 7 SCC 24: 1997 SCC (L&S) 1587 unequivocally stated that the pension payable to an employee on retirement shall be determined on the rules existing at the time of retirement. However, the law does not allow the employer to apply the rules differently in relation to persons who are similarly situated.

The High Court observed: '30. The precedents discussed hereinabove lent support to our view that there is a dichotomy insofar as the employees of the L.N Mishra Institute; both the teaching and non-teaching included, insofar as the persons who retired between the date of the original notification bringing in the Rules of 2017 and 23.07.2024, when Rule 9 stood amended by a notification in the Official Gazette. The former would be entitled to pension and the latter will have to challenge the amendment now carried out. The Rules of 2017, with Rule 9 as originally framed would be applicable to all those persons, who retired between the interregnum. 31. Insofar as the persons, who are still serving, Patna High Court CWJC No.644 of 2023 dt. 27-08-2024 30/37 necessarily the amendment made would apply; subject only to any challenge made by them. While declaring the eligibility to pension under the Old Scheme, for all those persons regularly absorbed to the services of the L.N Mishra Institute after its take-over, regularized prior to 01.09.2005, who also retired between the Gazette notification of the Rules of 2017 and 23.07.2024; we leave the serving employees to challenge the amendment made as per the Official Gazette notification issued on 23.07.2024.

 

"no cognizable offence, as alleged, is made out against petitioners", FIRs are quashed/set-aside: Patna High Court

In Broad Son Commodities Private Ltd. through its authorised signatory Santosh Kumar vs The State of Bihar Principal Secretary, Home & Ors. (2025), the petitioner had prayed before the Patna High Court for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing Bihta P. S. Case of 2021 registered on September 17, 2021 for alleged offences under Sections 379 and 411 of the Indian Penal Code and Rule 39 and 56 of the Bihar Mineral (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2019 on the ground that the same is completely illegal and without any authority of law. It sought an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents No.1 not to take any coercive steps against the petitioner. He prayed for holding that no cognizable offence is made out against the petitioners as per the contents of First Information report and therefore the petitioner cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution. 

The petitioner has sought relief in 15 other cases which were clubbed together and heard together. Justice Arun Kumar Jha bench of the High Court clarified that "core allegations as set out through different FIRs are mostly same, therefore, the pleadings made in Cr.W.J.C. No.501 of 2021 pertaining to Bihta P.S. Case No.864 of 2020 registered in the district of Patna is being referred and considered as to discuss the factual aspects of these cases." There were 16 FIRs and writ petitions on similar allegations. 

The other eight respondents were: Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Bihar, Director General of Police, Bihar, Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Officer In Charge, Sahar Police Station, Bhojpur, Principal Secretary, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, Assistant Director, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Bhojpur and Mines Inspector, District Mining Office, Bhojpur.

The background of the case is that a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court had reserved the judgment on September 28, 2022 but, before the pronouncement of judgment, on November 2, 2022, the Court came across its earlier judgment in the case of M/s Broad Son Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 2018(4) PLJR 706 and judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayant and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2021) 2 SCC 670, State of Delhi (NCT) vs. Sanjay reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 which had a bearing upon the adjudication process and, therefore, the counsel for the parties were given opportunity to address the Court in reference to these judgments. On November 4, 2022, the Single Judge reiterated its earlier view, in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Delhi (NCT) vs. Sanjay and Jayant and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, that no fault may be found with lodging of the F.I.Rs. in these cases and investigation into these cases need not be interfered with at this stage. The co-ordinate Bench expressed it’s inability to agree with the views expressed by the another co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar and Anr. (Cr.W.J.C. No. 540 of 2019) and also in Cr.W.J.C. No.1233 of 2021 (Aditya Multicom Private Ltd. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) disposed on April 7, 2022. 

In order to make the diverse opinion of the Court consistent with the law and the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court referred these matters to the Division Bench on the following issues:-
(i) Whether Section 22 of the MMDR Act of 1957 read with Rule 56 of the Rules of 2019 may be interpreted so as to read a bar on lodging of the FIR alleging commission of offences of theft etc. under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code against a licensee in the matter of excavation of sand from the river beds from an area beyond or contrary to the mining plan and in violation of the Environment Clearance, on the face of Clause (v) under sub-rule(7) of Rule 56 and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sanjay's case and Jayant’s case. 

