Justice Sandeep Kumar quashes order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar

In Mr. S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar    & Anr.(2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 29-page long judgement dated January 21, 2026 wherein, he quashed the order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar. The judgement recorded that despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of Milan Kumar Sudhaka, the opposite party no.2. Justice Kumar concluded:"33. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case No.238 of 2024 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned sanction order dated 28.12.2020 are hereby quashed qua the present petitioner. 34. Accordingly, the present quashing petition is allowed. "

The application was filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the order contained in memo dated December 28, 2020, passed by the Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar whereby sanction for prosecution under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was granted against the petitioner in connection with a Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 registered on May 24, 2014. Subsequently, during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner moved an Interlocutory Application in 2024 seeking amendment in the prayer portion of the petition and assailed the F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 and also the charge-sheet of 2021 filed against the petitioner. 

The Complaint Case of 2014 was filed on April 4, 2014 in the Court of C.J.M., Patna by the complainant namely, Milan Kumar Sudhakar in the capacity of power of attorney holder of his grandmother, Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav, against two accused persons namely S. Kumar, the petitioner and one Sitaram Chaudhary. In the complaint petition, the complainant stated that power of attorney (POA) was executed in the year 2011 and 2013 by the principal one Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav in his favour to look after her property including her family home, i.e., a three storeyed building situated at B/17, Road No. 12, Rajendra Nagar, Patna since the principal along with her family was living in the United Kingdom. It was stated that the principal had acquired the property at Rajendra Nagar, Patna from her husband, namely Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, who had passed away in the year 2008, through a registered deed in her favour, which was executed in presence of the witness namely one Kumar Indradev in the year 1985. Subsequently thep roperty was duly mutated in the name of the principal-Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav. The husband of the principal much prior to his death in the year 1999, had executed a POA in favour of the Kumar Indradev to look after the property situated at Rajendra Nagar. It was also stated that the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and her husband had two sons namely Gurvindar and Surender and one daughter Manjit Kaur.  

Later, it was alleged that on the strength of the POA when the complainant went to deposit the holding tax with the Patna Municipal Corporation, it came to his knowledge that the property at Rajendra Nagar was mutated in the name of one Kumar Gyanendra who was said to be the son of late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, whereas he was actually the son of the aforesaid Kumar Indradeo, who was previously given POA by the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav in his lifetime. Upon learning of this illegal mutation, the complainant filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the Bankipur Circle Office and received a response that the name of Kumar Gyanendra was mutated vide Mutation No. 288/19A/2004-05 in Circle No. 29, Holding No. 687 in the year 2005 itself. It was alleged that the illegal mutation in favour of Kumar Gyanendra was effected asserting falsely that he was the son of Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav however, he was the son of the Kumar Indradev. The complainant accordingly informed the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and thereafter upon instructions of the aforesaid principal, the complainant filed a complaint case No. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Indradeo and his son Kumar Gyanendra, wherein cognizance was taken under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC against the two persons and the complainant also filed an Appeal against the illegal mutation, before the Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation, which was numbered as Appeal No. 17 of 2012. 

The Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation had remanded the matter back to the Executive Officer for fresh consideration holding that the house owner was neither informed nor the succession was minutely examined. The Additional Commissioner also duly noted that the house owner (principal) Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav was shown to have passed away on November 7, 2004 whereas a VISA was issued to her on December 27, 2007. 

The complainant thereafter alleged that the petitioner-the Executive Officer in connivance with other accused persons got a report dated February 16, 2013 from the Revenue Officer wherein the Kumar Gyanendra was falsely and incorrectly shown to be the son of the husband of the principal Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav and they had deliberately ignored the documents adduced by the complainant such as, family certificate issued at Darbhanga proving that Kumar Gyanendra was not the son of the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav. It was alleged in the complaint that subsequently, the petitioner in connivance with other accused persons passed a cryptic order wherein the further proceedings were stayed till the disposal of the Title Suit No. 507 of 2011 to unduly favour Kumar Gyanandra and his faher Kumar Indradeo. It was also alleged that the accused persons in collusion with Kumar Gyanandra and his father Kumar Indradeo also issued holding tax receipts bearing the name of Kumar Gyanandra wherein his parentage was shown incorrectly as Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav instead of his actual father Kumar Indradeo.

