In Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar Through Its Pr. Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Rana Vikram Singh delivered a 24-page long judgement dated October 30, 2026, wherein, it considered the question: can High Court interfere with the order granting remand of the accused on the ground of non-service of the written grounds of arrest upon the petitioner’s son at the time of his arrest on June 5, 2026. The Court concluded: "27. Having considered the facts of the present case in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that once the prejudice-oriented test is applied in the present case, this writ application is liable to fail. As has been noticed hereinabove, the petitioner's son was fully aware of the ground of his arrest and it is not one of those cases in which he was taken by surprise and that he was not in possession of any information/materials to oppose the remand. The fact is that his lawyer had appeared through video conferencing and opposed the remand order. 28. In our order dated 15.10.2026 and 28.10.2026, we have noted how this case has progressed and time of this Court has been wasted. We have also taken note of the conduct and manner in which the case has been conducted. At one stage, we were of the considered opinion that this aspect of the matter was required to be discussed and appropriate order is required to be passed but considering that sometimes in legal profession, the lawyers engaged by a party go on making submissions under some excitements without understanding the effect of the same and as we have been informed by learned counsel for the petitioner himself that he was mostly dealing in service matters and perhaps for that reason he could not take an appropriate view at the time of filing of the present writ application, we have decided to drop this aspect of the matter and not to pass any order as regards the conduct etc. 29. Vide order dated 28.10.2026, this Court had imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- upon the petitioner which was required to be deposited within two weeks from the said order. If the receipt showing deposit of cost is not filed in the Registry within two weeks from the said date, steps shall be taken for recovery of the same in accordance with law. 30. This writ application, therefore, fails. It is dismissed accordingly."
The counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2026) 1 SCC 500, Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576 and Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 802. One of the contentions of the counsel was, that even if a non-bailable warrant was issued against the detenue that alone would not serve the purpose unless it was shown that the warrant of arrest was duly read out to the accused at the time of his arrest. In this connection, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2026) 8 SCC 275 (Paragraph ‘38’). The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ application as framed was well maintainable and in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court, the petitioner’s son would deserve his release on bail on the ground of non-furnishing of the written grounds of his arrest.
The Advocate General submitted that the facts of the case would clearly show that the petitioner was well aware of the accusations against him, he was in possession of a copy of the First Information Report in which he was named accused, he was also aware of the issuance of non-bailable warrant and in fact he had filed an application for recall of the warrant of arrest. It was also pointed out that the petitioner’s son had filed an application seeking pre-arrest bail before this Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No.38639 of 2026 which was pending consideration, therefore on the face of these materials, the petitioner cannot be allowed to argue that the grounds of arrest were not known to the petitioner’s son. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702: (2026) 8 SCC 223 and State of Rajasthan vs. Jhabra Ram reported in 2026 INSC 1169, the Advocate General submitted that the ratio of judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of Sri Darshan (supra) and Jhabra Ram (supra) would be applicable in the facts of this case. It was also submitted that the High Court has taken into consideration the various judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue of compliance with the requirement of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, in case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar
Ahmad Wani vs. Union of India through NIA, New Delhi (Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1478 of 2025). In it's judgment dated October 6, 2026, the High Court took note of the judgment in case of Sri Darshan (supra) and only after recording that the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra) was clearly distinguishable from that of Sri Darshan’s case, the High Court allowed the said writ petition. The Advocate General informed that after the charge-sheet was filed and cognizance was taken, the records have been committed to the court of session. It was pointed out the petitioner admits filing of chargesheet dated July 11, 2026, order taking cognizance passed on July 18, 2026 by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khagaria and registration of Sessions Trial No. 508/2026 in the court of District and Sessions Judge, Khagaria.
Justice Prsad observed: "....the legal position which emerges is that the constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is not a mere procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights. The intent and purpose of the constitutional mandate is to prepare the arrested person to defend himself. If the provisions of Article 22(1) are read in a restrictive manner, its
intended purpose of securing personal liberty would not be achieved rather curtailed and put to disuse.”
In the case of Dr. Rajinder Rajan, the Supreme Court held:-“20. It is no longer res integra that supplying the grounds of arrest to the accused in writing before the arrest or, in a given case, under exceptional circumstances, immediately thereafter, is the mandate of the Constitutional guarantees provided under Article 22(1) read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The ratio of the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah conclusively holds that any deviation from the above principle would lead to the arrest of the accused being declared illegal entitling such accused to be released forthwith.”
In the case of Sri Darshan, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of counsel for the respondents-accused that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (now Section 47 of the Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Court held that in absence of demonstrable prejudice such an irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot by itself warrant bail.