(ii) Whether the alleged thieving sale of sand from the stock license point without issuing pre-paid E-Challan and thereby causing huge revenue loss to the State Exchequer and unlawful gain to the petitioners may be subjected to an investigation by Police by way of a police case registered for the offences under Sections 379, 411, 406 and 420 IPC ?
(iii) Whether the judgments of the learned co-ordinate Benches in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh (supra) and M/s Aditya Multicom Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. no. 1233 of 2021) are per incurium for not noticing the earlier judgment of a Bench of equal strength, hence not laying down a correct statement of law?
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated February 9, 2024 answered the reference in para-26 in the following manner:-
“26. We accordingly, answer the questions referred to us, as under:
(i) In the matter of excavation of sand from the river beds from an area beyond or contrary to the mining plan and in violation of the Environment Clearance, FIR alleging commission of offences as of theft etc. under the provisions of the IPC can be filed against a licensee and bar under section 22 of the MMDR Act, 1957 read with Rule 56 of the Rules of 2019 would not be attracted.
(ii) For the alleged thieving sale of sand from the stock license point without issuing prepaid E-challan and causing huge revenue loss to the State Exchequer and unlawful gain to the petitioners, FIR can be lodged for the offences punishable under sections 379, 411, 406, 420 I.P.C. and it is open for the Investigating Officer to investigate the same.
(iii) The judgments of the learned Single Judge rendered in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Singh (supra) and M/s Aditya Multicom Pvt. Limited vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. no. 1233 of 2021) can be said to be per incurium as the earlier decision rendered in the case of Broad Son Commodities Pvt. Ltd. (supra) rendered by another learned Single Judge was not cited and considered.” 

After the Division Bench answered the reference, the matters were specially assigned to the Single Judge Bench of the Court for hearing.

Justice Jha observed: "Now, the only question which is required to be adjudicated whether in given fact and circumstances FIR’s as lodged against petitioners as discussed aforesaid constitute any prima facie case for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 411, 420 of the IPC and for the violation of rules of Bihar Minerals (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage Rules,2019) as alleged. 

He noted that by order dated February 20, 2025, the Court impleaded Enforcement Directorate as one of the party-respondent, expressing its view that the interest of Enforcement Directorate (ED) must be protected, in view of submission that the ratio of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 929, is only the guiding legal note available to the Court as far as case of PMLA Act is concerned, and, therefore, the Enforcement Directorate must at least be given an opportunity of hearing by impleading as a party-respondent. It was also submitted that the opportunity of hearing shall not in any way prejudice the petitioners, rather any such denial shall prejudice the Enforcement Directorate, which in broader sense appears essential to unveil the truth of the present crime (schedule offences) which is calyx of corruption and as such against the national socio-economic interest, upon which case of PMLA, 2002 against petitioners are founded.

Justice Jha recorded:"Admittedly, much prior to date of lodging of FIRs i.e. 3 to 4 months, the petitioners were ousted from the possession of sand ghats, which was with them under settlement and after taking possession of those sand ghats, possession of same were given to local SHO and concerned Circle Officers/Mining department to keep sand securely. It appears that if there were no covering of tarpolene as
alleged through FIRs or it was not fenced, it was the responsibility of the local SHO and the authorities with whom the sand in issue was in possession because for all such acts, the petitioners cannot be said to be liable once as possession was withdrawn over sand ghats. In such circumstances, non- displaying rate, name of settlee (petitioners) appears very obvious....Hence, with available allegation, it cannot be said that any prima facie offence qua theft appears to be made out against petitioners." The same holds true for allegations of breach of trust under Section 406, possession of stolen property under Section 411, voluntarily assisting in concealing or disposing or making away sand under Section 414 IPC and cheating under Section 420 of IPC. 

He noted:"The dispute also appears convincing civil in nature because for recovery of non-paid royalty amount for extended period, the concerned authority/respondents filed certificate case as mentioned in aforesaid paragraph No. 38 under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914."