The C.J.M, Patna vide order dated April 5, 2014 had forwarded the complaint case under section 156(3) Cr.P.C for investigation to the Kadamkuan Police Station and thereafter the present F.I.R in Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 was registered on May 24, 2014 against two accused persons including the petitioner. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was serving as the Executive Officer at the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna Municipal Corporation and under such authority and in discharge of his duties, he passed the order of stay. He submitted that the petitioner being the Executive Officer had passed the stay order dated June 27, 2013 observing that with regard to the same property situated at Rajendra Nagar a Title Suit of 2011 was also pending and the house, in question, being in possession of Kumar Gyanendra, the revenue court had no jurisdiction to decide the title and therefore, had kept the proceeding of the case pending till the final disposal of the aforesaid Title Suit. He submitted that the core allegation as against the petitioner was that he had passed the aforesaid order dated June 27, 2013 which was cryptic in nature staying the proceedings before him till the disposal of the Title Suit in collusion with the opponents of the complainant for extraneous considerations, however he had emphasised that the order of stay was passed by the petitioner in exercise of his quasi judicial authority and the same can be assailed/appealed before the superior authority in accordance with law, which in fact was done and an appeal had been preferred before the Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation. 

It was the contention of counsel for the  petitioner that merely passing an order for stay, in discharge of his official duties, could not lead to initiation of criminal proceeding on the basis of mere imputations of collusion with the beneficiaries of the mutation which was in fact carried out much prior to the petitioner even joining the post as the Executive Officer in the Circle Officer, Bankipur. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that upon a bare perusal of the complaint petition, it would clearly manifest that the fraud was actually committed by Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo with respect to the property of the principal situated at Rajendra Nagar and the present petitioner was in no way involved in any alleged fraud whatsoever. It was also emphasised that the mutation of the property situated at Rajendra Nagar was effected in the year 2005 itself and the consequent holding tax receipts were issued in the same year in favour of Kumar Gyanendra by the then Executive Officer one R.P Gupta and pertinently the petitioner was not posted in the aforesaid office at the relevant time when the mutation was carried.

It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned sanction order was passed without considering the legal opinion sought by the sanctioning authority. Since the impugned order for sanction was passed de hors the legal opinion wherein unequivocal stand had been taken that the actions of the petitioner cannot be characterized as malafide and that the petitioner never acted beyond his jurisdiction while passing the order of stay, it was therefore submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that no grounds for granting sanction against the petitioner exists in light of the section 197 Cr.P.C. which protects the public servants from vexatious prosecutions and consequently the impugned order of sanction for prosecution is bad in law and cannot be sustained. 

In support of his submissions the counsel drew strength from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695, B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 and Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of sanction was passed in complete violation of the provisions contained in section 2 and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Adverting to its provisions, he submitted that the petitioner acting as a quasi judicial authority was shielded and no civil or criminal proceeding against the petitioner could have been initiated since the actions of the petitioner was clearly within the ambit of bona fide discharge of his official duties. The counsel for the petitioner had also drawn attention of the High Court to section 77 of the Indian Penal Code to argue that the impugned sanction is in the teeth of the aforesaid section 77 of the IPC. He pointed that the complainant on the strength of the POA in his favour had earlier instituted a separate complaint case bearing complaint case no. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo, wherein the Trial Court had already taken cognizance. In the earlier complaint case the petitioner was not arrayed as an accused. It was only subsequently that the complainant had instituted this complaint case against the petitioner being the Executive Officer and the co-accused being the Revenue Officer in the year 2014. He submitted that the present criminal proceedings was initiated only to settle a personal score among the parties who are fighting over the property at Rajendra Nagar and no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Awdesh Sriwastava vs. State of M.P. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 693.

Justice Kumar observed: "The petitioner while discharging his duty as the Executive Officer in the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna had passed the order dated 27.06.2013 staying the proceedings of Mutation case till the conclusion of the Title Suit No.507 of 2011 since the same parties were ventilating their dispute in the aforesaid title suit for the very same property. There is no dispute that the aforesaid order dated 27.06.2013 has been passed by the petitioner in discharge of his official duty upon remand from the appellate authority." He referred to the decisions that have examined the question of applicability of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 to revenue authorities. In this regard, the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Tamboli vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. reported as 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 3651 delved deeply into the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and its applicability to revenue officers.