The High Court had occasion to take note of the various judgments of the Supreme Court on this issue in the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra). The entire discussions have been summed up in paragraph '36' of the judgment in the case of Sarfaraz @ Muzaffar Ahmad Wani (supra) which we reproduce hereunder for a ready reference:-
"36. The upshots of the aforementioned discussions would lead to conclude this Court as under:-
(i) The constitutional mandate and the statutory mandate as contained under Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of the CrPC leave no room for doubt that it would be necessary for the investigating agency/arresting authority, that a copy of the written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. This has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal versus Union of India reported in
(2024) 7 SCC 576:
(ii) If the arrest memo is simply a proforma
indicating that the grounds of arrest has been
conveyed, it would not be a compliance with
the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) and
Dr. Rajindra Rajan (supra): and
(iii) Templates of the arrest memo containing
the statement to the effect that the arresting
officer explained the grounds of arrest to the
accused before the arrest, is no compliance
with the mandate of Article 22 of the
constitution of India read with section 50 and
50A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Now
Sections 47 and 48 of the BNSS); and
(iv) The judgment in Sri Darshan’s case
(supra) was rendered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court with a clear finding that the
arrest memos and remand orders reflected
that the respondents were aware of the
reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for
bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an
immediate and informed understanding of the
accusations. In such circumstance, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court took a view that no
material has been placed on record to
establish that any prejudice was caused due
to the alleged procedural lapse. In the present
case, the facts are entirely different,
therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sri Darshan’s case
(supra) is to be read as explained in the case
of Ahmed Mansoor (supra) in paragraph ‘8’
of the judgment."
24. We have further noticed that, in it’s recent judgment
in the case of Jhabra Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has taken note of the prejudice-oriented test as has been laid down
in Sri Darshan's (supra) case. We reproduce paragraph '19' of the
judgment in Jhabra Ram as under:-
"19. In evaluating the effect of alleged procedural
defects in communicating grounds of arrest, this
Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan (supra)
definitively established that the governing principle
is the prejudice-oriented test. The Court
categorically observed as follows:
“32.5. While Section 50 CrPC is mandatory, the
consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a
prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged
procedural lapses. The mere absence of written
grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest
illegal, unless it results in demonstrable
prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to
defend.
32.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily
on the alleged procedural lapse as a
determinative factor while overlooking the
gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC
and the existence of a prima facie case. It
noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in
the remand orders about service of memo of
grounds of arrest (SCC OnLine Kar para 45),
the arrest memos were allegedly template-
based and not personalised (SCC OnLine Kar
para 50), and eyewitnesses had not stated that
they were present at the time of arrest or had
signed the memos (SCC OnLine Kar para 48).
Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India
[Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC
576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8
SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573], it
concluded (SCC OnLine Kar paras 43, 49-50)
that from 3-10-2023 onwards, failure to serve
detailed, written, and individualised grounds of
arrest immediately after arrest was a violation
entitling the accused to bail.
32.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and
remand records clearly reflect that the
respondents were aware of the reasons for their
arrest. They were legally represented from the
outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest,
evidencing an immediate and informed
understanding of the accusations. No material
has been placed on record to establish that any
prejudice was caused due to the alleged
procedural lapse. In the absence of
demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is,
at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself,
warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the
High Court treated it as a determinative factor
while overlooking the gravity of the charge
under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a
prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal
[Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC
576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] and Prabir
Purkayastha [Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC
(Cri) 573] is misplaced, as those decisions
turned on materially different facts and
statutory contexts. The approach adopted here
is inconsistent with the settled principle that
procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of
arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto
render custody illegal or entitle the accused to
bail.”
25. This Court further finds that in the case of Jhabra
Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed its
judgment in the case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra). In
this connection, the discussions made in paragraphs '20', '21' and
'22' of the judgment would be significant to take note of :-
"20. In examining the constitutional object underlying
Article 22(1)37 of the Constitution and Section 4738 of the
BNSS, this Court in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (Supra)
reiterated that the requirement of communicating grounds of
arrest is designed to serve a substantive purpose rather than a
mere formalistic routine. The Court observed as follows:
“32. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of
arrest should be communicated to the person arrested has
been very succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar [Vihaan
Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799]. On learning
about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in
a position to make an application before the appropriate
court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas
corpus. Further, the information will enable the arrested
person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his
trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the
Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be
communicated to the person arrested as soon as possible.
33. For the purposes of clause (1) of Article 22, it is not
necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the
offence. However, the information should be sufficient to
enable the arrested person to understand why he has been
arrested. The grounds to be communicated to the arrested
person should be somewhat similar to the charge framed by
the Court for the trial of a case.”
21. Applying these principles to the present facts, the record
clearly reflects that the respondent was fully cognizant of the
grounds for his apprehension and was effectively represented
by counsel at the stage of remand. The substantive mandate
of Article 22(1) thus stands meaningfully fulfilled, with no
demonstrable prejudice having been suffered.
22. As affirmed in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra) and
State of Karnataka (supra), the constitutional framework
requires that the arrestee be informed of the grounds of arrest
but does not insist upon written communication as an
indispensable formality irrespective of the attendant
circumstances. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice or
denial of an opportunity to defend, an alleged procedural
defect in the mode of service cannot ipso facto invalidate
detention or entitle an accused to regular bail, more so in
cases involving grave allegations of espionage affecting
national security and sovereign integrity."
37. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
38. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail.
26. At this stage, we are reminded of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. N.R. Vairamani and Another reported in (2004) 8 SCC 579 (para 9) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions
without discussing as to how the factual situation
fits in with the fact situation of the decision on
which reliance is placed. Observations of courts
are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as
provisions of a statute and that too taken out of
their context. These observations must be read in
the context in which they appear to have been
stated. Judgments of courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases
and provisions of a statute, it may become
necessary for judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant to explain
and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they
do not interpret judgments. They interpret words
of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as
statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton2 (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge,…””
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