In the penultimate paragraph of his 102-page long judgement dated May 16, 2025, Justice Jha observed that the case is squarely covered under the golden guiding principles No. 1, 2, 3, 5 & 7 as available through Bhajan Lal case (supra)". Citing the ratio of the Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal since reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, he concluded: "present FIRs are liable to be quashed/set aside." 

The ratio of Bhajan Lal case (supra) is given in para 102 of the Supreme Court's judgement. It reads: “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision, the High Court quashed/set-aside all consequential proceedings due to 16 FIRs. 

Notably, 100-page long judgement dated May 16, 2025 has been passed by Justice Jha in M/S. Aditya Multicom Pvt. Ltd. , Through Its Authorized Signatory, Pankaj Singh @ Pankaj Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Through Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), wherein he dealt with 19 writ petitions drawing on the ratio of Supreme Court's decision in the Bhajan Lal's case. The other eight respondents were: Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Bihar, Director General of Police, Bihar, Superintendent of Police, Aurangabad, Officer In Charge, Barun Police Station, Aurangabad, Principal Secretary, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, Assistant Director, Mines and Geology Department, Bihar, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Aurangabad and Mines Inspector, District Mining Office, Aurangabad. The text of the judgement by Justice Jha is almost the same as the one given in the case of Broad Son Commodities Private Ltd on the same day.

 

 

High Court reiterates constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019

The constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 2019, besides other amendments, repealing section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 was challenged in the case of Sudhakar Jha & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [2024 (3) PLJR 403 (DB)]. A Division Bench of Patna Court comprising Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy had dismissed the challenge to its constitutional validity. The judgement was delivered October 13, 2023. it was authored by Justice Sarthy. Notably, in this 174 page long judgement 127 pages are names of parties and advocates.  The petitioners has also challenged the orders passed by different authorities including the Additional Collector, the Commissioner of the Division and the Bihar Land Tribunal, all of which arise out of applications for pre-emption filed under section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. The petitioners had claimed that the amendments are against the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. It is . It is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 

The petitioners had claimed that Section 16(3) of the Act has been repealed in an arbitrary manner without assigning any cogent reasons and the amendment is arbitrary, unconstitutional, unreasonable and ultra vires the parent Act. It should not be made applicable with retrospective affect. The amendment effected has not only been done in excess of the power granted under the Constitution; assent of the President; without which it is otiose, has not been taken before its promulgation. The amendment affected was beyond the  competence of the State legislature and on account of repeal of section 45B of the Act, the statutory remedy of appeal/revision as was earlier available has been taken away without providing for any forum for adjudication of the disputes. They prayed that the amendments be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the same be set aside.

The High Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punyadeo Sharma & Ors. vs. Kamla Devi & Ors. [2022 (1) BLJ 434 (SC)] to hold that all cases or proceedings which may be pending before any authority or Court including the High Court stood abated and the amount deposited shall be refunded in the manner as provided under section 16(4) of the Act. 

The Supreme Court in the case of Punyadeo Sharma has held as follows :-
“4. The question examined by the Division Bench of the High Court was whether an application for pre-emption was filed within three months of the registration as required by Section 16(3) of the Act or was it required to be filed within three months of the day of execution of the sale deed i.e. 9.2.1990. However, the said question does not survive for consideration in view of the subsequent development whereby the right of pre-emption itself has been taken away by the Bihar Act No. 6 of 2019 when the Act was amended. The Amending Act reads thus:
………………………………
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and find that the right of pre-emption, after the Amending Act, abates as Sub-section 4(i) is specifically dealing with all pending proceedings before whatsoever forum. Therefore, the right of pre-emption will stand abated on and after 25.2.2019 including the proceedings which were pending before any forum.
………………………………
12. …Any other Court is wide enough to include the Constitutional Courts i.e. the High Court and the Supreme Court. ……………….Thus, keeping in view the object of the Statute, purpose to be achieved and the express language of the Amending Act, all proceedings of pre-emption under the Act pending before any authority under the Act or before any Court shall stand abated.