Justice Kumar observed: "....it is quite vivid from definition of Section 2 of the Act of 1985 that the petitioner was empowered to give definite judgment in revenue proceeding. The petitioner at the relevant point of time was empowered to pass an order of mutation of subject land in the names of purchasers (co-accused) under Sections 178 and 110 of the Code respectively and he would fall within the meaning of person under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 who is empowered by law to give definitive judgment in revenue proceeding. 23. The question for consideration would be, whether the petitioners are entitled for protection under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 ?"

In Union of India vs. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Supreme Court held that even an officer, while discharging judicial or quasi-judicial duties, is amenable to the disciplinary proceedings into his conduct in discharge of the duty.

Justice Kumar underlined that "it is patently clear that the petitioner would fall within the ambit of protections afforded by the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. The protection is obviously not absolute and the State or appropriate authority could proceed against an erring officers in terms of section 3(2) of the aforesaid Act. 31. The order of stay passed by the petitioner which forms the basis for initiating the criminal prosecution is appealable before the appellate authority and any error committed by the petitioner therein could have been rectified by the appellate authority. From the records, it appears that an appeal was preferred agianst the order passed by the petitioner. The present petitioner by his order had stayed the mutation proceedings which was before him on remand from the appellate authority since there was a dispute over the title of the subject property. If the parties to the mutation proceedings were aggrieved by the order of stay passed by the petitioner then they could have availed remedies available under the law to assail the aforesaid order of stay. A bald statement that the order of stay passed by the petitioner being in favour of one of the parties to the mutation proceedings would not suffice to initiate a criminal prosecution against the petitioner. The criminal prosecution launched solely for passing an order of stay by the petitioner while discharging his duties, in the mutation proceedings simpliciter would squarely amount to malafide prosecution. 32. Further, in the present case, the sanction order is totally silent as to the circumstances under which the protection afforded to the petitioner from vexatious prosecution are required to be stripped. Moreover, the impugned sanction order also makes no mention of any material which would warrant initiation of criminal proceeding against the petitioner for staying the mutation case proceeding until the conclusion of the Title Suit which existed for the very same subject property. The substance of why a sanction is required to be passed for criminal proceedings was however entirely missed and skipped by the sanctioning authority, more so, when the petitioner was protected under the ambit of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Therefore the impugned order of sanction suffers from clear non-application of mind and can not be sustained."

Supreme Court reverses judgement by Justice Chandrashekhar Jha in a Arms Act case

In Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu vs. State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh delivered a 46-page long judgment dated November 20, 2025, wherein, it reversed the judgement by Justice Chandrashekhar Jha of Patna High Court. The judgement was authored by Justice Karol. 

The appellant was aggrieved by the refusal of Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court to exercise his inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in terms of judgment and order dated May, 9, 2025 passed in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu vs. State of Bihar (2025), wherein the prayer was made to quash and order taking cognizance dated June 1,2022 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sahasra in connection with Sahasra Sadar P.S. case of 2005 dated April 24, 2005. 

In his 24-page long judgement, Justice Jha had concluded:"....this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order taking cognizance dated 01.06.2022 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa in connection with Saharsa Sadar P.S. Case No. 112 of 2005 against petitioner for the offences under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Section 30 of the Arms Act and, therefore, same does not require interference by this Court. 34. Hence, the present quashing petition stands dismissed as being devoid of any merit, including any pending petition, if any. 35. As this case was lodged in 2003 for which cognizance was taken in the year 2022, whereafter almost no progress in the trial was made in last more than two years, the learned trial court is directed to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within six months of this order after taking this matter on Board, on day-to-day basis."

The appellant had approached the High Court praying for for quashing of cognizance order dated June 1, 2022 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa whereby the Jurisdictional Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 30 of the Arms Act and for quashing the supplementary charge-sheet of 2020 submitted under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Sections 30 of the Arms Act, as the same is based on no fresh materials was found since the filing of the original charge-sheet of 2005 as well as first supplementary charge-sheet of 2006 where the allegation was not found true. He had also prayed for quashing of the sanction order dated April 27, 2022 granted by the State Government under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the prosecution of the petitioner in connection with Saharsa P.S.Case of 2005, as the same was not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court. 

The petitioner did not get any relief from the High Court. Although belated he got relief from the Supreme Court. 

