In Anil Rai vs. The State of Bihar Through Home Secretary (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 6-page long order dated September 10, 2025, wherein, it acquitted the appellant of all the charges by setting aside the judgement dated December 14, 2016 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Samarendra Pratap Singh which had confirmed the judgment dated December 1, 2011 and order dated December 2, 2011 by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Bagaha, West ChamparanTrial Court. It allowed the appeal.
The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Trivedi who had concluded:''34. Thus, from evidence as produced by the prosecution suggest that in all, therefore, the incriminating circumstances established by the prosecution form a complete chain of event which does not permit any confusion or doubt with regard to the involvement of appellant in this heinous crime of murder. What makes this offence abhorrent is the fact that not only the murder was committed; the same was designed to be a case of suicide by the appellant thereby trying to mislead the Investigating Officer as well as the prosecution party as well as by such activity abused the process of law. Consequent thereupon, the appeal impugned sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. Appellant is under custody which he will continue till saturation of the sentence so inflicted.'' The Supreme Court has concluded that this conclusion was wrong.
The appellant was the sole accused, who was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the trial Court and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The High Court had upheld the conviction and the sentence. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
The case of the prosecution in a nutshell was that the deceased was upset by the illicit relation of the appellant with his sister-in-law. The appellant was also demanding a sum of Rs.1.50 Lakhs in order to facilitate his appointment under the Siksha Mithra Scheme, which the deceased was unable to provide. In a fit of rage, the appellant throttled her and thereafter set her on fire. PW-3, the brother-in-law of the deceased, was informed by the uncle of the appellant (not examined) that the deceased died due to burn injuries. Thereafter, he informed the same to PW-6, the father of the deceased. Upon reaching the place of occurrence, they found the deceased had died due to burn injuries. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was given. The Supreme Court observed: ''It seems to us that the said criminal complaint was not registered immediately, and subsequently, another one was registered. The appellant was not found present at the place of occurrence. Based upon the materials available, he was accordingly charged and convicted.''
The Court recorded that in total, the prosecution has examined 17 witnesses, while four exhibits have been marked. PWs-1, 7 and 8 were the witnesses, who reached the place of occurrence, upon hearing the uproar of the deceased. PW-1 did not find the door to be locked from the inside. However, PWs-7 and 8 have deposed that when they reached the place of occurrence, the door was locked from the inside, and, thereafter, they broke open the same and tried to rescue the deceased. However, she had died due to burn injuries. PW-16 is the medical officer, who conducted the postmortem. In his report, he stated that the deceased died due to asphyxia, as there were injuries sufficient enough to show that throttling had taken place, followed by post mortem of burn injuries. Both the trial court and the High Court convicted the appellant based upon these facts and materials available on record.
The appellant's counsel had vehemently contended that the conviction, was based on circumstantial evidence, in the absence of an adequate link, and unerringly pointing out to the appellant alone, he cannot be convicted merely based upon surmise. There is no evidence to show that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence. There was a significant contradiction between the evidence given by the ocular witness and the doctor’s medical evidence. As there was no evidence to implicate the appellant, particularly, in view of the evidence of PWs-7 and 8, who clearly deposed that the door was locked from inside, the appellant could not have been convicted. Strangely, in the case at hand, the Investigating Officer was not cross-examined by the appellant. This created a compelling logic for the acquittal of the appellant.
The counsel appearing for the respondent-State submitted that both the Courts had rightly taken into consideration the evidence of PWs-3, 6 and 16. Under those circumstances, the presumption under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, operated, the burden of which had not been discharged by the appellant. Thus, the appeal deserved to be dismissed.
The Supreme Court observed: "To draw the presumption under Section 106 of the Act, the foundational facts will have to be proved. Unfortunately, such facts are lacking in the case at hand. Even the prosecution witnesses, namely, PWs-7 and 8 do not support the case projected by the prosecution. On the contrary, they clearly deposed to the fact that the door was locked from inside. They broke open the door, and thereafter, made an attempt to save the deceased. If that is the case, it can, at best, be a possible case of a suicide, warranting the charge under Section 306 of the IPC. Secondly, the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence has not been proved. We do not know why, many of the witnesses who were present at the place of occurrence, have not chosen either to inform PW-6 or register a criminal complaint with the Police. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer has not been cross-examined. As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, the very genesis of FIR itself is in doubt."
Supreme Court concluded: "8. In our considered view, both the Courts have not taken note of the aforesaid facts, which clearly show that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 9. In such view of the matter, the impugned order confirming the order of the Trial Court stands set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges. 10. The appeal is allowed, accordingly. The appellant is already out on bail. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged."
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