In Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587, Supreme Court has pointed out the difference between “public order” and “law and order”. Referring to various earlier judgments of the Court has distinguished between disturbances relatable to law and order and disturbances caused to public order. At paragraph 37 to 40, the Court has distinguished between the phrases “public order” and “law and order”. Paragraphs 37 to 40 of the judgment reads:“37. We may refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, where the difference between “law and order” and “public order” was lucidly expressed by Hon’ble M. Hidayatullah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in the following words: (SCR pp. 745-46, paras 54-55)“54. … Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. …
55. It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order” also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting “public order”. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State.”
For an act to qualify as a disturbance to public order, the specific activity must have an impact on the broader community or the general public, evoking feelings of fear, panic, or insecurity. Not every case of a general disturbance to public tranquility affects the public order and the question to be asked, as articulated by Hon’ble M. Hidayatullah, C.J. in Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., is this: (SCC p. 100, para 3)
“3. … Does it [the offending act] lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?”
39. In Arun Ghosh case, the petitioning detenu was detained by an order of a District Magistrate since he had been indulging in teasing, harassing and molesting young girls and assaults on individuals of a locality. While holding that the conduct of the petitioning detenu could be reprehensible, it was further held that it (read: the offending act) “does not add up to the situation where it may be said that the community at large was being disturbed or in other words there was a breach of public order or likelihood of a breach of public order. (Arun Ghosh case, SCC p. 101, para 5)”
40. In the process of quashing the impugned order, the Hidayatullah, C.J. while referring to the decision in Ram Manohar Lohia also ruled: (Arun Ghosh case, SCC pp. 99-100, para 3)
“3. … Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality.
Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. … It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. … This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another.”
In Criminal Appeal of 2024 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.12516 of 2024) [Arjun S/o Ratan Gaikwad versus The State of Maharashtra & Others] reported in 2024 INSC 968 (Neutral Citation), the supreme Court on 11th December, 2024, at paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 thereof has reiterated the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to in Ameena Begum (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 15 of the judgment in the case of Arjun (supra) has held as follows: -
“15. As to whether a case would amount to threat to the public order or as to whether it would be such which can be dealt with by the ordinary machinery in exercise of its powers of maintaining law and order would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. For example, if somebody commits a brutal murder within the four corners of a house, it will not be amounting to a threat to the public order. As against this, if a person in a public space where a number of people are present creates a ruckus by his behavior and continues with such activities, in a manner to create a terror in the minds of the public at large, it would amount to a threat to public order. Though, in a given case there may not be even a physical attack.”
In Arjun's case at paragraph 15 has observed that a person has to create ruckus by his behavior and continue with such activities, in a manner to create a terror in the minds of the public at large, then only he is a threat to the public order. In this case, it is missing.
11. The phrase “anti-social element” has been defined under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 at Section 2(d) thereof. Section 2(d) of the Act reads as under: -
“2. Definition.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
2(a) …
2(b) …
2(c) …
2(d) “Anti-social Elements” means a person who-2d(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code: or 2d(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or 2d(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or 2d(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or 2d(v) who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959.”
12. This Court, in the case of Abhimanyu Singh @ Sintu Singh vs. The State of Jharkhand & Others [W.P.(Cr.) No. 868 of 2024] has observed that a person should be habitual in committing offences, which would create negative impact and terror in the mind of the public at large and the society.
13. In this case, we find that the cases, which are pending against the petitioner are – one of 2016 and one of 2023, which are criminal offences in nature. So far as other pending cases, i.e., MGM Police Station Case No.70 of 2021 is concerned, in is in respect of purchase and sell of government land fraudulently. This clearly suggests that the petitioner is not an “anti-social”, as per the definition of the Act, as in his case, he cannot be said to be habitual offender. Further, the petitioner is on bail.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazneen versus State of Telangana and Others reported in (2023) 9 SCC 633 has held that the State is not without remedy in case the detenu is much a menace to the society. The prosecution should seek for the cancellation of bail and/or move to the Higher Court for that purpose. Taking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy. It is necessary to quote paragraph 19 of the said judgment, which reads as under: - “19. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society as is being alleged,
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