Referring to Justice Jha's judgement, the Supreme Court recorded:"The High Court rejected the application under Section 482, CrPC observing that various illegalities and irregularities pervaded the issuance of licenses by the appellant, in as much as certain persons who were physically unfit, were issued licenses; in some of the applications approved, the bodyguard of the appellant was listed in the “column of care”; in yet others licenses were issued a mere 2 days after calling for the police report, in which time the said report was obviously not furnished."

Unlike Justice Jha, Justice Karol observed:"....why the investigation in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us. Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by the appellant were also issued to a fictitious person even at the time when the order for further investigation was taken. Out of the 16 accused persons one person stood charge-sheeted in terms of the first chargesheet and the remaining, excluding the appellant and one Abhishek, were charge-sheeted by way of the second chargesheet. When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above- 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right van strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close. This is evidenced by the fact that further investigation or rather permission therefore, can be granted even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal Gautam v The State (2016) Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence." 

Justice Karol concluded:"On this count, prosecution against the appellant is liable to be quashed. The conclusion is that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also consequent action, we have decided in favour of the appellant. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

The petitioner's prayer to the effect that his prosecution was not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court stands vindicated. 

The Supreme Court has issued the following directions –

(i) ‘Leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being the position, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the Court must perform.

(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.

The direction above does not come based on this case alone. The Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. The Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a reality.

(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that the process of investigation has many moving parts and is therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of this Judgment, clearly establishes that investigations cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.

(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion. 

Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh takes oath as judge of Patna High Court

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh administers the oath of office to Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh. He was transferred to Patna High Court on October 30, 2025. The President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India had issued an order of transfer on October 14, 2025 from Allahabad High Court to Patna High Court. Some 11 judges from Allahabad High Court accompanied him to witness his oath taking ceremony. The notification dated October 14, 2025 in this regard was issued by Jagannath Srinivasaan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The notification reads:''In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judge, Allahabad High Court, to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.' Justice Singh enrolled as an Advocate on May 9, 1993 in Bar Council, U.P. and practiced in the Allahabad High Court. He was appointed as Additional Judge on November 22,2018 in the Allahabad High Court. He took oath as Permanent Judge on November 20, 2020. He will retire on January 20, 2031.

Justice Singh reached Patna after the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court on October 17, 2025. 

In Dhanajay Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), Justice Singh delivered a 35-page long order dated April 27, 2024, upon hearing the prayer made to stay the operation and effect of the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 of the appellants and to enlarge them on bail during pendency of the criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court, he concluded:''the prayer for stay of operation and effect of judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of appellant No.1 is refused and is hereby rejected. 42. Since prayer for stay of impugned judgment of conviction with regard to appellant No.2 (who is not a political person or government servant) has not been pressed during argument, therefore, his case has not been dealt with in this regard.'' 

Coincidentally, his transfer order has been issued in  the aftermath of his order against Dhananjay Singh. This order's mentioning in the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court underlines its significance. Is it similar to the transfer of Justice (Dr.) S. Muralidhar from Delhi High Court?  

This order was passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application (For Suspension of Sentence) under Section 389 (1) Cr.P.C. The appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellants-Dhananjay Singh and Santosh Vikram Singh against the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-IV/Special Judge, MP/MLA, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 109 of 2020 (State Vs. Dhananjay Singh and another) which arose out of Case Crime No. 142 of 2020, Police Station Line Bazar, District Jaunpur, convicting and sentencing the appellants as under :-
(a) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 364 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment.
(b) Five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence under Section 386 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, three months' additional imprisonment.
(c) One year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, one month's additional imprisonment.
(d) Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, forty five days’ additional imprisonment.
(e) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Justice Singh noted that at present ten cases are still pending against Dhananjay Singh, the appellant No. 1. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584, wherein the Court held that “though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the code, its exercise should be limited to very exception Cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the court has a duty to look at all aspect including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.”

Justice referred to Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, wherein the accused was convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of Prevention of corruption Act. He filed an appeal before the High Court, which has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non-suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service. On appeal, the Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that the High Court had mechanically passed the order by suspending the conviction and the discretion ought not to have been exercise by the High Court by passing such an order suspending the conviction.

He drew on Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan, (2003)12 SCC 432, which had relied on the decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 to reiterate that only in exceptional cases, the Court should exercise the power of stay of conviction.

Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, it was observed: “Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is that requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspect and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.''