13. Consequently, the present appeals are allowed. The entire pre-emption proceedings stand abated. It shall be open to the respondents to withdraw 10% of the amount deposited by them in terms of Section 16 of the Act in accordance with law.” 

In Narendra Kumar @ Sanjeev Kr. Sinha vs. The State of Bihar (2024), the High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy has held that the case arising out of an application under section 16(3) of the Act stands abated. It shall be open to the petitioner to withdraw the amount deposited by him in terms of section 16 of the Act in accordance with law. The judgement was delivered August 21, 2024. Justice Sarthy authored the judgement. Y.C. Verma, Senior Advocate represented the petitioner. There were seven respondents besides the State of Bihar. They are: Member Board of Revenue, Patna, the Collector, Nalanda, Biharsharif, the Additional Collector, Nalanda, Biharsharif, the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Nalanda, Biharsharif, the Sub Divisional Officer, Nalanda, Biharsharif, Ramashraya Prasad, Sherpur, Mahamadpur, Asthawan, Nalanda and Krishnaballabh Singh.

Patna High Court failed to inquire into 42 years of delay in determining basis of compensation for land acquisition by Bihar Govt: Supreme Court

On May 13, 2024, the Supreme Court expressed its disappointment over the approach of the Patna High Court in the case Dharnidhar Mishra Vs. of State Bihar. The Court asked why the Appellant was not compensated for forty-two years after acquiring his land. Supreme Court's division bench of  Justices J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Mishra has sent the case back to the High Court for reconsideration. It was filed on May 4, 2023 and registered on May 13, 2024. Meanwhile, Dharnidhar Mishra is dead.

Supreme Court concluded: "The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. Letters Patent Appeal No 997 of 2019 is restored to its original file. The High Court shall hear both the sides and pass an appropriate order in accordance with what has been observed by this Court in this order. We request the High Court to decide the matter within a period of two months from today." 

The Court allowed the application for substitution to bring on record the legal heirs of the first petitioner. Originally, there were two petitioners in the case, namely,  Dharnidhar Mishra and Sushil Kumar Mishra from Hanuman Nagar, Bharbari, Rosera, Samastipur. The legal hers are:Panchwati Devi, Saroj Devi,  Indira Kumari, Ranjana Devi and  Kanchan Devi. 

The Court observed: "There are many issues arising in this litigation and the High Court should have taken little pains to ask the State why it made the appellant run from pillar to post. It is sad to note that the appellant passed away fighting for his right to receive compensation. Now the legal heirs of the appellant are pursuing this litigation."

 

This appeal arose from a order passed by Patna High Court dated February 7, 2023 by which the Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal by asking the appellant herein to file an appropriate application before the concerned authority for disbursement of the value of the land assessed at Rs 4,68,099.

In the year 1976, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued for the purpose of construction of State Highway as notified by the State of Bihar. The land owned by the appellant herein was included in Section 4 notification referred to above. Sometime in 1977, the land of the appellant was acquired. However, it is the case of the appellant that not a single penny was paid to him towards compensation.

The appellant preferred an appropriate application addressed to the State Government immediately after his land came to be acquired and possession was taken over in the year 1977 for payment of compensation. It is the case of the appellant that State did not even pass any award of compensation and kept the matter in limbo. Years passed by and the appellant kept on requesting the authorities to pass an appropriate award and pay the amount towards compensation.

As the respondents did not pay heed to the say of the appellant, he was left with no other option but to file a writ petition in the High Court of Patna. The writ petition was heard by a Single Judge and by order dated July 19, 2019 rejected the same only on the count that the petition had been filed after a period of forty-two years of the acquisition. While dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge also observed that the appellant had failed to submit any paper or notification in connection with acquisition of his land for the purpose of payment of compensation.

Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting his writ petition, the appellant went in appeal. The appeal came to be disposed of by a Division Bench of the High Court.

Dharnidhar Jha, the senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the State conceded to the fact that the land of the appellant had been acquired and was put to use for the purpose the same was acquired. He would submit that if the State thought fit to acquire the land of his client, then it was obligatory on the part of the State to pass an appropriate award determining the amount towards compensation. He would submit that it is not the case that the appellant herein was lethargic in asserting his rights, but rather kept on requesting the authorities concerned to determine the amount towards compensation and pay the same. 

