In Kamakhya Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 45-page long judgement dated September 11, 2025 after hearing an appeal against the judgement and order of conviction and sentence passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur at Ara on 2November 27, 1995 in Sessions Trial No. 271 of 1991, whereby and whereunder, the appellants were held guilty and convicted of the charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Sections 149/302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. Both the appellants were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 148 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. It was directed by the Trial Court that substantive sentences of rigorous imprisonment shall run concurrently. This was one of the three judgements delivered on September 13 by the High Court.
The Division Bench of Justices Chaudhary and Dr. Anshuman drew on Supreme Court's decision in Shyamal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 646, wherein, the name of the accused was not stated in the F.I.R. He was not identified in police custody but the Court relied on the statement of PW-8 with regard to the role of the accused, on the basis of his identification in Court.
The Division Bench also relied on Supreme Court's decision in Tika Ram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 760, while rejecting the argument that name of the accused was not mentioned in the F.I.R. held that this would not by itself be sufficient to reject the prosecution case as against the accused. The Court further held that where the prosecution was able to establish its case, such omission by itself would not be sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused.
Justice Chaudhari who authored the judgement observed: "In the instant case, appellant-Kamakhya Singh is not entitled to get benefit of doubt on the same logic laid down by the Apex Court in the above-mentioned decision on the ground that in the F.I.R. his name was not mentioned as the assailant of Jagannath Kahar." He placed reliance on Supreme Court's decision in Paresh Kalyandas Bhavsar Vs. Sadiq Yakubbhai Jamadar & Ors., reported in AIR 1993 SC 1544, wherein, it held that mere interestedness was not a ground to reject the evidence of the eye witnesses, particularly those who were injured. Firstly, their presence during the occurrence cannot be doubted. Secondly, the injured witnesses would be the last persons to leave out the real culprits and implicate others falsely.
He also relied on Supreme Court's decision in Rajju @ Prakash vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 667 because it deemed it almost similar to the incident like the case in hand. He referred to decisions in Gangadhar Behera & Ors. vs. State of Orissa, reported in (2002) 8 SCC 381, Chanakya Dhibar (dead) vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., reported in (2004) 12 SCC 398 and Dani Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2005 SCC (Crl) 127 and in Ramachandran & Ors. vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2011) 9 SCC 257, Taijuddin vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in (2022) 1 SCC 395, Pulen Phukan & Ors. vs. State of Assam, reported in (2023) 13 SCC 41 and Naresh @ Nehru v. State of Haryana, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 134.
The Division Bench judgement reads: "On examination of the lower court records and the case-diary for a limited purpose, we are astonished to note that even the sketch map of the place of occurrence was not drawn by the Investigating Officer. 61. In our view, the investigation of the case was conducted in a very perfunctory manner. At this stage, question that arises for consideration is as to whether a wrong and perfunctory investigation would go in favour of the appellants when the evidence on record sufficiently proves the role of each of the appellants, precisely and without any shadow of doubt. It is needless to say that we are not in a position to discard the evidence of the injured witnesses."
It observed: "77. We have already stated that the appellants would not get any advantage due to perfunctory and lackadaisical investigation of the Investigating Officer. It is obvious that in a village house, source of light is by lantern and naturally lanterns were burning at about 08.00 P.M. on the date of occurrence in the house of the victims. Moreover, the appellants are residents of the same village and they are known to the witness from before. Therefore, no suspicion can be raised over identification of the appellants. 78. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Trial Court rightly convicted and sentenced appellant Kamakhya Singh for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to the imprisonment for life and also to pay fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment to six (6) months. 79. However, for the reasons, recorded hereinabove, we are of the view that the prosecution failed to prove the charge of offence under Section 302/149 of the I.P.C. against the accused Binod Singh on the ground of vicarious liability in prosecution of common object. Specific act alleged against Binod Singh is causing gun shot injury to Baleshwar Prasad on his right hand. 80. Therefore, while setting aside the order of conviction and sentence against appellant Binod Singh under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the I.P.C., this Court holds that appellant Binod Singh is liable to be punished for the offence under Section 307 of the I.P.C."
The Division Bench concluded: "81. Thus, this Court holds that appellant no. 2 Binod Singh be sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to suffer further simple imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the I.P.C. 82. In case of appellant Binod Singh, the period of incarceration which he had undergone during investigation, trial of the case, after passing of the sentence by the Trial Court till the grant of bail to him, shall be set up against the actual period of punishment. 83. The appellants are directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of two weeks from the date of this order, failing which the Trial Court is at liberty to issue warrant of arrest against them."
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