He recollected paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ravi Kant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673, wherein the Court held that “it deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case.”

Justice Singh also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 787, wherein the petitioner Sanjay Dutt was charged under various sections of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act. He was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 read with Sections 25(IA) and 25(IB) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, he was granted bail on February 28, 2007. Thereafter, he had filed application under Section 389 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. In the petition, it was mentioned that he belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and that the petitioner is now desirous of contesting election of the House of People from Lucknow Parliament Constituency and in view of Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, he has incurred disqualification from contesting the election for becoming a member of either House of Parliament. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner be suspended to enable him to contest the election. The Court declined his prayer and held that “Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) ) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. xxxxxxx “ In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner, In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. “

In the penultimate paragraph of his order, Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's decision in Shyam Narain Pandey V. State of U.P. (2012) SCC 384. The Court observed: “ In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant , the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed etc and his rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” The appellant Shyam Narain Pandey was a Principal of an institution, who was inter alia, convicted for murder. 

He also referred to Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384, wherein the Court held: “Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.”

Relying on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Singh observed:''40. It is often seen that after conviction of a person who was or is Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament, used to take a general plea for stay of operation and effect of his conviction that he wants to contest election and in case the judgment of his conviction is not stayed, he will be deprived of his right to contest the election which will result in irreparable loss and injury to him, but this Court feels that each and every case has to be decided on its own merit as well as considering all the surrounding circumstances and other attending factors including gravity of offences, nature of previous criminal history etc. No uniform and straight-jacket formula can be laid down for stay of conviction in all the cases. The parameter and legal position for stay of execution of sentence/bail and stay of conviction are different. Now it is the need of hour to have purity in politics, therefore for staying the judgment of conviction, the Courts should exercise its discretionary power sparingly with caution in a rare and appropriate cases. The purpose sought to be achieved by enacting disqualification on conviction for certain offences is to prevent person with criminal background from entering into politics and governance. Persons with criminal background pollute the process of election as they have no reservation from indulging in criminality to win an election. When persons having long criminal history turn into elected representatives and become law maker, they pose a serious threat to the functioning of a democratic system. The very future of our democracy gets imperilled when such offenders masquerade as leaders making a travesty of the entire system. The increasing trend of criminalisation of politics is dangerous and has steadily been eating into the vitals of our democratic polity along with growing corruption of a humongous nature. Considering the facts of this case that the appellant No.1 has secured acquittal in 28 criminal cases due to reasons that witnesses turned hostile as pointed out on behalf of the State, which has not been controverted on behalf of the accused-appellant No.1 and that there is no dispute that at present, 10 criminal cases (as noted in Chart-B) are still pending against him, I do not find any good ground, special reason or exceptional case to stay the operation and effect of impugned judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of the appellant No.1-Dhananjay Singh.'

While at Allahabad High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous bail application, in August 2021, in UP since there was no practice of recording the statement of victim of sexual offenses  by audio video means despite amendment made in the year 2009 in section 161 of CrP.C., Justice Singh issued directions to the state’s director general of police and principal secretary (Home) to issue guidelines to all SSPs on compliance with statutory provisions provided in first and second provisos to CrPC Section 161(3) within two months. He observed  that “in majority of cases”, provisions of CrPC Section 161(3), which make it mandatory for police to have rape or molestation victims’ statements recorded by a woman officer and through audio-video recording, are not being followed. The two provisions under the said CrPC section say that a statement may also be recorded by audio video electronics means and that in cases of rape and molestation, it should be recorded by a woman police officer.

In a criminal appeal he found that the handwritten reports are difficult to be correctly read. Justice Singh' order dated August 30, 2022 directed that all the postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued. During the postmortem examination there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for the purpose. After the order, all the postmodern and injury reports are being typed throughout the state of UP which is not only beneficial to the advocates but also to the general public.

 

Supreme Court sets aside Justice Rajiv Roy's order, restores Criminal Miscellaneous No.10400 of 2017 to file of High Court

In Azimun Khatun (Dead) Through LRS vs The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), in its order dated April 30, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan observed:"This is a very peculiar case. There were two first information reports (FIRs) registered in connection with the same incident. The incident is of 30th March, 2016. The original appellant in the special leave petition was the mother of the deceased. At her instance, FIR No.181 of 2016 was registered on 10th May, 2016 in which the allegation was that the wife of the deceased has killed the deceased. On 1st April, 2016, FIR No.122 of 2016 was registered at the instance of the wife of the deceased wherein she named brother of the deceased and nine others as accused.