 

On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. He submitted that it is not in dispute that the land of the appellant was acquired for a public purpose, but at the same time, it was the duty of the appellant to pursue the matter further for the purpose of getting appropriate compensation determined in accordance with law.

Having heard the counsels appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order.

The Court noted that Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court thought fit to reject the writ petition only on the ground of delay and in appeal, the appellate court disposed of the appeal asking the appellant herein to file an application before the concerned authority for disbursement of the amount of compensation. 

 

Supreme Court's order takes notice of two things: First, the High Court in its impugned order has stated that the appellant herein has been informed about the value of the land assessed at Rs 4,68,099. It reads: "We fail to understand on what basis this figure has been arrived at; at what point of time this amount came to be assessed; and the basis for the assessment of such amount. Secondly, the order of the High Court could be said to be a non-speaking order." It records that the counsel appearing for the State of Bihar submitted that "it was an order obtained with the consent of the parties, yet there is nothing to indicate that any consent was given by the appellant herein to pass such an order."

 

Supreme Court's order observes: "The first thing that the High Court should have enquired with the State is as to why in the year 1977 itself, that is the year in which the land came to be acquired, the award for compensation was not passed. The High Court should have enquired why it took forty-two years for the State to determine the figure of Rs 4,68,099. The High Court should also have asked the State the basis of the determination of the amount towards compensation. It is a well settled position of law that after the award towards compensation is passed, if the owner of the land is not satisfied with the quantum, he can even file an appeal for the enhancement of the same. The High Court proceeded on the footing that the amount of Rs 4,68,099 has been assessed and it is now for the appellant to file an appropriate application and get the amount disbursed in his favour. We are not convinced but rather disappointed with the approach of the High Court while disposing of the appeal."

 

The Court underlined that "In 1976, when the land of the appellant came to be acquired the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen ofhis property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300- A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1]

 

The Court drew on its decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627, this Court held that: “6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of“eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

The Court drew on its decision in N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy reported in (2008) 15 SCC 517, this Court held that: “21.If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

The Court recalled that in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court recognised the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and  jurists.”(Emphasis supplied) 

 

In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596, this Court held as follows: “48. … In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 

 

The Court drew on its decision in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension. 

 

The Court observed: "We regret to state that the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not deem fit even to enquire with the State whether just and fair compensation was paid to the appellant or not. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition only on the ground of delay. As held by this court in Vidya Devi v. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569, delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. As held by this Court, it would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice."

 

The Court relied on its decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152. The Court observed that in a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 

 

In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353, this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows:“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there area few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” (Emphasis supplied)

 

Prior to this, in Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, the Patna High Court Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had passed a judgement July 19, 2019. It reads: "The petitioners are seeking quashing of an order dated 08.01.2019, passed in Misc. Case No. 02 of 2019 by the Collector, Samastipur, whereby the petitioners’ claim for compensation against acquisition of their land has been rejected. It is the petitioners’ case that the land, in question, was acquired in L.A. Case No. 07 of 1976. After 42 years of the said acquisition, the petitioners appear to have filed their application before the Collector. The Collector has noted that the petitioners did not submit any paper or notification in connection with acquisition of their land for payment of compensation. I do not find any justification on record coming forth to explain the delay of 42 years. This writ application appears to be misconceived and is accordingly dismissed."

A Letters Patent Appeal was filed in this very case. A division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Satyavrat Verma passed a judgement on February 7, 2023. The judgement reads: "In view of the categorical stand of the State that the land of the appellants had been consumed and that the State is ready to compensate the appellants, nothing remains in this appeal to be decided.  The appellants have been informed about the value of the land has been assessed at Rs.4,68,099/-. All that the appellants have to do is to file an application before the concerned authority as to how the amount shall be apportioned between him and his son. It is expected that the decision in that regard by the State authority shall be taken without any delay as already the matter has become five decades old. The appeal stands disposed of."

The penultimate para of the Supreme Court's order reads: "we are of the view that we should set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remit the matter for fresh consideration." The court found both the orders of the High Court to be unjust.