Supreme Court's order reads" "After hearing the counsel appearing for the parties, we find that in the peculiar facts of the case, the petition for quashing filed by the private respondents ought to have been heard along with Criminal Appeal (D.B.) Appeal No.246 of 2022. However, the High Court did not exercise that option. Therefore, only course open for us is to set aside the impugned judgment and remit the petition criminal appeal. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order is set aside. Criminal Miscellaneous No.10400 of 2017 is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The restored application shall be heard along with Criminal Appeal (DB) No.246 of 2022. The interim relief earlier granted in the restored petition by the High Court will continue to operate till further orders. The appeal is partly allowed on above terms."

Unlike the Supreme Court, the order Justice Rajiv Roy of the High Court reads: "Having gone through the facts of the case, the two FIRs lodged in the present case as also the submissions put forward by the respective parties and the cases cited by them, this Court is in complete agreement with the submissions put forward by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that once the two FIRs were lodged, in one case (in which the petitioner was the informant), the police investigated the case, charge-sheet submitted, cognizance taken, charges framed, trial initiated which culminated into the conviction of accused-Azmat; in another case, the police submitted final form, the learned C.J.M. Sitamarhi differed, the petitioner knocked the door of this Court and interim protection was granted to her, now that conviction order has already been passed, as stated above, the further proceeding in the present case (Runni Saidpur P.S. Case No. 181 of 2016) lodged by the informant-Azimun Khatun will be an abuse of the process of law. So far as the cases cited by the learned counsel for the informant is concerned, it has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that neither the two cases were clubbed together nor it is a case that the two cases were pending before the same learned Judge in which the learned Court failed to take up the matter one after another as also the fact that the trial in which Azmat was accused already stands concluded. In that backdrop, having dealt with the case on earlier occasion also (22.2.2023), this Court is convinced that the further proceeding in Runni Saidpur P.S. Case No. 181 of 2016, G.R. No. 1369/2016, Tr. No. 1814/2017 cannot continue. Accordingly, the present petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is allowed and the order dated 2.2.2017 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi in Runni Saidpur P.S. Case No. 181 of 2016, G.R. No. 1369/2016, Tr. No. 1814/2017 stands quashed. The case accordingly stands disposed of." This order which has now been set aside was passed March 17, 2023.

In Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 246 of 2022, the High Court's Division Bench of Justices A.M. Badar and Harish Kumar passed the order saying, "The substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant is suspended and he is directed to be released on bail on executing P.R. bond of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) and on furnishing sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Sessions Judge IX, Sitamarhi, in connection with Sessions Trial No. 404/2016 arising out of Runnisaidpur P.S. Case No. 122 of 2016, till the disposal of the instant appeal. During pendency of the appeal, the recovery of fine is stayed."  The order authored by Justice Badar was passed on July 3, 2023. 

The charge-sheet was filed in FIR No.122 of 2016 on 28th July, 2016. In FIR No.181 of 2016, final report was filed on 10th July, 2016 seeking closure. On the basis of the protest petition, an order dated 2nd February, 2017 was passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. 

In the meanwhile, trial proceeded and the persons named in FIR No.122 of 2016 were convicted. An appeal against conviction preferred by them is pending before the Patna High Court as stated by counsel appearing for the appellants (legal representatives of the mother of the deceased). In the meanwhile, the order taking cognizance passed by the Magistrate on 2nd February, 2017 was challenged by the respondent nos.2 to 13. By the impugned order, the High Court quashed the order of Magistrate dated 2nd February, 2017 taking cognizance.

It added: "We make it clear that we have made no adjudication on the merits of the quashing petition filed by the private respondents as well as pending criminal appeal. All issues are left open to be decided by the High Court." The 5-page long order was passed on April 30, 2025.

FIR under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 & provisions of IPC quashed: Justice Sandeep Kumar

Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar quashed F.I.R. registered for the offence under Sections 323, 341, 376, 376-D, 420, 313, 120-B, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under section 67 of the Information Technology Act and all the consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid F.I.R. including the order dated January 6, 2023 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1st, Danapur. The Magistrate had passed the order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for registration of the F.I.R.. 

In his 34-page long judgement in Sanjeev Hans vs. The State of Bihar & Ors (2024). Justice Kumar examined as to whether the offence of rape is made out against the petitioner or not besides non-compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C.

The other respondents were: Director General of Police, Patna, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Rupaspur Police Station, Patna and Gayatri Kumari of Kataiya, Jamhur, Aurangabad.

Gayatri Kumari, the complainant is a practicing advocate in Allahabad High Court. She was practicing in Patna High Court from 2009 to 2015. In the month of February, 2016 while the complainant was staying at the residence of Senior Advocate Gajendra Prasad Yadav situated at Golden Plaza Apartment, Chitkohra for getting her case mentioned, a junior advocate namely, Shiv Nandan Bharti introduced her to Gulab Yadav, who was an M.L.A. It has also been alleged that said Gulab Yadav lured her by saying that he will get make her member of Women Commission and asked her to come to meet him along with her bio-data at his residence situated at Flat No.401, Bindeshwari Apartment. It is alleged that when the Complainant reached the house of said Gulab Yadav, he raped her at gun point and when the complainant was going to register F.I.R. then Gulab Yadav asked his servant Lalit to bring vermilion and put the same on the forehead of the complainant and said that they were married and they will get their marriage registered and asked for some time to get divorce from his first wife. 

She alleged that Gulab Yadav called the complainant to Pune to show the papers of the Court, by which divorce has been granted. On July 8, 2017 when thec complainant reached Hotel Bestil then Gulab Yadav introduced her to Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner and both raped her after mixing some intoxicating substance in her food. When the complainant regained her consciousness, Gulab Yadav showed her the video of her rape and sent the same on her mobile and threatened her to make the video viral. The complainant got scared and started to live in Allahabad and when she missed her periods, she informed Gulab Yadav about the same but Gulab Yadav asked her to take medicine for abortion which she consumed, however, she had to get admitted in hospital due to medical condition. Thereafter, Gulab Yadav got the complainant admitted in Rahul Judicial Classes, Delhi and arranged for her stay in a hostel in Mukherji Nagar, Delhi. 

She also alleged that Gulab Yadav used to call the complainant at different hotels and raped her where Sanjeev Hans, the petitioner also used to accompany Gulab Yadav. It has also been alleged that on February 13, 2018 at Ashoka Hotel, on February 14, 2018 at Park Avenue hotel and on March 27, 2018 at Le’ Meriden hotel, she was gang raped and resultantly she conceived and when she informed the accused about this, the accused persons threatened her. Out of fear, the complainant vacated her hostel and started living in Shalimar Bagh, Delhi where she gave birth to a male child on October 25, 2018 and when she informed this fact to Gulab Yadav, he told that it can not be his child as he has undergone vasectomy and said that the child is of Sanjeev Hans. When the complainant tried to contact Sanjeev Hans, he did not speak with her and since then the complainant is hiding from the accused persons as they are quite influential. It has further been alleged that the complainant went to Rupaspur Police Station for registering the F.I.R., but the Police did not register the F.I.R. by saying that the accused persons are quite influential and then the complainant sent the complaint to Superintendent of Police, Patna on October 28, 2021, however no action was taken in this regard. 

The complaint case was filed by the complainant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Danapur, Patna for lodging the F.I.R. The Magistrate in his order dated November  18, 2021 recorded that the complainant has not produced any document in support of her claim of compliance of Section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, called a report from the concerned Police Station. Despite granting sufficient opportunity, the complainant did not appear for recording her S.A. and resultantly, the Magistrate vide order dated September 20, 2022 dismissed the complaint case under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. Being aggrieved by the same, the complainant approached the High Court by way of filing Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 has disposed of the said petition with certain directions. 

The relevant part of the order dated December 12, 2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 reads as under:-

“Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State, this Court finds that there is no dispute with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this case, police was conducting a preliminary enquiry into the matter and a report was required to be sent to the learned ACJM Court at Danapur. The said report has been submitted or not is not within the knowledge of learned counsel for the State.

Be that as it may, this Court is of the considered opinion that once the matter was pending at the stage of preliminary enquiry and the report had been called for from the police, the learned ACJM should not have acted in haste in taking up the enquiry at his level by treating it as a complaint case.

The Magistrate vide order dated 06.01.2023  allowed the prayer of the petitioner to send the complaint petition under sectionn156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the Police for registration of the F.I.R and accordingly, the present F.I.R. has been lodged. The Investigating Officer of the case has filed an application in the Court of learned A.C.J.M.-1, Danapur for deputing a Magistrate so that blood sample of Gulab Yadav, the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 and the petitioner be collected for DNA test but the Magistrate vide order dated 06.03.2023 has rejected the prayer of the Investigating Officer by holding that he has no jurisdiction to pass an order for DNA test. 

The counsel for Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5 that respondent no.5 is a practicing advocate and Gulab Yadav and present petitioner used to commit rape with her. Since Gulab Yadav has undergone vasectomy, the presumption goes to establish that the petitioner is the biological father of the son of the respondent no.5. Thus, the DNA test of the petitioner and the son of the respondent no.5 is required in order to determine the biological father of the son of Gayatri Kumari, the respondent no.5.

The judgement reads: "This Court can consider the quashing of the F.I.R. for preventing the abuse of the process of the Court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice and in my opinion, it is a fit case for interference in view of glaring facts of the case. This Court finds that it is a malafide prosecution because of some dispute... "

The Court observed:"From reading of the complaint petition, I find that the complainant has not filed any affidavit as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme in the aforesaid case and she has also not filed any document with the complaint petition showing compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, on account of non-compliance of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C., the direction for registration of the F.I.R. vide order dated 06.01.2023 is against the law laid down by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt. The learned Magistrate though recorded non-compliance of the provisions of section 154(3) of the Cr.P.C. on 18.11.2021 but, has proceeded to pass the order dated 06.01.2023 for registration of the F.I.R. Before the learned Magistrate passed an order for registration of the F.I.R., he had passed an order for preliminary enquiry. On 18.11.2021, the learned Magistrate directed for calling for a report from the concerned Police Station through Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna in light of the complaint petition. On 11.05.2022, the Police submitted an application saying that the Police was directed to submit the report after conducting the enquiry outside the State. Thereafter, the case was started as a complaint case and because of the nonappearance of the complainant on a number of days, the complaint was dismissed on 20.09.2022. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2022 passed in Cr.W.J.C. No.1271 of 2022 has set aside the orders dated 12.05.2022 and 20.09.2022 passed by the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, on 06.01.2023, the preliminary enquiry report of the police was opened in the Court, which was submitted in a sealed cover, and after considering the same, the learned Magistrate directed for registration of the F.I.R. 

The moment the enquiry report was opened by the learned Magistrate on 06.01.2023, before directing for registration of the F.I.R., the fact that the complainant/informant claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and she gave birth to a child claiming to be the son of Gulab Yadav was well within the knowledge of the Court as well as the complainant /informant. The complainant / informant while filing the complaint / FIR has not disclosed the true facts i.e. she was treating herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav, whenever she was hospitalized she claimed herself to be the wife of Gulab Yadav and when a boy was born the name of Gulab Yadav was disclosed by the complainant/informant saying that the father of her son is Gulab Yadav. These materials have been collected by the Police during the enquiry and they have been suppressed by the complainant / informant in her complaint/F.I.R.

From reading of the F.I.R., it appears that the complainant / informant has made allegation against two persons i.e. Gulab Yadav and the present petitioner. The date of occurrence mentioned in the complaint/F.I.R. is from February, 2016 to the date of filing of the complaint petition i.e. 16.11.2021. Initially, the allegations are levelled against Gulab Yadav who is said to have committed rape with the complainant/informant. The name of the petitioner is mentioned for an occurrence which is said to have taken place on 08.07.2017 at a Hotel in Pune alleging that the complainant was sexually assaulted by both the accused persons and Gulab Yadav made a video of the same and thereafter threatened her of making the video viral. Further allegations levelled in the complaint/F.I.R. primarily against Gulab Yadav and the complainant/informant has mentioned the name of the petitioner as an accomplice of Gulab Yadav and has alleged that he also used to commit rape with her. The complainant/informant is admittedly a lawyer practicing since 2009 and the complaint has been filed after about five years of the alleged incident of rape.

The complainant has waited for five years to file the complaint and there is no satisfactory explanation for the delayed filing of the complaint petition.

The petitioner herself is a grown-up woman, who is practicing Law and as per her own statement she was in a relationship with Gulab Yadav.